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TRANSITIONS AND TRAJECTORIES OF CIVILIAN-TO-CIVILIAN ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

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Abstract

Elections are deemed to be at the epicenter of democracy and free and fair elections are viewed as integral to the success of the democratic consolidation of a nation. Hence, elections signify an important yardstick for measuring the direction towards democratic consolidation even though it does not constitute the entire gamut of democratic processes. The problematic of this paper is that the greatest challenge to Nigeria's democratic consolidation is the inability of civil rule to conduct elections according to the rule of the game devoid of electoral malpractices. The objectives of this paper are: i. to demonstrate the trajectories of civilian-civilian elections in Nigeria; ii. To demonstrate how Transition elections in Nigeria have been more creditably better and less of electoral malpractices; iii. To ascertain how Civilian-Civilian elections in Nigeria have constitute an albatross to Nigeria's democratic consolidation. The paper is situated within the theoretical prism of Marxist theory of the state. The paper adopts an explanatory design for analysis and relied on some empirical data generated through observation and official documents and essentially on secondary sources of data which were analyzed using a descriptive method of analysis. The findings of this paper show that even though civilian-civilian elections have potentials for democratic consolidation, it is shrouded in electoral malpractices and fraud. The paper therefore recommends that there is need for total implementation of electoral reforms, technological improvements that will make the electoral process more transparent and acceptable, building of strong institutions which are required to sustain moral rebirth, re-orientation, and value re-orientation towards politics. Theoretically, we must transcend minimalist procedural perspective to maximalist perspective to elections which is capable of improving the welfare of the people who are the subject and object of democracy.

Key Words: Election, Electoral Malpractices Transition Election, Civilian to Civilian Elections, Democratic Consolidation

Introduction

After over 100 years of Nigeria's existence as a nation following the 1914 historic amalgamation and nearly Fifty-nine (59) years of political independence as a nation-state and 20 years of uninterrupted civil rule, the journey from independence to date can be described like a long roller-coaster of anticipation, disillusionment, skepticism, hope and disappointment. The tidal wave of democratization which started in the 1980s and 1990s, has rendered other forms of governments such as communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, militarism and aristocracy obsolete with democracy seeming to have won as most hitherto authoritarian regimes have embraced democracy. By May 29, 2019, Nigeria broke the jinx of democratic breakdown witnessed following six years of the First Republic, four years of Second Republic and Third Republic that was truncated following the annulment of June 12 Presidential Election claimed to have been won by late Chief M.K.O. Abiola. Interestingly, Nigeria's Fourth Republic have survived 20 years and even offered the world the positive democratic achievement from long years of military authoritarian alternation of power between the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the opposition party, All People's Congress (APC).

The recently concluded 2019 General Elections is remarkable because by May 29, 2019, Nigeria's democratic governance has survived and thrived 20 years of unbroken and uninterrupted system for a record which has never been achieved since Nigeria's political independence in 1960. In addition to these years, Nigeria's democracy had managed to transit from one democratically elected government to another. We have also witnessed transition and defeat of an incumbent government by opposition party as witnessed in the 2015 Presidential Election that saw the emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari as the President and the then incumbent, President Goodluck Jonathan conceding defeat even before the final result was announced. The reason for all these illustrations is because, the point of transition always became the point of rupture where democracy buckled down but we have survived it. However, after two decades of uninterrupted civil rule, it has become apparent that consolidating democracy is often a task as difficult as establishing it as a result of the credibility and legitimacy of

elections. With transition from authoritarianism increasingly becoming out of fashion, it is expedient for us to confront the challenge of how really democratic is the post transition political institutions so as to avoid authoritarian reversal or whether they have proven to be stable enough for democracy to be consolidated. This paper therefore examines how the trajectories of civilian-to-civilian elections constitute a challenge to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

Theoretical frame of Analysis: Marxian Theory of the state

The Marxian Theory of the state has heightened awareness of the importance of studying the state as the key to understanding socio-economic formations, particularly their configuration of social forces and the possibilities of their transformation (Ake, 2003, p.55). It sees the state and its apparatuses as instruments in the hand of the ruling class. The motivating force behind politics in Africa is the overwhelming power of the state, together with the possibility of its use for domination, oppression and exploitation. Outside of the state the application of the concept of politics can only be metaphorical. Nnoli (2003, p.5) has noted that, “this power which alone includes that over life and death within state borders can threaten life, wealth, freedom and self-realization. Therefore, it gives concreteness and intensity to struggles associated with it”.

Ake (2003) sees state as the specific modality of class domination, one in which class domination is mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society and appears as an objective force standing alongside society. The state form of domination is the modality in which the system of mechanisms of class domination is autonomized-that is, the institutional apparatus of class domination is largely independent of social classes, including the hegemonic social classes (2003, p.56). The Hobbesian character of political struggles; in the absence of autonomizing mechanisms in the post-colonial state, made the resources of physical coercion become the tools of particular groups, especially the hegemonic factions of the ruling class, and the affinity between the coercive institutions and these hegemonic fractions has inevitably become particularly visible (2003, pp.60-61). The implication of this is because high premium is placed on political power, the struggle for power then is everything and is pursued by every means because power is everything and those who control the coercive resources, use it freely to promote their interests. Hence, the neo-

colonial capitalist character of the Nigerian state due to the central role of the state in wealth acquisition as well as its origin and non consolidatedness, made the contest for state power assumes a life of its own leading to fractionalization of the dominant class because of the high premium placed on the state as a zero-sum affair. We cannot appreciate the relevance of this theory in this discourse until we identify the nature of electoral malpractices and the actors involved in electoral malpractices during transitions and civilian to civilian elections. There are basically three major dimensions of electoral malpractices.

- A. Electoral malpractices pertaining to infringement of electoral laws. These infringements include the use of quasi-military organizations, voting by unregistered person(s), under age or juvenile voting, registration offences, impersonation in polling stations, offences in respect of ballot papers, misconduct at polling stations, etc.
- B. Electoral malpractices pertaining to improper and unethical infringements. Examples of these malpractices includes unlawful possession of electoral materials such as voters' cards, ballot papers and ballot boxes, assaulting election officials, campaigning on election day; bribery, impersonation, arrest of opposition members by law enforcement agents, multiple voting, forgery of election results, etc.
- C. Electoral malpractices pertaining to improper conduct or arrangements by electoral management body (INEC). These include electoral malpractices by INEC officials such as unlawful possession of ballot papers and boxes, unlawful possession of authorized and unauthorized voters' cards; stealing ballot box keys, stuffing of ballot boxes and vote buying (vote buying refers to economic transaction of selling votes between an electorate and politicians or their representatives before and during elections.

The consequences of electoral malpractices was aptly described by Claude Ake (2000)'s observation that under the ongoing democratic transition in Africa, people were voting without choosing. This was corroborated by Mkandawire's characterization of African countries undergoing democratic transition as choiceless democracies. The Actors /Institutions that supports or engage in Electoral Malpractices are as follows:

- i. Government in power and state apparatuses - INEC officials and its Ad hoc staff and security agents.

- ii. Political parties and their members
- iii. Unpatriotic individual and groups.

Incumbent government in its desperation to retain power employs every means available and at its disposal to manipulate the process and rules to its advantage. Here, state apparatus such as police, judiciary and the intelligence agencies which are controlled by government and political parties are often used to commit electoral malpractices.

Elections and Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation is procedurally conceived as the process through which democratic norms (democratic rules of the games) become accepted by all powerful groups in society, including labour, business rural landlords, the church and the military and no important political actor contemplates a return to dictatorship (Handelman, 2006:25). It is within this context that Larry Diamond sees election as the litmus test for democratization especially with the ascendancy of liberal democracy which has reduced democratization to election and multipartism. Democracy is thus explained in terms of essential procedures governing the elections and behaviour of government officials.

It is therefore inconceivable to contemplate democracy outside the context of election as election is seen as an important part of democratization. Election as a symbol of democracy is the vital aspect of modern representative government. To this end, Nnoli (1990, p.4) assert that election is so closely tied to the growth and development of democratic political order that is now generally held to be the single most important indicator of the presence or absence of democratic government. Election, also appears to be the only mechanism by which a democratic government can be realized and entrenched particularly in modern era (Nnadozie, 2005). Election, therefore signifies an important yardstick for locating the direction of democracy towards democratic consolidation.

Existing literature on democratic consolidation has therefore dealt too much on the procedural conditions to democratic consolidation. Hence, democratic scholars such as Diamond, Lenz, Huntington, Guillermo O' Donnell, have used different definitions of democratic consolidation based on two conceptions. On the one hand is the minimalist conception whose emphasis is on the procedure, process and formal democracy. The emphasis of the minimalists is exclusively on elections. It simply sees democracy as a

political system that holds relatively free, fair, contested election with near universal adult suffrage on a regular basis. The maximalists on the other hand, are of the view that Procedural conception of democracy no matter how exacting is incomplete. Instead, they insist, real democracy requires not only fair elections and proper government procedures but also fair and just government outcomes, comprising issues of substantive and distributive democracy which include eradicating poverty. Hence, the maximalists focus on the outcomes of politics such as institutionalization of political institutions, social justice, and economic equality. The maximalist conception is however, dependent on the quality of representation through election.

Even though election signifies an important yardstick for measuring the direction towards democratic consolidation, it does not constitute the entire gamut of democratic processes. However, democratic scholars have assumed that only elections that are credible, free and fair, and reflective of true will of the people would contribute to democratic consolidation.

Etymologically, the word Election is derived from Latin verb ELEGERE-meaning to pick or to choose. Conceptually, the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1972:1) defines election in its most incisive form as “a form of procedure, recognized by the rules of an organization, whereby all or some of the members of the organization choose a smaller number of persons or one person to hold office or authority in the organization. The Encyclopedia Americana Volume 10 (1996) defines election as a procedure for choosing officers or making binding decisions concerning policy by the vote of those formally qualified to participate. Meanwhile, what appears to be more encompassing is the one provided by (Bain, 1964). He conceived elections as the formal process by which the electorates select officials and determines the issues submitted to it. It is therefore *a procedure* for choosing officers or making binding decisions concerning policy by the vote of *those formally qualified to participate* (Bain, 1964, p.162). The fact that there are procedure and those qualified to participate means there are rules that governs the procedure and defines who is qualified to participate.

The implication of these definitions is that election confer legitimacy on public office holders and subject public office holders and political parties to periodic assessment of four (4) years; by so doing, it enhances accountability and good governance. Therein lies the traditional role of electoral system in just, fair and providing a level playing ground for all political actors. Electoral system here refers to the institutionalized process of

determining popular choice in direct and popular representation in indirect and representative democracies. The perversion of the above leads to electoral malpractices and fraud that is popularly described as lack of free and fair election.

Transition and Trajectories of Civilian-to-Civilian Elections, Electoral Malpractices and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria

The credibility of elections has had a turbulent history in Africa. Beginning with founding elections, electoral discrepancies and fraud have been prevalent. The notion of free and fair has gained significant importance as the validity of elections in Africa has come to rest on the free and fair criterion.

The term free and fair however, has become a catchphrase amongst many of those involved in the election monitoring and democracy development fields. The phrase is often interpreted loosely and is rarely clearly defined. Despite the recognition of the term, it is often differing interpretations, it remains a commonly used standard. Elections have become one of the defining institutions of modern democracy. Free and fair elections have become an increasingly critical requirement for governments to gain international legitimacy.

Rarely is it clearly defined. Critics of the phrase free and fair suggest that it has come to be used in a purely subjective manner. The lack of a clear and concrete definition allows for an open interpretation of basic democratic values and distorts the line between what is legitimate in terms of democratic values and principles and what is not. This is of particular importance because democracy development assistance providers often have differing mandates and agendas. In the case of election monitoring groups, this is especially true.

However, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005) free and fair elections require the recognition and affirmation of three sets of rights. These include: voting and election rights (these establish universal, indiscriminately suffrage, secret balloting and the right to individual appeal in situation where individual rights are compromised); candidature, party and campaign rights (these establish that everyone has the right to participate in government, to express political opinions, to campaign, to have equal access to the media, to be free from political violence and to the protection of the law); and the rights and responsibilities of the state (these establish the state as responsible for the establishment of an effective, impartial and non-

discriminatory process for registering voters, providing education on electoral procedures, and ensuring a non-partisan electoral commission exists).

Transparency International (TI, 2005) has taken a significantly different approach to defining the free and fair standard. According to TI, electoral legitimacy is of paramount importance. In defining what makes an election free and fair, emphasis is placed on independent electoral commissions and transparency of polling mechanics. With an independent electoral commission, the ability of incumbents to manipulate the electoral process is greatly reduced. In regards to transparency, the polling process should be scrutinized by all parties.

In a very comprehensive analysis titled “What Makes Elections Free and Fair”, Elklit and Jorgen set out to establish the most basic prerequisites for a free and fair electoral process. The authors argue that the freedom dimension should include elements relating to voters’ opportunity to participate in the election without coercion or restrictions of any kind. In regards to the fairness of an election, the authors refer to the notion of a level playing ground.

From the foregoing, election is said to be free and fair if it is devoid of electoral malpractices. Electoral malpractices refer to illegalities committed by government through its agents and apparatuses, officials responsible for the conduct of elections, political parties, groups or individuals with sinister intention to influence an election result in favour of a particular candidate(s). The underlying ingredients of electoral malpractices is that the action is deliberate, illegal, criminal and designed to undermine democratic principles or popular will. It can take any of the following forms but not restricted to these. It can take the form of stuffing ballot boxes with ballot papers well ahead of actual voting, seizure or hoarding of electoral materials, manipulation, fabrication of electoral results, the use of law enforcement agencies to intimidate, maim, and disenfranchise eligible voters, murder of political opponents, etc.

According to the great Latin American Political Scientist, Guillermo O’Donnell (1985), the overall change from an authoritarian to a democratic regime contains not one but two transitions: the first leads to installation of a democratic government, and the second to the consolidation of democracy or to effective functioning of a democratic regime. Between the two transitions lies what Guillermo O’Donnell (1985) described as “inherently endangered capricious tendencies” which are capable of truncating democratic consolidation (inability to conduct free, fair and credible elections). There is

therefore a complex continuity and discontinuity between the first and second transitions (Jibrin, 2016). This is because there appears to be continuity of the inability of democratic leaders since the return to civil rule in 1999 to guarantee free and fair elections. Inversely, no system will be adjudged democratic, without an election and election itself is not democratic if the process is not free and fair. For us to appreciate and understand the topic under discussion, it is imperative to make clear distinction between two (2) forms of elections we have experienced in Nigeria's political development (***Transition elections and Civilian to Civilian elections***).

By transition elections, we refer to those elections conducted by outgoing regime/ government be it colonial or military. Examples of transition elections are elections conducted in 1959, 1979, 1993 and 1999. In these elections, the regime in power had to hand over power to a democratic civilian government. For instance, in 1959, the British colonial regime wanted a smooth transfer of power to Nigerian self-government; in 1979, the military regime of General Obasanjo viewed itself as an interim fixture to ensure stability and then hand over power to elected officials. In 1993, a combination of both internal and external pressures forced the then President Ibrahim Babangida to organize election; and in 1999, arising from a product of necessity, the then military regime led by General Abdulsalami Abubakar organized election to disengage from politics. In a nutshell, transition elections under universal suffrage have been held four times, in 1959, 1979 and 1993, 1999.

In contrast, the Civilian-to-Civilian elections of 1964, (which ultimately led to the collapse of First Republic); 1983, (led to military intervention in politics) 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 elections (shrouded in credibility challenges) are typical examples of Civilian-to-Civilian elections. It is instructive to note that even though Civilian to Civilian elections can be viewed as a potential tool for democratic consolidation, regrettably, it is largely characterized by electoral malpractices, fraud and irregularities that threaten the credibility, free, fairness and acceptability of the outcome thereby leading to political conflicts. This is against the backdrop that one of the common characteristics of Nigeria's democratic rule since independence is conflict resurgence (conflict resurgence is usually associated with political conflict and it refers to the re-occurrence of conflict of what was formally or previously agitated, contested and tackled but reoccurs as a result of lack of compliance to the agreed rules) arising from the inability of civilian

government to conduct civilian to civilian election without gross electoral malpractices. In fact, both political violence and electoral malpractices had been the bane to successful civilian to civilian elections in Nigeria. How to avoid that and consolidate our democracy after 20 years of uninterrupted democratic rule in Nigeria becomes our major challenge.

Table 1. Trajectories of Transition and Civilian to Civilian Elections in Nigeria (1959-2019)

SN	Year	Nature of Election	Trajectories of Elections
1	1959	General Elections	Transition Elections
2	1979	General Elections	Transition Elections
3	1993	General Elections	Transition Elections
4	1999	General Elections	Transition Elections
5	1964	General Elections	Civilian to Civilian Elections
6	1983	General Elections	Civilian to Civilian Elections
7	2003	General Elections	Civilian to Civilian Elections
8	2007	General Elections	Civilian to Civilian Elections
9	2011	General Elections	Civilian to Civilian Elections
10	2015	General Elections	Civilian to Civilian Elections
11	2019	General Elections	Civilian to Civilian Elections

Audu, Field Survey, 2019.

A close examination of the above table reveals that in Nigeria's political development especially as it relates to general elections, transition elections are far more peaceful and the results relatively acceptable and less violent prone than civilian to civilian election. As Okolie (2005, p.433) had noted, both violence and fraud had been the bane to successful civilian-to-civilian transition in Nigeria's political life.

Nigeria's civilian-civilian elections have reflected a deceptive air of reality about them. For instance, the 1959 General elections was the last under

the direct supervision of the British colonial authorities before granting Nigeria her flag independence in 1960. According to Kurfi (2005) the 1959 federal elections were generally regarded as free and fair partly because the colonial government of the day was preparing to hand over power to Nigerians on October, 1 1960 and had no desire to perpetuate itself. Furthermore, the senior cadre of electoral officials were mostly administrative officers, majority of whom were British with a few Nigerians, and this cadre of public servants was highly regarded by the generality of the people as an embodiment of fairness, justice and equity (Kurfi, 2005, p.4). But the 1964, which was the third general elections and first since independence was described as the most perilous display of brinkmanship and during which the country tottered on the brink of disintegration and bloodshed (Kirk-Greene, 1971, p.21). According to Nnadozie (2005, p.123), the 1979 general election in comparative terms, could be stated that contrary to the bitterness, boycotts and electoral malpractices which characterized the 1964/65 federal elections, the 1979 elections were held with minimum electoral violence and rancor. The 1998/99 general elections had so many things in common with the 1979 elections including the Constitution under which they were conducted but more especially the lack of bitterness, boycotts, thuggery and other malpractices usually associated with electoral process in the country (Nnadozie, 2005).

In the 1983 general elections, Nnadozie (2005) had noted that one of the greatest problem facing Nigeria since her flag independence has been the inability of the members of the governing class to respect even the most rudimentary rules and regulations fashioned by them. This is one of the reflection of the state in peripheral capitalist societies. There is no area where this peripheral capitalist is manifested in Nigeria than in the organization of civilian to civilian elections in Nigeria where state and its apparatuses have been used as an instrument of the ruling class to advance their interest in controlling political power and retention of political power. For instance, in spite of poor performance of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in 1983 in its first term, the NPN capitalized on its incumbency factor and subsequently manipulated the electoral process in order to ensure that it retained power. Consequently, the election was marked by massive rigging and all sorts of electoral fraud. Kyari (1986, p.15) observed that “it is very clear that the Nigerian General Election of 1983 is a sham election. It was massively rigged and nobody can honestly, truthfully and scientifically state that Shagari and his lieutenant in the state capitals were democratically voted into office”. To

buttress the theoretical prisms of this paper, Kyari (1986) noted that there was a massive collusion involving the NPN, the FEDECO, the Police and some section of the judiciary to produce governments that could not claim legitimacy by dint of even the most rudimentary requirement of bourgeois democracy.

The 2003 General Elections presented yet another opportunity of a transition from one civilian government to another. The 1964 and 1983 elections were among other things characterized by manipulation of the electoral bodies and processes and the use of security personnel and agencies against political opponents. The 2003 general election shared a lot with the 1964 and 1983 elections. In the 2003 General elections, the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) exploited its incumbency to the fullest by mobilizing and deploying every available instruments of the state including the police and the military personnel before, during and after the elections to ensure its retention of power, in spite of its poor performance during first tenure. It's a common knowledge that the 1964, 1983, 2003 and 2007 elections were heavily rigged by incumbent ruling parties to the detriment of the opposition (State rigged elections).

In the build up to the 2019 elections, Tilde (2019) noted that the challenge before the APC led government is whether it will build on the nation's 2015 election achievement or kick the nation back into the dark pit of election rigging. Preceding the 2019 election, Tilde (2019) noted that ugly cloud had began to gather in the sky that may pose danger to the credibility of 2019 election. For instance, the president's refusal to sign into law the new Electoral Bill, preferring to defer it until after the 2019 elections is an indication. The bill, which is a product of extensive collaboration among stakeholders, including INEC, NGOs, the National Assembly, and the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation, had fine-tuned the process by embracing, among others, digital transmission of results and compelling electoral officers to abide by its guidelines without the option of resorting to the old method of manual transmission which was previously obtained. The tool that the APC led government employed to win bye elections held in Ekiti, Ondo, Bauchi, Katsina, etc. in those elections, the use of money was intensified, with the ruling APC being the highest bidder of votes . In the Bauchi Senatorial bye election, Tide (2019) noted on how card reader can be compromised. For instance, no polling unit was able to send its accreditation data or polling results from the polling station. All Returning Officer banded

over the locked card readers to collation officers at ward collation centres, who unlocked them and handled the data, including editing it where necessary. Then the officer inputs the figures into his laptop and escalates them to INEC database. More alarming are the reported cases of multiple voting which the card reader permitted. In a polling station in Wonu Ward, for example, the polling officer had to reassure the agitated crowd who complained of multiple voting that the card reader was good. After calming the nerves, someone proved him wrong by getting the card reader to pass him twice. The card reader as stated in the electoral bill makes card reader a precondition for voting and failure to transmit the result instantly from the polling booth is a crime punishable with five years imprisonment without option of fine for the defaulting officer. The 2019 civilian to civilian election was marked with violence and ballot box snatching, burning down of INEC office and killing in Rivers, Kogi, Lagos, and other states.

The biggest controversy in the recent past is the appointment of Commissioner Amina Zakari to chair the internal INEC committee in charge of the collation centre. The issue of CJN where the federal government ask Onnoghen to vacate office and to be arraigned on criminal charges. The suspension of the CJN by Mr. President on Friday, 25/01/19 was based on the alleged ex-parte order of the Code of Conduct Tribunal-the same Tribunal that, had on Tuesday, 22 January 2019 adjourned its proceedings to Monday, 28 January 2019, which the Executive had knowledge of. The Nigerian Bar Association on the 25 January, 2019 issued a communique:

1. Evident suspension of the Nigerian Constitution by the Executive arm of government
2. The action it stated portends a slide into anarchy and complete deconstruction of the Rule of Law and due process.
3. It amounts to an absolute breach of the Constitution and usurpation of the powers of the Senate and the Nigerian Judicial Council.

In a statement, the US Embassy in Nigeria said it had taken note of the widespread criticisms that the suspension is illegal. The Embassy of the United States is deeply concerned by the impact of the Executive branch's decision to suspend and replace the Chief Justice and head of the judicial branch without the support of the legislative branch on the eve of national and state elections. The decision is not only unconstitutional but it undermines the independence of the judiciary. It is devoid of due process, lack of rule of law

and the spirit of the Constitution of Nigeria. This action is tantamount to casting a pall over the electoral process.

Consequently, the 2019 election was characterized by allegation of collusion and partisanship in the general elections. The role of the military getting involved in the election shortly after Mr President's meeting with the Service Chiefs. The Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA), a prodemocracy and non-governmental body has described the recently concluded 2019 general elections as charade and a monumental travesty of justice. HURIWA accused the INEC of manipulating the outcomes of the elections in favour of the ruling APC and as such, committed more egregious and satanic crimes than the alleged billionaire kidnapper, Mr Evans. The chief Observer, Maria Arena noted that they came to Nigeria on the invitation of INEC to monitor the elections and make recommendations. Arena, who is a member of the EU Parliament, however, faulted the elections. She said, Observers, including EU Observers were denied access to collation centres in Rivers, apparently by military personnel. This lack of access compromises transparency and trust in the process. Arena lamented the violence, underage voting and vote buying that marred 2019 elections.

All these are reflections of the use of the state machinery to advance the interest of the ruling class as advanced by the Marxian theory of the state.

Conclusion

It is the conclusion of this paper after examining the transition and trajectories of civilian to civilian elections that the greatest tragedy to democratic consolidation in Nigeria is the inability of the civilian government to conduct credible and free and fair elections. This is manifested in all the civilian to civilian elections conducted in Nigeria but without prejudice to transition elections with minimal electoral fraud. For instance, the Chairman of the All Progressive Congress (APC) Comrade Adam Oshiomole in a build up to the 2019 electioneering campaign once said in response to the Osun state gubernatorial election stated that: "I think that for democracy to flourish, only people who can accept the pain of rigging-am sorry, defeat should participate in an election.

This paper concludes that that in Nigeria, transition elections are far more peaceful, free, fair and more credible and results relatively acceptable than civilian to civilian elections. This is essentially because of the sit-tight and self-succession syndrome, incumbency factor which prompts political

actors to cling tenaciously to power; changing level playing ground for the opposition and disregard to rules that should guarantee free and fair elections and using the instruments of the state actualize their goals of clinging unto power by all means.

The crux of the problem of Nigeria today is the over politicization of social life. We are intoxicated with politics: the premium on political power is so high that we are prone to take the most extreme measures to win and to maintain political power...to win control of state means for all practical purposes being all powerful and owning everything. Politics became warfare, a matter of life and death.

Finally, Nigerian electoral process especially since the return to democratic rule in 1999 suffers from a moral vacancy, an acute shortage of credible political actors who could plausibly champion democratic values and set standards that offers feeling compelled to live up to.

Recommendation

The history of South Africa's electoral politics dates back to the mid-19th century. Historical familiarity with electoral procedures and the development of a strong party system helps to strengthen modern electoral politics. In a statement to the Ghanaian Parliament on July 11, 2009 (as cited in Adelaja)

In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success. Strong parliament, honest police force, independent judges, an independent press, a vibrant private sector, and engaged civil society, those are the things that give life to democracy because that is what matters in people's everyday lives. Africa does not need strong men, it needs strong institutions. These are the hallmark of governance (2016, p. 209).

Strong institutions such as INEC, Political parties, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Security agencies, etc, are those institutions which independently perform their statutory functions according to the laid down rules or laws without any external influence, coercion or directives from the power that be. Strong institutions are catalyst of national development and no nation can develop to its full potentials without strong and viable institutions. But it is instructive to note that building strong institution requires investment

of time, education, resources, skills, ideas, patriotism, planning, strategy and good settings into the process which involves government, people and civil society organizations.

Huntington (1984:214) advances conditions required for the institutionalization of democracy as higher levels of economic well-being; absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income; greater social pluralism among others. In his own contribution, Ntalaja (2000:14) is of the view that democracy cannot be negotiated as a new bargain in developing nations; rather, it has to be richer than the liberal model, and should be capable of leading to a development strategy that is home grown, people-centred and oriented towards eradicating poverty.

Finally, the responsibility of ensuring free and fair elections in the 2019 Elections is the collective responsibility of all of us either as employee of election management body (INEC), the Nigeria Police Force, members of the various political parties and supporters of different candidates for the elections. This is because every one of us are either parents, Guidance, Traditional/Religious leaders, Public Office Holders or relations of same, candidates and supporters of a particular candidate hence we should monitor our children, ward and subjects and adherents to be law abiding and resist the temptation to engage in any act that have the potentials of rendering 2019 election unacceptable devoid of free and fair elections.

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INSECURITY AND WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Pastoralist-farmer conflict, Boko Haram insurgency, ethno-religious violence and communal clashes have constituted security challenges in the country. They have caused numerous deaths, destruction of property and massive displacement of people with associated socio-economic negative impacts. Insecurity is a major obstacle to women active participation in the electoral processes. The paper relied on secondary source of information. Human security approach was employed to as an explanatory framework. It argued that insecurity has not only affected the electoral processes in Nigeria but limited the involvement of women in exercising their political rights. When a political system is characterized by insecurity, women tend to stay away from playing active role which further perpetuates gender inequality in the decision-making process. The paper recommended that for women to effectively participate in the electoral processes, insecurity which has constituted a serious challenge to peace and development needs to be tackled by government at all levels. There is need for re-orientation of all political parties to shun any form of political brigandage and violence in order to encourage more women participation in the electoral processes. Security agents, particularly, the Nigeria Police need to be trained and retrained for capacity building and well remunerated to ensure peace during elections.

Keywords: Women, insecurity, election, electoral process, political participation

Introduction

Nigeria has been experiencing security and governance challenges since the advent of the Fourth Republic. Inter-and intra-communal conflicts, religious violence, indigene and settler conundrums, resource-induced conflict and Boko Haram insurgency have exacerbated the security challenges the

country is confronted with. Women have been victims of insecurity particularly as it affects their participation in the electoral processes. In a situation where the political system is characterized by different forms of insecurity, women suffer more harms and vulnerabilities which hinder them from exercising their civic and political rights.

Over the years, women have suffered a setback in having more access to political leadership positions and decision-making processes in the country as a result of various challenges including patriarchy, derogatory cultural and traditional beliefs, lack of funds to pursue political ambitions, political party insensitivity towards women's issues, to mention a few. The history of electoral process in Nigeria has been dotted with violence of different nature such as thuggery, political assassination, maiming, brigandage, terrorism and communal conflicts. In the areas affected by insecurity such as in the North East, North Central, South East and South, where incessant killings occur mostly on a daily basis particularly in the rural communities, women have been scared away from participating in the electoral processes which underscore why there was low turnout of women during voters' registration, campaigns and voting exercise.

As noted by Rasak and Garuba (2017), there has been poor involvement of women in the electoral process despite the increased number of educated women who can ably contest for elective positions in the Nigeria's political system. The reason for this dilemma is as a result of the violent nature of the electioneering process and the prevalent insecurity before election period which hinder women's advancement politically. Women suffer a lot of insecurity right from the family level which transcends to other socio-economic political institutions.

Literature abound on the various challenges perpetuating gender inequality in Nigerian political system, however, the role insecurity plays as a barrier to women participation in the electoral processes seems not to have been exhaustively explored. The paper is divided into five parts which include conceptualization of key terms, historical analysis of insecurity in the Nigeria's electoral processes, challenges insecurity posed to women participation in the electoral processes and measures to be adopted to reduce insecurity if not completely eliminated in the country.

Concept of security

Security, as a concept, has attracted various definitions by scholars. It is one of the highly contested concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies. According to Stan (2004), security implies mechanism put in place to avoid, prevent, reduce or resolve violent conflicts and threats which originate from the states, non-state actors or structural, socio-political and economic conditions. What is implied in the conception of security by Stan (2004) is that insecurity is multi-causal in nature and there are different actors whether state or non-state and situations which can constitute threats to security of human lives. That is the reason why there was a shift from the state centric approach to the conceptualization of security to embrace human security approach. It is of no use if the territorial integrity of the state is guaranteed and human lives within the state are not protected. Therefore, the primary responsibility of the state is to promote and protect human lives. However, the state can also perpetrate human rights violations as cases abound globally.

According to Egbewole (2013), security means a state, feeling or means of being secured, to be free from any form of danger. It also involves measures put in place to keep a person or country safe from danger or crime. Security is the opposite of insecurity, which connotes the state of fear, grave danger, deprivation and unqualified exposure to want and despair (Egbewole, 2013).

There are two dimensions of security namely internal and external. The state has the basic duty of protecting lives and property internally while it also ensures that its territorial integrity is not violated. The essence of any responsive and responsible government is to guarantee both internal and external security, ensuring that lives are secured and borders of a nation are adequately protected from external aggression by any other state and violent non-state actors. Every nation of the world has it as its duty to protect its citizens from any acts of insurrection which may violate their fundamental basic rights. Although, nations may hide under responsibility to protect to perpetrate acts of criminality against their citizens by preventing intervention from external actors to render humanitarian assistance to their citizens during conflict situations

From the post-modernist point of view, security is a mechanism put in place to ensure the safety of lives by the non-state actors and this put the state as the secondary provider of security in the society (Ewetan & Uhie, 2014). Security in another way can be viewed as protection from danger, violence, fear and want which impair or capable of impairing the full development and

existential well-being of the citizens (Alemika, 2015). Security has to do with efforts to protect one from dangers, need for order and continuity and aspirations for inner and mental balance. Boutros-Ghali (1994) conceives security as involving not only military, but also non-military dimensions such as environment, ethno-religious and natural identities, migration, poverty and disease. Security involves all conditions that guarantee peace, justice and good health of individuals in the society. Security is vital for national cohesion, peace and sustainable development and that is why national security is important for any form of good governance and development to occur in a society. Security has to do with conditions within which individuals in a society can go about their normal activities without any form of fear, intimidation or threat to lives and property (Ogege, 2013). The essence of security provisioning cannot be over-emphasised in a nation and that is why it is well entrenched in the constitution of every nation. For instance, in the 1999 Nigerian constitution, section 14 (2) (b), the essence of security and welfare provisioning for the Nigerians is accentuated but unfortunately, it has become elusive as lives and property are lost on a daily basis and the government and civil society organizations have become helpless.

Concept of Insecurity

In a situation where there is no security, the direct experience of the citizens is the opposite, which is insecurity. From different ideological and academic points of view, insecurity has been conceptualised in various ways. Insecurity is a situation that exists as a result of lack of effective measures put in place to guarantee the protection of individuals, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions. In a situation where there is insecurity, people will not be able to go about their normal daily activities, personal, economic, social and political securities will be grossly affected.

Insecurity according to Balard (2005) means lack of protection and freedom from unprotected harms, which is, not being protected from emotional stress resulting from paucity of assurance that an individual is accepted, has opportunity and choices to fulfill his or her potentials including freedom from fear. From another perspective, Achumba, Ighomereho, Akpor-Robaro(2013) conceptualise insecurity as a state of being subjected to danger, expose to risk and or anxiety. In the view of Cameron and McCornnell (1954), sources of insecurity include threat from within or beliefs particularly religion and emotional response to sudden external threats. Feelings of fear,

anxiety, uncertainty, poverty, injustice, unemployment and other forms of social violence create a political environment characterized by insecurity. On the other hand, insecurity is a condition of being vulnerable to anxiety or risks. As applied to the paper, insecurity is a condition of fear, not being safe, threat to lives and property and restriction from carrying out political and civic responsibilities which can impinge on the fundamental human rights of individuals particularly women.

Concept of Electoral Process

Electoral process does not readily lend itself to any generally acceptable definition. Various conceptions by scholars from different academic backgrounds exist. According to Elekwa (2008), electoral process involves the entire cycle ranging from the provision of voter education to the final voting of all aspirants. In another dimension, Ogbuide (2013) defines electoral process as including registration of voters, identifying the political parties to vote for, voting, counting of votes and declaration of election results.

Also, electoral process involves the selection of candidates, registration of voters and the entire voting procedures. It can be conceptualized as the orderly consequence of acts and activities regulated by the constitution and electoral law, that is, the activities political parties and citizens carry out with the aim of periodically renewing the seats of elected public officials. It is the procedure that guides the conduct of election in a particular nation. Any acts of violence that threatens the process jeopardise the will of the people. Insecurity can threaten the electoral process which can affect people's participation particularly the women. Electoral process can also involve the method and law for holding an election and explanation of laws and customs that must be followed by all partakers which must be periodic, free and fair elections (Foundation for Democratic Process, 2017).

Electoral process is divided into three major phases. These include pre-election phase, Election Day and post-elections. The pre-election phase covers electoral legislation, delimitation of constituencies, registration of voters, nominations and campaign period. The second phase which is the Election Day, involves voting, counting of votes, announcement of results. The third phase is the post elections period which involves review of elections and filing of any complaint by the candidates. Electoral process also means civil activities and procedures involved in the election of representatives by the electorate (Akamere, 2001).

In the view of Jinadu (1997), electoral process involves rules, procedures and activities relating to the establishment of electoral bodies, appointment of members, voters registration, nomination of candidates, balloting, counting of the ballots, declaration of results, selection and training of electoral officials, delimitation of constituency, voter education, registration of political parties and supervision of party primaries/congresses. The implication of this conception is that electoral process is carried out during democratic dispensation and all activities should guarantee free and fair process in the conduct of elections. Rules and regulations must exist in the political system in order to ensure fairness, justice and equality.

According to Nwanegbo (2015), electoral process has to do with all the institutional procedures, arrangements and actions involved in election. In another way, the United Nations Development Programme (2009) conceptualizes electoral process as fundamental to the attainment of political order which most often involves high stakes which can be a catalyst or acceleration of conflict. Electoral process is about procedures involved in electing people into political offices in order to allocate resources in a political system. If the process of electing leadership into political power is characterized by insecurity, the credible people can be scared away and the end product will be poor governance. That is why election is perceived as an alternative to violence and a way of achieving good governance (Nwanegbo, 2015). All activities and procedures put in place to ensure periodic election of political leaders by the electorate constitutes what is referred to as electoral process and for it to be adjudged good enough for the enthronement of political leaders, every phase of it must be free, fair, transparent and inclusive of all the eligible participants, including the women.

Theoretical framework

The paper adopted human security approach as its framework of analysis. Human security approach proposes that if security policy and analysis are to be effective and legitimate, they must pay attention to individuals as the primary beneficiaries. As an approach, it argues that there is an ethical responsibility to re-orient security around the individual citizens in a society rather than placing emphasis on the territorial integrity of the state and it should be in accordance with internationally recognized standards of human rights and governance (Oxford Research Encyclopaedia, 2019). Commission on Human Security(2003), argues that human security is needed

so as to respond to the complexity and interrelatedness of both old and new security threats arising from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, terrorism, health issues and other socio-economic challenges.

Human security approach emphasises protection of fundamental freedoms that are essential to life. It also encompasses creating political, social, economic, environmental, military and cultural systems that give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (Commission on Human Security (CHS), 2003). It involves human elements of security, rights and development. The characteristics of human security approach include people-centredness, multi-sectorality, comprehensiveness, context-specificity and prevention-oriented analysis (CHS, 2003). It places individuals at the centre of analysis instead of the state. State security centres on the protection of the territorial integrity of the state. From the traditional point of view, security has to do with protection of the territory of the state and if the state is protected, individuals living in it will also be protected. Human security approach focuses on a wide range of dangers that might be faced by the individual citizens and communities. It ex-rays the root causes of insecurities by advancing people-centred or oriented approach that are locally driven in providing solution to security challenges. Human security approach also advances that the realization of human security will include the governments and different actors such as regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local communities (Mbagwu, 2015). However, it must be pointed out that state security and human security approaches are interdependent. The point of departure of the human security approach is that it emphasises the security of the people through development, not through arms, cooperation, not confrontation, peace and not war (UNDP, 1994). Human security also focuses on protection of people from harms such as political, economic, environmental, personal, communal among others. According to the United Nations Development Programme (1994), human security approach adopts two strategies namely protection and empowerment. Protection shields people away from dangers while empowerment enables them to develop their potentials. In ensuring human development, there is need for human security approach to be adopted which will not only focus on protection of border integrity but also on the socio-political and economic well-beings and securities of people. The approach is adopted to anchor the

paper because of postulating and emphasising human security in all its ramifications particularly as it regards issues of violence.

As a people-centred approach, it considers the conditions that threaten people's survival, livelihood and dignity, therefore advocating for protection and empowerment of individuals in the society. Since security provisioning is not time-bound, it must also cover the period of election in order to allow inclusivity in the electoral process. If insecurity characterizes electoral process, women will not participate and essence of inclusive government is jeopardised. For instance, political violence is one of the security challenges affecting peaceful conduct of elections scares women away and robs them of exercising their political rights.

As a framework that emphasises protection of fundamental freedoms that are essential to life, it is suitable to the paper because it advocates that individuals should not be denied freedom particularly rights to participate in civic responsibilities. Electoral process characterized by insecurity will not attract the citizens' participation particularly women who are allergic to political violence. Human security approach identifies and alleviates the direct and structural violence that give room for insecurity to fester in a society (Mbagwu, 2015). In addressing myriads of security challenges prevalent in Nigeria, inclusive security approach needs to be adopted which will enable the citizens including women to participate in the electoral process.

Insecurity in Nigeria: An Historical Overview

Insecurity is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, before the advent of colonial invasion, it had been in place. Inter and intra-tribal conflicts were prevalent creating atmosphere of uncertainty and fear among the people. The prevalent wars in the pre-colonial period fed captives into the slave trade industry which gave room for the Africans selling their brothers to the Europeans who were used as labourers in the sugar plantation and as domestic workers. The pre-colonial situation was characterised by insecurity which prompted tribal groups to migrate to the perceived 'secured places'.

Insecurity continued with colonialism and its characteristic oppressive rule. The manner in which the British colonisers conquered some parts of Nigeria particularly the North created an environment of insecurity in the society. Merging different ethnic groups existing independently further

created atmosphere of tension and violence in Nigeria. As argued by Agbalajobi (2016), colonialism is the root of violence particularly with the introduction of election, which is one of the factors causing insecurity in the country. From her perspective, colonialism built the culture of violence due to its absolutist and oppressive rule adopted in seeking obedience to the British government. The nature of colonial administration encouraged the use of violence to enforce policies on the local people corralled together. Bringing ethnic groups of diverse backgrounds together induced atmosphere of crisis creating insecure environment as the major ethnic groups sought to dominate the minority groups. A political system characterised by inter- and intra-ethnic wrangling will be insecure for any credible and acceptable political activities to take place. As regards the violent electoral process, it was part of the electoral system during the colonial times as the case of the 1959 British conducted elections which witnessed intimidation of opponents, ballot stuffing and other irregularities (Jinadu, 1997).

In the post-independent Nigeria, insecurity has manifested in different dimensions in the electoral process in form of political assassination, gangsterism, hooliganism, killing of people, cultism, to mention but a few. The first republic experienced insecurity caused by the electoral violence due to winners-take all or zero-sum political culture and ethnicised politics which eventually led to its collapse. For instance, the 1964 general elections occasioned various dimensions of violence leading to insecurity in Nigeria. It witnessed intimidation of political opponents, harassment of voters and electoral officers and use of thugs to wreck havocs on the general body polity. Also, the December 1965 Western regional election which was characterised by insecurity that led to the declaration of state of emergency cannot be forgotten in a jiffy in the political history of the region and Nigeria as a whole.

In the opinion of Agbalajobi (2016), electoral violence constituted a serious security challenge in the first republic as a result of the nationalist leaders' attachment to the primordial interests. The ethnicised nature of Nigeria's politics aggravated the already tensed political environment which led to the killing of people and destruction of property. Electioneering campaigns during the time was characterized with violence creating uncertainty across the land. It must be noted that election period in Nigeria is like preparing for war of attrition. As noted by Ehinmore and Ehiah (2013), electioneering campaign is associated with fake electoral promises,

intimidation, confrontation, thuggery, political assassination and inciting hate speech which can ignite pre- and post-election conflicts.

On the issue of security caused as a result of electoral violence, the 1983 general elections were replica of the 1965 Western regional elections which led to the outright breakdown of law and order. The supporters of the National Party of Nigeria were caught with stolen votes (Joseph, 1991 cited in Awofeso et al., (2014). In the 1979 elections, the political environment was relatively peaceful. But the most peaceful, credible, freest and fairest election in the democratisation process in Nigeria was June 12 presidential elections annulled by the retired military head of state, Gbadosi Babangida. The elections that ushered in the fourth republic was conducted by the Retired General Abdulsalam Abubakar were violence free which was characteristic of the military- conducted elections in Nigeria. The insecurity that permeated the political terrain during the inglorious reign of the late General Sani Abacha made the country to be treated as a pariah state. It is noteworthy that the general insecurity that pervaded the political environment constituted a barrier to women active involvement in the electoral process, before, during and after elections in Nigeria. Since the military hand-over to the civilian administration in Nigeria in the fourth republic, elections conducted have been the replica of those of the first republic as they were characterised by the symptomatic experiences of ethnocentrism, parochialism, acrimony, rancor and violence (Obialor & Ugochukwu, 2015). Lives and property were usually destroyed during elections threatening the corporate existence of the nation as ethnic groups agitated for secession at different times in the history of the country. In the fourth republic in particular, insecurity has increased due to lack of employment which has promoted abject poverty among the people most especially the Nigerian youths. For instance, the 2003 general elections were crisis-ridden and reminiscent of the violent elections which constituted security threats to the national survival. Political assassination cuts across all the geographical zones (Obi, 2015). With insecurity that characterised the electoral process across the nation during the period, there was distrust in the political system thereby discouraging many credible people particularly the women to participate in politics. Insecurity also characterised 2011 post-election period when more than 800 people were massacred in the North including the youth corps members who served as electoral officials.

The spate of violence skyrocketed in 2009 with the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency which devastated and depleted human and material

resources in the North East, Nigeria. The insecurity is regionally- based but gradually spreads its tentacles to the other parts of the country. For instance, Boko Haram insurgency has been entrenched in the North East claiming lives and property with no permanent solution in sight. The criminality perpetrated by insurgents reached its highest apogee when 274 school girls were abducted in Chibok in 2014 with only 93 of them released (Women International League for Peace and Freedom, 2017). A lot of women and girls were abducted by the insurgents and used as bush wives, sex slaves and suicide bombers (WILPF, 2017).

Prevalence of militancy and kidnapping exacerbated the insecurity in the South East, Nigeria. Kidnapping involves illegal keeping of an individual in order to release the person after paying ransom. It is a way of making money by the criminal gangs who will never mind if the person kept in hostage dies or not. As observed by Nwagboso (2018), kidnapping became a prevalent issue since 2007 after the general elections in Nigeria as the political thugs used during the period became redundant. Herdsmen insurgency has constituted a serious security threat in the North-Central, Nigeria which is gradually spreading to other parts of the country. In the same vein, insurrection of militant and ethnic militias such as Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Odua People's Congress (OPC), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Egbesu Boys, to mention but a few, have contributed to the security challenges affecting Nigeria as a nation. Insurrection of ethno nationalistic activities has compounded the security challenges the government has to grapple with. In a situation where there is terrorism (North East), militancy (South-South), separatist agitation (South East), resource conflict (North-Central), ethno-religious conflicts, kidnapping and a host of other security challenges, civic engagement will be difficult.

The porous nature of the Nigerian borders has not really helped the matter with increased influx of light weapons being circulated by the criminal gangs and other violent non- state actors. A political system characterised by insecurity of different kinds will definitely scare away citizens from performing their civic responsibilities.

Insecurity and Women Participation in the Electoral Process

Women face security challenge of diverse dimensions which adversely affect their participation in the electoral process. Right from the domestic

level, women face a lot of security issues due to human rights violations. There is a general orientation that women are subordinate to men. They are to be dominated in every aspect of social life. The patriarchal belief in some African societies particularly Nigeria supports that women can be beaten as a corrective measure. This has contributed in no small way to perpetuate domestic violence against women until recently when women rights organisations began to advocate against it. As a matter of fact, women who face domestic and structural violence will not have the confidence of participating in the electoral process because insecurity at home and in political system will not encourage them to venture into public arena. As argued by Agbalajobi (2016), whatever treatment a man gives to a woman even if violent particularly within the family setting is accepted as the norm and should be endured by her particularly when children are involved.

There are some insecurities that women face at the private realm that are not observable but negatively affect their involvement in the electoral process which constitute a psychological threat or social restriction (Paasilinna, Palmer-Wetherald & Ritche, 2017). Insecurity perpetrated in form of electoral violence can manifest in the family level in form of psychological, economic and physical violence. Familial pressure is a form of intimidation or forced disenfranchisement which may include spousal or parental pressure on who to vote for, refusal to leave home to vote, refusal of relatives to watch children for women to vote, among other challenges, affect women disproportionately (Paasilinna, et al 2017). Psychological violence which is a form of insecurity perpetuated against women debars them from taking part in the electoral processes. This can be inflicted on women by the family members, particularly their husbands. Threat of divorce is another form of insecurity that women face which prevents them from participating in politics generally, that is the more reason it is a common phenomenon that women politicians are majorly divorcees, unmarried or widows. Due to violent nature of the Nigerian political environment, husbands will not readily support their women to go out to participate in politics particularly attending the night political meetings. In the opinion of O'Connell and Ramshaw (2018), as women's political activity has grown, the frequency and degree of violent responses to their presence in politics increased exponentially. According to them, globally, politically active women such as voters, candidates, local councilors, members of parliament, community activists, bloggers, among others, often experience physical threats. Insecurity experienced by women

particularly the active ones such as psychological, physical, sexual and economic, in no small way perpetuate gender inequality in the political process.

Party primary elections in Nigeria are also characterised with rancours which can be allergic to women. During election periods, insecurity can increase apathy among women thereby robbing them of meaningful exercise of franchise. Women face sexual harassment from their male counterparts which makes them lose interest in politics. Cases abound when women aspirants were robbed of electoral victory as a result to failure to submit to sexual overtures by the political party bigwigs and money bags. Social, religious and cultural expectations of women's electoral participation can result in social, psychological, sexual, economic and physical forms of electoral violence directed against women in the public sphere. Women candidates face psychological and sexual forms of violence coupled with economic and physical violence. Character assassination and slanders are also targeted at women who particularly want to be voted into power.

National Democratic Institute (2017) also noted that abuse and harassment that constitute psychological violence seek to delegitimize women as political actors, undermine their confidence, competence and visibility in the political and public spheres which negatively affect how they are portrayed and perceived. In a situation where women face psychological violence, it affects their confidence in participation in the electoral process dominated by men and glass ceiling will be reinforced and social policies will be men-centred. In the case of Nigeria, gender-based violence further exposes women to insecurity and attendant vulnerabilities. The challenges have grown astronomically in Nigeria particularly in the insurgence ridden areas of the North East which manifests in form of forced and early marriage, sexual assault, and this has led to psychological violence and harrowing experience that can rob women of meaningful participation in the electoral process. In the areas where insecurity is very prevalent, women find it difficult to register as voters, cast votes or contest for elective posts.

One major electoral process that gives opportunity for the citizens to express their will is election. Elections characterised with insecurity scare away the voters particularly the women. In the history of the Nigerian elections, hardly was there an election without security crisis. It must be noted that political environment and events before election do give signal on what will happen on the Election Day. In Nigeria, some election campaigns have

been marred by violence causing death of people. For instance, prior to the 2015 general elections, a lot of people died during campaigns as a result of the 'win or die' attitude of the Nigerian politicians. Also, a prelude to the 2019 general elections, six states like Akwa Ibom, Kaduna, Plateau, Adamawa, Kano and Rivers were hotbeds of electoral violence (International Crisis Group, 2018). There were security challenges such as power struggle between the incumbent APC and PDP to take over the control of the states, rivalry between the incumbent and former governors, herder-farmer conflict and activities of criminal groups who were recruited by the politicians to attack the opposition (ICG, 2018).

The political environment had been tensed up in those states before 2019 general elections took place which prevented women from participating actively in the electoral process. Insecurity also characterised the inauguration of the APC campaign in Lagos state when political thugs invaded the venue and engaged their opponents in a gun duel which claimed lives and property.

One of the major actors in creating an atmosphere of insecurity/violence is the political party. Despite the fact most political parties in Nigeria have women wings for mobilising women, yet, they are not always in support of those ones who are actively involved in the politics, particularly as the contestants. Many cases abound where political thugs were deployed to intimidate, violate and assault women out of the political race. A lot of women politicians at one point or the other faced gender-based violence to prevent them from running for public offices. Those who proved deviant faced the music by losing their lives or family members very dear to them.

It is noteworthy that when electoral process is characterised by insecurity, women will stay off and this robs them of civic engagement. As asserted by Paasilinna (2017), women do not have the economic means to engage in "muscle" politics like the men who can hire thugs to perpetuate acts of violence. Use of political thugs to militarize the political process makes it uncomfortable for women to participate. According to Rasak and Garuba (2017), women naturally are allergic to violence of any form and since men make use of them, women cannot compete favourably well with them in the political battlefield. One of the reasons why women did not feature prominently in the just concluded 2019 elections was due to insecurity that pervaded some parts of the country. Non- prosecution of perpetrators of political violence who are supported financially by those in government has made it difficult to curtail the abnormality and seems to have become an

acceptable norm. The implication on the electoral system is that there will be exclusion of a group of people who can make impactful contribution to democratic development.

A political environment characterised by insecurity tends to perpetuate gender inequality in the electoral process as an insignificant number of women make inroad into politics. For instance, only 62 (4%) women were elected in to public offices in 2019 general elections across board. A great decline was experienced in the number of women that participated in the electoral process in 2019 as a result of insecurity that pervaded the political system. The six female presidential candidates who joined the political race stepped down primarily because of the violent nature in the body polity. The militarisation of the electoral process right from party primary causes intimidation to women folk. Winners can emerge through the use of violence which prevents women from being part of the problem solvers in the society. As accentuated by Agbalajobi (2016), electoral violence is a major cause of low participation of women in politics in Nigeria. The inability of the government at all levels to make adequate security provisioning engenders gender inequality in the electoral process. The basic responsibility of government is to ensure human security is guaranteed and that is why there is a paradigm shift from state security to human security. An electoral process characterized by insecurity will not guarantee sanctity of the outcome, hence, unacceptable government which perpetuates state violence against the masses will be enthroned.

Measures to take Against Insecurity Affecting Women Participation in the Electoral Process

There is no doubt that insecurity affects socio-economic development in Nigeria which also perpetuates low women participation in the electoral process. Security provisioning as a matter of fact is not the sole responsibility of the government, it is indeed a collective duty for state and non-state actors. However, this should not prevent the government from seeing it as a primary responsibility to protect its citizens. It is high time government at all levels rose up to their responsibilities. Since government is the chief security provider, there is need for state of emergency to be declared in the sector; by training, retraining and equipping all security agencies with capacity building to tackle every security challenge in the country. Acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram insurgents and herdsmen need total elimination for the country to have peace. President Mohammed Buhari should wake up from

slumber and deploy more human and material resources in flushing out terrorist elements in Nigeria.

The Government needs to exercise the political will to fish out ‘spoilers’ or ‘conflict compradors’ among the security agents and government officials benefitting from insurgency taking place in North East and North Central, Nigeria. There are indeed invisible hands behind the throne fueling acts of criminality against humanity perpetrated by the insurgents in the two regions. If they are not fished out and prosecuted, insurgency will continue to fester and political terrain will become much more militarised and women will not have the boldness of participating in the electoral process.

Any political environment that experiences insecurity will not make progress democratically because where there is no peace, democracy cannot thrive.. One of the basic tenets of democracy as a representative system of government is social inclusion but when there is insecurity, a large number of people will be deprived of participating in the process, particularly women. It becomes very important that all state and non-state actors see it as a collective responsibility to ensure security of lives and property.

There is need for more security agents to be deployed to curb every act of hooliganism, thuggery and political brigandage that scare electorate, particularly women away. In all polling areas there is need for adequate security measures to be put in place to protect the citizens performing their civic responsibility. Security agents should be non-partisan in order to ensure adequate provisioning of security during electioneering campaigns, voting and counting of votes. There have been situations where the security agents looked away while the political thugs snatched ballot boxes after unleashing violence on the electorate. Cases also abound where security agents collaborated to perpetrate acts of violence in order to disenfranchise people particularly women during election. It is not also a hidden fact that in the electoral process, security agents are used by the incumbent government officials to perpetuate physical violence against women who are considered to be in opposition. Any acts of violence committed by the security agents should be prosecuted to serve as a deterrent in any election.

At the party level, a zero-tolerance should be developed against victimisation of women who desire to participate in the political process as voters or candidates. Therefore, legislation should be formulated and implemented at the party level to criminalise any acts of thuggery or violence perpetrated against women. Also, electoral acts/laws should see political

violence perpetrated against the electorate particularly women as a crime against humanity and should be treated as such. To an extent militarisation of electoral process will be drastically reduced which will positively impact on the number of lives lost during election period and also more women will have confidence in participating. As a matter of fact, party primaries, to be specific, should be conducted in the atmosphere devoid of chaos to give room for more women to participate and make their positive impacts in the process.

Curbing violence against women in electoral process will take a measure of tackling the structural and systemic factors and this will involve engaging politically with the institutions particularly political parties and parliaments that are complicit in perpetuating violence against women (O'Connell, 2018).

In order to allow women to participate in the electoral process in Nigeria, there is need for electronic governance to be explored and utilised in the area of conducting elections. Electronic voting enables citizens to vote conveniently whether from workplaces, homes or in any part of the country provided there is internet connectivity. The essence of this is women in particular will not be easy targets and victims of electoral violence. A militarised political process scares women away, hence, gender inequality in the electoral process holds sway. Not only will the provision of electronic governance ease the government of cumbersomeness in the conduct of its daily affairs, it will give room for inclusivity and responsiveness to women category. Although, cost implication and adoption in the local areas may constitute challenges, but there can be political education and awareness creation at the grassroots level for electronic democratic practices to be employed for conduct of election and ease of governance.

Conclusion

Insecurity has constituted a serious challenge in perpetuating low participation of women in the electoral process in Nigeria. As a matter of fact, insecurity has negatively impacted women participation in the electoral process over the years. Insurgency in the North East, herdsmen terrorism in the North Central, militancy and ethnic nationalism in the South-South and South East coupled with electoral violence have been security issues preventing women from actively participating in the electoral processes in Nigeria. Insecurity perpetrated at the domestic level, security agents, political parties/ thugs, and other violent non-state actors continuously affect women

and constitute barriers to their engagement in the electoral processes. Right from the family setting, women experience physical and psychological violence which affect their self confidence in participating in the political process. This is further reinforced by the violent political environment which degrades the dignity of womanhood and robs women of making positive impacts in the public arena. Any woman who has been abused, rejected and dejected will not have the confidence to compete favourably well with men in any electoral process. Therefore, there is need for an atmosphere of security that will enhance human dignity particularly those of the women. This requires a collective responsibility on the part of the government, non-governmental organizations, citizens and security agents to ensure that peace reign supreme in the country so that every Nigerian, every woman, will be secure to make contribution towards building a democratic society. In order to guarantee human security, a multi-sectoral approach needs to be adopted by the government and all stakeholders. Attentions must to be paid to economic, environmental, religious, political, etc., factors that engender insecurity in the country.

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REPRESSION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE TRIUMPH OF ANARCHISM

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Abstract

This paper explored the implications for modern society of the divergent theoretical views of Karl Marx on the class struggle and Mikhail Bakunin on anarchism for the attainment and construction of a more humane, equal and free modern society. Specifically, attention was focused on the contemporary romanticization of terrorism as a tool for radical social change. Terrorism is viewed, in this paper, essentially as a counter-weapon against the injustices of contemporary capitalism and the liberation of the oppressed classes. It was

the objective of this paper to demonstrate how terrorism arose from the suppression of the class struggle and how it ironically obfuscated the class struggle in the contemporary state. The paper was based on the proposition that since terrorist targets were diffuse and largely misdirected the contribution of terrorism as a strategy for social liberation and social transformation was weak and negative. Revolutionary theory as enunciated by Marx, Engels and Lenin served as the theoretical framework for the study. Data collection was mainly from secondary sources and the method of analysis adopted essentially qualitative and historical. A content analysis of the relevant works of Marx and Bakunin was also undertaken. It was a major conclusive remark of this paper that Bakunin's anarchist revolutionary strategy is largely responsible for the emergence and prevalence of terrorist organisations and tactics in the oppressed and exploited Third World countries. It was therefore recommended that strategies for closing the gap between opulence and the poverty would be necessary for defusing terrorism.

Key words: Anarchism, Terrorism, class struggle, exploitation, inequality, the state

Introduction

The history of the development of human societies is replete with records of various forms of terrorist actions undertaken by both the state, individuals and organised groups to achieve various purposes. Though what could generally come under the umbrella term of terrorism could be traced even to biblical times, contemporary terrorism is usually colligated with the French Revolution of 1789. Terrorism derives from the Latin word *terrere*, meaning “to cause to tremble or quiver.” Robespierre’s “Reign of Terror” was unleashed on the ‘enemies’ of the Revolution who were either imprisoned, tortured, or beheaded and has gone down on recorded as the first modern example of state terrorism (Ritzer, 2007: 136).

What Maxmilien Robespierre, one of the twelve leaders of the new French state in 1793, had instituted as a dictatorship for the purpose of achieving political stability, became the symbol of modern terrorism. His justification was the necessity to subdue the ‘enemies of liberty’ in the process of that massive social transformation of the ancient monarchical regime in France into a new stable and progressive liberal democracy. Zalman (2018 <https://www.thoughtco.com>) defined terrorism as “the unlawful use of

violence to achieve political gains” and traced its history to “humans' willingness to use violence to achieve political power”. Though earlier actions or activities that could be termed terrorist have been identified, scholars are generally of the view that terrorism would be analytically more useful if treated with a perception of modernity.

Terrorism is best thought of as a modern phenomenon. Its characteristics flow from the international system of nation-states, and its success depends on the existence of a mass media to create an aura of terror among large groups of people (Zalman, 2018 <https://www.thoughtco.com>).

Mention could be made of Barabbas that the Jews demanded to be released instead of Jesus Christ. “And there was one named Barabbas, which lay bound with them that had made insurrection with him, who had committed murder in the insurrection” (Book of Mark 15: 7). Obviously, those were a series of terrorist actions undertaken to achieve the liberation of the Jews from Roman imperial domination. Sicarii Zealots (dagger men), another Jewish group, also adopted murder and assassination as weapons for the liberation of Judea from the Romans in the first century AD. From the 11th to the 13th century the Hashhashin, from whom the word “assassin” was derived, operated in Syria and Iran (Zalman, 2018 <https://www.thoughtco.com>).

In the build up toward the 1917 Russian Revolution the Narodnaya Volya's relentless attacks facilitated the collapse of the Tsarist state in Russia. Terrorism is also usually associated or equated with anarchism. Russian anarchists and Narodniks (populists) advocated and actually deployed political terror and were responsible for assassinating Czar Alexander II on March 1, 1881 in the city of Saint Petersburg, for which they were dreaded (Lewis, <https://www.origins.osu.edu/connecting-history/top-ten-origins-terrorist-attacks>). From guerrilla tactics adopted by several Third World groups in their anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles terrorism has become a global phenomenon, particularly in the developing countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia.

Repression has been defined as “the use or threat of actions taken by state authorities, or their supporters, against opponents or potential opponents to prevent, weaken, or eliminate their capacity to oppose policies” (Darity Jr ed., 2008). Authorities include security forces and paramilitary agencies that target groups or individuals because of their political beliefs. State terror is a

repressive action or strategy by the state to instil fear and ensure quiescence in the entire population. Repression is viewed essentially as violence by the state.

What is termed the triumph of anarchism is the globally expanding scope of terrorist organizations and activities and the fear it has instilled in the leaders and citizens of these nations, which are committing immense proportions of their national resources to tackle the ugly menace. The steady spread in scope, intensity of action and subtlety of strategy have become the scourge of the modern societies, both developed and developing, and for which people tread with caution, fear and trepidation everywhere. Though terrorism has a conceptual specificity other forms of violence such as abduction, militancy, and insurrection would collectively be termed terrorist for the purpose of this paper since they all indicate the absence of social cohesion and stability in the state. Terrorism is no longer a fleeting episode that could be wished away but has rather assumed a dynamic that calls for proper academic attention with a view to attaining a better society for the future.

The Problem

Terrorism has gripped the modern world by the jugular. No part of the world is outside the reach of disguised and constantly lurking terrorists and nobody is completely free and secure from possible terrorist action or the threat of it, especially the post-colonial states of Africa, Asia and Latin America. These countries have become the breeding ground and recruitment channels for terrorist cells from where sudden and unexpected attacks are launched on targets across the world. Prior to the romanticization and intensification of terrorism in the contemporary world the most potent instrument of workers against the government and employers were strikes, protests, demonstrations, work-to-rule, etc. Despite the institutionalization of the process of resolving labour disputes through collective bargaining the suppression of workers' demands and agitations has been the hallmark of the "over-developed" post-colonial state (Alavi, 1972), with its all-powerful instruments of violence, and acting with "absolutism and arbitrariness" (Ake, 2001 p. 2-3).

This paper's central thesis is that the persistent brutal suppression of the class struggle is mainly responsible for the adoption of anarchic or terrorist strategies by the oppressed to confront the contemporary, largely capitalist, state and international capitalism. The disagreement between Marx and Bakunin in the First International was over the appropriate strategy for the

working class in its struggle against the ruling class and its oppressive state. Though the concept of revolution provided a common ground between the two revolutionary thinkers the dispute over the class struggle and anarchism was sharp enough to destroy the solidarity of the international working class' organisation. Even in the Second International Lenin had referred to Left-Wing Communism as an 'infantile disorder', to discredit the anarchists and their strategy of tactless destruction.

In the period following its crushing – a consequence, in Engels's view, of its lack of centralization and authority and the failure to use its coercive authority freely enough – the tendency towards state socialism of both the Marxist and reformist varieties gained ground. Some anarchists then adopted the tactic of 'propaganda by the deed' – acts of assassination of political leaders and terrorism of the bourgeoisie – intended to encourage popular insurrections (Bottomore ed., 2001 p. 22).

Part of the problem of this paper is what appears to be wrong targeting of the terrorists. Stories of abduction of wealthy capitalists or targeting of residential areas of the wealthiest beneficiaries and drivers of the capitalist world economy are very rare. In the main terrorist attacks are usually targeted at the common, crowded markets, bus or train loading points, stadia, etc. where the victims are the same poor and wretched people whose liberation they claim to be their objective. That is a major contradiction of the anarchist/terrorist revolutionary strategy in the contemporary world. From that perspective it would appear that the wealthy capitalist class is the ultimate beneficiary of terrorism.

That notwithstanding however governments across the globe still commit enormous resources to tackle terrorism and insurgency in terms of weapons, surveillance equipment, information gathering, media propaganda, etc. Diverting such resources in financially challenged post-colonial economies constitutes a serious threat to their developmental aspirations.

Another problem is the increasing level of unemployment and poverty across the world. Most of the youthful terrorists are lured into these groups with mouth-watering financial inducement that is difficult to resist because of the miserable economic condition to which capitalism has reduced them. Terrorism appears to be increasing in proportion as the level of unemployment and poverty rises. These are the identified problems that this paper addresses.

Aim and Objectives of Study

This paper aims to study the differential effects of the class struggle and terrorism/anarchism as revolutionary strategies and the responses of the state to the process of social transformation into a more humane society. The specific objectives are to:

1. Analyse the disagreement between Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin on the class/revolutionary struggle.
2. Demonstrate how anarchist/terrorist action intensifies with the suppression of the class struggle.
3. Examine how anarchism/terrorism obfuscates the class struggle and, in the process, gains more prominence and receives greater attention.

Research Questions

1. What were the points of disagreement between Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin on the class/revolutionary struggle?
2. How does anarchist/terrorist action intensify with the suppression of the class struggle?
3. In what ways does anarchism/terrorism obfuscate the class struggle and, in the process, gain more prominence and receive greater attention?

Research Propositions

1. The disagreement between Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin has a negative effect on the class/revolutionary struggle.
2. Where the class struggle is suppressed anarchist/terrorist actions would intensify and flourish.
3. Since terrorism thrives on disguised identity it obfuscates the class struggle and, in the process, gains more prominence and receives greater attention.

Methodology

Data collection for this study was mainly from secondary sources such as books, journals, newspapers, magazines, documentaries and internet sources and the method of analysis adopted was essentially qualitative, normative, analytical, conceptual and historical. A content analysis of the relevant works of Marx and Bakunin was also undertaken and proved to be an

invaluable component of the study. Baseline data presented in tables also greatly enriched the paper.

Theoretical Framework

The framework for proper theoretical guidance in this study derives from the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. It is based on the argument that the contemporary capitalist state and society thrive on class inequality, injustice, exploitation and repression, thus instigating a class struggle that would eventually result in a revolution leading to the inevitable destruction of the bourgeois state and its transformation into a proletarian state (Giddens, 1978 p. 207). Divergent views among revolutionary thinkers ruminate on the most appropriate strategy for achieving this objective. Social democrats like Kautsky and Bernstein believe in the possibility of a non-violent revolutionary transition while core Marxists insist on what is termed the “smashing of the state”. All previous revolutions are said to have merely perfected or reinforced the state machine but “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the state machinery and wield it for its own purposes, but that it must break, smash and destroy that machinery” (Miliband, 1970 pp. 309-319; McLellan, 1980 pp. 22-38). Smashing of the state is interpreted differently by Marxists and Anarchists. While to the former it implies a systematic dismantling of the bourgeois state institutions and their recomposition into a hegemonic workers’ state which would eventually “wither away” (Lenin, 2014 p. 52), the latter demand total freedom from any form of rule over workers. Smashing of the bourgeois state rather than peaceful transition involves a violent process.

For it is of course one of the basic tenets of Marxism, and one of its basic differences with anarchism, that while the proletarian revolution must smash the old state, it does not abolish the state itself: *a* state remains in being, and even endures for a long time to come, even though it begins immediately to “wither away” (Miliband, 1970 pp. 309-319).

The contradictory visions of a post-revolutionary society held by Marxists and anarchists are the results of disparate philosophical lines of thought on several historical and theoretical issues. Marx himself had thought that the issue of post-revolutionary social organisation should not be a subject of speculation but rather a practical and objective experience, thus leaving no guiding

principles on practical challenges that later confronted Lenin, who strongly attacked the anarchists and insisted on the need to retain the state in the transitional period of the dictatorship of the proletariat (Schapiro, 1979 p. 16; Lane, 1982 p. 10). Two key institutions were the bureaucracy and the military on which Marx argued for “the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people” (quoted by Lenin, 2009 p. 43). However, the practical challenge of transforming the military into an armed people was a task better left in the hands of leaders after a successful socialist revolution.

Lenin was equally to stress, as did Marx before him and Mao after him, that workers’ power could immediately be equated with, and did not automatically entail, the victory of socialism. It inaugurates an epoch of transition whose successful outcome is not pre-given, but depends upon a long, difficult, and stubborn class struggle, which after the overthrow of capitalist rule, after the destruction of the bourgeois state, after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, does not disappear . . . but merely changes its form and in many respects becomes fiercer (Corrigan, et al 1978: p. 25).

The class struggle merely changes form after the overthrow of the feudal state and upon its ruins the emergence of the bourgeois state, matures in the process of the development of capitalism and, successfully overthrows the bourgeois state and is sustained in the process of socialist construction. Anarchist/terrorist methods, such as the *Narodnaya Volya* in Russia, may be necessary in the revolutionary process, but as part of the class struggle, would be streamlined towards the institution of the proletarian state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat, before progressing toward a classless communist society (Lane, 1982 p. 25). That’s as far as the romance between anarchism and the class struggle can go. Beyond that anarchism romanticizes the idea of perfect freedom and equality, and rejects any form of authority.

For Marxism the class struggle, instigated by capitalist exploitation, oppression, deprivation and alienation, remains the fundamental dynamic of the revolutionary process. The state is the product of the irreconcilability of the class struggle rather than an institution for the reconciliation of classes. Engels (1978 p. 205) diverged from Hegel and rather noted that:

The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it “the reality of the ethical idea . . . the image and reality of reason,” as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel.

The state emerged at a particular historical period as an instrument of class exploitation and remains so, which necessitates its being smashed. However, “The state is not abolished. It withers away” (Lenin, 2014 p. 52) in the process of transition into a communist society. During the transition the state is turned from "a state of bureaucrats" into "a state of armed workers" (Miliband, 1970 p. 312). What this translates into is precisely the notion that the proletariat can both dominate and govern during its own dictatorship as a continuation of the class struggle.

The Firestorm between Marx and Bakunin

With each normative political thinker is imbued a cosmological perception of historical and contemporary events from a deep introspection peculiar to his genus as well as the philosophical tool for reshaping society to achieve the anticipated good life for humanity. These reflective thoughts have foreshadowed the future lives of generations of human communities. Two of such thinkers were burdened by the extremities of a sharply dichotomized modern society separated by so much opulence, comfort and opportunities at one pole and degradation and hopelessness at the other. While one advocated an organised vehicle for contending and contesting with the oppressor in the hope of reorganizing society based strictly on a preconceived vision, the other is completely averse to any form of governance or rule. Precisely at this point arose several strands of the chasm and acerbic rivalry between the two theoretical and philosophical paradigms.

While Marx based his theory of class struggle and historical development of human societies on a philosophy of definite stages of historical and social evolution that of Bakunin was purely spontaneous, being less of a systematic thinker or system builder and never pretended to be so. Bakunin was “not a philosopher and not an inventor of systems like Marx”

(Dolgoff, 1971 p. xiv). Though Joseph Proudhon is clothed with the toga of the father of anarchism much of the philosophical espousal and pragmatic activism for the realisation of an anarchist society rested on the shoulders of Bakunin. He refused to recognize any preconceived system or laws that shaped human history. He believed that no theory can 'save the world', but rather practical spontaneous action and in the aftermath a society of totally free and equal citizens without government or any form of rule. "Anarchism signifies the condition of being without rule" (Ritzer, 2007 p. 136). Bakunin had contended that teaching workers or labourers theories of revolutionary consciousness, organisation and action would simply quench the revolutionary fire in them.

More frightening is a graffiti inscribed to his credit stating that "the urge to destroy is a creative urge". The immediate impulse of the anarchists in any evolutionary situation is that singular drive to destroy. Nothing of the old order should be left standing as, henceforth, the functional relevance of any object in close affinity with the bourgeois state would be in the dustbin of history.

Bakunin's strategy envisaged spontaneous uprisings of the oppressed classes, peasants as well as industrial workers, in widespread insurrections in the course of which the state would be abolished and replaced by autonomous communes, federally linked at regional, national and international levels. The PARIS COMMUNE of 1871 hailed by Bakunin as a bold and outspoken negation of the state'-approximated to this anarchist model of revolution (Bottomore ed., 2001 p. 22).

In the doctrine of the anarchists the lumpen proletariat, the peasantry, the unemployed, the outlaws, underground world, criminals, unprivileged, urban mob, street urchins, pick-pockets, and all those untainted by bourgeois urban luxury, are the most revolutionary. The dregs and the very scum of society, the downtrodden gutter elements, men without property and no hope of regular employment, possess the strongest impulse for revolutionary action and are responsible for shaping human history. Bakunin, locked in a fierce contest for the leadership of the First International with Marx, had idealized the irrepressible spontaneous primitive movement or uprising and positive action of the hopeless social dregs and wretched urban mob for possessing the strongest revolutionary voice and strength in shaping human history rather

than an organised, overfed and over-pampered, white-collar working class vanguard seeking to replace the bourgeois in their self-seeking exploitative institutions (Bakunin, 2007). Some have pointed to the liberation movements against colonialism in the Third World and the examples of Russia, Spain, China and peripheral Europe - backward and spontaneous – as vindication of the anarchist position. Spontaneous revolutionary action rather than systematically planned labour movement, Bakunin and his anarchists argued, held the key for achieving the anticipated free society (Bakunin, 2007). But Marxists also claim the credit for these revolutionary achievements and their leaders align more with Marxism than Bakuninism, though anarchic/terrorist tactics had been deployed (Marx & Engels, 2010 pp. 97-108).

In that bitter intra working class struggle Marx had series of intellectual encounters with Max Stirner, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Rudolph Rocker, and Alexander Berkman, with tolerable variations, as the leading anarchists. Consequently, anarchism is “*a heterogeneous political field, containing a host of variations – for instance, organization versus spontaneity, peaceful transition versus violence, individualist versus collectivist means and ends, romanticism versus science, and existential versus structural critique of domination*” (Ritzer, 2007 p. 136). Theoretical anarchist variations such as libertarianism, libertarian socialism, syndicalism, anarcho-syndicalism, have blurred the essential disparity between Marxist-socialism and anarchism (Chomsky, 2013 pp. 9-11). Guélin (quoted in Chomsky, 2013 p. 19) identified a distinction between the anarchism of the nineteenth century “as essentially doctrinal, while the twentieth century, for the anarchists, has been a time of revolutionary practice”. Differing interpretations of anarchism made it apparently expedient for some anarchist leaders to participate in the “unconsummated social revolution” and the communist-dominated government in Spain, hoping to use that platform to “prevent the revolution from deviating and in order to carry it further beyond the war, and also to oppose any dictatorial tendency, from wherever it might come” (Chomsky, 2013 p. 52). To avoid getting befuddled by the various anarchist persuasions and losing focus this paper would stick to the orthodox Bakuninist theoretical stipulations on anarchism, while as much as possible maintaining the essential identifiable and unifying thread that runs through the thoughts of other anarchists.

Utopia of Anarchist Autonomy and Classless Society

Anarchism or Bakuninism is a philosophical doctrine and movement that rejects the idea and necessity for political authority but maintains that an ethical social order that engenders freedom and equality is possible and desirable without such overarching authority.

Its central negative thrust is directed against the core elements that make up the modern state: its territoriality with the accompanying notion of frontiers; its sovereignty, implying exclusive jurisdiction over all people and property within its frontiers; its monopoly of the major means of physical coercion by which it seeks to uphold that sovereignty, both internally and externally; its system of positive law which claims to override all other laws and customs; and the idea of the nation as the paramount political community. The positive thrust of anarchism is directed towards the vindication of 'natural society', i.e. a self-regulated society of individuals and freely-formed groups (Bottomore ed., 2001 p. 22).

Through a series of articles written in the wake of the events in Spain during the summer of 1873, Engels parodied the anarchists or Bakuninists who participated in the abortive cantonal revolts that were eventually overshadowed by the bourgeois counter-revolution of 1868-74. With the government's announcement that elections were to be held into the Constituent Cortes on May 10, 1873 the leaders of the Bakuninists were in a predicament as their continued avoidance of political participation became difficult and frustrating. In line with the anarchist philosophy its adherents had been preaching for years that no part should be taken in a revolution "*that did not have as its aim the immediate and complete emancipation of the working class, that political action of any kind implied recognition of the State, which was the root of all evil, and that therefore participation in any form of elections was a crime worthy of death*" (Engels, 1894, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864iwma/1872-hag/index>, Retrieved 15/05/2019). It thus turned out:

That most of the members of the International, including the anarchists, took part in the elections with no programme, no banner, and no candidates, thereby helping to bring about the election of almost exclusively bourgeois republicans. Only two or three workers got into the Chamber, and they represent absolutely nothing, their voice has not once been raised in

defence of the interests of our class, and they cheerfully voted for all the reactionary motions tabled by the majority (Engels, 1894, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864iwma/1872-hag/index>, Retrieved 15/05/2019).

Their advocacy was strictly for anarchy and autonomy, the abolition of all authority, especially that of the state, and the immediate and complete emancipation of the workers the achievement of which the Spanish revolution offered the best available opportunity for practical enforcement of what Engels termed their “ultra-revolutionary” doctrine.

As soon as they were faced with a serious revolutionary situation, the Bakuninists had to throw the whole of their old programme overboard. First, they sacrificed their doctrine of absolute abstention from political, and especially electoral, activities. Then anarchy, the abolition of the State, shared the same fate. Instead of abolishing the State they tried, on the contrary, to set up a number of new, small states (Engels, 1894, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864iwma/1872-hag/index>, Retrieved 15/05/2019).

The opportunity offered by the Spanish revolution to put to practice the most celebrated principles of anarchy such as free federation of independent groups, was not very successful, but rather resulted in a “senseless fragmentation of the revolutionary resources”, which enabled the “government to conquer one city after another with a handful of soldiers, practically without resistance”. But if anarchist autonomy failed in Spain so was the class struggle and progress toward a stateless communist society in Russia, China and elsewhere simply because they are utopias that should serve more as guiding principles than objectively realisable revolutionary goals. But despite its obvious flaws socialist principles still subsist in Russia, China, Cuba, Venezuela, achieved by revolutionary means. Several other countries are also producing socialist-oriented governments in Spain, Greece, and even France. However, to identify anarchist states one could only point to the failed states in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc. as displayed on Table 1 below.

Table 1: The World's Most War-Torn, Conflict-ridden and Failed States

Rank	Country	Conflict Related Fatalities
1	Syria	49,742
2	Iraq	23,898
3	Afghanistan	23,539
4	Mexico	12,224
5	Somalia	5,575
6	Nigeria	4,684
7	Sudan	3,891
8	South Sudan	3,544
9	Libya	2,865
10	Pakistan	1,803
11	Egypt	1,707
12	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1,565
13	Yemen	1,375
14	Ethiopia	1,114
15	Ukraine	902

Source: World Facts

<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-world-s-most-war-torn-countries>

The Class Struggle and its Suppression

The more the class struggle was suppressed the more terrorist/anarchist strategies were adopted in the struggle for the liberation of the masses from the oppressive capitalist state. Universally the most common official instrument for limiting workers' liberty from getting unionised, registering with a union, participating in a strike action or open protest, is legislation. In

several countries industrial courts have been established to determine the legality of the actions of unions and their leaders. Industrial arbitration panels are sometimes constituted to prevent the escalation of trade disputes between workers and their employers. Other industrial dispute resolution mechanisms include self-help (resolution based on the utilisation of an existing agreement), mediation (through a mediator mutually acceptable to both parties), and conciliation, through an Act that empowers the minister to appoint a fit person to reconcile parties in an industrial dispute (ILO, 2011; Akinbode, 2019).

Institutionalising or formalising the mechanisms for resolution of labour disputes has been a potent instrument by capitalists and governments to drastically reduce or frustrate labour actions and accordingly put labour in perpetual slavery and exploitation without revolutionary resistance (Giddens, 1978 p. 201). In many countries, workers cannot embark on a strike without the approval of the Industrial Court, and since it is a court established, funded, members appointed, operates under laws enacted, and under the authority of the government the direction of their verdicts is not farfetched. Despite being greatly discouraged by these intimidating layers of legal huddles the world keeps witnessing labour actions.

Twenty-first century Labour Strikes

- 2015 United Steel Workers Oil Refinery Strike
- 2015 British national rail strike of 21 May.
- 2015 London underground strike of 9 July.
- 2015 York University Teaching Assistant, Graduate Assistant, Research Assistant and Contract Faculty Strike
- 2015 Shell Oil refinery in Deer Park, Texas
- 2015 London underground strike of 6 August.
- 2015 Public-sector, air travel, retail, and transport strikes throughout Finland on September 18
- 2015 WCAU Photographers and Camera Operators Strike
- 2015 Kohler Strike
- 2016 Jewelers strike in India against excise duty
- 2016-17 The Chronicle Herald strike
- 2016 Verizon workers' strike
- 2016 China Airlines flight attendant labour unions
- 2016 Southern Rail strike in England
- 2016 Video game voice actor strike

- 2016 Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Union Strike
- 2017 Vandenberg Air Force Base civilian workers
- 2017 Charter Communications Spectrum CATV IBEW Local 3 strike
NYC Date: March 28
- 2017 Palestinian General Strike in support of political prisoners'
hunger strike
- 2017: 2017 Brazilian general strike
- 2017: 3rd October Catalan independentists General Strike
- 2017: 8 November Catalan independentists General Strike
- 2018 teachers' strike in the United States
- 2018 2018 York University strike: Teaching Assistants, Graduate
Assistant, Research Assistant, and Contract Faculty Strike
- 2018: Arizona teachers strike
- 2018: Brazil truck drivers' strike
- 2018: SNCF train transport strike in France
- 2018: Vermont nurses' strike
- 2018: Iran truck drivers' strike
- 2018: Rhode Island nurses' and allied health professionals' strike
- 2018: Marriott Hotels strike
- 2018: Feb 23-present: 2018–19 education workers' strike in the United
States
- 2018-present: School strike for climate
- 2019: 8-9th January India General Strike
- 2019: China Airlines pilots

Official crackdown on labour has become an indispensable insignia of the modern state. The gains of capital in terms of investment turn-over constitute a loss to labour in much the same way as the gains of labour through improved welfare eat deep into the profit margins of the capitalist. Here lies the source of irreconcilable contradiction between labour and capital that will end in the revolutions that would destroy the capitalist state which functions to sustain the exploitation of labour by capital. Consequently, capital would react negatively to the gains of labour unions achieved through sustained agitation.

The successes of Indonesian labour unions have led to a strong backlash from capital and the state. Employers have taken the threat of a strike wave seriously and tried to consolidate their power. Multinational corporations, including Samsung seem to

be behind those who are going on a reactionary offensive against workers' strikes (New Internationalist, 11 January 2018).

Crackdown on labour is to ensure wide profit margins for capital and that precisely is the purpose of capitalist investment. Labour strikes are a serious threat to capitalist profit, hence the crackdown as a necessary tool for containing labour, and since the state is a capitalist state it must act in the interest of capital. The crackdown is not organised by the employer but by the state in the interest of capital. Iran offers a classic modern example of state intolerance of labour emancipation.

Council for Coordination among Teachers Unions reported that the authorities have arrested at least 12 teachers since November 11 and reportedly summoned and interrogated 30 more. The authorities arrested Hashem Khastar, a prominent Teachers Union member in Mashhad, on November 1, after the first walkout, and held him in a psychiatric hospital until November 19, then released him. Three other prominent members of the teacher's union are also currently behind bars in Iran. Iran's recent crackdown on labor activists has extended to the private sector. On November 18, the Telegram channel of the Haft Tappeh Sugar Cane Workers' Syndicate reported that authorities arrested all members of the association of labour representatives for the Haft Tappeh Sugar Cane company, including two of the group's prominent leaders, Esmael Bakhshi and Mohsen Armand. On November 20, Mosfata Nazari, the prosecutor of Shoosh County, told reporters that authorities have released 15 labour activists who were arrested during the protests. Rasoul Bodaghi, a Teachers Union member who spent seven years in prison from 2009 to 2016 for his peaceful activism, told Human Rights Watch that authorities detained Khastar in the hospital without bringing charges. Sadighe Maleki, Khastar's wife told the Centre for Human Rights on October 25 that authorities at the hospital requested permission from the Mashhad's prosecutor's office before allowing her to visit (Mehri, B., Human Rights Watch, 13 November, 2018).

Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) protect the right to form and join labour unions. Iran is a party to both of these treaties. Iran is a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), but has refused to sign the treaty's convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organize and 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining.

A series of Amnesty International Reports indicate states' high handedness against labour protests all over the world. In Turkey 35 workers and union officials from the Renault plant were sentenced in 2018 for violating the Turkish law on assemblies and demonstrations. More than 1,000 people have been arbitrarily detained following the protests, with some having been brought to court in trials that do not meet international fair trial standards. Witnesses told Amnesty International of widespread torture and other ill-treatment including being made to roll in sewage or ashes from burnt tyres. Amnesty International "*confirmed that doctors have attended to 343 cases of people injured during protests and after arrests. Of these, 78 people had suffered gunshot wounds and four had been bitten by dogs which were set on them by the authorities*" (Amnesty International, cited in Premium Times, January 23, 2019). In Sudan officials claim at least 26 people, including two security personnel, died during a month of protests, while rights group Amnesty International put the death toll at more than 40. Upon their return from a strike action, more than 1,600 workers were notified that they had been laid off due to their alleged involvement in the unrest on December 20 in Bangladesh. Clamp down on labour unions and their leaders is a universal phenomenon involving almost all states mainly because it is viewed as a threat to the existence of the state. However, the long-term effect of this crackdown on labour is the emerging phenomenon of anarchist terrorism across the globe.

Terrorism/Anarchism and the Class Struggle

Terrorist groups usually recruit disaffected, alienated, unemployed and distraught individuals, and then expose them to strong ideologies like nationalism, religion, ethnicity and race. These downtrodden are, through constant indoctrination, made to hate the other group and devalue human life, a psychological condition necessary for committing terrorist acts. In recent history, political opposition groups such as anarchists, Marxists and

nationalists on the left to fascists and the ultra-right genus have adopted terrorist tactics to promote their agenda, through bombing, destroying property, political assassination, shooting, arson, and other forms of destructive crudity to attack and instil fear in the public. Colonial national liberation movements in the Third World, such as the Mau Mau in Kenya, Maji Maji in Tanzania, the Palestinians in the Middle East, the Irish Republican Army in Britain, the Basque Separatist Movement in Spain, the PKK in Turkey, etc. have all adopted similar terrorist patterns in their respective struggles for freedom and equality.

The term has also been associated in the twentieth century with indiscriminate or excessive use of violence. State terrorism has also been levelled against actions of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, the United States, Israel, and other countries. US state terrorist actions in Southeast Asia, Africa, South America, etc. are well known. In the 1980s the US became the only country that has ever been convicted by the World Court, which condemned US action against Nicaragua under Ortega (Chomsky, 1988). From the 1980s to the present, terrorists have constructed spectacles of terror to promote their causes, attack their adversaries, and gain worldwide publicity and attention through their own media outlets and networks. Terror spectacle is a new strategy being increasingly utilised as a significant part of contemporary terrorism and various groups systematically adopt it to promote their agenda. Sensational and awe-inspiring terrorist acts are promoted as media or terror spectacles to gain worldwide attention, dramatize or sensationalise terrorist actions and achieve their political objectives (Kellner, 2003).

Hijacking airplanes has been a standard terrorist practice from the 1970s when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked three western jetliners. The group forced the planes to land in the Jordanian desert, and then blew them up in an incident known as “Black September”. In 1972, Palestinian gunmen from the same movement stunned the world when they took Israeli athletes hostage at the Munich Olympic Games. In June 1985, a double bombing of Air India jets originating from Canada attracted global attention, same with the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. On September 11, 1993 the World Trade Centre was bombed in New York by Islamic terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden, as the most spectacular terrorist aggression. An American born terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 and

wounding more than 500. Further, the bin Laden group assaulted US embassies in Africa in 1998 and a US destroyer harboured in Yemen in 2000.

These actions introduced the world to modern terrorism and this paper argues that when the poor, wretched, economically deprived and socially displaced persons are denied the regular route of labour unions to perform their critical roles as stake holders in civil society they tend to resort to anarchist/terrorist violence as the only available alternative. Consequently, the more workers are repressed and alienated the more they become useful instruments in terrorist organisations. More often than not the modern state views workers and their unions as an unnecessary inconvenience that should be crushed or suppressed. Except in extreme cases the usual weapon of workers is strike action. But when channels for ventilating their grievances are closed then the resort to terrorist violence becomes inevitable.

Workers revolutions produced the socialist states of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Albania, Bulgaria, Vietnam, North Korea, Cambodia, Angola, Tanzania, Hungary, Mozambique, etc. This socialist map of the world has receded tremendously. Among them only China, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela and Vietnam could rightly lay claim to a socialist status. Multiparty states that are being governed by socialist parties include Angola, Bolivia, Congo, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Conversely terrorist-based anarchist states appear to be gaining prominence. War-torn states in which an anarchic situation prevails include Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, Central African Republic. The question has often been raised regarding the practicability of anarchy as a form of government. Bauer (2018, <https://www.quora.com>) insists that anarchic communities do exist as enclaves within states.

What I talk about is, at least in Germany, called “Wagenburgen” and can either be areas with trailers, camper vans and shacks on it, or whole buildings. Those places are squatted. Which means, they were once empty places with no landlord or owner and people started living in there, occupying the premises. The first squat in Germany was set up in the early 70s and is called “Rauchhaus”. It was the first time that people occupied a house like that and the police tried to force them

out, resulting in a huge war like confrontation where a young man was shot dead by the police. His family name was Rauchhaus and the building got its name because of his death and what it meant to the system in general. Eventually the people at the Rauchhaus were allowed to stay. After many shifts and changes how the house was used, it's today a rather peaceful place. The government has even declared it a protected place of German history and funds certain improvements the house may need.

He further stated that one can play music full blast even at night, loud enough to make the windows vibrate several meters away and nobody cares, use an angle grinder or any other noisy tool for several hours at even 3am. One can make money any way one pleased. Nationality of residents does not count as everyone lives freely without identity. Consequently, no flags are flown there.

Similar "autonomous zones" exist today in anti-authoritative and non-hierarchical fashion in some states. The Zapatistas in Chiapas Mexico live in a form of non-hierarchical anti-authoritarian communities; the Rojava in Syria; during the Spanish Civil War, Catalanian Anarcho-Communists; Congo East where militias rule and everyone does what he wants and there is large-scale rape, murder and violence without consequences, everybody carries guns and uses them to get what they want. Somalia from 1991 – 2006 experienced anarchy, Iraq was without government for 208 days in 2010, in 2011 Belgium had no government for 589 days, Libya has been in anarchy since after the death of Gaddafi, Yemen since the Arab Spring of 2011, Zomia in South East Asia, a vast area that covers parts of North Vietnam, Laos, Tibet, Burma, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In such areas there are no laws, no rules, no tax payment, no police, no authority.

It would appear that while the imperialist world focused on socialism and ensured its destruction anarchism has been on the rise largely unnoticed. Generally, less attention is given to anarchist communities, even the war-ravaged states like Congo and Somalia have attracted negligible global attention. The spread of anarchist terrorism like wild fire across the world is being deliberately concealed by the international media, dominated as it is by the owners of capital, to avoid frightening the global community. Several states, particularly in the Third World, have actually degenerated into anarchy without capturing effective media attention. Such states include Nigeria,

Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, etc. Anarchism is the new spectre that is haunting the world as the class struggle appears to have been largely contained.

Who Ultimately Benefits from Terrorist Action?

While Anarchic/terrorist resentment is directed at the propertied class and managers of state institutions, its strategic actions appear to be largely misdirected and consequently tend to be self-destruct to the benefit of the exploiting class. Terrorists characteristically target densely populated areas or gatherings to perpetrate their heinous devastations in the hope of hitting a large number of casualties. Consequently, most of the victims of terrorist actions are the same downtrodden, wretched, unemployed, peasants and middle-class elements rather than the wealthy capitalist oppressors except in rare cases like plane-hijack or terror-inspired plane crash or bombing. Since capitalism as an economic system is usually held to be responsible for the exploitation and oppression of the lower classes it would be expected that anarchist terrorists should have capital and its institutions and drivers as their primary target. But this is not so. To the extent that capital is not directly or even indirectly targeted for terrorist action capitalists have little or nothing to lose, except in rare high-profile bombings like the World Trade centre.

Though employers are usually not very comfortable with the actions of workers, unionization rights have received widespread acceptance. Union leaders are known and easily contacted for negotiations in the event of a labour dispute, unlike terrorists who operate clandestinely, without identity or even point of contact. Class struggle is thus easier to contain or manage than terrorism. Governments spend huge sums of money to contain terrorism either to combat it with sophisticated weapons or surveillance equipment or free hostages or somehow meet their demands. These are resources that could be deployed to create employment, reduce inflation, economically empower peasants and other rural dwellers as a means of winning the citizens back and keeping them out of the reach of terrorist scouts. However, the greed of profit maximizing capital would rather suppress workers agitations and spend on combating terrorism which makes everyone a loser.

Anarchism negates and weakens the class struggle as there is no synergy between the two groups seeking to create a better society for the same lower classes in society. It is a house divided against itself and therefore cannot stand, as it diverts the attention of the government away from the class

struggle. For instance, in Nigeria a paltry thirty thousand Naira (N30,000.00) minimum wage has been the subject of controversy with all kinds of intrigues, promises, blames and denials for some years but Boko Haram is appeased to release abducted victims. Currently the sum of one hundred billion Naira is being offered Fulani herdsmen after killing over 20,000 people, destroying property, ravaging several rural communities and taking over farmlands for grazing. Resources spent this way are huge losses to the working class constantly under pressure in efforts to maintain decent living standards.

Furthermore, rather than target the state for destruction terrorism/anarchism tends to create enclaves within the state as anarchic communities, in which they live as lawless lords, deploying their weapons to get what they want. Everybody in such anarchic communities is a bearer of weapons. In Nigeria such enclaves exist in the North East and neighbouring border communities with Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

Conclusion

In conclusion both Marx and Bakunin conceptualised capitalism as an oppressive and exploitative mode of production dominated by a property-owning class and aided by the state. The capitalist state is an organised system of power that functions in the interest of the ruling and economically dominant class (Poulantzas, 1978 p. 54). Beyond this point the fireworks begin. While Marx advocated workers' organisation in labour unions (Schapiro, 1979 p. 29), Bakunin considered such unions unnecessary. To Marx the class struggle is a sustained engagement against employers and the state, but Bakunin fixes his eyes squarely on spontaneous destruction of the bourgeois state. Post-socialist revolution involves a period of socialist construction before the state gradually withers away in the Marxist view but anarchism rejects any form of authority after the revolution and therefore smashing the state is a compelling immediate assignment.

One essential conclusion is that the disagreement between Marx (Marxism) and Bakunin (Anarchism) is apparently irreconcilable and irresolvable. Consequently, one could either be a Marxist or a Bakuninist or an anarchist. However, the emergence of various shades and colours of anarchism would appear to have blurred the distinction between the two revolutionary paradigms. Socialism, libertarianism, and syndicalism should therefore not be confused with anarchism

Workers' most potent weapon is the strike action until the outbreak of a revolution when violence of whatever form would be necessary for smashing the capitalist state. However, to prevent revolutionary outbreak labour leaders are constantly haunted and hounded down and their organisations repressed. But such actions against labour are the necessary seed for the resort to anarchic violence in form of terror. Unemployment is the creation of capital to enable the maximisation of profit. However, these unemployed youths become easy targets for recruitment into terrorist organisations. Consequently, terrorism is also a creation of capital. The more labour is oppressed or repressed the more terrorism thrives. While the capitalist world focusses on reversing the gains of socialism terrorism and anarchism are growing tremendously. Therefore, as socialist states reduce in number anarchic states and enclaves are on the increase. Finally, the world has a responsibility to decide between socialism and anarchism.

Recommendations

Based on the conclusions that have been drawn from this study the following recommendations are expedient:

- The clampdown on workers and their unions should be reduced. It is necessary for employers and the state to constantly dialogue with labour in order to resolve the problems of the society.
- Sincere efforts should be made to drastically reduce the level of unemployment since it is a major source of numerically strengthening terrorist organisations.
- The study of Marxism and Anarchism in the universities should be encouraged for students to have a good knowledge of the trend toward which the world is inevitably destined.
- States should strive to achieve socialism through peaceful social democratic transformation that would redistribute wealth and avoid a violent revolution.
- Strategies should be adopted for bridging the gap between the high level of opulence of the bourgeoisie and the mass misery and grinding poverty of the oppressed and dehumanised masses as a means of defusing terrorism.

Contributions to Knowledge

- Establishing the nexus between class struggle and terrorism is a unique contribution of this paper.
- The idea that the suppression of the class struggle encourages terrorism is also new.

- That the politically and economically dominant class is shielded more from terrorism and that the oppressed classes are also the greatest victims of terrorism.

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**THE POLITICS OF DECAMPING AND REALIGNMENT OF
POLITICAL FORCES: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRE-2019
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA**

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Abstract

This paper explains the underlying political views and how they relate to the 2019 general elections in Nigeria. It also analyses the emerging patron-client nexus between political actors and the electorate as part of crony capitalism that shaped elections in Nigeria. The patrons represent the political actors whose ambitions are driven by the language of money, power and influence. They have the audacity to interchange from one political party to another to cling to power. The clients on the other hand, symbolize the masses; they are friendly allies to every patron and are willing to compromise their positions for the sake of personal survival. This makes it simple for the political patrons to enjoy the support of the clients and use them against their opponents any time they are defecting to another political grouping or party. It was found that 2019 general election was strongly pre-determined by patron-client influence and arranged political decamping which benefited political actors.

Keywords: patron-client, political actors, electorate, decamping, party

Introduction

Before the 2019 general elections in Nigeria, the relationship between the patrons and clients played out in political rallies in favour of the former; party defectors enjoy the support of the crowd (clients) whenever they are switching side from one political party to the other. Politics of decamping and realignment of political parties is pervasive and most common amongst the actors of the two rival political parties, All Progressive Congress (APC) and People Democratic Party (PDP) that are so far the strongest in the last few years. This is not to say that politics of decamping and realignment of political parties are new developments in Nigerian politics. It is a phenomenon that has long been in practice prior to independence. Following the 1959 Federal

elections, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC), Northern People's Congress (NPC) and Action Group (AG) which were compelled by the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 to become regional parties have witnessed decamping and merger. The union between the NPC and NCNC brought Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to power as Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe as Governor-General and later President on Independence Day. This is because no single party was able to win majority in the legislative council to form a government in 1960. Later on, a faction of AG led by Samuel Ladoke Akintola decamped to form an alliance with the NPC prior to the Regional elections while the NCNC joined the other AG faction of Obafemi Awolowo to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). From then onward, defection and merger became a strategy used by political parties to win election and capture political power. In recent times, the reactions of political actors seeking elective positions across the length and breadth of Nigeria in the 2019 general elections have heightened between the two major political parties, APC and PDP which have large followers across different parts of the country. The struggle for political positions by the actors of the two political parties (APC and PDP) is clearly manifested in the number of decamping and alliances and the declining role of "godfathers" (Sobachi 2019).

Highlighting the importance of political alliances in democracy Dahl (1971) observed that coalition among political parties is imperative in democracy as it provides for majority rule and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups. Defection on the other hand provides opportunity for individual(s) with opposing view to denounce political party in place of a new one. In the context of Nigeria, for example, decamping and realignment among the elite group are instigated by poor party's internal democracy, politics of money bag, and imposition of candidates, "godfatherism", political exclusion, intra-party squabble and factionalisation. The trend was worse and more disturbing in 2014 when five state Governors defected from the ruling PDP to APC and APC became a coalition of opposition parties barely few months to the 2015 general elections. Similarly, in 2018 the Senate President, Bukola Saraki and fifteen other Senators, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yakubu Dogara and over twenty members from the APC ruling party alongside some state Governors decamped to the opposition party, PDP and vice versa. Related incidences

occurred in many State Houses of Assembly including; Ekiti, Ondo, Ogun, Rivers, Imo, Benue, and Plateau States among others.

While political actors are busy strategizing and plotting on how to capture political power in 2019 whereas there is a negation of critical matters of importance that bothers most Nigerians which ordinarily are to provide a bearing in the elections. For example, security, economy, corruption, poverty, political exclusion, incompetence, restructuring and unemployment are potent and decisive factors that should be top priority on the agenda list of every contestant. On the contrary, patron-clients relationship, sectional affinity and material drive are major areas of concern because of the premium attached to them. Despite the fact that the political elite are showing overriding influence in elections, the economically disempowered clients are also wielding their permanent voter's card as a sign of strength even though their votes might not necessarily weigh much, yet it remains a decisive factor in election. The conjecture of this paper is that though the 2019 elections may have been predicated on certain concealed interests of the political elite, the prediction is that it might likely change the narrative of 2015 where people voted massively and blindly for one political party and ignored credibility and competence. The situation outrightly changed because of the existence of multiple political parties and economic hardship which many people faced.

The other side of pre-2019 general elections is the ambivalence that faced the society; public betrayal, lack of trust, accusations and counter-accusations, switching of side by political actors from one political party to another and increasing political violence. These were challenges that were predicted to erode public confidence and exacerbate fear, doubt, and hopelessness in the country. Being a plural society with over 250 ethnic nationalities spread across different regions (Ojo 2009) the fear has become more worrisome. These ethnic nationalities interact closely with one another but have different religious belief, diverse primordial attachment to varying regions and deepened suspicion among each other. It is therefore more challenging for its leaders to share similar ideology and pursue common agenda for the good of all, knowing full well that individuals' priority usually differs and their interests are never the same. International Crisis Group (2014) aptly captures the scenario in this dynamic manner, that, it is only when the elite group agrees to share the spoils that all is well but when they disagree, they politicize, manipulate and instrumentalise ethno-religious and regional divisions. To state the obvious, it is worth nothing that the resumption of

civilian regime in Nigeria does not mean the unity of political forces; in short, the elite simply forgo their differences for a while in order to scavenge and solidify their grip on the nation's resources.

The period 1999 witnessed the avalanche of political collusion against the military and the emergence of political interest groups, while 2011-2015 was jolted with the trivial and parochial issues of religion, regionalism and sectionalism which are critical and decisive forces in the 2019 general elections. In the light of the foregoing therefore, the discussion in this paper is divided into five segments beginning with the introduction, zero-sum and elite theoretical perspective in part two, the primacy of political views in part three, the height of partisan politics located in part four, and the final part concludes by given suggestions on the need to strengthen electoral laws to make provision for healthy political decamping and realignment of political parties in a way that it will not impede on the unity and development of the Nigerian state.

Zero-Sum Game and Elite Theory Perspective

The research adopts two theoretical perspectives for its analysis; zero-sum game theory and elite theory. Zero-sum game theory drives from game theory which place emphasis on conflict and cooperation. It highlights the role of decision-making where many players must make choices that affect the interest of the other players. A player is an agent who makes decision in a game and his decision could affect others in a positive or negative way. Therefore, zero-sum game theory is a rational strategy where each player chooses actions that are best for them given their opponents' choices. In other words, players take the best form of action to win in all contests or battle while the opponent loses all (Turocy 2001). Zero-sum game theory explains the fierce state of political contest in Nigeria. Political actors seize each moment of election as opportunity to win and not to lose and when that happens the winner take all while the loser is left to grieve and given no choice to participate in governance. As such, the loser become the opposition force and ready to criticise the winning party and plots its down fall. The principle of winner takes all as observed in democracy encourages bad governance, expose the fragility of the state and poses threats to true federalism.

Elite theory on the other hand is a concept anchored on social class analysis in Europe in the years of fascism. Proponents of this theory are

Wilfred Pareto, Geatano Mosca, and Robert Michels. According to them, every society is ruled by small (minority) group of people who possess the attributes that makes it possible for them to ascend to the top. Generally, the elite are seen as successful people in every area of endeavour in the society. And because of their high ranks they are influential, wealthy and dominant and ride on that to determine and influence the direction of the society to their advantage or of their cronies. One notable trait of the elites group is that they are hardly in conflict with each other, they seldom experience crisis however when it happens the followers bear the brunt but as for them they hurriedly come together to form a new platform to defend their interests. In short, the elites have permanent interest and temporary foes. In the light of the Nigerian context the elites group has a united interest and ideology; they only differ in personality and context. They tapped into the diversity of the Nigerian state and deep ignorance of the public to exploit for their benefit. In short, the essence of decamping and realignment by political elites is simply for the sake of the overriding interest of the group or threat to their interests. While realignment on the other hand is a coalition of the interest of all political actors for the purpose of harnessing power and economic resources to promote stability of the elite class.

The Primacy of Political Views: Convolutd Political Decamping and Merger

At independence Nigeria practiced the Westminster system of government with three political parties, NCNC, NPC and AG in opposition. The election for an enlarged federal legislature took place in December 1959 and was contested under regional lines. Because no party enjoyed majority and because the North had the largest representation it was most favoured. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the NPC from the North formed a new government in alliance with the NCNC from the East while the AG remained in opposition (Iba and Asongo 2013). In 1963 because of opposing views, the merger between NCNC and NPC failed and there was a break up, the faction of NCNC joined AG led by Awolowo and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) led by Mallam Aminu Kano which later formed the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) while the NPC joined with the remaining faction of the AG led by Ladoke Akintola (premier of Western Region) to form the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). There was outright show of power in the west between Awolowo faction and Akintola who had

the backing of the NPC. During the 1964 general elections it was clear that alliances between political parties were intended to defend individual interests rather than uniting the country as given the support to individuals to win political position was almost a priority. This was what led to persistent election crisis in the west and constant invitation of the military by the politicians. As Eleazu (1988) argued, the 1966 military coup that ushered in Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi as Head of State was occasioned by near collapse of law and order after the 1964 general elections where “politicians had either used the army or attempted to use it against their opponents”. Nigerians went to war in 1967 due to sheer greed of the political class and the military of which the latter continue to occupy the political space until a duly elected government came on board on 1st October 1979. Unfortunately, the civilian regime presided over by Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979 was removed through a palace coup in 1983 by Gen. Mohammadu Buhari on allegation of corruption, complicity and maladministration charges. Due to poor human rights record of the Buhari’s administration and lack of trust in civilian regime it was also overthrown through a palace coup in 1985 by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida. The 1985 military coup was applauded; Babangida’s entrance received an awe-inspiring public support simply of the excitement for a change. Besides, the enthusiasm of the international community to receive anyone that will facilitate transition to civil rule and uphold fundamental human rights and open up the economy to foreign investors legitimized the Babangida’s regime. His promise to return Nigeria to civil rule in 1987 was celebrated across the length and breadth of Nigeria, the international community also promised to support Nigeria with its push to civil rule (Lewis et al 1998). Thereafter, political associations were registered under different platforms and allowed to mobilize followers across the nook and cranny of the nation. Meanwhile old politicians were banned from participating in politics and later unbanned when the government realized that such awkward decision could create tension in the country. Over 50 political associations subsequently formed alliances and registered as political parties, however, none was able to scale through the rigorous government scrutiny process. The government finally came up with two political parties, Social Democratic Party (SDP) mostly populated by the bourgeois and conservative class and National Republican Convention (NRC) filled up with progressives and young political minds. The dual finally came up with presidential candidates (MKO Abiola for SDP and Alhaji Bashir Tofa in NRC) to contest in the 1993 general elections which was later annulled by

Gen. Ibrahim Babangida on murky circumstances. His claims are still not clear up to this moment as his decision to step aside after the annulment of the election result is still ambiguous.

Thereafter, the annulment of the 1993 Presidential result which Chief MKO Abiola was alleged to have won, Gen. Babangida was confronted with serious public opposition and his continuous stay in power. A situation that constrained him (Gen. Babangida) to single-handedly select Chief Earnest Shonekan, MKO Abiola's kinsman from Abeokuta as alternative to head an Interim National Government (ING). The ING was described by political analysts and lawyers as illegal and unconstitutional thereby exacerbating pressure on the government. The inability of the ING to manage the ensuing civil disobedience and mass protest occasioned by the annulment of 1993 election and the appointment of ING prolong the stay of the military in politics. The Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Sani Abacha in a military coup grand style masterminded the removal of the ING and announced himself as the head of state of Nigeria in November 1993 (Lewis et al 1998). Having the knowledge of what precipitated the exit of his boss, Gen. Abacha quickly embarked on political and economy reforms to pacify Nigerians and to win the support of the international community. He flagged up a transition to civil rule with five government registered political parties that include; Congress for National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), United Nigerian Congress Party (UNCP) and Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM). All the five political parties are government funded parties and the structures and overall activities are determined by the military government. Unfortunately, Gen. Abacha could not achieve his dream of becoming an elected Nigeria's President after being endorsed by all the political parties as the only presidential candidate. He died mysteriously in the villa and his Chief of Army Staff Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar took over from him.

Having explained the backdrop of political merger the concern is further shifted to the critical issue of politics of decamping and realignment of political parties which began in earnest after the failed alternation arrangement of 2011 by the PDP stakeholders and founders. The PDP zoning formula which was a gentleman's arrangement within the party ultimately did not favour the northern section of the country and did not take into account the interest of certain political figures in the country too which have become a decisive force after independence. For this reason, the struggle for the seat of

the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was fiercely contested. Going by the PDP zoning formula it was agreed that after the completion of Obasanjo's tenure in office power was to be returned to the North. The arrangement became suspicious when President Obasanjo began to shop for new successors outside the Northern zone (the likes of Peter Odili, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, Donald Duke and Victor Atta) few months to the expiration of his tenure in office. Some Northern political heavy weight like Jibril Aminu, Rabiu Kwankwaso, Abubakar Atiku (Vice President), and southern political figures like, James Ibori, Rotimi Amechi, Good Luck Jonathan, Peter Odili etc who were eying the office of the President were denied the PDP presidential ticket when President Obasanjo bowed to pressure and single-handedly picked ailing Umar Yar'Adua as the PDP Presidential candidate and Goodluck Jonathan as his running mate for the 2007 general elections. Due to certain hidden interests in the mind of Obasanjo he went ahead to argue that the election of Yar'Adua is a "do or die affair" (*Daily Independent*, 2007). This vehement position of former President Obasanjo attracted criticisms and placed him on collision course with ambitious politicians who challenged the neutrality and capacity of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) under Professor Maurice Iwu to conduct free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria. At last Yar'Adua, the most favoured candidate contested against Gen. Muhammadu Buhari of All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP) in the presidential election of 2007. The elections were alleged to have been rigged in favour of Yar'Adua which the latter acknowledged some of the defects and went ahead to set up a committee to review and amend certain provisions of the electoral laws after he had become the President elect. The elections underscore the desperation of political actors to attain position of authority using every means available. Following the 2007 election, most prominent members of the PDP fall apart with the party and relocated to other political parties and those that remained continued to plots the down fall of the party. This eventually happened after the party failed to win in the 2015 presidential race and some of its ardent supporters defected to the opposition parties and a new comer to the party like, Ali Modu Sheriff that decamped from ANPP became the national Chairman of the PDP.

Unfortunately, President Yar'Adua could not complete his first four-year tenure in office having been knocked down by ill-health, he eventually died on 5th May 2010 (Iba and Asongo 2013). His Vice, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was sworn in as President as enshrined in the 1999 constitution.

After completing the four-year tenure of President Yar'Adua, close to the 2011 general elections prominent Northern political figures in the PDP emerged again to argue in support of the party zoning arrangement and call on President Goodluck Jonathan to resign his position and withdraw his intention to contest in the 2011 general elections. Obviously, the sudden death of President Umaru Yar'Adua and his inability to complete his four-year tenure in office created a gap and altered the PDP arrangement which threw open many questions on Nigeria's true federalism. Political gladiators argued that Goodluck Jonathan have no moral right to contest for the office of the president after he had completed the one tenure of Yar'Adua. According to them, President Obasanjo who held from the same region (south) with Jonathan spent eight years in office, so the next president should not emerge from that same region instead it should come from the North. According to the protagonists, President Jonathan violated the Party's agreement. Political forces both in the ruling party and the northern region used ethno-religious weapons to gang up against the Jonathan's regime. This was heightened by the increased Boko Haram attacks and hatred for Christians in the North. President Jonathan's fear was embedded in his expression that there were members of Boko Haram in his cabinet who usually leaked information to the Boko Haram terrorists. In fact, the prevailing view held in southern Nigeria was that Boko Haram was the proxy of northern politicians who are geared towards discrediting the government of a southern-Christian President (Mustapha, 2012). Surprisingly the intensity of Boko Haram attacks increased in the Northeast and bombings of Churches, Mosques and other soft targets even in the federal capital territory heightened. for instance, the Nigerian Police Headquarters, Nyaya motor Park, United Nations building and Catholic Church, Madella were all hit by Boko Haram bombs in 2011. The sharp disagreement among PDP actors was partly responsible for the post-election violence that engulfed Northern Nigeria after Jonathan was declared as the president elect in the April Poll of 2011 by INEC. In addition, the violent response to President Jonathan's victory reflected the perception of northerners that they were the losers in the zero-sum game of Nigerian politics which ultimately increased hatred and demeaning of the Jonathan's administration (*Weekly Trust* 21st May 2011; *Sunday Trust* November 13 2011).

Aggrieved members of the PDP that included some state governors like, Rotimi Amechi (Rivers), Abdulfatai Ahmed (Kwara), Rabiu Kwankwaso

(Kano), Murtala Nyako (Adamawa), Aliyu Takada Wamako (Sokoto), Speaker of the House of Representative, Aminu Tambuwal and a host of other members of the House of Representatives and Senate decamped to the opposition party before the 2015 general elections. These men and some aggrieved northern members from the opposition party plotted the down fall of the Jonathan's administration when it was obvious that the latter was seeking re-election in 2015. Meanwhile the opposition parties formed a merger and some prominent politicians from the PDP (Abubakar Atiku, Audu Ogbe, Rabiu Kwankwaso, Rochas Okorocha, Aminu Tambuwal, Bukola Saraki, Samuel Ortom, Godswill Akpabio etc) and other smaller parties joined them. The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) which was predominant in the South-West and partly South-South merged with the All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), and Alliance for Democracy (AD) and a breakaway faction of All People Grand Alliance (APGA) to form All Progressive Congress (APC). The APC featured Mohammadu Buhari as its Presidential candidate in the 2015 general elections against President Goodluck of the PDP. Even before the elections Buhari was touted to win the election and end the raging Boko Haram crisis in the Northeast and insecurity ravaging other parts of Nigeria. Buhari won the 2015 election with wide margin against the incumbent, President Goodluck Jonathan as a result of overwhelming grassroots support and his promise of "change" and intended radical departure from the status quo.

APC "Change" Slogan Ambivalence and Political Decamping

After three years and half in office, President Buhari was unable to deliver to Nigerians on his campaign promises; instead, insecurity grew worse in the Northeast (Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, Taraba, Gombe and Bauchi states), and North central states of Benue, Nasarawa, Kaduna and Niger. Human killing, kidnapping and cattle rustling in Zamfara and Kaduna States are seen as part of normal life style as there is a complete breakdown of law and order without immediate solution in sight. In the South-East, Biafra separatist intensified their protest for a separate state for the Igbo people under the banner of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Corruption assumed a high proportion, especially among Buhari closet allies. The Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Babachir Lawal, for example, was dismissed by the President after culpably found enmeshed corrupt practices. The General Manager of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Andrew Yakubu was

accused of diverting the corporation's resources to his personal account; the case is still pending in the law court, Minister of Finance, Kemi Adeosun was accused of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) certificate forgery which the government continued to ignore until the Minister bowed to public pressure and resigned on her own and fled the country to the United Kingdom. These are few cases among high profile cases pending in law courts.

Nigerians have accused APC government of poor performances, lack of internal democracy and political exclusion. These situations triggered yet another exodus of some political heavy weight from the party to the opposition, (PDP). The Senate President, Bukola Saraki for example and other 15 Senators, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yakubu Dogara including 25 members House of Representatives, some state governors, Samuel Ortom (Benue), Aminu Tambuwal (Sokoto) and Abdulfatai Ahmed (Kwara) and host of other political gladiators decamped to the PDP. There was similar movement of political actors of the PDP to the ruling party based on different reasons. Some of them simply ran away from the opposition party to the ruling party because of corruption charges against them and their sense of insecurity in the opposition party. For example, Godwin Akpabio (Akwa Ibom) (PDP former Senate Minority Leader), Orji Uzor Kalu (Abia), Ibrahim Shekarau (Kano), Adamu Aliero (Kebbi) and host of others decamped to the APC few months to the 2019 general elections for reasons Nigerians attributed to corruption allegation against some of them. While others within the APC went to form what they called n-APC (New APC) to disassociate themselves from the failed APC of Buhari. Ultimately decamping and realignment of political parties will continue to play out in Nigeria's democracy for the reason that parties' ideologies are not broad based and adherents do not believe in them and followers don't even understand what they mean. Personal and sectional interests are looked upon as alternative to party ideology because they provide easy access for recruitment, mobilization and impunity.

The lofty promise of APC of bringing about change in the way things are done in the country particularly in the areas of politics and governance left many unanswered questions in the minds of many Nigerians. Government at the federal level has no blue print to show, except for few projects which were started and unable to be completed by previous PDP government. At the state level despite huge federal government allocations to some state Governors they were unable to pay workers' monthly wages. For example, between 2017 and 2018 the situation worsened in some states where Governors owe workers

salary of about six to nine months and yet sharing expensive cars and houses to their cronies. Kogi and Benue are typical examples of states where government owes workers salary at the local government level up to about two years. Notwithstanding Federal government bailout plan, some states like, Kogi, Benue, Bauchi, Ekiti, Osun and Adamawa etc remained notorious and still owe workers since 2017. The declining capacity of the APC government to deliver on public goods in terms of health care, water, public transportation system, security, education and energy etc prompt analysts to argue that 2019 general election will provide the parameter to assess the performance of political actors.

Partisan Politics: The Patron-Client Nexus and the RoadMap to 2019 General Elections

Since 1992 Nigeria continues to witness progression in the number of registered political parties from 2 to 91 and the numbers of political actors seeking elective positions also doubled. In the same vein, numbers of registered voters increased from 58,920,078 in 2011 to 68, 833,476 in 2015 and 84,004,084 in 2019 (*Premium Times* 2019 and INEC 2015). This is a clear indication that many people are getting more familiar with their right to choose their representatives and also participate actively in politics. Also, the high level of politics of decamping and realignment of political parties approaching the 2019 general elections was a confirmation that desperate political actors are set to get to positions of authority by all means. The contention has always been between the ruling party, APC and the main opposition, PDP where actors of both parties often tapped into the huge space of poverty and ethno-religious content in the country to mobilize followers against each other. Politicians manipulate ethno-religious sentiment as potent instrument to divide the electorates in order to safe guard their pecuniary interests.

In 2011 for instance, when certain individuals' political ambition particularly from the North was frustrated hate speech was employed as a potent arsenal to incite the economically disempowered clients against the government. Civil disobedience and distrust eventually made way to planned mass killings and destruction of property in some parts of the country. The incidence of 2011 later influenced voting behaviour in 2015 general elections.

Following what happened in 2011 many people including the international community feared and predicted that Nigeria was going to breakaway in 2015. Reasons being that the idea of North verses South, Islam verses Christianity were so pervasive and deeply entrenched in the psyche of Nigerians prior to 2015 general elections. It can be discerned in almost every sphere of life in the country where primordial and sentiment attachment became a defining factor of getting government employment and admission into high institution of learning. Denying the existence of these critical elements in political life of the nation is equal to an invitation of anarchy as Nigeria is uniquely populated by people of diverse backgrounds and believes in their diversity rather than the country. The APC in the North for example, was so drawn to ethno-religious twist and take every opportunity to win public sympathy and support through mass mobilisation. They branded the PDP as corrupt group of individuals without integrity just for them to earn the popularity and support of the economically disempowered clients. Most APC actors used uncultured language to discredit PDP and dissuade their followers from aligning with the party. Consequent on this, sectionalism, religious animosity and bitter exchange of words among political actors are parts of what caused the escalation of decamping and alliances prior to 2019 general elections.

The band wagon effect of Muhammadu Buhari victory in 2015 further encouraged patron-client bond between political actors and the electorate which the latter seriously depend on the former for its survival. Political office holders capitalized on government weaknesses to promote the rule of impunity and corruption remains the order of the day. This gave rise to crony capitalism and recklessness among security agents in the country. The consequence of these is the rising waves of crime, lawlessness and insecurity in many parts of Nigeria especially in most parts of Northern Nigeria. For example, Fulani-herdsmen/farmers clashes in many parts of North central and some parts of Southeast compromised Nigeria's unity and poses threat to the nation. The manipulation of ethnic and religious symbols as a basis for the intra-class struggle for political interest has accentuated the level of social instability and challenged the corporate existence of the country. On the other hand, President Buhari's application of double-standard of resolving social instability was clearly demonstrated in the reaction to pro-Biafra protesters clam down by the

military in 2018. Often times the military was dragged in against the pro-Biafra separatist under the guise of maintaining law and order in the South-East while ignoring herdsmen killing of farmers in North central and parts of Northeast. The military have been accused of heinous crimes and atrocities in many parts of South-East and South-South by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

Emerging indicators on the other hand point to the nexus between godfatherism in politics and impunity. Godfathers' played crucial roles during the sixteen years of PDP rule and with the emergence of APC as ruling party, political relationship between godfathers and their followers appear to take a new dimension. Within the APC, Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, Governor Abdullaziz Yari, Ibikunle Amosun, Rochas Okorocha, Abiola Ajimobi, Godwill Akpabio, have come to prove that they have the capacity to enthrone their preferred candidates. Unfortunately, such arrangements provoked objections more especially during the party's primary elections. Apart from Bola Tinubu that successfully planned and executed the ouster of one of his godsons, Governor Akinwumi Ambode of Lagos State and replaced him with Babajide Sanwo-Olu, some godfathers that made similar attempt fell out of favour with the national leadership of their party and people. Out of desperation and show of power, people like Okorocha and Amosun decided to engage in anti-party activities by sponsoring candidates in other political parties even after been cautioned by their party leadership. Governor Okorocha who is a member of APC sponsored his son-in-law, Uche Nwosu of Action Alliance (AA) against the APC and governor Abdullaziz Yari of Zamfara State insist on fielding his political son for the governorship election and therefore arranged to favour him during the party's direct primary election. The move was frustrated as his continuous effort to serve as the referee was unacceptable by other aspirants and party's national executive. For this reason, the APC in Zamfara State could not present acceptable candidates for both the governorship, national and state legislative seats to INEC before the expiration of the deadline set by the INEC because of the governor's consistent interference. The in-house fighting among APC aspirants in Zamfara State on the one hand and the governor on the other would have prevented the party from featuring candidates during the March 9 poll if it were not for the timely intervention of

President Muhammadu Buhari. The President had promised the electorates during his campaign in the state that he would do something about their case and the verdict of the High court in Gusau which ruled that APC indeed held party primaries in the state was upheld. This temporarily gave a reprieve to the political stalemate in the state. However, one of those in contest of the governorship slot of the party, Senator Kabiru Marafa challenged the verdict of the Gusau High court at the Court of Appeal in Sokoto which annulled the lower court's decision affirming that the APC did not hold any primaries in Zamfara State preparatory to the 2019 elections. The verdict came after elections were held and the APC won both the governorship and most of the state Assembly seats. The APC further promised to go to the Supreme Court. This clearly shows the stake and high premium given to political offices which leads to intra-party contestations and results in decamping from one political party platform to another. However, there were loose ends that opposition party have tapped into and challenge the decision of the lower court at the Supreme Court. Eventually the APC lost out the whole of Zamfara State seats to the PDP through the Supreme Court verdict.

Supplementary Factors in 2019 General Elections

There are some important political developments and innovations that have helped Nigeria's democracy since the return to democratic governance in 1999. One of such developments is the management of the electoral process by INEC and the other is the role of the electorates in shaping the process. The reforms that took place in INEC in 2002, 2006 and 2010 which led to enactment of electoral laws facilitated the repositioning of the institution and practically restore public confidence in the manner which elections are conducted. Prominent among the changes in INEC was the introduction of Smart Card Reader (SCR), a technological device designed to curtail and checkmate multiple voting. Oni and Victor (2018) observed that SCR is a unique identifier that separate one individual from another even though they may have the same name, sex or parents. The SCR is a scientific innovation to electoral management which enables election officers to match the credentials of physical voter with permanent voter card. Similarly, the replacement of temporary voter card with Permanent Voters Card (PVC) is seen as new

innovation. It helps to authenticate the ownership of voter card during voting periods. The SCR and PVC were both used in 2011 and 2015 general elections. The new innovation has improved the conduct of elections and reduced over blotted figures and rigging in Nigeria. Meanwhile in 2019 INEC deployed the mechanism to all parts of the country to enable her conduct free and fair elections.

Participation of electorates is also critical to the democratic process in Nigeria; they determine the tone of the process by the use of their voter's card. In 2011 and 2015 general elections, APC presidential aspirant, Mohamadu Buhari evolved two philosophical positions as "mukasa, muraka, musare," (Hausa) meaning, cast your vote, ensure you protect it and make sure your vote counts at collation centres. The second one was the "sakk" philosophy meaning, total and comprehensive vote to anyone aspiring for elective position in APC from bottom to top (Councillor to the President). These two philosophical postulations led to the pervasion of democracy and institute the rule of impunity and lawlessness in some parts of Northern Nigeria as people of questionable credentials were voted into offices simply because they belong to the APC and being sympathizers of Buhari. After four years of APC in office many political office holders that were part of the Buhari band wagon and wish to contest again for another term in the same party were subjected to creditability and integrity test by the electorates prior to the 2019 general elections. Their performances in office have been a litmus test of their acceptability by the masses that have been cajoled and hoodwinked in the past three years.

Heighten Security Concern

Nigeria is gradually moving to a securitized state as a result of increased violence, over policing and militarisation. The declining security condition and increased violence is rampant at the approach of each electioneering year and immediately after elections. Many analysts are of the view that long years of deprivation, deep seated poverty and elite politics in Nigeria is responsible for most of the violence witnessed in the country. Pervasive poverty in any society makes people vulnerable to violent conflict.

Nigeria is a country that wealth of the society circulates only within few groups of individuals as such those who lived in poverty are subjected to all forms of humiliation and embarrassment. This is the reason why certain persons take to crimes while others allow themselves to be used by desperate politicians; there is an interconnection between poverty partyism in Nigeria. Because of the increase violence, security personnel are deployed in almost every parts of the country to protect the citizens and provide safety to electoral officials. This active involvement of security personnel in almost every civil conflict and especially in election process is a danger to the Nigerian state as it has increased the militarization of the society as some security personnel are willing allies of criminals.

The ugly scenario is that each time Nigeria is preparing for elections, cases of communal and ethno-religious clashes increase, herders/farmers conflict and Boko Haram attacks heightens. This trend is repeatedly noticed since 2011 and 2015. In 2015 insecurity caused the extension of general elections by six weeks. Similarly in 2018 Boko Haram intensified their attacks on military Barracks in Borno and Yobe States, herdsman violent rampage decimated communities in north central Nigeria while kidnappers and gunmen besieged Zamfara State and communal clashes and kidnapping have become daily routines in Kaduna State (Birnin Gwari) as part of tactics to frustrate and derail the 2019 general elections. This point to the fact that there is a correlation between poverty, politics and violence and these were contending forces in the 2019 general elections.

Conclusion

It is the argument of this paper that differences in political views are partly the cause of defection and reason for coalition of political parties in Nigeria. It further argued that hence political parties in Nigeria lacked clear and defined ideology to provide strategy for comprehensive articulation of issues to convince adherents to believe in them they make little sense to a common man. In Nigeria political actors are driven by waves of personalities and pecuniary interest rather than patriotism; important issues that centre on nation building and unity of the country are no longer plausible among

political elites due to overriding attention on private and sectional interests and absence of ideological commitment to the primary concept of democracy. Politics is seen as a lucrative business in Nigeria because of the high premium it offers to political office holders. Therefore, many people are drawn to it and willing to pay a supreme price even with their lives. Once an individual declares his intention to contest in any elective position under any political party, he is willing to do anything to achieve this aim simply because of high profit margin associated with Nigeria's political positions. If such an individual is denied the opportunity to contest, he is likely to shift his loyalty to another political party that may be willing to accept him. This is partly the reason why cases of politics of decamping are so rampant in the last couple of years in Nigeria. Political realignment on the other hand, is done for the purpose of expanding the scope of the political parties and increase their strength and capacity to capture political power. For example, the merger between the five political parties in 2014 that led to the formation of APC was to enable the party takeover political power including the office of the President from the PDP.

This paper reiterates that material benefit may influence voting behaviour in the 2019 general elections arising from sustained economic hardship caused by bad governance and systemic corruption. Even though voters' apathy may increase due to poor performance of government, vote buying and violence will take precedent over ethno-religious factors. Voters may make choice of candidates based on those that will meet their material needs, guarantee their security and promise them a better future. More than three years now Nigerians have not been comfortable with the APC "change" promise. Electorates are bothered with the growing inequality in the society and the level of pauperisation and insecurity. These are critical factors that may inform voters' decision in the 2019 general election. Political actors on the other hand are also concerned with their material conditions and for those who have been denied tickets by their political parties migration to other parties is much easier. To these categories of persons political ideology is not so essential to them what is more important is the aspiration to grab political power using all available means and methods.

Given the evolving realities on ground, this research observed that the politics of decamping and realignment has been part of Nigeria's political evolution. Much as this practice will strengthen democracy, it allows for broad base participation of all citizens in the affairs of the society, provides check

and balances and guarantee healthy competition among political actors. The most worrisome aspect is that desperate political actors use that as means to achieve selfish aims as they engaged in zero-sum game play. By so doing, the development and unity of the country is not prioritized, instead; private, sectional and ethno-religious interests are promoted. In the light of the foregoing this chapter suggests that we must acknowledge that politics of decamping and realignment are content of democratic practice all over the world and therefore Nigeria must not view it as ugly side of her democracy. It is further suggested that electoral laws should take cognizance of the practice of politics of decamping and realignment of parties to enable them comply with INEC provisions in order to guarantee the unity of the country, ensure good governance and peace in the country.

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NON-STATE ACTORS AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The paper examined the effects and impacts of non-state actors on security in Nigeria. Since the return of civil rule in Nigeria in 1999, there has been an increase in the activities of non-state armed actors that have taken up arms in challenge of the unity and security of the nation. Some of these groups have contested the economic resources and indeed the sovereignty of the State with the federal government. In their incessant attacks, they have left scores of deaths and loss of human lives and destroyed properties worth billions of dollars in their trail. The paper interrogates the concept of security from two perspectives. The paper discovered that as a result of deprivation and mass poverty that pervade the land and apparent lack of political will to equitably distribute social welfares, some groups have emerged to feed on the weakness or failure of the state to satisfy the well-being of its citizens especially in the economically and politically marginalized areas. It is therefore recommended that there is need to adopt a more proactive technique in tacking the insurgencies. Preventive diplomacy and early detection of agitations, grievances and perceived sense of deprivations through spot-on intelligence gathering by the security forces should be encouraged and embraced.

Keywords: *security, non-state actors, insecurity, insurgency, militancy, marginalization.*

Introduction

One of the greatest challenges confronting the Nigerian state and the international community at large today is the increase of destructive extremism amongst non-state actors and groups, whose actions are generally seen to constitute grave security risks to the lives and property of the citizens and the current world economic and political order. Spanning across North-East, North-West, North Central, South-South and other parts of Nigeria, the activities of non-state armed groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Boko Haram, the killer Fulani Herdsmen, the Movement for the

Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and other splinter organisations, are causing a great deal of concern amongst national security chiefs, political leaders, government officials, foreign policy analysts, and people across all faiths, creed and religious persuasions.

In the words of Oke, C. I. (2018), armed non-state actors represent a critical challenge for security governance. They highlight the instability, insecurity and the unpredictable environment characterised by violence and destruction typical of latent conflict situations. Insurgencies have long moved outside the confines of state borders and make their power and influence felt internationally. Indeed, some of these armed non-state actors, going by their activities, have been dubbed terrorist groups. According to Smith (2010), terrorist activities involve the use or threat of action intended to (a) influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (b) advance a political, religious and ideological cause. The above captures the very essence and purpose of all the armed non-state groups marauding in Nigeria.

In the last 8 years in particular, the nationwide trends in terrorist activities in Nigeria have reached an alarming rate, with Boko Haram alone causing the death of over 28,000 people, some 2.4 million people are uprooted, including over 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in north-eastern Nigeria, over 473,000 IDPs in Cameroon, Chad and Niger and over 226,000 refugees. In short, to date, the Lake Chad Basin region is grappling with a complex humanitarian emergency.

In both developed and Third World states, the threat of terrorism has become the main national security concern. This concern is heightened by the recent rise in ultraviolent groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and their territorial ambition to take control of the Middle Eastern countries of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Southern Turkey. Together with ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al Qaeda constitute the four most feared terrorist organisations, claiming more than 66% of deaths from terrorist attacks.

The increasing concern about the activities of these clandestine organisations has warranted a hard line response by Western governments, led by the United States, resulting in the use of latent military force to confront these terrorist armed groups. While a great deal of literature exists on the nature, motives and the spread of terrorist activities, there is very little discussion on the global economic and political contexts in which these groups

operate. The paper sought to provide an explanation of, but by no means a justification of, the use of violent extremism in the early 21st century and pose the question of whether the current counter-terrorism strategy is effective. It is on this premise that this study seeks to address the security challenges armed non-state actors pose to lives and property and overall development in Nigeria. Particularly, it seeks to demonstrate that the activities of these violent groups constitute a major impediment to the continuous corporate existence of the entity called Nigeria with a particular reference to Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen and other of such non-state actors.

Conceptual Clarification

Security

There are divergent approaches to conceptualizing security which is the direct opposite of insecurity. This paper consequently examined the concept of security to aid a good understanding of the phenomenon of insecurity. Security need was the bedrock of the social contract which the people voluntarily and willingly entered with the state, wherein the people freely relinquished their rights to a sovereign (government) who in turn, oversees the protection of all. In this circumstance, security represents the mechanism established or instituted to avoid, prevent, reduce, or resolve violent conflicts, and threats that originate from other states, non-state actors, or structural, socio-political and economic conditions (Stan, 2004). For ages, issues pertaining to security have been on the centre-stage in the development discourse. Several efforts have been made since the disintegration of the former USSR and subsequent end of Cold War to redefine the concept of security from a state-centric viewpoint to a more expansive dimension that places importance on individuals in which human security that encapsulates elements of national security, human rights and national development remain the foremost indicators for explaining the concept.

At the centre of this debate, there have been efforts to expand and deepen the concept of security from the level of the states to societies and individuals, and from military to non-military issues (Nwanegbo&Odigbo, 2013; Krahmman, 2003). In the opinion of Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013), the diverse methods to the conceptualization of human security in the theoretical literature can be categorized into two key divides. One is a neo-realist theoretical strand that sees security as primary responsibilities of the state. The second strand, a postmodernist or plural view, conceptualizes security as the

task of non-state actors and dislocates the state as the chief supplier of security. Advocates of this approach contend that the concept of security goes further than a military determination of threats. They are of the view that government should be more concerned with the economic security of individual than the security of the state because the major harbingers of insecurity are economic in nature. Some researchers in conceptualizing security laid emphasis on the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion, political and socio-economic objectives of a country (Igbuzor, 2011; Oche, 2001; Nwanegbo&Odigbo, 2013).

Thus, there is a consensus in the modern literature that security is critical for national cohesion, peace and sustainable development. It is therefore obvious that national security is a requisite for economic growth and development of any country (Oladeji&Folorunso, 2007). In the intelligence community, there is a consensus that security is not the absence of threats or security issues, but the existence of a robust mechanism to react proactively to the challenges posed by these threats with swiftness, proficiency, and in real time.

Insecurity

The concept of insecurity suggests diverse meanings and connotations such as: lack of safety; danger; hazard; uncertainty; lack of protection, and absence of safety. To Beland (2005), insecurity is a state of fear or anxiety due to absence or lack of protection. Achumba and others (2013) defines insecurity from two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being vulnerable to harm or injury. Secondly, insecurity is the state of being predisposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is an indistinct unlikable emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune.

These descriptions of insecurity highlight a major point that those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen but they are also susceptible to the threats and dangers when they occur (Olabanji&Ese, 2014). In the context of this paper, insecurity is seen as a breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno-regional, civil, social, economic, and political that contributes to recurring conflicts, and leads to gratuitous obliteration of lives and property.

National Security

National security which also means internal security traditionally refers to territorial security, the protection of the state, its boundaries, peoples, institutions and values from external attack. In 1994, however, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report redefined the concept of national security in line with what it identified as human security. According to Dambazzu (2016), it insisted on an all-encompassing change from the exclusive stress on territorial security to greater stress on the people's security. Also, Anan (1998) stated that, it means more than the absence of conflict but it should include education, health, democracy, human rights, protection against environmental degradation and the multiplication of lethal weapons. From the foregoing, national security is a multifaceted concept which considers the total safety of man in terms of psychological, political, economic, physical and social, in fact, all aspects of human existence within a defined territory.

Rationalising the Rise in Armed Non-State Groups in Nigeria.

The recent rise in armed non-state actors in Nigeria and their violent extremism can best be understood in the context of global capitalism in its late stage. More than at any time in human history, the start of the 21st Century is marked by unprecedented increase in human population, extreme inequalities, absolute and disproportionate poverty and growing pressure over economic resources. This has resulted in the creation of a two-tier society in which, on the one hand, we have prosperous areas/regions of the world with stable governments and functioning institutions, and on the other hand, an economically weak areas and politically destabilized states with deteriorating institutions. Feeding on the weakness or the failure of the state to satisfy the wellbeing of its citizens, especially in the economically and politically marginalized areas of the world, is the growth of new nongovernmental actors. The majority of these non-state actors, variously referred to as Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs), Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs), etc., are involved in good work within their communities - filling the gaps created as a result of states' retreat or inability to fulfill or perform their essential social functions to their citizens. At the very centre of any state-citizens relationship are the essential social values and utilities that any state and its institutions are expected to provide for their people. These values include; amongst others, security, freedom, order, justice and welfare. The increase in the welfare activities of NGOs in

the Third World countries, means that non-state actors are now performing significant functions or appear to be in partnership with governments in what used to be an exclusive prerogative of the State and responsibility in security and welfare provision.

With many states in the developing world in retreat and unable to meet their social obligations, non-state actors including faith based organisations are running welfare schemes and providing security for the people. Paradoxically, within the same structure of strengthening the civil society, some sinister organisations have emerged capitalizing on any ethnic, religious or tribal conflict to fuel group grievances. The apparent lack of inter-group cohesion is worsened by obvious lack of governance as manifested in the corruption of state officials, and other factors such as state sponsored violence, extra judicial killings, lack of access to justice, gross violation of people's rights. All these factors create a conducive environment for non-state armed groups to operate, thrive and launch attacks on local, national and international targets. These non-state armed groups usually elicit support to their cause by taking advantage of the economic vulnerability of the people in their area of operation. They often use extreme religious ideologies, separatist or nationalistic sentiments to coerce people to support their actions. Violence, intimidation, racketeering are some of the essential tools terrorist organisations use to consolidate their hold on society.

The cumulative effect of terrorist activities is to create fear amongst the people, destabilize the state and create further conditions for them to carry out their activities. The stronger the feeling of group grievances towards the state and its institutions and the more disconnected or disengaged people are from liberal politics, the greater the danger of festering extremism. The feeling of injustice and sense of economic hopelessness, for example, led to the self-immolation on 17th December 2010 of a young Tunisian fruit vendor which sparked what is now generally known as the Arab Spring. This single act of social and economic alienation and its attendant feeling of frustration led to popular uprisings that spread throughout much of the Arab world. Apart from Tunisia, other countries such as Egypt, Yemen and Libya have witnessed uprising and regime change. The essential lesson to be learned from this is the ability of the people to vent their anger and frustrations through organized protests or mass manifestation of grievance against state system and institutions they considered unjust, undemocratic and incapable of meeting their needs and aspirations.

Schelling (1966) suggests that terrorism is one form of violent coercion, a bargaining process based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for the use of overt military force. As such it is similar to other strategies based on the power to hurt rather than conventional military strength. Within this context, terrorism is meant to produce a change in the government's political position, not the destruction of military potential. Within this context, non-state actors deploying terrorism as a tool are assumed to act on the basis of calculation of the benefit or value to be gained from an action, the cost of the attempt and of its failure, the consequences of inaction, or the probability of success. According to Betts (1982), violent actions may occur for several reasons; the value sought for is overwhelmingly important; costs of trying are low; the status quo is intolerable; or the probability of succeeding (even at high cost) is high. Thus, violent groups may act out of anticipation of reward or out of desperation, in response to opportunity or to threat. This strategic perspective, according to Betts (1982), is a conceptual foundation for the analysis of surprise attacks. Thus, he concludes that violence is par excellence a strategy of surprise, necessary for small groups who must thereby compensate for weakness in numbers and destructive capability.

Applied to the context of Nigeria's security challenges, the Boko Haram Islamic sect contends that politics in the Northern Nigeria has been hijacked by a cabal of corrupt, false Muslims and thus seeks to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a "pure" Islamic state ruled by Sharia law (Adams, D. and Ogbonnaya, U.M. 2014). Since August 2011, Boko Haram has planted bombs almost weekly in public places or in churches in Nigeria's North East Region in particular and the North in general. The group has also broadened its targets to include setting fire to schools. In March 2012, some twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, and as many as 10,000 pupils were forced out of education (Walker, 2012).

Understanding the Rationale Behind the Existence of Non-State Actors in Nigeria

The current global security environment is increasingly becoming complex and dynamic due to the activities of non-state actors who have become the major source of conflict all over the world. Adding to this is the increase in intra-state conflicts and crises as well as the entanglement between

domestic and international threats which have compounded the security challenges. Nigeria is currently facing multiple security challenges that are spread across the major regions of the country. No one region in Nigeria is insulated from one crisis or the other and most of these crises are largely caused by various non-state elements.

Having good background knowledge of the reasons why they take up arms against the state and her citizens is the first step towards finding solutions to their nefarious activities. While some of these groups have clearly identifiable reasons for striking and challenging the state's sovereignty, others have made their motives nebulous, imperceptible and indiscernible. And this has hindered the process of negotiating with the clandestine groups or finding enduring solutions to the challenges they pose. For instance, the militant and non-state groups in the Niger Delta region such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), the Bush Boys, the Martyrs Brigade and other splinter groups have well-articulated points of agitation. Among their demands, they ask for the control of the abundant deposits of hydro-carbon resources in their region, better environmental policies by the multinational companies that operate in the region, adequate compensation for the degradation and depletion of their habitat and employment of their well-qualified men and women, etc. And when their demands were not met, they resorted to acts of militancy, arms proliferation, illegal oil bunkering, sea piracy, oil thefts, kidnappings and pipeline vandalisation/sabotage, armed robbery, cultism and political violence which have all combined to pose serious security challenges in the South-South Zone and the Delta Region.

In the South Eastern Region, Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) engaged in violent demonstrations, kidnappings, armed robbery, cultism, the proliferation of arms, road blocks, political disturbances, vicious confrontations and clashes with security agents, issuing of threats and inflammatory statements as a consequence of so many years of neglect of their region resulting to lack of social amenities, unemployment, poverty and lack of access to governmental powers. Due to the perceived disregard and apparent abandonment of the region by the federal government, these non-state actors mobilized the people of the region toward secession and separatist agenda.

However, the Boko Haram that has terrorized the northern parts of Nigeria with acts of armed robbery, insurgency, ethno-religious tensions, cattle rustling, kidnappings and hostage taking, bombing of vulnerable and soft targets with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), among others has no lucidly articulated reason for taking up arms against the State other than claiming to pursue a purist form of Islam. And when there is no clearly identifiable reasons for agitation it becomes difficult to engage negotiation and reconciliation with aggrieved parties. Largely, this is the reason why the Boko Haram insurgency has remained intractable. Even the herdsmen that operate within the same region leaving thousands of people dead have made obvious their reasons for engaging mercenaries against Nigerian citizens. Herdsmen complaints border on the depletion of grazing routes over the years and in trying to locate fresh routes, they stray into the farms of locals where damage is done to the crops hence, clashes become inevitable.

Non-State Actors and Insecurity: Implications for Nigeria

There are multiple reasons to be worried about the activities of armed non-state actors in Nigeria. The challenges posed by the emergence of violent groups in Nigeria are colossal. Examples from the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria indicate that what the groups represent in terms of the global potential and feasibility for non-state actors as security challengers with destructive capabilities rivaling those of the state is alarming. This is because their modus operandi has defiled national security mechanism and the strategic dexterity with which they operate coupled with the sophisticated nature of their weapons have raised such questions as to the source of their military training and experience, weapon system and general logistics making some analysts to have them linked to other international terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.

In Nigeria, the preponderance of militia and violent groups with international linkages has constituted potent threats to national security and economy, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and its citizens. For instance, the activities of the groups have resulted to numerous loss of lives and property. The Niger Delta Development Monitoring and Corporate Watch (NIDDEMCO), a non-governmental organization, released a statistics which shows that between 1999 and 2007, a total of 308 hostage taking incidents occurred in the region. A breakdown of this record shows that Bayelsa State was on the lead with 131 incidents. Rivers State had 113; Delta

State 45, while Akwalbom had the least record of 15. The record further shows that in 2003, 18 oil workers were taken hostage in Bayelsa, in 2004, 5 hostages, 39 in 2006 while between January and June, 2007 69 people were taken hostage, out of which 50 were soldiers. Within the period under review, Rivers State recorded 2 incidents in 1999, one in 2005, 55 in 2006 and 60 as at June, 2007, with 26 soldiers, 1 woman and a three year-old child involved. Unfortunately, the situation has since then deteriorated and the spate of militancy, hostage taking and kidnapping incidents have increased in scope and tempo covering virtually all the oil producing states of Nigeria.

In addition, militant groups have carried out deadly and paralyzing attacks on oil and gas facilities with their weapons. For instance, on March 16, 2003, Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Nigeria's biggest oil producing company, evacuated non-essential staff from its facilities in Warri, Delta State, and shut down oil production, following a month of escalating unrest by ethnic Ijaw militant groups that culminated in an attack on the Nigerian Navy on the Escravos River that left seven people dead, several soldiers wounded, and pointedly disrupted riverine travel. Subsequent attacks by militants killed one Chevron contract worker and five TotalFinalElf (TFE) personnel, while gunfire badly damaged a shell helicopter seeking to evacuate employees (Cesarz, et al, 2003:1). On July 12, 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) combatants killed four naval personnel and injured three soldiers who were escorting a Chevron oil tanker along Chomoni creeks in the Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State. On the eve of the Governorship and House of Assembly elections on April 14, 2007, armed militants attacked the Mini-Okoro, Elelenwo Police Stations, killing many police officers during the attack. On Tuesday, January 1, 2008, the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) attacked two Police Stations and a five star hotel in Port Harcourt.

The list of attacks is long and seemingly endless. Though some analysts have contended that the issue at stake in the Niger Delta is the demand by ethnic nationalities for greater autonomy and control of the oil resources, equitable distribution of the benefits of oil mineral exploitation, environmental justice and the development of the region, yet the activities of the militants constitute acts of international terrorism having taken up arms against the Nigerian state, kidnapped expatriate oil workers and blown up oil installations belonging to oil Multinational Corporations. On the other hand, the Boko Haram group, otherwise called JamaatulAlissunna lid da a wawal

Jihad, surfaced with bombing attacks and killings which as at the last count, have left over 10,000 Policemen, Soldiers and civilians including women and children dead (USCIRF, March 20, 2012; IOL News, 2012).

The violent stage of the activities of the group started in Bauchi State on July 26, 2009 and like cancer, have since spread to other parts of Nigeria especially the northern states. The group has since existed with known preferences in religious belief and social practices. But as Eso (2011) has observed, “the root causes of resort to violence and criminality in order to influence public policy is rather deep-seated and beyond the sectarian”. This is because the attacks of the group have been targeted or directed at the State, its institutions, and the civilian populations. Several police stations including the Force Headquarters, Abuja; army barracks, schools, government establishments and places of worship have been attacked in several states of the Federation. But the attack on the UN House in Abuja in 2011 was, according to Eso (2011), “a game changer replete with new dynamics, far reaching and imponderable reverberations that dramatically altered the scope, intensity, and focus of Boko Haram’s violence and mission, as well as any consideration of sect”.

Apart from the threat to life, national security, unity, sovereignty and territoriality, the operations of these violent groups have also impacted negatively on the Nigerian economy. For instance, in 2008 alone, it is estimated that Nigeria lost over 3 trillion Naira as a result of militancy in the Niger Delta while Boko Haram has caused extensive damage to property and reduced government revenue with a negative impact on the socio-economic development of the northern region in general and North-East states in particular.

The attacks by both the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram violent non-state actors have occasioned huge carnage and economic costs. In both cases there is no statistical exactitude on the costs that may have been engendered. For example, in the Niger Delta, since 2006 approximately more than a thousand people were reportedly killed and over 300 kidnapped (Azubike, 2009). Between 11 January 2006 and 20 May 2006 MEND alone was alleged to have killed 24 soldiers and policemen, kidnapped 13 oil workers and caused severe damage to critical oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta (Oladesu, 2009). On the other hand, a recent report entitled ‘START’ which was conducted by the University of Maryland for the American government on global terrorism revealed that Boko Haram emerged in 2012 as

the second deadliest terror group in the world by killing a total of 1132 people in 364 attacks. Only the Afghanistan's Taliban which killed 1842 people in 525 attacks was ahead of Boko Haram in the period under review. These Boko Haram-related deaths surpassed those of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Maoists in India and Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (LeVan, 2013; The Guardian, 2013). Aside from human deaths, the violence stimulated by the twin home-grown insurgencies has resulted in enormous economic costs for the nation, corporate bodies and individual business owners. The unhealthy security situation provoked by the insurgencies paralyzed and shut down businesses in many cities in the two regions. For example, Boko Haram ruined many local investments and caused a group of investors from Germany, who wanted to build a cement factory in Maiduguri, to shelve the plan and moved to another African country (Ishaya, 2011). Over 25 foreign airlines, which use the Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt and Kano international airport facilities are planning a boycott of some of the airports owing to Boko Haram-related insecurity (Abioye, 2011).

In the Niger Delta, since 2006 when the spate of militancy escalated, the economic costs have been tremendous. Between 2006 and 2008 Nigeria lost at least a quarter of its oil production due to frequent attacks on oil installations resulting from the activities of oil bunkering cartel and kidnapping for ransom in the region (Azubike, 2009). In specific terms, the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta estimated that the nation lost about N8.84 trillion or US\$61.6 billion to oil theft and sabotage during the period (Ajearo, 2009). In addition, the nefarious activities of the Niger Delta militants coupled with the decline in international oil price were attributed to the inability of Nigeria to meet the financial projections in the 2009 budget (Ajearo, 2009). Also, the cut in the nation's oil production capacity and shortages owing to the heightened spate of militancy contributed to the 2006 rise in global oil prices (The Nation, 2006). Equally, the activities of the Niger Delta militants significantly contributed to an increase in security expenditure by the federal and state governments as well as the oil companies. In the 2008 fiscal year, for instance, about N400 billion was voted by the federal government for providing security in the region. Also, the security manager of Addax Petroleum Nigeria, and the chairman of the Oil Producers' Trade Section (OPTS), claimed that the companies jointly spent about US\$3.7 billion on security in 2007 (Ajearo, 2009).

Furthermore, the horrendous violence and criminality of the militias in the Niger Delta and north-eastern Nigeria generated an image crisis for the nation locally and internationally. Amid the insecurity engendered by the two home-grown insurgencies, the US embassy and the United Kingdom (UK) Travel Advisory variously warned their nationals on the risk involved in travelling to Nigeria. For instance, the US State Department in a statement noted that: travel to Nigeria carries a considerable risk ... the lack of law and order in Nigeria poses considerable risks to travelers. Violent crimes committed by ordinary criminals... can occur throughout the country. (Quoted by Osumah and Ekpenyong, 2006) Similarly, the violence occasioned by the Boko Haram insurgency prompted the US and UK authorities to warn their nationals against travel to some states in the north, particularly Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and Plateau (Adepegba&Adesomoju, 2011; Ogunseye, 2012). Such travel warnings which are often relayed on international media outlets portray Nigeria as unsafe thereby undermining the country's efforts to rebrand its image internationally (Ojo&Aghedo, 2013).

Conclusion

It is apparent that non-state groups that operate in Nigeria with various agitations constitute serious security threats to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and corporate existence of nation. It is equally obvious that their activities have adversely affected Nigeria's economic and national interests. For instance, some multinational oil companies that work in the Niger-Delta region have either pulled out or relocated their operations from the region due to incessant hostage takings and attacks on their installations by MEND and other allied groups. Furthermore, due to widespread radicalization of youths, frequent bombings, hostage takings by the terrorist group, Boko Haram and rampant clashes between herdsmen and farmers in the northern part of Nigeria, the nation's international image has dwindled. This has invariably worsened her human rights records as Government has not taken adequate and proactive measures to save lives and property. And where it actually responded to the threats posed by these armed groups, it did so indiscriminately and with high handedness.

Recommendations

Violence, terrorism and extremism affect us all, as no one is immune from their vicissitude. And to win the war over terror, we need to confront and challenge the root cause of extremism and help build a peaceful and egalitarian society where every citizen will have a sense of belonging.

This paper believes that the current counter-terrorism approach cannot be said to be effective giving the rise in the number of and increased activities of non-state armed groups in Nigeria. We recommend that there is need to adopt a more proactive technique in tackling the insurgencies. Preventive diplomacy and early detection of agitations, grievances and perceived sense of deprivations through spot-on intelligence gathering by the security forces should be encouraged and embraced.

Again, this paper upholds that merely disrupting terrorist activities or killing members/leaders of violent armed groups only gives a false sense of victory, eventually, it fuels the violence and increases the brutality of these armed groups. From the experiences spanning from the Niger-Delta to the North East of Nigeria, military violence has not ended the violence of extremism. Rather, it has become a case of violence begetting violence. This paper, therefore, recommends dialogue and round-table discussion to find out the root causes of any agitation with a view to solving or ameliorating the situation.

It is a trite saying that a hungry man is an angry man. Also, it is generally held and believed in Nigeria that an idle mind is a devil's workshop. The above statements relate and connect very well with the situation on ground in Nigeria. There is absolute and disproportionate poverty in Nigeria. The citizens are living in abject poverty, a situation where majority of the populace live and sustain with less than \$1 Dollar a day in a country that is highly blessed by Mother Nature is simply appalling and can only fuel emotional sentiments of envy, anger, strife and resentment. This paper, therefore, recommends that the government must find alternative avenues to engage her teeming youths. Employment opportunities should be opened for the educated ones while art training centres should be established for the less educated citizens to be equipped with craft and handworks that will enable them find a means of livelihood.

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NIGERIA POLICE FORCE, COMMUNITY POLICING AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The study examined the challenges of Nigeria Police Force in combating kidnapping. It observed that security challenges which have manifested in ethno-religious conflict, terrorism, armed robbery, militancy, herdsmen/native farmers attack, among others have become worrisome in Nigeria. The rising cases of kidnapping that had led to general feeling of insecurity and the notion that the Nigeria police force is incapable of curbing the trend. The study adopted mixed methods. It utilised survey design and structured questionnaire including interview guides for data collection. The population for the study was the North Central geo-political zone of Nigeria comprising two states, Benue and Kogi which were purposively selected because of the prevalence of kidnapping in those areas. The data collected through the questionnaire were analysed using correlation and regression statistics. Data from the interviews were content-analysed. Findings revealed that there was a significant positive relationship between public perception of community policing and its adoption in Nigeria ($r = .340$, $p < .01$). Furthermore, the inability of Nigeria Police Force to cope with security issues is a predictor for the need to consider community policing in Nigeria ($\beta = .297$, $p < .05$). In addition, inability of Nigeria Police to cope with security challenges explained 88 per cent of the variance in the adoption of community policing ($R^2 = 0.88$, $p < .05$). The study concluded that security challenge constituted a major threat to national development and that community policing in collaboration with the Nigeria Police Force could help to address. The study recommended that the Nigerian government should implement the United Nations standard of population to police ratio in the country, while motivation of the members of the police force should be given adequate consideration.

Keywords: Community Policing, Insecurity, Nigeria Police Force, Policing, Security

Background to the Study

Crimes and general insecurity seem to be on the increase in Nigeria in recent times notwithstanding the concerted efforts of various security agencies especially the police in ensuring peace and security of lives and properties. The trend of insecurity is largely reflected in the increasing incidents of armed robbery, kidnapping, human trafficking, assassinations, terrorism, militancy in various parts of the country (Osakwe, 2009). Security challenge is one of the major problems confronting Nigeria especially in the last ten years. Moreso, considering the basic responsibility of government and state to lives and property of Nigerians as reflected in the 1999 Constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011). In 2009, Nigeria was listed among the 15 most vulnerable nations in the world (Ocholi, 2009), this position did not only corroborate the internal security situation, but also confirmed the increasing loss of capacity by respective governments to perform basic security and developmental functions despite repeated claims of huge budgetary allocation and expenditure on security of lives and properties (Njoku, 2012).

Nigerians perceived Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as an inept, unprofessional and dysfunctional institution which only sets out to occupy community rather than engaging it. While on the other hand, the police view the community as a threat that must be suppressed and repressed before it causes damage to the government and elite in the society (Ikuteyijo & Rotimi, 2014). Precisely, the police feel superior to the community, a relationship that brings power tangle of superiority and inferiority complex which generate negative perception. As the police relegates the community in its policies, actions and strategies, so also does the community withhold information from the police, a critical aspect of intelligence which resides with the people. Basically, all crimes are local and police cannot be everywhere but people are always everywhere. In short, communities and the police are working at cross purpose which negates the very essence of policing.

Community policing is a people-driven security arrangement which ensures that members of the community are active in securing their lives, property and the protection of the totality of their environment (Aremu, 2009). Community-policing is therefore a kind of co-operation between the community and the police in checking crimes and ensuring the general security of citizens (community). It is a paradigm shift that seeks to focus on constructive engagement with people who are the end users of the police service and re-negotiate the contract between the people and the police

thereby making the community co-producers of justice leading to quality police service. A recent attempt made by the Nigeria police force to improve its performance was the introduction of community policing programme on 27th April, 2004. It was introduced on pilot basis in 18 states namely Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Benue, Kogi, Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa, Bauchi, Katsina, Bornu, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Cross River, Oyo, Edo and the Federal Capital territory (FCT) (DFIH, 2010). This was part of the Force's effort to adopt modern and professional policing capable of providing maximum security of lives and property in Nigeria. Community oriented policing is a proactive philosophy that promotes solving problems that are either criminal, affect the quality of life, or increase citizens' fear of crime. It involves identifying, analysing and addressing community problems at their source. Like several other nations world over, Nigeria police force embraced the philosophy of community policing on the principle that in a democratic society, the police are interested in their fellow citizens, to protect and serve the public's fundamental rights to liberty, equality and justice under the law. To fulfill that privileged role, the police have to be an integral part of the communities they serve.

In view of the increased security challenges in Nigeria, the efficiency and effectiveness of the Nigeria Police Force in preventing, curbing, and controlling these crimes and criminalities with new operational strategy and methodology are required. In fact, as the country is prone to all sort of crimes, fear of crimes and other disorder, it becomes imperative that there should be change in policies, tactics and operational methods of the police in crime prevention and management. The wave of increased insecurity and other crimes are symptoms of failure of conventional policing approach hence the need for community policing. This paper therefore examined the Nigeria police force, community policing and security challenges in Nigeria with a view to emphasising the need for a more proactive community policing for a safer society.

Statement of the Problem

Observations have shown that there is inadequate police presence around the nooks and crannies of the society. Similarly, Nigerians perceive Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as an inept, unprofessional and dysfunctional institution which only sets out to occupy community rather than engaging it, a situation that adversely affects the security system in Nigeria (Tell, 2015). The spate of insecurity has assumed an unprecedented height in Nigeria today with

cases of armed robbery, ethnic tension, religious crisis, kidnapping and other forms of militancy occurring repeatedly all over the country. On account of religion, over 269 people were reported killed in Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna and Zamfara between 2010 and 2015 (Ngwama, 2014). Boko haram insurgence alone claimed over 20,000 lives as at 2015. Cases of kidnapping were officially reported to have increased from 277 in 2007, 309 in 2008, 703 in 2009, 738 in 2010, 600 in 2012 and 806 as at 2014 (Ani and Nweke, 2014). Consequently, citizens are increasingly losing hope of Nigeria Police Force's ability to cope with security challenges. Ensuring safety of lives and properties which ordinarily should be the responsibility of Nigeria police is no longer realistic. Hence, armed forces have to be drafted to assist in ensuring security of lives and properties. This in effect led to a section of the community calling on government to incorporate community policing which is already relatively in vogue into national security arrangement. Cases of traumatic experience of kidnapped persons as well as the negative image created internationally concerning insecurity in Nigeria motivated this paper to investigate the relevance of community policing in dealing with security challenges in Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between community – policing and the security system in Nigeria. The specific objectives are to:

- investigate the factors responsible for persistent insecurity in Nigeria.
- determine the challenges associated with Nigeria Police inability to cope with security issues in Nigeria.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses of the study are:

- Ho - There is no significant relationship between public perception of community policing and its adoption in Nigeria to curb kidnapping.
- H0₂ - Inability of Nigeria Police to cope with security challenges has no significant positive impact on adopting community policing in Nigeria.

Significance of the Study

This study would provide useful guidelines for stakeholders in the community towards establishing harmonious relationship between the

community and the police thereby reducing the rate of insecurity. The findings would significantly assist all stakeholders (Police, community leaders, members of the communities, researchers) to deal with the problem of ensuring an effective and efficient community policing by formulating and implementing policies that would ensure a society free from security challenges. The study would assist the police to identify the areas of collaborations with the people in areas of ensuring adequate security for the people and the society at large. The community leaders and members of the community would equally appreciate the importance of supporting the Police in all ramifications in their role of providing security for lives and properties.

This paper would be useful to the Federal and State government agencies, and international agencies on the importance of community policing not just in Nigeria and the selected states, but in other countries that are having security challenges, by ensuring that security matters are people centered and the people have to be practically involved the provision of adequate security for lives and properties.

Conceptual Clarification

Nigeria Police Force

Police refers to a socio-political and quasi-legal institution charged with the responsibility of enforcing criminal law and the maintenance of law and order (Akuul, 2011). The Nigeria Police Force is a security outfit of the Nigerian state established to combat crime and ensure security of lives and properties of the citizenry. Similarly, section 214 of the amended 1999 constitution and Police Act and Regulation (Cap359) part II, subsection 3, states that “there shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other Police force shall be established for the federation or any part thereof” Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2011).

According to Yecho (2004), the Nigeria Police is statutorily required to fight crime through detection, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of offenders in the law court and the protection of lives and property through proactive policing. To Tinubu (1993), the place of police in Nigeria cannot be compromised. Their constitutional and statutory functions according to him are well defined so that the force can manage crisis situation, maintain peace and security. Therefore, the Nigeria police force is a legitimate creation of the constitution, and the force has monopoly over the internal security of Nigeria.

In other words, there is only one Nigeria Police Force. In other countries like Britain, Canada, United State of America, there are state and even private owned police. This is however not obtainable in Nigeria (Ajayi, 2014).

By its nature, the Police Operational crime fighting function is felt by the populace. The relevance of the structuring of the Police to the defence and internal security of the nation can be appreciated by the totality of Police role in internal security. The whole weight of the powers and duties of the Police are spread on the balance of these structures. A periodic assessment and review of these structures to determine their relevance in the scheme of the nation’s defence mechanism has remained a traditional exercise in the Force, in order to catch-up with current global policing strategies as prescribed in international defence policies. It also provides avenue for getting along with other national security out-fits.

Nigeria has gone through diverse forms of political development and restructuring since independence in 1960. Tamuno (1982) posits that “Nigeria develops politically, states and local governments were created”. These creations were conscious moves by respective leaders to respond to the emerging needs of the people. To this end, the police organsational structures were not unaffected, but were often restructured to cater for the security needs of the populace. As such, state police commands were created as well as seven directorates at the force headquarters. Each directorate was headed by Deputy Inspectorate – General. Also, the increasing political developments manifesting in the creation of more states and local government led to the devolution of police zonal commands from eight zonal commands to twelve in 2001.

Table 1: Nigeria Police Force Zonal Command

S/N	Zones	States in each Zone	Geo-Political Zones	Zonal Headquarters
1	Zone 1	Kano, Kastina and Jigawa	North-West	Kano
2	Zone 2	Lagos and Ogun	South-West	Lagos
3	Zone 3	Adamawa, Gombe and Taraba	North-East	Yola
4	Zone 4	Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau	North-Central	Makurdi

5	Zone 5	Bayelsa, Delta and Edo	South-South	Benin City
6	Zone 6	Akwa-Ibom, Cross-River, Rivers and Ebonyi	South-South and South-East	Calabar
7	Zone 7	FCT Abuja, Kaduna and Niger	North-Central and North-West	Abuja
8	Zone 8	Ekiti, Kogi and Kwara	South-West and North-Central	Lokoja
9	Zone 9	Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Imo	South-East	Umuahia
10	Zone 10	Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara	North-West	Sokoto
11	Zone 11	Ondo, Osun and Oyo	South-West	Osogbo
12	Zone 12	Bauchi, Yobe and Borno	North-East	Bauchi

Source: Researcher's Compilation (2019)

In the early 1900's when the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were proclaimed, part of the Royal Niger Company constabulary became the Northern Nigeria Police and part of Nigeria Coast Constabulary became the Southern Nigeria Police. Although the South and North were amalgamated in 1914, their police forces were not merged until 1930, with headquarters in Lagos. It is important to also note that during the colonial period, most police were associated with local government (Native authorities) (Nwolise, 2004). But by 1960 under the first Republic, these forces were regionalised and then nationalised. By this Nationalisation of the Nigeria Police Force, the Inspector General of Police was in control of the general operation and administrative duties. He was supported at the headquarters by a deputy Inspector General and in each state by Police Commissioners. The 1999 constitution also provided for a Police Service Commission that is today responsible for Policy, organisation, administration and finance of the Nigerian police force.

The Command structure, also referred to as authority structure, of the Nigeria Police Force, is predicated on the regimental nature of the Force and conducted along the Force badges of ranks. Thus, in accordance with Section 215(2) of the 1999 Constitution, Section 6 of the Police Act, 1990 laws provide that "the Force shall be commanded by the Inspector-General of

Police”. This simply means that orders, directives and instructions to perform or carry out the duties with which the Police is carried, flows from the Inspector-General of Police, through the chain of Command, to any Officer positioned to implement such order. Disobedience or failure to carry out such instruction, directive or order, attract punitive sanctions.

Table 2: List of Inspectors General of Police in Nigerian Police Force since 1964 date

S/N	Name	State of Origin	Geo-Political Zone	Period of office
1	IGP Louis Orok Edet	Cross-River State	South-South	1964–1966
2	IGP Kam Salem	Borno State	North- East	1966–1975
3	IGP Muhammadu Dikko Yusufu	Katsina State	North-West	1975–1979
4	IGP Adamu Suleiman	Kano State	North-West	1979–1981
5	IGP Sunday Adedayo Adewusi	Oyo State	South-West	1981–1983
6	IGP James Etim Okon Inyang	Akwa-Ibom State	South-South	1985–1986
7	IGP Muhammadu Gambo-Jimeta	Adamawa State	North-East	1986–1990
8	IGP Aliyu Ibrahim Attah	Kogi State	North-Central	1990–1993
9	IGP Ibrahim Coomassie	Katsina State	North-West	1993–1999
10	IGP Musiliu Adeola Kunbi Smith	Lagos State	South-West	1999–2002
11	IGP Mustafa Adebayo Balogun	Osun State	South-West	2002–2005
12	IGP Sunday Gabriel Ehindero	Ondo State	South-West	2005–2007
13	IGP Mike Mbama Okiro	Rivers State	South-South	2007–2009
14	IGP Ogbonna Okechukwu Onovo	Enugu State	South-East	2009-2010
15	IGP Hafiz Ringim	Jigawa State	North-West	2010 - 2012
16	IGP Mohammed Dikko Abubakar	Zamfara State	North-West	2012 – 2014
17	IGP Suleiman Abba	Jigawa State	North-West	2014 – 2015
18	IGP Solomon Ehigiator Arase	Edo State	South-South	2015 - 2016
19	IGP Ibrahim Kpotun Idris	Niger State	North - Central	2016 -2019

20	IGP Abubakar Muhammed Adamu	Nasarawa State	North – Central	2019 Till date
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Source: Research's Compilation (2019)

According to Section 7 (1) of the Police Act, the next in the line to the Inspector General of Police, is the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Though this rank is not specially mentioned in the Constitution, it has legal backing, because the Police Act is a law made by the National Assembly in accordance with the constitution. According to section 7(1) of the Police Act, the Deputy Inspector General of Police is the second in Command of the Force and shall so act for him in the Inspector-General's absence. Section 5 of the Act makes room for as many DIGs as the Nigeria Police Council considers appropriate. Every other rank below the IGP, takes order of Command from him, in the performance of their lawful duties.

The Office of the Assistant Inspector-General of Police is provided for by section 5 and 8 of the Police Act. He shall act for the Inspector-General of Police in the event of the absence of the Inspector-General of Police and Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Section 5 of the Police Act, in accordance with the provisions of section 215 (2), of the Nigeria Constitution, provides for the Office and rank of a Commissioner of Police who shall be in Control of contingents of the Police Force stationed in a State. He is subject however, to the command of the Inspector-General of Police or who-so-ever acts for him, in his absence. Every other rank in the Force is legally provided for by section 5 of the Police Act.

Community Policing

It is commonly assumed that everyone knows the meaning and nature of community policing, and every action taken by police with community is really community policing. There is community policing, community participation in policing and Police Community Relations Committee. Though, there is usual symbiotic relationship of one that reinforces the other, however, the basic meaning and core values of community policing differentiates it from other forms or models of policing. It is perhaps, in recognition of this that Arase (2015) affirmed that, the nomenclature community policing has been variously abused. People especially the elites, use it when they want to rationalise what good policing and responsive

policing is about. Community policing according to Friedmann (1992, as cited in Mankanjuola, 2015: 80) is viewed as:

A policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduces fear of crime, improves quality of life, improves police services and reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime – causing condition. This assumes a need for greater accountability of police, greater public share in decision making and greater concern for civil right and liberties.

From the above and other extant literature, components of community policing concept are mutual engagement and partnership between the police and the community, organizational changes and problem – solving approach in dealing with crime, fear of crime and social disorder. In fact, community policing entails transparency, accountability, openness, accessible and visible policing, proactiveness in crime management and improved service delivery. Basically, community policing gives the citizen the benefit of trust, confidence and partnership between the police and the community.

Osaro (2012) points out that community policing projects a working relationship between the community and its police agency. The major elements of community policing are partnership and participation by members of the community to reduce crime, deal with community problem-solving and improve the quality of life for the community. It enables the citizens to partner with the police in dealing with crime, fear of crime and other social issues in the community. Similarly, International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), (2015: 17) agree that:

Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organisational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime”. It focuses on the three key components of community partnerships, organizational transformation, and problem solving to promote crime reduction through strong community-police relationships.

Community policing strategies are designed to strengthen police legitimacy, while also controlling crime. In community policing, legitimacy and

procedural justice rather than just the law build police authority in the eyes of the community” (Wasserman & Ginsburg, 2014).

Community Policing: A Shift from Police Community Relations Committee

It is a shift from the present Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) approach which builds community police relationships in a democratic and consultative way, empowers communities in relation to the police, and strengthens them through active involvement in policing in defined areas as well as enabling the police to communicate their problems directly to the immediate communities they serve and through that solicit community cooperation in the execution of their lawful duties while police officers and all law-abiding citizens in the community are involved and participate actively in community policing round the clock, the selected elite members of the police community relations committee meet monthly and neither prevent crime nor communicate awareness.

Osaro (2004) reveals that PCRC as is practiced in Nigeria is mere singing the praises of the police in the face of rising crime waves and deteriorating socio-cultural and economic structures. He reiterated that the PCRC is a far cry from the ideas and philosophy of community policing. PCRC elicits nature do not only exclude the real stakeholders in security but also make it functionally and structurally deficient. It operates like the formal police agency. Therefore, the PCRC should not be confused with community policing. The PCRC involves assigning a few officers in a police division as community affairs officers, or community relations specialists. These officers attend monthly PCRC meetings and reduce tensions between members of the police and the public. The PCRC programme is a merely a weak public relations attempt, it had no real effect on the philosophy or culture of most police divisions. Nevertheless, it can be emphasised that the most effective way to avoid such confusion is to integrate the capabilities of the country’s police with the citizens at all stages and all levels of policing through community policing. This is what Japan, Britain, USA, South Africa, have done.

Security

Security is critical to the survival of any nation. It forestalls lawlessness, chaos and the eventual disintegration of the system. Security is

considered a dynamic condition, which involves the relative ability of a state to counter threats to its core values and interests (Omede, 2011). According to Alan (2007), the security of a nation is predicated on two central pillars viz; the maintenance and protection of the socio-economic order in the face of internal and external threat on one hand and the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimises the threat to core values and interests, as well as to the domestic order on the other hand. Similarly, Nwolise (2004) states that security is an all-encompassing holistic concept which implies that the territory must be secured by a network of armed forces; that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a democratic and patriotic government, protected by the military, police and the people themselves. The people must not only be secure from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals, unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, environmental degradation and pollution and socio-economic injustices. Kaldor (2007) on his part defined security as activities that ensure the protection of a country, persons, and properties of the community against future threats, danger, mishaps and all other forms of perils. Here security is viewed only as a futuristic phenomenon. In all places and countries, security is a multidimensional subject of numerous debates and is considered a 'first-order-value' worth preserving.

In consensus with the above, Adamu (1990) observes that security extends to the interlocking realms of economic self-reliance, cohesion, and political stability. Adebakin and Raimi (2012) argue that the concept of national security has always been associated with the safety and survival of the state and its citizens from harm or destruction or from dangerous threats. For Stan (2004), national security refers to the zeal to avoid, prevent, reduce, or resolve violent conflicts- whether the threat originates from other states, non-state actors or other socio-economic conditions. Furthermore, Babangida (2011), views national security as the physical protection and defence of the citizens and a nation's territorial integrity. It is also the promotion of the economic well being and prosperity of the citizens in a safe and secure environment that promotes the attainment of national interests and those of her foreign partners. Otto and Ukpere (2012) on their part assert that "security means protection from hidden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life in homes, offices or communities; security must be related to the presence of peace, safety, happiness and the protection of human and physical resources or the absence of crisis, threats to human injury among others.

Human security is a concept that identifies the security of human lives as the central objective of national and international security policy. As Kaldor (2007) explains in her introduction to her volume *Human Security* that human vulnerability is pervasive, threatened by ‘new wars’ where actors are no longer states, that do not follow the rules of conduct of ‘old wars’, and that cannot be won by the means of old wars. Moreover, these new wars are intertwined with other global threats including disease, natural disasters, poverty and homelessness. “Yet our security conceptions, drawn from the dominant experience of the Second World War, do not reduce that insecurity; rather they make it worse.

Theoretical Framework

The theory underpinning this study is the queer ladder theory. The queer ladder theory was propounded by an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1919-2011), who coined the idea of ‘queer ladder’ in an attempt to explain the instrumental essence of organised crime as a desperate means of economic empowerment and social climbing. This theoretical perspective has since evolved into a popular theoretical framework widely used in contemporary crime studies. The basic assumptions of QLT are that organised crime is an instrumental behavior and a means to an end. It presents crime as an instrument of socio-economic climbing and/or socio-economic advancement. This is done by using crime as a means of accumulating wealth and build power (Mallory, 2007; Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Often ascribed to this theory is the notion that organised crime thrives in contexts where the government’s capacity to dictate, sanction and deter crime is poor and where public corruption is endemic. It thrives where prospects for legitimate livelihood opportunities are slim. Under these circumstances, the incentive to indulge in crime is high, while deterrence from criminal living is low. In other words, the benefits of committing a crime surpass the costs and/or risks. This creates ample pretext and motivation for criminal impunity and franchise (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Applied to the analysis of this study, QLT would enable one to come to terms with the prevalence of organised crime and sundry acts of criminality in Nigeria.

Bell’s theory of Queer Ladder seems reasonable, but some critics have argued that it lacks empirical support. Furthermore, it has been suggested that immigrants did not choose the queer ladder because of frustration or the few

legitimate opportunities that were open to them, but because rare and exciting opportunities to wealth were available.

Methodology

The survey design was adopted. The population for the study was the North Central geo – political zone of the federation. The multiple sampling techniques which comprise purposive, simple random and snowballing sampling techniques were adopted for the study. The rationale for purposive sampling was due to the fact that they have high cases of security challenges in the recent past. The simple random sampling technique was used to select the respondents in each of the states in order to allow for equal opportunity of appearance in the study. Similarly, the need to consult individuals and organisations whose opinions were useful in answering the research questions necessitated the use of snowball sampling technique. The under listed states were selected from the geo-political zones Benue and Kogi states. Structured questionnaire and interview guides were used to collect quantitative and qualitative data respectively. A total of 150 copies of questionnaire were administered, with a response rate of 96% while 6 personalities including retired and serving police officers, traditional rulers and prominent individuals in the selected states were interviewed. Data collected through the questionnaire were analysed using inferential (correlation and regression) statistics. Data from the interviews were content-analysed.

Test of Hypotheses

In line with the objectives of this study, two hypotheses were tested using regression analysis and correlation analysis as shown below:

Decision rule

The pre-test level of significance for all the hypotheses in this study is 0.05. The null hypothesis would assume that no effect of the independent variable on dependent variable, while alternative hypothesis would assume that the independent variable has an effect on or relationship with the dependent variable under consideration. If the significance of the tests exceeds the pre-set level of significance (0.05), then the null hypothesis will be accepted and the alternative hypothesis will be rejected, but if the p-value is less than or equals to 0.05, null hypothesis will be rejected and the alternative will be accepted.

Hypothesis One:

There is no significant relationship between public perception of community policing and its adoption in Nigeria to curb security challenges. This was tested using Pearson Product Moment correlation analysis and the result is presented in the table below.

Pearson Product Moment Correlation Analysis of public perception of community policing and its adopting in Nigeria.

Variables	N	Mean	S.D	R	Sig.	Remark
Public perception of community policing	1200	3.33	.480	.340	.000	Significant
Adoption of community policing to curb kidnapping	1200	3.24	.594			

Source: Field Survey, 2019

****Correlation is significant at 0.01 Level**

As shown in above table, there is a significant relationship between public perception of community policing and its adoption in Nigeria. Thus, a positive perception of community policing is an indication that such an arrangement could help to guarantee security ($r = .340, p < .01$). The validation of the forgoing hypothesis agreed with the positions of some traditional rulers in some communities in Yagba East local government of Kogi state during one of the personal interviews conducted by the researcher. The two (2) traditional rulers who were both retired senior police officers said that the people's perception of community policing is very low and that a lot of sensitisation programmes must be embarked upon by the Nigeria Police particularly at the grass root level since no serious policing can be achieved without the support and collaboration of the people. Similarly, Osaro, (2012) corroborated same when he stated that community policing projects is a working relationship between the community and its police agency.

The major elements of community policing are partnership and participation by members of the community to reduce crime and improve the quality of life for the community. It enables the citizens to partner with the police in dealing with crime, fear of crime and other social issues in the community. Aremu, (2009) also affirmed the fact that community policing is a people-driven security arrangement which ensures that members of the community are active in securing their lives, property and the protection of the

totality of their environment. It is a modern policing strategy which allows the police to proactively act beyond mere crime fighting, but to partner with community members in setting the security priorities in the society and fashioning ways of resolving identified problems in the community (Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines, Bucqueroux, Sluder, 1998). A positive perception of community policing among the public will facilitate its adoption.

Hypothesis Two:

Inability of Nigeria Police to cope with security challenges has no significant positive impact on adopting community policing in Nigeria. This was tested using regression analysis and the result shown below:

A Summary of Linear Regression Analysis showing the impact of Inability of Nigeria Police Force to cope with security issues on adoption of community policing in Nigeria.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig</i>	<i>Remark</i>
Inability of Nigeria police to cope with security challenges	.297	10.739	.297	0.88	115.327	.000	Significant

Source: Field Survey, 2019

The above table shows that inability of Nigeria Police Force to cope with security challenges is directly related to the need for considering the adoption of community policing ($\beta = .297, p < .05$). Further analysis showed that inability of Nigeria Police to cope with security challenges explained 88 per cent of the variance in the adoption of community policing ($R^2 = 0.88, P < .05$). The expected partnership will make both the police and the people “co-producers of safety” in the community. Furthermore, community oriented security and peaceful co-existence therefore will enhance the quality of life, or decrease citizens’ fear of crime.

Summary and Conclusion

The aim of this session is to present the summary of the study in order to provide insights to the logical conclusion that was drawn and provide a convenient basis for the recommendations. It is a statement of fact that Nigeria is bedeviled with security challenges that are multi-dimensional. Boko Haram insurgency, Herdmen/Farmers crisis, Kidnapping for ransom among others,

have added a new dimension to already tensed security situation. The summary of the findings is therefore presented below.

With regards to objective one which investigated factors responsible for security challenges in Nigeria, the study found that unemployment, poverty, corruption and poor leadership style were among such factors. The study equally found in respect of objective two that seek to determine the challenges associated with Nigeria police coping with security issues, includes the low staff strength, lack of sufficient professionalism and technicalities in the fulfillment of their constitutional responsibilities. In addition, the study found that lack of adequate human resources and corruption are other issues associated with security challenges.

In the face of multi-dimensional security challenges in Nigeria, the paper concludes that community policing in partnership with Nigeria police and community could help to minimise the scourge. It further concludes that the challenges inherent in adopting community policing could be overcome if efforts are made to regulate or minimise abuse of power.

Recommendations

Recommendations were drawn from the analysis with each meant to address each of the research findings. First, the government should create enabling environment to generate massive employment opportunities to take care of active but unemployed youths, minimize attraction to criminal activities particularly kidnapping. This can be achieved through huge investment in modernised agriculture that will lead to industrial growth and production of finished product. Second, the police and other security agencies cannot function effectively without public support and co-operation. Thus, the Nigeria police force should improve on its core professional values and integrity through cordial public-police relations. This should be promoted through deliberate public relations programmes and re-orientation activities by the Nigeria police with the help of the mass media and that the Nigerian government should implement the United Nation standard of population/police in the country, while motivation of members of the police force should be given adequate consideration by government in terms of prompt promotion and regular training.

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VOTERS' TURNOUT AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA, 1999-2019

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Abstract

Election is one of the cardinal features of a democratic society and a means for the promotion of citizens' participation in governance. In Nigeria's fourth republic, elections have been characterized by low level of citizens' participation or involvement in selection of candidates for political positions. This syndrome commonly referred to as voter apathy has not received adequate attention in extant literature. This paper therefore critically analyzes the voters' turn out in general election in Nigeria from 1999 to 2019. The paper aims to identify the factors that have contributed to low voters' turn out in Nigeria's general elections during the period and to further proffer solutions for increasing voter turnout in future general elections in Nigeria. The rational choice theory was adopted as the theoretical framework for this study. Data for the study were collected mainly from documents and analyzed through qualitative descriptive and content analysis. The study found that high level of insecurity occasioned by incessant violence, lack of citizens' trust in the electoral process, postponement of elections, problem of logistics, late arrival of electoral materials etc, have contributed to the continued low level of voters' turn out in Nigeria's general election. This paper recommended among other things the introduction of full electronic voting system, provision of adequate security, timely preparation and provision of adequate electoral materials as well as encouragement of political education to the public as the panacea for tackling low voter turnout in Nigeria.

Keywords: Voters' turnout, Elections, General Election, Democratic Consolidation

Introduction

The selection of legitimate political leaders needs credible elections, which give room for citizens to participate actively for electing the candidates of their choice. In contemporary democracy, citizens participate to decide on

who should occupy a particular political position and who will represent their interest. Therefore, for any state to have generally acceptable leaders requires not only credible elections but also need high level of voters' turnout on the election day.

Voter turnout is one of the crucial indicators of how citizens participate in the governance of their country. High rate of voters' turnout is mostly an indicator of the vitality of democracy while the lower turnout is usually associated with voter apathy and mistrust of the political process (Solyonov, 2016, p.13). According to Nwankwo, Okafor and Asuoha (2017, p. 249) "voters' turnout is the springboard of election as an election is to democracy and it is a major yardstick to measure democratic performance." Voter turnout is the most common means of participation in a democracy and plays an important role in democratic consolidation (Young, 2004). Electoral participation or citizen's involvement in the political process is essential for democracy to be viable and meaningful (Dalton, 1998 cited in Agu, Okeke & Idike, 2013).

To Amanye, Bariledum and Lucky (2015, p. 155) "the beauty of democracy depends not on the number of registered political parties in a country but rather on the degree of popular participation in the democratic process." Therefore every citizens must play adequate role in the democratic process mainly in area of selection of leaders and formulation of policies. According to Huntington (1991 as cited in Amanye et al, 2015, p. 155) "a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for voters and in which virtually all adult population is eligible for vote."

Since independence, Nigeria has conducted several general elections in 1965, 1979, 1983, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019. From the fourth republic, Nigerian general elections have witnessed low voters turnout or declining rate of voter turnout despite the increase in number of registered voters (Omotola & Alyedogbon, 2012; Nwankwo et al, 2017). Available data indicated that from 2007 to 2019 voter turnout has declined in Nigeria which has been a major concern to election stakeholders and need urgent intervention. In 1999 election, voters' turnout was 52.3% and rose to 69.1% in 2003. It decline to 57.4% in 2007 and further declined to 53.7% in 2011. It also went down to 43.6% and 35.6% in 2015 and 2019 presidential election respectively (Abdallah & Krishi, 2019; Obiejesi, 2019). The

continuous low voters' turnout is a threat to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

Although studies have identified several factors to account for low voters turnout which include: electoral violence, perceived lack of trust on the political/electoral process by citizens, poor planning, delay in arrival of electoral materials, or inadequate electoral materials, poor functioning of electoral facilities etc (Solijonov, 2016; Obiejesi, 2019; Amanyie, 2015). However, this paper is interested to evaluate the issue of voters turnout and democratic consolidation in Nigeria, with the specific aim to identify how voters turn out can undermine democratic consolidation and the factors that contributed to low voters turnout in Nigeria's elections in the fourth republic. In addition, it meant to proffer suitable solutions towards increasing the level of voters' turnout in the future general elections in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

Voters Turnout

Voterturnout can be seen as the extent to which eligible voters come out to vote during election. "It is the extent to which eligible voters use their vote on election day and it is measured as the percentage of votes cast at an election, including invalid vote" (Soliforov, 2016, p. 4). According to Agaibe (n.d, p.4) voters turnout "simply refers to the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election. While Roberts (2009 as cited in Agaigbe, n.d, p.4) sees voters turnout as "the total number of people that vote in a given election, sometimes given as percentage.

Democracy

The word democracy is derived from two Greek words namely demos meaning people and kratos meaning rule. Literally democracy means rule by the people. Democracy can be defined as a system of government in which the citizens exercise power directly or elect representatives from among themselves to from a governing body (Democracy, 2018). Abraham Lincoln described democracy as "the government of the people, by the people and for the people" (cited in Okolie, 2016, p.25). This implies that democracy is a form of government in which the people rule. It is the form of government where all powers of the state are vested on the people. To Ranrey (1975, cited in Okolie, 2016, p.25) democracy refer to "a form of government organized in accordance with the principles of popular sovereignty, political equality,

popular consultation and majority rule.” Furthermore, Diamond (2009 cited in Omemma, 2017, p.129) described democracy as a broad model of government that is epitomized by good governance, the rule of law, security, protection of individual rights, vibrant civil society and shared economic prosperity. Dahl (cited in Innocent, Alhassan & George, 2013) outline the features of modern democracy to include effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, exercising final control over agenda, inclusion of adults, Dahl further asserts that a democratic society produces desirable consequences like avoidance of tyranny, provision of essential rights, general freedom, self determination, moral autonomy, human development, protection of essential personal interest, political equality, peace-seeking and prosperous (cited in Innocent, et al, 2013). Furthermore, Uhere and Agba (2017, p.152) stated that

Democracy is a way of life or system of government that encompasses freedom to make choices about what one does, where he lives and how he uses his earnings, the operations of institutions – the home, the church, local, state and federal government; the right of justified property ownership, social justice and fairness, the absence of social and class barriers, equality of opportunity and the solution of common problems through exercise of the free will of the people.

Okolie (2016,p.28) outlined the principles of democracy to include:

- a. Periodic free and fair election
- b. Political competition and participatory role
- c. Universal and adult suffrage
- d. Separation of power with checks and balances
- e. Truly representative government
- f. Constitutionalism
- g. Independence of the judiciary

Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation can be seen as the improvement in the elements or principles of democracy in a state. That is, it is the sustenance, transformation and improvement of democratic values in a society. O’ Donnell (1996, cited in Ituma &Chukwu, 2016, p.94) took a liberal democratic view by defining democratic consolidation to involve “political and social freedoms that are minimally necessary not only during, but also between elections as a

condition for election to be free and competitive.” Furthermore, Ituma and Chukwu (2016, p.94) defined democratic consolidation as the transformation and sustainance of democratic ethos to bring about good governance. According to Omenna (2017, p. 130) democratic consolidation means “the full realization, internalization and institutionalization of the democratic values and attributes.” In addition, Diamond (cited in Innocent et al, 2013, p.202) defined democratic consolidation as:

The quality, depth and authenticity of democracy in its various dimensions has been improved: Political competition becomes fairer, freer, more vigorous and executive; participation and representation broader, more autonomous and inclusive, civil liberties more comprehensively and rigorously protected; accountability more systematic and transparent.

Theoretical Framework

In this paper the rational choice theory was adopted as the framework for analysis.

Rational Choice Theory

The rational choice theory can also be referred to as choice theory or rational action theory. The origin of this theory can be traced to the works of Kenneth Arrow, James Buchman and Gordon Tullock in 1962, Anthony Downs in 1957, Vincent Ostron in 1974 (Antunes, 2010; Igboeche, 2018).

This theory assumed that individual has preferences among available choice alternative that allows them to state which options they prefer. And, the individual as a rational being take account of available information, probabilities of event and potential costs and benefits in determining preferences. (Rational Choice Theory, 2019). Furthermore, this theory argued that individuals behave rationally in politics and all decisions made by voters and political parties are rational which is guided by self-interest and enforced in accordance with the principle of maximization of action’s utility (Antrunes, 2010).The rational choice theorists argued that a lack of willingness of individual to participate in making decisions or in any political issues is not a sign of their ignorance but of their rationality. This is because the rational individual will ask what he/she will benefit from such participation and the costs of such participation.

In electoral politics, the rational choice theory sees voters or electorates as a rational beings that make decisions on whether to vote or not which is influenced by the perceived benefit or cost of voting on election day. Voters will not likely to vote if the perceived that the outcome of the election will not be relevant to them or the cost of participating in election will outweigh its benefits. Based on the calculus-of-voting model by Riker and Ordeshook, voters operate rationally, and their decisions whether to vote are based on the expected utility of vote. So, citizens are expected to weight the benefit of voting against the cost and only decide to vote when the benefits outweighs the costs (Vergne, 2011).

This theory is relevant for this paper because it will give a clear explanation of whether the level of voters' turnout in Nigeria general elections can be as a result of the decisions of the electorate or voters which is based on the cost or consequences of turning out to vote on election day. In other words, this theory will enable us to explain if low turnout of voters in the general election is associated with the voters' perception of less benefit from voting on election day. Therefore, voters cannot come out to cast their vote, if they perceived that the electoral process would not be of benefit or advantage to them.

In application of this theory, it can be deduced that Nigerian voters most likely make rational decision for not turning out on election day because of unbearable cost which outweighs the benefits. Like the issue of electoral violence, postponement of election, lack of transparency in electoral process, late arrival of electoral materials and personnel etc can discourage voters to turnout on election day. If voters perceived that, their votes will not count or have the perception that they will not benefit from the election outcome or have perceived threat to their lives; there is high tendency that they will not come out to vote. The Nigeria elections have been characterized by several electoral frauds, irregularities, electoral violence and security threat and these had led to fear of insecurity and lack of trust on the electoral process. These conditions discourage voters or electorate to come out to vote in election day.

Methodology

The design of this paper was descriptive and historical in approach. This is because the researcher described voters' turnout and democratic consolidation. Also, the research looked at past records of voters turnout from 1999-2019. Data were collected through secondary sources, which include:

textbooks, journals and newspapers. The analysis of data were done qualitatively with content analysis and logical reasoning. The scope of this paper is limited or restricted to voters' turnout in presidential election from 1999 to 2019 elections. In the area of limitations of the study, this paper had limitations of problem of time and issue of adequate materials pertaining to 2019 general election. However, the researcher took adequate time to source for relevant materials and create time to write this work to ensure that these problems do not undermine the validity of this research.

The Rate of Voters Turnout in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Here, we will look at the rate of voters' turnout in general (presidential) election in Nigeria from 1999 to 2019. This can be observed or identified at the table below:

Table 1: Showing the rate of voters turnout in presidential election from 1999 to 2019

S / N	Year of Election	Number of Registered voters	Number of voters turnout	Percentage
	1 9 9 9	57,838,945	30,280,052	5 2 . 3 %
	2 0 0 3	60,823,022	42,018,735	6 9 . 1 %
	2 0 0 7	61,567,036	35,397,517	5 7 . 4 %
	2 0 1 1	73,528,040	39,469,484	5 3 . 7 %
	2 0 1 5	67,422,005	29,432,083	4 3 . 6 %
	2 0 1 9	82,344,107	29,364,209	3 5 . 6 %

Source: Omotola and Aiyedogbon, (2012), Obiejesi, (2019), Orijme (2019), Amayie et al (2015)

The above table indicates the level of voters' turnout in different period of presidential elections conducted in Nigeria in the fourth republic. Based on the results from the table above, it shows a continuous decrease of voters turnout in Nigeria's general election starting from 2007 election.

In 1999, there was 57,838,945 registered voters with 30,280,052 vote cast which represents 52.3% of voters turnout. While in 2003, there was increase in number of registered voters of 60,823,022 with 42,018,735 votes casts representing 69.1% of voters turnout.

In 2007, the voters' turnout decreases to 57.4%. The INEC had 61,567,036 registered voters and 35,397,517 voters turned out or cast their vote. In 2011, voters' turnout dropped further to 53.7% when there was 73,528,040 registered voters while only 39,469,484 of the voters turned out.

In 2015, it indicated that voters' turnout further decreased to 43.6% when INEC has 67,422,005 registered voters and only 29,432,083 voters cast their votes. While in 2019 presidential election witnessed the lowest rate of voters' turnout with 35.6% where there was 82,344, 107 registered voters and 29,364,209 eligible citizens cast their votes.

The result of voters turnout from 1999 to 2019 general elections revealed that Nigeria has had an average rate of 51.95% of voters' turnout. In addition, the result from available data shows that despite the increase in number of registered voters, the level of voters' turnout continues to fall. This indicates that if nothing is done adequately, the rate of voters turnout in Nigeria's election will continue to reduce or remain low in subsequent elections to come.

Voters Turnout and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria

The continuous decline of voters' turnout in Nigeria's fourth republic is a challenge to democratic consolidation in Nigeria. This is because election and the extent of voters' turnout is one of the crucial elements of democratic society. There is no how Nigeria can consolidate its democratic principles if the number of eligible voters continues to decline. That is why Diamond (2015, cited in Solejonov, 2016, p.43) argued that "low rates of voter participation are additional signs of democratic ill-health." This implies that the low level of voters turnout in general elections shows that Nigeria is still battling with the issue of nascent democracy where democratic values are not seen or not effectively observed and this make the process of consolidating or improving on democratic tenets difficult if not impossible. In other words,

Nigeria has not fully consolidated its democracy because the level of voters participation has been reduced drastically. The low level of voters' turnout is a challenge to democratic consolidation in Nigeria because:

- a. It shows that there is a problem in the electoral process which makes people unable to have trust in it.
- b. It raised a lot of questions on the capability of political institution and electoral management body towards conducting credible election.
- c. It indicates that the result of the election is not a true reflection of the wishes of the majority of the total population of eligible voters as a result of low voters turnout.

According to Ipinyomi (2015, cited in Vande & Jooji, 2017, p.211) "voters apathy has remained a recurring phenomenon in Nigerian elections and where less than 50% attendance is recorded in an election, any winner can still boast because those who chose to stay away can still turn the tide." Furthermore, Vande and Jooji (2017,p.211) maintained that: "if only a few people turned out to vote, the voice of the salient majority may be lost because, the small percentage of the electorates that may have come out to vote, may not truly represent the wishes of the entire people." In addition, an unpopular leader or political candidate may be elected if there is very low extent of voters' turnout and this is more evident if such issue of low turnout of voters are manipulated by some stakeholders to favour a candidate through encouragement of electoral violence, unnecessary cancellation or suspension of voting and deliberate delay of electoral results.

Factors That Contributed to low Voters Turnout in Nigeria's General Election

The factors that contribute low level of voters turnout in Nigeria include the following:

i. Insecurity/Electoral Violence: The fear of insecurity or perceived threat of violence highly contributes to low voters' turnout in Nigeria general elections. (Agaiage, 2016; Nwankwo et al, 2017; Amayie et al, 2015; Tonwe, Aihie & Igiebor, 2014). The study of Tonwe et al (2014) on six geo-political zones in Nigeria revealed that voter participation in the electoral process has been inhibited by violence and widespread insecurity and hence, increased tendency towards political apathy by the citizenry.

Currently, report from situation Room (a coalition of more than 70 civic groups monitoring the election process) showed several electoral violent

disruptions by political thugs that snatched and burnt ballot boxes and papers. Also, it was reported that people were killed across eight states of which six people were from Rivers state (Orjime, 2019). Furthermore, in Lagos state, evidence indicated that some voters stay away from governorship election after the presidential election were marred by violence and armed thugs who burned and snatched ballot boxes (Abang, 2019). In addition, the study of Amayiwe et al, (2015) show that there is a strong correlation between electoral violence and apathetic behaviour of voters in Nigeria. They maintained that voter's turnout increases whenever there is decline in electoral violence and vice-versa.

2. Postponement of Election: The late postponement or shift of election day contributes to low rate of voters turnout in election. Evidence has shown that late postponement of election has made most of the voters that travel from far distance to their home were unable to make such travelling plans for the rescheduled elections. A political scientist, Terhile Issac told **Sunday Leadership** that the low voters turnout in the 2019 general election may be as a result of the initial cancellation of the polls (Orjime, 2019). John Tomaizewski of the Joint National Democratic Institute (NDI) told reporters that more significantly, the late postponement had a negative effect on voter turnout (Akwagyuan & Carsten, 2019).

Nigeria has postponed elections on three different occasion and which contributed to the continuous decline of eligible voters. First postponement was in 2011 and had 53.7% turnout, the second was in 2015 with 43.6 turnout while in 2019 had 35.67. Voters turnout. Most especially the 2019 election postponement made it difficult or impossible for most of the voters that lived in far places to return again for casting of vote.

3. Lack of Trust in the Electoral Process: The low rate of voters' turnout is also as a result of the perceived lack of trust in the electoral process to Nigerian citizens. There has been a general assumption that Nigerian citizens general election is characterized by several irregularities or manipulation before, during and after elections. Also, people don't trust the capability of the electoral management body (INEC) to organize a credible election. Based on this, most of the eligible voters may decide not come out on election day because their vote may not count. The study of Amaigbe (2016) in Benue state, indicates that most of the respondents in his research argued that the

perception that votes will not count and lack of confidence in INEC are one of the major reasons for low turnout in election.

4. Late Arrival of Electoral Personnel and Materials: The failure of electoral officials and electoral materials to arrive at the polling units contributes to poor turnout of voters. This is because some of the voters don't have the patience to wait for a long period of time for voting to commence. This late arrival of electoral materials and personnel leads to late voting which makes people get frustrated and return back to their respective home without casting their votes. In 2019 election, elections were held very late in some places and in some there was no election at all (Obiejesi, 2019). Apart from 2019 election, other elections conducted in Nigeria's fourth republic from 1999 to present, has been characterized by late voting as a result of late arrival of electoral officials and materials at the polling units. The issue of delay can be as a result of poor planning and logistics problems experienced by the INEC towards distribution electoral materials and deployment of personnels.

5. Political Apathy: The lack of interest by most of the Nigerian citizens contributes to low level of voters' turnout in election day. The study of Fagunwa (2015) revealed that most of the respondents that actually registered for the 2015 general election did not do so, not because they were interested in voting but they did so against the backdrop of the importance of the voter's card. Also, others did not registered because they show lack of interest in voter registration exercise. This implies that the lower the rate of people's interests in politics of the state, the lesser the level of voters turnout. This issue of lack of interest was observed in the current 2019 general elections. Journalist and election observers reported that a good number of youth were seen playing football or discussing in small groups on the day of the election(Obiejesi, 2019).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The realization of a well-consolidated democracy requires the question on how to encourage citizens' participation in politics most especially in selection of political leaders. Therefore, voters' participation in election is seen as one of the most important indices of functional democracy. High level of voters' turnout is bedrock for solidifying the democratic process of a state.

This study has observed that the continuous decrease of voters' turnout in general elections has posed a challenge to democratization or democratic consolidation in Nigeria. This low turnout has shown that selection of leaders may not be a reflection of majority of eligible voters which most likely lead to emergence of unpopular leaders and also indicates problem in the electoral process. Furthermore, it revealed that the issue of electoral violence, late postponement of election, lack of citizen trust on electoral process, logistic problems and late arrival of electoral materials and political apathy among citizens have contributed to low level of voters' turn out in Nigeria's general election from 1999-2019. Based on these findings, the following recommendations were made:

- a. There is need for the government to provide adequate security personnel during the time of election to all polling units and other strategic areas.
- b. There is need for introduction of full electronic voting system whereby voters can be allowed to vote freely from their houses, offices or place of convenience without necessarily coming physically at the polling units.
- c. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should make timely preparation or plans in order to prevent late arrival of electoral officials and materials in the polling units and postponement of election. Without adequate planning, electoral material may not come early at the polling units thereby disenfranchising some people from voting.
- d. The government through its agencies, non-government organizations, political parties, interest groups, INEC should on regular basis conduct effective political education or sensitization to citizens most especially at the rural areas on the need for only to register but to turn out for election.
- e. Government and the election management body (INEC) should show sincerity in the management or conduct of election in order to achieve credible elections. This will help to gain the citizens' trust on the electoral process.
- f. Adequate political will and commitment by government is needed to make and implement laws towards punishing offenders that indulge in electoral violence and electoral malpractices.

- g. The introduction of compulsory voting to eligible citizens will be of help to increase the number of voters' turnout in Nigeria.
- h. There is need to introduce a system where a registered voter can vote anywhere. This will help voters that must have relocated to far places (may be outside LGA or states) to cast their vote in their present place of residence rather than stressing themselves on how to come to the areas they registered for voting.

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BLAME-GAME SYNDROME AND LEADERSHIP FAILURE IN NIGERIA'S QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

It is no longer uncommon to hear or see succeeding governments blame and castigate their predecessors for damages and underdevelopment pointers in Nigeria. This has become a recurrent issue that has deemphasized strategies for productive leadership and amplified the decay, failure, and ineptitude in Nigeria's political leadership at all levels of government. This study therefore sets out to examine the vicious circle of politics of blame game and its impacts on Nigeria's political and economic development. The study will adopt the theories of post-colonial and neo-patrimonial state as its framework of analysis. Secondary sources of data will be used while analyses will be done using content analysis. The study discovers among others that blame culture approach has not contributed positively in any way to Nigeria's development process; rather, it has exacerbated leadership failure while undermining the strategies for a transformational process. It recommends among others that Nigerian political leaders should eschew 'pointing fingers' and/or antagonising their predecessors and opponents, but make concerted efforts to build strong institutions which can ensure competence, good governance and consistency for national development.

Keywords: Blame-game, Development, Institutions, Leadership failure, Nigeria.

Introduction

The socio-economic and political development of any country depends largely on the ability of its leadership to facilitate, entrench and sustain good governance. Essentially, good governance is a function of committed, patriotic and disciplined leadership. Nigeria as a country is believed to have attained mature and productive age after over fifty eight (58) years of her independence, thus expected to be at par with her contemporaries in terms of socio-economic and political developments. However, its progress in these

areas has been stunted by lack of visionary and focused leadership. It is both pitiful and appalling that despite the long years of independence, Nigeria still continues to battle with the problems of leadership and good governance. The crop of leaders that have attained leadership position since independence had in one way or the other lacked vision; most of them have been engrossed with tribal and religious prejudice, corruption and political bickering leading to the enthronement of mediocrity, maladministration and mismanagement of public resources, and consequent economic and political setbacks that have left abject poverty as the nation's heritage.

Significantly, Nigeria is among the countries of the world endowed with abundant natural and human resources that are capable of improving socio-economic status and living standards of the citizenry; but the reverse has remained the case. Anyone who observes the current trend in Nigeria will baffle at the contradiction between the wealth of the nation, and the living conditions of most Nigerians. World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports shows that 77.6% of Nigerians are in lower middle class multidimensional poverty line value of less than US \$3.20, while 53.2% live in poverty line value of less than US \$1.90 per day (World Bank, 2018, UNDP, 2018). Unemployment rate is also high that the living condition of the populace has continued to deteriorate further. One will tend to ask so many questions on what could be responsible for this abnormal situation – poverty in the midst of plenty. There arises a perplexity that in spite of the natural endowments and abundant human resources in Nigeria, and after close to six (6) decades of independence, the country has achieved only very little. Experts reveal that countries like Belgium and Singapore have little or no resources compared to Nigeria, but their GDP is more than the total GDP of the entire African continent. In short, Malaysia and even South Africa that have but few of what Nigeria has, have stronger GDP (Asaju et al, 2014). This assertion then lends credence to the fact that from the period of post independence, successive governments in Nigeria have failed in translating Nigeria's potentials and numerical strength into real economic power that could lift Nigerians out of poverty, unemployment, and misery. They have rather capitalized on their predecessors' failures and loopholes to criticize and blame them, and perhaps, by that way justify their own visionless and unproductiveness.

Scholars and critics seem to share a consensus that the major reason for Nigeria's present predicament is lack of good and purposeful leadership at

the helms of affairs of the country (Asaju & Akume, 2012; Lawal & Owolabi, 2012). In agreement, Achebe (1983) maintained that Nigeria's problem is sheer wantonness in leadership. In his words,

...there is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character; there is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise up to the responsibility, to the challenges of personal example which are the hallmarks of true leadership (Achebe 1983, p.10)

This position lends credibility to the fact that Nigerian political leaders have consistently been inconsistent with their offices. Everybody blames somebody for the failure in the system – from the tiers of government to the organs, and even the informal political structures, everybody finds a way to exonerate him/herself and put both blame and liability on the other person. In view of the above, this paper investigates the politics of blame-game vis-à-vis leadership failure in Nigeria's quest for development, and recommends ways to curb this vicious political cycle and guarantee efficient leadership, good governance, and integral national development.

Theoretical Discourse

This study is premised on the theoretical postulations of the post colonial and neo-patrimonial models of state. The post colonial state theory arose as a counter to the proposition of the western liberal theory that the state is an independent force and an impartial arbiter that caters for the overall interest of every member of the society and regulates equitably their socio-economic transactions and processes (Okolie, 2006). On the contrary, leading Marxist scholars of the state theory such as (Lenin, 1984; Jakutowski, 1973) argue that the state is the product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The proposition is that the state arose from the conflict between classes, as a rule, the state of the most powerful and economically dominant class that also becomes the politically dominant class and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed.

The classical Marxist theory of the state has been further developed and employed in the elucidation of the peculiarity of the neo-colonial state by scholars such as Alavi (1973), Ekekwe (1985), Ake (1985) and Ibeanu (1998) and others. The major contention of these scholars is that the post-colonial

state is a creation of imperialism, and as such has followed a developmental strategy dictated by the interest of imperialism and its local allies. Ekekwe (1985) argues that the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state whose major pre-occupation was exploitation of local human and other natural resources through the creation of an environment under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie in alliance with the ruling elite would take place. Therefore, the post-colonial state that now emerged, though ostensibly independent and sovereign, was no less a creation of imperialism than the colonial state (Ekekwe, 1985).

Ake (1985) enunciated that one basic feature of the post-colonial state is that it is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so, is engrossed in the class struggles that go on in the society. The post-colonial state is also constituted in such a way that it mainly caters for a narrow range of interests - the interest of the rapacious political elite in comprador and subordinate relationship with foreign capital. This lack of relative autonomy is one reason why the post-colonial state in Nigeria is incapable of mediating political conflicts (Ake, 1985). As Ibeanu (1998) puts it, due to the distinct colonial experience at the stage of "extensive growth" of capital in which they emerged, the colonial state did not strive for legitimacy as the basis for their constitution was "principally for conquering and holding down the peoples of the colonies, seen not as equal commodity bearers in integrated national markets, but as occasional petty commodity producers ..." (Ibeanu, 1998, p.9). As a result of this, there was no effort made to evolve routine and institutionalised "principles for the non-arbitrary use of the colonial state by the colonial political class. The post-colonial states then passed into the hands of a pseudo capitalist class fervently seeking to become economically dominant, and becomes for the controllers, a powerful instrument for acquiring private wealth, a monstrous instrument in the hands of individuals and pristine ensembles for pursuing private welfare to the exclusion of others" (Ibeanu, 1998, pp. 9-10).

Although the theory demonstrates that political leaders of post-colonial states, due to the peculiar features of these states, and their quest for economic survival engage in brazen struggle for and control of state power, one major problem with the theory is that it has failed to locate the underdevelopment of African states, particularly Nigeria, to the character of the post colonial leaders' proclivity to lay blame on the colonialists and their subsequent

predecessors on the underdevelopment pointers of Nigeria. Put differently, the present leaders of Nigeria have persistently indulged in the tradition of blaming their predecessors for the vicious cycle of leadership inertia and underdevelopment as the post colonial state theorists.

In the same vein, the theory of neo-patrimonialism originated from Marx Weber's concept of patrimonial authority. The theory refers to a mixed type of political domination and administrative system principally in developing countries of Africa, Middle East, Latin America, Southern Europe and former Communist Empires. The principal assumption of the theory is that "an extensive network of personal patronage rather than ruling through ideology or impersonal laws has been the determining character of patrimonial rule" (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Mehler, 1998; Hansen, 2003; cited in Ezirim, et al 2016, p.101). The exercise of power under neo-patrimonial rule is erratic and unpredictable as opposed to the assessable exercise of power in Weberian sense. It is a system which power or office is used for personal gains. The patrimonial authority in Weber's postulation was a form of power characterized by personal rule acknowledged by tradition and personal loyalty. The ruler's personal preferences and sentiments were more important than extant laws and the ruler treats the people loyal to his authority as patriarch treated his family (Hansen, 2003). Neo-patrimonialism is equally of the presumption that the existence of widespread "network of patronage, personal relations and systematic clientelism undermines effective action against corruption... as the primordial enclaves shield the thievery business, administrative and political elites from the wrath of the law" (Ezirim et al. 2016, p.102).

Bratton & Van de Walle, (1997) held that patrimonial systems are associated with three informal political institutions. The first is presidentialism, which is unwilling to delegate power except the most minor task of decision making. The second is systemic clientelism, which the chief executive relies on distribution of benefits such as projects, contracts and appointments to his loyalists. The third informal institution is referred to as prebendalism or politics of patronage, in which public officers appropriate and use public offices to generate personal benefits and also distribute contracts, projects and top government positions to people of their ethnic nationality, region or district and religion, essentially to secure loyalty, support and solidarity of the clients or followers in the society (Joseph 1987, p.1). Utomi (2004) opined that;

The existence of patrimonial state orients Nigerians towards seeking their individual piece of the national cake. It orients business towards seeking economic rents as against wealth creation. Patrimonialism strips that state of accountability. Those who control political power use it to control economic access and to extract economic gains for themselves. They thus resist the separation of powers and of transparency in governance. These failures result in the abuse of public resources, inefficiencies (adding to transaction costs for business and major disincentives for investors) (Utomi 2004, p.124)

Based on the foregoing assumptions, both theories are apt to explaining the specific case of Nigerian leaders' blame culture and the accompanying leadership failure. While the post colonial state theory provides insight on how the post colonial state leaders constitute a bourgeois class to exploit the country and turn back to lay blame on imperialism; the contemporary successive leaderships in Nigeria instead of focusing on building strong institutions that can engender transformation of the country for the better, indulge in persistent blame of their predecessors on the underdevelopment status of the state, primarily to divert the attention of the people from their predatory missions and leadership inertia. At the point of their aspiration to leadership positions, the intending leaders, like their post colonial counterparts, expose and criticise the incumbents for their poor leadership, as strategies to capture power. When eventually they get into power, they resort to the blame game policy to cover their exploitative manoeuvre and visionless leadership that result to the vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment.

Similarly, the postulations of the neo-patrimonial theory clearly portray the Nigerian state as averse to the Weberian concept of the state as an impersonal and impartial entity. Taking clue from the neo-patrimonial trajectory, the past and present Nigerian leaders view the state as instrument for primitive accumulation and appropriation of the common wealth for personal aggrandisement. This explains the desperate struggle for leadership positions targeted at mindless exploitation and patron-client network that reflect mismanagement, misappropriation and underdevelopment of the country as opposed to leadership excellence. Based on the analysis of Utomi (2004) the

debilitating effects of patrimonial culture orient Nigerian people and businesses towards the plundering of the economy for private enrichment. This is the bane of Nigeria's leadership failure and subsequent underdevelopment.

Conceptual Clarification

Political Blame-Game Syndrome

The term 'blame' is defined as (to) "consider or say that somebody is responsible for something done (badly or wrongly) or not done"; "be responsible for something bad; deserve to be blamed"; "responsibility for something done badly or wrongly", and "criticism for doing something wrong" (Oxford Dictionary, 1989, p.107). This set of definitions points out two elements in the notion of blame. First, that it has to do with 'something bad' or 'wrong'. And second, it links the 'bad thing' to the responsibility of 'somebody'. Blame is the act of attributing a bad or wrong thing to a particular person or entity.

The above concept explains blame as involving at least two components. One, denoted as some element of perceived and avoidable harm (PAH), or loss – something is seen as being worse for some person or group than it could have been if matters had been handled differently. The second denotes blame as perceived responsibility (PR?), that is, some attribute of perceived responsibility or agency – that harm was avoidable because it was caused by acts of omission or commission by some identifiable individual or organization or possibly some more abstract institution such as 'capitalism' or 'patriarchy' (Sulitzeanu-Kenan & Hood, 2005). Attempts to deflect blame often involve working on the time dimension, as well as on the agency and loss dimensions.

Blaming in social or political sense is something that in principle extends across the whole spectrum of society from high-level potentates to the person in the street. Who do you blame for what is a central marker of your culture and attitudes (Douglas 1992). As a social process, blaming must involve at least two sets of actors, namely, blame makers (those who do the blaming) and blame takers (those who are on the receiving end). Naturally, people tend to notice and act on the basis of perceived or actual losses than they do for corresponding gains. Hence, it is easier to point out the negative trends surrounding a regime while totally ignoring their strengths; a phenomenon that goes under various names, one of which is 'negativity bias'.

Negativity bias denotes a commonly observed cognitive tendency for more attention to be paid to negative than to positive information and for losses to be valued more highly than gains of an equivalent amount. The causes of negativity bias are debated (notably as between competing figure-ground and loss aversion explanations), but the existence of the phenomenon is well established and several studies have suggested that losses are commonly weighted at between two and four times more than equivalent gains (Heath et al. 1999).

Negativity bias has been found in various forms in politics and government. Indeed, it has been said that politics is at its purest when action is prompted more by hatred of enemies than by attachment to friends (Carr, 2009). Dissatisfaction is often said to produce proportionately higher levels of activity and changes in allegiance than corresponding levels of satisfaction. The media are said to shape negativity bias by amplification of figure ground effects (in this case, by foregrounding what is perceived to be negative and back grounding the positive). That process is highlighted by Kasperson (1992) as controversial notion of ‘social amplification of risk, and the related idea that media tend to expose society to more information that decreases trust or reduces credit than to information that increases trust and credit (Koren & Klein, 1991).

The political sphere has the capacity to set the news agenda, which in turn will profoundly shape public opinion (Berkowitz 1992; McCombs & Shaw, 1993). Gans (1979) describes the relationship between sources and journalists as a dance, with the sources generally being the leader (executive). Hence, elected officials have an interest in blaming their political opponents. A political blame game is a dynamic relationship between accuser, accused, and audiences. Three conditions define the success of an accusation: the accuser has force and authority, the accused is unable to counter-attack, and the audience actively echoes it. The roles of accuser, accused, and audience depend on specific blaming instances. The audience role mostly belongs to the media, which make sense of the public discourse.

Strategies of Political Blame-Game

Politicians can shape what, how, and when events are discussed in the public discourse. However, a constellation of actors tries and orients the blame in the public discourse. Actors’ structural position can explain their resources and logics of action. Actors deploy different strategies and alliances to

dominate the blame game. First, politicians can set the agenda, namely what is being discussed. This capacity is both positive and negative. They can direct the attention towards some issues, and divert it from others. This selective focus can affect how audiences evaluate responsibility (Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 1982). Politicians set the agenda through speeches, hearings, and reports, which can represent half of news stories (Sigal, 1973). This point is important: it is not only what politicians *say*, but also what they *do* that has an impact on the conversation. Hence, while Buhari's administration continues to accuse Jonathan's administration of wrecking Nigeria, he also goes about arresting both cabinet members of Jonathan's administration and those he perceives as political opponents. This implies that actors can play the blame game directly through voice, and indirectly through action.

Second, politicians can shape the framing of the conversation, namely how events are discussed (McCombs & Shaw 1993). While this interpretive capacity ultimately belongs to the media, politicians are likely to have a major influence. It is important here to understand what is at stake. Accusatory frames rely on an active construction of both causality and moral wrongfulness. Moral cues might matter even more than causality in a context of high uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). A frame must be grounded in words and images that are noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged to resonate (Entman, 2003). This rhetoric can have a very strong impact. For instance, while blaming past leadership for Nigeria's poor living standard, Buhari commented:

...if they had used 50% of the money we made, when oil prices went as high as \$143 dollars per barrel, and stabilized the naira at N100 to the US \$1 dollar with production at 2.1 million barrels per day for many years, Nigerians would have minded their businesses. You could have almost grown food on our roads, as they were abandoned. The stealing was so much, and they were so inept that they could not even cover the stealing properly. I wonder how all those things could have happened to our country (Buhari, 2016, in AIT onlinenews).

But contrary to this point, Nicol (2016) argues that self-serving behaviours are themselves constructed. Actors can use others' mistakes to win the blame game. Politicians can activate scandals, and these scandals will have a major effect in orienting blame.

Third, politicians can influence the timing of the public conversation. Arguably, the timing politicians choose to use speeches, hearings and reports matters. As (Entman, 2004) suggested, initial frames will tend to discard disconfirming information in the future. Acting first, and acting efficiently matters in a blame game. Politicians therefore deploy their full leading power in their romance with blame culture syndrome. Power here rests on the material, institutional, rhetoric and status resources that actors can deploy to orient the public discourse. It is politicians' role and interest to play the blame game visibly. Their reputation is crucial, since they need to get elected or re-elected, remain legitimately in power, and justify their unproductiveness.

The Leadership Question

The leadership question is hinged on the interface of structure and behaviour dialectic of institutions and persons. Actors who create and implement the laws that are binding on existing social institutions play the state roles (Ogunmilade et al, 2017). The behavioural concern is the impact of personality trait, attitude and values on political governance. The extant literature on leadership offers the theoretical context and philosophical departure to explain the motives and character of the governing elite. Since the idea of organized society, there have been debates on who governs, who should govern, what the basis of political authority in a community should be, when, why, and how political actors should obtain and appropriate influence. Plato, Marx, Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, had raised philosophical interventions on these issues (Cranston, 1964; Obah-Akpowoghaha, 2013). However, these writers differ on methodology. For instance, Locke and Rousseau relied on the prescriptive method to set the criteria for generalized ideas on the nature of man, society and authority while the works of Karl Marx thrives on the history of societal material dialectics. Leadership is the process through which one individual consistently exerts more influence than others in the pursuit of group behaviour. Political leadership is the decision on social policy and resource allocation, as exerted by pattern representatives (Okadigbo, 1987; Abbott, 1947; Cranston, 1964). These definitions suggest that the leadership process is hinged on the capacity to allocate scarce resources, which determines the locus of power. The concept of leadership is also appraised at the implications of the concept of power, legitimacy and hierarchy.

For Omolayo (2006), leadership is an essential oil that keeps the wheel of government working without any difficulty. According to him, leadership makes the difference between success and failure in a country. It involves giving direction to citizens who are the critical assets of the nation. In addition, Ukaegbu (2010) sees leadership as a bundle of attributes including knowledge, vision, courage, imagination, determination, transparency, decisiveness, motivation, patriotism, nationalism, and more importantly, responsibility deployed by occupants of strategic positions to lead their citizens and or followers towards profound and positive societal transformations. Profound society changes require extraordinary leadership exemplified in transformational policies and actions.

The Blame-Game and Leadership Crisis

As noted earlier, most Nigerians believe that all of Nigeria's problems can be summarized in leadership failure. Hence, they tend to point at political leadership, specifically the president/presidency as responsible for all Nigeria's problems and ultimately the reason we are where we are - poverty and underdevelopment. Nigerian state officials have continued to serve their own interests without fear of being called to account. Politics is personalized, while patronage is essential to maintenance of power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is controlled; voluntary associations are co-opted or disbanded. This environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy (World Bank, 1989).

The foregoing analysis suggests that there is a leadership crisis. To properly historicize the issue, we should link in to the nature of the Nigerian state and character of the ruling class. This state lacks autonomy and enmeshed in the struggle among fractions of the political class to control the political domain. The political elite are not a productive class, but rely on the control of state structures to access economic rewards. The over politicization of the Nigerian state is also understood in the context of the unmitigated struggles for power, influence and patronage. The nature of political contest ensured the emergence of a local governing class without ideological commitment. Rather than pursue political contests within ideological frameworks, politics became a contesting terrain for shallow, self-centred political gains.

Besides, the lack of ideology and the overwhelming influence of political office make the political class look for a way out of their

unpreparedness. Hence, they resort to a game of blames – accusing their predecessors of laying a faulty foundation for them. This fear-driven blame provides the illusion of control without actually facing and solving the underlying problem and it is a source of great danger, since it can lead to dehumanization and even violence. This dynamic plays a huge role in today's politics. Hence, succeeding regimes having no cardinal plan of actions, set off by pointing fingers at their predecessors. This for instance, does not just happen in Nigeria with opposition party coming into government such as the incumbent Buhari-led APC and the out gone Jonathan-led PDP; it also surfaces with political godfathers handing over power to their godsons, and the 'sons' turning to accuse the 'fathers' – as in the cases of Chimaroke Nnamani and Sullivan Chime, and Peter Obi and William Obiano of Enugu and Anambra states respectively. Some even go to the extent of arresting and prosecuting their predecessors and political opponents. While this move endears further loyalty and affiliations to politicians, it also disparages the nonconformist political opponents who lie in wait for their own retributive anger. What is more worrisome is that when they have apportioned blames, first, they sit back and fold their hands because their failure or underperformance has already been justified; second, the blame has been used to achieve diversion of the people's attention from the perpetration of misappropriation of public fund which is the underlining aim of the blame. On the other hand, the blame takers – who are largely the former executives – hardly have any responses since they are already out of power; hence, they have neither the opportunity nor platform to accentuate their defence. When such becomes a political norm, subsequent regimes will follow the same trend, and in the end, they throw the country into Hobbes' *bellum omnium contra omnes*. If this becomes the case, everybody ends up fighting everybody – politicians against politicians, and loyalists against loyalists – development is halted, economy depreciates, and instability abounds. Hence, the country continues to suffer the adverse effects.

Consequences of Leadership Failure in Nigeria

As a result of the perennial failure of leadership, it is a common place to find Nigeria in the top of all the negative perception indices of poverty, disease, corruption, death rate, maternal and child mortality rate, while also

remaining in the bottom of the catalogues of positive indices of human development index (HDI), life expectancy, power generation (electricity and gas), expenditure on education and healthcare in Sub Sahara Africa and the World.

Nigeria with all the natural resources it is endowed with and being the largest economy in Africa has continued to rank 156 and 157 out of 189 countries in the world human development index (HDI) within 2016 and 2017 respectively, with abysmal human development value of 0.532%, below the Sub Sahara Africa average of 0.537% (UNDP, 2018). In the same vein, the population of Nigerians living below poverty line of US \$1.90 per day is 53.5%, while the Sub Sahara African average is 41%. Also, the Transparency International (TI) published 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measured the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 180 countries and territories. The index scores on a scale of zero (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) drawing on 13 surveys of businesspeople and expert assessments shows that Nigeria has a percentage of 27 to Sub Sahara Africa's 32 percent and ranked 144 out of 189 countries in the world (Transparency International, 2018). The hallmark of Nigeria's leadership is corruption, and it has remained the bane of the Nigerian society. "Corruption is much more likely to flourish where democratic foundations are weak and, as we have seen in many countries, where undemocratic and populist politicians capture democratic institutions and use them to their advantage" (Transparency International 2018, p.4).

Nigeria's education and health sectors which are perhaps the most critical sectors that drive other sectors of the economy has continued to show negative perception indices when compared to other countries and regions of the world as a result of the country's lack of visionary leadership. For instance, Nigeria has maintained the tradition of allocating between 4-10% to education and 3% to less than 6% to health in her annual budget since her independence, particularly since the fourth democratic dispensation. The UNESCO and African Union recommendations of 15-20% and 15% of the national budget have remained a mirage to Nigeria. Equally, it has remained a myth for Nigeria to achieve the World Health Organization's recommendation of at least 13% of national budget for developing and underdeveloped countries and African Union declaration that at least 15% of annual budget be allocated to health by her member states (Onyeji, 2018).

Another area which is critical to lifting Nigeria from the woods but which successive leaders have kept paying lip services to is the energy sector which is the major driving force that drive private and public sectors that are main engines of economic growth and development of any country. Nigeria with a population of more than 180 million has installed energy generation capacity of 12,522 MW from thermal and hydro energy, but only generates 4,000 MW of electricity. This is four times less than the energy generation of South Africa that is also four times less than Nigeria in population.

The table below explains explicitly some of the negative indicators of Nigeria's underdevelopment pointers which are direct reflection of the consequences of leadership failure in the country. Analysis of the table shows that Nigeria scores the least in the development indices and equally scores the highest in the underdevelopment indexes when compared to Sub Sahara Africa and some selected regions of the world.

Table 1: Nigeria's Development indices compared to Sub Sahara Africa and World Regional Averages 2017/2018.

Development and Underdevelopment Indices	Nigeria's Percentage	Sub Sahara Africa Percentage	Europe and Central Asia Percentage	East Asia and the Pacific Percentage	Latin America and the Caribbean Percentage
Corruption	27	32	35	44	44
Living Below Poverty line of US \$1.90	53.5	41	0.7	10	10.2
Life Expectancy	53.9	60.7	73.4	74.7	75.7
Expected Year of Schooling	10.0	10.1	14.1	13.3	14.4
Mean Year of Schooling	5.6	6.2	10.3	7.9	8.5
Human Dev. Index Value (HDI)	0.532	0.537	0.771	0.733	0.758
GNI Per Capita (2011 PPP \$) 2017	3.399	5.231	15.331	13.688	13.671

Source: Authors' Compilation; adapted from UNDP, World Bank and Transparency International, 2017/2018 Reports.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The habit of accusing past administration(s) for the present woes of the country is becoming a culture and calls for concern. This study has built a nexus between political blame-games and their effects on the social order, vis a vis the leadership debacle and consequent underdevelopment pointers in Nigeria. The foregoing has maintained that Nigerian leaders employ the politics of blame-game to either justify their lack of vision and ideology, failure and underperformance, and ultimately as a tool to discredit their political predecessors and opponents. Regrettably, poor leadership performance has persisted despite years of complaints and blames on past governments by incumbents. The masses have acquiesced in their own progressive destruction by submitting themselves to the leadership of political misfits. This is linked to the lack of ideology in the political space, monetization of the political process, and the influence of primordial factors. It is therefore not surprising that the so much expected dividends of democracy has eluded the mass of the people as the leadership has remained unaccountable and consequently subjected the country to economic and political subordinate in the world.

The challenge then is to evolve a political leadership based on nationalist ideology and vision that will alter the perception of politics and power from selfish to selfless service; balance politics with economic imperatives, respond to the dynamics of globalization and consolidate democratic structures, and programmes hinged on the people and development. The liberalization of the political space for subsequent emergence of moderate, ideological and vision-driven leaders that can expand the basis of political participation and canvass alternative policy agenda is of the essence. This will transcend the current economic morass and political lethargy, to issues and ideology that will refocus politics and governance to critical development imperatives.

The restructuring of the country to a 'true' federal state that will respect constitutional devolution of powers to component units, which suits a plural society like Nigeria, will encourage competitive development and national integration; shift the leaders' interest from appropriation of public fund to development of their areas.

Nigerian leaders must embrace transformational leadership by rising beyond the mediocre politics of blame-game to the first-rate politics of responsibility and personal example. Transformational leaders assume ownership of the national or local problems, depending on the layer of leadership; deploys intelligence, imagination and energy to lead followers to solve problems and enables followers to unleash hidden and untapped capabilities. The values of leadership relegates embezzlement of public revenue, mismanagement of public resources, and other forms of corruption by indigenous and international actors, the margins of national affairs and brings transparency and accountability to the fore.

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GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA, 2015-2019)

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Abstract

This paper examined the effect of governance on security challenges in Nigeria, 2015-2019. It is qualitative, adopted content analysis to investigate the nexus between governance and the security challenges confronting Nigeria and anchored on prebendalism and frustration aggression theories as the framework of analysis. The study showed that the internal security challenges disturbing the peaceful coexistence of Nigeria in the 21st century is from within Nigerians while corruption and inadequacies in internal security policies are the major factors behind the security challenges in Nigeria in the period under review. The paper recommended that the government at all levels should truly fight against corruption, poverty, nepotism, favouritism and unemployment in order to regain our peaceful coexistence that is in abeyance in Nigeria.

Keywords: governance, security challenges, corruption, internal security, Nigeria

Introduction

The responsibility of any government remains that of pursuing and maintaining the security and wellbeing of its citizens and its territory against internal insurrections and external aggressions. However, since her independence from Britain on October 1st, 1960, the Nigerian state has been fraught with a plethora of political and socio-economic challenges as well as violent conflicts which have threatened the development, peace, and security of the nation. This stems largely from the overwhelming effects of governance on the nation and its defense sector, as well as the nature of interactions among the various ethno-religious and regional groups in the country which pursue their objectives through different means (the use of arms inclusive). Particularly the so-called Islamic sect in Nigeria's Northeastern region, Boko Haram, and the activities of the Niger Delta Militant Groups whose deadly

activities have posed dangers to the nation and its citizens by causing massive mortality and casualty rates, national disintegration, displacement of many families, destabilized and crippled political and economic activities, and heightened insecurity and fear, as well as negatively affecting the country's global image. Boko Haram and operations of militia groups in the Niger Delta helped earned Nigeria a place among the least safe countries of the world (Out & Dickson, 2017).

The link between governance and insecurity is rightly gaining increased attention as seen in the allegations against Nigerian senior officers who have been bribed to turn a blind eye to Boko Haram, or to short-change the military by providing substandard military materials. In this vein, the poor state of security in Nigeria occasioned by the perpetration of crises and the corrupt-handling or theft of military appropriations meant for procuring the necessary equipment to confront and suppress these crises spells systemic failures and frustrates the Nigerian military's efforts of attaining national security demands (Out & Dickson, 2017). It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to examine the effect of governance on security challenges in Nigeria, 2015-2019. The paper highly relied on secondary data for analysis from which conclusion was drawn.

Conceptual Clarification

Governance

Governance refers to the exercise of political and administrative authority at all levels to manage a country's affairs. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. Specific reference is made to democratic governance as "a process of creating and sustaining an environment for inclusive and responsive political processes and settlements." The institutional and human capacities for governance determine the way in which the effectiveness of public policies and strategies is attained, especially in service delivery.

The theoretical meaning of governance is defined as directing "the economy and society toward some collective goals" in which the public sector is the fundamental focal point. Nevertheless, throughout the decades, the World Bank (WB) has had a few definitions of governance and in the year of 2007, the WB proposed the explanation of governance as "the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to

shape public policy and provide public goods and services”. Another definition proposes that governance is public and private activity that is “concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action” (Heinrich 2010; Kaufmann & Kraay 2008; Peters 2006).

In addition, it is widely agreed by other definitions that the significance of a governance lies within a state’s ability to function in accordance to its regulations and in line with its customs and institutions by which power is utilized. As it is further argued that the elements dealt with in the concepts of governance can be measured, one can therefore investigate whether a state’s governance is “good” or “bad”. However, seeing the nature of measuring such capacities, it is important to take into account that no resulting measurement is free from error or complete reliability (Heinrich 2010; Kaufmann & Kraay 2008).

There are at least four broad approaches to evaluating the quality of governance: procedural measures, input measures, output measures, and measures of bureaucratic autonomy.

Procedural measures

The most classic effort to define governance in terms of procedures was Max Weber’s famous characterization of modern bureaucracy in *Economy and Society*. We continue to use the term “Weberian bureaucracy” as an ideal type to which we hope highly corrupt, neo-patrimonial states will eventually conform. It might be useful to review Weber’s conditions here:

1. Bureaucrats personally free and subject to authority only within a defined area;
2. They are organized into a clearly defined hierarchy of offices;
3. Each office has a defined sphere of competence;
4. Offices are filled by free contractual relationship;
5. Candidates selected on basis of technical qualifications;
6. Bureaucrats are remunerated by fixed salaries;
7. The office treated as the sole occupation of the incumbent;
8. The office constitutes a career;
9. There is a separation between ownership and management;
10. Officials subject to strict discipline and control.

Conditions 1-5 and 9 are probably at the core of what people think of when they talk about “modern bureaucracy”: they clearly delineate such an

organization from the kinds of venal or patrimonial office that existed in Europe under the Old Regime, or that exist in contemporary neo-patrimonial developing countries today. However, characteristics 6, 7, 8, and 10 are more problematic. Condition 6, fixed salaries, is not compatible with the kinds of incentives often offered bureaucrats under New Public Management. Conditions 7 and 8 are not true of many mid-level officials in contemporary America, in both the public and private sectors. One could say that the US fails to live up to the Weberian ideal, but it does not seem likely that the quality of bureaucracy in the US would improve if it were impossible for talented individuals from the private sector or the academy to serve in government for periods of time. And condition 10 is incompatible with civil service protection, which during the Progressive Era was seen as a hallmark of the modern bureaucracy that was replacing the patronage system. More importantly, condition 10 suggests that bureaucrats are simply robotic agents whose only purpose is to do the bidding of principals. The idea of bureaucratic autonomy—the notion that bureaucrats themselves can shape goals and define tasks independently of the wishes of the principals—is not possible under the Weberian definition (Fukuyama, 2013).

Capacity Measures

The problem with all procedural definitions of bureaucracy is that the procedures, however defined, may not actually correlate with the positive outcomes expected from governments. We assume that a Weberian bureaucracy will produce better services than one that is highly discretionary and patrimonial; yet there may be circumstances where the latter's lack of rules result in faster and better tailored responses. Enforcement power is not part of Weber's definition; it is possible to have an impersonal, merit-based bureaucracy that nonetheless is extremely poor at getting things done. To say that a bureaucrat is selected on the basis of "merit" does not define merit, nor does it explain whether the official's skills will be renewed in light of changing conditions or technology (Fukuyama, 2013).

Output Measures

Good procedures and strong capacity are not ends in themselves. We want governments to do things like provide schooling and public health, public security and national defense. This suggests an alternative measure of government quality, a measure of final output. One could look at literacy,

primary and secondary education test scores, or various measures of health to get some idea as to how governments are performing (Fukuyama, 2013).

Bureaucratic autonomy

A final measure of the quality of government is the degree of bureaucratic autonomy possessed by the different components of the state. Samuel Huntington makes autonomy one of his four criteria of institutionalization; highly institutionalized political systems have bureaucracies with high autonomy. The opposite of autonomy in Huntington's terminology is subordination.

Autonomy properly speaking refers to the manner in which the political principal issues mandates to the bureaucrats who act as its agent. No bureaucracy has the authority to define its own mandates, regardless of whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian. But there are a wide variety of ways in which mandates can be issued. Ideally, the principal should set a broad mandate to the agent, e.g., procurement of an advanced strike fighter. But the principal can also issue many other mandates as well regarding the way in which to carry out the broad mandate, such as purchasing a strike fighter using contractors that increase employment in Congressional districts X and Y, or through minority and women-owned businesses, or to achieve Z degree of performance desired by a rival service. In other cases the principal can issue mandates regarding the bureaucracy's recruitment and promotion of personnel, requiring that they hire certain individuals, or else setting detailed rules for personnel management (Fukuyama, 2013). The concept of corruption is discussed below.

Corruption

Rousseau once pointed out that the legitimacy of the national public power comes from the people. The government is the executor of the sovereign. Its power comes from the people's trust. When the use of public power deviate from the original track, being abused, corruption problems arise. It accords with the definition of "the abuse of public office for private benefit". This definition is also the most widely used by the scholars on the concept of corruption (Liu, 2016).

There is no unified definition of "corruption". It is usually defined as the corruption of public officials in the state; organs use power in the hands for bribery, corruption, extortion, fraud and other acts. But this term includes

many aspects of economy, politics, culture, morality, law and so on. In recent years, the extension of corruption has continued to expand. The main body of corruption is no longer confined to the national institution. More subjects are included. For example “academic corruption” refers to the corruption in universities and research institutions. The forms of corruption include not only public officials’ personal gain behaviour but also interest exchange process, such as nepotism, nonfeasance and disposal of public resources (Liu, 2016).

Political Corruption and Bureaucratic Corruption

Political corruption is any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs (Heidenheimer et. al. 1993). This definition does not, however, distinguish clearly between political and bureaucratic corruption. It establishes the necessary involvement of the state and state agents in corruption, without any notion as to the level of authority where corruption takes place (Amundsen, 1999).

In a more strict definition, political corruption involves political decision makers. Political or grand corruption takes place at the high levels of the political system. It is when the politicians and state agents, who are entitled to make and enforce the laws in the name of the people, are themselves corrupt. Political corruption is when political decision-makers use the political power they are armed with, to sustain their power, status and wealth. Thus, political corruption can be distinguished from bureaucratic or *petty* corruption, which is corruption in the public administration, at the implementation end of politics (Amundsen, 1999).

Thus, corruption can be seen as a conscious and well planned act by a person or group of persons to appropriate by unlawful means the wealth of another person or group of persons. It can also be seen as the act of turning power and authority to ready cash (Philips & Akpokighe, 2014).

Forms of Corruption

Corruption occurs basically in four main forms: bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion (Andvig, 2000):

- i. Bribery is understood as the payment (in money or kind) that is given or taken in a corrupt relationship. Equivalent terms to bribery include, for example, kickbacks, commercial arrangements or pay-offs. These are all notions of corruption in terms of the money or

favours paid to employees in private enterprises, public officials and politicians. They are payments or returns needed or demanded to make things pass more swiftly, smoothly or more favourably through state or government bureaucracies.

- ii. Embezzlement is theft of resources by people who are responsible for administering them, e.g., when disloyal employees steal from their employers. It is not considered corruption from a strictly legal point of view, but is included in a broader definition.
- iii. Fraud is an economic crime that involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit. It involves manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise by public officials for their own profit.
- iv. Extortion is money and other resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence or threats to use force.

Another popular way to differentiate various forms of corruption is by dividing it into petty and grand corruption. On the one hand, petty corruption is defined as street level, everyday corruption. It occurs when citizens interact with low-to mid-level public officials in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other bureaucratic agencies. The scale of monetary transaction involved is small and primarily impacts individuals (and disproportionately the poor; UNDP 2008). On the other hand, grand corruption takes place at the policy formulation end of politics. It refers not so much to the amount of money involved as to the level at which it occurs (where policies and rules may be unjustly influenced). The kinds of transactions that attract grand corruption are usually large in scale. Grand corruption is sometimes used synonymously with political corruption (U4 - Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Glossary). The sub-heading below discusses insecurity.

Insecurity

In the view of Akin (2008) security refers to “the situation that exists as a result of the establishment of measures for the protection of persons, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions”. It is the existence of conditions within which people in a society can go about their normal daily activities without any threats to their lives or properties. It embraces all measures designed to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the

resources of individuals, groups, businesses and the nation against sabotage or violent occurrence (Ogunleye, et al, 2011). According to Igbuzor (2011) it demands safety from chronic threats and protection from harmful disruption.

Security however, can be described as stability and continuity of livelihood (stable and steady income), predictability of daily life (knowing what to expect), protection from crime (feeling safe), and freedom from psychological harm (safety or protection from emotional stress which results from the assurance or knowing that one is wanted, accepted, loved and protected in one's community or neighbourhood and by people around. It focuses on emotional and psychological sense of belonging to a social group which can offer one protection). This description structured the concept of security into four dimensions. However, this dimension can be weaved together to give a composite definition of security as the protection against all forms of harm whether physical, economic or psychological. It is generally argued however that security is not the absence of threats or security issues, but the ability to rise to the challenges posed by these threats with experience and expertise.

Insecurity on the other hand, is the antithesis of security. However, because of this very many ways in which insecurity affects human life and existence, the concept of insecurity has usually been ascribed different interpretations in association with the various ways which it affects individuals. Some of the common descriptors of insecurity include; want of safety; danger; hazard; uncertainty; want of confidence; doubtful; inadequately guarded or protected; lacking stability; troubled; lack of protection; and unsafe, to mention a few. All of these have been used by different people to define the concept of insecurity. These different descriptors, however, run into a common reference to a state of vulnerability to harm and loss of life, property or livelihood. Beland (2005) defined insecurity as “the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection”. It refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security (Achumba, et al. 2013). The following is a description of Nigeria as a sovereign state.

Theoretical Framework

The paper is anchored on prebendal and frustration-aggression theories in order to enhance our understanding of the governance-security challenges nexus.

Prebendal Theory

Prebendal theory or prebendalism refers to primitive acquisition. The concept is credited to Joseph Richard who depicts the politics of corruption in Nigeria where cronies or members of an ethnic group are compensated when an individual from the group comes into power or where; “state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups (Joseph, 1996).

This patron-client or identity politics has encouraged corruption in the country to the extent that appointments, promotions, admissions, award of contracts among others are done with consideration for one’s ethnic or religious affiliations.

Frustration-Aggression theory (F-A)

The frustration-aggression theory which John Dollard and his research associates initially developed in 1939 and has been expanded and modified by scholars like Leonard Berkowitz (1962) and Aubrey Yates (1962) appears to be the most common explanation for violent behaviour stemming from inability to fulfill needs. Theorists who rely on this explanation use the psychological theories of motivation and behaviour, as well as frustration and aggression (Anifowose, 1982). In an attempt to explain aggression, scholars point to the difference between what people feel they want or deserve to what they actually get-the “want-get-ratio” (Fuerabends et al 1969) and difference between “expected need satisfaction” and “actual need satisfaction” (Davies 1962). Where expectation does not meet attainment, the tendency is for people to confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their ambitions.

The main explanation that the frustration-aggression theory provides is that aggression is not just undertaken as a natural reaction or instinct as realists and biological theorists assume, but that it is the outcome of frustration and that in a situation where the legitimate desire of an individual is denied either directly or by the indirect consequence of the way the society is structured, the feeling of disappointment may lead such a person to express his anger through

violence that will be directed at those he holds responsible or people who are directly or indirectly related to them (Best, 2006).

The two theories are quite relevant to this paper, in the sense that Prebendal theory explains how political corruption have been paralysing security sector in Nigeria, which gives birth to insecurity while Frustration-Aggression theory, demonstrates how the atrocities being committed by the political office holders left majority of the Nigerians in frustration and there is no prospect to ameliorate their critical condition, which made them to resort to social vices. The sub heading below expantiates the causes of security challenges in Nigeria.

Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria

1. Challenge of Unemployment

In 2016, 61.6% of Nigerians in the labour force (not entire population), aged 15 - 24 were either unemployed or underemployed, compared to 59.9% in Q3, 58.3% in Q2, 56.1% in Q1, and 53.5% in Q4 2015. Of persons aged between the ages of 25 and 34, 37.5% of that group were either unemployed or underemployed in Q4, 2016 compared to 35.9% in Q3, 35.1% in Q2, 32.8% in Q1, and 31.3% in Q4 2015. Thus, out of a total youth labour force population of 40.74 million (representing 50.2% of total labour force in Nigeria of 81.15 million), a total of 19.3 million of them were either unemployed or underemployed in Q4 2016.

In 2017, youth unemployment Rate in Nigeria increased to 33.10% in the third quarter of 2017 from 29.50% in the second quarter of 2017. Youth Unemployment Rate in Nigeria averaged 21.73% from 2014 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 33.10% in the third quarter of 2017 and a record low of 11.70% in the fourth quarter of 2014 (NBS, 2017).

In 2018, unemployment in the country reduced by 1.1% in the first three months of this year, data obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics showed. According to the statistical bulletin on formal employment and earnings for the first quarter of 2018, the average formal employment increased from 48,192 in the last quarter of 2017 to 48,708 in the first quarter of 2018, while the average earnings also increased by four per cent. The NBS said when compared with the same quarter in 2017, the formal employment and earnings showed an improvement 5.4% and 7.9%, respectively (Naira Watch, 2018).

The statistical records above indicate the rate of unemployment in Nigeria and the youths are worst affected. Despite the improvement on formal employment and earning in the first quarter of 2018. The unemployment situation is still bad in Nigeria, which leave majority of the youths in frustration, as a result of poverty and lack of prospect to ameliorate their condition they find a means of surviving by resorting to social vices that result to insecurity.

2. Corruption

Global anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International (TI), has again ranked Nigeria low in its 2017 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released on Wednesday. The latest ranking has Nigeria in the 148th position out of 180. The country, according to the CPI, scored 28 out 100, a figure lower than the average in the Sub-Saharan region. CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as experienced by business people and analysts and ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

Nigeria is the 144 least corrupt nations out of 175 countries, according to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International. Corruption Rank in Nigeria averaged 121.48 from 1996 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 152 in 2005 and a record low of 52 in 1997.

3. Imbalance in Development

Geographically, vast countries invariably face the problem of regional disparity because of bundle of factors that are multi-faceted in dimension. Basically, the factors can be grouped into two main categories termed the “hard and the soft” factors. The “hard” factors relate to those that cannot be changed or very slow to change. These are the natural endowments available to a country i.e. its geographical position and climate. On the other hand, the “soft” factors concern the institutional framework put in place by the governments; the policies, investments and programmes United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (2011). In Nigeria, uneven distribution of natural endowments, difference in climate and physical condition and lopsided institutional policies all translate to non-uniformity of economic opportunities available to population residing in different regions. All these put together explain the concentration of manufacturing industries, government institutions, transport terminus such as sea ports and airports and other developmental programmes in certain areas than the others.

4. Weak Judicial System

The scourge of corruption has overtime been described as one of the most discussed causes of under-development in any nation. But much cause for concern, is the weakness of the justice sector delivery system, the pervading low integrity of the judiciary, which is only an aspect of the justice system, has suffered greatly due to the alleged despicable acts of some members of the bench who most times collude with the bar to weaken the law thereby allowing corruption to grow on fertile ground. The Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Walter Onnoghen alluded to this recently stating that ‘corruption in the judiciary is not limited to bribe-taking but includes giving of judgments or orders based on any consideration other than legal merit.’

5. Open Borders of Nigeria

The challenges facing African states to manage their borders are compounded by globalization that is tearing down traditional borders through advancement in technology and transformation of international relations. At the moment crimes are committed without crossing borders and huge amounts of goods are sold through cyberspace. The internet has not only made it more difficult to manage borders and to combat cross-border crimes, but has also effectively dismantled borders by allowing imports without going through customs. Trans-border crimes are said to have manifested themselves with the coming of colonialism which regrouped states and communities into new nation-state with defined borders manned by law enforcement agent to protect the polity and its economy. Nigeria is a colonial creation whose final stage was the merge of southern and northern protectorate in 1914. Nigeria came to share international land border with Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, totalling about 4745sq.km. Nigeria also shares maritime boundaries with Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Like other partitioned areas in Africa, the territorialisation of Nigeria state poses some challenges that have affected the structure of interregional trade as a result of colonial and post-colonial economic system. Borderlands are both melting pots and security hot spots. Often neglected in the development strategies of postcolonial states, they are an arena for cross-border crime and represent a dynamic place of historically fostered cultural and socio-economic exchange at the same time.

6. High Influx of Arms

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons is increasingly and dangerously becoming a transnational organized crime in Nigeria with Boko Haram's insurgency, reemerging Niger Delta crisis and escalating kidnappings, communal crisis and armed robbery in the South East serving as hubs or impetus for arms trafficking. Some border towns particularly in the North Eastern flank serve as locus for trafficking of arms as well as centers for stolen goods, drugs and hostages perpetrated by criminals, terrorists and their collaborators.

It is disheartening and unfortunate that the “merchants of death” have since devised methods use to beat security agencies at the borders and through the footpaths. These methods include the use of camels, donkeys and cows to traffic arms, ammunition and drugs, like cocaine into Nigeria. The fact that the weapons are small, light and collapsible makes it easy to be concealed and moved on camels and donkeys' back in a specially crafted skin or thatched bags mainly meant for the illegal “expedition” unexpected, unsuspected and therefore undetected. Similarly, some cows and grains merchants in the North-East sub – region of the country, devices means of hiding cache of arms and ammunition in empty fuel tankers, under vehicles' engines and inside bags of grains mostly undetected by security agencies at the affected border posts. The “grains” are transported in large number via trucks, trailers, Lorries and old model pickup vans and jeeps with little attention given to them by security agents.

7. Narcotics

No society is insulated from illicit drugs consumption and its negative consequences. Illicit drug consumption produces undesirable results which include mental disorder and deviant behaviours. It also encourages criminal activities. Contemporary security challenges in Nigeria which include criminal activities such as armed robbery, kidnapping, cultism, hooliganism, prostitution, cybercrime and violence are also associated with illicit drug abuse. Recent reports on drug abuse and drug related crimes by the police and drug law enforcement agency in the country buttress this claim (Obe, 2012; 5). For example, BoladeAkinyele, the controller of Owo Prison in Ondo State maintained that most of the ‘criminals convicts’ in Nigerian prisons are users of various drugs including cigarettes, Indian hemp, cocaine, heroin etc (Akinyele, 2012). His assertion was corroborated by Barrister AbibuAkilu, who claimed that criminal activities among the youth which in

recent times is on the rise is as a result of illicit drug use among the youth in the country(Akilu, 2012).

Analysis of Effect of Governance on Security Challenges in Nigeria

According to Ubong (2016), said that for the Government to tackle insecurity, a key starting point should be to understand the causes of insecurity as well as to investigate their sources of social disorder and instability. King pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish between different causes as each may require different remedy. Besides, it is to provide a holistic view to the suggestion or recommendations of solutions. More often, however, policy makers are disinclined to isolate and clarify particular causes. They prefer blanket references, with the consideration that the causes of insecurity are interwoven and contributory to one another. Like in many other societies, the sources of insecurity in Nigeria have been traced to a number of factors and explained by different people. These factors have been classified or grouped into external and internal factors. Beyond the external-internal dichotomy, sources of insecurity have also been classified as either remote or proximate and immediate sources/causal factors. In Nigeria, the challenge is not so much about insecurity of external sources, but rather that of internal sources. We recognize that some internal factors have been enhanced and strengthened by the presence of external forces, but, there is no doubt that, if the internal situations did not present themselves, the external forces would be unable to infiltrate.

Ubong (2016) went further to expatiate on the remote (root) factors of insecurity in Nigeria. Lack of institutional capacity resulting in government failure described as the corrosion or breakdown of institutional infrastructures. The foundations of institutional framework in Nigeria are very shaky and have provoked deterioration of state governance and democratic accountability, thus, paralyzing the existing set of constraints including the formal and legitimate rules nested in the hierarchy of social order. The state of insecurity in Nigeria is greatly a function of government failure, or can be linked to government failure. This is manifested by the incapacity of government to deliver public services and to provide basic needs for the masses. The lack of basic necessities by the people in Nigeria has created a pool of frustrated people who are ignited easily by any event to be violent. The argument here, is that, Nigeria has the resources to provide for the needs of its people, but corruption in public offices at all levels has made it impossible for office

holders to focus on the provision of basic needs for the people Nigerian situation as a 'Paradox of Plenty'. A situation where the country earns a great deal of revenue through oil sales, but fails to use these earnings to meet the needs of its people and to develop infrastructure as well as the economy. When these situations exist, crime rate is bound to rise and the security of lives and properties cannot be guaranteed.

This dilemma is even more acute and pronounced in Nigeria. Faced with a growing increase in population explosion (Ogunleye-Adetona, 2010), and a corresponding decrease in economic productivity and political accountability, occasioned by many years of higher level political corruption, bad governance, weak institutions and absence of the wherewithal to transform their human and material resources, these countries turned into veritable incubation centers for the emergence of violent anti-state groups whose deriving ideology, it would seem, is antagonism against their states (Stern & Ojendal, 2010). This ideology, to a greater part, is fuelled by meaningful, purposeful and qualitative life. As a result, de-legitimization process for many of them crept in whereby group loyalty, tribal and or religious, compete with state loyalty on one hand, and on the other hand, albeit the extreme one, crime, violence, anarchy, and lawlessness challenged the state's continued cohesion, stability and territorial integrity.

Underdevelopment and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Three Variables

From national security perspective, it is possible to make a number of deductions on Nigeria's threat analysis in the last decade. One, as a sovereign territorial entity, Nigeria faces no existential threat from any of its neighbors, as is the case with, say India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, or Iraq and Kuwait before the first Gulf War. In terms of military and economic capabilities, the country towers over and above all her neighbors in such a way that declaration of open hostility is practically impossible by any of the sub-Saharan countries. Although, it has for decades, maintained a love-hate relation with her eastern neighbor Cameroon over a disputed territory, the dispute has been eventually resolved by the International Court of Justice, The Hague. Secondly, Nigeria has never been, except during Murtala and Abacha administrations, in an open altercation with any world power strong enough to invade it. But even those altercations with the United States, under Murtala and Abacha, were in our opinion attempts by

Nigeria to assert its independence and supremacy in Africa. Consequently, we can describe them as a competition between an established world super power and an emerging continental power for supremacy and hegemony in African affairs. Three, Nigeria's position and the respect it enjoys in the sub-Saharan Africa, akin to big brother, make it impossible as well as immoral to invade another country in the region. All its military interventions, and they were many, in foreign lands were sanctioned by international law. All these make the argument strong that the major sources of threats to Nigeria's national security will almost completely remain internal and predicated upon socio-economic and political imbalances. These challenges are structural and deeply embedded in Nigeria's socio-political and economic institutions over the previous decades. Challenges such as massive corruption, tribalism, poverty, poor governance, near-zero industrial bases, and a single-line economic sector are often described as characteristics of developing countries. While this may be true, it is important to observe that in the case of Nigeria, these characteristics have stayed very long for any purposive drive towards national development. Years of military rule, complemented with an ineffective and corrupt bureaucracy have destroyed, by the end of the last century, any semblance of political accountability and people-oriented leadership (Aliyu, 2012).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Governance has negative effect on the Nigerian security. Corruption, nepotism and favouritism have denied majority of the qualified youths their opportunities to be engaged in the society in one way or the other. Inadequate security policies and the failure to understand the missing link between the national interest and the security policies in Nigeria has negative effect on the security architecture in Nigeria (2015-2019). This has resulted to frustration that triggers social vices and it worsen the security challenges.

The paper recommends that the government at all level should truly fight against corruption, poverty, nepotism, favouritism and unemployment. In order to regain our peaceful coexistence that is lost in Nigeria.

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STRATEGIES FOR CURBING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Political violence in Nigeria as a phenomenon is episodic and therefore not epochal. It is heightened during electioneering campaigns and voting periods. The history of political violence in Nigeria shows that people demonstrate against government injurious and unhealthy policies. Also, when people lose elections, their supporters demonstrate aggressively. In some cases, prolonged political violence has crystallised into economic violence, as may be found in the Niger Delta and the North Eastern Boko Haram phenomenon of Nigeria. The focus of this paper is to develop strategies for curbing or minimising violent eruptions in the political landscape of Nigeria. Desk method approach was used and the systems theory of schismogenesis was adopted, which opines that, every system has within it the seeds of its own self-destruction unless it quickly adopts the strategies of negentropy. The hypotheses tested are as follows; the satisfaction of the interests of political stakeholders shall minimise political violence in Nigeria, the useful deployment of Nigerian youths would make them unavailable for political violence. Given the process by which conflict develops, the following strategies have been suggested as recommendations; (i) the interests of Stakeholders have to be satisfied, (ii) the development of youth gangs and cult groups have to be curbed through education and the provision of employment, and (iii) access to fire arms and arming of the youth should be curbed also.

Key Words: Political Violence, Curbing Strategies, Youths and Stake Holders

Introduction

Violence in Nigeria in its various forms has evolved over the decades; from the use of traditional weapons, such as machettes, dane guns, traditional elimination, using charms and amulets. In recent times, violence in Nigeria, has taken more sophisticated dimensions; such as political, electoral, religious, ethnic/tribal cultism and other forms of violence at varying degrees. Each part of Nigeria has its peculiar form of violence; for instance, in Northern Nigeria, religious violence and extremist attacks of killing and destruction of people's lives and property, are peculiar. In the South - South of Niger Delta, militancy is popular and the vandalisation of petroleum pipe lines and other accessories are rampant.

In the South - East, cultist ferocity and robbery attacks are common forms of violence, while in the South West, political violence and thuggery are intrinsic. However, this does not mean that other forms of violence do not exist, such as gender based violence which involves rape, abuse and intimidation. Others include tribal clashes among the various ethnic groups of Nigeria, as well as kidnapping, armed robberies, assassinations, and other subtle forms which still exist across Nigeria. Above all however, is political violence which is regarded as very highly popular across the nation. This variant forms the focus of this paper.

In Nigeria, political violence has threatened the peace, stability and unity of the country even before independence in 1960. Although the current administration is degrading the war on terror in the North East of Nigeria, militants in the Niger-Delta (South -South) continue to stage incessant violent attacks on crude oil pipe lines and other vices. In Nigeria, different forms of violent threats are on the increase as the socio-political landscape has since been infested with terrific forms of political violence.

Since the 1950s, Nigerian governments have tended to be reactive rather than proactive. Confronted by a humongous political crises and violence in the old Western Region of Nigeria in the 1950s, and early 1960s, especially, all that the Tafawa Balewa government could do or think of was to host the Commonwealth Conference. Such government lethargy and insensitivity,

probably contributed to igniting the January 1966 coup. Such insensitive behaviour by successive Nigerian governments has caused the country unending violence, crises, destructions of lives and property, including an avoidable civil war.

Elections are very indispensable in the practice of modern democracy. *"It is closely tied to the growth and development of the democratic political order that is generally held to be the single most important indicator of the presence or absence of democratic government"*; Nnoli (1990). Elections when properly organised, and devoid of all forms of electoral manipulations and malpractices, do not only entrench democracy and legitimate leadership but can establish peace, love and unity in the country and also foster administrative effectiveness.

Elections, since the 1922 Clifford constitution of Nigeria, have been the legitimate pattern of putting people into power and leadership. Elections also can be used for transferring power from one regime to another through the ballot box. Through properly conducted elections, popular conduct and participation in public affairs as well as peaceful environmental regeneration can be created in the society.

According to Michael; (2012) the current global emphasis on democratisation has made elections to become an inevitable process of leadership choice and succession. Obviously, the success of every conditional democracy is tied to the integrity of electoral process while the quality of a representative government is also linked to the capacity of state to evolve viable, transparent, and trusted electoral machinery that will inspire the interest and confidence of broad spectrum of civil society and contending factions of political society Okolie, (2008).

Elections in Nigeria, ever before Independence in 1960 have been characterised by electoral violence and post electoral violence actions that often result into socio - economic and political tensions and unrests. Political violence has been recurring in all Nigerian political elections. For instance, there was political violence in the elections of the first and second republics

which nevertheless led to the Military interventions and suspensions of the nation's constitutions.

The Human Rights Watch recently revealed that the Federal and State elections of 1999 and 2003 were marred by serious incidents of political violence in which hundreds of people died and many injured. It also found that members and supporters of the ruling parties, and opposition parties were involved in many cases of political violence. The Human Rights Watch documented how ruling party politicians in the Oil - rich Niger Delta funded armed group to help rig elections. Observers from the European Union described the 2007 elections, which brought Umaru Yar'adua to power, as the worst political violence ever witnessed in which about 300 people were killed (Michael, 2012).

Election is a critical duty that is expected of every eligible citizen. It is the mechanism through which citizens choose their representatives; Muheeb, (2015)

Furthermore, according to Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGAS) the level of election violence in 2011 claimed the lives of more than 800 people and resulted in the displacement of approximately 65,000 people. In the 2015 general elections the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) reported that in the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria, in 61 incidences, 58 people were killed in 22 states, Odinkalu (2017). New York Times (2019) also reports that as many as 39 people were killed in election violence during the 2019 elections.

Furthermore, the Nigerian Security Tracker (NST) had their record in 2015 cycle and documented one hundred and six (106) elections related deaths. Sixty-two (62) of those people were killed in the nearly seven months preceding the election. Forty-four (44) persons were killed after, with the bulk of those deaths occurring in the first two weeks following the elections.

In 2003, 100 people were killed in election related violence and 300 people in 2007 according to the United States Institute of Peace. Lastly, Sanni (2019) says that an estimated 626 persons were killed across Nigeria in six

months between the start of the election campaign and the commencement of the general election and the supplementary elections.

Statement of Problem

Election and violence have become two mutually reoccurring phenomena in Nigeria since 1960, after the Independence. All the elections in the country are characterised by chaos, violence, fear and confusion which have provided a good platform for dissatisfaction, general instability in the polity, distortion and dislocation in the nation's political history and unquantifiable loss of resources. From 1999 - 2015, Nigeria has been through strains and stresses as the citizens go to the polls to cast their votes for elective positions.

Consequently, protesters and rioters destroy lives and properties as the election results fail to satisfy the interests of the stake holders. Jega, (2011) describes the electoral violence as "Crises of Expectation"

"I regret to say in my view that a lot of post electoral violence that we have seen, to a large extent, can be attributed to what I call Crises of Expectation. I think so many people expected the election to be credible, so perfect that in the perfection and credibility it is their candidate who will win, and once their candidate did not win, it was no longer credible and perfect and I think that would have explained, to a large extent, some of the post-election violence."

Furthermore, as the interests of the stake holders are not satisfied, the youths are therefore conscripted as rioters and protesters to disrupt the peace and unity of the nation as they quickly degenerate into ethnic and religious bloodletting across the nation especially in the Northern States.

In view of the statement of the problem above, our research questions are:

- Can the satisfaction of the interests of political stake holders minimise political violence?
- Would the useful deployment of Nigerian youth make them unavailable for political violence?

Literature Review

Satisfaction of the Interests of Political Stake Holders

Election has become a sine qua non for the survival of liberal - representative democracy because it offers the people the platform by which they choose their leaders, Odeyemi and Mosunmola, (2015). Elections involve a set of activities leading to the selection of a person or persons out of many to serve in positions of authority. They are also viable instruments for fine-tuning the workings of democracy and consummating representative government. It is also a means of leadership succession and turn-over; Elections infact, are the most frequent ways through which citizens interact with government; (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, Kerevel 2009; Obyan and Afolabi, 2013). Credible, free and fair elections promote citizens' participation in governance though the exercise of the right to choose or reject leaders, based on the performance of such leaders in fulfilling the social contract (Jega, 2014). Credible elections also bestow on governments the legitimate authority to, on one hand, initiate and implement policies while on the other hand they empower the citizens to hold governments accountable.

Furthermore, Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006) note that "elections are an expression of the people's sovereign will" helping to confer legitimacy on political leadership.

Akindele (2011); argues that elections are not just what happens on Election Day; but are subsumed in a process which:

Encompasses activities before, during and after elections. It includes the legal and constitutional framework of elections, the registration of political parties, party campaigns, the activities of the electronic and print media in terms of access; campaign financing, the activities of the security agencies and

the government in power. It includes the authenticity and genuineness of the voters register; it includes the independence or lack of it of electoral agencies and organs. It includes the liberalism or otherwise of the political process in the country and the independence of adjudicating bodies on election.

Elections are not conducted in isolation but are a complex set of interrelated activities and variables that have profound effect on the democratic process (Agbaje and Adejumobi, (2006). In the electoral process, multiple relationships are formed or forged; at one level, these are between or among the politician and the people or in a more restricted but nonetheless vital sense, the electorates. Yaqub (2001). The electoral process brings together various actors including individuals, groups and institutions who form the stake holders, and these include the Election Management Body (EMB), Political Parties and Candidates, the electorates, the Media and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Odeyemi and Mosunmola (2005). The success or failure of elections depend wholly on the cooperations of these groups and institutions above. According to Jega (2014), wide - ranging citizens' involvement in elections, both as individuals and as organisations, defines the role of stake holders. Thus stakeholders are the pillars upon which an election is rooted, if any of the pillars malfunctions, the process may collapse. Hence,

One defining characteristic of democratic maturity is the rising involvement of stakeholders in the electoral process. In other words, the more mature a democracy is, the more directly involved in the electoral process and its management that the citizens, as stakeholders would become, (Jega 2014).

The citizens are critical stakeholders who perform the following functions which include, mobilization of citizens, oversight of the electoral process, support for the EMBs, making demands for improvements from EMBs, other statutory agencies and political parties; as well as spreading supportive values and expectations. Others are information dissemination; gate

keeping; rule and norm-setting, conflict management and driving the electoral system (Jega 2014). Election Management Body (EMB) is an organised body established for the purpose of managing all machineries of election in a polity such as party registration, organising elections, polling place operations and results declaration. Kerevel (2009) reveals that a credible electoral process by an efficient Electoral Management Body; (EMB) helps to deepen democracy and governance, as confidence in the EMB influences voter confidence and turnout.

However, in a developing democratic nation like Nigeria with weak democratic institutions; the EMB in its action or inactions can promote or deter electoral violence. In Nigeria, many EMBs known by different names have been established to conduct elections, and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which is an example of EMBs is currently responsible in Nigeria for elections administration. Though over the years the independent and capacity of INEC and other past elections administrations have been questioned, Jinadu (2011) argues that one of the problems confronting Nigeria in her bid to engender confidence in the electoral process is "how to design and ensure an efficient, effective, and politically nonpartisan election management body". This is because, the EMBs have always been influenced by the stakeholders to favour their interests.

Useful Deployment of Nigerian Youth Can Curb Political Violence

Youth involvement in Electoral Violence in Nigeria involve those who are largely unemployed, politically ignorant on electoral processes, and mostly illiterates. Youths involved in electoral violence are not confined to vagabonds, gangsters, illiterate youngsters, and unemployed but "Youths involved in electoral violence" are also political godfathers, aspirants, electoral officials, civil servants, technocrats, ethnic militias, area boys, students, vigilante groups, criminal gangs and state security agencies, either by age or as mentors; Usman (2009).

Definition of youth is varied but for the purpose of this paper, the youths involved in electoral violence would be confined to unemployed

youths or the expendable youths. These are the category of youths qualified as gangsters and vagabonds that carry out the actual electoral violence. According to Usman (2009) this expendable or unemployed youth are not worthy of preservation. They are disposable at any given time. They are often incited, given arms to kill themselves for peanuts. A budget is usually made for the maintenance and feeding of these youths with drugs and intoxicants for them to become ruthless agents of destruction.

Unemployment, coupled with the high level of deprivation and impoverishments of the Nigerian youths, force many youths to take up the readily available job opportunity, which is to become implementers of electoral violence. Orji and Uzodi (2011) argue that there is a high rate of unemployment in Nigeria.

According to Odunsi, (2017); the number of unemployed Nigerians rose from 11.19 million, at the end of third quarter of 2016 to 11.55m in the 4th quarter of 2016; National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It should be noted that the unemployment rate rose from 13.9 percent to 14.2 percent. As NBS reports show, the rate was highest for persons in the labour force between the ages of 15 - 24, rising from 25 percent to 25.2 percent, and 25 -34 age group rising from 15 percent to 15.4 percent which compositely represents the youth population in Nigeria.

Consequently, Nigeria has a population that lacks access to opportunities and resources to actualize their potentials. Usman (2009) suggests that these conditions easily play the gullible youths into the hands of unscrupulous politicians, who manipulate them by dangling irresistible baits for the youth to undertake electoral violence, despite the attendant aftermath of violence. The aftermath could be the denial of appropriate employment and other capacity development training for the youths, a vicious circle that also causes another round of electoral violence.

Orji and Uzodi (2011) further observed that, the youths are pliant and easily enticed by the wealthy violent entrepreneurs who sponsor most of the violent political encounters. According to them (opcit) the Nigerian electoral violence is mostly carried out by these youth gangs, whose members are

openly recruited, financed, and sometimes, armed by politicians, state officials, and party officials or their representatives. Members of these youths are unemployed, poor young men and women, who are mobilised to attack their sponsors' rivals and intimidate the publics, rig elections to protect the interest of their principals and stakeholders, as well as protect their patrons from the oppositions' attacks. The awareness of the possibilities of getting away with acts of violence has steered the unabated continuation of those acts. Aniekwe and Kushie (2011) report that more than 11,000 people were killed in hundreds of separate out breaks of politically motivated violence in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. During the same period, the country recorded several high profile cases of politically motivated assassinations; (Ladan and Kiru 2005). In all these, no one was convicted (ICG 2011). The tendency of political actors to use violence in the electoral process is defined by the state's capacity to enforce law and order. But this capacity of Nigerian State to enforce law and order is undermined by the erosion of the states' monopoly of the use of violence. This power, or lack of it, is gravely challenged by the activities of "cult gangs", "area boys", ethnic militia, unlicensed vigilante groups, and armed bandits that operate in rural and urban areas (Adewale 2005), Pratten 2006, Higazi 2008, and Fourchard 2008). The paper suggests that the above groups are all wasted youths of the wasted generation. Hazen and Horner, (2007); observe that the armed operations of these groups are aided by the illicit and unrestrained flow of small arms. As Nigeria's experience demonstrates, political actors can sometimes take control of these armed groups and use them to perpetrate electoral violence (HRW 2005 and 2007). In all, Orji and Uzodi declare that the political elite and state officials support and use armed groups to achieve political ends.

Theoretical Perspective

The study adopts the schismogenesis theory as its theoretical framework of analysis. This theory literally means "creation of division". The term derives from the Greek words (borrowed into English such as schism, "division into opposing factions).

The concept of schismogenesis was developed by the anthropologist Gregory Bateson in the 1930s, to account for certain forms of social behaviour between groups among the Latmul people of the Sepik River. Bateson first published the concept in 1935, but elaborated on schismogenesis in his classic 1936 ethnography, *Naven*. In the 1950's a man called Ludwig Von Bertalanffy in developing the concept of the general systems theory, applied it to Biology. Later on, the concept was applied to physics in the development theory of thermodynamics which also was adopted into the laws of systems and as today, it is applied in the various disciplines of the social sciences.

So, as applied to this paper we want to explore political relations in practical terms and examine the interplay of political stakeholders as they disagree over principles therefore causing political violence which generate political instability in the political order.

Political power must always be seen to go beyond state power as the management of state power affects the homogeneity and stability of the entire society. In using this theory, the questions we ask are concerned with the proliferation and multiplication of violence in the political landscape and the concomitant production of instability in the entire society. The vocation of politicians across the world is to bring stability, sustainability, growth, and development to their societies; but when political violence becomes the norm as we find in Nigeria, then we reap the whirlwind of destruction, corruption, kidnapping, terrorism and dissipation of resources, leading to the increasing voices of disintegration, dissipation and centrifugality (tearing apart). The result is that there is a clamour for restructuring of Nigeria, as it is today. Whereas in the era of globalization, centripetal politics and international relations the world over, the ruling or dominant processes at home are those of schismogenesis or imbalance in the distribution of resources.

There are other questions of citizenship in a country of political violence and terrorism when people from one corner of the nation are not comfortable living and thriving, doing their businesses in other parts of the country. Another question is on the whole import of democracy on the Nigerian society, when it is only the clan or ethnic group in power that can benefit to the total marginalization of other clans not in power. These are

signs of disequilibrium or imbalance and lack of homeostasis in the social order whose general symptom is political violence.

Results

In order to test the influence of people's perceptions of various dimensions of a weak state on an individual's proclivity to engage in political violence, we estimate a multivariate logit model with country fixed effects.

Table 1 reports the results of estimations.

Table 1. Acceptability of Political Violence


Independent Variables	Coef.	Std. Err.	P-value
Order (presence of the state)	0.035	0.024	0.174
Insecurity (victim of crime)	0.099	0.032	0.002
State legitimacy	-0.142	0.023	0.000
Public service quality	-0.059	0.034	0.084
Lack of protection of private property	0.413	0.050	0.000
Group grievance	0.129	0.022	0.000
Personal economic condition	0.002	0.020	0.906
National economic condition	0.016	0.017	0.372
Support for democracy	-0.253	0.043	0.000

Urban (=1)	-0.046	0.055	0.405
Gender (female =)	-0.104	0.041	0.012
Age	-0.008	0.002	0.000
Education	0.010	0.013	0.437
Botswana	0.527	0.161	0.001
Cape Verde	0.222	0.300	0.459
Ghana	0.390	0.163	0.017
Kenya	0.990	0.148	0.000
Lesotho	0.349	0.170	0.040
Madagascar	1.196	0.149	0.000
Malawi	0.469	0.156	0.003
Mali	0.768	0.150	0.000
Mozambique	1.009	0.158	0.000
Namibia	1.645	0.149	0.000
Nigeria	1.042	0.136	0.000
Senegal	0.212	0.170	0.211
South Africa	0.743	0.144	0.000
Tanzania	1.441	0.149	0.000
Uganda	1.024	0.136	0.000
Zambia	1.197	0.147	0.000
Constant	-1.882	0.1192	0.000
Log likelihood	-7822.468		
Pseudo R2	0.0505		
N	16731		

Note: Table entries are logit coefficients with country fixed effects

Source: www.afrobarometer.org.

Figure 1. Percentage of Popular Acceptability of Political Violence and Engagement in Demonstrations



Source: www.afrobarometer.org

Intervention Strategy Formulations

In composing the strategies for curbing political violence in Nigeria, it is important to begin by critically examining the characteristics and circumstances of violence perpetrators. Youths are the major perpetrators of political violence in Nigeria, although adults in parties, governance and business are the sponsors and funders of political violence. Whereas the youthful perpetrators are highly visible the sponsors and funders are often times shady and high up in the hierarchy of society and so, almost invisible. We affirm in this paper a message of hope because our Nigerian society can intervene effectively in the lives of the youths of this country to reduce or prevent their involvement in political violence and other sorts of criminal acts.

According to the extensive report on youth violence conducted by the APA in 1993,

"Violence involving youth is not random, uncontrollable or inevitable. Many factors, both individual and social, or political, contributed to the youth propensity, even, any individual for that matter, to use violence, and many of these factors are within the power of society and governments to change"

Children and youths who begin to show violent and aggressive behaviour early in life, require prompt intervention right in the family, schools, churches, mosques, streets and in games. In fact, the greatest predictor of future violent behaviour is a previous (family or school) history of violence. Without early systematic and effective intervention strategies, early aggression and violence characteristics commonly will escalate into later youth and adult violence and broaden into other social and political vices such as political violence and anti-social behaviours:

Another factor to keep in mind is that violence and aggression of any type and especially political violence, is often a multi - dimensional and multi-determined event. When it happens especially political violence, it is often a multi-layered action, which pass through the gamut of serious political planning, from start to finish. The violent youths are often recruited and trained under the watchful eyes of political stake holders. The violent youths work with political parties or governments to capture power. They are often organized as "Youth Associations", but members carry guns in their hand. They are often members of fringe cult groups that litter the society, waiting to be used for violence. In 2003, during the course of my investigations and research on political violence, I was informed that guns were purchased at the national political level, and then distributed to the states, to ensure victory by violence. The Youths were often camped on end in one place, sometimes in the forest or bush and fed with food, drugs, hard drinks and violent pep talks. By the time they are put to use, they are often ready violent and killing machines; no more human beings.

All politically violent or aggressive behaviour is highly motivated. The violent youths are often promised appointments of cabinet ranks; and when their parties win, some of them are often rehabilitated into very critical positions of cabinet ranks and governance. It is now very well known that a former governor of one state in Nigeria had recruited violent political youths and thugs, some of them he had promised to vacate the government house for. Indeed, two or three of such former political thugs and violent youths have become governors of some States.

Quite often such bravado and "Comrado" promises may fail, and a back lash can lead to the development of fringe socio-pathic groups such as Boko - Haram.

It must be pointed out in this paper that in Nigeria and indeed most of Africa, intervention and prevention strategies are almost nonexistent, because, perhaps, the political thugs and violence perpetrators are protected by those high in the hierarchy of power who operate with impunity. What this present research report offers are therefore, suggested strategies for new and effective intervention responses to politically engineered youth violence that often mother all other forms of violence in the Nigerian society.

How And Why Do People Become Politically Violent?

A serious consideration of intervention strategies must begin with a consideration of why and how people become prone to political violence in Nigeria. The following are suggested reasons or antecedents:

- i. History of previous Political Violence. Between 1999 and 2007, one man called the Strong Man of Ibadan politics or the specialist in "AMALA Politics" had specialized in recruiting hundreds and thousands of youths and people with previous violent history and had hired them out during elections. Even the former President was his customer.

- ii. Some children show very early a fearless; impulsive and temperamental even uncontrollable behaviours. Such youth or adults will be predisposed to political violence.
- iii. Research has shown that most politically violent youths and adults had less than satisfactory parental care and supervision. This could be prevalent in the rural areas where little children can now insult their parents, join cult groups or runaway from homes. (APA Document 1995)
- iv. Middle class families that are negligent of their children can turn them into violent youths; especially where the children have unfetered access to violent DVDs, films and other dangerous materials while the parents are away "pursing money".
- v. Societal attitudes towards violence can predispose youths to political violence. Toy guns are available everywhere and the militarization of politics has made joining the Armed Forces a glamorous choice. Violence is now a choice.
- vi. Violence is most prevalent among the poor Nigerians, though the children of violent adults can also become politically violent. Children of the poor want to make it by all means; so they are easily recruited into political violence with the promise of a better future.
- vii. Unemployment is another factor that can predispose youths to political violence. A chain gang effect can occur when the unemployed are also married and domestic violence can ensue and develop into a vicious circle. A compound effect is that members of such families will take to political violence in order to survive.
- viii. Other factors include the following:
 - a) Access to firearms/guns,
 - b) Involvement with alcohol and other drugs or substances,
 - c) Involvement in anti-social groups such as cults and fraternities,

- d) Exposure to violence in the mass media and ICT/Internet.
- e) Ethnic and Religious diversities and pluralistic perceptions.
- f) Youths as victims of political violence. Some die and nobody even cares for their families.

Intervention Strategies:

These must be multi-modal; involving strategies and programmes aimed at improving the affective, behavioural and cognitive skills of youths previously exposed to political violence. As stated earlier on, such intervention programmes are almost none existent in Nigeria.

In suggesting the under listed intervention programmes or strategies, we must keep in mind further essential and critical factors.

According to Matthew F. Kiorn and Wonbin Cho; weak states or countries of Africa support or predispose political violence. In developing their "AFROBAROMETER" of political violence in 2009; they had defined weak states' as those that fail to govern their countries in so much that disenchantment, crime, poverty, violence and aggression walk on the streets of cities and in rural areas. Furthermore, in weak countries or states many people are actually ready to participate in political violence. (See table 1 and Figure 1 above)

Political violence predispose societies to insecurity and violent crimes. Nigeria is witnessing some of these, in recent times in the North East and South South. Roaming cattle rearers have even joined in violent and criminal behaviours all over the country because of weak or failed leadership; and failed governance or institutions.

There is also the total lack of state legitimacy which may lead to the inadequate protection of lives and property; as well as group grievances. Nigeria as a failed state has further bred the culture of insurrection and the clarion calls for the dismantling and restructuring of the foundations of the country. There is also the symptom of wide participations in violent public

demonstrations and political violence. Indeed, in Nigeria, there is wide acceptance and active participation in political violence and demonstrations, in which highly placed people in society such as Prof Wole Soyinka, participate. According to Herbst (2000) African leaders have failed to govern their states, hence the prevalence of political violence; even among the Executives, Legislatures and the Judiciaries. Elections have become so dangerous that African voters are often at a loss whether they are at war, facing guns or whether they are voting, (See Paul Collier (2009). *Wars, Guns and Voters*. Democracy in Dangerous Places; London, Boderly Head.

Furthermore, Orji and Uzodi (2012), writing on Post-Election Violence in Nigeria, had suggested that the culture of impunity in Nigeria had meant that perpetrators of political violence are often treated by the Nigerian legal system and law enforcement Agencies as "Untouchables, they are often "no-go-areas" because their sponsors are the "High and Mighty" ones of society. Nigeria is one place on Earth where "Might and Power equal to Right and privileges".

We therefore suggest the following possible intervention strategies:

8. Stake holders in the Nigerian political space, including those who are likely to participate in violence, need to be better taken into account and cared for.
9. Long term monitoring and public education of stake holders is highly recommended.
10. Conflict mitigation measures should be incorporated into the political design of Nigeria.
11. The state and political parties as well as the political gladiators need to imbibe confidence building among themselves as Stake holders; thereby encouraging deterrence in order to ensure state and societal security.

12. Election Management Bodies - eg, INEC, and the parties need to improve peace building around elections. The current practice of massive deployment of the Armed Forces during elections makes nonsense of democracy in the political space called Nigeria.
13. Early intervention strategies need to be institutionalized in families, communities, schools, churches and mosques in order to nip violent behaviour emanations in the bud.
14. Strategies for better anticipation of future political violence need to be developed and put in place in all the electoral Wards, 774 Local Governments and the 36 states and Abuja FCT of Nigeria. This is very urgent as none exist now.
15. Conflict mitigating propensities need to be encouraged. The politics of "Winner Takes it all" which Nigeria has practised since May 1999, has largely encouraged political violence even in families of opposing parties.
16. Underlying social - economic and political conditions that predispose people to political violence must be turned into processes of peace building using amity oriented approaches. It is correct to suggest that politicians in either Khaki or Agbada have since 1960 fritted away trillions of US Dollars that Nigeria earned from the Petroleum and Gas resources of the people. Today 1% of Nigerians are super rich and 99.9% are super poor. That is an error that must be corrected before the final conflagration and inferno. The people are simply very angry.
17. Conflicts before, during and after elections in Nigeria can and need to be mitigated through political education. Politicians need not tell their followers to tear down the country if the politicians fail to win. This is what Buhari did in Kaduna and Minna in 2007 and his failure at the polls had thereafter unleashed serious political violence across the country in which churches and Christians were bombed out of existence.
18. Cultism need not be encouraged by politicians.

19. Control of firearms by the State is now an urgent issue.

Conclusion

In this paper an attempt has been made to identify the prevalence and characteristics of political violence in Nigeria. It is established that youths are the major perpetrators of political violence in Nigeria although they are sponsored and funded by politicians and business people who fund politics.

In developing the intervention strategies for the amelioration of political violence in Nigeria, two questions and hypotheses were at the back of our mind; namely: Any possible correlation between the satisfaction of political stake holders and the minimalization of political violence; and also, any correlation between youth employment and the reduction in political violence?

This paper was based on a "Dask Research Method" and using data from the "Afrobarometer Research Group", this paper has shown that Nigerians are ready and willing to participate in political violence because of the "Failed or Weak State Syndrome" in which stake holders interests and the interests of Nigerian youths are not satisfied or addressed. This can lead to the tearing down of the structures of society, hence the theory of schismogenesis.

In this regard several suggestions have been made towards the development of intervention strategies for the prevention or curbing of political violence in Nigeria. It is hoped that our suggestions will be taken seriously.

In terms of future research on the empirical validation of our suggested intervention guidelines, there is the need to take it further. Also there is the necessity for exploring the actual role of formal and informal institutions in promoting political violence. This should be further explored. Previous researches such as Orji and Uzodi (2012) have explored the prevalence of youth participation and the concept of sponsor impunity in escalating political

violence. However not much attention has been paid to intervention strategies for curbing or preventing political violence in Nigeria.

Due to lack of data the paper could not explore the actual involvement of sponsors and government establishments who create the culture of impunity in the arena of politics of life and death and its attendant political violence in Nigeria. Another important observation from this paper is that in Nigeria, politics seems to be the only "game or business of highest turnover" in town and so attracts all and sundry who play to win or die.

As long as intervention strategies to mitigate or prevent violence in the political stage are not put in place, Nigerian citizens will continue to regard political violence as the only option for winning elections and for getting into power in Nigeria. When this scenario continues unabated democracy will only be a farce or a mockery of its real meaning in Nigeria.

Recommendations

The following are the recommendations

1. Corruption should be eliminated from the election management body, INEC; in all ramifications.
2. Independent National Electoral Commission should be strengthened to become an Independent National Institution in order to conduct free and credible elections.
3. Government and Individuals should build or attract Industries so that the rate of unemployed youth could diminish drastically. When the youth are positively busy in factories, political thuggery will not attract them.
4. Stake holders should have confidence in themselves and accept that they must be a loser and winner and accept which ever one they found themselves in.

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INCIDENCES OF POLITICAL KILLINGS IN NIGERIA'S DEMOCRACY, 1999-2019

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Abstract

The paper overviewed the incidences of political killings since the return to democracy from 1999 to 2019 in Nigeria. It further examined the role that political killings has played in the gradual disintegration of the Nigerian society, including how politicians and their supporters have complicated the search for an accountable democracy. The study employed secondary data obtained from textbooks, journals, and newspapers and other sources. It observed that since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, the country has strived to be cohesive, despite its cultural and religious diversity. The findings indicated that the inception of the Nigerian politics in the Fourth Republic has inter alia inclined towards increased intergroup bitterness, thuggery, arson, intimidation, banditry, assaults, harassment, kidnappings and assassinations. It further identified various phases of political killings and explained the impacts they have had on the socio-economic lives of Nigerians. It recommended that an authentic dialogue, amongst political actors in Nigeria rather than a militarisation option is the appropriate response to the current threat to democratic consolidation while suggesting ways that may be helpful in stemming further deterioration in the political killings in Nigeria in the long term.

Keywords: democracy, politics, violence, incidences of political killings

Introduction

Political killings/violence is not a new household issue in Nigeria and even in the world over. When we turn on television or pick up a newspaper both national and international, we are regularly inundated with the vision of a world in disarray images of ethnic cleansing in Central Africa Republic, demonstration in Burundi, Sudan, Somali and the Middle East crises.

Although Nigeria achieved her political independence in 1960, with a minimum of disturbances, the country stumbled from crisis to crisis, culminating in the civil war. Indeed, the country witnessed a marked increase in the inter-party bitterness, ethno-religious antagonism and intolerance. These regrettable propensities at different times triggered sectarian violence, riots, coups and counter coups, and high-profile killings. In 1999 when democracy returned to the country the expectations that social violence will be abated were dashed. *The Daily Trust* (May 19, 2011, p.26) has this to say: “violence is immoral because it thrives on hatred rather than love. It destroys community and makes brotherhood impossible. It leaves society in monologue. Violence ends by defeating itself. It creates bitterness in survivors and brutality in the destroyer.”

Specifically, Nigeria has demonstrated a very high propensity for ethno-religious and political conflict, since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Ethno-religious and regional tensions have been widespread. Episodes of violence which were ethnic or religious on the surface often had the competition for political and economic resources as root causes. Politics is seen in Nigeria as one of the few avenues to amass wealth. Olusegun Obasanjo (2002, pp.50-51) asserts: “We fight and sometimes shed blood to achieve and retain political power since for us in Nigeria, the political kingdom has for too long been the gateway to the economic kingdom.” The statement demonstrates how blood is being exchanged for political power in Nigeria. The use of violence in Nigerian politics has not only led to waste of human resources but it has also resulted in the dearth of able-bodied men who may be useful in the future Nigeria, and low participation of women in politics.

In Nigeria, when party lines and her political divisions coincide with ethnic or religious differences, the strong sentiments associated with people’s ethnic or religious identity come into play in the political arena. Politicians are often able to capitalize on this sentiment to mobilize support, in many cases exacerbating inter-group resentment and hostility.

Adeyemi (2003, p.370) express concerns over the situation of politics in Nigeria, when he observes that:

During the ward congress of the PDP, an intra-party affair, many politicians went to the Congress venue armed with assault rifles and acid containers for possible use on opponents. The two most notorious instances related to the PDP primaries occurred in mid-2006, well in

advance of the primaries when two PDP gubernatorial aspirants - Funsho Williams in Lagos State and Ayo Daramola in Ekiti State -were murdered in July and August 2006 respectively.

Violence is a common means used by people and governments around the world to achieve political goals. Many groups and individuals believe that their political system will never respond to their political demands, as they believe that violence is not only justified but very necessary in order to achieve their political objectives. In the same vein, most governments around the world believe that they need to use violence in order to intimidate their populace in compliance: the Abacha regime, Babangida regime against June 12 and the third term bid of Obasanjo are instances. Against this background, the major focus of this work is to undertake an assessment of incidences of political killings/violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic politics.

Conceptual Clarification

In order to put the focus of this work in its appropriate context, some concepts deserve clarification.

Democracy

Democracy has its formal origins in Ancient Greece, but democratic practices are evident in earlier society's including; Mesopotamia, Phoenicia and India. Other countries since Greece have significantly contributed to the evolution of democracy such as Ancient Rome, Europe, and North and South America. The concept of representative democracy arose largely from ideas and institutions that developed during the European Middle Ages and the Age of Enlightenment and in the American and French Revolutions. Democracy has been called the "last form of government" and has spread considerably across the globe. The right to vote has been expanded in many jurisdictions over time from relatively narrow groups (such as wealthy men of ethnic group, with New Zealand the first nation to grant universal suffrage for all its citizens in 1893.

Democracy is by far the most challenging form of government – both for rulers and for the ruled. The term democracy comes from the Greek language and means "rule by the (simple) people: The so-called "democracies" in classical antiquity (Athens and Rome) represent precursors of modern democracies. Like modern democracy, they were created as a

reaction to a concentration and abuse of power by rulers. Yet the theory of modern democracy was not formulated until the Age of Enlightenment (17th/18th centuries), when philosophers defined the essential elements of democracy: separation of powers, basic civil rights/human rights, religious liberty and separation of church and state.

Democracy in other words, is a form of government in which all eligible people have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. Ideally, this includes equal (and more or less direct) participation in the proposal, development and passage of legislation into law. It can also encompass social, economic and cultural conditions that enable the free and equal practice of political self-determination.

Majority rule is often listed as a characteristic of democracy. An essential part of an “ideal” representative democracy is competitive elections that are fair both substantively and procedurally. Furthermore, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are considered to be essential, so that citizens are adequately informed and able to vote according to their own best interests as they see them. It has also been suggested that a basic feature of democracy is the capacity of individuals to participate freely and fully in the life of their society.

Violence

The word violence like any other social science concepts’ lack any precise commonly accepted definition. The concept often serves as a catch all for every variety of protest, militancy, coercion, destruction, or muscle-flexing which a given observer happens to fear or condemn. (Tilly, 1978).

Corsini (1999) defines violence as the expression of hostility and rage through physical force directed against persons or property. It is an aggression in its most extreme and unacceptable form, and most investigators conclude it has no therapeutic justification, since there are most constructive and humane ways of expressing anger. It is usually politically justified in defensive wars or in combating terrorism. Essentially, political violence is viewed basically by citizens, civil society, government and institutions in different contexts. Also, it can be seen as a civil strife, arm violent, terrorism, war, and other such causes that can result in injury, death and loss of property.

Schmitz (1968, p.3) posits that violence, particularly political violence, represents a disturbance to the political equilibrium system. According to Gurr (1970, p.2), political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political

community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies.

Politics

Politics as a term lends itself to a more definite and precise explanation. Its original Greek roots are polis city and teche (art, skill or method). Etymologically, politics refers to the art of governing a city. A city here designates an organized governed, territory as a state under the jurisdiction of city (Nwoko, 1988). It was believed that political life as an organized mode of living started in the city and spread to the neighbourhood. In this classical sense, then, politics is held to be the art of organizing men in a society to live and interact with one another for the realization of their social nature. It requires the institutionalization of social structures such as the establishment of legal and governmental systems to facilitate this interaction (Nwoko, 1988).

It is fundamental to note that it is the nature of man to live in communities because he wants to interact with his fellow men, to raise his standard of living, and protect his own interests. So also does every other member of the community. Interests and needs of individuals in any community are sometimes identical, while at other time, they conflict (Adeyemo, 2000), politics starts with these facts of community life. It discusses the problems which the community creates, examines and compares the different kinds of community (Adeyemo & Awotokun, 1980). Politics concerns itself with the legitimate distribution of the good things of life that is socio-political and economic resources for the individual, groups or institutions in a society. This ‘distribution’ depends upon the decision-making process, the individuals, or groups and the scarce resources available in a community. It is inherent in politics that this distribution of resources brings conflict, and in the midst of conflicts, there must be co-operation.

It is the management of these conflicts and co-operation, and the problem of creativity which Miller (Adeyemo, 2000) refers to, as the pivot of politics. In trying to explain politics, David Easton (cited in Greenstein & Polsby, 1975) contended that politics involves authoritative allocation of values for society. Harold Lasswell (1935) shared the same view. He defined politics as “who gets what, when and how”. It is difficult for everyone in a society to get all his needs and desires without competition, hence, politics is inherently a fierce struggle for power (Pennock & Smith, 1967). In addition to

the distribution of societal values, politics is used to create values for a society, to satisfy common needs, to wield power and influence decisions, as well as actions of others in a society.

For this reason, those who struggle for political power often claim that they intend to use such power for the best interests of the members of their society, where people struggle for interest, influence, and ultimate power at any level (domestic or international). Violence and conflict, as elements of war thus exists (Adeyemo, 2000) perhaps that was why Mao Tse Tung sees politics as a war without blood-shed (Dahl, 1976).

In a related manner, politics can be seen as the process of handling demands. In this connection, Zartman (1991, p.300) states that demands that are either not handled or not properly handled escalate often from politics to violence. It has to be observed here that politics, whether national or international, is fundamentally and ultimately struggle for the minds and resources of men and nations. In this struggle, the gladiators often apply all forms of strategies and tactics to win, including deception. Those men and nations who are deceived in the process lose (freedom, power and resources) and grow fat. This is why politics and governance, especially international politics, require minds, brains and bodies that are properly schooled and tuned for them (Nwolise, 1997, p. 29).

Incidences of Political Killings/ Violence in Nigeria

The Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999-2017) has been bedeviled by several forms of violence and crime among which are murder, assassination, kidnapping, religious and ethnic disturbances, arson, sabotage, armed attack/ bombing, herdsman/Farmers clash, arms smuggling, intra and inter-party clashes, electoral/post-election violence among others. Several factors are/ were responsible for the spate of violence since the inception of the fourth republic. The 1999, 2003, 2007 elections were marred by ballot box snatching, political assassinations, bombings, killings, maiming of voters, arson, and abduction of electoral officials (Omotola, 2008, Omudiwe and Berwind-Dart, 2010; Aniekwe and Kushie, 2011).

Specifically, Ogbonna Uche Ogbonnaya, the candidate of the opposition All Nigeria Peoples Party was assassinated on February 8, 2003 (Smah, 2008). Similarly, on July 2006, Funsho Williams, a People's Democratic Party governorship aspirant for Lagos state was assassinated (Omotola, 2008). Since then, it has been killings upon killings with impunity

across the federation. The long list of casualties includes the former Chairman of Onitsha branch of N.B.A. (Nigerian Bar Association), Barnabas Igwe and his wife in 2002; Principal Secretary to the Imo State governor, Theodore Agwata; a leader of A.N.P.P. (All Nigerian Peoples Party) in the South-South, Dr. Harry Marshal; a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Chief Ajibola Olanipekun; P.D.P. (Peoples Democratic Party) Vice Chairman in the South-South, Aminasari Dikibo; a member of P.D.P. Board of Trustees, Adrew Agom; Kogi State Electoral Commissioner, Chief Philip Olorunnipa and Alhaja Sa'adatu Abubakar Rimi. The most worrisome dimension is the killing of Mr. Jesse Arukwu, Engineer Funso Williams and the latest being that of Dr. Ayo Daramola who were all gubernatorial aspirants in their respective states.

The foregoing raises doubts of the likelihood of their being eliminated to clear the political coast for others in the race. More than 300 people were killed in the widespread violence that marred the 2007 state and national elections (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Equally, the 2011 presidential election was marred by an unprecedented post electoral violence, especially in the far North, resulting in the death of many innocent citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Incidences of high profile killings of political figures like Marshall Harry in 2003, the National Vice Chairman for the South-South Zone then the largest opposition party, ANPP, Justice Minister and Attorney General Bola Ige in 2001, Dikibo Asari in 2007, Olaitan the Chief Press Secretary to then Edo State governor in 2012, the killing of Odunayo Olagbaju in 2001 in front of Moore police station at Ile-Ife have not only sent shockwaves throughout the country but have provoked perhaps greater turmoil in Nigeria political system.

The 2019 General Election is no exception as it was characterized by bloodbath. The serving member of the House of Representatives for Lagelu/Akinyele constituency, Temitope Olatoye, also known as Sugar, was shot dead by suspected political thugs in Lagelu area of Ibadan. Little wonder the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yakubu Dogara, *ThisDay* (March 10, 2019, p.9) reacted thus:

I received with shock, the sad and distressing news of the assassination of my brother and colleague, Hon. Olatoye Temitope Sugar, in Oyo state. The murder of Hon. Sugar in election violence is primitive, wicked, inhumane, barbaric and highly condemnable.

Political killings are prevalent in every political system across the globe, but the degree marks the difference. America has the most developed democracy in the world, yet it had its fair share of suspected politically motivated killings. On the list in this regard were John F. Kennedy, Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King. In India, Indra and Rajiv Ghandis had their lives snuffed out of them by assassin's bullets. There were also Awwal Sadat of Egypt, Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Aquino of Philippines, Olympio of Togo amongst others.

Kalu (2003) located the sources of violence within the context of ethnic and religious agitation, reckless manipulation of the electoral process such as ballot box snatches, imposition of unpopular candidates, disrespect for constitution, injustice, and downward trend in the economy, poverty, and unemployment, lack of patriotism, intolerance and cultism. Senator Idris Kuta corroborated this fact, when he said that the craze to amass wealth, 'sit tight' mentality of incumbent office holders and winner-takes-all disposition were responsible for violence in the current-political dispensation.

Similarly, *the Punch Editorial (2003)* attributed the problem of political violence to the rising number of idle youths pay for deployment as thugs, as well as the worrisome arms build-up, nation-wide. It contends that the fact that security agencies have rarely apprehended and brought to justice, the sacred cow, big-time politicians, adds to the menace.

Another cause of violence in political system is the notion of relative deprivation, interpreted to mean a state of mind where there is discrepancy between what men seek and what seems attainable, the greater this discrepancy, the greater their anger and their propensity towards violence. While corroborating this line of argument, the *Nigerian Tribune* (May29, 2001, p.1) had this to say;

You know the mentality of our people. If democracy does not Produce clean water, if democracy does not produce good roads, transform agriculture, cultivate industrial development, sanitize society, give us power supply, democracy will lose its credibility and they may say, Abina democracy we go chop?

Be that as it may, political violence, especially in the Nigerian context is a product of a struggle for power among various groups within the society. In Nigeria, the possession of the political power leads directly to economic power, hence power seekers can do anything to achieve political power

basically to improve their economic status and well-being (Joseph, 1999). Those who hold position in the power structure determine the location and distribution of scarce resources, exclusion from this power position is hence very costly. Dudley (1961, p.21) observed that in Nigeria:

The shortest cut to affluence and influence is through politics. Politics means money and money means politics. To get politics, there is always a price ...To be a member of the government part means an open avenue to government patronage, contract deals and the like.

He goes on to say:

But once, having known the probability of having power the party (and the individual members) naturally uses the same governmental machinery to stay in power. The leadership becomes a self-recruiting oligarchy and no self-recruiting has been known to tolerate opposition to it (Dudley, cited in Alemika, 2011).

More importantly, when the individuals and groups involved could not achieve their objectives through the normal democratic political processes of voting, parties or machine politics and given the stifling of electoral competition and the forced entrenchment of the ruling elites in power, the prospects of realizing their goals and aspirations through non-violence tactics must have seemed increasingly dim. As a result, violence emerged as the ultimate alternative for those concerned. According to Anifowose (1982, p.217), “political violence is often a natural concomitant of the political process, particularly where there is a fierce competition over the sharing of power”.

The nature of Nigerian state and regimes contribute to endemic violence in the electoral process. According Claude Ake (1996, p.73):

the state is in effect privatised. It remains an enormous force but no longer a public force, no longer a reassuring presence guaranteeing the rule of law but a formidable threat to all except the few who control it, actually encouraging lawlessness and with little capacity to mediate conflicts in society. In the circumstance where the state is privatized, those in power will use violence and state repressive apparatus to retain power. The people excluded from governance (especially in a society where politics is a license to oppress other citizens and to rob the public treasury with impunity) will resort to violence in their quest for office.

Nigerian political parties and politicians employ fraudulent and violent means. The Political Bureau reported that Nigerian politicians and parties rigged elections “in most blatant fashion...violence, corruption, arson, and brigandage were employed in the made desire to win and retain power both in the regions and at the centre” (Report of the Political Bureau, 1987, p.25). The constitution Drafting Committee (1976, p.5) observes the country’s politics is primarily geared towards securing “opportunity to acquire wealth and prestige, to be able to distribute benefits in the form of jobs, contracts, scholarships, and gifts of money and so on to one’s relatives and political allies.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the nation’s democracy has been plagued by violence right from inception, evidenced from current happenings. Available statistic shows that over 10,000 lives were lost to violent clashes 1999-2002. The Nigerian Red Cross, between 2000-2001 alone, had been involved in the resettlement of 250,000 families (Olukorede, 2002) as a result of the various acts of political killings/ violence in the country.

Politicians in the blind quest for power threw all decorum and caution to the wind and resorted to, among other inflammatory pronouncements/acts usually targeted at opposition. For example, pronouncement like “if anybody tries to change your votes, change him to dust” or “2007 is a do or die affair” or even the scarist” if it is war, we will give to them, if they want peace, we will get it. If they want riot, we will give it to them. If they want dead body they will get it. They cannot kill all of us (Umar & Danjuma, 2014, p.29).

Between May 29 and June 2, 1999, a violent clash in Warri, Delta state led to the loss of no less than 200 lives. The theatre of death shifted to Lagos between November 25 and 28 of the same year when Yoruba and Hausa merchants in Ketu market clashed, resulting in the death of over 100 people (Olukorede, 2002). Earlier on July 17, 1999, the O’dua People’s Congress (OPC) was involved in the ethnic clash that occurred in Sagamu. The confrontation resulted in the death of 50 people, while reprisal attack in Kano on July 22, 1999 claimed over 100 lives (Akinyele, 2001).

In 2000, many killings were recorded. From February 21 to 22, an estimated 33, 000 people lost their lives in a clash between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna, the capital of Kaduna State (Olukorede, 2002). The religious riot was sparked off by the proposed extension of sharia or Islamic law to criminal code. There was a reprisal attack in Aba, Abia State and about 450 persons were reported killed. Between March and May, Ife and Modakeke

in Osun State witnessed the loss of over 150 lives. And from May 22 to 23, Kaduna was again in flames when Muslims and Christians clashed, over 300 lives were reported lost (Olukorede, 2002)

In the fourth week of November 2002, sectarian violence rocked the city of Kaduna, after a newspaper, *ThisDay*, allegedly made a disparaging remark about Prophet Muhammad. The remark was made in the context of an international beauty pageant being staged in the country. There was also a violent reaction from the minority groups. More than 200 people lost their lives and thousands were rendered homeless (Cherian, 2002). Between 2000 and 2001, there has been trouble in cities such as Jos and Kano, all located near Kaduna. Much of the violence stemmed from inter-ethnic rivalries.

The states of 'Middle Belt' were not left out either. Between 1999 and 2001, serious fighting occurred in states like Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba and Plateau between groups that view themselves as "indigenes" and those viewed as "settlers", or non-natives in the areas, resulting in hundreds of deaths (www.hrw.org). The rising wave of killings mostly farmers and herders' clashes in several states, especially the Middle Belt region, a chronology of the deaths compiled by *ThisDay* (April 30, 2018, pp.8-51) has shown that a total of 901 persons have been reportedly murdered in the Middle Belt alone in the first four months of 2018. This States/region has also recorded an increase in the destruction of property and farmlands in the period under review, as well as thousands of displaced persons who have been chased away from their homesteads.

In the Niger Delta region, the oil-related resources, at stake coupled with the issue of grinding poverty have resulted in the outburst of ethnic violence in the area. For instance, on February 6, 2003, 11 people including two policemen were killed and 50 houses razed in the five-day hostilities between Urhobo and Itsekiri youths in Warri. Also damaged during the violence were filling stations, a police station and 150 kiosks. A soldier was among the 11 people who died in the violence (Ojiaboro, 2003). The violence (oil terrorism) in Niger Delta region still continues until present.

It should also be noted that the level of thuggery and political violence in the country since the inception of fourth republic has been on the increase in Abia, Anambra, Lagos, Kano, Plateau, Enugu, Ebonyi, Rivers, Edo, Bayelsa, Taraba, Ogun, AkwaIbom states etc. These were among the states that recorded high level of political violence with attendant incident of deaths.

Across Nigeria, politicians have shifted their individual and party alliances with disconcerting regularity. The breakup of “godfatherism” relationships where prominent business people or politicians sponsor political candidates has been source of violence. When a godfather feels that his protégé has not sufficiently served his interests: for instance, Enugu state- Chime versus Nnamani, Anambra state- Ngige versus Uba, Kwara state-Lawal versus Saraki senior, recently, Lagos State 2019 election, AmbodeVsTinibu, Kano State GandujeVsKwankaso etc. The social, political and economic profiles of persons involved have made it a national concern. Since godfathers are themselves the ruling elites or the makings of ruling elites, their activities have been institutionalized to the point of subverting the constitution for parochialism and self- aggrandizement. Subscribing to this assertion, a scholar has tersely submitted that:

Political godfathers are by design positioned above the laws of the land including the constitution. They and their thugs can involve arms without interference. They are entitled to police escorts

In Oyo State, for example, clashes between factions loyal to then PDP Governor RashidiLadoja and his estranged “godfather” LamidiAdedibu have led to violence on multiple occasions with attendances injuries and deaths. Both sides have drawn their armed support from Oyo State’s notoriously violent chapter of National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). Human Rights Watch interviewed several union members who had been shot and wounded during fighting between the Union’s rival factions during the first week of February 2007.

On February 3, heavily armed NURTW factions loyal to Governor Ladoja and Adedibu’s then political protégé Deputy Governor Christopher Alao-Aala, attacked one another when Akala was awarded the PDP gubernatorial nomination at a ceremony held in the Ondo State town of Akure. At least four people were killed. Several men alleged to have participated in the fighting were arrested but no one has been charged in connection with organizing the violence or arming the groups who participated in it. The head of the pro-Adedibu faction of NURTW has been charged with terrorism by the federal court in Abuja but the case is yet to be decided.

In Anambra State, according to numerous witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including some gang members themselves, the campaign of

PDP gubernatorial candidate Andy Uba has paid large sums of money to “mobilize” and arm a youth militia in the service of the campaign, primarily members of the Black Axe cult group. During one week in March, seven people were killed in a series of tit-for-tat assassinations between members of the Black Axe employed by the Uba campaign and youth adhering to rival cult groups. While representatives of Uba’s campaign denied this, well placed police and government sources unanimously confirmed these facts.

Clashes between factions in support of rival parties have taken place and demonstrate the uses for which youth “mobilization” is intended. On March 10, in Abeokuta, Ogun State 15 people were reportedly injured in clashes between armed PDP and ANPP factions. The State commissioner of police issued a statement ascribing the responsibility for the violence to youth “operating under the aegis of politician”. On March 18, the murder of a prominent local PDP youth leader sparked clashes between AC and PDP supporters that reportedly left at least ten people dead and many others injured across ten different villages in Benue State.

In the related development political violence also take other dimension such as inter-ethnic/religion crisis. In the first half of 2004, hundreds of people were killed in inter-communal fighting between Muslims and Christians in and around the town of Yelwa and southern part of Plateau state, North Central, bringing the total number of victims of the violence in Plateau state since 2001 to between 2,000 and 3,000. The violence reached a peak between February and May 2004 in the area around the towns of Yelwa and Shendam.

There were many attacks during this period, but two stands out in terms of their scale, the number of victims and the level of preparation and organization. On February 24, 2004, armed Muslims killed more than seventy-five Christians in Yelwa; at least forty-eight of them were killed inside a church compound. Then on May 2 and 3, large numbers of well-armed Christians surrounded the town of Yelwa and killed around seven hundred Muslims. Yelwa and many surrounding villages suffered massive destruction, and tens of thousands of people were displaced.

One week later, on May 11 and 12, Muslims in the northern city of Kano- several hundred kilometers away from Plateau state took revenge for Yelwa attack and turned against Christian residents of Kano, killing more than two hundred. A once localized dispute in a specific part of Plateau state had escalated into a religious conflict of national dimensions. Most of the victims

of violence in Plateau and Kano states were unarmed men, women and children who were targeted simply because of their religion.

During the 2003 elections, political violence was particularly prevalent in the Niger Delta region. The poverty, corruption and presence of arms and gangs make this region very volatile. Politicians reportedly use armed groups to encourage political violence. In November and December 2006, a number of primary elections were postponed in the region as a direct consequence of the violence. There is growing fear that violence will continue to escalate in the region which already experienced pervasive rights abuses.

There were also reports of hostages being held for ransom in order to raise funds for political campaigns. According to stakeholder Democracy Network, Stakeholder Democracy News (2007), an NGO that monitors violence in the Niger Delta has this to say:

The 2007 elections and control of territory ahead of the elections represent a converging set of interests for politicians, militants, and gangs... some gangs are acting directly on behalf of political aspirants solely for financial gain and other groups are seeking to control territory on the prospect of negotiating financial gain with political aspirants.

Armed groups in the Niger Delta were reported to have forged linked with politicians ahead of the April 2007 elections. For example, in August 2006 at least 12 people- group members and bystanders were killed during clashes between armed groups linked with two politicians from Rivers State. The state security service, Nigeria's intelligence agency, arrested both politicians, but they were released without charge after several weeks in detention and resumed their posts in government. The police failed to take effective steps to investigate and prosecute the members of the armed groups. The violence between these groups continued and serious clash took place in February and March 2007, resulting in many wounded and numerous houses destroyed:

In recent years, many leading political figures have been assassinated. Prosecutions have rare and convictions almost non-existent... The de facto impunity enjoyed for these crimes risks undermining Nigerian Democracy; and the 2007 election year threatens many more killings unless impunity is ended(cf Stakeholder Democracy Network News, 2007)

In March 2007, Stakeholder Democracy Network News, furthered reported on torture, reiterated the conclusion of the extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions:

There is no single entry point for reformers of the dismally inadequate Nigerian criminal justice system. Virtually every component part of the system functions badly. The result is a vicious circle in which each group contributing to the problem (police officers, politicians, and the judiciary) is content to blame the other.

Moreover, the role of politicians,- both candidates and those holding political office—instigating, encouraging or perpetuating election- related violence in Nigeria is widely acknowledged by officials, civil society organizations and the media. In August 2006, the then Inspector General of Police stated that politicians were recruiting students to engage in the political violence. In the same month, the Ebonyi State commissioner of police was reported to have identified political candidates when according to the police intelligence, had started to train “thugs” – armed supporters or gangs in preparation for elections. Similar statements made by police and other security officials in several Nigerian states about the role of politicians in instigating and encouraging political violence have been reported in the media.

However, despite these verbal acknowledgements and warnings by various officials, little effective action has been taken by the government or law enforcement authorities to curb political killings/ violence. The Nigerian police widely acknowledged to be subject to political violence is frequently ignored. According to NGOs monitoring police actions, the police frequently do not investigate effectively, and fail to ensure that persecutions are brought against people suspected of carrying out acts of political violence unless and until they receive political authorization; to do so .When the police arrest people during violent clashes, there is unofficial screening process that often results in the police releasing those linked to the ruling party or to powerful state or local political figures. Thus, it behooves us to say that, an x-ray of the happenings in this country, especially as it concerns the lives of Nigerians, has revealed a trend which the late Pontiff John Paul 11 termed “the enthronement of a culture of death” Good Shepherd (June 26-July 2, 2011:16).

In July 2009, a radical Islamic sect known as Jama’atuAlv-SunnatiWal Jihad, popularly known as the Boko Haram attacked government buildings across the north of Nigeria. After a week of intense fighting, an estimating 700

people were killed and the uprising was eventually put down. But attacks and killing continue as Boko Haram pursues its aim of enforcing Sharia law more ruthlessly across the north. The group is also thought to be behind a series of bombings in the wake of the re-election of Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the south.

June 16, 2011 the militant sect detonated a bomb in the Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja where about 77 vehicles were burnt. The attack on the Police Headquarters came barely after the then Inspector-General of Police, IGP, Hafiz Ringim returned from a duty tour of Maiduguri where the sect had just carried out some terror campaign and stated he would soon smoke them out. The sect followed up that attack with the bombing on August 26 of the United Nations House, also in Abuja where several lives and properties were lost, a place Shekau described as a “forum of all the global evil,” Thisday, (September 19, 2011). Since then, Boko Haram has either claimed responsibility for or has been credited with most terror activities in the north of the country. Its operations have also grown in scale and sophistication.

Indeed if Karl Maier’s political biography of Nigeria, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis* (2000), is dismissed as the cynicism of a foreigner, renown Nigeria novelist, Chinua Achebe, apart from decrying the leadership problematic of the Nigerian State some decades back notes that “Nigerian example of a country that has fallen; it has collapsed (Achebe, 1983:1 cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012:97).

However, the sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammad Sa-ad Abubakar III reacts thus:

*Most of the crisis in Nigeria are not religious, but are politically motivated. He is very concerned about politicians using religion for their own motives. It is the politicians who are the ones who arm them. The Politicians arm these people, they give money*Daily Trust (June 15, 2011:43).

Insecurity is the greatest challenge facing the administration of President Buhari. Since the return to democracy in 1999, traditional security threats such as violent conflicts, militancy, armed robbery and kidnapping have assumed worrisome dimensions in Nigeria. Evolving threats such as insurgency and terrorism have further complicated the situation. The challenges of the Nigerian federalism have assumed new dimensions. Today, more than before

now, there are more internal forces that seek for the re-conceptualization of the Nigerian federalism. The country witnessed (and it is still experiencing) fast spreading armed conflicts and other threats to internal security. The activities and operations of Islamic terrorist groups, the Boko Haram in the North-East, Nigeria and neighbouring countries, O'dua Peoples' Congress in the South-West, Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra in the South-East, Herdsmen/Farmers Clash in the North-Central Zones as well as the activities of the militant youths in the Niger Delta, are causes of concern, coupled with the problem of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.

Sadly, Nigeria has repeatedly witnessed divisive elections, leading to massive destruction and internal displacement, SBM Intelligence, an independent research firm, stated that 233 people were killed in 67 incidents between October 2018- when electioneering commenced –and the eve of the presidential poll. A collation of civil society organizations added that nearly 40 people lost their lives on Election Day itself. There is just too much bloodshed, *The Authority Daily* (July 31, 2019:1-2).

To date, the mayhem that emanated from the 2011 presidential election still brings on goose pimples of the bloodshed that it engendered. The Human Rights Watch estimated that 800 people were slaughtered across 12 Northern states in the short period that followed the election. Erroneously, Muslim youths targeted Christians, killing them and burning down their churches and houses. During that scary episode, 10 National Youths Service Corps members, who served as ad hoc INEC staff, were murdered by irate youths who were protesting the electoral defeat of Buhari, their preferred candidate. Two of the corps members were raped before being hacked to death, while four Christian's students and a lecturer were slaughtered at the NuhuBamali Polytechnic, Zaria. It is a moot point whether there was any consequence for the perpetrators of those dastardly acts, *the Punch* (March 10, 2019:16).

The militarization of the country's electoral process is a troubling one as this is not just about the presence military officials, but the actions our intelligence agencies, the use of the military by the political class and the partisanship and non-recourse to rules of engagement of our armed forces.

President Buhari, speaking after receiving his certificate of return from INEC chairman, Prof. Mahmood Yakubu said: *"Election is not war, and should never be seen as do or die affair. I pray that we all accept this democratic approach to elections, however contentious"*,

“Further expressed sadness at what he described as “the grievous loss of lives during the election” *Blueprint (February 28, 2019:24)*.

The Executive Director, Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (NCSSR), Clement Nwankwo was apt to states *unequivocally: that elections are for citizens to democratically exercise their right to choose their government and as such, no election should cost lives and notes with profound sadness the electoral related violence that has led to the deaths of many Nigerians in this electoral cycle including Hon. Temitope Olatoye (a.k.a Sugar) of Oyo State.*

He frowned at *the negative aspect of 2019 general elections as recorded by the Situation Room, , was excessive deployment of the military that interfered with electoral process, ThisDay, (March 10, 2019:9).*

The Executive Director, (CDD) I. Hassan also reacts thus: there was clear case of where party agents and thugs coerced and intimidated voters to vote for their candidates. That in spite of several attempts to entrench peacefully electoral democracy in Nigeria, elections has been marred by upsurge of violence. That the level of impunity at which this gruesome act was persecuted by hoodlums at the ballot box and the inability of security agents to respond adequately and hold perpetrators accountable were sources of concern, Leadership, (March 24, 2019:5).

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) in its 2019 general election report that at least 150 deaths contrary to Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room. The Coalition Observer group disclosed at its final report on the 2019 general election in Abuja that a total of 626 persons were killed across Nigeria in the six months between the start of election campaign in October 2018, and the final election in March 2019 compared to the 106 killed in 2015 general elections. According to the report, North-West region recorded the highest number with 172 killed during the elections, while the North-East followed with 146 fatalities. Also, the report revealed that the South-South and North-Central had 120 and 111 fatalities while 63 people in the South-West and 14 were killed in the South-East. These deaths, by any standard, are certainly too many for a single election or even a series of elections for that matter. That they happened in a single election is a great indictment of our fractured political elite that encourage such acts desperation, do or die politics and unbridled contestation for power. Our collective sense of humanity is unconscionably battered while our sensibility is viciously shattered *The Authority Daily (July 31, 2019:1-2).*

Prof. Adele Jinadu, a well-known political theorist, situates his analysis in a theory of the African state, conceived not only as a rentier state, but which is also a location of violent political competition and ethnic fractions of political elite to acquire political power for primitive accumulation and economic power. With specific reference to the 2019 general elections, Jinadu argues that while the 2015 elections met the electoral integrity test, that of 2019 would appear to be another 'degeneration of electoral outcomes' in Nigeria's electoral history. He buttresses his argument by reference to the subsisting political legacy of democratic backsliding, as well as surges of violent electoral conflicts, marking what he called 'a new low point in Nigeria's electoral history, not seen since the 1965 elections and the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election' *The Punch* (June 28, 2019:22).

In developed countries or advanced democracies, no such thing can happen by the hands of political opponents or even governments in power, otherwise the incumbent executive heads would be charged with crime against humanity at International Criminal Court (ICC). It is only a terrorists' attack, sans a war, that can cause such huge number of human fatalities in those climes. This is the reason the International community must note the nationwide tragic electoral process that have produced winners and losers at our national level of governance.

Electoral violence promotes jungle justice and discourages eligible voters from voting, making their level of participation to be greatly inhibited. The emergence of candidates becomes questionable when the political turf is left for hooligans and trouble-makers. According to Daily Trust Editorial (February 28, 2019:44) this invariably affects the quality of leadership that would emerge at the end of the day. Good governance is only possible when truly democratically-elected representatives are given daunting state responsibilities. Bad leadership has been the lot of Nigeria, as many citizens continue to wallow in abject poverty and suffer in the midst of plenty, despite the nation's rich endowments. National security is seriously being threatened by the prevailing acts of religious extremism, official brigandage and terrorism.

The roles of local and international elections observers are greatly whittle-down whenever violence is unleashed, thus creating credibility and integrity problems for elections outcomes. This should not be.

Way Forward

Since the activities and behaviour of our political elites and actors is seen to be capable of thwarting democracy and efforts at consolidating it, serious steps should be taken to stop the trend that has already dressed Nigeria's political climate in flowing murderous robe.

- There is need for attitudinal change on why people should play decent politics, if we are ever going to get it right as a nation and get many decent people into politics, as obtainable in saner climes.
- Political parties and contestants should always realise that the ultimate decision of the people is what matters
- Politicians should desist from lording their wills over electorate
- Law enforcement agencies should be more proactive in nipping in the bud, potential crises that may snowball into electoral violence.
- The practice of signing peace accord by party contestants should not be limited to presidential candidates alone but it should be extended to other contestants, to get their commitments to shun violence and be enshrined in the constitution.
- Screening of political office seekers should be returned to INEC and the security agents to ensure that the highest bidder syndrome in the parties is eliminated to give room for the emergence of credible candidates for the election.
- In addition, political parties and candidates should refrain from invoking religion, ethnicity or "indigene" status to build political support that will erode opponents
- Drivers unions that are usually patronized as thugs and miscreants by politicians should resist such illegality. The union members are usually used as kingpins and miscreants, to unleash trouble on the people. It is common knowledge that politicians often recruit, pay and arm them to victimize people and achieve their selfish or personal agenda. Innocent victims of violence should be adequately rehabilitated and compensated.
- Political parties and candidates should discourage the use of violence by party supporters, but publicize opposition to violence and assist the authorities in investigating any acts of political violence that occur. Political parties should also refrain from making unfounded accusations against political opponents when political associates are killed or attacked. Rather, they should initiate investigations and party disciplinary action; as

appropriate, in addition to cooperation with criminal investigations' department when party members are accused of violence.

- President Muhammadu Buhari speaking in Katsina recently said he would like to leave a legacy of free, fair and credible elections in the country. This is commendable. However, the President should start by ensuring the prosecution of those who allegedly killed 626 Nigerians and destroyed properties in order to have electoral advantage over their opponents in the 2019 general elections.
- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) must wake up to the responsibility of educating the youths and their parents on the dangers of indulging in violence during political activities. The police and other law enforcement agencies should also ensure that the youth groups did not make themselves willing tools in the hands of unscrupulous politicians. That the acts persist is evidence that no lessons have been learnt from past deeds and this explains why the same scenario keeps repeating itself.
- For future elections, parties and candidates should strengthen (or abide more closely by) constitutional provisions to create more transparent methods of reporting primary results.
- Political parties should allow internal democracy to flourish and caution their members against hate speech. More importantly, there is need to make political offices less attractive, to discourage the current penchant for do or die politics, god-fatherism and neo-patrimonialism. Sponsors and those caught engaging in electoral violence should be severely punished in line with the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). Being a civil offence, executive immunity does not cover election petitions and electoral offences, as per the case of *Turaki v. Dalhaltu* (2003) 38 WRN 54 at 168, hence no one should be shielded from prosecution.
- To ensure that justice is done and seen to have been done, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), has requested the Nigerian government to immediately refer to the International Criminal Court (ICC), pursuant to article 13 of the Rome Statute, to which Nigeria is a state party and that all cases of election-related violence, intimidation and killings between 1999 and 2019, are initiated for proper investigation and prosecution.
- There is a need for INEC to go back to the drawing board and re-evaluate their performance in the 2019 polls:
 20. Put all necessary machineries in place to correct the identified lapses

21. INEC should endeavour to eradicate the growing culture of inconclusive elections,
22. There is also a need for a political will towards ensuring peaceful, transparent election
23. The authorities concerned to improve voter education for the benefit of the electorate on their expectations, while we pray that future elections would have less military interference,
24. The youths should also resist the temptation of serving as political thugs desperate and power-hungry politicians during elections. They should rather identify ways to grab leadership and put the nation back on track of socio-economic development and growth.
25. Above all, the progress we envision for our electoral system will remain elusive if necessary and progressive amendments are not carried out on the Electoral Act. Now is the time to act. A stitch in time, they say, saves nine.

Conclusion

The paper has brought to the fore many incidences of politically motivated killings/ violence, assassination, kidnapping, and repression that have occurred in Nigeria between 1999 and 2019. Power politics stands out as the major cause of political killings/ violence. Several violent acts were perpetrated to win and maintain political power. These incidences seriously jolted the peaceful and harmonious co-existence among the people of the country. The continued perpetration of political killings/ violence signal grave danger for the future of the Nigerian nation and concerted efforts are required by all stakeholders to stem the ugly tide.

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**REGIONAL AGITATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL
INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA:
POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING AS A PANACEA**

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Abstract

There has been a clamour for self-determination and disintegration of Nigeria from different regions. The political system has been under serious political tension. The south-south (Niger Delta agitation), the south-west calling for the republic of Oduduwa, the south-east (IPOB) demanding for actualization of Biafran state as well as the Northerners (Arewa Consultative forum) issuing quit notice to the southerners among others. The agitations have remained a reoccurring decimal threatening the existence of the polity. It is against this backdrop that this study interrogates the remote causes of the recent crisis emanating from agitations from different regions of the country as well as situating why and how restructuring remains a lasting panacea to the lingering crisis threatening the unity of Nigeria. It adopted secondary data which were presented in textual form. Thus, descriptive and deductive logic were used as method of data analysis. To that extent, the theory of Conflict Transformation was adopted as a framework of analysis. However, the study argued that political demands, lop-sidedness in revenue allocation, faulty federalism, marginalisation among others were the remote causes of regional agitations in Nigeria. By and large, the study recommends that political restructuring/true federalism remains the only panacea to save Nigeria and Nigerians from this time bomb waiting to explode in the near future.

Key words: Fiscal Federalism, Marginalisation, National Integration, Regional Agitation and Restructuring.

Introduction

The attempt to keep Nigeria as one and indivisible country code named “project Nigeria” which started through the amalgamation principle under British colonial rule in 1914 has been under serious threats of collapsing since 1966 till date. Almost every party to the union at one time or the other believes they are tired and do not want to continue with the union anymore. Whenever one is agitating for a breakup of the union, others are always of the opinion that the union must be sustained at all cost, no matter how real the reason for the agitation is. It is this agitations and counter agitation that has kept Nigeria and Nigerians together but not united. This has made our unity a marriage of strange bed fellows. Even in marriage, consents of parties to be united are very important in the establishment of the union. But in the issue of Nigeria, the architect who design Nigeria’s union as a single nation did not sort for the consents of the federated unions especially on whether they would like to be members of a single nation and central government before amalgamating them under single national union that has shortly after independence till date continue to create tension upon tension to the unity of the polity. Amalgamating the various units without their consents under a single nation and central government was a political blunder and this has been a serious barrier for the progress and smooth running of project Nigeria. (Adetoye, 2016).

Recently, there has been a pattern of agitations in Nigeria which the writer referred to as Regional Agitation though it is not entirely new as a concept but more inclusive and repetitive presently. Among these recent regional agitations include; Niger Delta Avengers, the Republic of Oduduwa, Arewa Consultative Forum, the Indigenous People of Biafra, Boko Haram agitation as well as the most recent Herdsmen crisis ravaging the country. These appear to be regional arsenal/weapons for the demand of the share of the national cake in Nigeria. These can be described as a time bomb waiting for its explosion. Quite obvious that a toad does not run in vain in the noon, either it is after something or that something is after it. Therefore, the system of government we currently operate puts too much powers at the hands of our leaders, thereby making them become emperors, and this has led to leadership bias arising from prebendalism, nepotism, corruption, marginalization, underdevelopment. There is therefore an urgent need to dilute theses powers

from not just the Presidency but also from the state governors and for the interest of the local people. Moreover, the most recent upsurge in the agitation for a separate Biafran State calls for an inquiry to understand why the demand has persisted, close to 50 years after the end of the Nigerian civil war (Nnoli, 1980); the consequences as well as the lasting solution to the said agitations from across the regions of the country.

Thus, the calls for negotiations on the terms of national unity are dishonesty-driven in the sense that when our ethnic leaders felt that they are sidelined in the scheme of things as regards to their access to “national cake” they will instigate their people for agitation that hinges on the unity of the country either in the areas of resource control, restructuring, or self-actualization. The distrust and hostility against the Nigeria Government is largely driven by perceptions of elite corruption with impunity. It is against this backdrop that the paper interrogates the remote and immediate causes of the recent regional agitations in Nigeria which has seriously affected the unity and threatened the continued existence of this country as one united nation and to equally suggest how restructuring should be adopted to save Nigeria and Nigerians from this time bomb waiting to explode at any moment.

Conceptual Clarifications

National Integration

This implies a collective effort to bring seemingly loosely-structured ethnic societies into the federation. It can also be seen as efforts at engendering centripetality within a federation. The integration crisis facing Nigeria is manifest in the minority issues, religious strife, ethnic politics, resource control, youth restiveness and the call for a sovereign national conference (Ifeanachi & Nwangwu, 2009). This implies that integration promotes unity which encourages smooth interaction among the members of the given society based on certain established principles of fairness. As a follow up, this relates to a situation where territorial divisions within a polity gradually yield ground to cordial interactions of its members owing to the integrative mechanisms established.

Therefore, national integration is an important and serious aspect of nation building which must be pursued with vigour and purposeful endeavour, because failure to achieve this especially in a multi-ethno-religious cum

cultural diverse country like Nigeria has grave consequences. This is the reason, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu sees it also as 'active nation-building' which means "forging out a nation out of our diverse ethnic groups." He also contends that the failure to achieve this in respect of Nigeria is that: "Today, the result is that tribalism and ethnicity has become a potent source of friction, rather than diminish in the face of an emergent, virile and modern nation" (Odumegwu-Ojukwu, 1989, p.174).

From various views and conceptualizations of national integration by different scholars, it is obvious that there are many meanings of the subject matter even though some of them have some elements of similarity. But still, we would like, to see the concept of national integration from the point of view that it is a situation whereby the members of a multifarious political entity like Nigerian state can see themselves as one, treat one another fairly and work together cooperatively and freely agree to and manage their differences peacefully in the overall interest of the nation. In this way, unity, fair treatment, cooperation, consensus, and peaceful conflict-resolution become essential components of loyalty to the nation.

Moreover, national integration is actually a means leading to political unity and sentiments of loyalty toward a central political authority and institution by people belonging to different social groups or political units. Ernest (1991) has argued that "national integration is a process whereby political actors in distinct national setting are persuaded to shift their loyalty specification and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation state. The implication from the above implied that our quest of national integration entails bringing people of different background to become as one family for the progress and development of the state.

Series of Regional Agitations and the Heating up of the Polity

There has been a series of agitations arising from different regions of Nigeria. From Biafra to Niger Delta to Oduduwa Republic to Arewa Consultative Forum form the Northern part of the country. Agitations around Biafra have drummed out other separatist agitations, giving the wrong impression that Biafra is the only separatist threat in the country. There is separatist agitation in virtually every area in the country – underlying the fact that the foundation for Nigeria's nationhood remains on shaky ground. Among the Yoruba, for instance, echoes of separatism come in different forms

– from a direct call for Oduduwa Republic to those championing a Sovereign National Conference to decide if the federating units of the country still want to continue to live together, and, if so, under what arrangements. In the north, there are intermittent demands for Arewa Republic, while some talk of the “north” as if it is “a country within a country.” In the Niger Delta, apart from the demand for Niger Delta Republic, shades of separatism are embedded in the demands for “resource control” by regional activists. In essence, there is a fairly generalized feeling of alienation and dissatisfaction among the various constituents of the Nigerian federation, a situation that has also deepened mistrust and incentivized regional agitations. However, because there has never been a referendum in any of the areas agitating for separation, it is difficult to know whether the leaders of the various separatist groups actually reflect the wishes of the people of those areas or whether the agitations are mere masks for pursuing other agendas.

The regional agitations took a new turn on June 6, 2017 when a group of northern youths under the aegis of Coalition of Arewa Youths gave the Igbos until October 1, 2017 to leave the 19 northern states in what they called The Kaduna Declaration. They also said an inventory of assets owned in the north by the Igbos would be taken and confiscated at the expiration of the ultimatum. The so-called Kaduna Declaration further heightened the tensions and the social distance among Nigerians (Adibe, 2017). Consequently, in a press conference held at Arewa House Kaduna on Tuesday, the representative of the coalition, Alhaji Abdulaziz Suleiman of the Northern Emancipation Network said all Northern civil society and pressure groups are by this declaration mandated to mobilize for sustained and coordinated campaigns at their respective states (Muhammad, 2017).

Similarly, the leader of the Yoruba Liberation Command (YOLICOM), George Akinola in an interview with Telegraph speaks about the various agitations in the country and heavy lop-sidedness in President Muhammadu Buhari’s appointments that has fueled the regional crisis. Reacting to the question posed to him on why they agitate, the YOLICOM leader stated thus:

There is heavy lop-sidedness in Nigeria. To demonstrate, over 90 per cent of revenue in the country is generated by the South-South and South-West but over 60 per cent is spent in the North. It will not be allowed to continue. Looking at the local government areas, in 1985 Kano State had about 24 local government areas then and Lagos had about 18 or 20 LGAs but 20 years after Kano has been

divided into three: Kano, Katsina and Jigawa with each of them having about 30 LGAs. Kano alone has 44 local governments. In all close to 100 local governments have been created out of the old Kano State, yet Lagos State still has 20 LGAs until Bola Tinubu came and fought for more LGAs which were refused by the Federal Government. So, we are saying that this kind of lopsidedness cannot continue (Bisi, 2017).

Arguing further on the nature of lopsided development in the country, he also added that where the money is being generated from is not where it is being expended in; lopsided development in the sense that monkey is working and baboon is doing the chopping to use that cliché; lopsided development in the sense that Lagos for instance is generating over 55 per cent of Value Added Tax but the amount which accrues to it is only eight per cent of VAT; lopsided development because all the ports, border posts at Seem, Idi Iroko the Nigerian Customs Service and all the sources of taxes are from the South-West. Most of these incomes are second to oil. Over 75 per cent of all these incomes are generated in the South-West but the amount of expenditure accrued the South-West or money from the federation account is less than 10 per cent. That kind of development justifiable. There is no way you can be robbing Peter to pay Paul and you expect Peter to be happy. The same thing goes for the South-South. Over 70 per cent of oil generated is from the South-South but they are being given only 13 per cent back. But Kano State generates only two per cent VAT that is taken from commodities like alcohol, beer and stuff like that that are banned in the north, but it is given almost the same and sometimes even more revenue than the states generating more than 50 per cent VAT.

On the other hand, The South-South is one of the six geo- political zones in Nigeria and of course the region that produces oil wealth of the country. The minorities from these areas complained of marginalisation and infrastructural development as well as underdevelopment and environmental degradation. With the restoration of democratic order in 1999 and the unresolved developmental problems of the Niger Delta region, there has been a protest for the institutionalization of resource control and the practice of true federalism. At the 2005 National Political Reform Conference, the South-South demanded for an upward review of the current 13% derivation as basis

for distribution of revenue to 25% in the first instance which was expected to be increased to 50% after five years and eventually 100% at some time in the future (Odubajo, 2011). The North strongly opposed the demands and argued that much has been conceded to the region and as a result, the delegates from the region (South-South) staged a walk out of the conference. However, the 2005 conference recommended an increase in derivation to 17% in the interim pending the outcome of expert commission. Similarly, the 2014 conference recommended that government should set-up a technical committee to determine the appropriate percentage on derivation and other issues such as special intervention funds and issues of reconstruction and rehabilitation of areas ravaged by insurgency (Adeosun, Ismail & Zengeni, 2017).

Similarly, the Southeast has suffered undue marginalisation in so many ways particularly in the state creation structure of Nigeria. Under the present 36 states structure, which ought to give each zone six states apiece, only the Southeast has five and the Northwest seven. “In the arbitrary distribution of the nation’s 774 local governments, the Southeast has the least. The entire North has 419 local governments, while the South as a whole has 355. The zonal distribution of local government is as follows: Northwest 186; Northcentral 115; Northeast 112; Southwest 137; South-South 123; and Southeast 95. Why was the Southeast given 95 when other zones got over 100? Furthermore, since the appointment of ministers, recruitment into the civil service and security agencies and admission into unity schools, federal higher institutions and revenue sharing is based on states and local governments; the Southeast has been overtly marginalised due to having the least number of states and local governments. How many Police Commissioners and Military Commanders are from the zone?” (Leke, 2016). Consequently, the present administration’s lop-sidedness in the appointment of ministers and security heads has equally added more salt to the injury.

Theoretical Framework

Conflict transformation theory was adopted in the analysis of “Regional Agitation and the Problem of National Integration in Nigeria.” The theory offers a framework to discuss not only the cause(s) of regional agitations in Nigeria but also the appropriate mechanisms for changing the complex conflict dynamics of the Nigeria socio-political and economic structure. Using this approach, it is imperative to perceive the regional

agitations going on in Nigeria as being wedged in the middle of a major conceptual rift: a historical legacy of ethno-religious sentiments mixed with structural violence that has spurred enormous rage, protests, and violence, and the need for order in light of contemporary realities, especially the recent nationwide calls for fundamental restructuring of the country's system and the potential impact of all these regional agitations with its violence antecedents on Nigeria's economic and political stability. For the country to experience a long-standing peace, it must anticipate and engage the host of forces, including coercive structural fissures that gave rise to the agitations in the first place.

Conflict transformation theory is relatively new in the field of peace building. However, the core of the theory draws on many of the familiar concepts of conflict management and conflict resolution. Because of its ideological linkage to these, conflict transformation as a theory, is not entirely seen as a new approach but as a re-conceptualization of the field to make it more relevant to contemporary conflict situations (Miall, 2004). This re-conceptualization is imperative due to changes in the nature of contemporary conflicts. For example, most contemporary conflicts occur within national boundaries impelled asymmetrically by structural conditions, including inequities of power and resource appropriation and distribution. Also, as Smith (2004) observes, many contemporary conflicts are protracted and marked by sporadic periods of violence and peace. In this case, conflict occurs in waves – rising precipitously until some accommodation is reached and then falling off dramatically (almost to the point that there is a marked absence of conflict) and then rising again. Protracted conflicts not only upset social equilibriums but also ultimately distort society, creating complex emergencies.

The conflict transformation approach embodies three distinct theoretical motions: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Conflict management has been defined as the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict... addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of differences (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).

For theorists and practitioners working within this tradition, violent conflicts result from differences in values and interests embedded within the

structure of society. Because these differences are entrenched within macro and micro social structures—historical experiences, institutional relationships, resource appropriation and distribution, existing power coalitions, racism/ethnicity/tribalism, egos, religious differences and so on—they cannot be eradicated. The best society can do is to manage the conflict and prevent it from escalating in such a way that it potentially disrupts the smooth running of society. The goal of conflict management, therefore, is to achieve political settlements leveraging the resources of certain key actors that are powerful enough to exert pressure on the conflicting parties to settle or to guide the inevitable conflict into appropriate channels.

Every region or ethnic group in Nigeria has its different version of the type of restructuring they clamour for and as such this has made it impossible for the country to achieve any meaningful structural, political and economic change that will bring about all round developmental change the country needs. Thus, conflict transformation theory becomes apt because it extends conflict management and conflict resolution theories beyond the mere reframing of positions and the identification of positive outcomes to include concern with creating a new system, process, or approach that consolidates and leverages the gains from ending a conflict into building peace. Conflict transformation theory is defined by Lederach (2003) as envisioning and responding to “the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships”. It investigates the nature of the conflicting parties, including their operational structures, historical experiences, and relationships that extend conflicts beyond specific sites. According to Miall (2004), it is a “process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.” By interrogating and affecting these domains (i.e., both episodes of conflict such as the actual fighting and the epicenter of conflict such as the web of relational patterns, including the history of lived episodes from which new episodes of conflict emerge), conflicts may be transformed from their virulent, destructive form to situations amenable to all conflicting parties.

By and large, it becomes apt to engage conflict transformation theory to evaluate the regional agitations in Nigeria in order to determine whether it

is able to transcend the demands for restructuring and national integration which is at the epicenter or the core of the conflict.

Causes of Regional Agitations

Political Demands

The Nigeria socio-political formation is in such a way that ethno-religious and socio-political agitations and conflicts is inevitable unless a fundamental restructuring is undertaken. As a multi-ethnic nation, with diverse religious and cultural background the political system is expected to cope with and control both human and natural resources effectively, but in contrast this diversity becomes the source of regional agitations and political violence. The issue of regional violence have tended to occur constantly in Nigeria since during the period of fourth republic 1999 where organized ethnic-based actions with their ethnic and regional agenda escalate into series of violent conflict (Edlyne, 2002). Studying regional agitation in Nigeria, one has to consider the following questions: Does the concept of ethnicity be regarded as a means for the political elites to defend their political interest? Or is it coming from the socio-political configuration of the country a closer look into the political issues in the country will show that both phenomena are matters affecting national integration process of the county Nigeria.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a population of over 130 million people, it consists of multi-ethnic groups, religious diversities, and also a multicultural society. Historically, the country can be traced to pre-colonial times when there were “elaborate systems of governance, which varied in scale and complexity depending on their geographical environment, available military technology, economic, spiritual and moral force.” (Political Bureau Report, 1987).

Thus, political divisions based on ethnic identities are, it can be argued, qualitatively different from those based on individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics or adopted ideology. The ethnic and religious composition of Nigeria and its manipulation by the political elite has posed a lot of challenges to governance and national integration in Nigeria. This has been aggravated by the failure of the state to perform its core duties of maintaining law and order, justice and providing social services to the people. For instance, the failure of the state has led to the emergence of ethnic militias in several parts of the country such as the Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), MEND, MOSOP,

MASSOB, IPOB, Arewa Consultative Forum, Middle Belt Forum and the emergence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

Lop-sidedness in Revenue Allocation

Revenue allocation is a controversial issue in a federation because of the dispute over the suitable formula and basis of distribution among the constituent units. Ugoh, Ukpere, and Ashiwhobel (2012) contend that in most federating states; the constituent units always have disputes with the general government over the financial issue and this issue bordered on securing enough resources to discharge its constitutional assigned functions. Thus, Ikeji, (2011) define revenue allocation as the allotment of generally collected revenue among various levels government in the federation to reflect the structure of fiscal federalism. Thus, revenue allocation is the sharing of revenue accruing to the government of a federation between or among different tiers of government.

Faulty Federalism

Federalism is defined as a political arrangement in which there is a constitutional division of powers between the central government and the component units, each having autonomous power on certain matters on which it is not subordinate to the other (Wheare, 1967). Similarly, Friedrich (1968) defines federalism as a process whereby the central and regional governments are limited to their spheres and within those spheres should be independent of the other.

Awotayo, Sakiru, Ilelah, and Olutokunbo (2013) reaffirmed the defectiveness of Nigerian federalism. They contended that the component units have been reduced to unviable units of development while the central government has in its control huge amount of resources in excess of what she requires. Similarly, Aaron (2015) noted that several years of uninterrupted military rule left a legacy of centrist tendencies intrinsic in the central command system of military organisation. Moreover, the power of the central government has been enhanced by its seizure of oil resources rights thereby reducing the ability of the federating units to engage in wealth-generating activities. Thus, Nigerian federalism has been federal in name and not in practice and this is because too many powers are vested in the central

government and this is against the tenets of federal practice, hence the reason for the regional agitations.

Elites Interests

The political behaviour of Nigerian elites draws its core values from the legacies of the colonial state whose political culture was embedded in traditions of political totalitarianism. At the time of independence, Nigerian elites were less interested in the development values of modern democracy but more focused on promoting the paraphernalia of liberal democracy such as written constitution, independence of the legislature, multi-parties, separation of power and rule of law (Ladan-Baki & Enwere, 2017). This misapplication of democratic values stimulated conflict of interests and struggle for power, prestige and supremacy among Nigerian political elites. The Nigerian political environment, therefore, became a theatre of conflict for proxy interests of power seekers which culminated in the collapse of democracy as seen in the 1962 crisis in Nigeria. The crisis was tacitly ignited by multi-sum struggle for power and prestige between different political elites from different regions of the country then. This conflict of interests widened to unprecedented proportion resulting in hot fighting within the legislative chambers and many legislators were injured and the mace which is the symbol of parliamentary authority was broken. The competing nature of elite struggle for power is what Claude Ake described as the ‘democratization of disempowerment’ : a process whereby the political conditions in Nigeria allow for the rotation of self-interested political elites of different parties and regions over time, while the majority of the population remains disempowered from the political processes and benefits. This process tends to represent the interests of political elites in their struggle for power as revealed in the inauguration of the National Assembly on June 9, 2015.

The inauguration of the 8th National Assembly was characterized by intra elite conflict and struggle for power. This was as a result of the inability of the ruling All Progressive Congress party (APC) to adopt the zoning option, where strategic leadership positions were allocated to all the geopolitical zones to reduce the negative strife or quest for hegemony. But rather the party leadership resorted to hand-picking of legislative officers, which turned the National Assembly into a battlefield for proxy wars between the Yoruba elites

and the Hausa/Fulani elites for the control of the power structure of the parliament. Such covert conflict between the two ethnic power blocs provided the framework for the emergence of new players in the elite power game. This triggered several other political tensions and agitations in Nigeria including the renewed regional agitations, and calls for restructuring which also has elite inducement and support.

Marginalisation

The history of the marginalisation of the Southeast started with Gen. Yakubu Gowon's creation of 12 states, purposely to weaken Ojukwu's resistance to his regime in 1967, prior to the declaration of Biafra and the commencement of the Nigerian Civil War. Though Gowon's 12-states structure had a sense of equity between the North and South of Nigeria at six states per zone, it denied the Southeast majority states in the defunct Eastern Region as was the case for the Hausa and the Yoruba in the Northern and Western Regions respectively. When Gen. Murtala Muhammed split the country into 19 states in 1976, the East Central State became two states of Anambra and Imo. Thus, Muhammed gave the Southeast one out of the seven states he created. It was Gen. Ibrahim Babangida that rose to address the Southeast marginalisation, by giving us additional two states of Enugu and Abia out of 11 states he created. At that time, the zone needed three states to level up with others. The late Gen. Sani Abacha also gave the zone one state, Ebonyi when he created six states. Therefore, the Southeast has suffered undue marginalisation in the state creation structure of Nigeria. Under the present 36 states structure, which ought to give each zone six states apiece, only the Southeast has five and the Northwest seven (Leke, 2016).

In addition, Leke (2016) equally observed that "since the inception of President Muhammadu Buhari's administration, the Igbos of Southeast has stepped up the protest over the continued marginalisation of the zone under the current administration. They accuse Buhari of side-lining the zone in major appointments so far and of assigning less-juicy portfolios to ministers of Igbo extraction in his cabinet. Indeed, since the emergence of Buhari as the President, the Igbos have resumed agitation for secession from the Nigerian federation. The militant group, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), is spearheading the campaign, with support from the Movement for Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)". Perhaps, it could be

rightly stated that this is one of the major causes of the current regional agitation from the southeast extraction.

Restructuring: The Way Forward.

There are different conceptions or meaning of restructuring. Restructuring has been seen as synonymous with resource control. Najakku (2016) defines restructuring as “thoroughgoing process that allows each region to control its resources and pay royalties to the central government. It is a process that is anchored on the principle of “from each according to each according to his needs”. This definition likens restructuring to resource control but restructuring encompasses resource control. On the other hand, restructuring can be defined as the process of rearranging a system by either increasing or decreasing the number of component parts that makes up that system thereby re-defining the inter-relationship between the components in such a way that the entire system performs more efficiently. However, restructuring requires a meticulous handling, because if it is not well planned and handled can lead to greater inefficiency or even system collapse (Steven Adedayo, 2017).

Therefore, political restructuring entails both political re-configuration of the country and devolution of powers to the constituent units as it is practice in other climes. It involves ownership, control, and management of mineral resources located in a state by the state and power to establish its own police as against the present system where the police is under federal control. In short, political restructuring concerns the practice of what Nigerians call true federalism. Fiscal federalism according to Ajibola (2008) denotes an intergovernmental fiscal relation defining functions and responsibilities among the various tiers of government as well as the financial resources to achieve the stated objectives. It is a term used to describe a system of government in which the fiscal responsibilities rest with the various tiers of government in the country.

Wheare (1985) believes that if states authorities, for example, found that services allocated to them in a federal system are too expensive to perform, and if they call upon the federal government for grants and subsidies to asset them, they are no longer coordinate with the federal government, but subordinate to it. Financial subordination makes an end of federalism, in fact, no matter how carefully the legal forms may be preserved. It follows, therefore, that both states and federal authorities in a federation must be given the power in the constitution, each do have access to and power

to control its own financial resources; each must have power to tax and to borrow for the financing of its own services by itself. Against this backdrop, Onwe (2011) stated that we adopt the above cogent analysis not only as one of our major classical principles upon which true and balanced federalism ought to rest, but also as our standard concept and definition of fiscal federalism. It is neither the federal nor the state or local government in a true federation should be dependent upon each other in performing the statutory duties and functions devolved upon it in a federal constitution. In view of the underlying imperatives of fiscal federalism, Okoli (2004) maintained that the principle of fiscal autonomy and fiscal integrity is a sine qua non for the survival and continued existence of a truly federal system of government. She advocated that each level of government – federal, state and local must necessarily have a minimum source of independent revenue and full control of such revenues in order to enable it discharge its constitutional responsibilities. As a matter of the fact, the greater the fiscal independence through internally generated revenue amongst the component states, the stronger the foundation of its federal system and the greater the chances of the survival and continued existence of the federation.

By and large, to actualize true federalism through restructuring, Nigeria should first of all allow the people, ethnic nationalities and communities come together and create their own autonomous state governments as they please. It is only after the various ethnic nationalities have created their own autonomous state governments that they can then come together to create the federal government. There is nowhere in the world where the federal government creates the state governments, rather it is the pre-existing autonomous state governments that come together to create the federal government (country) and decide what and what political and economic powers should be given to the federal government. This is the first principle of federalism.

The most basic features of federalism according to KC Wheare is as follows

- The federating units (states and community governments) maintain autonomy over the most basic issues that affect their people. From security to education, resources, taxes, infrastructural developments, elections, judiciary, health care, etc.

- Powers are shared between the various tiers of government in a manner that unnecessary interference becomes unnecessary.
- The government (tier) closest to the people is more empowered to meet up with the needs of the local people.
- The federal national government is usually a creation of the sub-national (state) governments.
- The federal government responsibility is usually limited to just foreign affairs, monetary policy, immigration, customs, defense and related matters. All powers not expressly given to the federal government by the federal constitution is reserved for the state governments (www.restructurenigeria.ng).
- Governance is run in a bottom-up approach.
- There is a federal and state constitution.

However, the former vice president Atiku Abubakar among other voices, has again restated his calls for restructuring of Nigeria. He said that devolution of powers to the lower tiers of government is the solution to Nigeria's problems, adding that the country's unitary federalism has also been characterised by too much government involvement in economic and other activities (Wale, 2018).

Other principles that will give birth to true federalism/restructuring in Nigeria context include but not limited to the following rules;

- i. The federal constitution shall guarantee the autonomy and need for federal, state, community and institutional police system. Federal regulations should be unlimited on matters of security, environment, economy, etc.
- ii. Issuance of licenses (whatever kind be it exploration or social license) should be the exclusive right of the state governments while regulations of such licenses should be jointly done by both the state and federal governments.
- iii. The federal and state constitution shall guarantee the autonomy of every tier of government in conducting their own elections. Each tier of government shall be solely responsible for the conduct of its own

elections without external interference. The people of the communities, towns and cities that make up a state shall be solely responsible for electing the state government officials in the same way the people of the state governments shall be solely responsible for electing the officials of the federal government.

- iv. The federal constitution shall separate religion from the state and state from religion.
- v. The federal parliament shall be structured in such a manner that a bill can only become law if and only if it receives support from a minimum of 1/3 representatives from each state and not a 2/3 of the general House.
- vi. As well as the creation of state police

The above rules are what should be consider as fundamental principles of true federalism as may be applicable to the Nigerian society. Once we are able to establish these rules in Nigeria, Nigeria has become a true federal state! The rules will expand as time goes.

Concluding Remarks

The study analysed the contentious concepts of regional agitations and how it impinge on national integration in Nigeria. It examined the remote causes of the regional agitations from different sections of the country and its effect on national integration and development as well as what should be done to nip the ugly tide in the bug. The study was able to demonstrate that their agitations from different regions emanating as a result of perceived victimization particularly from the northern hegemony. The causes of this ugly trend was identified and therefore, the study recommends that government should sincerely embark on restructuring that depicts the principle of true federalism as nothing short of that will save Nigeria and Nigerians from this time bomb waiting to explode.

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**INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGY IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA**

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Abstract

A comprehensive national security strategy is an important feature of good governance for a sovereign state facing a threat of insurgency or political terrorism. Nigeria has been plagued by a protracted insurgency waged by the group popularly called Boko Haram for about a decade in the Northeastern part of the country. This has affected in various degrees many parts of Nigeria and its immediate neighbours. The paper examines the counter-insurgency strategy currently employed by the State to address this national security threat. There are a number of policy inadequacies inherent in the counterinsurgency. Generally, an insurgency can be effectively addressed when its fundamental dimensions are taken into cognisance in the formulation and execution of a counterinsurgency strategy. Using the General Systems Theory as a framework, the paper argues that the ongoing efforts at tackling the insurgency can only bear fruit when the dimensions and factors that shape the dynamics of this security threat are properly formulated and executed in a comprehensive strategy. The paper recommends a number of measures required to develop a robust counter-insurgency strategy for Northeastern Nigeria in order to enhance stability and corporate existence of the country as a whole

Keywords: counter-insurgency, governance, insurgency, national security, terrorism

Introduction

Insurgency is a recurring threat to the vital national security interests of many countries around the world. At various times this phenomenon has led to the undermining of long-term strategic interests, the destabilisation of regimes or even the sovereign personality of states. In the same light, different

measures have been adopted by governments of many states and at different times to manage or resolve the issues that give rise and sustain insurgencies. The history of the Nigerian State shows that many threats to its stability and corporate existence which have manifested in various degrees at various times. The State is currently threatened by an extremely violent insurgent group professing an Islamist ideology called *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah li-Da'awati wal Jihad* (meaning People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Struggle). This group is popularly known as Boko Haram because it views western civilisation and its system of education in particular, as inherently incompatible with Islamic injunctions. It professes a complete rejection of the constitutional, legal and social foundations of the Nigerian State as in its secularity, democratic governance and sovereign personality (Mohammed, 2014, p.15). It views other Islamic adherents outside its exclusive fold as heretical and therefore, as legitimate targets of verbal and physical attacks. Just like many contemporary Islamist groups around the world, the ideological inspiration of Boko Haram is driven by the *fatwas* (rulings) of Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th century scholar (Anugwom, 2019, p. 118) whose views can be situated within the political, cultural and theological crises of his time. This ideological orientation became evident when the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and thus became the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015 (Barkindo, 2016, p.3). A brutal security crackdown in 2009 culminated in the controversial killing of Muhammad Yusuf and several of his followers. Since then, the group went underground and began a violent reactionary campaign against the basic features of the Nigerian State. The group has remained a threat to the stability and territorial integrity of the country. Between 2009 and 2016, over 1,000 terrorist attacks took place resulting in about 32,000 casualties and the geographical displacement of over 1.6 million persons (UNDP, 2018, p. 39). At one point, in 2014, the Boko Haram insurgents were on the offensive, capturing a number of major towns like Baga, Bama, Gwoza, Kukawa, Marte and Mubi as they shifted from guerrilla tactics to regular combat employed by standing armies. Generally, it has been estimated that about 14.3 million people have been directly or indirectly affected by the insurgency (Ibrahim and Bala, 2018, p. 2).

The response by the Nigerian State has been mainly characterised by the use of conventional military force in protracted attempts to defeat the insurgents (Adelaja, Labo and Penar, 2018, p. 37). These have consisted of a

number of successive operations namely: Operation Flush in 2009, Operation Restore Order in 2011, Operations Boyona and Zaman Lafiya in 2013 and since 2015, Operation Lafiya Dole (Nicholas, 2018, p.155-157). In addition, attempts have been made by governmental and non-governmental bodies to settle affected persons either in internally-displaced camps across the country or repatriate them to their 'liberated' homelands. However, the emphasis on the use of military force as the major pillar in the strategy of counterinsurgency (COIN) has not resulted in the defeat of the group as incidents of attacks by the group on military and civilian targets have continued in parts of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States in Northeastern Nigeria. In a nutshell, the COIN effort by the Nigerian State is apparently flawed. Insurgency is a multidimensional, asymmetric type of warfare that requires a corresponding response to address the factors and forces that shape its intractability in the society. Thus, the persistence of Boko Haram activities through suicide attacks and surprise raids on vulnerable civilian settlements or military formations indicate certain inadequacies in the counterstrategy adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria which this paper identifies and examines.

Aim and Structure of the Paper

The paper provides a critical examination of the inadequacies inherent in the COIN strategy adopted by the Nigerian State with particular reference to the Federal Government. This is with respect to the measures adopted by central authorities in tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency which has persisted in the Northeast. The paper shows that such inadequacies are responsible for the inability of the state to address the factors and forces that have given the insurgency its vigour and thus, led to its intractability. The paper is divided into the following sections: introduction of subject matter; aim and structure of the paper; definition of key concepts of the paper; overview of the literature; theoretical framework of the paper; critique of the strategy of COIN in the Northeast of Nigeria; conclusion and recommendations.

Definition of Key Concepts

The term 'insurgency' as applied to the activities of Boko Haram is operationally defined as that form of warfare that is asymmetric, multi-dimensional and extremely violent whose chief goal is to establish a political entity using the insurgents' own version of Islamic precepts within the

geographical space of Nigeria and possibly, those of its sovereign contiguous neighbours. The strategy is to undermine the political, economic and social structures that define State-Society relations of Nigeria. On the other hand, the term 'counterinsurgency' (COIN) is used here as the series of measures (both military and non-military) employed by the Nigerian government to reverse the gains of the Boko Haram insurgency through re-establishment of sovereign control over geographical areas and populations overrun by the insurgents.

Overview of the Literature

The literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are mainly derived from the fields of revolutionary, sociological, strategic and security studies. The ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu (1988) and two ancient Greek historians Thucydides (1974) and Xenophon (see Solomon, 2015, p. 2) form part of the early literature where descriptive and prescriptive accounts are provided of strategies or tactics in the conduct of irregular warfare. In the 20th century, a number of works identified the fundamental principles of the strategy or tactics used by insurgencies driven by revolutionary or nationalist sentiments. Lawrence (1991) gives a descriptive account of irregular warfare waged during the Arab revolt against Ottoman Turkey in the First World War. Irregular warfare lacks any form or set of defined doctrines as seen in the operations of standing professional armies. He sees this kind of war as 'an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back' (Lawrence, 1991, p. 192). Insurgency as a form of irregular warfare is a concept synonymous with the practice of guerrilla warfare or more recently, the theory and practice of terrorism (Gray, 2012, pp. 285-286). Guerrilla warfare is now replaced with the term insurgency. Krepinevich (1986, p. 7) defines insurgency as 'a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to obtain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order'. Another definition of an insurgency tends to specify the nature of the struggle in terms of the inseparable linkage between politics and military force. Thus, it is viewed as being largely driven by political and to a limited extent, military considerations. The United States Military field Manual, avers that an insurgency is 'an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political

authority' (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 1). However, the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, the revolutionary leader of China (1949-1974) constitute the major principles for conducting an insurgency which he defines as guerrilla warfare. These ideas were greatly influenced by his knowledge of Marxism, the bitter experiences of the Japanese invasion of China and the internal struggle to wrest power from the Nationalists. They culminated in the development of a theoretical discourse on how to wage a protracted military struggle as defined by different political conditions. This protracted struggle is described as having to pass through three major phases, which are- the strategic defensive, preparation for counter-offensive and strategic counter-offensive stages (Mao, 1963, pp. 210-211).

Insurgency, as a multi-faceted form of warfare has many dimensions. The major ones often highlighted are the political, military, psychological, economic, socio-cultural and international dimensions. Each of these dimensions reinforces the effectiveness of other dimensions in the struggle to discredit, undermine or subvert and eventually overthrow a government or an existing political system. The ideological or political dimension is seen as the driving force behind other dimensions because it relies on popular support or relative sympathy from the society in which it is waged in order to ensure that it assumes its protracted character (Ayam, 1996). These dimensions are embedded in what Mao Tse-tung identifies as the key precepts of guerrilla warfare for it to succeed. These are: the guerrillas' support base among the people, group organisation, favourable terrain, military organisation and economic strength (Thompson, 2006, p. 17). In a comparative analysis, a United States Marines reference publication identifies ten indices to study the nature of revolutionary insurgencies using Cuba and South Vietnam as case studies. These are: the motives of the insurgency, its level of popularity, the strength of its leadership, quality of its fighters, its level of resourcefulness, its internal cohesion, its weaponry, the terrain in which the insurgency is conducted, its communication networks and the places the insurgents use as sanctuary (FMFRP, 1989, pp. 29-30). Similarly, for an insurgency to take root and be effective it must have a four-tier operational structure. At the top is the combatant who wages the violent struggle. The next tier is the supporting infrastructure. The third is the network of close sympathisers who provide recruits and logistics. The bottom tier consists of the population who provide intelligence services for the insurgency on predisposing conditions for offensive strategy, retreat or elusive tactics (Kilcullen, 2010, p.8).

In the case of terrorism, it is often used interchangeably with insurgency or militancy. It is implied to mean a form of irregular warfare as stated by Gray (2012, p. 290) involving the 'deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through the use, or threat, of violence'. It aims to achieve a psychological advantage either against the population, government or both. In other words, the purpose is to undermine the social bond of trust and confidence that exists between the leaders and the citizens of a political entity. However, a distinction is made between terrorism and insurgency on the basis of objectives, support base, and degree of violence. It is said that terrorists employ a higher degree of violence, pursue largely unacceptable goals and draw minimal sympathy from the populace (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 188). In the empirical space of international politics, the term terrorism is used as a political label by governments to discredit the ideological bases of groups employing extremely violent methods. The subjectivity that often trails the ascription of an act to terrorism is simply put in a phrase that 'a person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter' (Primoratz, 2004, p. ix). Generally, the ambiguity in the term is based on the divergent views of 'academics, politicians, security experts and journalists' who at different times and places seek 'to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era' (Solomon, 2015, p.2).

In the aftermath of the 911 attacks on the United States and the proliferation of terrorist incidents in many Western countries, there occurred a systematic intellectual shift from traditional state-centric methods of understanding and dealing with insurgent or terrorist groups to the application of anthropological or political economy models of conflicts to explain the genesis, growth and effectiveness of insurgencies in order to tackle them. These cover subjects like governance failure, wrong military strategy, social deviance, radicalisation, grievance, relative deprivation, environmental changes and theological manipulation as predisposing and trigger factors responsible for the existence and threats posed by insurgents or terrorists (Borum, 2003; Kilcullen, 2009, p. 296; Moghadam, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2005). With respect to Boko Haram, the 'governance failure' paradigm is identified as a major driver in creating the socio-economic conditions for its emergence and threat to the country (Adelaja, Labo and Penar, 2018, p. 43; Anugwom, 2019; Asuelime and David, 2015, p. 55; Okereke, 2013, p.154; Taft and Haken, 2015, p. 9). A departure from these frameworks is that put forward by MacEachern (2015) where he employs archaeology, ethnography,

physical geography and history to rationalise the culture of violence associated with Central Africa which serves as the cradle and terrain of Boko Haram insurgency.

Counterinsurgency (COIN), on the other hand, is generally seen as measures adopted to confront and defeat an insurgency. It is defined as "...the complete range of measures that governments take to defeat insurgencies. These measures may be political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, or informational, and are almost always used in combination." (Kilcullen, p. 1).

Simply put, it is the opposite of an insurgency. This strategy attracted the interest of policy-makers and military specialists in France, Britain and the United States around the late 1940s and 1950s where wars of decolonisation assumed irregular forms in places like Algeria, Kenya, Malaya, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. This involved the use of tactics outside conventional doctrines to suppress insurgencies. While the experience in Malaya helped the British to crush the Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya, the French were not successful in Algeria despite their bitter experience at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. The racist regime in Rhodesia employed even more daring tactics by infiltrating or terrorising the guerrilla units fighting for Zimbabwean Independence through an understanding of the physical geography and social aspects of the insurgency (Baxter, 2012). In the contemporary period, insurgents especially Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, ISIS and Taliban have largely blended their peculiar brands of religious extremism and hatred in various degrees with similar asymmetrical military strategies with deadly effects. Occasionally they also adopt regular warfare tactics when government forces are in retreat. The primacy of an insurgency lies in the political sphere of the struggle. It implies that while the use of military force can curb an insurgency, it can only do so when the non-military aspects effectively address the factors that give rise and sustain it. Galula (2006, p. 63) attests to this where he notes that the political aspect of an insurgency is 80% of the struggle while the military sphere comprises 20% of the struggle.

Generally, the literature on insurgency as a strategy of violent conflict identifies the significance of political ends as determinants of the contest between opposing sides. However, there is an inclination in the literature on COIN to place emphasis on the significance of the military dimension as the primary means of tackling insurgencies. The implication is that other dimensions of COIN are given less attention. Since COIN is a form of war that

is asymmetrically opposed to insurgency, it means that all dimensions in the latter have to be given equitable attention in the conception and application of COIN measures.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts the General Systems Theory (GST) as outlined by Bertalanffy (1968) to explain the relationship between an insurgency and efforts to counter or tackle it. The GST is defined as ‘the doctrine of principles applying to all (or defined subclasses of) systems’ (Bertalanffy, 1972, p. 414). It was first applied in biology but eventually led to its application in other fields including the social sciences. A system is a set of interacting elements or aspects whose function is to preserve and nurture its collective whole. Simply put, each of these interacting elements plays an important role that has a crucial effect on how the whole system functions (Ackoff, 1981, p. 15).

The persistence of insurgency has an inverse relation to fundamental lapses in the COIN strategy in Northeast Nigeria. The formulation and execution of an effective COIN takes into cognisance the multidimensional nature of the insurgency to be tackled. COIN as a component in the national security architecture of a country facing an insurgency can be conceived as a comprehensive plan made up of different facets or dimensions which holistically performs a general function- to defeat an insurgency by tackling the multidimensional conditions that give rise and sustain it. Each of these dimensions has to interact with the other dimensions in order to have the desired effect. COIN is thus a synthesis of the political, economic, social, military and international components geared towards tackling the factors that give rise and sustain an insurgency. Each dimension exercises an important role (in the form of a strategy) that invariably augments the other dimensions. The success or failure of COIN depends on the roles that each of these dimensions simultaneously plays. As such, the strategy of COIN would experience setbacks if any of these dimensions fails to exercise its expected roles. This determines the efficiency and effectiveness of COIN. Efficiency has to do with performing a clearly defined task within assigned resources while effectiveness is an impact indicator of the correlation between adhering to defined procedures and achieving the ends of policy (Bruneau and Matei, 2008, pp. 915-921).

Counterinsurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria: A Critique

The counterinsurgency (COIN) effort against Boko Haram by the Nigerian authorities is currently in its first decade. The political and military gains made by the insurgents in terms of capturing territory and erecting parallel administrative structures have been reversed by the efforts of the Nigerian armed forces and those of neighbouring states. However, the insurgency has entered into a low intensity type of warfare with incessant, surprise attacks on civilian settlements, military formations, suicide bombings and abduction of people in order to make threats and demands on the State as in the case of the famed Chibok and Dapchi school girls. The relative failure to defeat the insurgents in the asymmetric battle field is an indicator that the strategy of COIN employed by the Federal Government has some basic inadequacies. Five major inadequacies are identified as reasons why the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast has persisted and remains a major threat to the country's peace, unity and stability.

- **The Absence of a Comprehensive Strategy of Counter-Insurgency (COIN)**

There is an apparent absence of a clearly-defined plan of COIN which is as important in today's world as conventional warfare strategy. A strategy of COIN ordinarily involves exploiting the weak points of an insurgent group. The idea is to eventually adopt and execute a timely series of political measures aimed at weakening the ideological drive, population base, economic incentives and external support of Boko Haram. It has an ideology that is built on the pillars of hate, vanity, revenge and violence. It draws support by exploiting, through psychological and material incentives, those who suffer extremes of intellectual and material poverty especially victims of the governance deficit in Nigeria. It is estimated that as at 2010 the group had about 280,000 members (Harmon, 2014, p. 123). Apart from raiding commercially attractive places to acquire cash and ransom or protection money for kidnapped persons and threatened communities, Boko Haram has imposed levies on the age-long informal networks of cross-border trade in fisheries, grains and livestock that takes place in the Lake Chad basin. Finally, it draws support as in fighters, informers and logistics not only within Nigeria but from foreign nationals especially in the geographically-contiguous areas in Cameroun, Chad and Niger Republics (Magrin and Perouse de Montclos, 2018, pp. 120, 123 & 158).

The National Defence Policy of Nigeria (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2005) identifies terrorism and insurgency as threats to national security. Similarly, the more recent *National Security Strategy* document of Nigeria specifically identifies the Boko Haram insurgency as the most direct threat to the country's peace, security and sovereignty (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2015, p. 9). However, both policy documents have deficits in both methodology and goals on how to tackle such a threat. The absence of an operational COIN strategy is the reason the government has been unable to effectively address the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeastern part of the country. According to Mao Tse-tung:

In all battles and wars, a struggle to gain and retain the initiative goes on between the opposing sides, for it is the side that holds the initiative that has liberty of action. When an army loses the initiative, it loses its liberty, its role become passive; it faces the danger of defeat and destruction (FMFRP, 1989, p. 98).

Between 2009 and 2014, the Boko Haram insurgents were on the offensive with large population centres coming under their control while the government forces were on the defensive or sometimes fleeing when the insurgents launch attacks. It is important to add that the first documented and publicised national defence policy was formulated at least three years before the evident outbreak of the insurgency. Initially, the government forces adopted a strategy based on the doctrine of frontal confrontation with a defined enemy. This proved disastrous as the government and its military leaders failed to realise that an insurgency could only be confronted by adopting a different strategy that is different from that applied in fighting conventional threats. In essence, it requires applying a COIN strategy aimed at undermining the insurgents' sources of support especially the local and external support they receive.

Currently, the Federal Government has been unable to devise a comprehensive COIN strategy that would articulate an array of political, social and economic programmes aimed at undermining the ideological, operational and organisational foundations of Boko Haram. There is no concrete COIN strategy to deter or dissuade vulnerable individuals and groups from being potential recruits into its fold. Similarly, incentives are not in place to address problems of widespread illiteracy and poverty in the Northeast where as at 2017 about 72 percent of its estimated 26 million people live below the poverty line (UNDP, 2018, p. 20). Therefore, over-reliance on the use of

military means to defeat an insurgency merely tackles the symptoms without addressing the root causes or drivers of that insurgency. Simply put, it requires a carrot and stick approach.

- **Near-Total Dependence on Military Force to tackle Boko Haram**
Insurgency is an asymmetric form of warfare that is driven by multidimensional factors. Therefore, the logical course of action in applying a COIN strategy is to engage the insurgents using a multidimensional approach. The major blunder by the Nigerian government since 2009 is the near total dependence on the use of military force to address the Boko Haram problem without equally articulating COIN policies that cover the political, economic, psychological, social and transnational dimensions. This dependence on the military since 2009 has left legacies of gross human rights abuses such as torture, extrajudicial execution and prolonged detention of suspects which have aggravated the conditions and given Boko Haram a leverage to acquire new recruits or passive sympathisers from victims or their relations for its deadly attacks on military and civilian targets (Magrin and Perouse de Montclos, 2018, p. 141). In its annual report, Amnesty International (2018, p. 282) specifically identifies incidents of torture, arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings by the military in its COIN operations in the Northeast. Humanitarian efforts at providing material relief to displaced persons have witnessed cases of diversion or funds not accounted for by relevant governmental agencies. The military has institutional and operational limitations in dealing with an insurgency beyond the limits of its professional competence. Just like the current scenario playing out in Afghanistan, effective military power may win all battles against Boko Haram but in the long run, the Nigerian State can lose the war against ideological and cultural resilience of Boko Haram. Military force can neither de-radicalise the radicalised nor provide the dividends of good governance such as requisite skills for upward socio-economic mobility and a sense of relevance in a democratic process. When these non-military components are not given the same attention as military strategy, it is expected that an insurgency would continue. The strategic goal of COIN as in the conventional forms of warfare is political.

- **Relative Ineffectiveness and Inefficiency in the Use of Military Force**

Operational effectiveness implies carrying out the missions in line with goals set out by the civilian authorities. The fundamental goal of any COIN mission is to defeat the insurgents by discovering their plans and neutralising (by deterring or thwarting) their offensive operations against civilian populations. The Nigerian military in conjunction with other security outfits have been battling armed groups for decades in many parts of the country. Based on 2009 assessments, the numerical size of the Nigerian armed forces stood at 80, 000 when Boko Haram began its insurgent attacks (IISS, 2009, p. 314). By 2017, the number of military personnel increased to 118, 000 personnel (IISS, 2017, p. 528). The Nigerian Army, the oldest and largest of the three services has about 100, 000 troops and is currently conducting internal security operations in thirty-two of the thirty six states of the Federation (Ibrahim and Bala, 2018, p. 5). The manpower of the Nigerian Police Force as at 2014 is reported to be about 371, 800 personnel (Johnson, 2015, p. 66). The Force is often unable to enforce or restore law and order in many volatile areas in a country having a population of about 199 million people occupying a territory of 923, 763 square kilometres. The civilian authorities often rely on the army to carry out quasi-policing and peace-keeping functions alongside its conventional war-fighting and COIN roles. The number of human resources available for force deployments in high risk areas and the intensity of security challenges across the country have invariably overstretched the army and police formations. The proportion of combined army and police personnel to the country's population is about one personnel for every 422 persons. In terms of personnel-territorial size ratio, it is one army or police personnel for every two square kilometres. This challenge has led to deployment of the Nigerian Airforce (NAF) and special units of the navy as an augmenting measure. In addition, the operational effectiveness of the military is affected by parochial perceptions of national security interests among decision-makers and institutional weaknesses in the processes of legislative oversight. The concept of security is largely measured in terms of the number of armed security personnel deployed to potential and actual hot spots as well as providing personal protection to those close to the corridors of power. Apart from the military's numerical limitations, there are other factors such as lack of requisite training, surveillance and combat platforms, spare parts and maintenance for COIN operations (Nicholas, 2018, p. 166). In retrospect, it is reported that General Azubuike Iherijika, then head of the army admitted 'that the army was neither equipped nor trained to handle

this type of warfare' (Asuelime and David, 2015, p. 105). This is however, a general trend of the military forces as noted by Braun (2012, p. 77) who reflected on the relative limitations of the United States military expedition in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban insurgents. Similarly, Gray (2012, p. 264) noted that 'most of the world's armed forces are not well designed, doctrinally prepared, trained or equipped to wage war against elusive handfuls of religious fanatics'.

Institutional efficiency dwells on the optimal use of available resources for carrying out missions in line with defined objectives. In other words, it means the 'judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and space' (Brodie, 2008, p. 9). This is related to accountability and transparency of the military institution. The annual defence budget as a percentage of GDP has fallen from 0.9% in 2009 to 0.4% in 2017. On the contrary, this translates to an increase from 224 billion Naira and 495 billion Naira for the respective years of 2009 and 2017 (SIPRI Data base, 2018). Despite these statistics, there is no clear accountability mechanism to indicate how these funds are used and for what purposes. In essence, factors such as institutional corruption, lack of legislative oversight and emphasis on recurrent expenditure can be seen as responsible for apparent military inefficiency (ICG, 2016, pp. 10-13). Between 2009 and 2014, it is estimated that only 14.3 % of the cumulative defence budget went to capital expenditure (ICG, 2016, p. 11). There is an apparent lack of accountability and transparency in the security sector of the country in terms of how appropriated funds are spent in military operations. Indications of poor welfare and equipment for personnel serving in COIN missions in the Northeast are pointers to this feature. In the same light, the nature of civilian democratic control of the security forces indicates some weakness due to poor oversight capacities in the legislature (Omitoogun, 2002, p. 274; Omitoogun and Oduntan, 2006, p. 175) and high level of corruption that remains a persisting feature of apex public institutions in Nigeria (Agunyai, and Olawoyin, 2019, p. 112).

- **The Intelligence Deficit**

An important component of COIN operations is the ability to identify and assess potential or actual threats to a country's political, population, economic and military foundations. Intelligence is a prerequisite in setting the agenda in the conduct of national security responses at its formative stage. As

an important component in the national security system of a country, intelligence can be defined as:

the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analysed and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful activities (Lowenthal, 2008, p. 8).

It involves gathering, processing and management of information for immediate and future use by decision-makers and strategic planners in times of relative peace and emergencies. Intelligence can also be conceived as an alarm mechanism that gives foreknowledge of the plans of an insurgency to relevant policy makers so that the most effective measures in defeating the strategies and tactics employed by insurgents are adopted. It enables government 'to drain the water from the fish so that it dies'. Nigeria's intelligence community is drawn from a number of autonomous and intra-agency outfits. However, their operational capabilities are under-utilised and thus affect the effectiveness of COIN operations. The most important reason has to do with lack of trust or coordination arising from protracted inter-agency rivalries when it comes to sharing or coordinating intelligence (Irabor, 2018, p. 182). Another factor has to do with technological constraints as in surveillance capabilities for monitoring insurgents embedded in population centres or in remote command outposts. These factors have often led to a phenomenon that Cline (1974-75) refers to as 'policy without intelligence'. It implies that strategic decisions are made either on the basis of misleading information or as a result of negligible intelligence input. The danger is that erroneous courses of action taken eventually would lead to policy failure. Intelligence deficiency is disastrous for a country fighting an insurgency. In appraising the intelligence angle of the COIN operations against Boko Haram, it is observed that there exists 'an absence of collaborative platforms for efficient and effective warehousing and dissemination of intelligence required from slated sources' (Irabor, 2018, p. 180).

- **Lack of Proper Strategic Coordination with Neighbouring States**

There exists a relative absence of a proactive strategy to engage the international environment particularly, Nigeria's immediate neighbours that

share the vast Lake Chad basin which is dotted with armed groups operating in swathes of ungoverned spaces. Since 1960, Nigeria has been unwilling to develop a policy of courting strategic allies and instead relied on fair weather friends in times of need. It is noted that the history of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and these countries is largely characterised by an alternation of warm and cold ties often determined by territorial disputes (Ate, 1992: 1). Nigeria and its neighbours are confronted with a myriad of common threats such as human, arms and illicit drugs trafficking, smuggling, banditry, piracy and insurgency which contribute to instability in the West and Central African regions. The Lake Chad basin covers an area of about 2,397, 423 square kilometres and is the birth place of Boko Haram. It is estimated that this basin is home to about 22 million Nigerians and about 19.5% of the country's total landmass is within the basin. Nigeria shares the basin with Algeria, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger and Sudan (Umara, 2014, p.3 & p. 90). The near-absence of a functional transnational security framework in Nigeria's foreign policy agenda is a strategic set-back. In retrospect, Nwokedi (1987, p.195) noted that 'geographical propinquity links in an inextricable manner the security interests of contiguous states' and thus it implies that the stability and security of Nigeria are intertwined with those of its neighbours. It was when the Boko Haram insurgency escalated to alarming proportions in 2013 and 2014 that Nigeria was compelled to solicit the support of its neighbours. This led to the setting up of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Even with this, factors such as mutual suspicions, differences in security threat perceptions and operational doctrines have placed limitations on its effectiveness. In order to effectively pursue the goals of national defence and security, the recruitment of allies is important for Nigeria.

Conclusion

The paper identified and critically examined five basic reasons why the current COIN efforts of the Nigerian State have so far failed to address the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria. The Boko Haram threat is a dynamic and flexible insurgency in terms of its ability to exploit the political, social and economic problems that successive leaders of the Nigerian State have failed over the decades to address. While adopting the General Systems theory, it argued that for any COIN strategy to be effective it must be able to incorporate all the factors that sustain the multidimensional conditions of the insurgency at the formulation, execution and evaluation stages. The decision-

makers of the Nigerian State are often guilty of adopting politically-bankrupt, parochial and archaic approaches in their understanding of national security issues and thus, have adopted a near-total dependence attitude on the use of military force as a means of addressing the Boko Haram threat.

Recommendations

26. There is need for political, social and economic restructuring of the Nigerian State in order to strengthen public institutions. The goal is to restore social trust in governance and regulate lingering factors that give rise to social cleavages. More constitutional responsibilities, powers and resources should be devolved to the federating units because the states and local governments are closer to the people. Religious and ethnic activities while guaranteed as fundamental rights should be given close monitoring without compromising Nigeria's unique multi-religious realities.
27. Genuine efforts at addressing perceived injustices and a transparent mechanism to drastically reduce corruption in public institutions must be initiated. Economic and social policies of the State should be designed to cover majority of citizens. The goal is to moderate the psyche of aggrieved groups across the societal divides.
28. A reliable, comprehensive and centralised national data base on the nation's population should be developed for the purposes of having an accurate picture of the political, social and economic indicators of the country. This would assist in determining how resources are used especially in the provision of physical infrastructure and basic social services.
29. Traditional institutions must be fully integrated into the national security architecture at the grass roots level as part of intelligence gathering and conflict management mechanisms for security forces, local and state governments.
30. The asymmetric pattern of Boko Haram insurgency in some parts of Nigeria and its contiguous neighbours requires a comprehensive grand strategy to address the structural conditions that engender its perpetuation. This should form the basis of alliance formation with its immediate neighbours as the security interests of these countries are linked to the security interests of Nigeria.

31. The ideological platforms such as the media, schools, cultural and religious bodies rather than the coercive bodies must take the lead in devising strategies and goals in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency. Thus, political authorities must establish effective democratic control over the use of military forces by defining the rules of engagement, ensuring fiscal accountability by the security forces and ensuring minimal collateral damage. In addition, areas of intellectual competence notably: anthropology, demography, economics, ethnography, history, theology and psychology should be involved in developing a comprehensive national COIN strategy. Civilian authorities should be the vanguard of a 'winning hearts and minds' policy and not left to military personnel. To paraphrase the words of a former French statesman, Georges Clemenceau the policy of war is too important to be exclusively left in the hands of generals (Jackson, 1946, p. 228).
32. On the use of coercion to fight bandits, insurgents or terrorists, the government should also adopt the same asymmetric tactics as a way of infiltrating their ranks and destabilising them. Special operational forces or COIN battalions should be created under a unified but autonomous command drawing from units of the army, navy airforce, police, civil defence, and other paramilitary/security agencies as well as from reliable vigilante outfits in the areas concerned in order to relieve the current burden imposed on the armed forces.

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POLITICAL EDUCATION: A PANACEA FOR CURBING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study is prompted by the fact that politics governs our life in the society and affects many aspects of our lives. Potent and substantial political participation of the citizens in the management of their own affairs are essential for the political and economic stability of the society. Unfortunately, this has constantly been threatened over the years, and has not augured well for the political landscape. It has been argued that the greatest obstacle to democratic consolidation in Nigeria is electoral violence. The phenomenon affects the credibility of the electoral system, the democratic system and the rule of law. It is in the light of this menace that this study argues that political education is a viable tool and weapon for curbing this democratic encumbrance. Political education in Nigeria since independence is far from being ideal. Lack of political education shows itself in intolerance, ethnic politics, greed, intimidation, votes buying, election rigging and politics of bitterness. To this end, this study examined the concept of political education, investigates the problems of ineffectual political education in Nigeria, and equally makes recommendations on how to employ adequate political education to achieve political stability and magnify unwavering democracy in Nigeria.

Key words: Political Education, Political violence, Electoral violence

Introduction:

Nigeria like many other African states has a multifaceted history of conflicts. The cause of these conflicts could be traced to primordial factors associated with ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry, structural imbalance of its federalism, bad governance, political intolerance and electoral brouhaha. Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the most deeply divided states

in Africa. Nigeria is a colonial creation by the colonial masters. The assimilation of more than 250 different linguistic and cultural groups into one political unit has a big bearing on the political development of the country. From its inception, the country has faced a perennial crisis of territorial or state legitimacy, which has often challenged its efforts at national cohesion, democratization, stability and economic transformation (Soyinka and Routers (2009).

Starting with the amalgamation of 1914, and with the attainment of independence in 1960, a new (alien) system of administration came into existence. The joy of independence made some people think that sooner or later, ethnicity would give way to an integrated, strong nation where unity in diversity will be the order of the day. The desired unity was not achieved as a wrong political foundation was laid by the founding fathers of the nation. Political activities and the formation of political parties were regionally/ ethnically based. The citizens were aligned to their regions rather than the Nation. Political Parties were regionally based and none of them commanded a national outlook. Consequently, there were political rivalries between the regions and among the political parties.

The politicians in Nigeria have over the years 'become more desperate and daring in taking and retaining power: more reckless and greed in their use and abuse of power; and more intolerant of opposition, criticism and efforts at replacing them' (Alemika 2008, p.19). These conflicts orchestrated by political elites and their allies, have been for selfish actualization of primitive accumulation anchored on regional sentimentalism, ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry, economic materialism, political domination of the State. To achieve their inordinate interest, these politicians manipulate the youth to accepting them as the corner stone for their survival in the State. They arm these youths with dangerous weapons to prosecute the elections in their favour. Those already in government use the men of the Nigeria Police to chase their opponent and protect them in order to use the youths to unleash mayhem against their perceived enemies. (Ogbeide 2012).

Commenting on the forgoing, Human Rights Watch, noted: 'Many of Nigeria's ostensibly elected leaders obtained their positions by demonstrating an ability to use corruption and political violence to

prevail in sham elections. In violent and brazenly rigged polls, government officials have denied millions of Nigerians any real voice in selecting their political leaders.

Other factors that have hindered political stability and enduring democracy in the country include greed, religious dogmas, political violence, political assassination, rigging of election results, snatching of ballot boxes, etc. According to Ojo (2014), violence has become synonymous with Nigeria's political culture such that virtually all elections held so far in the country are violent ridden. And election periods are tantamount to period where majority of lives are lost. The above factors usually create lukewarm attitude among the citizens and consequently leads to political Apathy.

To Falade (2014), "The level and pattern of political participation of the citizens determine to some extent, the success of the political system". A high level of political participation can be achieved through political education. The need for sound social and political education cannot be neglected. Without it, our people are forced to operate in the social and political world without the skills and insights that they need to be in control of their own destiny.

To Lynch, (2000) Despite the legal framework that guides the electoral process, there is usually a contest between those who want to acquire power and those who are likely to lose power. The contest is normally wrapped up in violence because some politicians usually want to cut corners. The point has to be made that historically, violence is a major feature of political life everywhere around the world. Only that politics-related violence varies in intensity, trends and dimensions from one political system to another. As a matter of fact, comparative political scientists agree that from time immemorial, violence has been a constant of human societies all over the world, and in particular, today's world is awash with violence Ayeni and Akeke, (2008). Since electoral violence with concomitant effect had been the bane of Nigeria's elections, there has been the need to set in motion a machinery to curb the menace. Apart from that the fact that this phenomenon affects the credibility of the electoral system, the democratic system and the rule of law, the nature, extent and magnitude of violence and rigging

associated with elections in Nigeria had assumed alarming proportions that necessitates intellectual excursion to the realm of possible solutions. Political education has been discovered to be a major strategy and weapon to curbing this democratic impediment. To this end, this paper examined the imperative of political education in curbing this ugly trend if the nation is to enthrone enduring and sustainable democratic order that would be a delight of all.

Clarification of Concepts

Election: Election is a formal decision-making process by which a population chooses an individual to hold public office. It is a procedure that allows members of a state, organization or community to choose representatives who will hold positions of authority within it, and which promotes public accountability. Election can therefore be seen as an integral part of a democratic society that enables the citizenry determine fairly and freely who should lead them at every level of government periodically and take decisions that shape their socio-economic and political destiny. The intensity of democracy worldwide is quantified or weighted by the credibility of elections. For any election in a democratic state to be plausible, it must be free and fair from all forms of electoral malpractices and electoral violence which are generally accepted to be at the heart of democracy.

Awopeju (2011) explains that, election is a procedure that allows members of a given society to choose representatives who will hold positions such as leaders of local, state and national government. According to Dye (2001) election is an important mechanism for the employment of administrative governance in democratic social order, a major involvement in a democracy; and the way of giving approval to a regime.

Political Education:

Education refers to the process of imparting knowledge, skill and judgment on people. It may also be referred to as a process of teaching, training and learning, to improve knowledge and develop skills Okafor (1984) observes that education embraces all those experiences of the individual through which knowledge is acquired, the intellect enlightened, or the will strengthened.

Political education on the other hand, implies the collective process of study, research and analysis that is needed to acquire and imbibe political behaviours. In other words, it is a continual and long term process by which people acquire political cognition, attitude and behaviours.

Electoral Violence:

Robert (2011) stated that electoral violence depicts acts of aggression, thuggery, and other similar acts that are displayed in the course of the electoral process. Balogun (2003) explains electoral violence as any form of violence that arise at any stage (pre, during and post-election) from differences in opinions, feelings and engagements of electoral processes. Ladan Baki (2016) also noted that electoral violence during general elections include the snatching of ballot boxes to rig and manipulate election results; causing pandemonium in polling stations to hinder voters from voting; beating up electoral officers and sometimes killing same in the process when weapons such as guns and cutlass are used during the elections.

Albert (2007 p.136) defines electoral violence as ‘all forms of organized act or threats- physical, psychological and structural- aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process’. Electoral violence are categorized in to three namely physical electoral violence, Psychological electoral violence and structural electoral violence. It is pertinent here to give examples of the three dimensions of Electoral Violence.

Physical Electoral Violence: Entails the following: Physical assault on individuals during campaign, elections and when election results are released. Assassination of political opponents or people perceived as a threat to one’s political ambition. Burning down of public or opponents houses or cars, shooting, shoot-outs. Killing of individuals, partisan harassment by security agents, arrests, forceful dispersal of rallies, or shooting, wounding or killing of people. Kidnappings and hostage-taking. Bombing of infrastructure. Forceful disruption by thugs of political and campaign rallies. Destruction of ballot boxes and ballot papers by thugs or partisan security agents amongst others.

Psychological Electoral Violence: Threats against and harassment by security agents of opponents of the ruling regime or party, which create political apathy. Shoot-on-sight orders that breed fear in voters. Terror inflicted by political assassinations, which makes people scared to participate in politics or elections. Threats to life through phone calls, text messages.

Structural Electoral Violence: Coercion of citizens by government to register or vote. Unequal opportunities for political parties and candidates. Deliberate changes in dates, venues, or times of events to the disadvantage of others. Partisan delimitation of electoral constituencies and location of polling booths. Excessive fees for collecting party nomination forms. Reliance on money and brute force instead of moral integrity and competence. Use of the incumbency factor to give undue advantage to some candidates. Announcement of false or fraudulent results. Lengthy delays in announcing election results. Absence of (adequate) voting materials and election result forms. Delays in voting, absence of electoral officers from polling booths. Partisan behaviour of police and other security agents. (Nwolise, 2007)

Method of data collection:

The secondary source of data was adopted in the study, the information gathered were obtained through pre-existing sources, research articles, Text Books, newspapers, journals, library searches.

Theoretical Framework: Frustration-Aggression Theory

This study adopts the frustration-aggression theory given the emphasis of election violence in Nigeria and the constant struggle for political power in a democratic environment. This theory was developed in 1939 by Dollard and colleagues. They published a monograph on aggression, which later was known as the frustration-aggression theory, anchored on the assumption that “aggression is always the consequence of frustration.” This theory primarily focuses on aggression, as Dollard theorized that “the occurrence of aggressive actions always presumes the existence of frustration and contra wise, and that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears 1939).

Frustration aggression reflects the reasons for electoral violence because men who want to live beyond their social means do not accept their limitation in defeat this results into violence as the last resort in order to live beyond their social means. Frustration aggression theory addresses the pre-election and postelection violence. In cases of pre-election violence, frustration and aggression comes into play when a certain aspirant is power hungry and possibly realizes the indications that he/she may possibly lose to the rival, thereby adopting vehemence for their own personal gains (Tamuno,

1991). In post-election violence, persons who feel cheated on election outcomes, isolated or disadvantaged by the injustice of the electoral practice are likely out of frustration, transfer aggression on other individuals through violent acts.

The relevance of the frustration aggression theory to this current study shows that political actors resort to violence as a means to achieving their aims and exercising power, out of feelings of frustration that leads to aggression, especially when the results of the election would not favor them. This theory helps in understanding the psychological behavior of persons in the use of violence to achieve selfish interest. Electoral candidates adopt violence when they fail in their bid to win elections, thereby employing thugs to execute their selfish intentions Ladan-Baki, (2016). Therefore, the frustration aggression theory provides an explanation for electoral violence that has been occurring in Nigeria.

The theory stipulates that events surrounding electoral violence in Nigeria are as a result of fear of defeat exhibited by electoral candidates, which triggers frustration and then transfer of aggression, through the employment of human mercenaries in perpetrating violence in pre, during and after elections. Therefore, to achieve peace, fairness and transparency of elections in Nigeria, the theory specifies the need for enlightenment on the importance of citizens coming out to vote in their masses in support of a free and fair election, making their votes count and as well provisions for well-equipped security personnel that would safe guard life and properties of voters during elections.

Historical Perspectives of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

The nation's political history is replete with instances of electoral violence. Since Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960, the history of elections has been written in violence. The Human Rights Watch (2007) in its follow up of post-independence events describes the nation's post-independence history as being overshadowed by the depredations of a series of corrupt, abusive, and unaccountable governments. This description is apt because it appeared that Nigerians seem to have acquired a culture of electoral violence as most of the general elections conducted since independence in 1960 have been violence-ridden – 1964/1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, 2003 and 2007 (Malu, 2009).

The history of elections in Nigeria dates back 1922 with the introduction of Clifford's Constitution. For example, at independence, the

country adopted a parliamentary system of government akin to the British type. The first post-independence election organized by that government led by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa/President Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1964 and 1965 were characterized by widespread complaints of fraud, violence and intimidation (Osaghae, 1998).

Protest in the wake of the regional elections, which in some areas degenerated into a violent exercise in competitive rigging, led to widespread violence and inter-communal rioting that claimed more than 200 lives (Anifowose, 1982; HRW, 2007). There were also violent conflicts in parts of Northern Region especially between supporters of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and supporters of other parties, mainly the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and Action Group Alemika (2008)

The upheavals led to the First Military coup on January 15, 1966. This coup marked the end of the First Republic. Subsequent elections that followed were the 1979 and 1983 which ushered in Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), as the President in 1979 and 1983 respectively and the Legislators of the Second Republic. The Shagari-led government organized a civilian to civilian transition election but again like its First Republic counterparts repeated history and massively rigged the 1983 general elections through very violent means in connivance with the election management body, Federal Election Commission (FEDECO) and security force. This sparked up series of post-election violence. Since the center could no longer hold, the Second Republic was therefore overthrown by the General Muhammadu Buhari led Military Junta. Buhari's government could not savour the political terrain for long because of obnoxious policies and lack of vision for a Transition Programme, thus the Regime was sacked in a Palace Coup led by his Chief of Army Staff, then Major General Ibrahim Badamusi Babangida. With Babangida's transition programme on course, a general election was organized in 1993. The 1993 elections were believed to be the most free and fair, ever conducted in Nigeria. Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the Social Democratic Party was assumed to have won the election. The annulment of the election by the Military Junta was greeted with stiff opposition and thus led to political unrest. Vociferous groups emerged, pressing on the Military to return the Country to democracy. Faced with this pressure, this again set the stage for the second wave of military intervention in the nation's politics on December 31, 1983. The military from

then remained in power until May 29, 1999 after several attempts to democratize. (HRW, 2007).

Since the restoration of civil rule, attempts have not been made by politicians to deepen and strengthen democracy. Instead, Nigeria has only added to its history of fraudulent and violent elections. The 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections that brought President Olusegun Obasanjo and later late President Umaru Yar' Adua to power were marred by such widespread violence and fraud. For example, this was how the US-based Jimmy Carter Centre for Democracy which monitored the 1999 election as an international observer concluded its report on the outcome of the presidential election like the others before it: "It is not possible for us to make an accurate judgment about the outcome of the presidential election" (HRW, 2007). In the same vein, the 2003 elections were more pervasively and openly rigged than the flawed 1999 polls, and far more bloody. Further to the massive rigging were pockets of violence in different parts of Nigeria. A number of people have argued that there were no elections in 2003, but merely the intimidation of voters and the selection of already decided winners by elites and caucuses Abimbola JO and Adesote SA. (2012). For example, according to the Human Right Watch's report, between April and May 2003, about one hundred people were said to have been killed and many more injured during federal and state elections in Nigeria and that most of the violence was perpetrated by the ruling PDP and its supporters (HRW 2004)

These events set the stage for the 2007 elections which both domestic and foreign observers succinctly described as the worst in Nigeria's history ranking among the worst conducted anywhere in the world in recent times (HRW's interviews with voters and observers on the April 2007 elections).

For instance, the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) stated in its post-election statement that the electoral process "failed the Nigerian people" (NDI, 2007). The Human Rights Watch (2007) which monitored the election in its report said the Nigeria's failed April 2007 polls cast a harsh and very public light on patterns of violence, corruption and outright criminality that have come to characterize Nigeria's political system and on the extent to which officials and institutions at all levels of government accept, encourage and participate in those abuses (HRW, 2007). It would be recalled that the 2007 general elections reeked off all manner of chicanery characterized by the brazen attempt to disenfranchise the electorate and announce fictitious results in areas where no elections took place, not to mention

intimidation of the electorate by the police and military in many places, non-delivery of election materials, hijack of ballot boxes, thumb printing and even foot-printing of ballot papers, incarceration and humiliation of independent election observers, bribery of electoral officers in order for them to look elsewhere when atrocious acts of perfidy were being perpetrated by party agents which all resulted in a bogus series of elections which both foreign and local observers described as nothing less than a travesty. Contributing to the above, Marietu (2010, p. 12) opines Prior to the elections, the political atmosphere was again very tense. Among other mind-boggling incidents, President Olusegun Obasanjo condescendingly declared that, for him and the PDP, the 2007 election was ‘a do or die affair’ Supporting the above, Mbah (2014) argue that the political violence that erupted in all these elections progressively had high ethnic tones as there were ethnic insurgencies during the various elections, such that between June and August 2006, three gubernatorial candidates were assassinated. The run-up to the April 2007 elections was violent, as campaigning in many areas was punctuated with political killings, bombings and armed clashes between supporters of rival political parties. The process was characterized by unprecedented electoral malpractices which led to wide condemnation from local and international observers to the extent that upon inauguration, the then President, late Umaru Ya’Adua condemned the flawed election that brought him to power . Abimbola and Adesote (2012)

Nigeria’s 2011 polls marked the fourth multiparty election in Nigeria. The 2011 general elections were generally acceptable by both local and foreign observers to be partially fair when compared with the 2003 and 2007 general elections. The election however witnessed some violence, the pre, during and post-election period. The release of 2011 Presidential election result by the Independence National Electoral Commission (INEC) which produced President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP as the winner led to sectarian violence in some Northern parts of Nigeria. Some of the affected states were Bauchi, Yobe, Maiduguri, and Kaduna among others. The post electoral violence that accompanied the 2011 general election resulted in the killing of about ten Youth corps members in Bauchi State (Mbah, 2014).

Cases of Electoral Violence in Nigeria’s Six Geo-Political Zones (a study of the 2011 general Elections)

Nigeria, is divided into six geo-political zones as reflected below:

- a. South-West comprising Oyo, Lagos, Ogun, Ekiti, Osun and Ondo States.
- b. South-South made up of Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Cross-Rivers and Edo States
- c. South-East consisting of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States.
- d. North-Central having Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau States.
- e. North-West made up of Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara States and
- f. North-East having Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe States.

The study considers it imperative to give some instances of how violence swept through these six geo-political zones beginning with South-West zone. The first taste of such electoral violence started with ruinous political campaigns in almost all the states of the federation. Ruinous as violent clashes ensued among supporters of political parties which led to the death of several people and many were injured less than nine days to the general elections. In Ondo State, three people were shot dead in Obanla area with four people reportedly injured in Iro street in a clash between supporters of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the ruling Labour Party (LP).

The electoral violence and irregularities that marred the election at Ondo State prompted the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) to submit a 47 page petition to the election tribunal in Akure seeking a rerun of the polls. Meanwhile, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had already declared the Labour Party (LP) candidate, Rapheal Nomiye as a winner in the National Assembly election. The ACN had claimed in a petition EPT/ODS/NAE/HR/2/2011 that the election was marred by violence, unprecedented irregularities, voter intimidation and various instances of ballot snatching in two riverine councils of Ilaje and Ese-Odo which made up the constituency (Bello, 2011:7).

In Ado-Ekiti, the Ekiti State Capital, two supporters of the PDP identified as Ayo Kehinde Faluyi and Michael Ipindola were killed by assassins dressed in police uniform during a brawl between the supporters of the PDP and the ruling Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). The clash in Ado-

Ekiti caused pandemonium as the corpse of one of the casualties, Ayo Michael was dropped at the Governor's office by the protesting members of the PDP in the state.

Ogun state had before the elections thrown itself into a confused state by presenting two controversial lists of candidates to Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Adetunji Olurin and Gboyega Isiaka. However during the campaign, no fewer than two people died in a clash between supporters of the governorship candidate of the Labour Party (LP) and commercial motorcyclists (Oladoyinbo, Nwaoko and Olukoya, 2011:1 and 4).

States in the South-South were equally engulfed with electoral violence. Thus in Akwa-Ibom, political campaign took a destructive dimension when both Ikot-Ekpene and Uyo were turned into theatres of political war. The face-off was between loyalists of the PDP and ACN. The ACN had its gubernatorial campaign rally at Ikot-Ekpene while the PDP had its own in Mkpāt Enin and Abak Local Councils at Uyo. Different versions of the cases of the quarrel were advanced, but, it was certain that the quarrel took place between the supporters of ACN and those of the PDP which resulted into the death of many while several were wounded. The presidential campaign office of Goodluck Jonathan/Namadi Sambo situated along Abak Road was set ablaze. Some 127 Peugeot, 307 Salon Cars and 157 Keke NAPEP tri cycles belonging to the state government were burnt. About 20 other vehicles belonging to well meaning Nigerians were equally burnt at different locations. About 51 suspects were arrested in connection to the political violence at Uyo (Akpan-Nsoh, 2011:22 and 23).

Electoral violence took the same ugly situation among the North-Central States. In Benue State, the campaign turned into a disaster when a convoy of the Benue State Deputy Governor, Steven Lawani on his way back from a rally in Gbajimba, Guma Local Council ran into an ambush by armed political thugs. While most of the vehicles in the convoy escaped the attack, the bus in which the Chief Press Secretary to the Benue State Deputy Governor, Mr. Ejembi Ogwuche could not. He was shot in the head and hand while the driver Mr Inalegwu Ode, had nine gunshot wounds Nwakaudu (2011, p.12)

In Niger State, the trouble there started with violence during the campaign. In Suleja for instance, hand-held explosives were thrown into the venue of the Niger East Senatorial campaign flag-off by unidentified persons. Angry youth protesting the results of the elections stormed the Nigerian

Christian Corpers Fellowship Secretariat in Minna, Niger State Capital and locked 50 corps members serving in the State in the building and set it ablaze.

Within the North-West States, electoral violence became the order of the day. Kaduna State became another center of violence occasioned by the protests against President Goodluck Jonathan's victory at the polls. In the violence, several people were said to have been killed while properties worth billions of naira, including churches and mosques were set on fire. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) headquarters as well as houses belonging to People's Democratic Party (PDP) Chieftains in Hayan banki and Tudun Wada were set ablaze by the irate youth. Other areas that the violence reached included Kafanchan and Zonkwa. In other places such as Zaria, several people were reportedly killed while Baptist Church was razed by an angry mob alleged to be supporters of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). In areas such as Angwar Muazu, Kabala West, Rigasa, Kawo, Angwar Romi and Sabo, angry youth mounted roadblocks attacking perceived political opponents (Akhaine, 2011, p.16).

In Kano State, especially during the primaries, there had been cases of disagreements over the primaries. For examples, Governor Ibrahim Shekarau of the ruling All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) had fallen apart with his deputy, Alhaji Abdullahi Tijani Gwarzo over his support for Alhaji Sagir Takai, as the governorship candidate of the party. On the other hand, within the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the governorship ticket was controversially handed over to (Rtd) General Lawal Jafaru Isa, former military administrator of Kaduna State instead of the much-touted Mohammed Abacha. Even though, the position was surrendered to Mohammed Abacha, the aftermath of the election was not favourable. The violence started on 18 April 2011 by 10.00 am defied political, ethnic or religious interpretation as virtually all segments of the Kano society were badly affected. Aside, property worth hundreds of millions of naira owned by the Emir of Kano, late Dr. Ado Bayero, the Galadima Kano, Alhaji Tijani Hashim, chieftains of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) like former speakers, House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na'Abba and Salisu Buhari were reduced to rubble. The All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) Elders Committee leader and former presidential candidate of the defunct National Republican Party (NRP), Alhaji Bashir Tofa's residential building was also burnt. Hundreds of Kano residents were severely injured, their cars damaged by the aggrieved youth who claimed

the presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) was denied victory at the polls (Abuh, 2011, p.12).

At Zamfara State, thousands of youth went on the rampage in Tsafe Local Government area of the State whereby they destroyed dozens of shops and vandalised three churches. Major roads were also barricaded; bonfires were made to disrupt vehicular movement while about 47 suspects were arrested.

In the same vein, nearly all the States in the North-East also experienced violence. At Gombe, 17 people lost their lives during the post-presidential poll violence in Gombe and 100 suspects were arrested. The Acting Head of Clinical Services and Training of the Federal Medical Centre, Gombe, Dr Ali Shaliza stated that 71 patients of post-election violence were brought to the hospital. The violence also resulted into about 300 casualties to be attended to by the Red Cross (Sabiou et al, 2011:53). In Bauchi State, 10 Youth Corpers who served as election umpires, a Divisional Crime Officer (DCO) and a policewoman lost their lives. Over 4,500 people were displaced following the mayhem unleashed on the residents of Bauchi of supporters of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Four INEC offices were equally burnt down in Bauchi, Dambam, Misau and Jama'are local government areas while 500 laptops used for the voter registration exercise were looted by the irate youth. Onuorah(2011,p.1).

Factors responsible For Electoral Violence in Nigerian Politics

Critical observations reveal that Nigeria has a very poor political foundation that can enhance and sustain quality political education. Prominent among the factors that militate against such political education include;

Political culture: This refers to historically-based widely-shared beliefs, feelings, and values about political systems, serving as a link between citizens and government. Nigeria is a very highly fragmented society. Each segment has its own belief system and views the government as an alien structure, incapable of uniting the entire people. This makes sustainable democracy difficult.

Ethnicity: This has been a very important factor that has hindered effective political education in Nigeria. It has not only affected the political but also all other aspect of the society. Many efforts towards educating the citizens had yielded poor results. All the ethnic or tribal groups identify their groups more

as a source of pride, and even more importantly as a source of dislike division. **Electoral Crisis:** The electoral history of Nigeria since independence has been a history of crisis. Greed, violence, assassinations, thuggery, vote buying, snatching of ballot boxes, etc. have been a common feature of elections in Nigeria. Credible candidates hardly win elections. Those who win do so at a very high cost, making political office an enterprise investment with the highest bidder making the most gains. This is the main cause of political apathy in the country. **Perception of the Politicians:** A generally held opinion about the politicians is that an average politician is greedy, dishonest and corrupt. People believe that the type of political education that can change this perception is yet to come. **Political Apathy:** This is the indifference on the part of a citizen towards political activities. This begins with a lack of political knowledge to a certain degree which makes it difficult for the individual to see any benefit in participating in political activities. Many Nigerians do not participate either because of the negative opinion they have about politicians or because they regard politics as a dirty game. **Conclusion** From the discussions of this paper, we discovered that the stability of any political system and the durability of its democracy rest on the positive participation of the citizens in the civic and political affairs. The level of participation also depends on how much the citizens are conscious of the socio-political realities of the nation and ability to form independent opinions about their society, however, the political culture of Nigeria and the numerous agents of political socialization have failed to inculcate the right political attitudes in the citizens which is a threat

Unnecessary Political Ambition: Unlike before, Nigerians have become highly politicised.

In fact, the demand to participate in politics keeps on increasing in geometrical progression while the absorbing capacity of these participants increases in arithmetic progression. This leads to a very high competition among the participants who are prone to take the most extreme measure in order to win and maintain political power.

Unemployment: Unemployment also contributes immensely to electoral violence. Many of these people who are jobless enter politics with the intents and purposes of causing confusion.

Monetization of Politics: In the time past, political offices did not attract money as it is today. The government had made politics more financially attractive that nobody wants to engage in any other profession than politics. Thus as it is now, the 109 senators receive N4,066,212,458.00. The 350 members of House of Representatives receive N11,496,523,333.00. The 36 State house of assemblies receive N17,129,465,597.00 while about 600 Councillors receive N74,766,456,000.00 per annum (Audu, 2010: p. 1 and 7).

To combat this ugly phenomenon of electoral violence, government should reduce the salaries and allowances of these political office holders. Nigerians are now aware of this robust pay packets and this is why there is a clamour for a reduction in their salaries and allowances.

Most of these people who enter into politics do so because of financial benefits rather than the services they will render to their wards and constituencies.

Government should provide more jobs for the populace. Provision of jobs should not be treated with levity. This should be treated with all seriousness as millions of people are roaming Nigerian streets without jobs.

People should be educated to seek redress in the court rather than take laws into their hands.

What exist in the nation today is that people cannot accept defeat without exhibiting the act of violence. This is not good for democracy. The former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon realised this when he pointed out that 'Democracy is premised on the ballot box and not on violence' (Ban Ki –moon, 2011:2).

Political education: A Panacea to Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Political education is a form of intentional action. It is guided by objectives and values. Politics is about implementing a moral code. It is about negotiating between a set of interests and objective-fuelled conflicts according to the situation (Sutor, 1999). There is plethora of ways that Nigeria could use curbing electoral violence and strengthen democratic governance. These include constitutional amendment; electoral reform; pressure from civil society groups through agenda-setting; change in the character of the elite; political education etc.

However, the most important of them which is the objective of this paper is: political education. All others rest on its effectiveness. It has been argued at severally that the significance and utility of political education

cannot be over-emphasized. This is because political education is the channel through which the political cultural values and behavioural patterns of the society are imbibed, internalized and serves as an agent of political socialization.

Since education has been identified as a stronghold of a nation-state's development agenda, political education constitutes a herculean task for the several agents of education in Nigeria; namely: the family; peer groups; schools (primary, secondary, and tertiary); religious institutions; civil society organizations and the mass media).

- a. The Family is the bedrock of a child's political socialization. The parental background of the child determines the extent of his/her interest in the political affairs of his/her society. A child who grew up in a family that detests political discussions „may“ naturally detest political participation.
- b. For schools as agent of socialization and social change, the political education that the pupils and students would receive will both in the short and long term deepen our political culture and socialization processes. School has been recognized, world-wide, as a very important agent of socialization. In many countries of the world, political education has been included in the school curriculum. In Nigeria, such subjects are social studies, government, civic education, and citizenship education. All these subjects are intended to enable citizens to acquire the knowledge and skills essential for informed and effective citizenship.
- c. Political parties are also strong agents of political education. They help create awareness of the political situation of the country through debates, campaigns/rallies, symposia, etc. Most people feel the impact of political parties only during election periods. However, political education should not be limited to elections or voting only. It is concerned with the whole activities of man in a society.
- d. Religious organizations and other numerous organizations should also be saddled with the responsibility of carrying out the functions of political education.
- e. The citizens also need to know and appreciate the workings of the nation's election management body (Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC) including the enabling legal framework. This framework outlines the amendment of the 1999 Constitution, the 2010

Electoral Law (Act), and other related regulations and rules to enhance the integrity, relevance, and adequacy of the institutional reform of INEC. That understanding must include citizenship education that encompasses a good understanding of the legal basis of electoral governance with a very useful model that operates at three levels: (a.) rule making; (b.) rule application, and, (c.) rule adjudication (Aiyede, 2008 while quoting Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). This legal basis stipulates the punishment to be meted out to electoral offenders no matter how highly placed.

- f. Politically, and in terms of development, leaders who emerge as products of violence-prone elections are not likely to be the people's choice, and are not likely to consider the peoples' opinion on policies and issues that affect their daily lives. While such leaders lack legitimacy by procedure, they may spend their entire term in office trying to secure legitimacy by results which may lead to necessary people-oriented policies because aggrieved citizens that had suffered mandate theft may withdraw into their cocoon, and from the arena of the state. In this regard, a state that have agenda of development and yearns for sustainable national development should educate its citizenry about the inherent dangers of allowing an entrenched culture of electoral and political violence as part of the features of the political system. Unless this is achieved, the problem of electoral violence may persist in Nigeria.

Nevertheless, it is worthy of mention that the roles of these agencies need to be improved because there are still high level of ignorance and political apathy among the people.

Conclusion

Electoral violence generally refers to violence that is directly or indirectly connected to protest against an election. Nigeria's post-independence history is replete with accounts of incidents of electoral violence. In the contemporary world, elections have become the most accepted means of changing the government. Although history has shown that, it is usually difficult to hold elections that are completely free and fair. The article discussed the phenomenon of electoral violence and the challenge it posed for democratic consolidation. Based on relevant literature, the article

conceptualized electoral violence away from the narrow definition based only on physical dimension of violence. The article identified the prebendal character of the Nigerian elite and their quest to attain or retain public office by all means which make them intolerant of opposing views as the key driver of violence during election. A very important strategy for achieving a stable polity and a durable democracy in Nigeria should be to embark on an aggressive political education that would re-orientate the citizens towards patriotic political values.

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EFFECT OF STATE-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The research was carried out to examine the effect of State-Local Government relations on rural development in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study were to find out the extent to which the operation of state joint local government account has affected the local government in the provision of rural infrastructure; examine how hijacking/ usurpation of local viable tax bases by state government affects local government in promoting the standard of living of rural dwellers and ascertain how administrative control of local government through state agencies challenge local government in addressing the peculiar needs of rural dwellers. The study was anchored on Cooperative Federalism theory. Using the content analytical method, the data were subjected to critical analysis and the following findings were made – that the implementation of state joint local government account has not encouraged provision of rural infrastructure by local government councils in their areas of jurisdiction; that the usurpation of local viable tax bases by state governments has significantly constrained local government in improving the standard of living of rural dwellers and that the administrative control of local governments by state agencies have significantly challenged local government in addressing the peculiar needs of rural dwellers. The study recommended that the local government councils should be allowed direct access to federally allocated revenues so as to meet the infrastructural needs of the rural dwellers; that the local viable tax bases that have been taken over by the state governments should be re-allotted to local governments to boost their internally generated revenue base and there is need for state agencies that exercise overbearing control over the local government councils to be scrapped through constitutional review. These measures are believed to significantly enhance rural development across the lengths and breaths of rural areas in Nigeria.

Keywords: Effect, Rural development, State joint local government account, State-local government relations, Tax base

Introduction

Nigeria is a federation with three tiers of government – the central, state and local government. Like every other country that practices the federal system of government, there is a constitutional division of powers among the levels of government. Although powers and areas of jurisdictions are obviously shared among the tiers of government, there is still room for each of them to interact and interrelate with one another to deepen good governance in the country. The interactions which take place among the levels or units of government could be vertical or horizontal. This relationship is technically known as intergovernmental relations. The idea of intergovernmental relations has become very important in the contemporary period as the stability of the federal system depends on the nature and level of collaboration existing among the federating units as well as units of government. In the words of Anderson (1979), intergovernmental relations is the body of activities or interactions occurring among governmental units of all types of levels within the federal system. He was quick to state that although complexity of intergovernmental relations are obvious features of all federal political system, they are not necessarily restricted only to the federal political system as the complex web of relations could be noticeable in all unitary system.

Iheanacho and Nwachukwu (2014), argued that any meaningful discussion of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria should begin from 1954 when the country became a federal political entity. To Enefiok and Ekpe (2014), the concept of intergovernmental relations has its beginning in the 1950s following the establishment of advisory body on intergovernmental relations. They argued that the establishment of the body became necessary due to numerous and complex problems confronting three levels of government in the heterogeneous society.

The pattern of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria has oscillated from the separated authority model through the inclusive model to the overlapping authority model. These patterns have remained clear reflections of changes in the constitution and form of government whether (military or civilian) in the Nigerian federation. This goes to show that intergovernmental relations is a continuous dynamic process and not a one time occurrence. It

has to be emphasized that fiscal relations is the central issue in intergovernmental relations. However, there are interactions among the levels or units of government in areas of political, administrative and judicial spheres.

There is no gain saying the fact that among the three tiers of government in Nigeria, the local government has been recognised as a viable instrument for rural transformation and delivery of social services to the people at the grassroots level. Local government is often regarded as the government at the grassroots level (Adedire, 2014). According to the United Nations Office for Public Administration cited in Obikeze and Obiora (2012), local government is the political sub-division of a nation or (in a federal system) a state, which is constituted by law and has substantial control over local affairs including the power to impose taxes and exert labour for prescribed purposes. Ogunna (1996:82), sees local government as government at the grassroots which is designed to serve as an instrument for rural development. Put differently, local government exists to bring about rural development.

At the level of vertical relations, the local governments interact with the federal government to obtain their share of federally allocated revenues, grant-in-aid as well as to step down some federal government programmes meant for the standard of living of rural dwellers. This is made possible because local government exists for purpose of bringing national government closer to the people and to make its policies and programmes felt among the rural dwellers who live in the nooks and crannies of the society (Okoli, 1998). In addition, the local government maintains vertical relations with state governments. It is believed that this interaction is imperative for coordination in administration for attainment of effectiveness and efficiency in government business (Nwachukwu, 2003). This may have prompted the crafters of the constitution to make local governments the creatures of the state governments. For instance, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria permits every state to ensure the existence of local government under the law. Such law must provide for the structure, composition, finance and functions of the council in question. Agbor (2004), argued that the supervisory power accorded the state government has further debased the autonomy of local government. It is observed that the pattern of relationship between the state and local governments in Nigeria is a super-ordinate – subordinate relationship as the

state governments have powers of control and supervision over local governments. According to Akinsanya (1995:43),

What seem to have compounded the dilemma of local governments as effective third-tier system of government is the power exercised by the new local government areas and removal of council chairman from office. If state governments can exercise power of control and supervision over local governments; if disbursements of federal statutory allocations to local governments can be suspended or withheld to ensure compliance with state policy and directives; if new local government areas can be created at the pleasure of federal and state government. If additionally, states can conduct inquiries into activities of local government...we cannot strictly speaking continue to talk of local governments as the third tier of government.

The seemingly overbearing control and supervision by the state over the local governments in flagrant abuse of the constitution may be blamed for the development crisis at the rural areas. For instance, section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria allows for democratically elected representative councils but in practice, most of the councils are administered by appointed chairmen or caretaker committees while only very few could boast of democratically elected officials (Onuigbo, 2015). Moreso, Ekpe (2002), noted that the mechanism of the state joint local government account committee is lopsided, and that it is more often being manipulated by most officials in favour of state government. The situation that local governments have found themselves has made it almost impossible for them to be responsive to the peculiar needs and aspirations of the rural dwellers. In other words, rural development has continued to elude rural dwellers. In the words of Essang and Idachaba (1981) cited in Adedire (2014), rural development implies a means for the provision of basic amenities, infrastructure, improved agriculture productivity and extension services and employment generation for rural dwellers. The indicators of rural development include among others – appreciable level of economic development, quality of life, access to opportunities, facilities and amenities, standard of living and general viability in rural areas. In laying bare the situation of development in rural areas, Onuigbo (2015), maintained that

there is no visible development in practically all the 774 councils in Nigeria. Their physical and social infrastructures are still as dilapidated as ever. The standard of living of the rural dwellers has continued to decline; thus, leading to mass exodus of able-bodied men from rural areas to urban areas with the hope for better living conditions thereby overstressing available amenities in our various cities. It is against the above backdrop that this study becomes imperative to examine the implications of the relationship existing between the state and local governments on rural development.

Statement of the Problem

It is apposite to state that intergovernmental relations is the hallmark of federal system of government. According to Wheare (1963), who is credited to be the father of federalism- a federal state is one in which the central (national) and state (federating) governments are co-ordinate such that neither tier of government (central-state/regional) is subordinate to the other in legal authority (Jinadu, 2003). In other words, it is the political division of powers, authority and jurisdiction between the federating units so that each within its area of jurisdiction is independent of the other level of government. In Nigeria, we have basically three levels of government provided for in the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. However, the constitution made the local governments creatures of the state. Thus, section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “The government of every state shall subject to section 8 of this constitution ensure that their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils”.

As we noted earlier on, overall development cannot materialize without interactions among the tiers of government in any federation, Nigeria inclusive. This underscores the importance of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria. Intergovernmental relations ensures that policies and programmes by higher levels of government directed towards alleviation of poverty, rapid infrastructural development and increase in agricultural productivity are stepped down to the area that matters – rural area. As Nigeria is a mono-economic country which depends on proceeds from the sale of oil, such funds that are statutorily kept in the federation account ought to be shared among the tiers of government using approved sharing formula. Moreover, intergovernmental relations involves legal, functional and administrative interactions. The nature and number of the levels of governmental powers

and responsibilities tend to determine the patterns of relationship among them (Obiora, 2014). It is believed that intergovernmental relations are the responses that have been developed to facilitate cooperative policy making among divided government within a federal system.

However, state-local government relations is an aspect of intergovernmental relations which is very significant because its effects are mostly received by people that reside in the rural areas. The constitution has not only made local government a tier of government with relative autonomy to operate but also vests in the state government the power to ensure its creation, functions and finance. The bottom line of this arrangement is to make state and local governments responsive to the peculiar and local needs of the people in their areas of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, what is seen in most states of the federation is the subordination of local governments to the superior powers of state governments. On the part of federal allocation to the local governments, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 162(6) provided for the establishment of state joint local government account. This account is believed to serve as a mechanism that could encourage fiscal federalism at the local government level. Ahmad et al (2013), revealed that majority of state governments made some unnecessary deductions and more often diverted the funds to other areas of personal interest instead of development of local government areas. He went further to argue that this situation has contributed significantly to the abysmal performance of local government in initiating and implementing rural development programmes. Similarly, Okafor (2010) cited in Ahmad et al (2013), noted that state governments have used the state joint local government account to hold local governments hostage and make them appendages of the state. In practice, the operation of the joint account has denied local governments their financial autonomy. The diversion of funds belonging to local government has therefore deprived them of their rightful allocations that are very critical to embarking on infrastructural projects to address the infrastructural deficits in the rural areas. This may have explained the poor condition of rural infrastructures in most of the rural areas in Nigeria. Feeder roads are still deplorable, rural electricity appears to be non-existent and where it exists, it is always in bad shape, portable water supply has remained a scarce commodity, etc in most rural areas.

It is noteworthy that state governments have taken over viable tax bases while leaving the unviable ones to the local governments to exploit. The

tax bases, in most cases, do not yield enough revenue with which the councils could deploy to enhance the standard of living of rural dwellers. This situation has been responsible for the somewhat overdependence of local governments on federal allocations as well as state governments for financial assistance and supports. The inadequacy of internally generated revenues have worsened the financial interactions between the local and state government as local government chief executives go cap in hand to beg the state governments for help. To worsen the matter, the internal revenue drives of local governments are not commendable. Most council chairmen often fail to effectively exploit even the unviable tax bases as they endlessly wait for both federal and state allocations. Thus, any fluctuation in their federal allocations always throw them off balance as it concerns meeting their basic obligations to their workers not to talk of improving the standard of living of the people.

Furthermore, the control and supervision of local governments by state governments through the Ministry of Local Government and State local government service commission have been anything but desirable. These state organs have continued to trample on what is left with the relative autonomy bestowed to the councils by the constitution. They have been in the vanguard of encouraging and ensuring that local governments identify with uniform state government policies and programmes with flagrant neglect of peculiar needs and aspirations of rural dwellers. This situation may have been responsible for imposition of projects and programmes on the people, which oftentimes run counter to their pressing needs of the people. The above situation may have been possible due to flagrant abuse of constitutional provisions by state governments in their interactions with local governments.

Objectives of the Study

The main aim of this study is to examine the implications of state-local government relations on rural development in Nigeria. However, the specific objectives of the study include –

1. To find out the extent to which state joint local government account has encouraged provision of rural infrastructure by local government.
2. To examine how hijacking/usurpation of local viable tax bases by state government affect local government in promoting the standard of living of rural dwellers.

3. To ascertain how administrative control of local government through state agencies challenge local government in addressing the peculiar needs of rural dwellers.

Theoretical Framework

The theory adopted for this study is Cooperative Federalism theory otherwise known as marble cake. The theory was coined in the 1930s. It was espoused by Corwin (1941). The theory of cooperative federalism places emphasis on the fact that the relationship between the federal (national) government and the states is one in which all governmental functions should be jointly performed by federal and states including the local governments as well as agencies, rather than exclusively by one level of government. Sharing of power characterizes a cooperative federalism instead of an exclusive sovereignty at either level of government and power tends not to concentrate at either level, or in any one agency as the fragmented and shared nature of responsibilities gives citizens and interest groups "access" to many centres of influence.

Cooperative federalism is a modern phenomenon. According to Corwin (1941) the main features of the theory include - sharing of policy responsibilities and financial resources, interdependence of administration, overlapping of functions (associated mainly with the federal grant-in-aid programs). Collaborative grants-in-aid from the national government to the states, bypassing of the states through establishment of grant programs aiding local governments directly, and development of auditing procedures and conditional grant requirements. The emphasis here is on cooperation between the levels of government in a federation. Such cooperation is necessary for the proper functioning of the overlapping functions and responsibilities of these governments. As such, in cooperative federalism, the various units of government have interdependent relationship among themselves despite the constitutional division of powers and the provisions for independence and autonomy (Eleazar, 1991). Critical to cooperative federalism is its view of the supremacy clause, which says the highest law is the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties, and these laws must be obeyed when in conflict with state laws.

It has been argued that the emergence of cooperative federalism signifies that the old-style federalism is "dead" and displaced by "intergovernmental relations". Thus, the tension, pretensions at autonomy, and the notion of separateness of responsibilities that characterized governance in

the old-style federalism no longer form part of the reality of the federal system.

The relevance of the theory is that there should be interdependence and cooperation existing between the local governments and other levels of government because no government can effectively function in isolation. The higher levels of government should shun the overbearing attitude of lording it over the local governments by denying them viable internally revenue sources as well as usurpation of the councils' share of the federation account. The nature of relationship that ought to exist between the state and local government should be based on partnership/cooperation. This is because the local government exists to extend the presence of government to the grassroots. It is the local government councils that could step down some beneficial policies and programmes of the state government for the good life of the rural people. Unfortunately, in Nigerian situation, the local governments have continually existed as servants to the state governments, who are condemned to receive any manner of directives or development programmes for implementation in their respective areas of jurisdiction. Moreso, state governments have been in vanguard of usurping the funds allotted to the local governments from the federation account. It has equally shied away from fulfilling their constitutional obligation of making 10% contributions to the local governments from their internally generated revenues. This situation has been largely blamed for the poor state of rural development which stare everyone on the face.

Conceptual Clarifications

Concept of Intergovernmental Relations

Intergovernmental relations is imperative in view of the fact that government exists for the good life of the people. There is no doubt that intergovernmental relations is mostly associated with federal system of government, that is not to say that it could not be observed in a unitary system of government. This is so because it allows for interactions among levels and units of government in order to address perceived yearnings and aspirations of the people. However, examination of the concept will suffice here. Anderson (1979), sees intergovernmental relations as a term intended to designate an important body of activities or interactions occurring among government units of all types of levels within the federal system. To extricate himself from avoidable criticisms on the definition, he quickly averred that

intergovernmental relations could to a reasonable extent be observed in the unitary political systems. To Adewale (1995), intergovernmental relations embrace three perspectives – political, social and economic efforts of government and various bodies in the state directed towards the enhancement of public goals and objectives. Implicit in his notion is the fact that intergovernmental relations is a complex web of transactions among constituents and various bodies in the state geared towards attainment of government objectives. According to Dare (1979), intergovernmental relations refers to different layers of government cutting across each other's domain of specific authorities and in which they interact cooperatively and or conflictually to achieve parochial and collective objectives of divisional and general government. This definition appears to capture the situation as it happens in Nigeria. More often than not, we observe some levels of government in the course of interactions attempting to intimidate or humiliate lower level so as to gain undue advantage over it. This kind of relationship is best described as master-servant relationship. Intergovernmental relations is perceived as the level of positive or negative interactions and transactions among the various levels and units of government (Ahmad, Abubakar and Mohammed, 2013). They added that the expansion of government activities has made it not to be fashionable for government to operate in isolation. Therefore, the scope of intergovernmental relations has expanded to embrace socio-political and economic issues that touch on the lives of government and citizens. The interactions could be vertical or horizontal.

Models of Intergovernmental Relations

Many scholars have advanced several models of intergovernmental relations. Perhaps, the most widely accepted models are espoused by Deil S. Wright in 1978. According to him, the models are –

- a. **Separate/Coordinate Authority** – In this model, both the federal and state governments are independent and autonomous while the local governments are subordinated to the states (regions/provinces). Nigeria experimented with this model between 1954-1966 (Enefiok and Ekpe, 2014). This model has become inappropriate and undesirable because it has been addressed to non-existent political conditions.
- b. **Overlapping Model** – This model guarantees independence between the three levels of government and equally necessitates political bargains between them. Akinsanya (1989), indentified three basic

features of this model. First, substantial areas of government functions involve federal, state and local government units simultaneously. Second, the areas of autonomy and full discretion are comparatively small. Third, the power and influence available to any one jurisdiction is significantly small. Nigeria experienced it within the Second Republic to 1979.

- c. **The Inclusive Model** – This model implies that states and local governments are minors or agents or mere appendages to the federal government. The power and influence of the federal government are ubiquitous and supreme. This model characterized the era of military rule in Nigeria from 1975-1998.

State-Local Government Relations: An Overview

Before the 1976 local government reforms, local government was historically at the mercy of the state governments as it is captured by the Dillion's Principle. The kind of relations existing between the state and local governments could be termed master-servant relations rather than ideal co-equality (Iheanacho and Nwachukwu, 2014). This situation allowed for uncontrolled interference of states in the internal affairs of local governments thereby undermining the essence of local government.

However, Onwusi (2011:662), articulated the bases of relationship between the state and local government in Nigeria. They are –

- a. **Establishment** – Though the constitution in section 7(1) guarantees a system of democratically elected local government, the state is given the power to make laws that will provide for their establishment, structure, composition, functions and finance. The implication of the foregoing is that local governments are creatures of the state government inspite of the fact that they are listed in the constitution including their functions.
- b. **Fiscal Basis** – Section 162(6) and (7) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provide that each shall maintain State Joint Local Government Account into which money standing to the credit of the local governments from the federal account shall be paid and 10% of the state internally generated revenue for the benefits of local governments within the state in keeping with the formula approved by the state Houses of Assembly. This fiscal relationship mechanism has been flagrantly abused by the states as a lot of them

take undue advantage of it to manipulate the finances of local government. Moreso, Enefiok and Ekpe (2014), argued that most state governments have bluntly refused to fulfil their statutory obligation of giving to local governments 10% of their internally generated revenue.

- c. **Economic Planning and Development** – Section 7(3) of the 1999 Constitution stipulates that the state Houses of Assembly should pass a law establishing Economic Planning Boards to facilitate the participation of the local governments in the economic planning and development of the state. This relationship is believed to be mutually beneficial to both the state and local governments.
- d. **Joint Funding of Projects** – In view of the lean resources available to local government, some viable projects that are beneficial to the local government could be jointly financed by the local government and the state. This collaboration is capable of bringing rapid development and transformation of the concerned local governments.
- e. **Administration** – The administrative relationship between the local government and state could be clearly perceived from the supervisory role of the state governments on the councils. The state uses such organs as the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters and Local Government Service Commission. The commission is charged with personnel functions for senior staff of the local government.
- f. **Legal Service** – The state through the Ministry of Justice deploys counsels who assist local governments to draft and process their legal document including their bye-laws.
- g. **Training and Orientation** – This is usually done through either the Ministry of Local Government or Local Government Service Commission.
- h. **Conduct of Election** – The state independent electoral commissions are state organs that conduct elections in the local governments in keeping with the 1999 Constitution.

Effect of State-Local Government Relations on Rural Development

Before delving into the discussion proper, we shall first of all conceptualize rural development. Rural development has received variegated definitions from scholars. Obinne (1991) cited in Adedire (2014), sees rural development as the process of creating and widening opportunities for

individuals to realize their potentials through education and share in decision and action which affect their lives. Ebong (1973), opined that rural development implies the enhanced capacities of society as manifested by increases in the living standards of people and greater self-actualization. It is also seen as a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of the rural people who are mainly poor and consists of mainly peasant farmers and tenants.

However, the impact of state-local government relations has been enormous on rural development. This is because it has the capacity to make or mar rural socio-economic transformation. To start with, the constitution that has empowered the states to ensure the establishment, structure, finance and functions of the local governments has succeeded in giving subordinate status to the local governments. Put differently, the envisaged autonomy which the 1976 Reforms sought to introduce has been denied the councils. Thus, our local governments have become agents of the state governments which are ever ready to do any kind of bidding from the state government thereby stifling development at the rural areas.

Moreso, the State Joint Local Government Account has become a vehicle through which states hijack funds allocated to the local governments. It is a common knowledge that state governments effect all manners of deductions from source with little or nothing left for the councils to initiate and implement life touching projects for rural dwellers. This may have explained the sorry state of social and physical infrastructures in our rural areas.

Furthermore, the excessive control of the local government via the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters and the Local Government Service Commission has swiftly discouraged the elected and appointed officials of the councils from feeling the pulses of the people. The control has made local government to be docile so that it receives any kind of centrally approved development strategies and programmes that are far from peculiar yearnings and aspirations of the people. The idea of uniformity and coordination in projects/programmes' initiation and implementation across rural areas as emphasized by advocates of state government's control through its agencies runs counter to peculiarity of needs of rural areas/dwellers which calls for bottom top approach in rural development.

Lastly, elections into the local government councils have been roundly handled by governors. It is alleged that they usually handpick contestants

whom they must return at the polls through the instrumentality of state independent electoral commission to steer the ship of leadership at the local government level. The implication of this development is that the so called elected officials are oftentimes responsive and responsible to the governor rather than the people who are entrusted in their care. The council officials tend to serve the governors instead of the rural people.

Contextual Review

Nigeria is a federation of 36 states with 774 local government areas. As a federal state, intergovernmental relations has remained its hallmark. Thus, we have the following levels of intergovernmental relations: federal-state relations, federal-local relations, state-state relations, state-local relations and local-local relations. Among all these complex web of relations, the state-local government interactions have continued to receive attention of scholars who have flair for rural development. The overwhelming interest is due mainly to the fact that local government is the tier of government that is closer to the rural dwellers, which promotes grassroots development. It is argued that development could not be meaningful if it fails to get to the door steps of rural dwellers (Adedire, 2014). This because a significant size of the population about 70% lives in the rural areas where local government as a third level of government in intergovernmental relations is primarily responsible for provision of physical, social and public services to the people (Ekpe, Daniel and Martha, 2013). It is generally believed that state-local government relations has been largely blamed for stagnation and deterioration in the rural areas where the bulk of the Nigerian population reside.

It has to be pointed out that before the coming on board of the 1976 Local Government Reforms, the local governments in Nigeria lacked uniform structure and as such performed variegated functions. According to Onwe (2004), there were several types of local governments in the country. In the West, there were three types of local government known as Divisional councils, district councils and local councils while in the Eastern region, there were the County councils and local councils. Thus, some local governments were more powerful than others. In addition, they were perceived as instruments for local administration by regional governments. In other words, local governments were mere appendages or agents of the regional (state) governments as they lacked autonomy both financially and administratively.

However, the 1976 Local Government Reforms as well as its subsequent entrenchment in the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria granted local government a third-tier status (Odalonu, 2015). Consequently, local government became a uniformed multi-purpose single tier government. With these legal instruments, the local government automatically was independent/interdependent of other tiers of government. The local governments were also to receive allocation and other grants from the federation account including 10% of the state's internally generated revenue. Unfortunately, only very few states honoured the provision. Infact, some states forced some local government councils to make contributions for the provision of some services like primary education (Usman and Erunke, 2014).

However, some provisions of the constitution pertaining to state-local government relations have been differently interpreted or misinterpreted in the course of implementation which oftentimes undermines the relative autonomy of the local government councils. It is unarguable that some state governments have serially abused the constitution especially as it relates to their interactions with local government councils to the effect that local governments have become mere appendage to the state with its attendant adverse implications on rural development. Today, our rural areas are now shadows of themselves as there are little signs of rural development.

Empirical Review

Onuigbo (2015), in a study entitled "State-Local Government Fiscal Relations: Implications for Local Government System" examined the nature and relationship between state-local government fiscal relations in Nigeria. The content analytical method was adopted as data were mainly generated from secondary sources such as articles from reputable journals, newspapers, official publications, etc. The study revealed among others that the laws made by the state houses of assembly to bring the state joint local government account into force are usually tilted to favour the state thereby compounding the already distressed financial positions of the councils; that the key officers of the joint account committee as state government representatives who function on the directive of the chief executive with little or no control from the council chairmen who are the real owners of the funds; that substantial amounts of the joint account are deducted from source by state government in the guise of joint projects or any other contrived reasons. The study however

recommended that section 7 and the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria be amended to give the local governments more autonomy so as to shield them from the excessive control of the state governments; that target financing should be adopted in financing projects in the local governments; that more viable tax sources should be transferred to the local government and finally, that a National Commission should be set up to monitor federal, state and local governments relations in Nigeria.

Adedire (2014), carried out a study entitled “Local Government and the Challenges of Rural Development in Nigeria (1999 to date).” The main objective of the study was to examine challenges of local government in rural development from 1999 to date. The methodology used in the study is content analysis with overwhelming data generated from secondary sources. The study revealed that local governments were faced with challenges of inadequate finance, corruption, poor implementation of projects, lack of involvement of rural dwellers in policy decisions and hijack of local government allocation by the state government among others. The study therefore, recommended an upward review of statutory allocations to local government councils as well as direct disbursement of funds to local government, better welfare package to workers and open administration that encourages local participation, etc.

Usman and Erunke (2014), carried out a research titled “State-Local Government Relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: An Assessment of the (1999 -2010) Experience.” The study examined the chequered relationship that has existed between the state and local governments in this current dispensation in Nigeria. The study relied heavily on secondary source for data collection and analysis. It was found that the place of local government councils as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is honoured in breach; that the local government councils have been highly politicized by the powers that be and that the true position of the constitution on the status of the local government councils is greatly in doubt. On the basis of the foregoing, the study concludes that greater autonomy, consensus building, adequate constitutional obligations should be granted to local government councils to enhance overall best practices and grassroots transformation.

Enefiok and Ekpe (2014), in their study entitled “Local Government in intergovernmental relations in Nigeria: Effects on Governance and Project Implementation” assessed the effect of intergovernmental relations on the governance and project implementation by local government. The study adopted historical and descriptive approach in data collection. The study found

that right from 1954-1979, local governments have been subjected to all kinds of control by other tiers of government; that even with the 1976 local government reforms, the status quo still remains; that the lopsided relations has impacted negatively on good governance and by extension inability to implement life touching projects. Based on the foregoing revelations, it was recommended that local government should be allowed to function as government with minimal control from the state governments; that section 7(1) of the present 1999 Constitution as amended be altered so that local governments should be constitutionally created and not state.

Discussion of Findings

It is argued that local government is primarily established to bring government presence closer to rural dwellers by engaging in aggressive rural development programmes to address the numerous peculiar needs of the people. Unfortunately, the local government councils have performed poorly in that regards owing to the pattern of intergovernmental relations that exists between the local government councils and state governments.

It has been observed that local governments have overtime remained at the mercy of state government in the provision of infrastructure in the rural areas. The state governments have continued to give them directives on the nature and type of infrastructure to be sited in the rural areas. Oftentimes, the state approved infrastructure usually run counter to the infrastructural needs of the rural people. The implication of the foregoing is usually lack of support of rural dwellers and rural institutions to both the project teams and the sited projects. As rural dwellers are not comfortable with such imposed projects, they do everything to frustrate the projects. The materials and other essential tools for the projects are usually vandalized and in extreme cases stolen by some unscrupulous elements in the rural areas.

In addition, there has been excessive control of local government councils by state government through state joint local government account. It has to be pointed out that state joint local government account was initially designed to serve as a mechanism for ensuring adequate revenue to local government (fiscal federalism at local government level), which is critical to the performance of the local government councils. Unfortunately, Gboyega (1989), observed that the present mechanisms of state joint local government account committee is always lopsided, and that it is more often being manipulated by most officials in favour of the state government. Majority of

state governments have made some unnecessary deductions and more often diverted the funds to other areas of personal interest (Ahmad et al 2013). They further argued that the relationship between state and local government is more of domination and hijacking of local government funds through state joint local government account. Although, it is provided in the constitution that states should pay 10% of the internally generated revenue to local government councils, very few states have honoured the provision. The implication of the foregoing is that state governments have unfortunately turned the interactions between them and local governments to an avenue where they often divert significant part of the federally allocated revenues for benefit of their local governments. This singular situation has significantly condemned the local government councils to be shadows of themselves as they have continued to perform poorly in addressing the deplorable infrastructural conditions in their domains. The feeder roads have become death trap even as primary health care facilities have remained comatose. Rural electricity is still non-existent and where it exists, it is in bad shape. The socio-economic development in the rural areas has been moving in an awkward snail pace.

Again, the most viable local tax bases that yield substantial revenues have been taken over by state governments with unviable tax bases left to the councils for exploitation. This arrangement was arguably perfected through the instrumentality of state laws that establish local government councils. The implication of the foregoing is that local governments have continued to heavily rely on both the federal allocations, grants-in-aids and other supports from state governments to meet its basic obligations especially payment of workers' salaries. In most cases, any fluctuations in the federation allocation always adversely affect the local governments in meeting salary obligations of their workforce. The poor internal generated revenue capacities of local government have been blamed for the inability of local government councils to address the poor standard of living of rural dwellers. Human development index has continued to show that rural dwellers usually live below poverty line. Specifically, poverty is usually high, there is still high death rate arising from preventable diseases. Maternal and infant morbidity are still on the high side in the rural areas.

In addition, the state governments in their relationships with the local governments have used various state agencies such as Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters, State Local Government Service

Commission and Office of the Deputy Governor to exert undue control over the local government. It has been argued that such state agencies would encourage uniformity in the performance of their (local governments) functions. The above position appears to be misleading in view of the fact that local governments are established in order to resolve peculiar needs of rural dwellers in each state of the federation. The peculiarity implies that the needs of rural people can never be the same; hence, any approach adopted to ensure uniformity in the provision of local public goods and services becomes an aberration. This situation has continued to undermine the relative autonomy of the councils as uniform and centrally determined programmes at state level are performed by all the local government councils. All these issues have been blamed for the inability of the local governments to address the peculiar specific needs of rural dwellers in their areas of jurisdiction.

Conclusion

The local governments are created to bring government to the door steps of the people. This is to ensure that peculiar needs and aspirations of the rural dwellers are met. In addition, local governments have equally functioned at the vehicle through which policies and programmes of both federal and state governments are stepped down for benefit of rural dwellers. Overtime, it has been realized that meaningful rural development cannot be achieved without local governments. This is so because people at the rural areas have their peculiar needs, which can best be articulated by the local government councils for purpose of addressing them for the good life of the people. It is equally argued that with effective interactions between the state and local government, there is high tendency for rapid development to be actualized at the rural areas. Unfortunately, it is observed that state governments have firmly maintained their grips on the local government to the extent that the local government councils appear to have lacked initiative on how to bring about rural development as they tend to wholly rely on state governments for guidance and direction, thus the poor state of development in the rural areas.

Recommendations

Arising from the foregoing obvious observations, we however recommend as follows –

1. The local government councils should be allowed direct access to federally allocated revenues so as to meet the infrastructural needs of

the rural dwellers. Therefore, State Local Government Joint Account should be repealed through constitutional amendment.

2. Since finance is known as the life wire of any organization, local governments should intensify efforts in increasing their internally generated revenue.
3. The local viable tax bases that have been taken over by the state governments should be re-allotted to local governments to boost their internally generated revenue base.
4. Local government councils in Nigeria as a matter of urgency should be granted relative autonomy with a view to ending the current master-servant relationship that exists between the state and local governments.
5. There is need for state agencies that exercise overbearing control over the local government councils to be scrapped through constitutional review.
6. The notion of ensuring uniformity in the local government councils' provision of physical and social amenities by state government should be jettisoned and should rather be replaced with monitoring of activities of local government to check corruption and other unwholesome practices in the process of local government administration of development programmes and projects.

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INTERNAL PARTY DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA AND GHANA

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Abstract

Political parties are fundamental and incontrovertible tenets of modern political processes. As a result, they are considered vital and essential to the development of consolidating democracy particularly to the current wave of democratization in Africa. In short their ability to internalize democratic principles appropriately is an indispensable condition for the consolidation of democracy. Therefore, the study examined the nexus between internal party democracy and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. Despite the fact that numerous scholars have interrogated electoral administration, civil society organizations, and even political parties as factors accounting for the differences in democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana, yet little attention have been paid on how absence of internal party democracy among Nigerian political parties accounts for the difference in democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana as regards free and fair elections, party ideology. In this manner, the study ascertained how absence of internal party democracy accounts for the difference in democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. Methodologically, the paper significantly appropriated qualitative method and data were generated through the secondary sources of data collection and analyzed in content. The study adopted the theory of post-colonial states. Also, the study noted that lack of party ideology in Nigeria unlike in Ghana has led to bitterness and rancor in Nigeria especially during regime change, that the appointment of candidates by Godfathers especially in Nigeria has enhanced corruption more in Nigeria than in Ghana and also that the profound rigging of party primaries in Nigeria than in Ghana has increased electoral violence in Nigeria than in Ghana. It recommended among

others, the promotion of internal party democracies among political parties not just in Nigeria but in both countries, the eschewing of the practice of Godfathers in party politics.

Keywords: *Political Party, Internal Democracy, Democratic Consolidation, Godfathers, electoral administration.*

Introduction

Political parties are fundamental and incontrovertible tenets of modern day political processes. It is an indisputable fact that they are considered integral and central to the process of consolidating democracy particularly to the current wave of democratization in Africa, in terms of its transition or restoration, where democracy was absent or was scuttled, and consolidation, where there exist democratic institutions but requires to be strengthened (Huntington 1993; Diamond, 1999, Young, 2000). For as Diamond (1997) observed that political parties remain important if not essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidate for office; organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective government, and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process.

As a result of their centrality to the consolidation of democracy, the health and vibrancy of political parties are genuinely encouraged by scholars and international organization (Omotola 2006). International organizations have come to agree that political parties are essential to the efficient and proper functioning of democracy. Also they posited that political parties are instrumental for democratizing and consolidating democracy (Diamond and Gunther 2001; Scarrow, 2005; Freedom House, 2010; Afrobarometer, 2014).

Democratic consolidation for Schedler (1998) entails the challenges of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual “reverse waves” “To render democracy” “the only game in town”, political parties are not synonymous with democracy (Bratton, 1999) yet they are important to the extent that neither democracy non-democratic society can exist without them (Omotola, 2010). These invariably prompted, Katz (1999) to conclude that modern democracy is party democracy; the political institutions and practices that are the essence of democratic government are creations of political parties and

would be unthinkable without them. Although, political parties have been identified as the weakest link in the democratization of many countries, old and young, including some consolidated democracies (Aleyomi, 2014) argues that political parties are reputed and makers of democracy because they dynamics and manifestations of political parties are by all standards one of the most outstanding and distinguishing elements of democratic consolidation (Omotola, 2010). However, for political parties to perform the above functions, the quality of its internal democracy matters. This is because the quality of democracy within political parties impacts the overall quality of democracy in a state. Political parties are the building blocks of a democratic structure and if parties become subservient to individuals, and decisions are taken undemocratically without involving the decision-making structures within the party, the national democratic system become hostage to a few individual (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2014).

However, despite the existence and activities of political parties with their various organizational structures in Nigeria and Ghana and the strong premium placed on them as institutions processing the capacity to deepen and consolidate democracy in both states, democracy in Ghana have fared better than in Nigeria (Skanning, 2008; AfroBarometer, 2006; Freedom House, 2011). This assertion is based on how peaceful, free, fair and creditable the electoral process in Ghana has been when compared with that of Nigeria since 1999. These dissimilarities in democratic consolidation in terms of free, fair and creditable election in countries have been traced to the existence and activities of political parties among several factors (Majeed, 2011, Oladipupo, 2011). Therefore, it is against this backdrop that this study examines the nexus between internal party democracy IPD and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. In particular, it seeks to unravel how IPD accounts for the discernable differences in democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana and also to x-ray factors that cause the difference in IPD in both countries with the aim to pin-point useful lessons that can boost democratic growth in both countries and the overall development of Africa.

Political parties play a critical role in the consolidation of democracy. It is also indisputable that political parties are keys to the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy. This sustainable democracy is dependent upon well-functioning and effective political parties. Democracy is unthinkable without political parties and conversely, political parties cannot

add value to a political system under condition of authoritarianism (Carbone, 2009). To be sure, there is widespread agreement among scholars that political parties motorize the process of democratic consolidation in third wave democracies, particularly in Africa (Huntington, 1993, Bartton & Van de Walle, 1999, Young, 2005, Lindberg, 2007). Yet African parties operate in a challenging environment given the socio- economic conditions and the multi-ethnic makeup of their respective countries. As a result they are seen as devoid of ideological coherence, heavily personality driven and relying on an ethnic support base (Carothers, 2006). In similar vein, Bogaards (2000, 2004) raised doubts about the ability of African political parties to constructively contribute to the process of democratization. This is because political parties in Africa are less organized, insufficiently institutionalized and are unable to provide a visionary leadership for their own countries. Even though political parties in culture in society yet they have fail abysmal woefully in this regard (Khabele, 2005). Corroborating this view, Chinsinga & Chigona (2010) observed that political parties in Africa are nothing but channels of resource distribution, patronage, upward mobility and expressions of indigenous and ethnic aspirations. To this end, negates the process of democratic consolidation.

Moreover Nigeria and Ghana join the democratization train with the same period. Although Ghana transited to democracy in 1992, while Nigeria followed suit in 1999. Yet, Ghana has fared better than Nigeria as regards free, fair and credible elections. To this end, there exist developmental dissimilarities in democratization in both countries (Mimpen, 2009; Elischer, 2010; Khabele, 2005; Chinsinga & Chigona, 2010). There is a broad consensus domestically and internationally that Ghana is on the right track in the process of democratization when compared with other West African countries given her free, fair, credible elections and insignificant level of party wrangling and defections (Elischer, 2010; Gyimah-Boadi, 2010; Quaye, 2012; Karim, 2014). In fact, Elischer (2010, p. 34) noted that:

In Ghana, both the current governing party and increasingly also its opposition have engaged in closely fought competitions over party positions as well as national office. Both have accepted electoral outcomes without resorting to electoral fraud, it is interesting to note in this context that a party's relationship to intra-party democracy reflects its interaction with democratic procedures in general: Parties which are democratic internally also accept democracy as 'the only game in town' Nigeria, on the other hand has received fewer encomiums from domestic and foreign writers on democratic

consolidation (Lewis, 2009, Rakner & Savasand, 2004, Omotola, 2010, Mbah, 2011).

To be specific, Mbah (2011), lamented that lack of internal democracy in Nigerian political parties has become a persistent threat to the country's nascent democracy. Party primaries throughout the country clearly show that Nigeria political parties are not operating within norms of democratic principles. Various political parties have failed to adopt the provisions of the party's constitutions to all party members who are eligible and want to run for office in their party primaries. Some candidates were imposed on the party without election and due process.

Furthermore, as far back as 2006, AfroBarometer (2006), ranked Ghana as first among others West Africa countries with an excellent grade (71%) whose citizens believed in her democratic process. It is this observed difference in democratic consolidation between 2003 and 2015 in both countries as regards free, fair and creditable elections and insignificant level of internal party squabbles that justify the period of study. Although, previous comparative studies on democratic consolidation in sub-Sahara Africa, particularly in Nigeria and Ghana (Rakner & Savasand, 2004; Omeiza, 2010, Mimpfen, 2009, Elischer, 2010 Khabele, 2005; Chinsinga & Chigona, 2010; Omotola, 2010; Majeed, 2011; Oladipupuo 2011), posited that both countries do differ considerably in democratic consolidation as a result of strong and vibrant civil society organizations, electoral institutions and political institutions in Ghana than in Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

The framework of analysis adopted for this study is Marxist theory of the post-colonial state. This theory is an off-shoot of the classical Marxist political economy approach. The major tenets of the theory of post-colonial state are generated from the works of Ekeh (1972) Alavi, (1973); Ake, (1985); Ekekwe, (1986); who among others are the Marxist epigenists that have contributed to the explanation and understanding of the character of states in the periphery.

The central focus of the theory is on understanding the nature, structure, history, composition and character of the (Nigerian and Ghanaian) state in order to ascertain the dynamics of political development and processes within the state and this dynamics include political parties and democratic consolidation with their various manifestations. They argued that it is the state

that occupies the center stage of politics and therefore is the major determinant of the most societal processes including political parties and democratic consolidation. The theory suggests that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism.

The relationship between democracy of political parties and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana from 2003-2015 is better explained in the light of neo-Marxian theory of post-colonial state. This framework unravels the hidden relation that influences the internal working of political parties and how it affects differently in the process of democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. The importance of this approach in interrogating IPD of political parties and democratic consolidation in both countries lies in the following.

First, this theory enables us to go beyond analyses whose account are limited to the features, origin, types and potentials of political parties and their role in the process of democratic consolidation. The theory mirrors vividly the actual conditions and organizational structure of political parties and its implications for democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana because it is the nature and character of the Nigerian and Ghanaian states that ultimately control and influence political parties and also account for the difference in democratic consolidation. This view was corroborated by Aiyede (2005), noted that in this context, political parties can hardly be institutionalized as it becomes vulnerable to the overarching character of the state as the dominant employer, bearer of opportunities for upward social mobility, and manipulator. Although both states are post-colonial states, however, there exist a difference in the nature and character of both states.

- **Political Corruption and Selection of Party Candidates**

The process of selecting candidates by political parties is a strong indicator of IPD in party democracy. To this end, Mimpfen (2009) argues that organizing free, fair and regular elections of internal positions, as well as candidates for representative bodies by political parties is a fundamental aspect of IPD. According to IDEA (2007) the selection of candidates is one of the hallmarks of IPD yet this vital attribute is lacking among political parties in Africa. In this context, Mwakyembe (1994) noted that African political parties are not democratic; they exclude ordinary, mostly uneducated people from the political process, and are elitist and non-transparent. In some cases, non-elected wealthy and powerful party members collude with the state to control

the party, thus creating a situation in which the legislative or political checks and balances on the executive are muted.

The above scenarios have characterized the selection of party candidates more in Nigeria than Ghana. For example, the recent selection/election of Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari by PDP and APC respectively conforms to the above assertion. To this end, candidates are more predisposed towards settling political Godfathers than working for the masses thereby fueling corruption. Similarly, the activities of godfather in political parties render the parties ineffectively in the process of discharging their responsibilities. These godfather impact negatively on democracy by restricting citizen participation as a voter or candidate. Also in an undemocratic way, they imposed candidates' right from local level to national level, on agreement that they surrender the state treasury to them (Omotola, 2007). These kinds of agreement explain why the divided of democracy becomes mirage in our society. Thus, democracy has no meaning once it failed to improve on the life of citizens. The legitimacy of leaders whose selection fallout of democratic norms are highly questionable at the expense of national stability. On the other hand, since Ghana returned to democracy, the selection process of candidates for party internal position and for representative positions has over time become democratic. According to Elischer (2008: 149) that:

NPP congresses have proven to be closely contested, defiant of orders from above and thus somewhat unpredictable. The NDC on the other hand experienced democratic contests only after 2000. Before Rawling's departure from the Presidency individuals were pre-selected for specific positions. While most observers saw in the chairmanship of Obed Asamoah a turn toward greater acceptance of democratic norms, the party's 2005 congress reversed that trend. Asamoah's landslide defeated against Kwabena Adjei, a former minister of agriculture and Rawlings close confidante, saw the defection of leading personalities of the NDCs' reformist wing to the newly formed Democratic Freedom Party. Their exist was accompanied by widespread complaints about the pro-Rawlings personality cult, violent threats and harassment of anti-Rawlings party activists. However, the emergence of John Mahama as Mills vice-presidential candidate, against the wish of Rawlings and many others, was a clear sign that the

democratizes within the NDC were still a strong force to be reckoned with.

The weak powers of Godfathers in the selection of candidates in Ghana unlike that of Nigeria have reduced the level of corruption in Ghana. The reverse is the case with Nigeria where corruption as a result of activities of Godfathers who emasculate the purse of the state for their selfish purpose. O wonder, Transparency international from 2003-2013 rated Ghana better than Nigeria as regards corruption and governance issues.

- **Rigging of Party Primaries and Electoral Violence**

A fact that cannot be disputed is that electoral violence is one of the recurring decimal in most third wave democracies. However, most party primaries have descended into a free for all fight. Shugart (1997) have argued that the methods which a party employs in candidate selections and nominations have incontrovertible implications on those selected or elected and indeed how they behave in either party or public office. However, party primaries if at all they exist in Africa are fraught with rigging which is accompanied with electoral violence. Most of the party primaries in third wave democracies involve the intimidation and even the assassination of political opponents of the same party. The above is mostly common in Nigeria. For according to Mbah (2011), that there is no doubt the fact that the practice of democracy in Nigeria lacks essential internal democratic virtues that conform to international best practices as in the developed countries. It is characterized with kangaroo primaries organized by leaders of political parties in favour of their anointed, preferred or imposed candidates, unlawful substitution and wrongful replacement of candidates who are voted through the people's mandate, the selection of candidates for political offices by the party overlords without resource to due process and laid down regulations in the parties' constitutions among others. The People Democratic Party (PDP) cannot lay claim IPD and democratic consolidation if it continues with the current mode of organizing her primaries most especially during the 2011 Presidential primary and the Party National Convention (Aleyomi, 2013). This is because it was characterized with violence and constant contestations.

In Ghana, party primaries are contested but not with the kind of violent intensities that normally occur in party elections in Nigeria. Most party disputes are resolved without much acrimony, rancor and bitterness. In this

context, Elischer (2008) noted that here remain differences within Ghanaian political society with regard to intra-party democracy. Within the NPP leadership positions have been contested by a variety of individuals and, all party contests concluded on conciliatory notes between losers and winners. This is especially true of the position of the presidential candidate, which throughout the 1990s was heavily contested between Adu Boahen and John Kufour and later between Kufour and Akufo-Addo. The aftermath of Kufour's victory over Nana Akufo-Addo is illuminating for this study: being a member of the so-called G-15, a group of extremely wealthy party financiers, Akufo-Addo did not withdraw his support from Kufour instead he chose to serve in two consecutive Kufour cabinets. In addition NPP congress delegates have consistently resisted orders from the leadership when it comes to choosing the party's top executive. At the 2005 congress Kufour openly supported Stephen Ntim over Peter Mac Manu for the position of NPP chairman. In the end Mac succeeded narrowly, thus NPP congresses have proven to be closely contested defiant of orders from above and thus somewhat unpredictable. The NDC on the other hand experienced democratic contents.

- **Party Ideology and Peaceful Change of Regime**

It is important to note that at the very heart of the success or otherwise of political party is the important question of political ideology. The issue of ideology has been so central to the activities of political parties across Time and space that Morse (1896: 76) has argued that ideology, being the durable convictions held in common by party members in respect to the most desirable form, institutions, spirit and courses of action of the state, determines the natural attitude of a party towards every public question. Corroborating the above views, Davies and Vincent (1996, p. 1025) noted that Ideology functions as planks that is, single issue statement within the platform, the exact ideological orientation of which is often used as a bargaining chip in seeking party unity. Here, the platform connotes a statement of the official party position on a variety of issues.

In similar vein, Nnoli (2003), concludes that ideology is a very crucial aspect of politics, not only by serving as a cognitive structure for looking at society generally and providing a prescriptive formula, that is, a guide to individual action judgment, but also as a powerful instrument of conflict management, self-identification, popular mobilization and legitimization. It may, therefore, be correct to assert that the first and most important vehicle of

a political party, under an ideal situation, should be its ideological stance. From the above assertions, ideology is central to modern political parties, despite this fact; political parties in Nigeria are known to be ideological dispositions. Logically, it may be argued that if the parties have been guided by a clear commitment to a particular belief system and principles, much of the crisis and contradictions that characterized party politics under the fourth republic in Nigeria could have been averted. But, since the parties were motivated largely by ethnic competition for power through their respective ethnic champions, nothing more could be expected (Omotola, 2006). The absence of ideology is responsible for the widespread cases of defection in Nigeria. Most Nigerian politicians are called political prostitute because of their inclinations to change party at any slightest provocations. In this case Mbah (2010) noted that Cross-carpeting certainly predates Nigeria's independence. However, this has been shaped and sharpened by colonialism and sustained by the structures of post-colonial state. It was colonialism that set the pace for modernization and economic development in Nigeria, while dramatically changing the exiting patterns of social, political and economic integrations among peoples and groups. Colonialism had far reaching and uniform impact on the development of the Nigerian ruling class, their character and behavior. There are two ways the defections occur. First, there is great movement of politicians from different political parties into the ruling party towards the time of the general elections. The idea is to participate in party primaries of the ruling party. The second movement starts after the party primaries. At this point those who lost in the party primaries move to their former parties or to new ones or even to form a new party under which they intend to contest the coming elections.

However, the reverse is the case in Ghana where since the return to democracy, the two major political parties have professed distinct ideological platform which they use to woo the electorates. In this context, Elischer (2008: 191) noted that all major Ghanaian political actors have displayed allegiance to distinct political ideologies. The NPP has, from its inception, regarded itself as a follower of the Danquah-Busia tradition, a Ghanaian political strand of thinking favouring the free market and individual enterprise. Its election campaigns of the early 1990s referred to the failure of communism and state owned enterprise in Eastern Europe by which the NNP saw its own ideas to be vindicated. While in opposition NPP leaders have shown great verbal support for tax reform benefiting the middle and entrepreneur classes. Since taking

over the reins of power the NPP's express aim has been the creation of a 'property owning democracy' a goal it reiterates at almost every public occasion. As already mentioned there are growing tendencies within the NDC to incorporate the principles of social democracy. On various occasions NDC leaders have condemned the NPP's concept of 'property owning democracy' as creating social exclusion.

Furthermore, Todi (2014) noted that the very survival of political parties in Ghana has made us consolidate the democratic gains in Ghana, the survival of political parties itself, especially given the history of Ghana, has been a big achievement for the country. The survival has come in part due to the institutionalization of these political parties, which in turn has much to owe to intra-party democracy within these parties. In similar vein, IDEA (2007) noted that the successful regime change in terms of the Huntington's two turn test which is a key yard stick of democratic consolidation that Ghana has achieved is largely due to her effort in developing into a two-party system in which the two major parties have taken on a genuinely ideological and national character. They further noted that in Nigeria, the imposition on the political parties of a national character, where ethnic, religious and regional issues are not allowed to be used to mobilize the electorate, has instead created tensions within the four major political parties that threaten the very existence of those parties. The tensions in Nigerian politics along ethnic and regional cleavages have now been moved inside the parties instead of being issues for different bases of mobilization between the parties thus creating division inside the parties that threaten to cause breakdown or splits in all of them

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study examined and analyzed the role of internal party democracy (IPD), in the process of democratic consolidation with particular reference to Nigeria and Ghana. The study asserts that what account for the difference in democratic consolidation between Nigeria and Ghana as regards peaceful and competitive elections that have alternated power between the two major parties in Ghana is the absence of IPD accounted for the differences in democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana. However, the study argues that lack of party ideology by political parties in Nigeria have affected the peaceful regime change given that constant defection and cross carpeting heats up the politics and makes nonsense of the democratic process. This is unlike their counterparts in Ghana who are largely ideological. Political parties in

Ghana as a result of their distinct ideologies can woo voters without resorting to ethno-religious sentiments. Furthermore, the study submitted that the selection of party candidates by Godfathers in Nigeria also foster and enhance corruption more in Nigeria than in Ghana. The high premium Nigerians placed on grabbing state powers for self-aggrandizements and perverseness of corruption in the Nigerian polite have contributed in making the nonsense of IPD. While in Ghana, the low level of corruption when compared to Nigeria can be attributed to the near absence of Godfathers. Lastly, the study posited that the rigging of party primaries in Nigeria is accountable for the rampant presence of electoral violence in Nigeria. And this scenario is not in tandem with what is obtainable in Ghana where party primaries are done according to laid down rules and political opponents are not killed or assassinated.

To be frank, the implication of these findings is that democratic consolidation in Nigeria will continue to groan because IPD is lacking among Nigerian political party unlike their counterparts in Ghana. The absence of IPD among Nigeria political parties is a factor that account for the difference in democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana.

Recommendation

Therefore, arising from the above findings, the study put forward the following recommendations:

5. That political party especially in Nigeria should imbibe such tenets of democracy such as party ideology, eschewing Godfathers, defection and across carpeting among others.
6. Internal party democracy is very central to the strengthening of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana and at such political parties should be encouraged to be more democratic.
7. The Ghanaian government despite recorded democratic achievement should be watchful against democratic rollback as regards the proclivity of politicians to manipulate ethnic and religious cleavages in order to acquire, consolidate and demonstrate power. The first and the second wave of democratization in Ghana coupled with the heated ethno religious conflicts neighboring countries should always serve as a constant reminder to politicians who want to toe that path.

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DEMOCRACY AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Democracy is widely acclaimed as the system of government that ensures stable social order and delivers popular expectation of better life for citizens. The political liberalisation agenda of the 1990s presented liberal democracy as having the capacity to transform the living conditions of marginalised citizens who were caught in the net of dictatorship and authoritarian governments. Democratisation in Nigeria has so far been characterised with abuse of public office, misappropriation of public funds, corruption, and unfulfilled electoral promises. While laws and institutions set up to checkmate these tendencies among public office holders have largely been ineffective, citizens are left to carry the burden of mal-governance without the capacity to hold their leaders accountable. Yet, the prospect of democracy delivering on popular expectations lies in the ability of citizens to hold their leaders accountable for their actions and inaction. This paper critically re-examines the challenge of political accountability in the Nigeria's democratization experience. It explores factors that account for the continued prevalence of the culture of impunity in the public service despite the expectation that democracy should afford citizens the opportunity to get their leaders account for their stewardship. It examines factors that undermine political accountability, and explores ways of engendering the values of accountability in Nigeria's political culture. The paper recommends the establishment of a "National Electoral Campaign Promises Commission" and attendant legal instruments, to check the spate of unfulfilled electoral promises by political office seekers/holders.

Keywords: Democracy, Political accountability, Development, Political culture

Introduction

Accountability is an essential element of any democratic government. Democracy, based on the mandate principle, demands that elected officials

remain accountable to their constituencies. Political accountability has been a central issue in modern government. The rise of administrative state with increasing complexity, specialisation, discretion and power of bureaucracy poses a big threat for democracy if there is no effective system of ensuring that officials give account of their stewardship (Arowolo & Aluko, 2012). Accountability is important for maintenance of fundamental human rights and the rule of law. The challenge of modern democracies has been not only how to make them effective, efficient and flexible, but also, how to ensure they remain fully accountable to the people. In governance, the purpose of accountability is to uphold underlying and fundamental principles, such as public interest, public trust, rule of law and good governance (Majekodunmi, 2012). Accountability therefore, defines the expectations of the public pertaining to the responsible exercise of political power. It also implies that when public office holders are not performing, the invocation of sanctions readily becomes the remedy. This is underscored by the fact that the essence of accountability is that those exercising public power must be answerable, responsive and transparent.

Nigeria today faces the challenge of developing a clear system of accountability in the public sector. A major continuity that runs through successive governments in Nigeria has been cases of corrupt practices among government officials. The challenge has been how to eradicate the culture of corruption and impunity in the public sector. Despite her numerous natural resources, Nigeria, like most other states in Africa, has been struggling with the task of political and economic development (Okeke, 2014). One major factor that has been attributed to the failure of the country to attain development has been the absence of good governance built on accountability. The expected gains from years of democratisation have not been realised due to the absence of entrenched culture of accountability. Without good governance being entrenched and institutionalised through accountability, consolidation of democracy becomes jeopardised.

Various forms of manifestations of lack of accountability have undermined development and worsened the standard of living of citizens (Okafor, 2011). After more than half a century of independence, Nigeria is still struggling with problem of infrastructures and basic social amenities like roads, power and water, despite huge budgetary allocations to these areas by successive governments. These problems of infrastructure have regularly featured in campaign promises of politicians during electioneering period. Yet,

most of these campaign promises are either left unfulfilled or out rightly renounced after elections. Roads and other facilities built by a government hardly outlive the tenure of the administration that built it; yet no body is held liable. In some cases, a particular road is constructed and reconstructed almost every year with budgetary allocations made for it annually. There has been a clear erosion of accountability in the unfolding democratisation process in Nigeria. This is a clear departure from the message of high hopes and expectations that drove the global wave of democratisation which presented democracy as a harbinger of good governance and development (Omotola, 2007). It is against this background that this paper examines the extent and challenges of political accountability in the democratisation of the Nigerian state.

Conceptual clarification

Democracy

Democracy as a principle of government has gained wide acceptance. It is a concept that is subject to almost universal acclaim. Scholars and politicians from both ends of ideological spectrum from extreme left to extreme right insist that the various governments which they support are democratic in character, making the concept of democracy somewhat confusing and prone to contradictory usage. This, perhaps, is because democracy is sometimes portrayed as an ideal end in itself. Joseph Schumpeter, an Australian Economist, has argued that the notion of democracy must be stripped of its moralistic connotation. According to Schumpeter (1947), cited in Hoffman and Graham (2009), there is nothing about democracy that makes it desirable; it is not an end in itself. Democracy is simply a political method, an arrangement for reaching political decisions. The wishes of the masses may after all be more fully realised in an authoritarian system than under a democracy. According to Lev (2005), what is usually called democracy, which serves a kind of conceit and makes people feel “virtuous” has made the term so problematic that it should probably be banned or a charge levied on its usage by serious students of politics.

Despite the tendency to portray democracy as a complex and confusing concept, which is amenable to conflicting interpretations, Ake (2000) points out that there is nothing complex or confusing about the concept of democracy. For a political concept, democracy is uncharacteristically precise. According to Ake, the confusion over the meaning of democracy stems from

the fact that the phenomenon has become so trivialised and globalised that it is no longer threatening to political elites, who can now conveniently don the garb of democracy and enjoy democratic legitimacy without subjecting themselves to the constraints and restraints associated with the practice of democracy.

Democracy as an idea and a practice is not Western, especially if it is understood as decision-making through public reasoning, an idea that has a long tradition in different parts of the world, including Africa. Democracy, defined as popular participation in public decision making, is definitely not a European export to Africa. Africa had evolved forms of popular participation in governance before colonial incursion. What European colonists imported into Africa was the notion that democracy is reducible to election and representation. Historically, the notion of democracy describes forms of popular power and citizens' participation in governance (Ober, 2013). This notion was derived from realities in ancient Athens, and was an essential element of many pre-colonial political systems in Africa. Semantically, however, the term democracy is attributed to have originated from two Greek root words "demos" which means people, and "cracy" which stands for rule or government. Thus, democracy literally means "rule by the people" or popular power. This was the sense in which the idea of democracy was conceived and practised in the Greek city-state. The classical notion of citizen refers to one who has the ability and opportunity to participate in the government of the state (Hoffman and Graham, 2009). This means that citizens, who are constituent members of the state, should be part of its governance. Sabine and Thorson (1973), however, pointed out that the idea of direct democracy conducted by the whole assembly of the Greek people is rather a political myth than a form of government. The interesting thing about the Athenian government was not the Assembly of the whole people but the political means which had been designed to make the magistrates and officials accountable to the citizenry and answerable to its control. The method by which this was achieved was a special kind of representation, which in some important ways was different from the modern idea of representative government (Sabine and Thorson, 1973).

Representative democracy founded on liberalism appears, more or less, to be a form of adulteration of the content and essence of democracy. Liberal democracy repudiates popular power, replacing "rule by the people" with government by consent of the governed. Mill (1937) in his essay *On Liberty*

states that a system of representative democracy makes government accountable to the citizenry and creates wiser citizens capable of pursuing public interest. The development of representative government tends to reduce citizens to the status of mere voters who, through elections, periodically choose their leaders, reducing the role of citizens in a democracy to vote-casting. A classical definition in this regard is that offered by Huntington who conceives a political system as being democratic “to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (Huntington, 1991, p.7). In fact, the idea that democracy is the rule by the people has been rejected by some scholars. While Weber prefers that the social context of modern industrial society impose limit on democratic participation, Schumpeter launches a direct attack on participatory democracy. For Schumpeter, the essence of democracy is not the opportunity to participate in government but the opportunity to replace unwanted rulers (Hoffman and Graham, 2009). Thus, it is a good idea if the mass of the population do not participate in decision-making since the masses are too irrational, emotional, parochial and primitive to make good decisions. Hence, democracy is more realistically defined as a “political method” by which politicians are elected by means of a competitive vote. In other words, democracy becomes a system of elected and competitive elites. Thus, democracy does not mean that the people actually rule, but rather that people have the opportunity to accept or reject those who do actually rule. The role of the people becomes to allocate legitimacy to the rulers, rather than to actually make decision about conditions under which they wish to live. It must, however, be noted that though electoral democracy advances social and political rights, this approach to democracy tends to give premium to the professionalization of the public sphere in which politics becomes an exclusive reserve of a few, usually seen as the political class, while the generality of citizens are reduced to mere consumers of dividends, instead of makers, of democracy. As argued by Boyte (2004), when democracy becomes the occupation of professional elites and political class, the citizenry lose stake and are marginalized in the important work of public sector governance and are reduced to the secondary role of mere consumers of dividends of democracy. The professionalization of politics has greatly influenced liberal democracy around the world replacing civic identity with consumer identity, citizen participation with career politicians while the bulk

of the citizens become marginalised (Edigheji, 2005). This has led to a trend towards declining public interest in elections, increasing citizens' apathy and disengagement from public affairs and distrust of government.

However, democracy is based on the principle that public decision-making is the business of all the citizens. Democracy is not so much about how "the people" choose their government, as much as it is about the degree of control citizens have over the government (Kingsburg, 2007). Rousseau (1712-1778) in his *Social Contract* associates democracy with popular sovereignty. According to Rousseau, sovereignty does not only originate from the people, it continues to reside with the people and cannot be transferred by representation. To this effect, "the people's deputies are not, and could not be, its representatives; they are merely its agents; and cannot decide anything finally".

Democratisation is a far more penetrating process than a shift from military dictatorship to civilian governance, and demands a pervasive politicisation of the generality of the population of the state. The essence of democracy resides in the relationship between the state and the citizens, especially in the ability of citizens to exercise control over the state and government officials (Chole, 1995). This means that all citizens must not just be entitled to, but must be willing and able to participate in public decision making. The basic element of democracy could generally be said to include citizens' capacity for participation in the public space and accountability from leaders. Though these elements are compromised in some degrees in every system, the extent to which they are available is a prime marker of the level of political development in the state.

Political accountability

There is a tendency to approach the issue of accountability from the financial and accounting point of view (Ozor, 2000). For example, according to Smith and Hague (1972), the principle of accountability specifically requires that the government must have the assurance that public funds are spent for the purposes specified and without personal gain to any private individual beyond fair compensation for his services. However, accountability is not entirely a financial matter. Accountability as applied to modern government is a basic democratic principle. As Robertson (1993) noted, those who exercise the power of government, whether elected or appointed, are in a sense stewards and must be able to show that they have exercised their power

and discharged their duties properly. Therefore, accountability refers to conformity between the values of a delegating body and the person or persons to whom powers and responsibilities are delegated. Mclean (1996) associates accountability with the requirement for representatives to answer to the represented on the disposal of their power and duties, act upon criticisms and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit.

MacCandless (2008) cited in Ugandan (2010) defines political accountability as the obligation of authorities to explain publicly, fully and fairly, how they are carrying out responsibilities that affect the public in important ways. This notion equates accountability to transparency. It is the responsibility of authorities to explain publicly, fully and fairly what they intend to do, how and why they did it. The essence of public accountability is not just after the fact of concluded actions (*fait accompli*) but full and fair public explanation even before an action that allows citizens and their elected representatives to act sensibly to commend, alter or halt ill-conceived intentions. Orngus (2006) emphasises the role of the people (citizens) in his definition of accountability as essentially the process of holding public and elected officials responsible for their actions and/or inactions, thereby checkmating corrupt practices. It is important to emphasise that public officials are held responsible for their actions and inactions, and are not expected to willingly submit for accountability when the push for that is not coming from the people. The idea of “holding to account” is central to the operation of political accountability.

Political accountability is based on the idea that political power exercised by leaders in a democracy is delegated to them by the people. Any delegation of power will usually carry with it a requirement to report on how that power is exercised, and any institution seen as having power may be required to justify its operations to a superior authority (Robertson, 1993). The idea of political accountability is based on the premise that all political (public) office holders hold their positions entrusted for the people. Political offices are platforms for public service and those who render those services must account to the people for their successes and failures (Ezeani, 2003). Political accountability derives from the notion of popular sovereignty which states that sovereignty does not only originate from the people but continues to reside with the people and cannot be transferred to elected representatives. To this effect, political office holders are agents or stewards, properly so called, who are required to render account of their stewardship to the citizenry whom

they are working for. In trying to ensure accountability, countries adopt various mechanisms including legislative instruments, executive means, judicial and quasi-judicial processes, official rules, codes of conduct, official hierarchies, public hearings, interest groups, and media scrutiny (Ugandan, 2010).

Theoretical Framework

The framework of analysis is based on theoretical insights drawn from the *theory of the state in postcolonial societies*. This theory takes off from the premise that state formation in post-colonial societies differ greatly from what obtained in Western capitalist societies. As a result of their historical specificity, states in postcolonial societies came to be not only a pervasion of the classical bourgeois state, but also fundamentally differentiated from the classical Marxist theory of the state (Saul, 1974). According to Alavi (1972):

the historical specificity of post-colonial societies, a specificity which arises from structural changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignments of classes and by the superstructures of political and administrative institutions which were established in that context, and secondly from radical re-alignments of class forces which have been brought about in the post-colonial situation (Alavi, 1972, p.9).

Western bourgeois class, through colonialism, established a perverted version of the bourgeois state and its attendant legal and institutional framework in the colony. The task of the Western bourgeoisie in the colony was not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established in the West but, more importantly, to create a political order of perpetual dominion and continued control over the political institutions of the colonised societies. Thus, the structures and institutions of oppression and coercion of western states were transported into the colonised societies, for the primary purpose of suppressing the indigenous population and social groups. Thus, the imported state was inherently coercive, oppressive and unaccountable to the indigenous population, who, being glorified subjects (properly so called), were admitted as “privileged citizens” (Mamdani, 2002). The state, thus, came as the political institution of a “superior civilisation” drafted to a culturally conquered society to entrench the submersion of the people under the new civilisation. This means that the state and its government were not subject to the people, but were designed to be accountable to those that created them. The state in

postcolonial societies does not stand on a history that gives the people at least a theoretical right of control over the state and the government; rather the history subordinates the people to the state. All attempts to artificially decorate the state with the cosmetics of democratisation have failed to redress the imbalance between the state and its officials, on the one hand, and the citizenry on the other. The socio-political order which assigns citizens a subordinate position in the political economy of the state takes the right of accountability from the people and transfers it to the western bourgeois class, the original creators of the state, who invisibly operate through a network of policy packages sponsored through international institutions and multinational corporations. By this way, postcolonial citizens are stripped of the capacity to hold their governments and leaders accountable.

State character, democracy and Political Accountability

The character of the Nigerian state derives from the genealogy of the state, the specific historical circumstance of colonialism that produced the state. The foundation of Nigerian state was laid as an instrument of colonial exploitation and subjugation of the indigenous population and groups. The colonial state was characteristically undemocratic. In the process of its consolidation, the colonial state destroyed indigenous political structures within which the people participated effectively in the governance and exercised control over those that governed them. Through the indirect rule system, the colonial state seized the traditional public space in which the people democratically participated in public life and subjugated the people through decentralised despotism, enforced by appointed chiefs with the coercive instruments of the colonial state (Mamdani, 2002). By this way it downgraded and destroyed the people's own institutions and cultures. The assumption behind the introduction of the western model of nation-state in Nigeria is that the traditional political systems of the various groups that were brought together were backward and devoid of modern potentials. Thus, there was need to import the political system of a superior civilisation that will help the people move out of their backwardness. The implication of the assumption that formed the foundation of the imported state is that the state theoretically stood on a platform that is higher than the people. Thus, the essence of citizenship in the state was to benefit from the fruits of a superior civilisation, and not the agency of citizens in the governance and development of the state. Development, therefore, was seen not as coming from the agency of the

citizens but through a continuous subjection to the source of this superior civilisation. Since the state was a dispenser of a superior civilisation, it assumed the status of an omnipotent juggernaut that is not accountable to the citizens. Subsequent political development that followed has rather perpetuated this unequal relationship between the state and the citizens, and between the governors and the governed.

In response to the nationalist pressures and dynamics of international political economy in the late 1950, the British colonists entrusted political power with a few select elites that would ensure their continued control of the politics and economy of the Nigerian state in the post-independence era. Though the state was decolonised, it was not democratised (Ake, 2000). Of course, one of the most inspiring messages of the nationalist movement upon which the people were mobilised in the quest for independence was the ideal of establishing a democratic society (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1995). Though this message had a strong appeal and was capable of engineering a democratic transformation of the postcolonial state, the nationalists did not envisage a far reaching transformation which may after all jeopardise their hold on the state. In fact, political mobilisation and popular participation in politics soon became seen as anathema to the task of development and nation-building. Instead of laying strong foundation for democratisation of the postcolonial state, the elites were engrossed in intensive struggle for state power to the extent that electoral politics took the form of warfare (Omodia, 2013). Violence, crisis and corruption became the defining character of Nigerian politics, as exemplified by post-independence bitter rivalries among the major regional parties in their struggle for power at the centre and various political turmoil, including the 1962 Action Group crisis, the 1962/3 Census crisis and the 1964 General election crisis which truncated the first republic (Osaghae, 2004).

Against this background of politics of violence and warfare, the military who are specialists in the art of warfare and violence had no choice than to seize political power. Many years of military interregnum retarded the development of democracy in Nigeria, and actually gave new fillip to the problem of corruption and impunity in the country. Successive military rulers that took over political powers had alleged that the governments they deposed were corrupt, and they themselves not being accountable to anyone soon became even more corrupt than the government they deposed. This was the point where the civilian faction of the local elites allied with global forces to “ideologize” democracy and instrumentalize liberal democracy as the pathway

to progress and development. Democracy came to be portrayed as the opposite of military rule: as long as the military stays out of politics there is democracy (Lawal & Ohikayode, 2012). No place was envisaged for citizens in the implementation of the democratisation agenda. Thus, citizens became reduced to consumers of dividends of democracy, rather than makers of democracy. In line with this, buildings renovated and roads rehabilitated are catalogued in national dailies and bill boards as dividends of democracy, as if military governments (which are seen as opposite of democratic government) do not build those things. Yet, dividends of democracy can only be measured against the scope and quality of citizens' participation in the governance and their ability to hold their leaders accountable. Democratisation in Nigeria has been more or less an intra-elite transfer of power, rather than a broadening of the social base of state power.

To a very large extent, the democratisation process has not led to the transformation of the state, whose form and content are not only undemocratic but essentially anti-democracy. As Ake further expounds,

To all appearances, democratisation is not doing much about the democratic transformation of the state; attention is on who will control the state. But in so far as democratisation is limited to the competitive selection by political society at large of those to control the state, what has been gained in the end is only the right to choose between oppressors, not the right to choose between liberty and oppression. Democratisation should offer much more than what it appears to be offering now, namely, electoral competition which conceals the illusion of voting without choosing (Ake, 2000:73).

The apparent weakness of democratisation in Nigeria, like in other states in Africa, is the inability to customise democracy to African conditions in a way that it will address the challenges and concerns of the people like improved livelihood, more voice in the public space and political accountability. Democratisation does not appear to sufficiently reflect the fact that for most people the national political democratising processes is really abstract and has little bearing on their immediate concerns for survival and rescue from the clutches of poverty and destitution.

Democratisation of the Nigerian state has followed the neoliberal path. The success of liberal democracy, built on a representative system of

government, depends heavily on the electoral system. Representative government operates on the mandate principle in which mandate is given and taken through periodic elections. Through periodic elections, citizens acting as voters exercise the power to remove non-performing government and bring in another. However, when the electoral system is not properly constituted, the system of accountability becomes corroded. The foundation for political accountability in a representative government is the electoral process through which elected officials get their mandate (Egwemi, 2009). Without free and fair elections the basis for demanding and obtaining accountability from elected officials does not exist. When politician ascend to political offices not through the vote of the people but through manipulation of the electoral system, there will be no sense of accountability to people that never voted for them in the first place. Moreover, when electoral outcomes do not reflect the choice of voters but that of godfathers and political oligarchs, office holders that emerge from such processes naturally will be accountable to their sponsors and not to the people. The Nigerian electoral system has over the years been characterised by various forms of malpractices and irregularities, including: underage voting, vote buying, ballot box snatching, intimidation of opponents, and compromises by officials of the electoral body and security agents (Adesote & Abimbola, 2014). Electoral manipulations and malpractices produce public officials whose allegiance is not to the people but to the powers that enabled them to circumvent the electoral will of the people to ascend the office (Ugandan, 2010).

The Challenge of Political Accountability in Nigeria

The pattern of governance in the Nigerian state from the colonial to the postcolonial eras appears to have made way for the festering of a political culture that does not promote political accountability. The messianic optimism of the millennial liberal political waves of the 1990s which facilitated the advent of Nigeria's Fourth Republic projected democracy as having the capacity to deliver good governance and transform the living conditions of marginalised citizens who were caught in the net of dictatorship and authoritarianism. This redemptive narrative of democracy influenced the dynamics of political culture, which became heavy with high expectations that poverty and destitution would be conquered through political participation. In order words, political participation was seen as avenue and opportunity for one to better his/her economic fortune as political office seekers are supported

and campaigned for based on their ability to give out money and other economic values. While political office seekers hope to recoup the money they spent to get to the office, political supporters queue behind candidates not necessarily on the basis of conviction of their ability to deliver on the demands of the office, but on what they think they stand to gain personally.

Nigerian politics tends to defer more to primordial instincts of ethnicity than to a drive towards nationalist agenda. As a result, political leaders usually cash in on the prevalent ethnic sentiments and lack of appropriate political orientation of citizens to present an extractive view of politics which persuades the individuals to seek personal advantage from political participation. The survival of personal, familial or ethnic obligations tends to supersede the survival of the “nation”. Accountability became much more synonymous with the size of a leader’s bank accounts, than a measure of responsibility to one’s constituency and to the “nation” as a whole.

Citizens are becoming more skeptical and cynical about the sincerity of the government and their leaders. There is general dissatisfaction with the quality of leadership the country has had since 1999. The idea of politics and political office being a place where people go for personal aggrandizement is a dominant notion in the political landscape. The sense of responsibility and demand for accountability from vigilant citizenship, which is supposed to keep leaders on their toes, appears to be weak among the citizenry. Since political positions are seen as opportunities that go round “turn by turn”, it appears that majority of those outside the corridors of power are only waiting for their own turn to do the same thing that the leaders in power are doing, or even worse.

Nigeria at present faces the challenge of developing a clear and efficient system of accountability in the public sector. A major continuity that runs through successive governments in Nigeria has been cases of corrupt practices among government officials. The challenge has been how to eradicate the culture of corruption and impunity in the public sector. Despite her numerous natural resources, Nigeria, like most other African states has been struggling with the task of political and economic development (Okeke, 2014). One major factor that has been attributed to the failure of the country to attain significant development has been the absence of good governance built on the practice of public accountability. The expected gains from years of democratisation have not been realised due to the absence of an entrenched culture of accountability. Without good governance being entrenched and

institutionalised through accountability, consolidation of democracy becomes jeopardised.

Despite the arrest of several high-ranking public officials by the EFCC in the past, allegations continued that the agency's investigations were targeted at individuals who had fallen out of favour with the government, while those who were favoured continued their activities with impunity. For example, there was controversy over the reinstatement of former chairman of the Presidential Task Force on Pension Reforms, Abdurashed Maina, as acting director, Human resource Department in the ministry of Interior (The Sun, October 23rd 2017). Maina had earlier absconded from duty after he was declared wanted by EFCC for alleged complicity in the over N2 billion pension biometric scam in the office of the Head of Civil service of the Federation. Instead of being arrested and prosecuted after he came out of hiding, Maina was rather reinstated in the federal civil service and promoted to deputy director. It was only after intense public outcry that President Buhari instructed that Maina be disengaged from service. There have been a number of corruption cases and scandals in which some of the perpetrators were charged to court while others were never investigated. The former Delta State governor James Ibori was in December 2009 acquitted of all 170 counts charges of corruption at a Federal High Court in Asaba but was later convicted for money laundering in a London court, where he was sentenced to 13-year imprisonment. Ibori served his prison term and returned to the country with a heroic welcome reception in his honour organised by the people of his state (Pogason and Ogidi, 2013).

The kerosene subsidy scam is another case in point. The former Governor of the Central Bank and now Emir of Kano, Mr. Lamido Sanusi, had shown that the kerosene subsidy was eliminated in 2009 by a directive of the late President Umaru Yar'Adua; yet a shady subsidy scheme on kerosene has continued to be maintained. Evidence from across the country shows that nowhere in the country is kerosene sold at a subsidised rate (Olalemi, 2016). An estimated \$100m goes unaccounted for every month in this shady subsidy scheme that never benefits the man on the street, but only enriched officials of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and marketers. Rather than selling the product at the subsidised price of N50 per litre at the filling stations, these products are sold at between N200 and N300 per litre and even more as the case may be (Olalemi, 2016). This anomaly had continued without officials of Pipelines and Products Marketing Company (PPMC) sanctioning

anybody. Though the national assembly had concluded investigation on the issue kerosene subsidy, no official of the NNPC, PPMC or petroleum marketer has been sanctioned or prosecuted (Olalemi, 2016). The public also continued to buy the product at the same exorbitant price without complaining or protesting.

The \$6bn fuel subsidy scam is another case in point. Though the probe by an ad hoc committee of the House of Representatives was blighted by the \$620 million bribe scandal involving the panel's leadership, it nonetheless exposed monumental fraud in the management of the oil subsidy scheme (Isaac, 2015). The probe exposed mismanagement and theft to the tune of about \$6.8 billion (N1.7trn) over a period of three years, and indicted top government officials who presided over the subsidy scheme (Daniel, 2015). While some of the indicted importers, who were alleged to have collected subsidy claims without supplying fuel, were made to face charges, others were shielded from prosecution. Some highly placed government officials of the oil sector in the NNPC and the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) who were named in the scam have not been made to answer charges. On the alleged non-remittance of \$20billion by the NNPC to the federation account, the person that went down with the allegation was the person that raised the alarm, the then governor of the Central Bank and current Emir of Kano, Lamido Sanusi, who was eventually fired. Report of the audit by the federal government indicted the NNPC as a body and ordered the corporation to refund \$1.48billion (Olalemi, 2016).

The current acting chairman of the EFCC, Ibrahim Magu, was indicted of wrong doing by the Department of State Security Services (DSS) on his activities in 2008 as a commissioner in the EFCC under the former Chairman of the Commission, Farida Waziri. According to the report, following a search at Magu's residence, some sensitive EFCC documents which were not supposed to be at his disposal were found with him (Isaac, 2015). He was subsequently redeployed to the Police after days of detention and later suspended from the force. In December 2010, the Police Service Commission found Magu guilty of action prejudicial to State Security, withholding of EFCC files, sabotage, unauthorised removal of EFCC files, and acts unbecoming of a Police officer and awarded him severe reprimand as punishment (DSS Report, 2016). The Senate refused to confirm Magu as the substantive EFCC Chairman based on the security report it received from the DSS. On the other hand, the Federal government under President Buhari has

refused to nominate another as EFCC chairman and allowed Magu to continue as acting chairman. However, the Senate has maintained that Magu's rejection as chairman of EFCC also meant that he cannot hold the position of the acting chairman of the commission (Olalemi, 2016).

Unfortunately, the hopes that persons accused of being involved in corruption would be brought to book are gradually waning as a result of disappointing performances of the anti-corruption agencies and the judiciary. Their performances have shown lack of willingness to prosecute, shoddy prosecution when they do, and poor record at securing convictions (Olajide, 2012). Anti-graft agencies are accused of repeatedly filing for amendment of charges against accused persons after arraignment. In one of such cases, Justice Abubarkar Umar, who was in charge of a case that had suffered one year of repeated request for adjournments maintained that:

It has been over one year now and still the EFCC is coming up with excuses. The EFCC should know that if it is not ready to prosecute and bring cases to conclusion, it should not apply for leave of court to arraign anybody... I therefore strike out the suit for want of diligent prosecution (Oluokun, 2012:17-18).

Non appearance in court, unending demands for adjournments and amendments of corruption charges by lawyers engaged by EFCC have contributed to delays in prosecuting corruption cases. There are even suspicions that many of the lawyers hired by EFCC for prosecution of cases may be conniving with the defence team to elongate cases, especially the ones involving highly placed persons. The judiciary has at various times granted orders prohibiting the prosecution of suspected perpetrators of corruption, and at other times delivering judgements in favour of accused persons in spite of overwhelming evidence. The conviction of James Ibori, who is now serving a 13-year jail term in the United Kingdom on similar charges for which he was summarily acquitted here in Nigeria, illustrates how corruption has subverted the Nigerian judicial systems. While Ibori's eventual conviction in London may serve as deterrent to public office holder in that justice can still catch up with criminals even beyond the shores of the country, it still remains disappointing that it took the British justice system to prove a corrupt practice that was carried out in Nigeria.

Conclusion

Political accountability is an indispensable part of modern democratic governance. It is essential for the maintenance of fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and requires strengthening the judicial and legislative institutions as well as other agencies to be able to hold political office holders accountable. Since modern democracy is by electoral representation, the electoral system should be strengthened to develop the mandate principle in the relationship between political office holders and the citizenry. Citizens should also be empowered by strengthening democratic governance structures at the local level, ensuring full participation of citizens, empowering marginalized groups to become partners in the accountability system; invigorating the civil society and autonomous mass media, securing fundamental workers' rights, especially freedom of association, ensuring that those who work non-violently for the democratic transformation of their societies are provided with the space and resources needed for their task, among other such measures. Consolidation of democracy through political accountability will go a long way in redressing the power imbalance which presently favours the political elites against the generality of the citizens.

Political accountability begins with holding institutions and leaders responsible for their actions, inactions and failures, building mechanisms to comply with the terms of accountability, and transparently reporting on performance. These are the bedrock principles for stable democracy. Accountability is a necessary adjunct to the power that government exercises in society. Breach of electoral campaign promises by political office holders should be made a punishable offence and treated as a breach of public trust since office holders were supposedly elected based on promises they made to citizens. Politicians have to be held responsible and made to account for how far they went in fulfilling electoral campaign promises, which should be seen as social contract, upon which votes were canvassed from the citizens. This can be achieved with the establishment of a "National Electoral Campaign Promises Commission" and attendant legal instruments to punish erring political office holders.

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**COMPROMISE IN RESTRUCTURING NIGERIAN FEDERALISM
AND NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF 2014 NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT**

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Abstract

The aftermath of 2014 constitutional conference reawakened expectations of Nigerians on restructuring of Nigerian federalism. The conference dictates capture the salient problems that attract agitations and upheavals in Nigerian polity. It also recommended panacea for it but the uncompromising attitude of Nigerian elite has made restructuring a failure because of vested economic and political interest. The broad objective of this paper is to examine the problem of non-implementation of 2014 constitutional conference recommendation on restructuring of Nigerian federalism. We adopted the aid of elite theory to observe among others that, there is a nexus between elite compromise and non-implementation of 2014 constitutional conference recommendation. Secondary sources of data collection were utilized. We recommend among others, a pro-active restructuring legislation and policy devoid of elite intervention.

Keywords: Federalism, Restructuring, Compromise, Elites, Interest, Constitutional Conference.

Introduction

A constitutional conference is concerned with the sole aim of developing a constitutional framework or making proposals for constitutional changes within the existing constitutional framework. Hence, the inauguration of a constitutional conference was a fundamental advance in dealing with the complex national question. In response to the continued agitation for a national question, Goodluck Ebelle Jonathan Administration constituted a

high-powered committee on the review of outstanding issues from recent constitutional conference of 2012 under Justice S. M. Belgore. The Belgore Committee was mandated to examine the relevance and currency of the recommendations of the previous Conferences which were not implemented, draft bills for consideration (where necessary) and propose policy guidelines for the implementation of those recommendations (CONFAB Report 2014, p.10). On October 1, 2013, President Goodluck Ebelle Jonathan in his Independence Day broadcast to the nation, declared the intention of his government to organize a national dialogue as a way of resolving the intractable security and political crises in the country. In line with his broadcast, the President set up a 13-member Presidential Advisory Committee on National Dialogue with Senator Femi Okurounmu as Chairman and Dr. Akilu Indabawa as Secretary. The Committee, which was charged with designing the framework for the National Dialogue toured thirteen (13) cities, (two) 2 in each geo-political zone and the FCT Abuja and interacted with more than 7,000 Nigerians. It also received thousands of memoranda from individuals, groups, and professional associations. The Committee submitted its report to the President in December 2013 (CONFAB Report 2014, p.11). The President accepted the Committee's recommendation for the convening of a National Conference.

Consequently, President Jonathan inaugurated the national conference on March 17, 2014 with Hon. Justice Idris Legbo Kutigi as Chairman, Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi as Deputy Chairman and Dr. (Mrs.) Valerie-Janette Azinge as Secretary. He described it as a historic national conference which promises to be another significant landmark in our efforts to strengthen national unity and consolidate democratic governance in Nigeria. In his inaugural Address at the auditorium of the National Judicial Institute (NJI) Abuja, which was attended by the 492 Delegates and other Nigerians, the President told the Delegates that they were free to discuss any issue about Nigeria with particular emphasis on finding solutions to the problems of national unity and development. He said that the Conference had no-go-area although he ruled out any discussion on breaking-up the country. The President emphasized that the Conference should come up with strategies to strengthen rather than weaken Nigeria's national unity, and enhance a participatory and inclusive democratic system of Government (CONFAB Report 2014, p.12). The conference recommendations embraced restructuring including other issues pertinent to Nigeria's National Question but his non re-

election for a second term seems to have trapped its implementation. The campaign slogans of parties that contested with him including the present ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) was heralded with promises of restructuring.

In essence, the change mantra of the President Muhammad Buhari's regime which kick started in 2015 is designed to achieve the restructuring project which Nigerians desired following his campaign manifesto on restructuring that attracted votes for his success at the polls. This promise refreshed the hope of average Nigerians that the recommendation of the 2014 Constitution Conference will fly into the National Assembly as an executive bill but surprisingly up till today, nothing has been done. The question to ask is why campaign promises trapped and unfulfilled after elections in Nigeria; why is compromise so hard in democratic Nigerian politics. The problem seems not unconnected with the political attitudes and arguments among the political elites. In the opinion of Thompson and Gutmann (2010:1) "the resistance to compromise is a problem to any democracy because it stands in the way of change that nearly everyone agrees is necessary, and thereby biases the political process in favour of the status quo". The mindset and disposition to compromise is conducive to campaigning, but not to governing because on assumption of power, the game changes against the majority for the interest of a few.

Since the amalgamation of Nigeria by Lord Lugard in 1914 to the present, Nigerian state has witnessed series of constitution reforms and restructuring tailored towards upholding one principle which is "Unity in Diversity". Richard constitution of "1954 set the stage for regional federalism which our political leaders used those years to lay the foundation of what we have today. Unfortunately, they did not have an agreeable, nor to talk of an agreed plan to build upon (Ige,1990, p.48). A similar event happened in 1966 following the collapse of Aburi Accord of 1966 and the consequent Nigeria civil war of 1967-1970.

Learning from the past mistakes gives credence to the successes recorded from post- independence constitutional conferences of 1994-1995 of General Sani Abacha's regime that gave birth to the present six geo-political zonal structures of North East, North West, North Central, South West, South East and South South geo- political zones after the annulment of June 12,1993 presidential election. This is currently sustaining the tempo of agitation for marginalization by ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Despite these efforts, Boko

Haram insurgency from the North, militancy from the South –South, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra from South East and Oduduwa People’s Congress from the South West emerged with one agitation or the other. As a panacea, the former regime of President Goodluck Jonathan inaugurated a constitutional conference in 2014 where the most sensitive dialogue seems to have been achieved but its implementation becomes a nightmare.

The re-election campaign of the present Mohammed Buhari regime raised serious hope in view of the party’s campaign programme on restructuring but three years after the election the government has not sent any bill to the National Assembly on the subject. The implication is that the national question has remained a big challenge for Nigeria’s existence as the current debate revolves around the quest for restructuring of Nigerian federalism. Arising there-from informs our desire to examine the problem of compromise in restructuring of Nigerian federalism with a focus on non implementation of 2014 conference report..This project, we intend to prosecute in this sequence; i, theoretical framework of analysis, ii, conceptual elucidation of compromise and restructuring, iii, 2014 conference recommendation on political restructuring, iv, compromise and restructuring of Nigerian federalism, v, conclusion and recommendation.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Elite theory is adopted in this study to unravel the power play and elite manipulation of the Nigeria state to preserve the status quo against the greater interest of Nigerian masses. In political science, elite theory describes and explains the power relationships in contemporary society. The theory posits that a small minority, consisting of members of the political, economic elite and policy planning networks, holds the most power and that this power is independent of a states’ democratic electoral process through appointment into top positions in government, parastatals, bureaucracy, military and paramilitary formations. Members of the “elite” are able to exert significant power over the policy decisions of corporations, business and governments. Bottomore (1993:25) explained that the elite theory stands in opposition to pluralism by suggesting that democracy is a Utopian Ideal. It also stands in opposition to state autonomy theory. Mainly, this concentration of power in the hands of a minority group, according to Mosca, “performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings”.

The basic assumptions of elite theory are derived from two rival perspectives. The liberal pluralist version focuses on the dispersion of power within the elites and argues that changes are likely to happen over time. In contrast, the critical elite perspective emphasizes elite power concentration and cohesiveness, leading to resistance to change and limited openness and inclusiveness. Founded on the ideas of classical elitists (such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels), the word elite is usually defined as those groups with excellent access to resources or capacities, a characteristic that set them apart from other (non-elite) members of society. The interpretations of superiority based on the access to valuable resources leads to the justification of elite dominance and social inequality. The elite theory considers inequality as the outcome of power distribution, which in turn reposes on them, other resources such as economic and organizational assets. Critical elite analysts insist that the political elite, despite their nominally divergent nature, stem from common backgrounds, which explains their similar political socialization, formation of attitudes and interest cohesion.

Arising from the basic assumptions above, informs the basic generalizations of elite theory as follows: In every society, there is and must always be minority which rules. This stands out in Michels, (1977:385) famous statement, “who says organisation says oligarchy”. This implies that the oligarchy is a logical derivative of organisation. In addition, Pareto says that minority rule is the reality in all societies developed, underdeveloped, simple or complex. This minority that rules derived its original power almost invariably from force or coercive services such as the monopoly of military function. But over time, this coercive power is transformed into hegemony through routinization. The minority ruling circle is composed of all those who occupy commanding political positions. The utility of this theory will underscore elite manipulation of the Nigeria state which undermines the implementation of 2014 constitutional conference proposal on restructuring of Nigerian Federalism.

Compromise Defined

The Concept, compromise appears problematic to define and cannot even be confined to any historical framework in view of perspectives prisms attached to it. However, it remains a very important problem in politics because “the ability to make a compromise demands a high level of political

culture of those who actually make compromise in practice” (Ledevyev, 1989:1). Hence, the problem of compromise today constitutes a burning discuss in the political life of the modern world since it is a means of solving lingering economic and political problems. The question now is what is compromise?

Compromise is linked to the concept of a “medium” or intermediate position in the sphere of interest of the conflicting socio-economic, historical and political tendencies and forces. According to Lenin, compromise “is a moment of agreement, a moment of some unity of interest; it did not eliminate the struggle, nor did compromise make the question of who will defeat whom irrelevant”. At the same time, Lenin observed that compromise is a very specific form of struggle. It is a peaceful form of struggle in which of factor of agreement and coexistence prevail over the factor of mutual exclusion thus, emphasizing the maintenance of certain equilibrium.

A compromise happens in a situation in which people accept something different from what they really desire, because of circumstances or because they are considerate of the wishes or agitations of other people. To “compromise is to make a deal between different parties where each party gives up part of their demand” <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compromise>. In every human relationship “compromise” is frequently said to be an agreement that no party is happy with, this is because the parties involved often feel that they either gave away too much or that they received a little”(<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compromise>.)

In our commitment to maintain One Nigeria with Unity in diversity, a high level of productive mind-set of political compromise is needed on the sides of our political elites. This is to avert possible consequences of failure of compromise in serious national issues like restructuring. The argument is that should the country Nigeria go to the extreme point once again, chances of survival may be lean, if the statement credit to General T.Y Danjuma that no county ever survives two civil wars is anything to go by.

Restructuring Defined

The word restructuring has gathered significant momentum in the literature of politics and political science in recent times. Every political commentator and scholars have approached it with different perspective prisms. According to Bellow (2017:3) restructuring is the process of increasing or decreasing the number of component parts that make up a

system and re-defining the inter relationship between them in such a way that the entire system performs more efficiently. He further opined that restructuring if not well planned and handled can lead to greater efficiency or even system collapse. This perception is inclined mostly to either state or local government creation since his emphasis is mostly on sub- units of Nigerian federalist structure. In line with the above, former President Ibrahim Babaginda during prayers to mark his 75th birthday celebration at the Hilltop, Minna, Niger State strongly advocated for devolution of powers to the extent that more responsibilities be given to the states while the Federal Government is vested with the responsibility to oversee our foreign policy, defence, and economy (Babaginda, 2017). He continued ‘The talk to have the country restructured means that Nigerians have agreed on our unity in diversity; but that we should strengthen our structures to make the union more functional based on our comparative advantages’. Akin Osuntokun (2017) avers that restructuring is simply a call for the restoration of federalism-the foundational constitution structure to which all Nigerians subscribed as encapsulated in the independence constitution of 1960. For him, this constitution was violated in 1966 and the violation set in motion a chain of events that has culminated in the present abnegation of a 36 states structure against the four regional structures that emanated from the independence constitution. All the ills presently plaguing the country are directly or indirectly a consequence of the wrong anti federalist diversion Nigeria took in 1966.

In solidarity with the opinion Supo Shonibare (2017) a chieftain of the Pan-Yoruba socio-political organization, Afenifere, maintained that “I would wish that we have a Federation with independent self- sustaining federating units able to develop infrastructure, critical amenities, undertake other developmental projects, education and health without a central body interfering. We already have geo-political zones. Why don’t we have say six(6) or eight(8) Regions from that template, enable the Regions exercise the functions presently being exercised by the federal government in the various States and co-ordinate such functions as well as utilize economies of scale. Each Region should be at liberty to create more States in their region as their constitution stipulates. In essence, political restructuring simply defined is ‘the process by which a political system undergoes adjustment, adaptation, change or reconfiguration from time to time, may be regarded as intrinsic to political systems or in fact human societies for that matter’ (Osaghae,2018:1). He posits that the evolution or progression of societies and states from the earliest

communities of hunters and gatherers to modern nation states, the rise and fall of states, fluctuating boundaries and so on are perhaps the most notable manifestations of the fundamentality of restructuring. Restructuring “is the refinement of the institutional structures that undergird the workings of a system in order to either firm it up or prevent it from collapse, or make it more efficient and beneficial to those which the system ought to serve” (Nwakanam 2017 :1). Restructuring means “making changes to our current federal structure so that it comes closer to what our founding fathers established in response to the very issues and challenges that led them to opt for a less centralised system. It means devolving more powers to the federating units with the accompanying resources; that is greater control by the federating units of the resources in their areas.

It means by implication the reduction of the powers and roles of the federal government so that it would concentrate only on those matters best handled by the centre such as defence, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal policies, immigration, customs and excise, aviation as well as setting and enforcing national standards on such matters as education, health and safety... Using the zones would ensure financial viability of the states and also address the concerns of minorities about domination by our three major ethnic groups (Atiku, 2017). With specific focus of this study, restructuring entails continuous and unhindered process of adjustment, Nigerian federal system should undergo in a bid to make it work well and adapt to changing demands of Nigerians.

2014 Conference Recommendation on Political Restructuring and Forms of Government

1. FEDERALISM: The Conference agreed that Federalism denotes a political arrangement in which a country is made up of component parts otherwise called Federating Units. Thus, in a Federation, political powers are constitutionally shared between the central government and the federating units. These powers basically, represent the functions of each tier of the federation. Conference also noted the inherent advantages of a federal system of government in a heterogenous society such as ours. These include: - the sustenance of unity in diversity; - expanded opportunities for the various peoples, including minority groups, to participate in the governance of the country; thus minimizing the fears of domination and/or marginalization among minority groups. It also and promotes broad-based development.(final conference report page 278)

Consequently, Conference unanimously resolved as follows: 1. Nigeria shall retain a Federal system of Government; 2. The core elements of the Federation shall be as follows: i. A Federal (Central) Government with States as the federating units; and ii. Without prejudice to States constituting the federating units, States that wish to merge may do so in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Provided that: (a) A two-thirds majority of all members in each of the Houses of Assembly of each of the States, in which such merger is proposed, support by resolution, the merger; (b) a Referendum is conducted in each of the States proposing to merge with 75% of the eligible voters in each of those States approving the merger; (c) the National Assembly, by resolution passed by a simple majority of membership, approves of the merger; and (d) States that decide to merge shall also reserve the right to demerge following the same procedure and processes for merger.

2. REGIONALISM. At independence in 1960, Nigeria had three regions and by 1964 had added a fourth region. All four were autonomous but subordinated only to the Federal Constitution. Then came the military in 1966 when aspects of the Federal Constitution were suspended leading to the creation of 12 states, (six in the north and six in the south) in answer to political exigencies including the protection of minority rights; (final conference report page 279) More states were created to satisfy the yearnings of various ethnic nationalities which fear domination by some others. Nigeria now has 36 States plus the Federal Capital Territory. In spite of this subsisting arrangement, there continues to be demands for the creation of more States. After extensive consideration of Regionalism/Zones, Conference decided as follows: (i) The States shall be the federating units; and (ii) Any group of States may create a self-funding Zonal Commission to promote economic development, good governance, equity, peace and security in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

3. STATE CREATION The subject of State creation has remained a huge political issue in Nigeria. Conference examined the Reports of the 2005 National Political Reform Conference and the Report of the Presidential Committee on Review of Outstanding Issues from Recent Constitutional Conferences 2012 (the Belgore Report) and after wide consultations and extensive deliberations and in the interest of equity, justice and fairness. In addition, Conference therefore resolved as follows: (i) In the spirit of reconciliation, equity, fair play and justice, there shall be created an additional

State for the South East Zone; and (ii) That all other requests for State creation should be considered on merit. Conference approved the criteria for the creation of new States as follows:

(1) Any new State sought to be created must be viable. In considering viability, the following should be taken into consideration: (a) Any new State should be economically viable; (b) It should have human, natural and material resources; (c) It should have a minimum land mass/water mass; and (d) The viability of the existing State(s) should be taken into consideration as well, so as not to create a situation where new State(s) would leave the existing State(s) unviable. (2) That State creation should be on the basis of parity between the geo-political zones to ensure equality of Zones; (3) Additional States should be created in each of the six (6) geo- political zones to bring the number of States in each zone to nine (9); (4) That eighteen (18) more States be created as follows: a. Apa State from the present Benue State; Edu State from Niger State; Kainji State from the present Kebbi State; Katagun State from the present Bauchi State; Savannah State from the present Borno State; Amana State from the present Adamawa State; Gurara State from the present Kaduna State; Ghari State from the present Kano State; Etiti State from the present South East Zone; Aba State from the present Abia State; Adada State from the present Enugu State; Njaba-Anim State from the present Anambra and Imo States; Anioma State from the present Delta State; Ogoja State from the present Cross River State; Ijebu State from the present Ogun State; New Oyo State from the present Oyo State; (final conference report page 281 b.) That the third State to be created in the South –South Zone will be named later, along with its State Capital; c. That the third State to be created in the South-West Zone will be named later, along with its State Capital; and The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be amended to allow for less onerous process for creation of States.

Compromise and Restructuring of Nigerian Federalism

The assertion that compromise is very effective in the struggle for the unity of opposing groups and their views cannot be overemphasised. Compromise is also extremely productive in preserving and consolidating peaceful coexistence between people with different social system including religion, ethnicity, traditional and cultural inclination. The dynamically changing reality of Nigeria state today generated political consciousness and awareness among every stratum of both the elites and non-elites makes

compromise inevitable. This is because our dynamically changing reality poses new economic, political, historical and social problems and in order to solve these problems, fresh attempt is needed to assuage the clamour for restructuring which is today the latest buzz word in our political nomenclature.

According to V.I Lenin, “every zig-zag turn in history is a compromise, a compromise between the old which is no longer strong enough to completely negate the new, and the new, which is not yet strong enough to completely overthrow the old” (Lenin, 1917), In our considered opinion, the above captures our position since the compromise we are advocating is Nigeria’s core national interest of “Unity in Diversity’ and a restructured Nigeria featuring: geo- political restructuring, fiscal restructuring, administrative restructuring, security restructuring and political office restructuring.

Lucky enough, it is on record that serious precedents has been laid on our journey to restructuring from our past restructuring efforts since independence of which its success demonstrates the compromising spirit of our past leaders. According to Bellow, (2017) “consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or in-deliberately, most Heads of State or Government had since independence implemented one form of restructuring or the other during their reign. The reason why we did not know is that the decisions were not called or announced as restructuring, and they were done piecemeal making them unnoticeable by the general public”. The charity displayed in this exercise then shows the level of patriotism of the leaders in question as here-under:

TafawaBalewa (1960-1965) created Mid- Western Region from the then Western region.

General AguiyiIronsi Jan.1966-July 1966 abolished the federating regions by Decree 32, Cancelled Native Authority Police, Federal Government took over revenue from natural resources and cooperate taxes from regional governments and introduced unitary government.

General Yakub Gowon (1966-1975) Created 12 states to replace four regional structures.

General Murtala Mohammed (1975-1976) Started the process of relocation of federal capital from Lagos to Abuja and created additional states.

General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979) Changed the British Parliamentary system to American Presidential system,

Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) Introduced Federal Character Principle and applied it in his political appointment and other bureaucratic organs.

General Ibrahim Babaginda (1985-1993) Created more states and replaced derivation principle and set up OPADEC.

General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) Inaugurated constitutional conference which recommended the creation of the present six geo-political zones and the creation of additional states and local governments.

General Abdusalam Abubakar (1998-1999) Modified the 1979 constitution and removed local government joint account with state governments.

President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) Restored the Policy of Derivation, Created the Economic and Financial Crime Commission.

President GoodLuckEbele Jonathan (2010-2015) Inaugurated the 2014 Constitutional Conference that fruitfully recommended restructuring which its desire is today gathering momentum.

It is on record that prior to 2015, the people seen on the political stage clamouring for restructuring are mostly those of south- south and south- east extraction but lucky enough that in our contemporary times, prominent northerners are currently joining their southern colleagues in asking for the restructuring project which is long overdue. A case in point is the most recent suggestion of the speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Dogara for a constitutional amendment that will deliver the local governments from the hands of state governors. This is another form of restructuring agitation. Also, the former Vice President, Atiku Abubakar in his speech during the launching of a newspaper outfit called Daily Stream included in the list of issues to be restructured as reduction of federal government exclusive legislative list (87) in favour of concurrent list(15),developing a new model of fiscal federalism, administrative restructuring among others. These inputs from prominent northerners and southerners in favour of restructuring demonstrates the fact that we have inculcated productive and compromising mindset against unproductive and uncompromising mindset, hence, their shift of attitudes and motives. The compromising mind sees mutual sacrifice not as an occasion to tenaciously stand on principle, or to imprudently abandon principle to reach agreement, but a an opportunity to adjust one's principle to improve on the status quo. This class of compromisers also finds in wilful opposition to policies, not excuse for mistrust, but resources for understanding among those

who disagree. Arising from above demonstrates that there is a nexus between compromise and restructuring of Nigerian federalism.

Conclusion

This study examined the problem of compromise in restructuring of Nigerian federalism with a focus on non implementation of 2014 conference report. In the process, we observed the tension between what is required in campaigning to win election and what is required to rule. This brings in the problem of compromise because to govern effectively, politicians must devise means of reaching agreements with the opposition, including members of the ruling party who feel aggrieved with the status quo. This tension between what is required to win power and what is required to rule manifest into compromising and uncompromising mindset thereby introducing cluster of attitudes and arguments in policy adjustment and implementation. This is a replica of the present restructuring agitations from Nigerians which needs urgent intervention. We recommend a pro-active restructuring programme inform of legislation by the government as well as unity of interest of Nigerian elites in support of the restructuring agenda.

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**SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH-EAST, NIGERIA:
ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

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Abstract

The need for security as a catalyst of development in Nigeria as well as anywhere in the world cannot be overemphasized. This is because; any nation that lacks absolute security for its' citizenry would find development both economically, socially, educationally and otherwise almost impossible. This paper focuses on the review of the security challenges in the North-Eastern zone of Nigeria and the threats that such insecurity poses on the developmental progress in those States. The paper therefore evaluates how insecurity has affected the North-Eastern part of Nigeria in the past decade and recommends measures of what can be done to salvage the region from total and absolute collapse. The paper is descriptive in nature and data was obtained from secondary sources. The paper thus argued that poverty, high rate of illiteracy, especially in western education, corruption, lack of exposure, unemployment and underemployment, leadership failure, human rights abuse, bad governance and weak mentorship, etc. are factors that led to the security challenges in the region. It therefore recommends, among others that government at all levels should do everything possible to restore lasting and permanent peace in the affected States; to enable them compete favorably with other States in the country especially the South-South and South-Eastern States, and suggestions of necessary steps to be taken for relative peace in the areas were given.

Key Words: Governance, insecurity, poverty, unemployment, corruption

Introduction

“We cannot live with security unless there is development, and there can be no development without security” Kofi Annan, General Secretary of UN (1997-2006).

One of the major obstacles to indeed, development in Nigeria is insecurity. Until very recently, many explanations on the slow pace of development in Nigeria tend to pay little attention to the centrality of security to national development (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Nigeria as a country has been seen by many as providing the fertile ground for the emergence of both terrorists and militant groups due to her failure to; live up to expectations as a responsible and credible nation. The high level of youth unemployment, illiteracy, environmental degradation and neglect, seeming marginalization, general poverty and elite corruption make her prone to one form of agitation or the other (Ikechukwu, 2016). In the submission of Isa (2010), he argues that *Boko Haram* communities are wrecked by poverty, deterioration social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising number of unemployed graduates, massive numbers of unemployed youths, dwindling fortunes in agriculture...and the weak and dwindling productive base of the northern economy. Nigeria is characterized by and divided into states in which major political issues are vigorously and or violently contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions in the country (Smyth and Robinson, 2001). From its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has faced a perennial crisis of territorial or state legitimacy, and insurgency which has often challenged its efforts at national cohesion, democratization, stability and economic transformation (Maier, 2000).

The north-eastern states of Nigeria since the emergence of *Boko Haram* insurgency have suffered a huge setback in areas of security. This insecurity has affected the developmental projects in the region. Government attention at all levels has been channeled to the region, but it has always been almost impossible to develop the region.

Conceptual Clarifications

For the purpose of clarity, it will be good to understand in clear terms, the meaning of certain key terms that made up the crux and thrust of the article.

Security

Security is a contested term and practice. There are two perspectives on the ontology of security. Some argued that the term depicts a reality, feeling and a condition. However, some argued that security is a label attached to a condition that someone considers undesirable. The term security is very elastic in nature because it attracts various views in different fields. Generally, security refers to safety from harm and danger which may constitute threat to human existence. According to Phenson, Ojie, Esin, and Atai(2014), security is seen as all measures, precaution, actions and personnel put in place that ensures safety to lives and assets and provide a peaceful atmosphere for citizens and government to pursue their legitimate activities without fear, threats or hindrances in a given country. Insecurity is the opposite word for security. The re-occurring problematic nature of human insecurity is of concern to all. The capacity of state actors to deliver as a statutory policy to protect lives and property, maintain territorial integrity and other internal forms of security is becoming doubtful in the recent times as Nigerians have remained unprotected and unsecured despite the huge monthly allocation to security votes and ever increasingly expenditure on security management in Nigeria. Security is more than military security or security from external attacks. For many of the four billion inhabitants in the developing countries, security is conceived as the basic level of the struggle for survival. Therefore, in order to provide an integrated African security assessment, the non-military dimensions of security should be added. Henceforth, African security as a concept should be applied in its broadest sense to include economic security, social security, environmental security, food security, the equality of life security and technological security (Nwolise, 2006).

Development

Development is best viewed in the perspective of Dudley Seer who posits that; the question to ask about a country's development are, what is happening to poverty, unemployment and what is happening to inequality? If all these three have declined from high to low percentages, then beyond doubt this would be a period of development for that country concerned. On the other hand, if one or two or all of these three central problem areas have been growing worse, it would be strange or wrong to call the result development, even if per capital income doubled (Seer, 1972). So development means decreased in all forms of lack. Development as the main entity in the human life comprises of

the word change, hence it is the process of changing from bad to good, good to better, and better to best. This means the development is the process of changing from a low to high level at a particular time in which there is a positive gain.

Discourse on development is always sound when it is related to the postulation of Rodney (1971:9) in his view, “development in human society is a many-sided process.” It involves sustaining growth. It means an economy must register advances, which in turn will promote further progress. According to WDR (1991), the challenge of development is to improve the quality of life; better education, improvement in health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life. HDR (1994) posits that the purpose of development is to create an environment in which all people can expand their capabilities, and opportunities can be enlarged for both present and future generation. To Edgar (1987), he suggests that development occurs when there is development of people (Human Development) and not development of things.

Theoretical Framework

There are numerous theories that can be used to explain the prevalent and prevailing security challenges in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria which to a large extent has hindered full or partial development in the states across the north-east in general. However, the most suitable theory adopted for this paper is the relative deprivation and frustration-aggression theory.

The central premise of the relative deprivation theory is that it is derived from the experience of being deprived of something to which one feels to be entitled. In his explanation, Gurr (1970) posits that relative deprivation is the gap between expected and achieved welfare and this leads men to discontent and eventual violence. According to Ayegba (2015), this ultimately created the feelings of deprivation and impulse to form a rebel group and undertake terror attacks on both the citizens and government.

Gurr also posits that, the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism; the anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) also postulates that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and contrariwise that the existence of

frustration leads to some form of aggression. It was later expanded and modified by other scholars, such as Yates (1962) and Berkowitz (1962). Frustration – aggression theory which is the off spring of relative deprivation theory could be used to explain the prevailing events, such as terrorism and wave of violence in Africa and particularly in Nigeria. The extent of relative poverty and inequality in the north has led several analysis and organizations to argue that socio-economic deprivation is the main factor behind *Boko Haram's* campaign of violence in northern Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013b and Kukah 2012). Forest (2012) cited in Okoli and Lortyer (2014) argues that *Boko Haram* is largely a product of wide spread socio-economic and religious insecurity whose repercussions resonate among certain communities in the north. It could further be argued that the basis of the *BokoHaram* insurgency is more socio-economic than it is ideological. Poverty and ignorance are fertilizers for insurgency anywhere and any age. When combine and cloak themselves in religious, ethnic, or other partisan garbs, they become ready incendiary for the most brutal and reckless violence (Nchi, 2013). In addition to these factors the youth unemployment, social inequality, social and economic exclusion, and the practice of Almajiri system of Quranic education. All these aforementioned factors created a fertile ground for the rise and prevalence of the *BokoHaram* insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria.

The Emergence of Security Challenges in North-Eastern Nigeria

The exact base of the emergency of *BokoHaram* sect is not known. The only relative facts about this sect are the accounts gathered from the media and scanty extant academic documentations. According to Onuoha (2010), the emergency of *BokoHaram* could be traced to 1995 when one AbubakarLawan established the Allusunnawaljamaahhijra sect in University of Maiduguri. AbubakarLawan, who was the leader of the sect, then left the country for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. Despite the existence of various conflicting accounts, it is agreed by most observers that in 2002, a 32 years old charismatic Muslim cleric, Muhammed Yusuf, established a religious complex with a Mosque and Islamic boarding school in Maiduguri, Borno state, along with a prayer group which he christened “Jama’atulAlhulSunnahLidda’wahwal Jihad” loosely translated as “people committed to the propagation of the Prophets teachings and Jihad” (Chothia, 2011). It was in same year 2002 that Nigeria came face to face with a new security challenges arising from the activities of *BokoHaram* sect up until

date, still paused as a critical security threat to the nation. Muhammed Yusuf, the founder of the sect, started the movement as an itinerant preacher and gradually won the hearts of people mostly the youths through his radical Islamic ideology. Beginning as an itinerant preacher in early 2000 in Maiduguri, Borno State, Muhammed Yusuf gained a large following among disaffected young men who became susceptible to recruits. The largest following came from semi-illiterates, unemployed youths, who were forced to make a living between the twin divide creativity and criminality, (Okoli and Lortyer, 2014).

The clamp-down on members of the sect, those who survived arrest and trial went underground, telling their stories of injustice and nursing their grievances in exile. It is, indeed, believed that the contact the group had with Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Somalia must have been achieved during this period (Wikipedia, 2012). In 2011, the sect initiated a campaign of suicide bombing, a phenomenon witnessed for first time in Nigeria's history. The Nigerian state responded to this security challenge by declaring an anti-terror war on the sect. The escalation of the insurgency between 2012 and 2013 led to the declaration of state of emergency on Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states, respectively. But the sect has since expanded its activities to other areas, such as Kano, Bauchi, Gombe, Niger, Kaduna and Plateau states, carrying out increasingly frequent and sophisticated attacks against the civilian population (IDMC, 2014).

Correlation between Security and Development

Security and development are two inseparable items; they are the two sides of a coin. It is almost impossible for one to exist without the other. In the perspective of Oyebode (2011), he asserts that it is self-evident that without security hardly is anything possible, being it social or economic development. Building infrastructures and empowering human resources, among others, which are the symbols of development, are done to enhance people and secure their lives and property. Furthermore, Tedheke (1998) posits that security can be understood as overall socio-economic wellbeing of the society. Thus, "any Nigerian leader or government that places priority on 'force security' against the socio-economic wellbeing of the populace lacks adequate and proper understanding of security" (Haruna, 2013:3). Adedayo (2011) pontificates that security is a measure that ensures the peaceful co-existence and the overall development of a community. "This means that security challenges tend to

arrest development just as social economic development may arrest insecurity” (Haruna, 2013:3).

Causes of Insecurity and Underdevelopment in North-East Nigeria

In the past 16 years, issue of insecurity in the region of the north-eastern Nigeria and the nation in general has dominated the minds of many scholars. Ousman (2004) asserts that decades of military dictatorship, economic mismanagement, financial chaos, lawlessness, poverty, political repression, social tensions, corruption, are but major causes behind the rise of Islamism in northern Nigeria. The region has been permanently relevant in the global discourse on security affairs. The northeast Nigeria has enjoyed a lot of sympathy from subsequent government of Nigeria because of the prevalent security quagmire it faces. So many reasons have been put forward as basis for the frequent brouhaha in the region. But the following 10 key causes shall be adopted in respect to this paper. They includes; unemployment, corruption, Imbalance, Weak judicial system, open border of Nigeria, high influx of arms or proliferation small arms and light weapons, Criminal situation in Nigeria, terrorist threat, insurgency and insurrection, illiteracy, poverty, drugs abuse

1. **Unemployment:** Generally, the nation is faced with huge rate unemployed youths, but that of the north-east region seems to be larger than the rate of unemployment in other parts of the country. This has contributed immensely to the crisis and conflicts in the region. The army of unemployed youths in states like Borno and Yobe are easily propelled to crime propensity because of idleness. According to statistics, every tenth young citizen of Nigeria is officially unemployed. Another statistic provided by the NBS shows that unemployment rate in Nigeria has risen to 14%. It means that Nigeria does not get about 19% of its GDP.
2. **Corruption:** To say corruption has become endemic in Nigerian state is the obvious. The criminal resort to the massive stealing from the commonwealth of Nigeria’s public office holder’s act as major impediment for development especially in the north-east region. Those in government only loot for their selfish interests. This massive corruption contributes to the outbreak of terrorism. Since leaders in the north-east do not find it pertinent to provide jobs for the teeming youths, this level of corruption leads to conflicts.

3. **Weak Judicial System:** The killing or assassination of Muhammed Yusuf is a clear case of injustice that led to swift spread insecurity in the region by the sect members. If the judiciary could have handled the case well. *Boko Haram* would not have gotten out of control in the early days. The sect members saw the killing or murder of Yusuf as injustice to them, and result to carrying arms. The justice system must be equipped to help stabilized the nation. Justice is a very important sector that needs not to play with at all. Some opinion and thoughts leaders have also criticized the random killings of the members of the sect. They have query government stand on the use of force. The judiciary must come together to put the justice system in the right path in order to bring peace and justice among warring groups in the nation and especially in the north-east region, respectively.
4. **Porous Border:** Nigeria has borders that are poorly guarded. Porous coastal borders are the main cause of terrorism and insecurity in the country. This situation especially prevalent and dangerous in the northeast. The federal government must take a rapid action to securing the territorial integrity of the nation. Overtime, many of the insurgents come through Chad, Niger and Cameron. The immigration agency must be equipped to bring this quagmire of defenseless border to a plausible end.
5. **Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons:** Smugglers take advantage of the weak border system to smuggle small arms and light weapons into the country and also bring in multiple military uniforms. This is a very complex problem; government must work tirelessly to tackle this menace of insecurity that arises through the borders absorbent state. In the news, you see how custom intercepts illegal weapons been brought into the country.
6. **Illiteracy:** There is a belief that education is bad, this led to attacks on western education in the north-east. The high rate of illiteracy in the in the region has contributed to sporadic spray of insecurity and crisis in the states of Yobe and Borno. Illiteracy is a yardstick to violence in the north-east, Nigeria.
7. **Poverty:** Former United State secretary general, John Kerry posits that “much of these challenges come out of this poverty where young people are grabbed at an early stage, proffered a little bit of money...” over 71.5% of population of the north-east are poor. Borno has the

lowest economic indicators in the country, and investors shun the state because of poor security. The region to a large extent has been doing so poorly. Most youths lives in abject lack and want, the terrorist take advantage of this to lure them into accepting crimes in exchange for food, water and comfort. If the problem of poverty is reduced drastically. Many will not find joy in crimes

8. **Drugs Abuse:** Members of *BokoHaram* are often linked to drugs. The availability of drugs in the region make them to lost their senses and feelings of humanity to commit crimes. Overtime, it has been known that those that involved in drugs abuse are use as instrument in the hands of insurgent molders. The government must fight these traffickers to end the influx of drugs into the region. This is a major challenge.
9. **Imbalance:** The huge gap between the elites, the rich, the middle class and the poor or *talakwas* is reason for insecurity in the north-eastern Nigeria and other parts of the north. To buttress this point, the thoughts of Elie Wiesel, a Romanian born Jewish American is most appropriate. He said, "*Mankind must remember that peace is not God's gift to his creature, peace is our gift to each other*". It is therefore pertinent that the gap between the very poor and extremely rich in the region be bridged to enable the *talakwas* to have access to other basic necessities of life like water, electricity, roads, states of the arts healthcare facilities and schools, etc. If all these facilities are made available in the region, it will act as propensity base for many youths to have a rethink toward matter of insecurity. It is conventional wisdom that there can't be no development without peace.
10. **Bad Mentorship:** When the large numbers of youths are not well mentored, there will be high tendency of them been use by immoral people to carryout criminal acts against the state. A region that has good leaders and mentors is a clime that crime rate and insecurity would be very minimal. Leaders are pillars of the youth. The nation and south east region are doing well in this aspect of mentorship.

Challenges of Security to Development in North-East

The current security challenges in north-east, Nigeria is widespread. Thus, there is high security threats including kidnapping of school girls like the in the case of Chibok in the past and most recently Dapchi 113 girls saga,

respectively. Securing schools and providing safety to girls in the region is now a major source of concern. Government at all levels has not been able to bring massive development to the region since the inception of insecurity in 2008. Economic development, social development, health facility development, road construction and infrastructural development are scarce because of the dangerous, obnoxious and egregious activities of the insurgents in the northeastern region.

School safety and protection of girls in all schools in the north-east, Nigeria is a major challenge faced by the federal government and state government as the case is in recent time. The north-east region is also greeted with ethno-religious or farmers herders' problem in states like Adamawa; Numan axis and Taraba; Mambila plateau areas where many people have lost their lives. The insecurity in the region has affected the development of the states bedeviled with crisis. Extra-Judicial killings and bombing contribute immensely to the security quagmires in the states of Borno, Taraba, Yobe and Adamawa. What Gombe state experienced was temporal invasion of the *BokoHaram* insurgents and order was restored almost immediately after the attempt attacks of the state. That made the state to have recorded more developmental strides in the region unlike its counterpart states.

Prospect of Security and Development in the North-East Region

The security of the north-eastern Nigeria must be taken seriously by federal government. The abduction of Dapchi girls in February, 2018 in Yobe state shows how reluctant government at all levels are or have been toward the issue of security since the incident of the Chibok girls abduction in 2014.

The prospect of security in the North-East is a multidimensional; the government, the community, the state government, the traditional rulers, the local governments, the general citizenry, the international community, civil societies and all well spirited individuals, respectively. Hands must be on deck to bring permanent and constant security to the region. Politicians, Laity's, clergies, critical stakeholders must contribute their quota to issues of peace in the region.

Development is only possible when peace is on ground. There can't be any economic, social, health, educational, infrastructural development without constant peace in the states. It will take a collective responsibility of the inhabitants of the region for peace to be restored and for development to take place.

Humanitarian Services: The federal government need about \$248 million emergency respond in the region according to 2016 approximated figure, to take care of the over 5.2 million displaced people. The federal government as a matter of necessity should intensify its activities on the internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps. More assistance are needed both from federal and international community to provide food to the people living in the IDPs. They must be protected against insurgents. The IDPs camps must be secured. The occupants must not be abandoned or allowed to starve as the case in the past few years. Resources and materials meant for the internally displaced people must not be diverted as reported. The members of the IDPs in Borno state protested recently over the poor condition of service towards them by the federal, state and local governments. If the IDPs are provided for sufficiently, it will reduce insecurity to its barest minimum. Human security and food security are best forms of security needed in the north-east region.

The Military: The military must do everything possible to protect lives and properties in the north-eastern region. The military must be equipped adequately to enable it carry out the responsibilities accorded to it with much vigor, grace and gusto through resilience and steadfastness. As the custodians of national peace and security, the government work with all the agencies involved to safeguard the lives and properties in the region. The role played the security personnel contribute immensely to development of the region in all facets of life.

Federal Government: The federal government must play major role in protection of lives and securing the people in the north-eastern states. The government must do everything within its powers; use every resource available to bring succor, hope and safety to the people. They must identify with the *Bokoharm* and rescue all the adopted girls, and must follow world recommended standard of negotiation in order to reach out to the insurgents. The government at all levels must intensify efforts to educate the people, bring education very close to the people at all levels. If the citizens are educated, they will not involve in crime and insurgent activities easily as the case is. The level of illiteracy if curtailed will go a long way to cut down the rate of crime in the region. Political and economic corruption is another angle begging for attention as a panacea to peace in north-east, Nigeria.

Conclusion

In the course of writing this article, attempts have been made to contribute to the body of literature on the issues of security and development in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The paper reveals the possible causes of insecurity in the north-east and linked the security challenge to cause of underdevelopment in the region since early 2000's. It was clearly noted that there cannot be development in any region without adequate security. Once security is available and visible in the North-Eastern Nigeria all forms of development would be very possible and all investments in the areas will produce results. Security precedes development. Insecurity in the states of Borno and Yobe was popularized because of the mishandling of the early warning signs by the security apparatus, especially the unwarranted killing of the erstwhile leader of *BokoHaram*, Mohammed Yusuf in Kano prison.

Development and security are seen as two sides of the same coin. Investment in infrastructure in the states without concomitant security measures amounts to waste of resources. If the ten items itemized are taken seriously, the north-east will develop and compete favorably with its southern and western counterparts.

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**EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS AND GOVERNANCE IN
NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW OF PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU
BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATION, 2015-2019**

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Abstract

In most democratic societies of the world, executive and Legislative engage in an antagonistic relation. While in liberal democracies the relation fosters proper oversight function enshrined in the constitution and encourages good governance, in developing countries like Nigeria, it has been characterized by vested interest, hostility clashes and deliberate attempt to truncate the nascent democracy. The executive and the 8th national Assembly have indicated lack of commitment and seriousness in dealing with national issues, evidence of which can be seen in the federal government versus senate president in the code of conduct tribunal, not confirming some presidential nominees by national assembly, not honoring of national assembly's invitation by executive, inversion of national assembly by security agencies, deliberate budget padding and delay in passing the budget, lack of lobbying and bargaining skills etc. it was on this background this paper examined the causes and consequences of hostile relationship exist between the executive and the legislature in president Muhammadu Buhari's administration. The paper used qualitative analysis in explaining the relationship that exists between the executive and the legislature in the present democratic dispensation. The research relied on secondary data consisting Journals, News papers, official written documents in both hard and online version. The paper opined that the cat and mouse relations co-exist between the two arms of government within the period under study was the principal factor responsible in denying much dividends of democracy at grassroots level. This paper recommended that harmonious relationship is highly needed between executive and legislative arms for democracy to effectively operate and it is concomitant to good governance.

Keywords: Executive – Legislative, Relationship, Good governance, Democracy, Administration and Nigeria.

Introduction:

The return of democracy in May, 1999 has opened a new page to the polity and system of governance in Nigeria. The era which politically recognized as the fourth republic adopted presidential democracy and ratified 1999 constitution. In the constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers known as the system of checks and balances as well as oversight functions are clearly spell out. The 1999 constitution (as amended) upholds the separation of powers to the three branches of government as in section 4, 5 and 6.

Thus, section 4(1) stated that the legislative power of the federal republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the federation which shall consist of a senate and a House of representatives. Accordingly, section 5(1a) asserted that the executive powers of the federation shall be vested in the president and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the vice- president and ministers of the government of the federation. However, section 6(1) made it clear that the judicial powers of the federation shall be vested in the judicial courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the federation.

The aforementioned sections of the 1999 constitution (as amended) have defined the powers and relations among the three branches of government in order to safeguard the liberty of individual and as well avoid tyranny. It aimed also at ensuring effectiveness and efficiency in governance where dividend of democracy can reach people at grassroots level.

Recently writers are concerned with the pattern of relations between executive and legislature more especially in the developing countries due to its significance on policy decisions and governance. In Nigeria for example, beginning from the fourth republic, executive- legislative relations is more of conflictive than cooperative. From 1999 to 2007 of president Obasanjo administration, five senators served as senate president due to what most analysts pointed out as executive interference. The fourth republic National Assembly has witnessing in most cases a situation where senate president or speaker of the House of Representatives is impeached, removed or pressure to resign. A scenario at which look like been sponsored by the executive branch of government to dealt with senate president or speaker of the house that refused to dance to the tune of executive branch.

It is against this background this study examines the executive-legislative relation and governance in the first tenure of President Muhammadu Buhari administration and the 8th National Assembly. Thus, the paper is divided into eight sections: Introduction; Objectives; Conceptual and Theoretical reviews; Methodology; Causes and pattern of conflict relation between President Buhari led Executive and the 8th National Assembly; Consequences of the conflict relations between executive and legislature; Conclusion; and Recommendations.

Objectives:

1. To expose the causes and pattern of relations between President Muhammadu Buhari led Executive and the 8th National Assembly.
2. To highlight the consequences of the relations between the two arms of government on governance within the period of study.
3. To offer recommendations which when strictly adhered to could lead to harmonious relations and good governance between the two branches of government.

Theoretical and Conceptual Reviews:

Governance and separation of power

Governance relates to “the processes of interaction and decision – making among the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or production of social norms and institutions” (Hufty, 2011). According to Bevir, (2012), Governance comprises all of the processes of governing-whether undertaken by the government of a state, by a market or by a network – over a social system (family, tribe, formal or informal organization, a territory or across territories) and whether through the laws, norms, power or language of an organized society. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (UNESCAP) defined Governance as “the process of decision-making and the process by which decision are implemented (or not implemented)”.

On the other hand, ‘Good’ governance entails the effective and efficient delivery of services. This requires governments to be responsive and responsible in order to meet the needs of the citizens (Elaigwu, 2011). He elaborates that good governance deals with how those who have the authority of the state make efforts to achieve the goals or the ends of the state – the maintenance of law and order, the provision of welfare for its citizens and the

pursuit of national interest in the global arena. Generally good governance involves: participation; Equity and inclusiveness; the rule of law; Transparency and accountability; and the effective and efficient delivery of services.

Maduabuchi in (Onyebuchi, 2013) and Andre (1994) averred that while the executive as an arm of government is responsible for policy formulation, evaluation and execution to realize set targets, the legislature enacts laws and make the same functional as instrument of cohesion in the society. It is very clear that all the levels of government, be it executive, legislature and Judiciary each of them may not necessary subsists without the other (Igbokwe-ibeto and Anazodo, 2015).

In this regard, Separation of powers refers to the division of responsibilities into distinct branches to limit any one branch from exercising the core functions of another in order to prevent the concentration of unchecked power by providing for “checks” and “balances” to avoid autocracy. The Nigerian constitution recognized the executive – legislative relations through the principle of separation of powers and balance. The constitution, under the provision of section 4, 5, and 6, separates the powers of the state and distributes them to three separate arms of government- Executive, Legislative and Judicial (Akuki, nd). He stressed that the doctrine is to promote efficiency in governance and prevent friction by precluding the exercise of arbitrary power by all the arms. Moreover, the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for a system of check and balances. For instance, the executive arm can veto bills passed by legislature while the latter can override the veto by the former. Again, the executive can check the Judiciary through its power to appoint or remove judges while the judiciary can declare laws made by the legislature and certain executive actions unconstitutional. (Ugwuanyi, 2015).

The Executive

The executive, according to Anifowose (2008), is the arm of government responsible for applying the authoritative rules and policies of the society. Ikoronye (2005) defines the executive as the organ of government which bears the responsibility of putting into effect the laws enacted by the Legislature subject, however to the judgment and orders of the Judiciary. However, Garner (1952) posited that “in a broad and collective sense, the executive organ embraces the aggregate or totality of all the functionaries and

agencies which are concerned with the execution of the will of the state as that will has been formulated and expressed in terms of law”. Igbokwe-Ibeto and Anazodo (2015) encapsulate that the executive run the machinery of government. They noted that, it formulates the national policy and ensures that it is finally implemented. Anifowose (2008), however, on the powers and functions of executive, posited that it’s divided into three; Legislative, Administrative and Judicial functions. On the same issue, (Ghai, nd) has mentioned the following functions of the executive: enforcement of law; appointment making; treaty-making; defense, war and peace function; foreign policy-making and the conduct of foreign relations; policy-making; functions relating to law-making; law-making under the system of delegated legislature; financial function; some semi-judicial function; Grant of titles and Honors.

The Legislature

As an organ of government, Taiwo and Fajingbesi (2004) defined Legislature as the forum for the representation of the electorate. According to Lafenwa (2009) Legislature is an official body, usually chosen by election, with the power to make change, and repeal laws; as well as powers to represent the constituent units and control government. To Oni (2013), Legislature means a branch of government, a deliberative assembly of persons, usually elective, with the power to pass, amend, and repeal laws for a state. In Cambridge Dictionary, Legislature is defined as an elected group of people who have the power to make and change laws in a state or country. According to Oni (2013), the following are the major functions of the legislature found in the literature; Legislation, oversight, representation, financial function and committee function. In similar note, Augustyn, (2019) outlines the powers of legislature which include: passing laws; confirming executive appointments; ratifying treaties; investigating the executive branch; impeaching and removing from office members of the executive and Judiciary and redressing constituents’ grievances.

The functions of legislature also include legislative control over public cooperation. Patrick (2010) posited that the means of legislative control include: Enactment of laws; Legislative question; Half-hour Discussion or Debate; Adjournment motion; motion for censor; Budget Debate; vote of no confidence; and committees.

Theoretical framework:

In their quest to explain, predict and make informed judgment on a given phenomenon, scholars have propounded theories with predictive and explanatory powers describing different pattern of executive-legislative relations in both presidential and parliamentary democracies. However, for the purpose of research on this concept (executive-legislative relations and governance in Nigeria) the theory of separation of powers has been adopted due to its applicability in explaining the concept of discourse.

The theory was formulated for the first time by Montesquieu in the spirit of laws (1748) where he made the following assertion:

‘When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and trying the causes of individuals.’(Appadorai, 2004 p516-517)

More to that, the federalist (1788) had made another authoritative expression of the theory of separation of powers:

‘The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’(Appadorai, 2004 p217)

The theory of separation of powers emphasized that a different body of persons is to be in charge of each of the three organs of government and no one of them has controlling power over either of the others. The argument among scholars is that whether Montesquieu means complete and absolute separations among the three organs of government or limited separation of the three powers. In view of that the federalist pointed it out clear that Montesquieu did not mean a total and absolute separation of powers.

Therefore interrelations are necessary and separation is for the purpose of preserving the liberty as well as avoiding tyranny.

In the case of Nigeria, there is an abuse of separation of powers and checks and balances as it was observed that each organ is desperate to control the other branches of government not for the common good of all.

Methodology:

The research relied on secondary data consisted of various books, Journals, News papers, official written documents in both hard and online version consulted as sources of information. Qualitative data analysis is the approach applied while carrying out this research. However, current political events which involved executive-legislative relations between president Buhari led executive and the 8th National Assembly were followed.

Causes and pattern of conflict relations between President Muhammadu Buhari led Executive and the 8th National Assembly:

Scholars have different perceptions toward executive – legislative relations. While some see conflict between executive and legislature as a necessary and beneficial precondition to limiting and controlling government (Aiyede, 2005), others view it as contributing to gridlock over major public policy decisions, thus making government ineffective (Mbali, 2007; Dulani and Donge, 2006).

Rockman (1983) identifies some causes of executive – legislative conflict namely; pride and personality clash, executive dominance, ignorance of the constitutions, functional overlapping and legislative performance of oversight function.

Momodu and Ika (2013) outlines the following causes; struggle for power and domination; conflict of roles; limited conceptualization and understanding of their constitutional responsibility; high-handedness of the executive over the legislature; Greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs; lack of patriotism; corruption; poor leadership skills; poor conflict management skills.

In the case of Executive and the 8th National Assembly, intra-party conflict, lack of party discipline, marginalization in power sharing, godfatherism, I don't care attitude, selfish/vested interest were among causes of conflict between executive and legislative branches of government.

In view of that, the relationship between President Muhammadu Buhari led executive and the dual leadership of 8th National Assembly under the Senate President Bukola Saraki and the Speaker Yakubu Dogara can be viewed in two ways – the cooperative and conflictive relations. Cooperative in the sense that despite challenges and feud, the two arms of government have shown some cooperation in terms of security, education, agriculture, monetary policy and foreign relations.

But the hostile or cat and mouse relations between the executive and the 8th National Assembly has been vividly exposed after the new set of leadership of the National Assembly have emerged. Initially, President Muhammadu Buhari has shown interest to work with whoever emerges at the leadership of National Assembly. But barely after the caucus of new People Democratic Party ‘new PDP’ – a group of former governors who left Jonathan’s then ruling party for the All Progressive Congress (APC) shortly after the opposition coalition was formed – maneuvered their way and the National Assembly elected Dr. Bukola Saraki as Senate President, things went awry to both Presidency and the ruling party (APC). This arrangement resulted in repeated battles between the legislature and the executive (Hussaini, 2018).

The relationship between the two arms of government – Executive and Legislature – has been degenerated and gave birth to many conflicts between them such as:

8. The Federal government versus Bukola Saraki.

The rift between Executive and legislature got to head in September 2015, when the Federal government dragged the Senate President, Senators Bukola Saraki... to the Code of Conduct Tribunal on the allegation of false asset declaration (Nigerian Tribune December 30, 2017). In that matter, Saraki appeared in CCT with many Senators on solidarity whom viewed the case as an act of persecution by the executive arm.

9. The Senate versus Inspector General of Police (IGP) Ibrahim Idris.

The IGP face-off with the Senate began when he refused to honour the invitation of the Senate to appear before a committee that was investigating some serious allegations made against him by Senator Isah Missau, an APC member from Bauchi State. The IGP simply went to court to declare the invitation illegal. (Guardian, May 16, 2018).

The Senate complained that Police Mishandled Senator Dino Melaye in several occasions and also need explanation on high rate of insecurity in the country.

10. Senate versus Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs).

The legislature with constitutional powers of checks and balances as well as oversight function can invite head of Ministries, Departments and Agencies for Explanation on issues related to their Ministries, etc. There were issues between Senate and e.g. the Comptroller General of Customs, Col. Hameed Ibrahim Ali (Rtd); Acting chairman, Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), Mr. Ibrahim Magu; Minister of work, power and Housing, Mr. Babatunde Fashola and many others (Guardian 16 May, 2018). In this case, Nigerian have observed a situation where head of Ministries refused to in one way or the other honor an invitation by the Senate or House of reps. This has exposed a great danger to Nigerian democracy.

11. A deliberate Delay in Passing a Budget:

In 2017, the budget which was presented to the National Assembly in December, 2017 did not get signed in to law until six month after. There were claims of padding and altercations about introduction of new subheads by the legislative (the Nigerian Tribune December 30, 2017).

12. Senate versus Acting Chairman (EFCC) Ibrahim Magu.

The Senate in two instances refused to confirm the Acting Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) Mr. Ibrahim Magu. Magu's confirmation was rejected by the Senate in December, 2016 and in March, 2017.

13. The inversion of the premises of the National Assembly by DSS.

On Tuesday, August 7, 2018 DSS operatives mount a blockade at the entrance of the National Assembly preventing Senators and workers from gaining access (PM New, August 7, 2018).

The Vice President Osinbajo condemned the unauthorized standoff at the National Assembly Complex, describing it as "a gross violation of constitutional order, rule of law and all acceptable notions of law and order." (Blueprint, August 7, 2018)

That issue raised a lot of suspicions among the opposition party, ruling party and the Presidency where each party exonerated itself from the invasion.

14. The National Assembly versus Former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) Babachir Lawal.

The Senate Ad-hoc Committee on Humanitarian Crises in the North-East led by Shehu Sani had indicted former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), David Babachir Lawal after he refused to appear before the committee twice on an allegation of grass-cutting scandal of about N233 million contracts through a company, Rholavision Nigeria Limited. While it looks like the senate was exercising its oversight functions on the matter, it was also clear that senate is fighting what they called cabal in Buhari administration.

Other related issues which indicated harsh relationship between the executive and legislature in Buhari's administration include: the power of appropriation, constituency project for law – makers, rejecting or delay in clearing Presidential nominees. All these have caused unnecessary disputes between the two arms of government and sometimes spread into inter party and intra-party conflicts.

This has come in concord with the assertion of (Gods wealth, Ahmad and Jawan, 2016) that partisan politics and unethical godfatherism are some of the factors affecting executive – legislative relations in Nigeria. They noted that there have been cases where the executive refuse to sign into law a bill passed by the legislature on the grounds of political differences.

Consequences of Conflict relations between Executive and the 8th National Assembly on Governance:

- Delay in passing the annual budget.
Public institutions and other sectors e.g. Education, Health, Transport, Agriculture, Security etc. depend on appropriation funds from the budget to effectively operate. Delay in passing the budget has suffocated major sectors which somersault the nation into economic recession and affected economic growth and development.
- All Ministries, Departments and Agencies that have issues with the Senate may likely suffer discrimination during Ministerial budget defense and under-appropriation of funds.
- Under-performance by Executive and Legislature

Witch-hunting and interference by both arms of government have affected their concentration to constitutional responsibilities. For example, the National Assembly adjourned her sitting whenever Senate President is expected to appear before the code of conduct Tribunal. So also head of Ministries and Departments are disturbed by frequent invitation by the Senate.

- The executive – legislative conflict caused delayed in the release of funds to fight insurgency and banditry. As a result many lives and properties were lost more especially in the North-East, North-West and other regions of the country.
- It exposed lack of commitments by our leaders towards democratic consolidation.

The conflict has affected many democratic institutions e.g. the Electoral Body, Political Parties, Security agencies, Executive branch, Legislative branch, the Judiciary etc. through which democracy relied on for consolidation and good governance.

- It has affected the Economy.
Investors usually observed the cordial relationship between the executive and legislature to determine the rate at which economic policies in a given country take effect and influences business growth. However, many investors have avoided Nigeria while others have relocated to other countries.

Conclusion:

The paper has examined the executive and legislative relations focused on the first tenure of President Muhammadu Buhari's administration and the 8th National Assembly. It was discovered that the intra-party conflict which has started during the elections of the leadership of 8th National Assembly had degenerated and affected governance entirely where citizens became victims of circumstances. It was clear that the ruling party had failed to call her members in to order, and therefore, decided to share elective position in the National Assembly without considering the Federal character and marginalizing some caucus which contributed in forming the party.

As a result, governance has suffered because the rule of law has been violated in several circumstances, the consequences of which people are been denied the dividends of democracy at grassroots level. Finally, Buhari administration and the 8th National Assembly need to harmonize and manage

their differences; respect the principle of separation of powers and check and balance; cooperate with each other in all aspect of governance so that dividends of democracy can reach people at the grassroots level.

Recommendations:

Firstly, political parties in Nigeria should act based on the three fundamental roles for political parties as postulated by Yab, (2014): (a) as vehicles to mobilize support for elections (b) as political pillar encapsulating regularized patterns, such as programmatic political contestalism rather than personalistic politics; and (c) undergird executive – legislative relations that frame political performance.

Secondly, the Presidential advisers on legislative matters have shown lack of lobbying and bargaining skills. In contemporary Presidential democracy, lobbying is an important aspect of administering government where registered lobbying companies involve in intervening issues of governance between the executive and the legislature. It would be good for this administration to employ the services of lobbying experts and professionals in dealing with executive and legislative matters.

Thirdly, the need to observe the principle of separation of powers, checks and balances, oversight functions, and respect to constituted authorities can never be over emphasized. The executive should concentrate on its core functions so also the legislature. Interference between and among the branches of government must be avoided while interrelations must be encouraged. Abuse of oversight functions and executive powers is an abuse to democracy.

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SECURITY EDUCATION AND MORAL VALUE: A STRATEGY FOR CURBING ELECTORAL CRISIS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Crisis has ever been the general attribute of any election in Nigeria since its formation as an entity. Contestants in Nigeria can go to any length to ring and win an election even if it means to destroy the entire society in which they are out to govern. The paper contended that despite the peaceful and positive outcome of the 2015 general election, elections in Nigeria cannot be entirely hitch-free unless the exogenous and endogenous factors that obstruct the smooth conduct of elections in the country are significantly addressed, with much emphasis on building effective and reliable security education and moral value in the country's democratic system for peaceful conduct towards 2019 General Election in Nigeria. These factors include ineffective electoral governance, weak national bureaucracy, poor state of national infrastructure, deteriorating standards of public education, fierce contest for power, worsening state of insecurity across the country. In this write-up, a framework for understanding security education, and moral value has been outlined alongside with the problem associated with. The paper recommended some lessons for electoral governance and peace-building in Nigeria based on the role of INEC and other stakeholders towards 2019 elections.

Keywords: election; electoral crisis; security education and moral value

Introduction

Security is indispensable to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections because of the central role crisis played in most, if not all elections in Africa and Nigeria in particular. From the provision of basic security to voters at polling units, at political party rallies and campaigns, protecting electoral

materials and making sure the whole electoral process is circumscribed by security considerations. This may be difficult to manifest due to the multi-dimensional nature of the Nigeria society in the form of language, culture, tradition, geography, democratic culture, political parties and the people therein. With over 923,768 square km landmass and estimated population of over 200 million people coupled with the impression people has over the security agencies. It could be said that to conduct elections in the country presents one of the burdensome logistically challenged operation apart from war time in Nigeria. The electoral statistics has it that there are over 85 million registered voters, 36 States and FCT, 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs), 8,776 Wards (RACs), over 120, 000 Polling Units and plethora of Voting Points (VPs). With the above scenario and statistics, one should not be suppressing with the difficulties the Nigerian electoral commission and security agencies are always face in discharging their statutory duties. It is important to note therefore that the Nigerian electoral environment is replete with enormity of challenges during every electoral processes or phase that could trigger electoral security related risks. There has always been a risk associated with conduct of elections in Nigeria right from 1964 till date. But in all of these periods, it has not been adjudged to be free, fair and credible by both local and international Observers except in the case of 2015 general elections that was adjudged to be good, peaceful and positive with less violence outcome, but events in the country (such as farmer/herdsmen clashes, the intensification of Boko Haram insurgency and the attitude of the security agencies towards the opposition) during the past three years and as well the leading to the general election (such as the burning of the electoral materials and other commission's properties, burning down of the opponent properties, political assassinations and other electoral related matters) require the Commission to focus a lot of attention on electoral risks and securing the process towards 2019 general election. Security is critical in the protection of electoral personnel, locations and processes; in ensuring that voters exercise their civic duties without fear or hindrance; in creating a level playing field for all political parties and candidates to canvass for support, in protecting domestic and foreign observers in discharging their duties and obligations, and in maintaining the overall integrity of the democratic and electoral processes.

It is in this light that, the paper is advocating for a concerted effort to be made in the form of providing effective security education, value re-

orientation and a sense of morality to be built into the country's democratic system.

Conceptual Clarification

Election

Election as a periodic political ritual, is an integral part of a democratic process that enables the citizenry determine fairly and freely who should lead them at every level of government periodically and take decisions that shape their socio-economic and political destiny. This was why Rose (1978) and Dye (2001) aptly defined election as a major instrument for the recruitment of political leadership in democratic societies; the key to participation in a democracy; and the way of giving consent to government (Dye, 2001); and allowing the governed to choose and pass judgment on office holders who theoretically represent the governed (Rose, 1978).

Electoral Violence

There is no agreeable definition of electoral crisis. This is because of the contentious issue of 'violence begets violence' developed by Frantz Fanon in the era of anti-colonial struggles. The Fanonian argument is predicated on the fact that 'violence provokes violence'. So those who retaliate to the first violence of political opponents do not agree that they are perpetrating violence. They simply argue that they are countering violence. So from the above position of Frantz Fanon it would be suitable to define electoral crisis as all forms of violence (physical, psychological, administrative, legal and structural) at different stages engaged in by participants, their supporters, and sympathizers (including security and election body management staff) in the electoral process (Burchard, 2015). These forms of violence take place before elections, during elections and after or post-election, and could also be intra- or inter-party.

Security Education

There are two important terms in the conceptualization of Security Education, there are security and education. A clarification of these terms is germane to the understanding of the concept of Security Education. What then is security and what is education? Security is an important concept that has received far less scholarly attention than it deserves, that is why Digeser (1994) described it as a 'neglected concept'. Literature shows that there are

four perspectives of security: The military or national security perspective, the cooperative or inter-national security perspective, the global security perspective and the comprehensive or human security perspective. Francis (2012) aptly summed up the meaning of security thus: Security is generally about the condition of feeling safe from harm or danger, the defense, protection and preservation of core values, and the absence of threats to acquire values. Security is about survival and conditions of human existence.

Unlike security, the concept of education has received considerable attention in the scholarly literature. Therefore, to build the concept of security education, a number of definitions of education would be given. According to Good (1973) education is the aggregate of all the processes by means of which a person develops abilities, skill and other forms of behavior which are of value in the society he lives. Another important definition of education is that given by Habte and Wagaw (1993). To them, education is the mechanism by which a society generates knowledge necessary for its survival and sustenance and transmits this from one generation to another. Dave and Rajput (1999) defined education as a process of human enlightenment and empowerment for the achievement of a better and higher quality of life. To Aigbomian and Iyamu (2001), it is the process by means of which an individual is taught what is desirable in the society. Obanya (2004) defined education as the inter-generational transmission of cultural heritage. From the various definitions, it is germane to note that education is a lifelong process that spans through life. It has to do with transmission of knowledge, values, skills and other forms of behavior from one generation to another. Finally, it predisposes the survival and sustenance of society.

What then is security education? This term is hardly defined in literature. Edozie (2014) after an extensive review of the available related literature, views Security Education as that cooperative, dynamic and lifelong process through which a society generates knowledge, values and skills for its survival, sustenance, enlightenment and empowerment against all forms of danger and threats to its wellbeing and coexistence. That this process is cooperative shows the complementary role of security education. Aside the formal school system, its content may be learnt personally, or given by different institutions of society and the neighborhood. That it is dynamic shows its responsive nature. This implies that its content and methods can change over time as security challenges change. Again, that it is a lifelong

process shows that it builds security consciousness and strategies in the individual all through his/her lifetime.

In the context of this study, however, security education is design from the concept of security as reflected in the theme “Governance, Security and Elections in Nigeria” this is aimed at creating awareness of and appropriate behavior that will guide member of the society by creating a secured environment in discharging their civic responsibility.

Moral Value

A conceptual clarification of morality and value is germane to the understanding of the concept of moral value. What then is morality and what is value? Obasola (2003) observed that issues of morality arise fundamentally when choices or actions people make affect the wellbeing of others by either increasing or decreasing it causing harm or benefit, Allen (2004, p.194) sees it as “right behavior or moral correctness”. Akanmidu, (1995:35) sees morality as “a set of principle which is derived from customs categorized as best among others and connotes conventional standard of conduct acceptable by the people”. Moral behaviour implies acceptable and unacceptable behavior or attitudes. In this case, it involves social criteria because it revolves around the acceptability and non-acceptability of the established social order, norms and value. Morality to Allen entails value judgement and this refer to some behavior that are socially acceptable in the society.

Just like morality, Oyedepo (1986, p.16) cited in Obasola (2015) opines that: “Value...is the study of such concepts as good, bad, desirable, beautiful, uglye.t.c. and it tends to examine the justification of judgements that involves these concepts, the logic of the argument by which they are supported or challenged”.

To this, value imply the desired, the perfect, the good or what is important or unimportant to a person, or group of persons in any given situation. It is a worth a person sees in a thing, or wants to attribute it worthwhile in this context may mean different thing to different people depending on their personal perception and life experiences. Dopamu (1993, p.17) surmises that for the purpose of maintaining law and order which in turn, will enhance national stability and growth, values are respected and such values are the moral worth, principles or standard which the society holds in high esteem. Conformity to these value systems, no doubt, results in an orderly and purpose-driven society which ultimately brings in the desired

development in the society. Value play a great role in a man existence as they determine what he is and to a great extent what he does in a given situation. The contribution that people make or fail to make towards the nation's political process most largely depend on this premise

Moral value in a democratic institution entails the right type of conducts, attitudes, behaviors and actions taken and justified by the society in all its democratic endeavors. The concern here is that, a lots of activities going on in the nation's democratic processes are not morally justified. For instance, why is our democratic process characterized by high level of corruption, vote buying, thuggery, assassination, poor value, ringing, etc.

Causes of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

The anatomy of the causes of electoral violence in Nigeria Suffice it to say that contingent upon the debilitating effect of electoral violence on the nation's political landscape, a galaxy of questions and posers about the causes of electoral violence had been raised. A critical look at the literature reveals suggests a number of reasons. The answer can be found in the array of causes of electoral violence that have been identified in the literature. Some scholars contend that the causes are: greed; electoral Abuses, and rigging of elections; Abuse of political power; alienation, marginalization, exclusion and the political economy of oil (Igbuzor, 2009). Yet, other scholars adduce the following as the causes of the phenomenon: poverty/unemployment (Collier, 2014); ineffectiveness of security forces and culture of impunity; weak penalties; weak governance, corruption and proliferation of arms and ammunitions. In the same vein, other pundits argue that the causal factors are: lack of security; partisanship of traditional rulers who were supposed to be the custodians of our cultural heritage; abuse of office by elected officials; zero-sum politics or winner takes it all syndrome; lucrative nature of political office; poor handling of election petition, and lack of faith in the judiciary also included is the lack of compliance with the extant electoral law and enforcement of the enabling laws; the partisan disposition of the police, and other security agencies detailed to monitor the election, and secure lives and property; corrupt INEC staff and ad-hoc officials who connive with the politicians; conflict of interests between and among politicians; and greed as well as selfish interests of politicians coupled with ideological bankruptcy (Ugiagbe, 2010).

However, prevalent forms of political violence in Nigeria exude in political assassinations, arsons, violence-pruned campaigns, thuggery, election-related ethno-religious crisis, snatching of ballot boxes and so on and so forth. Analysts agree that this has been possible because election in Nigeria is seen as a “do or die affair”. This violence is most often carried out by gangs whose members are openly recruited and paid by politicians and party leaders to attack their sponsors’ rivals, intimidate members of the public, rig elections, and protect their patrons from similar attacks. The architects, sponsors, and perpetrators of this violence generally enjoy complete impunity because of both the powers of intimidation they wield and the tacit acceptance of their conduct by police and government officials at all levels (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2007).

It is against this backdrop that the Nigeria’s governing elite have been widely implicated in acts of electoral violence, corruption and fraud so pervasive as to resemble criminal activity more than democratic governance (HRW, 2007). It is intriguing to note that members of the political class responsible for instigating this plethora of violence as well as their foot-soldiers who undermine the electoral process by perpetrating these violent acts are never brought to book. Political behaviouralists have argued that violent electoral behavior which is either intended to hurt or kill political opponents or their supporters has a devastating human rights impact on ordinary Nigerians. In the same vein, they contend that the scenario is prevalent because of the nature of the political system, the prevailing political culture and the level of political socialization. In the Nigerian case, electoral violence is more entrenched because our political system is supportive of zero-sum game politics. This was why Otoghile (2009) described electoral violence as the radioactive by-product of some structural and attitudinal dislocations in the society which affects the level of political participation of the citizenry.

The sociological discourse on the theory of violent conflicts and violent political behaviour that exude in electoral violence contends that such acts hinge on the following theories: relative deprivation; rising expectation; frustration-aggression; systemic hypothesis; and group conflict theories (Okanya, 2001). All of them can be used to explain electoral violence in Nigeria but the one that best captures the general phenomenon of electoral violence is the systemic hypothesis. It lays emphasis on the variable which often contributes to the maintenance of a political order or disorder, such as the breakdown of consensual norm, instances of political alienation, the

cohesiveness of a ruling group and its legitimacy, and the attendant effect on the social structure and the political process (Okanya, 2001; Anifowose, 1982).

Pre-election campaigns, election-time, and post elections periods are usually violent, with campaigning in many areas beset by political killings, bombings and armed clashes between supporters of rival political factions (see Abutudu and Obakhedo, 2009). Even though this plethora of violence forms part of a broader pattern of violence and abuse that is inherent in Nigeria's largely unaccountable political system; often times, perpetrators are never punished leading to a great distortion of our democratic practice. As a matter of act, examples too close for our comfort abound of Nigeria's system of politics has actively rewarded corruption and violence with control over governorships, parliamentary seats and other positions of public trust despite existing law (HRW, 2007).

Electoral Crisis, Security Consciousness and Moral Value in the Democratic Society

Elections are key elements of democratic processes. They provide for transparent and peaceful change of government and distribution of power. For this reason, a strong emphasis on security education and moral value as a means to durable peace is required and highly needed in our democratic process, in order to sustain the democratization that emerged among international policy circles in the early 1990s.

Violence as a recurring phenomenon is chief among many vices associated with elections in the Nigerian politics, election as a periodic political ritual remain the fundamental aspect of the democratic process that trigger violence mostly, due to the consequence of political repression, discrimination, outsmarting opponents, desperation, ignorance of the effects of crisis on the nation's democratic institution, moral bankruptcy and lack of security consciousness in the democratic process which is the very reason why groups took to arms in the first place.

The nexus between free, fair and credible elections has become so strong that any attempt to subvert the process often invokes the wrath of the electorate. Electoral violence generally refers to violence that is directly or indirectly connected to protest for or against an election. Electoral violence can be classified into three broad categories namely: (a) Pre-election violence (b) Violence during election, and (c) Post-election violence. Pre-election

violence occurs mainly at the stage of party primaries, when contestants from the same political party jostle for tickets to become party flag bearers. Experience has shown that at this stage, thuggery, arson, shooting and maiming are deployed to achieve a particular objective. The pattern of violence at the election stage is not remarkably different. However, in addition to the methods mentioned above, snatching of ballot boxes and papers, kidnapping or abduction of electoral officers and party agents, forcefully preventing voters from exercising their franchise, forcing electoral officers to alter, manipulate or deface results or result sheets suffice. The third category, which is post-election violence, manifests in the same manner as pre-election violence through looting, arson and wanton destruction of lives and properties by aggrieved stakeholders and opportunists as well as members of a political party that lost an election (Adoke, 2011). All this are possibly carried out because of the lack moral value in our democratic process

The opening up of the socio-political space in Nigeria's fourth republic has been bedeviled with electoral crisis with the preponderance of both civil and uncivil groups making claims and counter-claims. This crisis over contestations for power, relevance and patronage are becoming stronger day by day due to the extractive nature of the nation's economic and political institutions, just as Babawale (2012) rightly observed that, the political class has sustain the sectional politics and the predatory structure, which they exploit at will to acquire political power and gain unfair access to the control of state resources, the state in the process loses its relative autonomy and becomes alienated from the generality of the people who in turn relate to it as an institution to be cheated, exploited and abused at will. The perceived failure of the state to deploy its instruments of force of coercion to mediate fairly and objectively in political agitations and contestations have occasionally been held as justification for the violations of rules of engagement by both aggrieved stakeholders and opportunists alike thereby turning the state into an arena of zero-sum competition for power and the wealth that goes with it.

This absence of the moderating influence of the state coupled with the erosion of the ethical foundation for political contests, renders Nigerian politics uniquely Hobbesian. This scenario required security consciousness and moral value of citizenry to effectively operate and guide their safety in the electioneering process, in this connection, Edozie (2014) views Security Education as that cooperative, dynamic and lifelong process through which a society generates knowledge, values and skills for its survival, sustenance,

enlightenment and empowerment against all forms of danger and threats to its wellbeing and coexistence. Since the predominant route to power in Africa and Nigeria in particular has been characterized by violence and the security institutions that are supposed to secure the democratic environment are always being seen in compromising with one party against the other, people need to be properly educated about the basic security knowledge of their safety in the electioneering process.

Political violence is both a curse in itself and an obstacle to accountable and legitimate government. It is a curse because the process of violent struggle is hugely destructive and it is an obstacle because where power rests on violence, it invites an arrogant assumption that government is there to rule rather than to serve Collier (2010). Electoral crisis as one variant of the struggle for power is illegitimate; might does not make right, ballots not bullets should pave way to power. Elections as the institutional technology of democracy has the potential to make governments both more accountable and legitimate, election should sound the death knell to political violence and not the riding vehicle of political violence

Yet experiences and recent research suggest that democratization in transitional or war-torn countries, and elections in particular, can become a hindrance rather than a solution to peacebuilding (Snyder 2000; Jarstad & Sisk 2008). In fact, elections can generate conflicts, rather than solving them (Paris 2004; Reilly 2002; Lyons 2005; Collier 2009). For several reasons, violence can be an attractive option to influence the electoral process and outcome. In transitional and war-torn countries, incumbents are often seen manipulating or believed to be tampering with the electoral processes. The opposition parties also have incentives to further their strength through the use of violence. Spoiler groups intent on disrupting the election may use violence to prevent the election from taking place or to make sure that the election outcome is declared invalid.

Such violence is potentially damaging for democratic processes and can undermine progress towards democratization (Collier, 2012) Electoral violence - beyond direct effects such as hindering people from casting their vote and preventing candidates from participating in the election - can have long-term effects of causing disillusionment and frustration with politics. The absence or presence of political violence during an electoral process is also central to determining the legitimacy of an election. From a conflict prevention perspective, low intensity or localized violence can serve as a

‘training ground’ for more largescale violence campaigns, including civil war. Managing election-related violence, thus, is important in the long-term effort to build a strong, democratic and peaceful society, based on the rule of law, accountability and transparency.

As conscious agents, we regard ourselves as persons, with perspectives, values, interests and beliefs. The moral perspective, in contrast to aesthetic, economic, and political views, commences from the idea of moral worth and the entities that possess it. The fundamental premise of the moral perspective is that persons have a special sort of value or dignity that non-persons do not. To fix politics require adaptation of a moral value in the nation democratic process, just as Aristotle assert that the hallmark of human actions including politics is the pursuit of moral virtue, which in turn will guarantee common happiness (Calhoun, 2005). The moral perspective forms the basis of our societies, which are governed by laws established by moral persons precisely in order to protect moral persons from harm.

Fundamentally, a good moral foundation is an indispensable and absolute factor for social, economic and political developments. Our development efforts should commence with the human capital. By human capital, we mean the investment in the moral development of the people who are living in such society. Human capital involves giving the people the right kind of environment to sharpen, develop and actualize their skills which they have acquired over a process of time. The channeling of this skill in the positive direction will bring about a change in the life orientation of the people for maximum benefits. Human capital also involves the moral worth and development of the people. Omorogbe (1990, p.197) encapsulates this as follows: “moral development is the most important aspect of national development, for there can be no development of a nation if its citizens are morally under-developed or immature”. In similar perspective, Isokun (2003, p.116) lends credence to this when he asserts that: “A Nigerian society obsessed with that which is scientific without the consciousness of the societal values must be mending her rope of suicide if her search for knowledge discounts the value on which the Nigerian social order rests.”

This shows that the role of moral values in the society for meaningful development cannot be compromised. Therefore, primacy should be given to the acquisition of moral values among the people rather than any abstract projections. The imperative of moral values is a fundamental tool for social, economic and political emancipation. In this regard, no nation can grow or

develop if morality is extricated from the body politic. Thus, without a solid moral base, our social, economic and political development will be in shamble. I shudder to think of a Nigeria of intellectual giants and astute economists and politicians without the relevant moral values as internalized through the socio-cultural orientation as espoused by religion. Therefore, we need to relate our development to our values system. To do contrary is in the words of Isokun (2003, p.121) “to entrust the safety of the insane man into his own hand which is a recipe for self-destruction.” Consequently, he surmises that: “A scientific modern Nigerian society without a sound social and moral base will be her worst enemy in terms of the human misery, fear, insecurity and barbarism that would be self-inflicted in the process of a misguided scientific advancement” (Isokun, 2003, p.121).

In similar perspective, Omoregbe (1990, p.199) opines that “if a country produces” intellectual giants” but who are “moral dwarfs”, it is simply producing obstacles to its own development”. The purport of this is that morality is germane to social growth and development. Therefore, to extricate morality from the Nigerian society is to destroy the very essence of the society, thereby inviting anarchy and disorderliness. Morality is a necessary tool for the survival of human society. It is vital to the survival of any society because it is the basis of all social structures and institutions. It should be noted that the problems which besiege us as a nation are anchored on noncompliance with or total neglect of moral principles and these have led to the doldrums we are experiencing in our private and public lives. This shows that national growth and development depend largely on the good sense of justice, moral worth and responsibility, conscientiousness, devotion to duty, selflessness, probity and honesty exhibited by the leaders and the led. This will bring about the much needed growth in our national lives.

The need for security and protection of life and property predates modern security architectural system, the desire for security of life and properties prompted the development of perimeter walls around the shelter of trees and barricades at cave entrances by the early man in prehistoric periods (Buah 1969 cited in Atolagbe, 2011). As civilisation increased and technology advanced, the development of daring weapons, tools, and mechanical and electronic devices rendered ineffective, the security devices that were earlier considered insurmountable. Hence, democratization does not only open up for manifestations of political rights, but is also seen as a response to addressing the root causes of conflict. Support to strengthen institutional capacity to

promote democratic norms and to ensure democratic rule of law is now seen as crucial for peace building. Security education and moral value promotion have thus become central strategies to build peace in countries shattered by violent conflict.

Proactive Measures in Preventing Electoral Crisis

Since inception, the Police and other security forces that are shawled with the responsibilities of protecting lives and properties as well as safeguarding the electoral materials, personnel, voters and the electoral environment have been roundly accused of being abused by politician. For example, officers and men of the Police Force have been accused of crass partisanship, turning the force into the enforcement arm of the ruling party, wantonly used to tilt and occasionally thwart the will of the people or generally act in ways that negate its constitutional mandate of maintaining law and order like shielding those who engage in violence. However, local and international stakeholders draw on an array of strategies to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process that can guarantee peaceful conduct. Electoral monitoring and observation have become the most frequently employed interventions since the returned of democracy in 1999, playing an important role in ensuring accountability and reducing the chances of impunity. They aim to produce assessments concerning the fairness and legitimacy of the polls based on solid documentation. Yet, these are passive observation activities, with limited or no capacity to promptly react to episodes of violence or other irregularities (Open Science Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), 2012,p.4; Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), 2010, pp. 4-6).

More recently, there has been recognition of the need to supplement electoral monitoring with more proactive conflict prevention strategies (International Peace Institute (IPI) 2012; OSIWA 2012), which can range from electoral mediation and the implementation of rapid response mechanisms, to programs that foster social cohesion in electoral contexts (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009, p.37). According to the UNDP, the promotion of social integration is one of the most effective mechanisms to build trust in the electoral process and to curb tensions that can lead to the outbreak of violent episodes (UNDP, p.38). Key activities include voter education, peer-to-peer peace advocacy, engagement with the media, creation

of structures of dialogue among stakeholders, and direct engagement with vulnerable populations (UNDP 2009, p. 38).

Preventive strategies can be more effective if combined with the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Civil society initiatives, non-government organizations, have been particularly creative in making technology a key ally against electoral violence (Bardall, 2013). For example, they rely on crowdsourcing in election monitoring, increasing citizen participation in election observation. By sending reports via SMS, social media platforms, or specific websites, ordinary citizens can actively participate and report election-related violence and other bad electoral conduct, such as fraud and vote buying. Mobile technology can facilitate communication between actors and the delivery of real-time reports from the ground by speeding up the flow of information through SMS messaging or internet-based platforms (email, or social media like Twitter and other websites), ICT help expedite responses to violence or misconduct, thus contributing to a peaceful and fair election process.

Other strategies used to manage and prevent electoral crisis includes, peace initiative by different actors such as public authorities, political parties, an electoral commission, religious organisations, civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and traditional authorities such as chiefs or clan leaders. Five main types of this strategies can be identified. First, the presence of monitors can be instrumental in preventing electoral crisis through naming and shaming mechanisms and by creating awareness of tensions building up. Second, mediation can be carried out in high-tension situations to solve an ongoing election-related dispute. Third, the legal framework and institutional design provides the basis for combating impunity and for creating conditions discouraging crisis. Fourth, law enforcement highlights the deterring function of security forces. Fifth, voter-focused strategies emphasise the importance of long-term prevention through the cultivation of security consciousness, moral value, democratic norms and tolerance in society at large (Adebayo, et al, 2016).

Conclusion And Recommendations

Empirical evidence abounds of how electoral crisis affects the credibility of the electoral system, the democratic system and the rule of law. This ugly trend raises a fundamental question about the capacity and ability of the Nigerian state to curtail electoral crisis and fraud since security agencies

and INEC officials are implicated in the business of electoral crisis that dots the nation's electoral history. In fact, the rate of insecurity and moral decadence in Nigeria is disturbingly alarming and this has affected the pace of development in the country.

In this regard, there is the urgent need for a re-orientation, a re-engendering and a re-focusing on the societal security architectures and our moral values with the view of ensuring peaceful conducts before, during and after election, which will guarantee free fair and credible election, with the ultimate gains of actualizing our potentials and harnessing the national resources both human and materials, for a greater, purposeful, egalitarian and vibrant society. As a result of this, all hands must be on deck to actualize this goal. In this regard moral instruction and security education must be given a pride of place in all our educational institutions starting from the primary to the tertiary levels. Also, every citizen must imbibe the culture of moral value and peaceful coexistence recognizing that political stability beget development, which can only thrive on a peaceful environment and value system

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**THE CHARACTER OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND ARMS
PROLIFERATION IN FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES IN AFRICA:
THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE**

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Abstract

This paper set out to investigate the relationship between the struggle over the control of state power and the increasing volume of SALWs in the African continent and the attendant threat to democracy and national unity. The study employed secondary data to establish the linkage between the struggle for power and the proliferation of SALWs in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. Findings indicate that the nature of politics in Africa, Nigeria inclusive, is determined by the character of the post-colonial state; and that the concentration of economic and political powers in the state is what has led to the intense and fierce struggle over the control of state authority by individuals and groups in society. It is this struggle that has led to the use of SALWs. It is suggested that the political class need to redefine their perception of the essence of the state which is to create good for the majority in society.

Keywords: post-colonial state, democracy, small arms and light weapons, arms proliferation, power.

Introduction

The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in Nigeria and the African continent remains a potential threat to peace and security and the stability of emerging democracies in the region. The availability of illicit weapons has contributed to the escalating tension and the high number of violent conflicts witnessed in the African continent. Equally, the increasing wave of crime and criminality in most African countries perpetrated by youth armed gangs and insurgent groups can be attributed to the massive inflow and easy access to small arms and light weapons in the different countries. African countries at present are faced with the threat of terrorism and other forms of assaults carried out by groups using arms and

weapons. Lives and properties are under severe threat, and the future for a peaceful and harmonious relationship between and among individuals and groups, is gradually but consistently drifting beyond their reach and imagination.

In Nigeria, the emergence of youth militias in various parts of the country since the return to democratic rule in 1999 marked a new beginning of social relations among the different tribes and ethnic groups that constitute the Nigerian federation. The emergence of the various Niger Delta militia groups, the Oduduwa People's Congress (OPC), the Bakassi Boys, the Arewa Youth Forum (AYF), and the emergence of the religious set "Boko Haram" in the northern part of the country has taken the nation into series of ethnic and religious crises. Issues of kidnapping, hostage taking, sea piracy, rape, armed robbery, cultism, electoral violence, herdsmen/farmers clashes, and other forms of criminal activities pervade the length and breadth of the Nigerian nation. The frequency of these crimes as well as their destructive nature remains a threat to peace and security in the nation, poses severe threat to national integration and development as well as the stability of the nation's nascent democracy.

Unfortunately, the most frequently used instruments of violence perpetrated by individuals and groups are small arms and light weapons. The Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2016 observed that the flow of illicit SALWs across national borders in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Sahel Region of West Africa in the last decade have had grave security implications for Nigeria and has become a destabilizing force in the West African sub-region (Anayo, 2017). The report further stated the effects and argued that arms proliferation has aided armed rebellions, violent insurgencies, and undermined the rule of law in several countries in the Sub-region and in Nigeria. The report also asserts that the growing capacities of non-state actors have stretched the limits of security services, leaving scores of untoward incidents in parts of Nigeria, adding that the number of casualties among civilians and members of the armed forces continue to mount. These numerous crimes are committed with the aid of SALWs.

Typically, an act of violence and war (the extreme form of violent conflict) is perpetrated with the use of weapons by the disputing parties in order to subdue or annihilate the opponent (Oluwadare, 2014). Certainly, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria and in the African

continent remains a potential threat to peace, security and stability and, the consolidation of democracy in Africa. The proliferation of SALWs is something that everyone and every government need to be worried about. Salopek (2001) reported that there is an estimated 100 million small arms and light weapons circulating in Africa, out of an over 550 million circulating in the world. Uwa and Anthony (2015) observed that out of an estimated 640 million SALWs in circulations worldwide, over 100 million are estimated to be in Africa, about 30 million in Sub-Saharan Africa and over 8 million in West Africa alone and over 70 percent or 8-10 million illegal weapons that are in West Africa can actually be located in Nigeria.

Studies on the proliferation of illicit weapons among countries have shown that in West Africa, Nigeria remains a dumping ground for SALWs (Uwa & Anthony, 2015 United Nations, 2017; Adeniyi, 2017; Ogu, N.A.). The United Nations report states clearly that “over 500 million weapons can be found in West African sub-region, out of this number, Nigeria account for 70 percent or over 350 million” (Anayo, 2017). The world body raised the alarm in 2017 and stated that the country is awash with illicit weapons, which have found its way into unauthorized hands or non-state actors that are threatening the corporate existence of the nation as well as lives and properties.

In the same vein, Badmus (2010) stated that SALWs have become so widespread that not only do they threaten security across the world, but also undermine the peace and security of civil society. On the part of Nna, Gbara and Friday (2012), they argued that Africa has become attractive and profitable dumping ground for SALWs.

The large volume of illicit weapons in the African continent can be seen from the large number of violent conflicts and the high rate of crime among the nations in the region. For example, as at 2017, about 25 African States were battling one or more forms of insecurity, such as organized rebellion or civil war, organized crime, violent extremism, ethno-religious violence, militancy, etc (Adeniyi, 2017). In Nigeria, between 1999 and 2010, the country recorded over 187 ethno-religious conflicts leading to the death of thousands of persons (Uwa and Anthony, 2015).

This study is set out to examine the underlying cause of the spread of SALWs in Nigeria’s democratic experience. Democracy as a form of government provides the platform for individuals to aspire to political/elective offices by seeking the consent of the people. This form of government has been successful in most industrialized nations and has become, in the view of

most development scholars and observers, the most preferred system of administration. Nevertheless, the success of a democratic system remains a function of the character of the State and the nature of politics within which democracy is practiced. In other words, the perception of what politics is to the elites and the actors in a given society and the primary role of the State in the ownership and distribution of resources determine to a large extent the success and sustainability of democracy in that society. This is irrespective of region or the level of development of any particular society.

Consequently, we need to have an in-depth understanding of the character of the state and nature of politics in post-colonial Africa to properly locate the underlying cause of the proliferation of SALWs in the continent. This understanding is imperative against the backdrop of the critical role of the post-colonial State in Africa vis-à-vis the concentration of economic and political powers in the State. This phenomenon has directed intense struggle for occupation of State coercive apparatus by individuals and the various ethnic groups. In Nigeria and in most African nations, it is this struggle over the control of State power that has resulted to the emergence of ethnic militia and other insurgency groups. In countries like Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, etc, similar struggles have resulted into full blown civil wars (Renner, 2006; Eavis, 2002; Adetiba, 2012).

The objectives of the study therefore are to undertake an historical overview of arms proliferation in Nigeria. and examine the character of the post-colonial state in Africa and the nature of politics as the primary reason/ cause of proliferation of SALWs in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. The study is basically a qualitative and explanatory study as such the study relied on secondary sources of data sourced from journals, textbooks, newspapers and magazine publications as well as online materials. The contents of these materials are employed to further deepen the analysis of the issues raised in the study.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The study adopts the power framework of political analysis for the explanation of small arms and light weapon proliferation in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. Though the power theory is closely associated with international politics and global economic relations, however, its utility in the analysis of the increasing wave of arms proliferation in African countries cannot be underestimated and ignored.

Power, according to Varma (1975) is the instrument of coercion and has a physical effect. Tawney (1931) cited in Nna (2000), defined power as the capacity of a person or group of individuals to influence the conduct of other individuals or group in a way which he desires. In the same vein, Pious (1986) also cited in Nna (2000) sees power as the ability of an actor to make others perform what he wants them to do by method of furtive or clear pressures or even the application of force. From the above views, power relates to the ability of one or a group or an institution towards changing the behaviour of others. Thus, the primary objective for the exercise of power either by an individual or group of individuals is to bring about a change in the behaviour of others through some subtle means. It means the use of physical force or threat of it.

As a framework of analysis in international politics, the power theory focuses on analysis of the development of state power by various countries as an instrument of influence. This development is anchored on the belief that the more powerful a country is, the more influential it becomes in the international system. The first advocates of the power theory include German historians of the 19th Century such as Heinrich Van Treitschke and philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche (Varma, 1975). Eric Kanffmann in 1911 stated that the purpose of the State is “*Manchtentfaltung*” translated as meaning, the development, increase and show of power along with an effective intention preserve and assert itself (Varma, 1975).

A strong advocate of the power theory in the 20th century is the American political science scholar, Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau (1973) defines the global system as the struggle for power among nations. He contended that the security and survival of any state in the international system depends very much on its accumulation of power. He argued further that global political and economic relation like domestic politics is a struggle for power. He defined power as man’s influence or command over the minds and actions of other men (Morgenthau, 1973).

Domestic politics like international politics is characterized by conflict of interest by various individuals and groups which invariably leads to the struggle for control of state power. Oluwadare (2014) sees politics as the struggle for power. This struggle for State power in post-colonial Africa is intensified by the character and the role of the post-colonial state in the ownership and control of natural resources and the centralization of political power. This has made the post-colonial state in Africa become the central

focus of politics, hence, the main focus for struggle by individuals and groups. The main purpose of the struggle is to get control of state apparatus to enable the holders of state power to determine the distribution and redistribution of available scarce resources of the state (Eavis, 2002; Oluwadare, 2014). Thus, the structure of the post-colonial state in Africa is such that he who controls the state, controls both political and economic power. It enables the political power holder to place himself in a vintage position to decide who gets what, when and how. It is this struggle over the control of state power between individuals and groups that now determine the nature of politics in Nigeria and most of Africa. Apparently, it is this form of politics in Africa and Nigeria in particular that has given rise to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the continent. In a nutshell, the study asserts that the primary reason behind the massive spread, availability and easy access to arms in most African countries, and Nigeria in particular, is the struggle for the control of state power between and among individuals and groups.

Historical Perspective of the Proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria

There is no universally recognized definition of SALW. The UN Group of Governmental Experts that explored the issue of SALW in 1997 put forth a definition that included clubs, knives and machetes, though most of the subsequent regional and international instruments have narrowed the definitions used to focus exclusively on arms (UN, 2002). Small arms are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns (UNDP, 1994).

Light weapons are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person (Laurabce & Stohl, 2002). Although small arms and light weapons are thus distinct categories of weapons, UNDP uses the term 'small arms' to cover both small arms and light weapons.

For the purpose of this study, small arms and light weapons refers simply to any dangerous weapon capable of causing damages and destruction to human lives and property, that can be easily used and manipulated by an individual or two. Thus, small arms and light weapons in this study include all those described by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts as well as clubs, spears, knives, machetes, bow and arrows, etc.

Detailed account of the gradual growth and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Nigeria is scanty and imprecise. This may be attributed to the traditional nature of African societies before the advent of colonial rule; though, it should be noted that inter/intra-communal strifes and wars in African societies pre-dates the colonial era. Nevertheless, these wars were fought with spears, clubs, machetes, and bow and arrows. The discovery of the African continent by white traders and the subsequent development of the region as a major slave trade root precipitated the use of small arms by the Europeans and their African allies. Small arms were used for raiding and rustling of free Africans who were forcefully made slave victims. Arms were used for raiding African villages and communities in search of victims. Those Africans who became aware of the superior fire power of small arms became interested in acquiring them and did so by exchanging their goods for small arms. The acquisition of these arms from the Europeans further enhanced the powers and their ability as middlemen to carry out raids in villages and communities. Slave trade era therefore became the point of departure for the beginning of the inflow of small arms and ammunitions into the African continent.

The slave trade was followed by the legitimate trade and the forceful acquisition of African territories by European powers. This process in Africa was successfully accomplished with the effective use of small arms and light weapons by the colonial invaders. Africans were also integrated as foot-soldiers into the Whiteman's army and were trained to use the Whiteman's weapon to forcefully subdue their fellow brothers in their own territory. Those Africans who became the Whiteman's foot-soldiers created for themselves a new class in society. Trained in the art of the Whiteman's weapon of destruction, they were feared and were seen as demy gods by the natives. On their part, they became arrogant and oppressive. Thus, the Atlantic Slave trade that lasted for several years and the introduction of colonial rule is how small arms and light weapons came into Africa.

Today, small arms and light weapons have serious negative effect on African societies. It has become a determining factor on the direction of politics and the dimensions of power struggle in most African countries in Nigeria. They are the primary weapons use for most of the violent conflicts in Africa.

However, the proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria in particular can be traced to the beginning of military rule in the 1960s. This is as a result of the

kind of politics the military introduced into the body politics of the country. First and foremost, the military introduced a centralized governmental system in the country where political power and economic power were vested in the central government. This phenomenon allowed the State to have possession of all economic resources and control over the instrument coercive force. The central government became the “pot wherein the sub-units of the federation relied on for their survival”. In other words, the central government became the determining factor in the distribution and redistribution of the scarce resources of the nation. Thus, power became centralized and the struggle for it became fierce and detrimental to every known political practice elsewhere in the world.

The fierce political struggle and the use of SALWs that now characterize the body politics of the country is a mere manifestation of the concentration of political and economic power of the State in the central government. A process that started by the military regime in the 1960s.

Another important factor one need to acknowledge during the military interregnum is the massive corruption that was carried out among the rank and file of the military. Corruption often has negative effects on society. Corruption in all its ramifications weakens political and socio-economic institutions in society (Wenibowei, 2017). It destroys professionalism, slow-down efficiency and effectiveness, promotes mediocrity and undermines merit (Adetiba, 2012). During this era, the military became politicized, while abuse of political offices and direct theft of public funds took place freely among the rank and file of the military. The affluent and flamboyant lifestyle of the personnel outside the barracks attested to the massive corruption that took place in this era (Adetiba, 2012).

In January, 1966 and July, 1966 witnessed the beginning of series of military coups in Nigeria. The July, 1966 military coup led to a power tussle among the top military brass. This struggle led to the 1968 Nigerian Civil War between the Igbos of Eastern Nigeria (Biafra) and the Nigerian State. The Nigerian civil war could be argued to be the starting point of the massive inflow into the country SALWs. This view is made clear by Adetiba (2012) when he stated that “the civil war commenced the militarization of the Nigerian society”. During the period of conflict, the two warring parties made use of both heavy and light weapons to prosecute the war. The civil war undoubtedly escalated the number of weapons that came into the hands of non-state actors in the country. Unfortunately, at the end of the civil war, these

arms were not totally mopped up from the hands of this group of persons. They now contribute to the huge number of arms in circulation in the country.

The Character of the Post-Colonial State in Africa

Agagu (2004) argued that colonialism in Africa “created structural arrangement imbued with ethnic conflict and antagonism among indigenous constituent units of the conquered territories and a dual morality among the citizens, as it laid a foundation for exploitation, brutality, praetorianism and corruption”. Thus, noticeably, the post-colonial state in Africa is dominated by the following features:

Divisions between and among the different Ethnic and Religious Groups:

The second feature is the schisms underlying social relations between and among the different ethnic nationalities. This element is very strong and remains a potent factor in political matrix and permutations in most African nations. It goes a long way in determining the emergence of political leadership, followership, and voting patterns of electorates. Ethnic diversity is often reinforced by religious and other forms of clandestine and parochial sentiments. This trend is quite visible in Nigeria during elections where voters’ assessment of a candidate is usually based on or guided by his or her religious, ethnic and primordial biases, rather than critical assessment of candidate’s integrity and policy objectives.

Ethnic and religious sentiments often serve as already made criteria for support of candidates and are also employed by dissatisfied, disgruntled and failed politicians to cause crisis especially when they failed to realize their political goal through the electoral process. They often fall back on such clandestine and parochial support to achieve their selfish ambitions. The violence that erupted in northern part of Nigeria in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections was caused by the alleged rigging of the election by the candidate of People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Christian from the Southern part of the country. Violence began with widespread protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, northern Muslim, who contested on the platform of Congress for Democratic Change. Human Rights Watch reports claimed that over 800 persons were killed including 10 National Youth Service Corps members in Bauchi State (HRW Report, 2011). Ethnic plurality and religious differences in Africa and the struggle for state power has degenerated to more

violent situations in countries like Somalia, Sudden, Nigeria in 1967-1970, Congo Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.

Institutional Weakness among African States: The third characteristic of the post-colonial state in Africa is the existence of weak, inefficient and ineffective political and socio-economic structures and institutions (Wenibowei, 2017). As part of the legacies of the colonial government, the over-developed political and socio-economic institutions (e.g; the Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, the Police, the electoral body, the military, the political parties, the bureaucracy, etc) bequeathed to Africans were weak from the foundation and no serious efforts were made by the colonial administrators to strengthen these institutions to withstand the peculiar challenges characteristic of plural societies (Fadakinte, 2013). The colonial government needed to create state apparatuses to enable it exercise political and economic hegemony over African societies (Osaghae, 1989; Olowu, 1994). Thus, colonial goal was primarily to exploit the economic resources through political domination and therefore was not interested for the development and stability of these societies during and after their departure (Agagu, 2004; Adedayo, 2010). At independence, the inherited institutions were maintained by African leaders. The prevalent of high level of corruption, judicial inefficiency, lack of efficient and effective security, poor healthcare system, poor educational system, poor infrastructure, religious/ethnic based conflicts, weak electoral system etc, is a clear indication of institutional failure in post-colonial states in Africa.

The State as an instrument for Personal Aggrandizement: The State in Africa has also become a source of personal aggrandizement. Agagu (2004) observed that Nigerian politics has turned out to be a way of mindlessly appropriating state resources to suit one's interests. State power has become an avenue for African political elites to accumulate wealth often seen as a powerful instrument to control the minds and behaviours of the impoverished masses. Thus, whosoever that controls the state apparatus do so for two reasons. The first is to be at a vintage position to authoritatively allocate the scarce values in society. The second is to amass wealth through corrupt practices and by denying the mass of the people benefits due them. This explains the massive political corruption prevalent among African leaders in the various countries. These factors have become the decisive factors in politics among African nations. It goes on to explain and as a matter of fact

determine the nature of the struggle for state power in Nigeria and most African countries.

This study recognizes the potency of these features as well as their implications on the socio-economic and political development of African nations in general and Nigeria in particular. However, our point of departure in this study is the critical political and economic role of the post-colonial state and the consequences of politics in Nigeria and in Africa as a whole. The Nigerian State, for example, owns, control, and manage the economic resources and has under its whims and caprices all the military and other security apparatuses. Ekeh (1975) put the above observation more clearly when he noted that “colonialism also brought with it the centralization of power and the creation of a modern military that used the centralization of power as a tool to control the country and its natural resources”. Consequently, the Nigerian state wields so much power to influence individuals and institutions within its sphere of jurisdictions in domestic and in international politics.

The Struggle for Political Power and the Proliferation of SALW in Nigeria

Unfortunately, the nature of politics in Nigeria and most African countries are clearly determined by these post-colonial features. The State’s ownership and control of economic resources place the state above society and its citizens (Olowu, 1994). Because the state wields so much political and economic power, the state becomes the primary focus of politics. According to William, (1980), the state in Africa organizes and engages itself in economic activities and is responsible directly or indirectly for the allocation of strategic opportunities and resources. Thus, the state in Africa has become an arena of conflict, rather than an institution of conflict mediation, management and resolution. The dominant trend today is that when individuals engage in politics, the primarily objective is to control state apparatuses to enable them allocate political and economic benefits, to determine, according to Easton (1962) “who gets what, when and how?”

Ake (1996) argued that in Africa, politics is essentially about management and control of state power. As a result, the character of the post-colonial state in Africa with enormous political and economic power has intensified the focus of politics on the state and has largely defined the essence of the struggle for its control by individuals and groups. Thus, according to Ake (1996), Africa’s state politics are harmful to democracy. He equally

observed that what is not so well-known in Africa is the degree to which the disposition of the state as well as its powers determines politics. He then contended that much of what is exceptionally destructive about Africa's politics stems from the character of the state, especially, its absence of autonomy, the vastness of its powers, its vulnerability to maltreatment, and the absence of protection against it (Ake, 1996).

It is this centralized role of the state that has made possible the struggle for political power by individuals and groups in Nigeria in particular and among African nations in general.

In post-independence Nigeria, the struggle over the control of state power by various individuals, political, and ethnic groups have resulted in the introduction and inculcation of a negative attitude, a negative orientation and behaviour by Nigerian politicians. Politics in post-independence Nigeria is now characterized by two dominant attitudes and beliefs. The first is the belief and attitude that the winner in an election wins all. Here, the winner in the competition for power wins everything, the loser loses everything. According to Ake (1996), "nothing can be adverse than losing and nothing can be beneficial than winning". Consequently, no contestant would want to lose knowing that losing means losing everything. Therefore, everyone seeks power by every means, legal or otherwise and for those who are already in power position try to maintain their positions by all means. Therefore, winning becomes a must for a politician, while losing must not be written or known in the political lexicon of a contestant.

This form of politics is what has produced a second political mentality and attitude known as "do-or-die" (a zero-sum) politics in Nigeria. A "do-or-die" politics is a mentality, orientation and understanding as well as a belief by politicians that elections once contested must be won and that there is no room for failure. It means an orientation and belief that, the means justifies the end. Thus, the method, strategies, tactics or whatever means employed to get victory at the poll is immaterial, but the most important thing for the contestant is, how he wins an election. It is this mentality and orientation that has become the guiding principle of electoral engagement between and among competing candidates in an election in Nigeria.

Ladan (2015) averred that feasibility of electoral violence in Nigeria is owed to the political terrain which encourages zero-sum politics. In this form of politics there are two or more players involved, with the ultimate goal of winning employing the rules and strategies (Kehinde, 2007). The main rule of

the game is that there can be only one winner and there are no compensations for losers. The winner therefore takes all and do not usually consider the losing party as worthy of any reward or acknowledgment. Such condition may be frustrating on the part of the loser(s). In other to avoid humiliation, contestants often adopt clandestine plans that are strange to the rule of the engagement (Kehinde, 2007). Under this circumstance, prospective losers can resort to violence means as a way of expressing dissatisfaction and discontent.

Duru (2002) assessed the political conditions of the country and suggested that politicians who have become very conscious of the values of the spoils of office often adopt various means to ensure that they capture power and relegate or in extreme cases eliminate the opposition from political activities. This according to him is responsible for the riggings, vote buying, thuggery, and violence employed by ambitious politicians to subvert the people's will to choose their leaders in the country.

In Nigeria, candidates contesting in an election often lack confidence and trust in electoral institutions and the ability of the electorates in exercising their own discretion during elections. This fear stem from the fact that in most cases electorates are either denied of their civic rights to choose their preferred choice of candidate by contestants through rigging or are influenced with money (vote-buying) and sometimes voters are harassed, intimidated and victimized by supporters of candidates in the polling bouts. Equally, the lack of confidence could also stem from the poor leadership exhibited by the members of the governing class. This is because most of them who had the privilege to serve the masses in public capacity use their offices for their personal interest and the interest of their cronies. Thus, often times they lack the moral justification to fall back to the electorates to seek for their support in an electoral contest. However, for their desire to remain in office or gain access to state power, most of them resort to using such crude and violent means to achieve their inordinate ambitions. Obi (2009) asserted that conflicts occur when power is exploited through the democratic process to incorporate or eliminate certain persons, communities, groups of people, religion or region. Those eliminated he further argued, resort to drastic measures such as the use of violent demonstrations or arms insurrection using illicit arms and weapons during elections (Obi, 2009).

Adetiba (2012), for example, argued that, Nigeria's democratic past is beset by lack of faith in the impartiality and integrity of the electoral system due to prevalent of political corruption. Especially among those who

considered themselves to have been cheated in the electoral process usually have little or no confidence any more in the system. Thus, for the Nigerian politician, the electorates and the electoral process must be influenced and manipulated by every available means irrespective of whose ox is goose.

Therefore, in pursuant of their political ambition, Nigerian politicians have come to acknowledge the importance of elections as a sure window through which their political motives can be attained. They have come also to understand that what truly they could not have achieved in a free and fair contest, they can achieve the same through the use of violence. After all, Mao Tsetung of China, clearly stated that power emanates from the barrel of the gun (Nna, Gbara & Friday, 2012). Today in Africa many political leaders shoot their way into power under the disguise of election and maintain themselves in power position through unconstitutional means. Therefore, the issue of armament does not relate only to security or economic objectives but also to politics as well. This is because arms now serve as a means to political power (Nna, Gbara & Friday, 2012).

Adenubi (2018) investigations claimed that about 21,548,608 million arms and ammunitions were shipped into Nigeria illegally between 2010 and 2017. According to the report, the largest cache of ammunition of 21,407,933 live ammunitions was intercepted at the Apapa Port in November 2010, while 1,100 pump action guns were seized at Tin-Can sea port in September 2017 (Adenubi, 2018). The table below shows the breakdown of seized arms and ammunitions by the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) from 2010 to 2017.

Table 1: Showing the Number of Arms seized by NCS between 2010-2017

S/N	Date	Entry point	Arms and Ammunition Seized
1.	January 10, 2010,	Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Ikeja, Lagos	1 AK -47 Rifle
2.	January 3, 2010,	Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Ikeja, Lagos	Arg-3 and 2352 Quantity of Pepper Bullets
3.	November 1- 2010	Apapa Port, Lagosja, Lagos	21,407, 933 Live Ammunition and 34062 NilGrenhard Fuze of Rockets

4.	February 24, 2011	PTML Terminal in Tin Can Port, Lagos	1 Remington Pistol and 15 quantity of Calibre ammunition
5.	September 13, 2012	Apapa Port, Lagos	3000 live ammunition was intercepted
6.	January 26, 2013	Sahuda Border , Adamawa State	1800 live ammunition was intercepted
7.	April 2, 2013	Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Ikeja, Lagos	49 live ammunition and 1 Barette Pistol were intercepted
8.	April 24, 2013	Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Ikeja, Lagos	1 Air of Zinc Alloy Shell Pistol and 5 Rubber bullet Pellets were seized
9.	May 17, 2013	Sahaki, Oyo State	56, 750 live cartridges were seized
10.	May 13, 2013	Koko, Kebbi State	149 Jack Knives were intercepted
11.	September 17, 2013	PTML Terminal in Tin Can Port, Lagos	3 Sniper Rifles and 140 live ammunitions were siezed
12.	February 26, 2014	Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Ikeja, Lagos	1,142 live ammunitions of 12 grammes were seized
13.	March 11, 2014	Sahaki, Oyo State	30, 000 live cartridges of 7.2 mm were intercepted
14.	June 18, 2014	Sokoto State	120 Jack Knives were seized.
15.	December 24, 2014	Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Ikeja, Lagos	1 Remington Pistol and 20 cartridges were seized
16.	July 8, 2015	Cargo Shed of Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport	2 Air Soft guns and 1 live ammunition were seized
17.	July 24. 2015	Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Ikeja, Lagos	2 Ak-47 Rifle and 60 live ammunitions were intercepted
18.	January 9, 2016	Agbara, Ogun State	510 live cartridges were intercepted

19.	July 26, 2016	Tin Can Port, Lagos State	1 revolver gun was seized
20.	November 10, 2016	Lagos Domestic Airport	3 Unnamed Air Vehicle Drone was intercepted
21	December 16. 2016	Tin Can Port, Lagos State	7, 504 Premier Hollow Air Guns pallets /Tactical Rifles seized
22.	December 30, 2016	Lagos Domestic Airport	2 Fighter Jets Helicopters were intercepted.
23.	February 10, 2017	Lagos Domestic Airport	150 live rounds 9mm bullets were seized
24.	January 30, 2017	Mile 2, Lagos State	661 Pump Action Guns were seized
25.	May, 2017	Tin Can Port, Lagos State	440 Pump Action Guns were seized
26.	September, 2017	Tin Can Port, Lagos State	1,100 Pump Action Guns were seized

Source: Adenubi, T. (2018, January 13).). 21-million arms, ammunitions shipped into Nigeria in 7 years-Investigators. *Nigeria Tribune*.

The table shows a clear description of the large number of arms importation into the country. Security experts believe that most of the arms are used during elections. Thus, the struggle over the control of state power by the members of the political class has increased the spread of the use of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria.

Agagu (2004) describing the nature of politics in Nigeria stated that “post-colonial politics in Nigeria was scripted in the calculus of power, and this script has been the political template for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Republics”. Ake (1996) also stated that “the character of the state rules out a politics of moderation and mandates a politics of lawlessness and extremism for the simple reason that the nature of the state puts too high a premium on capturing power”. He stated further that this form of politics does not know legitimacy or legality, only expediency”. Consequently, electoral contests in Nigeria have been governed by intimidations, harassments, rigging, arson and other forms of electoral violence carried out with use of SALWs.

Democracy is believed to be the most preferred form of political administration in modern societies. This belief is anchored on the system’s in-

built principles that provide aggrieved individuals and groups the opportunity to come to a round table for dialogue and negotiate with the aim of resolving individual or group differences, without necessarily employing violence means to achieve intended goals. Given this understanding, the hopes, expectations and aspirations for better days with a democratic system in place were raised among the citizens of the country, when the country re-introduced democratic rule in 1999. Unfortunately, after twenty years of democratic practice, the high expectations of the people are dashed. Rather than celebrate the dividends of democracy, the people are now made to face harsher conditions of living. For example, poverty, hunger, corruption through massive looting of the state treasure by elected and appointed political officials, high rate of unemployment and inequality pervade the entire country. Several research studies in Nigeria links the existing high rate of crime in most part of the country to the existing difficult living conditions in the country (Eavis, 2002; Adetiba, 2012; National Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

Eavis (2002) opined that SALWs are causative to high levels of crime, violence, and insecurity in society. In the same vein, Adetiba (2012) observing the high level of crime in the country noted that a distressing trend of SALWs proliferation in Nigeria is as a result of increase in cultism, especially in tertiary institutions”. Equally, in 2016, the National Bureau of Statistics, the official institution responsible for collation of data in the country reported that, a total of 125,790 cases of criminal acts were reported from the 36 states of the federation. According to the body, the criminal offences reported were offences against property, offences against lawful authority, against local acts, against persons such as murder, manslaughter, infanticide, concealment of birth, rape and other physical abuses (NBS, 2016). The highest criminal acts 45,385 were recorded in Lagos state in the south of the country, according to the report. Undoubtedly, easy access to arms in Nigeria by non-state actors has increased the rate of crime and other forms of violence that is posing severe threat to internal peace and security in the country. Equally, the fragile peace and security situation in the country is a clearly an indication of threat on the nation’s fragile democracy.

Concluding Remarks

Small arms and light weapon proliferation is a global phenomenon. It is a problem confronting both developed and developing nations of the world, though more prevalent in developing countries, especially, among African

countries. The phenomenon has become a real threat to democratic governance and national unity and cohesion among Africans. In Nigeria in particular, non-state actors (individuals and groups) usually have easy access to small arms and light weapons due to ineffective security systems at national borders as well as the involvement of prominent members of the governing class in the importation of arms for use particularly during elections. It is the candid opinion of this study that the high volume of SALWs in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular is as a result of the struggle over the control of state power. This struggle, as we have seen, is occasioned by the character of the post-colonial state in the ownership of the natural resources of the state. The centralized nature of power, its weak institutions, and the perception of the apparatuses of the state as means of personal aggrandizement by the political class only gave birth to the form of politics (winner-takes-all or do-or-die) struggle in Nigeria and most African nations. It is the humble view of this study that members of the political class need to redefine their perception concerning the essence of the state.

Given the above assertion, the study suggests that Nigeria as a nation should tackle the eradication or reduction of SALWs from a holistic approach. This implies that it should involve all relevant institutions - legislative, administrative, and judiciary - in her approach to solving the spread of SALWs in Nigeria. It is equally important that relevant institutions be strengthened by adequately funding them, providing adequate equipment as well as providing professionally trained personnel to carry out their assigned tasks. Vital to SALWs control and reduction is the need for international cooperation and strong support from the international community and donors for a successful reduction and control of SALWs in Nigeria. However, it should be noted that all these will be an exercise in futility without the commitment and will power of the Nigeria government to vigorously pursue the achievement of these goals.

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NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN POST-2019 ELECTIONS

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Abstract:

The nature, orientation and tendencies that have characterized the foreign policy of Nigeria since independence have been the subject of great debates among scholars and practitioners in the field. This paper seeks to interrogate the main issues in the debate with a view to taking a position that would mark a point of departure for the inauguration of a post-2019 election foreign policy. The objective of the paper is to unearth the conditioning variables that have so far determined the orientation of the said policy with a view to positing the essential ingredients of a Post-2019 election foreign policy for the country. The theoretical frameworks that are at play are the power approach and the neo-Marxian political economy tendency. This is a descriptive research that has adopted content analysis in which secondary data is the main source of materials. It was discovered that hitherto Nigeria has not achieved the optimum results that are possible from its foreign policy pursuits and that the draw backs that have accentuated this ugly scenario are from the lack of the appreciation of power in international politics, the inhibiting factors in the domestic setting and the neocolonial factors that are lodged in its political economy. It is therefore recommended that for a dynamic post-2019 election foreign policy for the country, the Nigerian economy must be de-linked from the identified economic drawbacks.

Keywords: *Policy, Orientation, practitioners, neo-Marxian, Election.*

Introduction; Conceptual and Methodological Issues

The foreign policy of any given country or social formation is an area of very serious concern among the citizens of the modern-day nation-state. It is to be noted that the post-Westphalia contraption that goes by the name of the nation-state is an overwhelming actor in the international political system. Indeed, from a relatively small number of these contrivances that got imbued with the attribute of sovereignty at the epochal Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and which were mainly of European origin, there are about a hundred and

ninety-one of these entities which are playing in the contemporary international system. These self-governing entities do as a matter of necessity interact not only bilaterally between themselves; but also multilaterally. However, the said interactions are characterized by a lot of factors including that they are imbued with the attribute of sovereignty. These factors are nearly always reinforced not only by the dynamics of variables located within the frontiers of the nation-state but also externally by the dynamics of the structural and power-economic configurations of the international political system extant at any given time.

In other words, the orientation to action that is brought to bear on the foreign policy of any given nation-state as it plays and interacts with the others and the institutional amalgams extant at any given time is a function of factors domiciled in its local environment including not only the overwhelming world-view of the ruling class but also moderated by the existential realities of factors located outside of the boundaries of the nation-state; factors that may at times be totally beyond the control of the policy makers at home. It could therefore be stated that the aptness and success of the foreign policy of any given country is to a very large extent tied to the ability of the handlers of such a policy in terms of their ability to strike the delicate mix between intra and extra territorial imperatives of the necessary factors located in the referenced dual locations.

Foreign Policy defined.

The term ‘foreign policy’ has attracted a diversity of definitions from scholars and practitioner alike in the area of foreign policy. Indeed, conceptions and definitions as to what constitutes the foreign policy of given nation-states has elicited a variety of divergent positions from commentators in the field. But first what do mean by the term ‘policy’?

Without necessarily dabbling into the analysis of linguistic muddles, it is apposite to state that according to Eulau and Prewitt (1973, p. 465) by policy, is meant “a standing decision characterized by behavioral consistency and repetitiveness on the part of both those who make it and those who abide by it.” Agreeing with this, Anderson (as cited in Kraft & Furlong, 2007, p. 4) had gone on to state that “The term policy refers in general to a purposive course of action that an individual or group consistently follows in dealing with a problem.” Indeed, Kraft and Furlong (2007, p. 4) were to state that

“Public policy is what public official within government, and by extension the citizens they represent, choose to do or not to do about public problems.”

The on-going paper is not deeply on public policy. Suffice it to say that a public policy may not be necessarily a problem. On the contrary, it could be a desire to introduce an issue in the public domain if only such an innovative idea could fulfill the goal of Jeremy Bentham’s greatest happiness of the greatest number or accentuate the realization of a point of departure from the old ways of doing things.

Flowing from the above stated positions, the term foreign policy could be defined as strategic and carefully thought-out tendencies, dispositions and orientations to actions which moderate and define the nature and dynamics of a given nation-state’s interaction in the external area outside of its national frontiers with other actors in international politics. These actors could be other nation-states as in bilateral relations or other governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the international system. Perhaps it needs to be added here that the modern-day nation-state devices the strategies of foreign policy in order to play in such a way as to maximize the realization of the national interest. Indeed Stoessinger (1986, p. 28) was alluding to this when he stated that “A nation’s foreign policy is the expression of its national interests vis-à-vis other nations”

However, articulating much more concretely, the nexus between the foreign policy of any country and the realization of its nation interests, Agbu (2009) has stated pungently that “Foreign policy, therefore is the pursuit of what a country has delineated as its national interest utilizing all means available to it.”

The National Interest

The national interest inheres in and constitutes a set of highly priced goals which the post Westphalian nation-state nurtures, projects, protects and pursues with the aim of realizing as it interacts with other actors in international politics. The national interest could constitute an amalgam of properly defined goals which could be made up of tangible and intangible qualities; it could also be made of core interests on which the nation-state would never brook any compromises and other less important areas that are open to compromises.

Let it be stated at once that the national interest is so important to the modern-day nation state that it would normally exert itself to the fullest if only

to effect its realization. Therefore, the effort to achieve the national interests animates the nation-states as they play in international politics. Indeed, it could be stated that the nation-states as they are presently constituted worship only one God and this all-consuming god is the national interest. Put in another way, it could be stated that these contrivances that go by the name of the nation-state worship at the altar of a god that brooks no nonsense and the main kernel of this god is the national interest. This is partly the reason why most states find it difficult to be forced or even cajoled into abandoning a core national interest. For instance, the territorial integrity of a nation-state is a vital national interest and the conceding of even an inch of such territory is almost taboo to most modern states. To be exact, left to their own devices most states would normally want to acquire new additional territories rather than loose same. Corroborating this fact of life in international politics, Peters (2000 in Akindele & Ate, 2000, p. 19) has stated that “Although war has its horrors, dangers and uncertainties, these will often be endured by a state rather than surrender any national territory or permit national prestige and honour to be humiliated.” Needless to say, this is a benchmark from which to interrogate the futility and the bankruptcy of the Obasanjo cession of the Bakassi Peninsular to Cameroon in the not too distant past. A word on this latter in this work.

Power, the Nation-state and Foreign policy

National power is the instrument that nation states deploy in the pursuit of their national interest. Power itself is the ability of an actor to compel obedience in another actor it is involved with by way of making that other actor behave in a certain expected way or in fact desist from behaving in a way it would otherwise have done. National power is a condensation of many elements such as size, military might, economic wherewithal climate population, technological advancement, diplomatic skill, etc. However, it must be appreciated that all these elements whether tangible or intangible coalesce into the ability to mobilize the needed force and ability to influence other actors in the international arena whether as a potentiality or in practical demonstration.

Let it be recalled that according to Morgenthau (1967, p. 25) “International Politics, like all politics is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim” Morgenthau makes no pretensions about his deployment of the concept of

power as the ultimate theoretical framework for the interpretation of the behaviors of statesmen and their states once in the area of international politics. This according to him is because power could be said to be another name for the national interest which is at the epicenter of the strive of states (Morgenthau, 1967). This position was finally concretized when he concluded that statesmen could coach the language of their foreign policy in whatever way they liked. However according to him, “But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.”

Perhaps it needs to be pointed out that Morgenthau is no alone traveler in the conceptualization of the importance of power in the game that nation-states play (to use a cliché by James Spaniard) Indeed Art and Waltz (2009, p. 3) have introduced the concept of the fungibility of force (and therefore power) as the currency at play in international politics. To be exact, he does not only place a lot of premium on power as a very important element in international politics, he is much more provocative in the optimization of this phenomenon and contends that even as diplomats negotiate force as evidenced in military might is a big and unavoidable element. According to them (2009, p. 3)

Lurking behind the scenes, unstated but explicit, lies the military muscle that gives meaning to the posturing of diplomats...In politic force is said to be the ultimo ratio. In international politics force serves not only as the ultimo ration, but instead as the first and constant one.

It is apposite to state that one is not unaware of the trenchant criticisms or contention between the protagonists of power as the desideratum of international politics and the others who also insists that there are other approaches to international politics than struggles accentuated by power. There is the ‘Complex Interdependence Paradigm’ that is promoted by Nye who has contended that the international system has become so complex that nation-states now tend to achieve their goals without baring their fangs or thinking in power terms.

This is not exactly the true position for there are no historical parallels to buttress this position. Indeed in spite of claims to the contrary, the international system is still predominantly anarchic. There is no doubt in the fact that it is still essentially the philosophy of ‘might is right’ in international

politics. The diplomat out there in the international system is ambi-dexterous. On the one hand, he wields the big stick and on the other he has the usual carrot. He advances the carrot if he realizes his country's national interest. However, there is no doubt that since the national interests of states clash and are also very important in the satisfaction of the yearnings of the masses of the people in the domestic setting, force or an implied use of it becomes the final decider and this is almost an immutable law of international politics.

It is therefore trite to state that countries that do not maximize the power attributes that are available to them as a way of strengthening their bargaining position vis-à-vis the others, end up not realizing the national interest. This has been the bane of the foreign policy of Nigeria since independence and this is why it has not been able to derive an optimum result in its striving in the foreign policy area.

The Nexus between the Domestic Environment and the External Setting

There is a line of continuity between the domestic setting of a country and its ability to play effectively in international politics. Indeed the foreign policy of a country, any country for that matter is partly a reflection of factors generated in the domestic environment. To be exact, the dynamics generated at home be they economic, cultural, geography, population, the vision of its ruling class, etc are all factors that are very critical in the nature of the foreign policy that such a country is able to spawn in the external arena. A country's ability to properly articulate the national interests let alone pursue same as it interacts with others or other multilateral organizations, is seriously enhanced or crippled by factors domiciled in the domestic environment. It is also for this reason that a scholar like Rourke (2005) has identified what he characterized as intermestic'

In other words, an amalgam of factors that are domiciled in the domestic setting interact in concert with the others in the external environment of the nation-state to determine a country's foreign policy and the ways and means of realizing same. These factors are characterized as the elements of national power and do combine to either enhance the ability to assert the national interest or act to vitiate same.

Nonetheless an enumeration of the factors that constitute the elements of national power is not within the province of the work at hand and would not be allowed to detain us here. Rather an attempt would be made to isolate two

critical factors in this area around which our analyses would revolve. This is another way of saying that an analysis of the role of national leadership in terms of its ability to activate and articulate the national interest and mobilize factors in the domestic setting for its realization and the capacity of the said leadership to appreciate not only the factors that are located beyond the frontiers of the nation-state but also the dynamics that are generated by these and how they impinge on the execution of the foreign policy of such a state.

Again the economic realm of a country and the sub-structural imperatives associated with the country's affairs is another factor that can impinge to either positively or negatively affect the execution of any country's foreign policy. Indeed how does the economic tendencies of an extant leadership and its orientation to action in this area affect the execution of a given country's foreign policy? The point being made here is that an examination of the operation of the Nigerian economy and the organizing devices emergent from same and the world-view of the available leadership would certainly offer a window to appreciate the nature of the foreign policy of the country hitherto and what the likely contour of the post 2019 genre is expected to be.

National Leadership, the Economic Foundation of Nigeria and its Foreign Policy.

Two critical factors are at the epicenter of the elements that either embolden the nation-state in the pursuit of the national interest or whittle down and indeed vitiate the effort at the realization of same while playing in the international arena. These variables constitute the hub or pivot around which the other elements in the domestic setting revolve and also work in tandem with forces generated in the international political system to condition or influence the nature of the foreign policy of a given state.

These elements that are being referred to here are the national leadership of a country and the economic or sub-structural realities of the given state. However, perhaps a rider by way of explanation is necessary here. This paper is not jettisoning the importance of the other elements of national power. It is rather interrogating the hitherto existing foreign policy of contemporary Nigeria in relation to the orientation to action of the leadership that is associated with it with a view to stating the drawbacks in the foreign policy of the country which has been occasioned by the bankruptcy of ideas of that leadership and the negative dynamic it has spawned in the sub-structural realm of the state nay the debilitating results that this has exerted on the

country's foreign policy in the more than fifty years of the country's existence. This is being done for the simple reason that in spite of the importance of the other elements of national power, the part played by the quality of leadership in terms of its ability to galvanize the other elements including the economic or sub-structural attributes of the Nigerian state is of a central importance in the ability of the country to pursue and realize its national interest.

A detailed theoretical examination of the theories of leadership is not within the province of this paper. Suffice it to say that leadership is that central factor which mobilizes, organizes and projects the elements of national power. It is also the same leadership that must take action to strike the necessary delicate mix in the utilization of the referenced elements of national power. This role of the national leadership can really not be overemphasized so long as adeptness in diplomatic practice makes the difference between success and failure in a given diplomatic pursuit. It therefore goes without saying that once the existing leadership class is acutely aware of the nature of international politics, it is better able to take action particularly in the domestic setting so as to booster the national power wherewithal to strengthen its negotiating position as it plays in the international arena.

To be exact, a national ruling class that is totally ignorant of the configuration of forces in the foreign arena or that unable to face the realities of these configurations because it must unnecessarily caress and or romanticize these configurations be they economic, socio-political and cultural perhaps because it simply must play in a certain way to protect its class interests as against the overall national interest is certainly not going to inaugurate let alone achieve much in terms of the realization of the national interest.

Let it be stated right-away that cheap altruism and empty or vacuous moralization are not the stuff that the pursuit of foreign policy is made. Whether stated or not, states in the contemporary international system exist in a state of anarchy in which wanton altruism is the hallmark of a clearly uncharted or misplaced foreign policy practice. This is partly the reason why Nigeria continued to carry the burden of the economic and military contributions of the liberation struggles that went on in the Southern part of Africa and even became a Front-line State even when she was not geographical contiguous with the region. That massive contribution in human and material resources was undertaken under the nebulous and meaningless policy of aiding the total liberation of African of colonial and settler regimes.

These countries on the attainment of political independence did not reciprocate by way of respect for Nigeria in terms of the national interest of the country. Take the case of the now famous “Africa has come of Age” speech of late general Murtala Mohammed at the Organization of Africa Unity’s conference in 1975 and which effectively neutralized the United State’s Angola policy agenda in its support of Dr. Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA as against the likely support of a majority of the OAU members for Augustino Neto’s MPLA, the Nigerian diplomatic offensive led to the independence of Angola but the overriding influence and gains thereafter went to Cuba and even china and not to Nigeria. When the other side of the coin is turned, Murtala Mohammed and ipso facto, Nigeria offended the United States of America and of course drew negative flakes from her as the February 13, 1976 abortive coup that led to the demise of Mohammed is still being speculated to have been sponsored by an unnamed foreign power.

Needless to say, the contradictions and outright delusion inherent in that single momentous but strategically bankrupt foreign policy outing are totally at variance with not only the policy orientation of the modern day nation-state but indeed also totally ignored the power configurations at play in the international system of the time.

In the first, place, this was the period that could be described as the high-water-mark of the cold war rivalry between the two super powers of the time; the United States of America and the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR. The point to note is that if the then Head of State was going to intervene on the side of one of the big powers, and if he knew what he was getting into and if he appreciated the other factors at play both domestically and internationally, perhaps he should have tried to situate that intervention within a better strategic setting.

It is therefore the contention here, that the knowledge capacity of an extant leadership is more than a critical factor. Indeed taking a peep into Nigeria’s foreign policy in Africa since independence, and against the backdrop of the role she had always played in African affairs, Nigeria’s action in pre independence Angola was not in any way related to the historiography of the orientation to action of the said role. This position is taken for a variety of reasons.

Perhaps a brief expose on the intrigues and diplomatic maneuvers that preceded the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU) is apposite here. There were two tendencies that were

available and that would have led to the concretization of a continental organization for Africa in the late 1950's and the early 1960s. There was the possibility of an outright supranational organization which was to crystallize into a continental government of a possible United States of Africa. This was the option that appeared in the horizon for the Casablanca group led by such African leaders like Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nasser of Egypt. The other option was the formation of a continental organization patterned along the lines of a functional organization and this was championed by the then Nigerian Prime Minister, late Alhaji Tafawa Balewa. Needless to say, Nigeria was able to mobilize African countries of like persuasion and the organization that was formed became the functionalist Organization of Africa Union; a loosely coordinated body of African countries which retained all the essential attributes of their sovereignty and therefore could not muster the necessary oneness to speak with one voice or act in unison. Note also that this was the arrangement that was favored by the Western world who did not like the idea of a strong and one united continental government of the emergent African states.

The result was the OAU became only a forum for much talk without any concrete action in terms of the defense of African interests. Indeed it rather became a place where extra African neocolonial interests played the interest of one African country against the other thereby undermining all.

Let it be stated that Nigeria was at the behest of the formation of OAU or the African union along the lines of the usually atomistic functionalism paradigm as was adumbrated by Mitrany (1975) According to this theory of Functionalism, states can cooperate in certain functional areas like Aviation, and other less important socio-cultural and economic areas while retaining their autonomy in the usually high-water-mark of critical areas like defense, foreign policy, etc. Herein lies the problems that lay in check for such functionalist organizations. The cooperating states still retain the essential sovereign characteristics of the post Westphalian states thereby guarding jealously their right to decide for themselves in almost all the important areas of national life.

Indeed with the benefit of hindsight, the automaticity of the spill-over effect from the functional to the consummate political area as was envisaged by Mitrany has not matured even among the European states which tried out the experiment with the European Coal and Steel Corporation (ECSC) that was formed in 1957. The point must therefore be made that the Nigerian

foreign policy offensive on Angolan independence, was just a policy that had no historical background or even the least strategic undercurrent. It was patently based on an altruistic foundation that did not only hurt the national interest of the country but in fact put her on the firing line of the animosity of one of the hegemons of the time; the United States of America.

Nigeria's Foreign Policy in Post-2019 Elections

The building blocks of the post 2019 election's foreign policy of Nigeria must be based on a trilogy of factors that are located in the domestic domain of the country and these internal factors must also work in unison with the dynamics of the international environment.

The first of these factors is a visionary and selfless leadership that must be committed to the interests of the masses of the population. It is the historic duty of this leadership to mobilize the other internal elements of national power to be able to negotiate and assert Nigeria's national interests. It must carry out actions in the area of the economy. Particularly important is to examine the nature of Nigeria's economic relationship with the outside world. A pattern of trade that is totally uncharted in which the country becomes a dumping ground for foreign made goods which are paid for in hard earned foreign currency must be stopped immediately. This would immediately begin to work in reducing the country's indebtedness to both the Paris and London Clubs and to some of the other multilateral agencies. A debtor country is usually thoroughly crippled in its attempt to assert its national interests. It lacks the moral fiber; it also lacks the economic muscle to force obedience when the chips are down.

Furthermore, a post 2019 Nigerian foreign policy must be linked to a favorable agricultural policy at home. This is to say that a country that is able to feed its population is also able to mobilize such a population and galvanize it towards the national goal. Indeed a country that is not able to cultivate and source much of its food requirements at home is unable to muster the national strength to assert its national interest. Writing on this very important factor Yaqub (cited in Akinterinwa, 2007, p. 353) has argued that "To reiterate, no country could be food insecure which can at the same time enunciate, as well as implement an autonomous foreign policy nor guarantee national security." Nothing could be so graphically stated.

Again a post 2019 elections Nigeria foreign policy could be bolstered by a perceptive national leadership that is able to mobilize the people easily

because it is perceived as being legitimate. Such a leadership has the authority to rule because it is the outcome of a free and fair election in which the will of the people is not subverted. A Nigerian leadership of such hue is therefore able to begin to remove and heal the crevices of ethno-national atomism, which has dealt a deadly blow to the need to national integration. Indeed there is no gainsaying the fact, that tribalism which is a euphemism for ethno-national or primordial attachments is easily the national question in Nigeria. Sadly, this has led to a situation in which every issue is seen from the narrow prism of ethnicity. This has greatly vitiated national integration and has tended to weaken extant national institutions whether one is referring to the Presidency, the National Assembly or the Judiciary. Such level of atomization in the domestic setting is antithetical to the assertion and realization of the national interests.

Furthermore, the Presidential system of government in Nigeria should be overhauled and made to conform to the stated juridical and legislative patterns. This is also basic for a dynamic post 2019 foreign policy. The Nigerian presidential system needs to be restructured to make a balanced federation. In the first place, the extant presidential system is grafted to a defacto parliamentary system which was what the country practiced in the first republic. As a result, the members of the National Assembly behave as though they were member of the cabinet in a parliamentary system. Bills and their passage are not handled as national issues but are subjected to the rigors of parliamentary opposition rituals.

Added to this is the fact that 1999 constitution which is a military contraption has seriously bifurcated foreign policy functions between the Federal government and the governments of the thirty-six states in Nigeria. While it is trite that the authority to handle the foreign policy of Nigeria is vested in the Federal government, there is a subtle problem that arises from the requirements of constitutional federalism in which powers are shared between at least two levels of government and in which these levels derive both their lives and powers from the federal constitutions (Wheare,1964). As has been argued, the constitutional provision in Section 12(3) of the 1999 constitution which makes it mandatory for a bill that would commit Nigeria to a binding treaty to also be passed by a majority of the States' Houses of Assembly extant in the federation might constitute a serious drawback to the implementation of a dynamic foreign policy (Akindele cited in Akindele & Ete, 2009, p. 63).

To be exact, there is a fundamental reason to enunciate and fashion out a new post 2019 election foreign policy for Nigeria. It is reiterated that apart from galvanizing the other elements of national power, the role of leadership in this enterprise is of very critically importance. It is emphasized that the international political arena is a place where the possession of power and the know-how for its usage is critically important in the realization of the national interest. The foreign policy of Nigeria should be divested of unnecessary moral suasion and altruism. Indeed it is totally unacceptable that in a world of the 21 century that is not only anarchic and infested with all the attributes of power politics, Nigeria in one of subsections of Section 19 of the 1999 constitution is still talking of the “promotion of a just world economic order” (1999 Constitution)

The above stated provision of the 1999 constitution is not only naïve, it is patently unappreciative of the unjust world economic order that arose since the end of the Second World War in which the unequal exchange that exists between the countries of the world and the third world countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America is simply unjustifiable. It is suggested here that the framers of the constitution are advised to appreciate the full gamut of this international system that is skewed against Nigerian-type societies at least economically and in which the International Monetary Fund and its sister agencies have not helped matters by maintaining trade and finance patterns that have continued to drain off the resources of these underdeveloped countries.

Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion

The foregoing brief essay has been an attempt at interrogating the practice of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence. Put in another way, it has particularly examined the orientation to action that has pervaded the execution of that foreign policy with a view to setting the pedestal from which to establish a new direction taking into account the period of the Post 2019 elections in the country.

The verdict has been that the handlers of the foreign policy of the country have all operated from standpoints which have tended to introduce an overdose of moral principles and altruism in the practice of that foreign. The result has been that the country has not been able to execute a foreign policy that is dedicated to the realization of its national interest. Not only that the definition of that national interest has been bogus, problematic and

convoluted, the ideas and world-views of the men at the helm of affairs seem not to appreciate the nature of the post Westphalian state and the consequent nature of the extant international political system.

The work reiterates that power is the single most important thing that pervades international politics and that states ignore this to their detriment. It states that inspite of claims to the contrary by protagonists such Keohane and Nye of the complex interdependence paradigm, the international system is still anarchic so long as the states with the power attributes can still go ahead to act to realize their interests even when an organization such as the United Nations has not given its consent. The structure of the United Nations itself portrays the importance of the self same power coordinates and the anarchic nature of international politics. This is the reason why for instance the United States of America could act outside the consent of the UN in what it termed the “Coalition of the Willing” in invading Iraq and sacking Saddam Hussein.

Nigeria must therefore make do with men of ideas who are very knowledgeable in international politics and whose world-views are sharp enough to appreciate these factors in foreign policy. This is the only way to begin to enunciate a post 2019 elections new direction in her foreign policy.

This appreciation of the nature of politics outside the frontiers of the nation-state must also be married with the conditions in the domestic environment which are also critical in the concretization of enough power potentials or the lack of it. The unmitigated rancor, the ethno-national intrigues and the atomization of the Nigerian populace in terms of ethno-religious fractions are all factors that may whittle down any attempt by the country to seek to implement a new foreign policy agenda in the post 2019 election era given the fact that even as this piece is being written the legitimacy of the authority of the winner of the 2019 presidential election is still an issue for serious contention at the courts.

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN NIGERIA: THE ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS'S UPSTAGE

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Abstract

One of the most attractive and enduring elements of liberal democracy is found in its vertical accountability function. It is here that the power of the people's sovereignty is activated. For any democracy to enjoy this level of efficiency it must experience a virile opposition, the presence and function of which attest to the level of institutionalization of democratic governance. Nigeria's democratic experience with opposition has been thorny. Wrecked by the ruling party's suppressive tendencies and endemic schisms, fragmentation and personalization of the opposition parties has vitiated their capacity to ensure effective checks on the ruling party and deepen democracy in Nigeria. A merger of opposition parties into the All Progressives Congress has appeared as a new face of the attempts to challenge the ruling party for effective governance. This task is possible only when the new party ensures internal democracy, de-personalized the party and pursue politics of issues.

Keywords: democracy, accountability, sustainable, development, opposition

Introduction

Prevailing ideas about liberal democracy as Weghorst and Lindberg (2011) have shown are built around the normative value of constitutional governance which is expressed in vertical democratic accountability. This perspective of democracy resonates with Dahl's (1971) earlier assertion that as a form of rule, democracy requires broad based political participation and competition. In a democracy, Dahl further argued that those who govern are not only chosen through competitive elections, candidates for political offices as well as political parties which are the major platforms for running for such offices also accept the outcomes of the electoral process.

Scholars like Dahl (1971) Sklar (1976) Nnoli (1985) Przeworski (1991) Huntington (1991) Carton (2007) and Weghorst and Lindberg (2011)

are unanimous that the powerful accountability mechanism that lies at the heart of the democratic philosophy is best activated and invigorated by opposition parties. As Powell (2000) argued, the power and functions of elections as instruments of democracy are made real and feasible only when it includes strong and credible opposition parties. Among other functions the latter provide alternative policy proposals which constitute rich optional choices for the citizens (IDEA 2007; Teshome, 2009). In Africa where good governance has remained elusive as a result of weak political institutions, a virile opposition is a sine qua non for effective democratic governance since it facilitates the building of strong state institutions.

The role of opposition parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic is here examined to demonstrate the extent to which political parties generally have been unable to activate democratic accountability in the country and the challenges the opposition must transcend to become virile and the moving force of Nigeria's democratic politics. The discourse is divided into five closely interrelated parts. These introductory remarks are followed by conceptual and theoretical clarifications and a brief interrogation of the historical dynamics of opposition politics in Nigeria. The fourth section discusses the forces, the calculations as well as the political expectations behind the emergence of the All Progressives Congress (APC) as a potentially viable opposition in Nigeria. A brief conclusion ties the discussions together and identifies the challenges, the APC must tackle if it is to succeed as an opposition party or take over governance.

Parties and Opposition Politics: Conceptual and Theoretical Insights

Political parties are as much a life blood of liberal democracies as all the other institutions and principles associated with that specification of governance. Indeed a symbiosis exists amongst the values of representativeness (which political parties appear best suited for activating) freedoms of association, movements and conscience, of equality before the law and accountability which the philosophy encapsulates.

The view that a political party is a voluntary coalition of people seeking to control and run the government by contesting elections and winning office has been accepted and repeated down the ages (Dahl 1971; Maliyamkono 2003; Duverger 1964; Giovanni 1987; Nnoli 2003; Edoh 2005; Genyi 2013).

In theory and practice, parties do manifest conspicuous differences in structure, organization and ideological outlooks (Nnoli 2003). These differences derive from the immutable reality that in all societies, different perceptions, views and interests exist with respect to how society should be governed and scarce resources allocated. Parties provide frameworks for harnessing, mobilizing and proffering viewpoints that are similar and presenting them to the electorates.

Opposition parties are part of, and integral to this democratic process. Fundamentally, opposition parties therefore serve as an option for change of governance. Thus, opposition political parties according to Dolo (2006, p.34) are 'partisan political institutions that are intentionally designed to temper the ruling party's excesses while still pursuing both legislative and presidential offices'. Opposition parties are usually minority parties in relation to the number of seats they occupy in national or local legislatures. Such parties do not control governmental power but act as a check on governments. In a functional democracy, opposition parties remain conscious of, and accord due respect to, government but remain free to criticize the ruling party and government, while offering alternative policy and programme proposals. In established democracies, opposition parties are governments in waiting or alternate governments. Liberal democracy accepts the right of the majority to decide but equally concedes to the minority the right to have a dissenting voice. This creates the situation in liberal democracies for both ruling and non-ruling parties to oppose each other and at the same time to be tolerant, cooperative and compromising as may be necessary in the interest of the public good. A strong and authentic opposition is therefore the moral compass in governance in contemporary liberal democracies for a ruling party.

The degree to which opposition political parties can be effective is dependent on a variety of factors. Young (2004) and Bogaards (2007) for example have emphasized the cohesiveness of the opposition party as a key independent variable. The more fragmented and factionalised any political party is, in terms of its structure and leadership the weaker the party in the scheme of national politics. However, protracted squabbles, endless jostling for power and positions, schisms and crises are all counterproductive for a party's capacity to be relevant as an opposition force (Erdmann and Basedau, 2007).

The level of the institutionalization of a political party has also been identified as relevant for its ability to function as an opposition force

(Mozaffar and Scaritt 2005; Nnoli 2005). Clearly, parties that survive gestational teething problems and go on to develop deep and strong taproots in the political environment have better chances as an opposition. Moreover, such parties can more easily withstand the ever present gale of clandestine and Watergate tactics of ruling parties usually aimed at weakening or decimating the opposition. Other factors that can be important include the strength, character as well as the organizational ability of the leadership of the party at all levels, and the clarity and appeal of its ideology. Thus parties are and have been vital for the establishment and deepening of democracy. Indeed as Stephan (1996) and Olukoshi (1998) have posited, it is impossible to democratize modern societies without political parties. It is equally impossible to sustain modern democracies without opposition parties.

Opposition Politics in Nigeria: Its Historical Context

Nigeria's First Republic was dominated by three powerful political parties. These were the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG). These parties essentially represented platforms for ethnic mobilization for contestation for federal resources. The NPC and the AG represented Hausa and Yoruba nationalism respectively. The NCNC however started as a Pan-Nigerian drive but was compelled by the ethnic dynamics of Nigerian politics to retreat and seek an ethnic base among the Igbos of the then Eastern region.

The general election of 1959 that ushered in political independence in 1960 was won by the NPC which entered into a coalition with the NCNC. The AG served as the opposition. The parliamentary strength of the parties at the federal legislature supported this arrangement. The NPC won 148 seats; the NCNC-NEPU alliance won 89 seats while AG-UMBC-COR alliance won 75 seats (Uwechue, 1991). While the competitive political space was preponderantly dominated by the trio of NPC, NCNC, and AG, minor parties existed operating as the opposition in their regions. Such parties included the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) in Central Nigeria, the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) which had considerable following in the upper parts of the Northern region especially around Kano.

It was not long however before it became clear that Nigerian political elites who had all accepted the Whitehall model for the country had not sufficiently imbibed the ethos and nuances of that system. Thus even before the ink had quite dried on the instrument of independence, the NPC/NCNC

coalition government had started manifesting deep suspicions of both the style and motives of AG opposition. The latter's criticisms of the 1961-62 Federal Budget, its implacable opposition to the 1962 Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact as well as its suggestions for the inclusion of wide-ranging social welfare programmes in the First National Development Plan, among others were interpreted as indicative of a hidden agenda by the conservative coalition. On the other hand the opposition's continued propagation of the "Social Democracy" ideology for the emancipation of the masses was received with phobic distaste especially by the Hausa-Fulani oligarchies no less than his well orchestrated political overtures to the UMBC which was opposed to the Northern region as it was constituted then.

Equally irritating and politically offensive was AG's support for the balkanization of the other regions. The coalition decided to cripple the opposition leader chief Obafemi Awolowo and neutralize and decimate the AG. He was arrested, tried and jailed for treasonable felony, a state of emergency was declared in the Western region at the end of which political power was handed over to his bitter opponent that was an ally of the NPC ruling party while another region (Mid-western) was created out of the west. With these developments the opposition was totally vitiated and the Federal Government under the ruling NPC/NCNC coalition operated without checks.

It appears correct to conclude that during the First Republic the opposition was largely ineffectual albeit not inconsequential. On the surface of it, the merciless onslaught and gang up by the NPC/NCNC ruling coalition as well as the dynamics of its own internal schisms provide ready explanations. In retrospect however, it is really difficult to see how the opposition could have succeeded in the immediate post colonial Nigerian state. On the one hand there was the attempt by the withdrawing British colonial masters to transplant into Nigeria the Whitehall model of governance based on a strong opposition. On the other hand the same mentors had consistently demonstrated to the emergent African leaders through the massive use of coercive instruments of the state that those who govern do not take kindly to opposition. It was not too long after their withdrawal that this inherent contradiction took its toll on the system. This contradiction has come to haunt the polity to date.

The Second Republic lasted for four years (1979-1983) with the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led by President Shehu Shagari as the ruling party. The NPN was largely considered the successor to NPC and literally rose on the ashes of the defunct party (Uwechue 1991; Osaghae 1998). The Unity

Party of Nigeria (UPN) headed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo was also considered as a successor of former AG. The party was socialist inclined with a preference for welfare policies such as free education and health care services. The Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) was headed by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The party was viewed by a number of observers as a resurrection of NCNC and was tailored towards social welfare (Osaghae, 1998). The party also had international appeal to Pan Africanism. The Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP) was a faction of the NPP and was headed by an entrepreneur and a former Federal Minister Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim. Ideologically, the party was inclined to free enterprise (Osaghae, 1998). The People's Redemption Party (PRP) was a radical left wing party that bore resemblance to NEPU. It was headed by Alhaji Aminu Kano.

On assumption of office, it was very clear to the President that his party did not have a simple majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives for easy passage of party programmes and policies. The NPN therefore offered to work with the other parties but initially they all declined. UPN promised to cooperate on the condition that its four cardinal programmes on economic and political objectives would be implemented. UPN eventually rejected a coalition government on the grounds that it would be a haven for abuse and misuse of power and for unabated corruption on the part of ministers (Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985 p.75). The PRP favoured the formation of a national government based on a fusion of party manifestoes. It was only the NPP that accepted the invitation with the hope of securing key appointments for its members and money for development in the states the party controlled. The NPN-NPP accord was to soon break down in 1981 on the demand for more posts by the latter. However, the crisis in the accord stemmed from the absence of consultation between the parties and the regard of NPP as a mere subordinate partner without a voice.

Having refused to join the NPN led government, the UPN, GNPP and PRP entered into an alliance of progressives with some vaguely defined socialism as the basis for governance in the states they controlled. Both the UPN and GNPP controlled states moved faster on the governance trajectory than the Federal Government. For instance all western UPN states had implemented free education policy while PRP abolished a flat rate personal taxation as part of a revolution to free the masses. The progressive alliance was pursued with vigour why eyeing the 1983 general elections.

Though the alliance failed to metamorphose into a political party, the Federal Government still moved against it. The alliance failed largely though due to conflicting aspiration of its leaders as all three were still eyeing the Presidency in 1983 without apparent consideration for giving way to another. The alliance also lacked a unanimous programme indicative of a cohesive opposition. But even at this the ruling NPN found itself quite uncomfortable with it and decided to infiltrate it (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985; Uwechue, 1991). As it were in the First Republic, the ruling party through its control of state power sought to repress the opposition. In Borno State for example, it deported Alhaji Shugaba Abdurrahman, the GNPP majority leader in the State House of Assembly on the grounds that he was not a Nigerian. This was a strategy to disconcert the opposition having one of their prominent politicians embroiled in such a controversy. The UPN supported the GNPP challenge of this development in court as a mark of solidarity in the spirit of the progressive alliance. The build up to the 1983 general elections saw the Federal Government move up against the opposition by creating fear in their members using the Nigeria police which became an instrument of terror against the opposition. In a development ominously reminiscent of a déjà vu with the First Republic, the opposition itself remained largely disparate, in-cohesive, unfocused and highly fractionalized. Eager to partake in the lucre and the spoils of patronages that come with controlling political power in Nigeria, a number of its key members cross-carpeted or literally just “switched over” to the ruling party.

By the time of the 1983 elections although the UPN still held sway in the Western axis of the country, the opposition at the national level had become highly crippled if not completely dead. The ruling party bestrode the Nigerian political landscape like a colossus brooking little or zero opposition. This rabid phobia for dissent and opposition as was the case a decade and a half earlier was to prove, ultimately, its own death knell. The party’s victory songs celebrating its phoney “land slide” triumphs in the 1983 elections soon proved to be the baneful dirge signaling the demise of the Second Republic.

Nwosu (1991, p.121) has stated that to “all sincere admirers and well wishers of Nigeria the Second Republic was indeed a painful disappointment”. He posited that the manner, in which politics and governance were carried during the period, clearly indicated that the Nigerian political class had really learnt nothing new in the art of accommodation, tolerance of dissent and commitment to fair play. Indeed the dominating presence of many of the

political elites, whose implacable disdain for dissent and alternative points of view created paralysis in the First Republic, was suggestive right from the start that the same old political beat would go on.

It was the series of rather poignant attempts at re-engineering the contours of party politics in Nigeria by the military penultimate to its final disengagement in 1979. It became mandatory for example for parties to become “National” in their memberships, executive structure and office locations. They were banned from reference, directly or obliquely, to any ethnic or religious symbols and sentiments in their programmes, manifestoes and campaigns.

Way off into the fourth republic, in retrospect the failure of that experiment has given rise to many questions for which Social Scientists are yet to provide final answers. Was it for example, the case that the reforms did not go far enough? Or were they deliberately crafted to fail so as to provide a return passage for the military at a later date? These questions and many others remain relevant as ever as Nigeria intensifies its search for a more stable polity firmly anchored on accepted democratic principles.

President Babangida’s Third Republic presented an extraordinary experience for party politics in Nigeria. Party formation was tightly controlled and teleguided by the military in terms of their structure and operations. The military government to start with banned certain category of politicians branded as ‘old breed’. These were persons who had been part of the major political parties in the First and the Second Republic and had in the opinion of the military, contributed significantly to the failure of the democracy in the country.

Once the ban on party politics was lifted in May, 1989 over eighty-eight political associations announced their formation (Oyediran and Agbaje, 1991). These associations, it was clear, had connections with political parties in the past despite the military declaration of interest at making a clear break with the past. At the same time the National Electoral Commission (NEC) came out with a list of conditions that political associations must meet to qualify for registration as political parties. The associations were to demonstrate national spread with presence in all 21 states then and local governments across the country and to pay a non refundable fee of N50,000. In addition, they were to provide names and addresses of members with their passports to be physically verified by NEC within two months. Importantly, the ideological inclinations of the associations were to be clearly outlined and

articulated in manifestoes and submitted to NEC. Other requirements touched on reflection of the federal character principle in the composition of their officials.

Against the stiff conditions put out by NEC only 13 associations eventually filed for registration. After a comprehensive verification of the claims of the associations and applying a scoring formula the Commission had ingeniously devised, it submitted only six associations for consideration for registration as political parties to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). The six were Peoples Solidarity Party (PSP); Nigerian National Congress (NNC); People's Front of Nigeria (PFN); Liberal Convention (LC); Nigerian Labour Party (NLP); and Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN). According to NEC, most of the associations, had links to parties in the past, were funded from questionable sources and perpetuated widespread fraud in relation to memberships (NEC, 1989).

Convinced that all of the six parties recommended by the Commission were closely related to one or the other of the political parties of the First and Second Republics the military proscribed all the 13 political associations and, in an unprecedented move, decreed into existence two new political parties; the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which was "a little to the left" and the National Republican Convention (NRC) which placed a "little to the right". The decision to create two parties de novo resulted in part from the failure of the 13 political associations to meet up with NEC's requirements on party formation. Yet, contradictorily enough, the associations themselves helped to give the cue for the AFRC's decision on the issue. A careful examination and analysis of their articulated programmes, policies and manifestoes indicated that the 13 divided, more or less evenly, into two broad ideological groups. While one group leaned towards "liberal capitalism", the other preferred greater welfarism. The military used this to create two brand new parties which it hoped would evenly match each other in national electoral contests. It envisioned an outcome whereby the governing party would be effectively checked by an equally strong opposition.

The outcomes of the elections conducted with the two parties in contestation do in fact support this trajectory. These were the 1990 Local Government election and the Legislative/Gubernatorial elections of 1992. In the latter for example, the SDP won 14 states while the NRC won 16 states. The SDP won 650 State Assembly seats across the country while NRC won 545 State Assembly seats. At the National Assembly the SDP won 52 Senate

seats and 312 House of Representatives seats; while the NRC won 38 Senate and 275 House of Representatives seats (Osaghae, 1998 p.233-234).

Unfortunately the Third Republic was aborted following the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election in which the SDP featured Chief MKO Abiola against NRC's Alh. Bashir Tofa as presidential candidates respectively. Before the annulment, preliminary results had indicated that Abiola was clearly a head of his rival. Had a government been formed at the federal level, based on the results, it would have been possible to assess the performance of the two parties in their ruling and opposition functions in the face of their seemingly balanced appeal and presence across the country. Following the annulment, Babangida, consumed by the political logjam he had created, "stepped aside" leaving behind an Interim Government which soon collapsed. With Abacha's coup in 1993, Nigeria once again found herself in the political wilderness of military dictatorship.

Gen Sani Abacha's Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) approved the holding of a constitutional conference which would have recommended a road map for the country's democratic process. Elections of delegates on non-party basis into the conference were held on 23rd May 1994 but were massively boycotted especially in South West Nigeria, in compliance with the National Democratic Coalition's (NADECO) demands; a coalition of major civil society groups opposed to the Abacha regime. The Conference was inaugurated on 27th August 1994 and deliberated on national issues submitting its report to the Federal Military Government on 27th June, 1995. In the report the Conference recommended a multi-party system, rotational presidency between the south and the north, as well as the handover to a civilian elected government on January 1st 1996 (Amuwo, Bach and Lebeau 2001). Subsequently Abacha approved the reconstitution of the national electoral body and renamed it National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON). The PRC also approved the constitution of the National Reconciliation Committee headed by Chief Alex Akinyele. The Federal military government also set up a Transition Implementation Committee to supervise and monitor the transition to civil rule programme.

With regards to multi-party politics, NECON taking a cue from its predecessor, released stiff conditions for party registration and ended up with the registration of only five political parties namely: Committee for National Consensus (CNC), United Nigeria Peoples Convention (UNPC), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN) and

Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM) (Idachaba, 2001). Gen. Abacha's transition was intended to terminate in 1998 but abruptly came to an end following his death on 8th June, 1998.

Parties and Opposition Politics in the Fourth Republic: The Early Years

The Abdusalami Abubakar's military government registered three political parties as platforms for electoral competition. The military was still concerned about national spread of political parties and their organizational abilities. To test this, more than 30 associations that desired state recognition as political parties were required to confirm their national spread and acceptance as well as organizational capacity by contesting the local government elections of 1998. Nine political associations were accredited to take part in that election. They were the Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM), All People's Party (APP), the Alliance for Democracy (AD), Democratic Advanced Movement (DAM), Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ), National Solidarity Movement (NSM), Peoples' Redemption Movement (PRP), United Democratic Party (UDP) and United Peoples' Party (UPP) (Idachaba, 2001 p.361).

The results of the election showed that the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) won 465 (nearly 60%) of the 774 local government councils, All Peoples Party (APP) won 192 (about 25%) while Alliance for Democracy (AD) won 109 (about 15 percent) (Egwemi, 2010 p.160). The military registered the PDP and APP as political parties and to avoid a two party structure altered its previously stated condition for parties to have won 10 percent in 24 states to qualify for registration. The condition was softened to also pave way for the registration of Alliance for Democracy (AD) apparently to appease the Yoruba over the June 12 controversy as well as obtain the South Western support for the transition. The military thus registered AD as a party to contest the general elections staggered between December, 1998 and February, 1999. The PDP won the presidential election with Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as candidate defeating the APP/AD accord candidate of Chief Olu Falae. The PDP also won 24 states governorship position to AD's 6 and APP's 6. The National Assembly results show that PDP won 209 seats in the House of Representatives to APP's 77 and AD's 68 respectively (Epelle 2005: 141). For the Senate, PDP had 63 seats, APP 24 and AD 20 (Onuoha 2002 p.334).

The above results had a number of implications for the role of the opposition in the new scheme of national politics. For one it was obvious that

the PDP's overwhelming majority in both chambers of the National Assembly meant that the ruling party was positioned to get its programmes and policies passed no matter the view of the opposition on such programmes.

Perhaps, much more significant was the persistent failure of the opposition in the National Assembly to rise beyond broad and general criticisms of the Federal Government policies to the presentation of concrete and specific alternatives for more productive good governance. In the absence of this the opposition began to appear to observers as a disgruntled group determined to "oppose" any, and every, government policy with little or no consideration of cost benefit analyses.

But if the opposition at the federal level succeeded in maintaining some noise making visibility, the situation was remarkably different in the states. Here none governing parties generally "hunkered down" or were literally overwhelmed or completely emasculated. The scenario however varied from state to state or political zone to political zone. In some key states where the PDP was in opposition, for example, Kwara, Borno and Lagos, it used its leverage of control of power and resources at the centre not only to keep the opposition alive but to continue to grow in strength to a point of posing serious challenge to the ruling party.

There are a number of other instances where the position of the opposition did not quite fit the pattern described above. The case of Kano for example is unique and fascinating. Won by the PDP in 1999, it was captured by the opposition (ANPP) in 2003 only to be recaptured by the opposition (PDP) in 2011). This development became very prominent in the South Western axis of the country in subsequent elections.

In the built up to the 2003 general elections the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) registered three more political parties based on the provisions of the 2001 Electoral Act. This decision was contested by late Chief Gani Fawehimi that ended at the Supreme Court which declared its judgment on 8th November, 2002 against INEC, that the Commission had no right to introduce new registration guidelines for parties outside those stipulated by the constitution. 26 more political parties were thus registered in early 2003 to contest the general elections that year. Among the parties registered were the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA); United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) and National Democratic Party (NDP). In total 29 political parties contested for various positions in that election. With the advantage of an accord between the PDP and the AD, the ruling PDP extended

and consolidated its hold on the Nigerian polity and governance. The party won 28 states governorship positions including four of AD previously controlled states in the South West except Lagos. In the National Assembly elections the PDP won 203 House of Representatives seats, to ANPP's 94 and AD's 38. For the Senate the PDP cleared 72 while ANPP took 28 to AD's 6. The PDP also won the presidential election with a wide margin even though the election was generally considered flawed and described as the worst in Nigeria's democratic history (Nnadozie 2005; EU 2007; Tsa and Mbaeyi 2007; WACSO 2007).

The conduct of AD especially in the accord perfected with the PDP not to field a presidential candidate clearly stood out the party as incoherent, ideologically bankrupt and fragmented. The party it appeared was more concerned with political opportunism than in defending its ideological interest and political identity; this was starkly different from that of its assumed progenitor, the AG that struggled to defend its core values even in the face of federal onslaught. In any case long before the Obasanjo contrived accord with the PDP, the AD appeared to have since lost its luster and viability as an effective opposition party at the national level. Soon after the return to democracy, the party was gripped by endless crises and internal schisms that gnawed the dynamism and clarity of purpose that characterized its formation. The party's incipient disintegration was to lead to the formation of the Action Congress (AC) in 2006.

As with the AD, the ANPP was equally rapidly losing its political visibility and stamina as an opposition party due to personality struggles and schisms. Though it succeeded in wresting Kano state from the PDP in 2003, the party suffered electoral setbacks in states like Kwara and Gombe where it was a dominant force in 1999. Unable to make any serious impacts in both the South Western and South Eastern states and completely checkmated in the South South axis of Nigeria, the ANPP remained, rather precariously, hemmed in around Borno, Yobe, and Zamfara states. As the party's electoral and political fortunes nosedived and its base shrunk, the ANPP, like the AD, was further weakened by internecine wrangling and factionalism that chipped at its cohesion and unity.

The 2007 election again confirmed the declining clout of the opposition political parties as demonstrated in the low number of elective positions won. The PDP not only won the presidential election but also won 28 governorship positions to AC's 1, ANPP's 4 and APGA's 1 and Labour

Party (LP) 1. The PDP also took away 86 Senate seats, to ANPP's 15 and AC's 6. The PDP also won 169 House of Representatives seats to ANPP's 49 and AC's 26 (EU 2007 p.43). The PDP had overwhelming majority in both Houses of the National Assembly and controlled over 2/3 of the states in the country. International monitors and observers including local organizations and individuals however gave the election a dismal assessment. Mark Van den Berg, the Chief European Union observer stated that the election had fallen far short of basic international standards and that the process could not be considered credible (EU 2007). The election was poorly organized. It lacked transparency and was characterized by significant levels of fraud, voter disenfranchisement, violence and even snatching of ballot boxes (Ajaero 2007 p.20). In some places as Bayelsa state, voter turnout was higher than those who had registered to vote (EU 2007; ICG 2007). The election was characterized as a 'do or die' affair for the PDP by then outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo. Desperate to win, the PDP deployed security agencies to intimidate voters and protect INEC and PDP agents and staff to perfect the rigging process. This flawed nature of the 2007 election was acknowledged by President Umaru Yar'Adua on his inauguration (ICG 2007).

It will not be however correct to assume that the emergence of the PDP as a political behemoth heralded or implied a total elimination of the opposition. With the AD nearly non-existent, and the ANPP supine, Lagos state under the debutante ACN was gradually becoming the epicenter of the new opposition. The state government took the PDP central government on a number of critical national issues. Perhaps the best known of these was over the authority to create new local government Areas (LGAs). Lagos state like a few others had gone ahead to create new LGAs. But unlike some others, refused to back down, when the issue became one of the major controversies with the Federal Government.

The challenge against the Federal Government by the Lagos State under Senator Ahmed Tinubu over the creation of local governments and Chief Obasanjo's subsequent suspension of Federal allocation to the state turned the issue into the most formidable confrontation by an opposition party against the ruling party during the Obasanjo years. The opposition approached the court and got a favourable judgment but the Federal Government under Obasanjo refused to abide by the courts' verdict. It was President Yar'Adua, when he took over in 2007 who ordered compliance with the judgment and the release of the accrued funds to the Lagos State Government.

The country returned again to elections in 2011. This time more political parties numbering 63 contested the election. Prominent among these parties were the PDP, ANPP, ACN and the brand new Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). The CPC was singlehandedly created by General Muhammadu Buhari a two time ANPP Presidential candidate who had fallen out with other members of the party leadership. The CPC quickly became at least in the three northern geo-political zones a destination point for a number of other individuals who had political axes to grind (mainly over failure to clinch nominations for particular political positions) with their erstwhile party of memberships. Expectedly, General Buhari became the party's Presidential candidate.

The April 16th presidential elections having been postponed from April 9th due to logistic problems (Smith 2011; Purefoy 2011) were bitterly contested; the major candidates were the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau of ANPP, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu of ACN and Muhammadu Buhari of CPC. President Goodluck Jonathan was declared the winner by INEC having polled 58.89 percent (22,495,187) of the popular votes cast at the election to CPC's Muhammadu Buhari's 31.98 percent (12,214,853) (INEC 2011 p.1). The election was declared by national and international observers as "among the fairest in Nigeria's history but they also were among the bloodiest" (Dufka 2011 p.1). Indeed the elections represent a remarkable improvement over the 2007 general elections in terms of electoral credibility.

The result of the presidential elections caused a spontaneous violent protest from supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari of CPC across major cities in Northern Nigeria considered to be the strong hold of the party. The riots affected states like Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. The post election violence lasted for three days and left an estimated 800 persons dead (HRW 2011 p.2). This violence was an expression of electorates' frustration with the electoral outcomes which were believed to have been manipulated to favour the PDP candidate. The perceived distrust in the judicial process as a credible avenue to get justice also has remote bearing on the post election riots (Ayoade and Akinsanya 2012; Genyi, 2013).

ACN's presidential candidates poor outing in the election is widely believed to be attributed to his party's unwritten deal with the PDP for its members to vote for the PDP's presidential candidate Dr. Goodluck Jonathan.

If true the decision of the ACN which began to emerge as the avant garde of opposition during Obasanjo's second term, to turn and cut a deal with the PDP is at best perplexing. It raises fundamental issues about both the principles and motives of opposition in Nigeria's politics. An arrangement with the PDP could therefore prove heuristic for senior members and development resources to areas of control.

The National Assembly election shows that ACN had 18 Senate seats to PDP's 53, ANPP's 4 and CPC's 6 and 1 to APGA. The PDP won 123 of the 360 House of Representatives seats against ACN's 45, ANPP 11 and CPC 21. PPA won merely 2 seats. By 2012 ACN was in control of 4 states; the ANPP 2 and the CPC 1 with APGA 2 and PPA 1. The PDP still looms large on the political turf with the control of 18 states. Though the election was considered an improvement over the 2007 elections, there were noticeable inconsistencies and incidents of malpractices here and there in the country. There were reported cases of underage voting, ballot stuffing and snatching and non-conduct of elections in many areas (Smith 2011; Adam 2011, Taiwo 2011; Kaura 2011).

The results clearly showed the ACN as the rising star of political opposition in Nigeria. In the gubernatorial elections it took over virtually all the south western states. Similar feats were repeated by the party in the National Assembly and the state assembly's elections. ANPP's performance on the other hand was however, a continuation of its slide. For example, from 9 states and 101 members of the National Assembly in 1999 the party took a negative slide to 2 states and 15 members of the National Assembly in 2011.

Merging for Strength: The All Progressives Congress (APC)

The driving impetus of opposition politics in Nigeria as indeed anywhere else has been largely the desire to win elections and take control of the process of governance. This is the *raison d'être* of party politics in all liberal democracies. Perhaps what make the Nigerian experience a deviant are the level of desperation as well as the crudeness of the means often exhibited by those in control and those outside but determined to wrestle that control. The typical Nigerian power seeker, always a faithful disciple of Nicolo Machiavelli has consistently remained unperturbed by the legality or, for that matter, illegality of the technique of power acquisition. What really matters is the end that prize confers: an open sesame to wealth, graft and status. Ake (1981) captured this succinctly when he declared that for the Nigerian political

elite, control of the machinery of governance provides the greatest access to status and wealth. Ultimately, he posited further, a desperate struggle to win control of state power ensues since this control means for all practical purposes being all powerful. Politics in such environment he concluded becomes warfare, a matter of life and death. As the resources available for control at the Centre has increased so also has the intensity to control it by the various factions of the political elite.

To gain leverage, Nigerian political parties have often turned to mergers and alliances. During the First Republic a number of such alliances dotted the political landscape. In 1964 for example, an alliance was formed between the ruling NPC and Akintola's breakaway faction of the AG, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). The alliance was to strengthen the latter and give it some cover of federal might in the show down with the AG and to provide the former a foothold in the Western region preparatory to the national elections that year. The alliance was subsequently upgraded with the addition of a number of smaller parties to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).

Not to be out done, the NCNC whose political marriage of necessity with NPC had to all intents and purposes collapsed by the time the election approached, teamed up with what was left of the AG, NEPU and other minority parties to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).

The second attempt at alliance came in 1979 when the Progressive People's Alliance (PPA) was conceived involving NPP, UPN and GNPP to present a stronger opposition to the NPN in the election of that year. The efforts towards this alliance were sustained by UPN and GNPP through regular combined intergovernmental meetings involving governors of states run by these opposition parties (Lawrence 2013). The alliance was to be joined later by PRP governors in 1980 (Falola & Ihonvbere 1985). This alliance by opposition political parties was to enhance electoral victory in 1983. However, cohesion; a necessary ingredient in alliance formation was undermined by the fractionalization of PRP and GNPP. The other factor that destroyed the alliance was the personal ambitions of Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe both of who had wanted to use it as platform for gaining the presidency. Against this back ground the alliance failed to metamorphose into a full fledged political party. Lack of cohesion, inadequate alignment on ideological premise and NPN's infiltration of its rank collectively destroyed the alliance.

The third alliance was in 1998. It was between the AD and APP. It also worked only as far as the presidential election of the following year and collapsed shortly thereafter. The two parties fielded Chief Olu Falae but failed to win the election (Okocha 2009). The alliance was at best haphazard and lacked any serious political content. In any case both parties had little or inadequate time to prepare their members to accept it or understand its philosophy before the elections.

The fourth attempt at serious alliance formation or merger is the result of the formation and ultimately the registration of the All Progressives Congress (APC) as a political party by the Independent National Electoral Commission. The merger turned into one mega political party, the ACN, the ANPP, the CPC and a faction of APGA led by Rochas Okorochoa, the governor of Imo State and a number of other minor political parties.

To date, the APC with its full registration as a party stands out as the greatest success by opposition parties to unite and present a solid challenge to the governing party. The new party no doubt has given the clearest signals that the opposition can indeed be transformed into a powerful political force capable of possibly dislodging the ruling PDP from power as Nigeria girds for the 2015 general elections. For the first time in Nigeria's political history, pre-existing individual parties have dissolved their political individuality and identities into one single organic whole. Clearly the Nigerian political environment has never witnessed anything quite like this. When earlier alliances and mergers were forged, the different parties kept their separate identities. With the APC each of the merging party has gone into political extinction.

The ACN no doubt has been the prima ballerina in the formation of this new political creature. Formed in September 2006 from the ashes of the dying AD and bringing in a number of other smaller parties like the Justice Party (JP) and the Advance Congress of Democrats (ACD), the AC gave signals early that it was not going to accept any form of bullying from the ruling PDP. As an AD governor of Lagos state, Senator Ahmed Tinubu, the founder of AC stood up to Obasanjo on many issues including that of creation of new Local governments. When the party succeeded in reclaiming from the PDP the 2007 elections the gubernatorial seats it had taken from the AD in the South Western geopolitical zone in the previous elections, it became clear that the party indeed represented a new force in Nigeria's opposition politics. This was further confirmed when the AC turned down Yar'Adua's invitation to join

his National Coalition government even as it doggedly pursued its case in the courts to prove that it had won the Edo governorship race and not the PDP. The subsequent declaration of judgment in the party's favour in that particular case indicated that the party can compete and win elections outside Yoruba heartland. According to CAN's National Chairman, Chief Bisi Akande the change of name was to accommodate the broader spectrum of opposition in Nigeria and create a platform for collaborative efforts towards chasing the ruling PDP out of office.

Through the merger the ACN has brought the biggest political muscle into the APC. It has 18 seats in the Senate, 74 seats in the House of Representatives and 6 governors compared to the ANPP's 2 governors, 6 senators and the CPC's 1 governor, 6 Senators and 21 seats in the House of Representative (Ayoade and Akinsanya, 2011).

The route to this current position began with an alliance proposal between ACN/CPC in the build up to the 2011 general elections. The alliance collapsed due to overriding personal ambitions of the leaders of the two parties, none of whom would concede to the other the presidential candidate's position. With the defeat of the opposition parties at the election and the seemingly deteriorating quality of governance in Nigeria, the leaders of the four major opposition parties came to appreciate the need to down play their ambitions in the collective public interest and therefore merge to become a more formidable force against the ruling party at the 2015 general elections (Lukman 2013; Iredia 2013). The process of painstaking consultations and series of meetings between the opposition parties resulted in a decision on 6th February 2013 to merge. At the inauguration ceremony of the merger committee of the ACN, Chief Tom Ikimi (Mazen 2013 p.1) stated that:

at no time in our national life has radical change become more urgent... We, the following parties – namely ACN, ANPP, CPC and APGA have resolved to merge forth with and become All Progressive Congress and offer to our beleaguered people a recipe for peace and prosperity.... the APC is committed to the principles of internal democracy, focused on serious issues of concern to our people, determined to bring corruption and insecurity to an end, determined to grow our economy and create jobs in their millions through education, housing, agriculture, industrial growth etc and stop increasing mood of despair and hopelessness among our people.

Legally, the first major hurdle towards the merger was for the various parties to organize their conventions to affirm the merger. To achieve this, the ANPP and CPC held their conventions simultaneously on 11th May, 2013 in Gusau, Zamfara state capital to approve the merger with ACN. The two conventions considered and adopted the APC Constitution, manifesto, flag and slogan. The Gusau conventions were actually sequel to the one by the ACN which was held earlier in Lagos on the 18th of April 2013 to ratify the merger. Without a dissenting voice all delegates approved the motion to merge with ANPP, CPC and a faction of APGA (Fadare, 2013; Adamu and Shehu, 2013).

Many Nigerians have reacted enthusiastically to the merger and the prospects it holds for Nigerian democracy and good governance. Ogunyemi (2013) describes the APC as a baby of necessity, “born to salvage the country from the hands of scavengers in the last fourteen years”. Also, the Chairman, Board of Trustees of ANPP, Alhaji Ali Modu Sheriff described the merger as a move to oust PDP from power, which had started and can never be stopped (Adamu, and Shehu, 2013). This optimism must be tempered with caution in evaluating and estimating what the new force portends for the stability of Nigerian political system generally and the dawn of new governance in particular. The APC can potentially create a more credible and focused opposition if it preoccupies itself with articulating concrete and coherent solutions to the multiplicity of those issues touching on the lives of the majority of citizens and indeed that of the country itself.

The ruling party, the PDP’s reactions, not unexpectedly, has been suggestive of political arrogance. The party dismissed the APC declaring that; ‘Nigerians are here confronted with an irony. It is an irony of a national party which without adequate planning, without a solid working rhythm, yet wishes to be entrusted to its effete, the fate of over 160 million Nigerians; the nation, her people and our democracy are all in jeopardy should they be entrusted with power’. A noted exception to this perhaps, was the view expressed by the party’s Board of Trustee’s Chairman, Chief Tony Anenih. According to Lawal (2010, p.40) Anenih is quoted to have declared that they “PDP needed to re-organize itself otherwise the merger will affect the party and therefore cannot be ignored”. Only time would tell which of these views, predictions and trajectories would come to pass.

Following APC’s formal application for registration as a political party on June 7th, 2013 and having met all relevant laid down conditions for a merger, INEC registered the All Progressives Congress as a new political party

on 31st July, 2013 from a merger of the ACN, ANPP and CPC. In relation to the PDP, the newly registered mega opposition party is controlling 11 states against PDP's 23. The APC also have 32 senators to PDP's 72 and 134 members of the House of Representatives to PDP's 214 (Agbese, et al 2013 p.6). In the democratic calculation of the country's electoral politics, the new party appears strongly positioned to challenge the ruling party in the 2015 general election.

As the PDP organizes to confront the challenge to its future even as the 2015 elections approach, the APC must also brace itself against critical issues that would nudge it going forward as a credible opposition party. Ibrahim (2013:1) has captured broadly the challenges confronting opposition parties in Africa which aptly applies to APC rightly thus;

It is extremely difficult for opposition to win presidential elections in Africa. They have to confront the external challenge by incumbent parties that make it difficult for them to operate. They also face the internal challenge of forging unity among the various leaders of the opposition, most of who believe unity should only happen under their tutelage....

The challenges posed by an incumbent party to retain power through brazen attack of the opposition and the lack of unity and cohesion due to inordinate personal ambitions of party elites within the opposition are formidably real. The APC may have partly managed to overcome the latter in a bid to get registered by INEC, but the incumbent party challenge awaits it in the march towards elections in 2015. The incumbent ruling party in Nigeria, the PDP is capable of anything including using repressive tactics – the state apparatus to undermine the APC's desire to remove it from office. The PDP has demonstrated repeatedly that it is intolerant of opposition. To be able to withstand the PDP onslaught, APC must move fast to demonstrate transparency and integrity in its commitment to the future of Nigeria beyond its current leadership so as to win public support as a party different from the PDP. Two ways of doing this are by ensuring internal democracy to facilitate the emergence of popular candidates as a major way of building confidence and earning public trust. This will entail democratizing the party at all levels and making every voice and opinion matter to the degree that party decisions

reflect members' interest. Secondly, current APC leadership must seek to demonstrate convincingly that the merger was not about them to build a power base for access to the State. APC leaders must refrain from hijacking the party through imposition of "unpopular" candidates which may foreclose the chances for more electable candidates (Momodu 2013; Iredia 2013). These are credible, genuine and reassuring ways of institutionalizing the party.

The APC must work hard to move away from the politics of self enrichment and personal promotion to one that recognizes overriding public interest (El Rufai 2013). APC must seek to do things differently especially in encouraging its party men and women at state and local levels in charge of governance to show the distinction in governance outcomes. The Nigerian people are waiting to offer them support once they are convinced that the APC is not just another hoax.

Conclusion

Opposition politics is serious political business in ensuring vertical democratic accountability towards good governance. Therefore a virile political opposition is a key feature of liberal democracy. The opposition checks the actions of a ruling party and criticizes its policies with alternative policy proposals. The opposition questions the use of state funds. For instance the established waste in fuel subsidy payments and National Independent power projects in the last fifteen years is indicative of lack of sustainable development thinking for a country with enormous development challenges like Nigeria. Oil is an exhaustive resource and Nigerian elites spend public money generated by crude oil sales like it will be there forever. The quality of public infrastructure also attests to this. For instance roads are constructed and rehabilitation work starts barely a year after! Development in Nigeria in all ramifications is unsustainable given the waste and malfeasance that is associated with it. At elections therefore, the opposition should offer itself as an alternative ruling party through convincing arguments with alternative solutions to the economy and politics. Sometimes, the ruling party finds an opposition this active irritating and seeks to suppress it.

The history of opposition politics in Nigeria has been a long and thorny journey in the democratic process. As the opposition struggled and found it hard to operate, governance suffered and Nigerians bore the brunt in unemployment, insecurity and poor social service delivery. The opposition had been confronted by party fragmentation, personalistic interests, lack of

cohesion and hazy policy alternatives for the citizens; non institutionalization of the party system, lack of a mass base and inadequate financial resources. To crown these challenges is the intolerance and repressive ruling parties. These sets of factors are both external and internal to the opposition. These factors have combined to diminish the performance of the opposition in the Fourth Republic.

The emergence of the All Progressives Congress represents a hope in the horizon which needs to be jealously guarded to illumine the political firmament and liberate the Nigerian people. The APC attempt promises to deepen democracy. The party must be prepared to offer alternative credible leadership in economy and politics through a demonstration of concrete and pragmatic programmes. The APC must focus on the issues that border Nigerians: security, employment, infrastructure, education, health care and food and corruption. By dealing with these issues, sustainable development would be better achieved. In the build up to the 2015 elections, the opposition must clearly demonstrate firm grasp of these critical issues. APC leaders must demonstrate party unity and coherence as well as a commitment to the principles of internal democracy thereby underplaying the interest of its leaders. By focusing on the collective good, public trust and confidence can be generated to boost the goodwill the APC desperately needs to confront the PDP in the next general elections.

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FOREIGN POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: SHOWING THE WAY, THE TRUTH, AND THE LIFE

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Abstract

Foreign policy efforts to development in Nigeria since Independence have not yielded the desired result. Nigeria since its cradle still grappled with the problem of underdevelopment which has now turned quite malignant. Several foreign policy strategies were devised which raised hopes for development high, and then dashed them to the ground. The one million dollar question here is why? This paper investigated foreign policy, human rights and development in Nigeria. It has an explanatory research design. It collected data from secondary sources, and content analysed them in demystifying the reason why foreign policy has failed to achieve development in Nigeria. With the guidance of Capability theory, it argued that the capabilities of the people are the drivers of development, and that the role of foreign policy in achieving development is complimentary and dependent on the capabilities of the people of Nigeria. It concluded that the overemphasis on foreign policy as an instrument of development is the reason for the persistent underdevelopment in the country. The paper recommends that the Nigerian government should prioritize increasing the capabilities of the citizenry, by ensuring the protection of human rights, in their efforts for development.

Keywords: *foreign policy, human rights, development, underdevelopment, capabilities*

Introduction

The path-to-the-present of the Nigerian foreign policy is undulated. At Independence, it was guided by the Balewa's pro-Western and Afro-centric foreign policy thrust which did nothing special except playing a son to Britain

and a brother to African nations. This thrust manifested as the signing of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact in 1961, prodigally giving Britain access to Nigeria's territoriality for military purposes; and also as the strong support which Nigeria gave for the several liberation struggles in the Southern Africa. Specifically, the pro-Western Nigerian foreign policy stance of the era was palpable even against the avowal to non-alignment by the country in the prevailing cold war between the Eastern and Western power blocs. For instance, Balewa's government granted funds to Western missions in Lagos but bluntly refused accommodation to the Eastern missions, banned communist literature, and rejected scholarship awards from the Eastern bloc (Anifowose and Enemu, 2005; Akinboye, 1999, all in Iganga, n.d.).

Following the developments that attended the Nigeria-Biafra civil war such as the rejection of requests for arms by Nigeria from her father-figure West, Nigeria faced East for help in fighting her secessionist Eastern region. Hence, the Yakubu Gowon's led government lifted the hitherto ban on communist literature, and allowed Eastern bloc's missions in Lagos, the Capital of Nigeria. The appreciation for the assistance by the Eastern bloc to Nigeria *in bellum* would later be rewarded with the contract awarded to Russia's TYAZHPROMEXPORT (TPE) to build the massive Ajaokuta steel in 1970. In this manner, the pendulum of the Country's foreign policy swung to the Eastern bloc under Gowon.

On the 29th July, 1975, the 9 years reign of General Gowon ended in a palace coup carried out while he was in Kampala, Uganda for a conference of the Assembly of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) and ushered in the Murtala/Obasanjo administration. The impulsive Murtala rumbled and roared in the Nigerian foreign policy. It was a golden era with foreign policy achievements that are still unbeaten, within six months. In an extraordinary meeting of the OAU on 11 January, 1976 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Murtala Mohammed chided the letter from the US President, Gerald Ford which expressed reservations on Nigeria's recognition of the Soviet propped MPLA government against the apartheid South Africa backed UNITA in Angola. In his words: "... Africa has come of age. It's no longer under the orbit of any extra continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or to mar..." (Mohammed 1976, para 3). He died some days later in an alleged CIA sponsored coup (Pulse.ng, 2018). The height of the Buhari administration's foreign policy that succeeded the democratically elected

Shehu Shagari's administration is marked with the Umaru Dikko's botched extradition and the ensuing Nigeria-UK diplomatic row.

However, a fundamental shift occurred in the Nigerian foreign policy in the late 1980s with the introduction of the concept of Economic Diplomacy by the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida due to the prevalent economic crisis in the country. The rationale behind the Economic Diplomacy thing is to establish link between the Country's economic needs and her foreign policy (Gabriel, 1988 quoted in Kia, Nwigbo & Ojie, 2016). In this line of thought, Wikipedia Encyclopedia quoted in Ajaebili (2011:279) defines Economic Diplomacy as:

The process through which countries tackle the outside world, to maximize their national gain in all the fields of activity including trade, investment and other forms of economically beneficial exchanges, where they enjoy comparative advantage; it has bilateral, regional and multilateral dimensions, each of which is important.

Going by this definition above, the objectives of the Babangida's Economic Diplomacy foreign policy thrust becomes glaring. It points to the intention to use foreign policy in achieving economic objectives. The Babangida's Economic Diplomacy has to its credit a great deal of unimaginable debt-rescheduling, revitalization of prostrate economy of Nigeria, greater visibility of Nigeria in international organisations, and recognition of the Country's pride of place in Africa (Fawole quoted in Pogson 2011).

Following the hullabaloo of the 1993 Presidential election annulment, General Ibrahim Babangida vacated power for an Interim National Government led by Ernest Shonekan who later was ingloriously ousted from power by General Sani Abacha in a palace coup. The emergence of the General Abacha triggered Nigerian foreign policy to hit its all-time low, no thanks to the "Area Boy Diplomacy" of the regime.

Under this period, the domestic environment witnessed a great deal of instability, conflicts, demonstrations, politically motivated killings, and bombings as well as the aggressive attempt to consolidate power. This culminated in the killing of nine Ogoni Citizens in the Niger Delta alongside an international environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa and subsequent

expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations. Nigeria's foreign policy lost focus and attracted series of face-offs, strains, and blunders which qualified her "a pariah state" (Kia, Nwigbo and Ojie, 2011:29).

This lacklustre image of Nigeria was what Chief Olusegun Obasanjo inherited in his second coming to power, when he was democratically elected the President in May 1999. There was indeed the obvious need to whiten the besmeared foreign policy garment that the Country was wearing. President Obasanjo in this regard, engaged in record-level globe-trotting in what has come to be known as Shuttle Diplomacy. The administration recorded immense success in the Country's image laundering as epitomized with the wide array of bilateral relations with different countries of the world including the emerging economic powers such as India and China. The historic debt relief that absolved Nigeria from \$30 billion out of her \$37 billion external debt, by London and Paris Clubs remains a *locus in quo* in the success of the administration.

These successes midwived the Yar'Adu/Jonathan administration. It was hoped that the maiden civilian to civilian transition would consolidate on the gains made by the predecessor in foreign relations; the administration rather started on a lower note and continued to lower. Agbese (2009) quoted in Iganga (n.d.) in this regard regretted that Nigeria's shrinking to voiceless irrelevance among nations especially as the Country's presence was missing, and its voice unheard in the meeting of the world leaders in New York in 2009. The administration however launched the Citizen Diplomacy foreign policy thrust in which it sought to guarantee the welfare and security of Nigerians at home and abroad in the pursuit of national interests. Under the umbrella of Citizen Diplomacy, Nigerian government aspired to cater for the basic needs, human rights and socio-economic welfare of its citizens in her bilateral and multilateral engagements. A little life was given Nigerian foreign policy when President Goodluck Jonathan took over the presidency following the death of his boss, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. He promoted a portmanteau of Economic and Citizen Diplomacy which informed the tit-for-tat response by the Nigerian government against the deportation of Nigerians travelling to South Africa in 2012 on the frivolous accounts of faked Yellow Fever vaccination cards. Pretoria tendered her unreserved apologies.

The succeeding Muhammadu Buhari's administration emerged in 2015 with no apparent foreign policy thrust. As a matter of fact, it took the administration some six months to appoint the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This appeared to mean either the prioritization of or sheer confusion in, the conduct of foreign policy in Nigeria. Within the period in question, President Buhari spent over a quarter of his first 100 days in office abroad drumming support with little or no success, from the neighbouring African countries in the fight against terrorism. The administration romanced the West for security assistance and courted the East for economic advancement, but in those relations, President Buhari could hardly look his hosts in the face and make demands as a sovereign nation. "For now, the truth is bitter," Stears Business (2017, para. 21) wrote "in areas that can be measured and evaluated, Nigeria's voice has so far been muted on the world stage. Africa desperately needs it to be heard again."

These assortment of foreign policy trajectories by Nigerian leaders since independence have a common nature which is the pursuit of Nigeria's national interest, socio-economic and political development inclusive; but yet, Nigeria remained underdeveloped. The one million dollar question remains *why?* This study against this background investigates foreign policy, human rights and development in Nigeria with a view to understanding the reasons why development has eluded Nigeria despite the foreign policy efforts.

Statement of the Research Problem

Foreign policy efforts for development in Nigeria has not yielded the desired results since Independence. Nigeria still flaunted the characteristics of underdevelopment such as high rates of poverty, unemployment, and population; and low levels of income per capita, standard of living, basic infrastructure, and literacy. This is corroborated by Ubi and Akinkuotu (2014) that Nigeria's foreign policy still leaves more to be desired in achieving development in Nigeria and they recommended that for Nigeria to achieve development:

...its foreign policy and international economic relations should be designed to fashion a set of strategies and tactics that will take into consideration both implicit and explicit bargaining processes in order to effect fundamental changes both at the domestic level and within the international system (Ubi and Akinkuotu, 2014:432).

They also recommended a citizen-centred foreign policy which will aim at creating benefits for the betterment of the people. These recommendations justifies the fact that development in Nigeria is still elusive.

In a similar view, Aribisala (2018) pointed out indicators of underdevelopment in Nigeria such as the Country's debtor status and economic dependence, and blamed failure of leadership and stagnated foreign policy in the Country for the problems. It recommended that Nigeria should "...invest in Nigerians and then use our foreign policy to promote the country, (Aribisala 2018: para. 15). In his own position about the status of Nigeria's development, Eneh (2011) regretted that Nigeria is still underdeveloped even as the second largest exporter of crude oil in Africa, and the sixth in the world to the extent that today, Nigeria has been surpassed in development by the mid-90s by some other developing countries that were inferior to the Country in the 1960s such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Venezuela, and blamed mismanagement and corruption for the problem.

The scholars on this subject agreed generally that Nigeria is underdeveloped. Ubi and Akinkuotu (2014) as well as Aribisala (2018) attributed the reason for the lack of development in Nigeria to the utter disregard of the citizenry in the foreign policy matrix. This is obvious in their recommendations that promoted government's attention to the hoi polloi. They however failed to say in declarative terms what form of attention they would want the government to give the people in the conduct of foreign policy. In this manner, the recommendations appear quite nebulous and inchoate especially as the foreign policy of Nigeria between 2007 and 2015 was largely centred on Citizen Diplomacy. This constitutes a gap that this study will fill by investigating the gains in development from foreign policy in *pari passu* with the gains of increasing the capabilities of the citizenry through the promotion and protection of the fundamental human rights of Nigerians.

This study will therefore will be of great importance to the Nigerian government led by President Muhammadu Buhari which is still finding its bearing on the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy especially, its dimensions on development. It will also enrich the extant literature on foreign policy and development which until now is yet to be its best.

Conceptual Discussions

Foreign policy:

The concept of foreign policy has been approached from different perspectives. According to Alamai, Dung, Zoaka & Sadiq (2017:94), foreign policy connotes “a course of action or principles adopted by a nation's government to define its relation with other countries or groups of countries.” This definition presents foreign policy of a nation as a compass for navigating the waters of international relations; as a predesigned manner of behaviour in the international arena. In most cases, the course of actions that guides the relations of a nation with other nations are products of national interests. In other words, the course of actions are suggested by the national interests, and they are implemented for national interests. This truism informed the position by Hartman in Avutor (2001:1), which believes foreign policy to mean “the systematic statement of deliberately selected national interests and actions which the officials of a state take in relation to other states.” There is no gainsaying therefore that foreign policy maintains strong link with national interests; this explains why it is largely predesigned. The two definitions above however can best be seen as the traditional notion of foreign policy. In the globalized world today, the definitions cannot pass a validity test as it centralizes the role of states in foreign policy. The prevailing argument posits that state is just a part of the tapestry of foreign policy world. If foreign policy can be taken to mean a plan of action by states in their relations with other states, where is the place of international organisations such the European Union (EU) and Amnesty International which also engage in foreign relations? This error of the traditional definitions of foreign policy is what Hill (2003:6, 3) avoided in defining foreign policy as the “sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in the international relations.” The definition duly recognized the prominence of state in foreign relations but not its misconstrued monopoly, given that “an independent actor” phrase in the definition captures every other entities in the international arena.

Human Rights

The concept of human rights does not pretend about its nature that it is exclusively for human beings. This fact is nuanced in the definition of human rights by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights which defined human rights as those rights inherent to the human being (OHCHR, n.d). Rights in this instance means entitlements, and in this case, entitlements to human beings. The United Nations agency further clarified that human rights are rights that every human being has by virtue of his or her

human dignity (OHCHR, 2016). This definition points to the relationship between human rights and human dignity in which there cannot be the latter without the former. The importance of human rights to human dignity is hinged on the fact that without human rights, life will not be worth living. The range of the entitlements to human beings which are known as human rights are pillars of dignified human existence. Following from this position, human rights can safely be seen as a range of entitlements for a dignified human existence. These range of entitlements pertain to all aspects of life, spanning civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the collective rights of peoples. Examples of human rights are:

In the area of civil and political rights

- Right to life
- Freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
- Freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour
- Right to liberty and security of person
- Right of detained persons to be treated with humanity
- Freedom of movement
- Right to a fair trial
- Prohibition of retroactive criminal laws
- Right to recognition as a person before the law
- Right to privacy
- Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
- Freedom of opinion and expression
- Prohibition of propaganda for war and of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred
- Freedom of assembly
- Freedom of association
- Right to marry and found a family
- Right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, vote, be elected and have access to public office

In the area of economic, social and cultural rights

4. Right to work
5. Right to just and favourable conditions of work
6. Right to form and join trade unions

7. Right to social security
8. Protection of the family
9. Right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing
10. Right to health
11. Right to education

In the area of collective rights

- Right of peoples to:
 - Self-determination
 - Development
 - Free use of their wealth and natural resources
 - Peace
 - A healthy environment
- Other collective rights:
 - Rights of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities
 - Rights of indigenous peoples (OHCHR, 2016:20 – 21).

These sets of human rights are listed in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted in December 10, 1948 as the first international document of human rights. The instruments of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were later adopted to give the glossary of rights in the UDHR legal teeth.

Development

The concept of development has a muddle of dimensions which is further obfuscated by a litany of definitions of the concept. In some instances, development is painted a process while in another, it is depicted as a condition but in the whole, development is seen as a positive or desirable change. In line with this thought, Rostow (1971) believes development to mean a process of evolutionary succession in stages, where human societies leave a rudimentary model until they arrive at a western industrialized civilization consumption model, which is considered unique and universal. By this definition, Walter Rostow argued development not just as a process but also a condition; to the Third World countries, development is a process while to the Western countries, it is a condition. He outlined the stages of development which are:

traditional society, precondition for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and age of high mass consumption. Each of the succeeding stage represents a development over the preceding stage, hence, the reason why the path to development as well as development itself passed as development. Ribeiro (2005:11) approached the definition of development, just like Rostow (1971), comprehensively. It promoted development as both a process and a condition, and also a little more. In his words, development is “a state, process, well-being, progress, economic and human growth or ecological balance”. This definition ingeniously mixed the variegated dimensions and meanings of development, but it is lacking in details.

In his *magnum opus*, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Walter Rodney reduced the multi-dimensions of development to levels – the individual and social group levels (Rodney 1973). He defined development at the individual level as improved skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being; while at the social group level, it implies the increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships. It is quite observable from the twin definitions by Rodney (1973) that development at the individual level is *sine-qua-non* to the development at the social level. This represents the crux of the people-centred perspective of development which is based on the notion that development involves empowering groups and individuals to make their own choices; that individuals and social movements are the agents of change (hubcymru.org, n.d). From the dimensions, meanings and perspectives of development, several types of development have become possible as below:

- ***Economic development***: i.e., improvement of the way endowments and goods and services are used within (or by) the system to generate new goods and services in order to provide additional consumption and/or investment possibilities to the members of the system.
- ***Human development***: people-centred development, where the focus is put on the improvement of the various dimensions affecting the well-being of individuals and their relationships with the society (health, education, entitlements, capabilities, empowerment etc.)
- ***Sustainable development***: development which considers the long term perspectives of the socio-economic system, to ensure that improvements occurring in the short term will not be detrimental to the future status or development potential of the system, i.e. development

will be “sustainable” on environmental, social, financial and other grounds.

- ***Territorial development***: development of a specific region (space) achievable by exploiting the specific socio-economic, environmental and institutional potential of the area, and its relationships with external subjects (Bellu, 2011:3).

To be added in this list also is ***Political Development*** which was formerly the attributes of English and American liberal constitutional democracy (Parkenham, 1973) such rationalization, national integration, democratization, participation; but today, as whatever strengthens governmental institutions, measured by adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of government institutions (Huntington, 1965).

Theoretical Foundations

This study is founded on the capability approach by the Indian philosopher and economist, Amartya Sen, and later Martha Nussbaum. This framework of analysis is a normative, human development inclined approach for the evaluation of policies, and development in a society with its focal point on individual well-being. The theory drew largely from classical political philosophy of Aristotle, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, and Karl Marx who placed high premium on human well-being in their respective works. The capability approach is used in a wide range of fields, most prominently in development thinking, welfare economics, social policy and political philosophy (Robeyns, 2003).

The theory in repudiation of the utilitarianism (happiness, desire-fulfilment or choice) and resourcism (income, commodities, assets), promotes human functioning and capabilities in which Sen argued that in social evaluations and policy design, the focus should be on what people are able to do and be, on the quality of their life, and on removing obstacles in their lives so that they have more freedom to live the kind of life which, upon reflection, they find valuable:

“The capability approach to a person’s advantage is concerned with evaluating it in terms of his or her actual ability to achieve various valuable functionings as a part of living. The corresponding approach to social advantage – for aggregative appraisal as well as for the choice of institutions and policy – takes the set of individual capabilities as

constituting an indispensable and central part of the relevant informational base of such evaluation” (Sen 1993: 30).

The theory used two central concepts: functioning, and capabilities to drive home its thesis. The concept of functioning is seen basically as the “being” and the “doing” of a person. This concept of functioning is distinguished from the concept of capabilities which are “the various combinations of functionings that a person can achieve. Capabilities are thus a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another” (Sen 1992). A person’s functionings and her capabilities are closely related but distinct. Succinctly put, functioning is the achievement while capabilities are the abilities to achieve.

The Capability theory seeks to address what can best be called the errors of the contemporary approaches to the evaluation of well-being. Some of the errors include:

1. *Focus on the means instead of the abilities:* This error in the contemporary approaches resulted from the failure to recognize differences in the abilities of individuals to convert the same into valuable functionings. There are for example specific goods that the physically challenged persons can convert to achieve mobility, and which the pregnant women cannot convert to achieve their nutritional needs. Sen argues that focus on the means instead of the abilities is insufficient.
2. *Insensitivity to the relationship between functionings and capabilities:* This error emerges from evaluating functionings (“beings” and “doings”) in isolation of capabilities (effective freedom). There is no doubt for instance that the nutritional state (functionings) of people starving is the same with that of people fasting; but that cannot be said of their effective freedom (capabilities) to choose to eat. Therefore, any evaluation which is not sensitive to both actual achievements (‘functionings’) and effective freedom (‘capabilities’) is misleading.
3. *Evaluating the available that was made the desirable:* This error is a fallout from adaptation and contentment in which people accept the available as the desirable. According to Wells (n.d.), people can internalize the harshness of their circumstances so that they do not

desire what they can never expect to achieve. This is the phenomenon of ‘adaptive preferences’ in which people who are objectively very sick may, for example, still declare, and believe, that their health is fine. Therefore, evaluation that focuses only on subjective mental metrics is insufficient without considering whether that matches with what a neutral observer would perceive as their objective circumstances.

4. *Overlooking the complexity of reality:* Capability theory regrets that the contemporary approaches to the evaluation of well-being uses shortcut by excluding all sorts of information from consideration in advance. Capability theory considers it erroneous that happiness should be the only aspect that matters in measuring people’s well-being; it therefore clamours for open-minded evaluation. This has earned the theory the criticism of under-theorization in which it is accused of being less than a theory by failing to provide its own yardstick for measurement.

Sen believes development to mean capabilities expansion but however, did not dismiss analysis of resources as useless.

It should be clear that we have tended to judge development by the expansion of substantive human freedoms – not just by economic growth (for example, of the gross national product), or technical progress, or social modernization. This is not to deny, in any way, that advances in the latter fields can be very important, depending on circumstances, as ‘instruments’ for the enhancement of human freedom. But they have to be appraised precisely in that light – in terms of their actual effectiveness in enriching the lives and liberties of people – rather than taking them to be valuable in themselves (Drèze and Sen 2002: 3).

This conception of development is in consonance with Walter Rodney’s meaning of development at the individual level which says that it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being (Rodney, 1973). These positions see development as human-centered. This motivated Martha Nussbaum to develop the underlisted Central Human Capabilities which governments must seek to expand for development in their policies and programmes.

Nussbaum's list of The Central Human Capabilities (Reproduced from *Creating Capabilities* 2011, 33-4)

1. *Life*. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. *Bodily Health*. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. *Bodily Integrity*. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
4. *Senses, Imagination, and Thought*. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. *Emotions*. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6. *Practical Reason*. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. *Affiliation*.
 - A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)

- B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.
8. *Other Species*. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
 9. *Play*. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
 10. *Control Over One's Environment*.
 - A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.
 - B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason, and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

The Capability theory is relevant in analysing the topic: foreign policy, human rights and development in Nigeria especially as it concerns its position that development is all about expansion of human capabilities (well-being). This theory shows that everything that limits human capabilities, as seen in Nussbaum (2011) above, is antithetical to development. It advises that policies and programmes of government (foreign policies inclusive) should be geared towards promoting the capabilities of the citizenry; i.e., promoting everything that development at the individual level stands for which are: increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being (Rodney, 1973).

Foreign Policy, Human Rights and Development in Nigeria: the Way, the Truth, and the Life

It is quite verifiable that foreign policy is a veritable way of achieving development but the truth remains that it must have to be human-centred in order to be effective. Since Independence, Nigeria has wanted the life called development; the country has followed foreign policy as a way to the life but has generally ignored the truth by the gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the citizenry.

A decisive step in using foreign policy as an instrument of development occurred in 1980s with the foreign policy thrust called economic diplomacy under Ibrahim Babangida's regime. Previous efforts in development through foreign policy had no monolithic interest on development, and worst still, were not human-centred. The foreign policy thrust of economic diplomacy was blighted not just by the fact of being associated with militarism (an aberration in politics) but also because its architect, General Babangida has the worst human rights record in Nigeria (NBA, 2010). The regime annulled the 1993 presidential election and opened the floodgate of the crisis that included the Abacha's palace coup in November, 1993, and the eventual public execution of the Ogoni Nine, and others. Human Right's Library (n.d) captures the situation thus:

Although human rights violations in Nigeria have been commonplace under military rule, 1993 was a particularly challenging year for Nigerian human rights groups. Former President General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the results of a presidential election, which would have brought the country back to civilian rule, and installed an interim government. In mid-November, Defense Minister General Sani Abacha forced the interim government to resign, effectively staging the seventh coup d'etat since Nigeria's independence. The regime banned all political meetings and associations. No timetable was set for the return to civilian rule (para 1).

More so, the regime's economic diplomacy featured the notorious Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was implemented with harsh IMF conditionalities in utter disregard of the well-being of the Nigerian people (Salami, 2013).

The return of democracy in 1999 failed to improve the human rights violations in the country. This was against expectations and predictions. Anyigor (2000) revealed this fact when he said that in a good will message at the Senate public hearing on the state of the human rights promotion and protection in Nigeria, Chairman of the Centre for Free Speech, Lagos, Mr. Richard Akinnola ran a comparison on the situations during late dictator, Sani Abacha's government and those of Obasanjo and concluded that there was no much difference between the two. A case in point was the Odi tragedy of November 20, 1999 in which combined military personnel stormed Odi town

and left in its trail a massive loss of lives and property. The late former Senate President, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo, who led a delegation of the Nigerian Senate to the area, expressed shock, and said "...there is nothing to say, as there is nobody to speak with" (The Guardian on Saturday, December 4, 1999, p.17.). The human rights situation posed a serious challenge against the administration's shuttle diplomacy foreign policy thrust. Under the foreign policy thrust, the nation and its leadership enjoyed accommodation and tolerance by the international community but the ordinary citizens are often made to suffer personality depredation, inhumane treatments and abuse of fundamental human rights at embassies and off-shore. There was no change due to the utter disregard of human well-being by the foreign policy thrusts.

The citizenship diplomacy foreign policy thrust of President Goodluck Jonathan which had focus on the citizenry failed to bring about development as it was largely a tit-for-tat foreign policy thrust. In this manner, it is a parody of human-centred foreign policy thrust which was in its best reactionary to ill-treatments against Nigerians in diaspora, and in its worst, lacked measures to improve the rights and capabilities of Nigerians at home. A very good instance was the March, 2012 diplomatic row in which Nigeria deported 28 South Africans under the pretext of invalid documentation, obviously in retaliation of Pretoria's deportation of 125 Nigerians from OR Tambo International Airport over allegations of possession of fraudulent yellow fever vaccine certificates. This instance represents a case where the foreign policy thrust followed the result instead of the causes which include the unwholesome human rights standings in Nigeria.

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the discussions above, it is quite understandable that foreign policy could be an instrument of development but it must have to be used to address issues of human well-being. No nation can develop without improving the *capabilities* and *functionings* of her citizenry, and that has been the problem of the litany of foreign policy thrusts in Nigeria. They have followed different angles of interest except that of human development. This study therefore recommends that Nigeria should rethink her foreign policy thrusts to focus on the improvement of human *capabilities* and *functionings*, and by extension, the human rights of her citizenry. This is based on the fact that human beings are the drivers of development.

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THE ROLE OF WAR IN THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS: THE UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE

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Abstract

Man is a political animal so Aristotle informs, therefore, he must necessarily engage in activities including war and institutions building that secures his environment from competitions and ensure the well-being of his immediate community. One of the causal factors of war is that it is inherent in the nation-states systems which suggest that it is a basic part of the Westphalia structure that the modern world inherited. As long as there are interest to be pursued by states in the international arena who differ in various complex ways, to that extent will they resort to war to achieve their objectives no matter how other states rationalizes their behaviour. Thus, the emergence of global institutions especially the United Nations owes its existence to war- The 2nd World War. Before it was the League of Nations (1919-1939), another institutions borne out of the 1st world war. UN has in the last 73 years (1945-2018) evolved into an octopus with so many sub-institutions (IMF, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, WB, etc) that addresses specific issues of human well-being. The article relied on secondary sources for materials and found out that but for the 2nd World War, the UN as presently constituted would have been difficult to bring out. The article recommends that the UN should not shirk its responsibility of ensuring peace and security in the world in consonance with its charter, even if preventing conventional wars proves impossible to achieve.

Keywords: War, Institutions, Role, United Nations, Emergence.

Introduction

One of the cardinal themes that have remained irrevocably pivotal in the pursuit of national interests between and among nation-states in the global milieu is qua the instrumentality of war. Back in time man had engaged in warfare to secure his environment against other rivals and to hunt for predators for survival.

When the 2nd World War broke out in 1939, little did the world realize that it will lead to the emergence of a supra-national organization known as the United Nations (UN) from the ashes of that war in 1945. Today, the UN has become an institutional behemoth that has touched and still does, the lives of humanity in all facets of existence. For instance, in education, science and culture, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) holds sway, in health, World Health Organisation (WHO) is called to service, in agriculture, Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) comes to the rescue, in financial cum economic issues, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank lends a helping hand, in peacekeeping, the United Nations Peace Operation, (UNPO) is always deployed, on refugee matters, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees provides succor, to mention but a few.

More importantly, of the six major organs of the UN only the Security Council is saddled with the responsibility of maintaining world peace and security, including the declaration of war against a belligerent country anywhere in the world as exemplified in the Gulf War of 1991 when the UN resolved to chase Iraq out of Kuwait. This role is achieved by the five permanent members namely, Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States of America.

Ever since its (UN) inception 73 years ago, no global war of the magnitude of the 1st and 2nd World Wars has been waged, thus lending credence to the relevance of the organization and the fact that it was war that brought into being.

It has however failed to prevent limited wars such as Algerian war of Independence, Nigerian Civil war, Vietnam War, Afghan War, Ethiopian-Eritrean War, Isrealite-Arab Wars, British-Argentine War, among others.

Reflecting on the role of war in man's progress, Shotwell (1929) stated:

“War... has been the instrument by which most of the great facts of political national history have been established and maintained. It has played a dominant role in nearly all political crisis, it has been used to achieve liberty to secure democracy and to attempt to make it secure against the menace of its use by other hands. The map of the world today has been largely determined upon the battle field. The maintenance of civilization itself has been, and still continues to be

underwritten by the insurance of army, navy (airforce) ready to strike at anytime where danger threatens. Thus, even in peace, the war system has to a large degree determined not only international relationships but the character and history of the nations themselves.

Again, arguing on the attitude of America before its entry into the 2nd World War, Ambrose (1984) contended that, it was odd that a nation that had come into existence through a victorious war, gained large portions of its territory through war, established its industrial revolution and national unity through a bloody civil war, and won a colonial empire through war, could believe that war profited no one....

This article will therefore be approached in four segments. One will offer an abstract (already done) and introduction while segment two will operationalise the key concepts imbedded in the topic as well as enunciate the theoretical compass. Segment three will discuss the UN, its structure and some agencies while segment four will highlight the major findings, conclude and make some recommendations.

Operationalization of Key Concepts

Below we provide the operational definitions of institutions, role and war as a way of easing understanding and illuminating the objective of this article.

Institution

An institution is an enduring and stable set of arrangements that regulates individual and/or group behaviour on the basis of established rules and procedures. Political institutions have a formal and often legal character, employ explicit and usually enforceable rules and decision-making procedures and are typically part of the machinery of the state. For this reason political institutions have been defined as the rules of the game (Heywood, 2011: 93). Institutions are political actors, independent from and capable of influencing wider social, economic and cultural forces. The UN as an institution, addresses issues with social, economic and cultural perspectives using its various agencies.

Role

A role is a patterned sequence of action situation and explains why peoples various behaviour in their interactions with others are influenced by the position they occupy in society, and vary as they interact with different persons. Each social role is a universe of right, duties, expectations, norms and behaviour a person has to face and to fulfill (Turner, 1979).

To Merton (1957), role is a complement of relationship in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status. Biddle (1986) conceptualizes role as a set of expectations that society places on an individual while Mead (1934) posited that role is not fixed or prescribed but something that is constantly negotiated between individuals in a tentative, creative way.

Role complementarily occurs when the behaviours and expectations of people (individuals, groups, community, organizations, etc) in inter or intra-personal systems are harmonious when the role of a partner is carried out with ease and in an expected way. But if on the contrary, the section of community feels neglected or not carried along in the retaining of the community, role conflict may occur which are the difficulties that people experience in performing their roles or incompatible expectations (Osadebe, 2014:217).

Role is therefore a position assigned to individuals or groups without regard for merit but because of certain traits beyond their control and is usually forced upon a person. An institution (UN) is in effect, a number of interrelated roles (Nation-States). One can still talk about individual behaviour but now it is in terms of roles (agencies of UN) which in turn are the basic components of institutions (Isaak, 1975:200).

Synthesized from the above views, roles are in part dictated by social structure and in part by social interactions which guide the behaviour of the individual. The individual in turn influences the norms, expectations and behaviours associated with roles. The UN and its agencies are profoundly influenced by the roles which they perform in various fields of human Endeavour's and these are projected to enhance world peace and security. The experience of the 2nd World War brought this truism to bear on humanity.

War

One of the most surprising facts about war- an institution that has dominated so much of human history- is that there is still no widely accepted definition of the concept. This complexity in operational sing the term stems from what Wright (1942) referred to as the specialized definitions which have

been elaborated for professional purposes by lawyers, diplomats and soldiers, and for scientific discussion by sociologists and psychologists.

Thus, various scholars define war to satisfy their own perception of the concept which essentially reflects any scenario that is conflictual between two or more entities. For instance, World War, Civil War, Cold War, Revolutionary War, Guerrilla War, Psychological War, etc are some of the nomenclatural meanings attached to war. The difficulty notwithstanding, some analysts have offered germane and utilitarian definitions of the term. According to Plano and Otton (1961: 77) war is,

“Hostilities between states or within a state or territory undertaken by means of armed force. A state of war exists in the legal sense when two or more states declare officially that a condition of hostilities exists between them. Beyond this, international jurists disagree as to the kinds of conditions, intentions or actions that constitute war by legal definition. De facto war exists however, whenever an organized group undertakes the use of force against another group”

Clausewitz (1911) states that war is an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will.... War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means. Similarly, Mao Tse-tung (1985) posited that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.

War is therefore a question of political attitude and subject to all the vagaries of time and place. Wars have then fought and will still be waged because it is one of the effective instruments for achieving the objectives of states. It may be regarded as evil, a curse on mankind, condemned as destructive and immoral but the fact is that war has all too often been useful.

Theoretical Framework

Two theoretical frameworks are considered useful for this article and these are the realist and the interdependency theories. While the realist perspective resonates with the dynamics of the 2nd World War, the aftermath of which is the UN- is anchored on the interdependency orientation. We examine both theoretical strands below:

The Realist Theory

The main thrust of the realist (Morgenthau, 1973, Kissinger, 1973, Sprout and Sprout, 1962, etc) is that nation-states are the primary actors in the international systems. They argued that the relationship between foreign policy and maintaining relations with other states is intricately linked to the preservation of national security. Put differently, national interest as determined by nation- state, influences the behavioural pattern outside their environment. No matter how big or small a country is, its first reaction to any issue impinging on its well-beings, immediately or remotely is self-preservation, irrespective of what countries think or does. Thus, nation-states levy wars against another without qualms as to the consequences on each other.

A strong attribute of the realist theory is the power element which asserts that a realistic look at human nature and politics is only understandable in terms of a national struggle for power. Power is loosely conceptualized as psychological relationship in which one actor is able to control the behavior of another actor (Coulombis and Wolfe, 1986:6). Morgenthau (1973:27) a strong advocate of the realist theory contends that

“international politics like all political is a struggle for power whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal..... but whenever they strive to realize their goals by means of international politics they do so by striving for power”.

Stressing this notion further, Morgenthau maintained that once the realist paradigm is understood, international relations begin to make sense. Fundamentally, he claimed that there are only three foreign policy courses open to states:

- a. Struggle to maintain power.
- b. Increase power.
- c. Demonstrate power.

This means that states will support the status quo in an attempt to retain the power they already wield, they will endeavour to expand their power capabilities or they will try to bluff for prestige or other purposes in an effort to exert influences. For instance, the behavior of Nazi Germany in precipitating the 2nd World war in 1939 and the Iraqis unprovoked invasion of Kuwait in 1990 exemplifies this realist perspective.

Thus, power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man and it covers all social relationships which serve that end from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.

Also supporting the realist orientation but with a modified tract is Kissinger (1973) whose argument is to the effect that:

“Military power is a purposive functional thing- One of the many instruments in the orchestra of power which states utilize at the appropriate moment in the pursuit of their respective policy objectives or national interest”.

From the above, it is clear that Kissinger recognizes the fact that Military power alone does not solve international disputes but can be more useful if deployed in conjunction with other elements such as diplomacy, propaganda, economic leverages, sanction, and threat, among others.

Aligning their views with the foregoing Sprout and Sprout (1962) asserted that power has so many parts of which none should be neglected in international relationships. Attributes such as populations, natural resources, geography, national character, ideology, leadership, morale, technology and above all. Military strength are relevant in national power calculations.

There are some flaws inherent in the reliance on the realist theory in the explication of international phenomena. One is the difficulty in drawing a line between what one country considers its national interest vis-à-vis other country's national interests. Such lack of clear distinction results in overlapping of interests and in some cases leading to wars. In this era of globalization, relying only on the realist approach in solving international disputes is patently unhelpful, for as Shaw (1952:145), aptly put it, “ the realist orientation lacks profundity”. It is precisely for those flaws in the realist strand that this article employed the interdependency approach as a supportive tool of analysis.

Interdependency Theory

The interdependency theory is one of our instruments of analysis in this article in view of the fact that international organizations (UN) and regimes are resoundingly a reflection of the synergies of countries in the global arena.

Essentially, the Kernel of the interdependency approach is that in a world made up of multifarious political systems liable to constant processes of change, it will be beneficial to adopt mutual and multilateral recourse to events. Such they believe will eliminate war and render the use of military power to settle disputes between states in the international system obsolete and unedifying.

Interdependency is also the debate that because nations of the global system have become mutually vulnerable through an interrelationship of socio-economic and technological issues (low politics) --- energy, poverty, overpopulation, ecology, food supplies, human rights, monetary exchanges – their future behaviour will be oriented toward long collaboration rather than the old balance of power security through the use of force mentality (high politics issues). In short, the maxim of we will be all loss or gain together than his gain is my loss (Spanier, 1981:596). Russett and Starr (1985:506) encapsulated this scenario thus:

“ States act to achieve their goals and interests both singly and in groups. As the world has become more tightly linked through various interdependencies-including transnational linkage as well as the traditional intergovernmental interaction- states have found themselves grouped together in various regional groupings that are economic, political, and military in nature.”

Furthermore, the traditional notion of individual states seeking their own special or national interest is now counter –productive in a world where states are enmeshed in many different kinds of groups (UN and its Agencies, NATO, OPEC, AU, ASEAN, ANZUS, OAS, ECOWAS, SADC, etc). Interdependence is infact a quality of all systems for instead of looking at one state and the foreign policy processes that go on within it, we look at the system of states and other international actors and the various networks of relationship among them. This includes, the various distributions or

hierarchies of attributes such as how is wealth or military capabilities distributed among all the states? Interdependence emphasizes the links that may affect the opportunities of states and the willingness to act.

There is another view represented by Keohane and Nye (1977) that points to interdependence as a possible, and very important source of conflict. Interdependencies especially, if they are lopsided, making one partly much more dependent than the other can also generate frustration and anger as states hopelessly wish for past times when they were not inextricably yoked with others and when they had greater freedom of action (Brexit, Mauritians and Morocco's exits from ECOWAS and AU respectively). It is therefore important to remember that interdependence means only that what goes on within one state will have important consequences for the other international actors in the system. This can occur with or without increased cooperation. Accordingly, interdependency has two different dimensions as follows:

1. Firstly, nations are sensitive to developments in other nations. The degree of sensitivity depends on how quickly changes in one country bring about changes and how great the effects are.
2. Secondly, states vulnerability may be measured as the cost imposed on a state by external events, even if the state tries to avoid those costs.

It is along this trajectory that Spanier (1981:551) argued that the Oil politics of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 was due to the Arab – Israeli conflict (Yom Kippur War), gave credence to interdependency as a veritable tool of analysis in international relations.

In fact, every state's action have an impact on all other states, implying that interdependence is mutual vulnerability. It is indeed a sort of halfway house between the anarchy of the contemporary system and the promise of a world system in the future....greater cooperation rather than conflict, less emphasis on violent resolution of conflict, more emphasis on joint solutions peacefully arrived at – to become common (Brown, 1972). But interdependence will increasingly bind all states together, put them in its web and make their individual security and especially economic fortunes dependent on one another (Spanier, 1981:551).

Having examined the two, theoretical orientations used in this article, it is our candid submission that none is mutually exclusive in terms of relevance, rather they both reinforce each other to determine the emergence of the UN after the 2nd World War, for as Al-Mashal

(1985:14)stated, national security is more than territorial defence and should focus on the physical, social and psychological quality of life of a society and its members, both in the domestic setting and within the larger regional and global systems:

The Emergence of the UN

The irreparable loss of life and property caused by the 1st World War compelled the statesmen of the world them to put their heads together during the 2nd World War to thrash out schemes and chalk out plans to form an international organization which eventually became the UN on October, 24th, 1945 with the following preamble:

“We the peoples of the United Nations Determined to serve succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind and And for Ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods that armed forces shall not be used save in the common interest and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, Have Resolved to combine Our Effort to Accomplish These Aims....Have agreed to the present charter of the UN and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the UN”. (UN, 1968:553- 574).

Thus, with those declarations the UN became a recurrent decimal in international relations, for as Claude (1964:158) poignantly observed; the charter was the product of past experiences in the building and operations of international institutions, wartime planning, great power and particularly American leadership, intensive negotiation amid an intricate pattern of national disagreements and conflicts of interest and popular pressure for realization of desperate demand and visible aspiration for a just and durable peace.

The UN was therefore born out of a universal desire for a better approach in arbitrating international conflict and negotiating peace after the 2nd World War. The organizations in addition aim to develop friendly relations

among nations, achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of economic, social and humanitarian nature, as well as serving as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of the objectives of the UN. Indeed, the complexity of global security threats compelled the UN to seek solutions to issues, conflicts and crisis in a peaceful manner than was provided for by the League of Nations in 1919. Plano and Olton (1975) supported this view when they stated:

“the UN as an international organizations with formal arrangements transcending national boundaries provided for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social and related fields”.

Reflecting on the promotion of international economic and social cooperation as well as on respect for human rights for all peoples, etc, Saliu and Aremu (2013:118) contended that this welfare function is considered equally important because a reasonable level of economic well-being could as will be necessary to ensure durable peace in the international system.

The Structure and Processes of the UN

An overview of the structures and processes of the UN will help to clarify its goals and objectives in this article.

The General Assembly

The general Assembly is the main body all members irrespective of size who have ratified the charter. Following the principle of one government, one vote, the Assembly passes resolutions dealing with the self-determination of nation-states, the new economic order, and wide array of other vital issues of global concern. In its elective role the Assembly collaborates with the Security Council to select the secretary General and the Judges of the International Court of Justice. Finally, approval of the United Nations budget is contingent upon favourable action by the Assembly.

The Security Council

The fifteen members of the Security Council have the authority under the charter both to formulate and to implement policy. To take action on important questions, the five permanent members – China, France, Great

Britain, Russia and the United States of America must concur and be supported by at least four of the ten nonpermanent members, whom the General Assembly elect for two-years terms. Should one of the permanent Members cast a negative vote (veto), no decision is possible. The Security Council may set in motion the machinery of collection security, impose economic sanctions, or authorize the deployment of peacekeeping force in such troubled areas as Congo DR, Cyprus, Lebanon, Haiti, Kashmir, East Timor, Sudan, South Sudan, etc. the councils recommends a candidate for the post of Secretary- General to the General Assembly and with that body elects the members of the international Court of Justices.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

The third organ is the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) whose fifty-four members are elected by the General Assembly for three year terms, one third being replaced each year. Reaching decisions on the basis of a simple majority, the council focuses on human rights, world trade, the status of women, and related social and economic questions. Functional commissions, such as the one on human rights, implement its programmes. ECOSOC has among others functions, the responsibility of coordinating and lightly supervising the activities of the all- important specialized agencies such as the IMF, WHO, FAO, World Bank, UNESCO, ILO,WTO, ITU,ICAO, UPU, etc.

The Trusteeship Council

Fourth among the major structures is the slowly disappearing Trusteeship council to which the charter assigns the responsibility of monitoring the process of political development in those territories which have not yet attained self-government or independence. By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence. Its walk completed the council has amended its rule of procedure to meet as and where occasion may require.

The International Court Of Justice (ICJ).

The ICJ is the fifth deliberative organs. The General Assembly and the Security Council concurrently elect each of the fifteen judges for staggered terms of nine years. No two judges may be of the same nationality, and the composition of the court reflects the world's principal legal systems. Members of the UN or Security Council itself may refer a case to the court and the

tribunal renders advisory opinions at the request of either the General Assembly or the Security Council. With a quorum of nine judges, decisions reflect the consensus of the majority.

The Secretariat

The Secretariat is the sixth major organ of the UN whose responsibility is to administer the world organization under the direction of the Secretary General, whom the Security Council recommends for a term of five years. The Secretary General provides designated good offices to help resolve international disputes and sometimes, as in the case of Cyprus, even serve as a mediator between contending parties. (Coulombis and Wolfe, 1986:291). The staff of the secretariat organizes conferences, collects data on social and economic trends, maintains peacekeeping operations and supplies the media with information on the activities of the UN.

Since its establishment in 1945 the body has produced the following Secretary Generals: Trygve Lie from Norway (1945-1953), Dag Hammarskjöld, Sweden (1953-1961), U Thant, Burma (1961-1971), Kurt Waldheim, Austria, (1972-1981), Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Peru, (1982-1991), Boutros-Ghali, Egypt, (1992-1996), Kofi Annan, Ghana, (1997-2006), Ban Ki-moon, South Korea (2007-2016) and the current Secretary General, António Guterres of Portugal (2017 to date).

Evaluation and Major Findings of UN Activities after the 2nd World War

One of the fall-outs of the 2nd world war and the birth of the UN is the advent of the concept of complex interdependence which owes much of its relevance in the global arena to the consequences of and destructiveness of war. The world was non-conflictual or anarchical between or among states, it would have been inconceivable to talk of interdependence and co-operation. The League of Nations and its successor, the UN, was/is a product of war. Although states have not been able to stop limited or conventional wars, they especially the UN, have significantly impacted on world peace, and well-being of mankind. It is pertinent to note that since the end of the 2nd World War and the establishment of UN, no world war (3rd world war), Conventional or nuclear has taken place whereas Conventional wars of different hues (wars of independence: Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, etc. civil wars: Nigeria, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Colombia, Libya, Balkans, etc.) have been witnessed all over the world. Again, the US for instance has been involved in conventional wars in

Korea, Vietnam Afghanistan, Iraq despite its arsenal of nuclear warheads. Similarly, Russia was involved in wars with Hungary Afghanistan Ukraine, etc. The point is that war is still being used to settle scores in international relations despite the presence of the UN which in its charter permits states either individually or collectively in alliance to use force for self-defence. Thus, when collective security is applied by the UN as was the case in Iraq-Kuwait (Gulf war) in 1991, both interdependence and realist approaches were called to service. It was the closest the world came to a 3rd World War because it involved a coalition of 29 independent and willing countries led by the US and sanctioned by the UN.

It is also relevant to stress that the major powers who are permanent members of the Security Council of the UN-China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States of America have never faced each other in war after the 2nd World War, rather, where their interests clash, negotiation (interdependence) and proxy wars have been used to settle scores. For example, in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and the defunct Soviet Union (Russia) could have led to serious military confrontation but at the end of the stand-off, negotiation and pragmatism prevailed. Again, where their interests coalesced as in Iraq-Kuwait in 1991, a coalition force was built to wipe Iraq into submission. Similarly, in the Balkans in the mid 1990s NATO ensured the protection of Kosovans and other minorities from Serbian onslaught during the civil war in that region of Europe. Some leaders of that war such as Slobodan Milosevic have been convicted by the ICC for war crimes Against humanity.

The state of Israel owes its modern status to the consequences of the 2nd WW and the emergence of the UN in 1945. The carnage inflicted on the Jewish people by Nazi Germany during the War (1939-1945) was a major catalyst in bringing the new nation into being. An estimated six million Jews were exterminated in Europe during Adolf Hitler's war. It was therefore to heal this wound that, the UN suspended the carving out of a home land for the Jews in West Palestine and this was achieved in 1948. However this did not come without a price for as Ambrose (1984: 334) noted:

“War, as always has been the supreme arbitrator there have been four major Middle eastern conflicts in the past generation, in 1948, 1956/1967 and 1973, with endemic border warfare in between the big wars the united states the soviet Union, Britain, France and

Czechoslovakia have all sent massive shipments of arms to the area, while Britain France and the USSR sent fighting men to participate in the struggles”.

Another fallout of the 2WW is the technological and scientific advances made by man today in the development of the military industrial complex, that presently not only serve war efforts, but are also deployed to peaceful purposes. Thus, nuclear reactors- a product upgraded from the nascent Atomic Bomb of the 2WW Fame are now used to generate electricity, for domestic ends. Military aircrafts, missiles, transport planes, submarines, trucks ships, space exploration medicine etc. have all benefitted from the science of nuclear energy. It was from this frame that Wright (1942) asserted: “war has politico-technological juro-ideological, socio-religious and psycho-economic causes and therefore benefits as well. The UN IAE is in involved in the regime of regulating atomic energy development and use by nation states in the world.

One other area the UN has impacted the world is through the activities of the specialized agencies such as the World Health Organisation International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations International Children’s Education Fund, International Labour Organisation, among others, have global influences on all facets of human endeavors in the world. For instance, the peacekeeping operations of the UN has been very useful in the maintained of global peace and security for without these two concepts, other aspirations of man will be a mirage. Since the UN peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observes to the Middle East, 69 peacekeeping operations have been undertaken, 56 of them since 1988. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel, as well as ten of thousands of UN police and other civilians from more than 120countries have participated in UN peacekeeping operations. More than 3,326 UN peacekeepers from some 120 countries have died while serving under the UN flag. (UN (2017) War, through, a dangerous game exerts, as did the 2WW, an irritable pull on man. It has produced great men in history both medieval and contemporary Mention must therefore be made of Alexander the Great, Julius Cearsar, Hanrilbal, Mansa Musa, Idris Alooma, Montgiomery, Rommel, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Powell, Schwarz-Kopf, Adekunle, Achuzia, Akinrinade, Shuwa, Murtala, etc who defied death to win glory for

themselves and countries. Many soldiers and aspiring politicians would want to emulate the war exploits and statesmanship of these personages. Here a wise dictum by Mao Tse-tung (1985) becomes instructive and invaluable: “all military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the experiences of past wars summed up by the people in former days or in our time. We should seriously study these lessons, paid for in bloods which are a heritage of past wars”.

The UN is indeed a heritage of war- the 2WW and both features have remained pivotal in the determination of national interests, world peace and security.

Conclusion and Recommendation

In this article we contended that despite the destructive nature of war especially the 2WW and the perception by some that it is immoral, it has intrinsic values for humanity. Even the emergence of the UN, a product of a global war, in which the first and only atomic bomb was used on mankind, has not been able to resolve the use of war by nation-states as an instrument of national objective. For instance, the states of Algeria, Angola, East Timor, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Israel, Mozambique, etc. owe their independence to wars. The civil wars in the US and Nigeria brought new frameworks and dynamics into their governance structures. While war separated West and East Germany, North and South Yemen, the aroma of interdependence united them.

The UN emerged from the ashes of the 2WW, which itself ensued because the covenants of the League of Nations were breached by the Axis Powers led by Germany, But in the past 73 years since the end of the 2 WW, the UN has bestrode the world with its octopoidal tentacles in enhancing peace and Security health, education, money and finance, energy, labour, sports, human rights social welfare, agriculture, environmental protection, culture, tourism, migration, refugee peacekeeping, capacity building, water, seabed out space, climate change, among others. For instance the Ebola outbreak in 2014 in some West African states of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Mali and Senegal were promptly tackled by the WHO. Similarly the WHO facilitated the arrest of the Zika virus epidemic in Brazil before the Olympic Games in 2016. As stated earlier, peacekeeping operations has become an index signature of the UN in maintaining peace and security in conflict zones of the world.

However, the UN is plagued with some challenges. One of which is the undemocratic of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Major issues of the UN are dominated by the fire-retro wielding countries and even among them, one members Reto renders a proposal null and void. In this sense, the UNSC lacks democracy, as it is the whim of the minority (5 countries) over the majority (196 states) members.

We therefore recommend that the UNSC be restructured to incorporate more countries from all the continents and regions of the world just as the Secretary-General appointments of the UN has reflected humanity's diversities and regional representations. Again, the NIEO, fashioned by the UN in 1977 should be vigorously pursued and implemented to assure the developing countries of equality fairness and justice in the distribution and utilization of planetary resources.

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INCONCLUSIVE ELECTIONS IN 2019 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY.

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Abstract

Nigerians in 29 out of the 36 states of the federation went to the polls on 9th March 2019 to elect their Governors and the 991 members of Houses of Assembly in all the States of the Federation, 6 Chairmen as well as 62 Councilors for the Area Councils in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Despite concerted efforts by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to ensure a credible, free and fair electoral process, some states' results were declared inconclusive necessitating the conduct of supplementary in Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Kano, Plateau and Sokoto states, respectively. What are the factors responsible for INEC declaration of elections in six states as inconclusive? Were the outcomes of the rerun elections free and fair? What are the implications of the supplementary elections in the affected states? What are the alternatives to inconclusive elections in Nigeria by INEC? This development in Nigeria's electoral process is not without implications on the credibility, free and fairness of the process. This paper examines the implications of inconclusive election in these states in Nigeria so as to bring to the fore the factors that necessitated INEC's declaration of six gubernatorial results as inconclusive, the free and fairness of the supplementary elections and so forth in Nigeria's democratic process.

Keywords: Inconclusive, Gubernatorial, INEC, Free and Fair Elections

Introduction

Election is essential to any democratic process and system of government. Elections in a democracy provide the electorate with the opportunity to choose from among those veering for elective positions the candidates/individuals and personalities they desire as leaders and to represent them in the decision-making process of a polity. Elections are ideal for democratic systems, and the management of the election process by

constitutional established bodies is but a reflection of the important role of elections in the choice of prospective leaders out of the numerous contestant or viable options presented by various political parties. In other words direct and indirect participation by individuals and groups in a democratic system of government is ensured through free and fair elections.

A free, fair and credible election ensures the constitutional legitimization of the exercise of political authority, and via this legitimizing standard shall be different from non-free, fair and credible selective process. The main characteristics of elections in democratic systems everywhere as posited by (Wojtasik, 2013: 2) are: uncertainty of the electoral outcome, which depends only on the decisions of voters; possibility of a real alternation of power and formation of a de facto division between those in power and the opposition. Therefore, the real empowerment of the opposition makes it that, as a result of the election, it has the constitutional right to control the ruling, and proffer alternatives to those proposed by the government. Andrew Heywood rightly captured this when he argued that, mutual influence of the citizens and those in power, as well as elites and the masses is ensured through elections (Heywood 2000; 200). Elections based on the free and fair principles normally serve as a foundation upon which a democratic system, enabling a conducive environment of selecting of candidate for elective positions in the political systems. They facilitate a peaceful transfer of political power in the event of changes due to electoral victory. Free and fair elections ensure the moral right to rule which in turn increases the stability of the political system. It then follows that, the litmus test will ultimately be, by choice, the peaceful transition of government power with the opposition winning elections and forming a government, and the ruling party easily conceding defeat and quietly handover power without violence or intimidation

In Nigeria however, the electoral process since the return to democratic government in 1999 have been marred with irregularities and these irregularities ranges from massive fraud, intimidation and even assassination of political opponents, vote rigging, vote buying, outright violence, political violence, disregard of the electoral acts, and so forth (Idike, 2019:133 and Okoye,2011:3). Idike further stressed in line with The Economist () report that the results of elections come in two separate columns in which one records the votes cast at a polling unit or stations; the other, the number of people killed around the time of elections; as violence is an integral part of Nigerian politics. Furthermore inconclusive elections have since 2015

become a phenomenon in the political land scape and the electioneering process in Nigeria. The Independent National Election Commission (INEC) in the just concluded gubernatorial elections held on the 9 of March, 2019 declared some states result for the gubernatorial elections as inconclusive. This trend of inconclusive elections is becoming a worrisome feature of the country's electoral process and is getting many people worried. INEC has, however, been accused of trying to circumvent the provisions of Section 179(2) of the constitution, which states inter alia, "a candidate for an election to the office of governor of a state shall be deemed to have been duly elected where, there being two or more candidates- (a) he has the highest number of votes cast at the elections; and (b) he has not less than one-quarter of all the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all the local government areas in the state" (Makinde, 2019). This paper examined among others the factors responsible for the INEC declaring results in six states as inconclusive, the outcome of the supplementary elections in terms of free and fair conduct of the process, the implications on affected states, and to proffer alternative to inconclusive elections by INEC in Nigeria. The paper is in six parts: introduction, conceptual discuss and theoretical framework, review on the origin and emergence of inconclusive elections in Nigeria, inconclusive elections in six states of Nigeria factors and implications, alternative to inconclusive elections by INEC in Nigeria, and conclusion and recommendations.

Methodology

This paper adopted the documentary research method. Data for the study was obtained from secondary sources utilizing already existing literature on free and fair elections and inconclusive gubernatorial elections in Nigeria, the responsibility of INEC as enshrined by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Electoral Act. Scholarly positions, Newspaper articles and press releases by INEC as well as media reportage of the electoral process in Nigeria were reviewed and on the basis contents analysis we presented our findings. This is because content analysis or documentary studies involve conceptualizing, analyzing and assessing collected data to buttress an argument in an academic research.

Conceptual Discourse and Theoretical Framework

(i) Inconclusive Election Meaning and Origin in Nigeria's Electoral Process:

The concept of inconclusive election has since 2015 become a term with common usage in the political environment and many Nigerians have expressed concern over this development. For instance the House of Representatives at its plenary session of Wednesday 13th March urged the independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) not to subvert the will of the people by declaring elections inconclusive after a motion of urgent National importance was moved by Hon. Sunday Karimi (PDP Kogi). Hon. Karimi while raising the motion alluded that the high incidence of inconclusive and supplementary elections that INEC has declared since 2015 Governorship election in Kogi had led Nigerians to refer to the electoral umpire as the "Inconclusive National Electoral Commission". The motion by Hon. Karimi was supported by other members of the House. Hon. Femi **Gbajabiamila** (APC Lagos) in reaction to the inconclusive elections syndrome suggested an amendment of the 1999 constitution (as Amended 2011) and the current Electoral act and in addition the Hon. Cautioned members who were trying to interpret the law stating that such power reside with the Judiciary alone.

What then is inconclusive election?

For a meaningful interrogation of the concept of inconclusive elections, it is imperative to first examine the concept of election. Election like any other social science concept does not have a universally acceptable definition. However election we could argue is a process or an activity associated with democracy as form of government. Election is a formal and organized choice by vote of a person for political office or other position. In addition election is a process in which people vote a person or group of people to hold an official position. The Encyclopedia of Social Science Volume 5 defined election as on aggregating preferences of a particular kind. From this conception of election it has two features and these are (a) Procedure that is to say a special way of doing an activity, programme and social engagement; (b) Preferences which means choice between alternatives. Election according to Abdullahi (2010) can be described as a procedure that allows members of an organization or community to choose representatives who will hold positions of authority within it. It's indicative that elections select the leaders of local,

state and national governments. In other word the three basic types of elections that is primary, general and local.

Election in political science according to David, Heinz and Roger (2003) is the formal process of selecting a person for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting. Elections make fundamental contribution to democratic governance. Because direct democracy – a form of government in which political decisions are made directly by the entire body of qualified citizens-is impractical in most modern societies, democratic government must be conducted through representatives. Elections enable voters to select leaders and to hold them accountable for their performance in office. The possibility of controlling leaders by requiring them to submit to regular and periodic elections helps to resolve the problem of succession in leadership and thus contribute to the continuation of democracy (David, Heinz and Roger, 2003)

Elections are important in a democracy because they encourage the recruitment of political leaders. Imperatively, through the electoral process, the electorates are able to choose their political leaders from the list of contestants. As such the legal instruments of election is made up (a) Constitutional rules (b) Electoral Laws (The Electoral Act), (c) Complimentary regulations of election management authority (INEC); (d) Explicit or implicit code of conduct aimed at promoting the best practices (for more detail see Abdulhamid, 2010:19-27). The function of the election management body (INEC) include among others: To ensure the ballot through appropriate measures to prevent double and multiple voting and trend; Ensure the integrity of the electoral process of counting votes; Announce the election results and facilitate any transfer of authority. These are germane to the credibility of the electoral process. For a winner to emerge the votes must count on the basis of a free and fair contest for all aspirants. The declaration of results as inconclusive in governorship elections in six states of the federations can be attributed to inability of the electoral administrative body INEC effectively ensure that these stipulated functions were adhered to during the governorship election in the six states. Over voting and collation of results and were marred with irregularities as reported by media and the electoral body in these states. this development informed the high number votes cancelled during the gubernatorial elections in the affected states. Hence the inconclusive elections since the cancelled votes in all the states affected were

more than the margin of lead between the leading candidates and the second in place contestant.

An inconclusive election in this regard is one where challenged ballots are not sufficient to affect the outcome of the election and one of the following occurs:

- The ballots provides for at least three (3) choices –no union or neither and the votes are equally divided
- The ballot provides for at least three (3) choices, the choice receiving the highest number of votes does not receive a majority, and at least two other choices receive the next highest and same number of votes
- When a runoff ballot provides for a choice between two parties and results in the votes being equally divided
- When the electoral management body determines that there have been significant procedural irregularities
- Ballot, if the electoral administrative body determines that the election is inconclusive, the election will be rerun with all the choices that appeared on the original ballot.
- The number of rerun. There will be only one rerun of an inconclusive election.

All of the above no doubt played out in the gubernatorial election held on the 9th of March 2019 and also the supplementary elections conducted on the 23 and 28 of March 2019 respectively in five of the states and Adamawa being the last in that order.

Independent National Electoral Commission; is the constitutional body responsible for administering elections in Nigeria. INEC seen as the 4th Republic electoral body and is a successor to the late Abacha's National Electoral Commission of Nigeria. INEC has since 1998 conducted elections that brought into political offices the 4th to 8th elected Presidential candidates National Assembly members, the gubernatorial candidates and state house of assemblies and others. INEC has had seven Chairmen- Ephrain Ibukun Akpata 1998-2000; late Dr Abel Guobadia 2000-2005; Professor Maurice Mmaduakolam Iwu 2005-2010; Prof Attahiru Jaga 2010-2015; Zainab Bala Zakari acting July 30th to October 21st 2015 and the current chairman Professor Muhammad Yakubu October 21st 2015 to date. Professor Mahmood since assuming the chairmanship of the electoral body in 2015, has not been able to conduct free and fair elections without the process being marred with

irregularities that some results had to be declared inconclusive. We have had inconclusive governorship election in states like River, Ekiti, Osun and Kogi and the latest of such inconclusive elections is that declared for six states. From all indication inconclusive elections has now become a phenomenon in Nigeria's polity under the current chairman of INEC. Even though desperation by politicians and their thugs has been stressed as the causes for the inconclusive elections the result of over voting, ballot box snatching, violence and intimidation of voters we are still of the view that inconclusive election is now a characteristic feature of the election process in Nigeria particularly for governorship and other elective offices with the exception of the presidential election.

Theoretical Framework

Theories serve as foundation for analysis and interpretation of the problematique. For this study, the systems theory is adopted. The systems theory owe it emergence to a biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy who proposed it in the 1940s and furthered illuminated by .Ross W. Ashby (introduction to cybernetics in 1956); Talcott Parson 1951; David Easton 1965 and host of others. Systems theory is a transdisciplinary and in this regard, Von Bertalanffy, system theory came as a reaction against reductionism and attempting to revive the unity of science. He argued that real systems are open to, and interact with, their environments, and they can acquire qualitatively new properties through emergence, resulting in continual evolution. Rather than reducing an entity for instance the human body to the property of its parts or elements such as the organ or cells, systems theory focuses on the arrangement of and to relations between the parts which connect them into a whole. This particular organization as argued by the advocates of the systems theory determines a system, which is independent of the concrete substance of the elements (eg particles, cells, transitors, people and so forth). As such the same cocepts and principle of an organization underlie the different disciplines (Physics, Biology, Sociology, Political science and others), providing a basis for their unification.

Generally, Systems theory conjures politics as a web of interaction and processes, a chain of mutually linked components working in unison to realize a common goal. It is in this regard that Easton (1965) argued thus, politics is nothing but a system of collaboration in a society, through which authoritative choices are made and implemented. Systems theory assumes

that, in every society there exist a system, and there are sub-systems and supra-systems that make a whole or complete system. The fact that, systems are created to perform important role in the development of the society, they are goal oriented and focused (Durkheim, 1984). Further, system theory posits that, a system is a set of two or more interrelated elements with the properties of each: each system has an effect on the flinch of a whole. Each system is affected by at least one other element in the system and all possible sub-groups of element also have the first property. These elements are input, output, conversion and feedback.

As a result of the high consequences of election related problems, a more suitable guide can be found in the aspects of system theory that deals with the issues system atrophy. Systems theory provides a suitable framework for describing, modeling, analyzing, and designing social systems; developing and institutionalizing changes to social systems; and managing systems and system change. This study examines the complexity of electoral processes in Nigeria, where system input, output, conversion and feedback is shaped by the unpredictable micro-level effects.

The 2019 Electoral process and Inconclusive Gubernatorial Elections in Six States of Nigeria: A Critical Review of Issues.

Generally, the electoral process relates to the entire cycle ranging from the provision of voter education to the dissolution of the national Assembly and so forth. Idike (2014:135), Elekwa (2008:30) and INEC (2006) argued that the electoral process has several phases and they include: (a) Delimitation of electoral boundaries (b) Registration of voters (c) Notice of Elections (d) Nomination of Candidates (e) Election Campaigns (f) Elections, announcement of results and compilation of tribunal sittings (g) participation of other organisations (h) Resolution of electoral conflicts resulting from the participation of other organisations, people, groups and so forth. It is in this regard that the electoral process is seen as a complex process that encompasses the good intentions and undesirable outcomes of election administration, particularly in emerging democracies where general elections are often marred by culturally hued electoral malpractices.

Scholars of the banal wisdom argued that, in spite of the political gainsaying of the 1990s, there is still no place for democracy in most parts of Africa because of one-party dominance, restrictions of civil liberties, monopolization of the means of mass communication, marginalization of civil

society, detrimental economic indicators and disrupting foreign interference (Diamond 2008: 7-9). This is apt, because African states have been variously suffering from inflation and food shortages, inadequate foreign reserves, external imbalances coupled with the heavy burden of debt. On top of all these, many (African) citizens are beginning to perceive that democracy has distinctive shortcomings including unruly political discourse, a poor record of service delivery, and new opportunity for corruption' (Bratton, 2007;5). The above view tend to be in line with Joseph (1999:5) observation that, in Africa, the prime purpose of elections will remain the legitimating of whatever regime that currently holds governmental power...(and) are far from being autonomous operations; they reflect the character of the political order especially the degree of risk incumbents are willing to tolerate..

Accordingly, African elections are in essence, window dressing rituals with no significant political orientations other than stuffing of the ballot boxes in whatsoever manner they deemed necessary. Elections in Africa are just constitutional processes which have become standard avenue adopted by African governments to satisfy their western benefactors on whom they are financially and politically dependent (Adejumobi, 2000). Cynics even argued that, in Africa 'a flawed election may be preferable to no election at all' (Anglin, 1998: 474). The fact that people bother to vote, reflects the presence of important morally socialized suasions. The significance of voters turning up to exercise their civic responsibility therefore depends on the way society encourages or undermines these kinds of civic responsibilities.

This is exactly what happened. On Saturday 9th March 2019, millions of Nigerians went to the polls to elect 29 Governors, 991 members of House of Assemblies in all the States of the Federation; 6 Chairmen as well as 62 Councilors for the Area Councils in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). But despite concerted efforts by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to ensure a credible, free and fair electoral process, the elections were replete with delays, logistic issues, voting irregularities, apathy, misconduct and electoral violence that resulted in loss of lives. Although INEC was able to address some of the issues that marred the Presidential elections, there were challenges which affected the smooth conduct of the gubernatorial, State House of Assembly and the FCT Council elections. A total of 1,082 candidates were supposed to be elected by voters throughout the country but some states and area Councils encountered various problems that forced INEC to declare elections in Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Kano, Plateau

and Sokoto States as inconclusive. This was because the number of cancelled votes was higher than the leading candidate's margin of victory, over voting, and failure to use the smart card readers amongst other irregularities. These gubernatorial elections experienced serious violence that led to the death of 17 people as well as direct interference by political actors and security agents (Wilmot, 2019:1). Verdicts of inconclusive elections did not start this year. Various polls organised by INEC as far back as 2011 in Imo State and the Osun State governorship election held on September 22, 2018 were declared inconclusive. But the level of inconclusive polls in 2019 indicated that more elections results had to be determined after supplementary elections.

The forgoing is but a reflection of the electoral process in Nigeria. In other words in Africa, Nigeria is a typical example of democracy in which the electoral process have over the years been marred with irregularities or have been immensely characterized by a culture of malpractices which is the illegalities committed by government officials responsible for the conduct of elections, political parties, groups or individuals with sinister intention to influence an election in favour of a candidate or candidates (see Idike, 2014:136 and Ezeani, 2004:145).

The 2019 electoral process in Nigeria has been the subject of debate at local and international levels. The declaration of results as inconclusive in six states of the federation in which the opposition party evidently had upper hand and possibility of winning triggered or generated debates on whether INEC has the mandate in this regard. For instance, the opposition party Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) publicity secretary (Kola Ologbundiya) alleged that the INEC Chairman Prof Mahmood Yakubu in declaring the gubernatorial election results as inconclusive in Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Kano and others as playing the script of the ruling All Progressive Congress (Premiumtimesng, 2019 March 15; and africanews.com.com and). This position no doubt is on the basis of fear that the opposition party may lose in the affected states to the ruling party and since previous inconclusive election conducted in Osun state in 2018 did not favour the PDP candidate, and the APC candidate was declared winner after the supplementary election was conducted. In the first ballot, the PDP candidate Ademola Adeleke won majority votes of 254,698 while Gboyega Oyetola the APC candidate came second with 254,345 votes. Adeleke margin of lead was 354 votes and lower than the cancelled votes of 3,498. On this basis, a rerun was conducted in seven polling units and at the end the APC candidate won (Ebuka, 2019). . In

addition the INEC chairman had in 2016 declared that the Commission would not be able to guarantee conclusive elections in 2019 (see Remi 2016 and Punch Newspaper of August 20, 2016). Remi (2016) in reaction to the INEC Chairman's position argued that the INEC boss is one of the enemies of Nigeria and that the INEC boss was bent on destroying the imperfect democracy that everyone is working hard to sustain.

It is imperative however to examine the basis in support of the INEC position with regard to the inconclusive elections. The basis of INEC action is contained in our Electoral Acts which is the margin of lead principle in section 26 and 53 of the electoral Acts and paragraph 41(e) and 43 (b) of the INEC Regulations and guidelines, the Commission cannot declare a winning if the number of cancelled votes can mathematically affect the outcome of the election. This means that if the margin of victory between the candidates with the highest votes and leading in the first place and the candidate in the second place with next highest votes is placed at let say 130, then the number of cancelled votes should not be or cannot be more than 129. However, if the number of votes cancelled is more than 131 or more, then the election could be declared as inconclusive since the second place candidate stand a chance mathematically to emerge winner of the election. That is on the assumption that the 131 or more voters cast their votes for just the candidate in the second place. In addition, votes are most commonly cancelled during elections (just as have been recorded in the six states) when affected areas witness any form of violence or other factors that compromise the results. Reflecting on Ningi Local Government Area of Bauchi State, we can argue that the results were compromised. INEC had to review the declaration of its returning officer concerning the nullification of the results of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area. The Commission argued that its investigative panel found out that halfway into the LG collation, armed gangs attacked the collation centre and destroyed the LG Result Sheet (EC8C) and some collated results from the Registration areas. This affected results of seven out of the 11 Registration Areas for governorship and six out of the 11 for state Assembly. However, the collation officer, under pressure from party agents who could not wait for the arrival of a replacement result sheet decide to collate the result on an available RA Result Sheet instead of the replacement LGA result sheet. Furthermore, the investigative committee also established that the number of cancelled votes for the four polling units in Ningi LGA which had 25,330 recorded as the collated results in Form EC40G(1) was incorrect, as the actual

figure is 2,533 (Jide, 2019). Jide argued further that what singled out the 2019 general election is the high number of cancelled votes due to violence, over-voting and non-adherence to the use of Smart Card Reader. The cancelled votes which he stressed as in millions brought about the inconclusive governorship elections in five states of the federation (Adamawa, Benue, Kano, Plateau and Sokoto). Bauchi on the other hand was initially enlisted by INEC among the states before the electoral body reversed itself after a careful review by the investigative panel set up on the governorship election.

It is imperative to note that inconclusive election in Nigeria is not a unique phenomenon to the 2019 gubernatorial election. The history of inconclusive election predates the 2019 governorship elections in which six states results were declared inconclusive., Earlier inconclusive elections have been declare in the 2018 Osun election, 2015 Kogi experience, Taraba, Abia, Imo and others.

Inconclusive Elections as a Phenomenon in Nigeria’s Electoral Process.

The history of inconclusive elections can be traced to the 2009 Ekiti state , the Anambra central senatorial constituency election and the Imo state governorship election in 2011; the oguta constituency election in Imo state, and the Anambra governorship election in 2013; Imo state governorship election in 2015 then the controversial elections in Kogi State on 21st November, 2015, when the clear winner of that polls Alhaji Abubakar Audu of the APC died before the official announcement of his electoral victory. In addition INEC had to cancel results in 91 polling units across the state as a result of cases of violence, over-voting, snatching of ballot boxes, and so among others. Subsequently, a supplementary poll was ordered in the affected units, and on the basis that the margin between the two leading contenders then later Abubakar Audu of APC and the PDP candidate Governor Idris Wadawas 41,000 votes while the total number of registered voters in the affected units was 49,953. The impasses was resolved, with the declaration of late Audu’s substitution Yahaya Bello as winner. The result showed that APC polled 6,885 votes in the supplementary poll while the initial November 21 votes 240,857. It means that APC candidate was declared winner with a total of 247,752 against the PDP candidate Wada who scored 5,363 in the supplementary and 199,514 in the initial votes bringing the total votes scored to 204,887 (see The Nation, 2016). After the Kogi experience, the governorship election in Bayelsa State in January 2016, was declared

inconclusive reason being the election was characterized by poor logistics and violence in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area. INEC initially wanted to shift the voting in this area to the next day, but this was truncated as armed thugs continued to cause mayhem by disrupting the distribution of election materials. The election was therefore cancelled thereby re-enacting the Kogi scenario.

INEC appeared to have weathered the storm as Nigerian's turned their attention to the 2019 polls. However in last year (2018) the lexicon reared its ugly head once again during the Osun State gubernatorial elections.

The forgoing inconclusive elections by INEC in Nigeria's electoral process with many of these occurring under the chairmanship of Professor Yakubu, has put the INEC and its leadership on the spotlight. Consequently INEC declaration of inconclusive gubernatorial election results in six states after the 9th March, 2019 governorship elections in 29 out of 36 states; and on the 11th March 2019, the opposition party PDP which apparently polled more votes in five of the affected states than the incumbent ruling party APC, interpreted the action as strategy to give the APC candidates the wining votes. Their concern is however justified from the experience in Osun and other inconclusive elections before the march 9 2019 governorship elections. In addition many Nigerians criticized and in Sokoto state in particular there was demonstration by some women to register their dissatisfaction with the inconclusive elections as officially announced by INEC. It's imperative for us to state that INEC decision and declaration of result in the affected states is in consonant with the country's law-that says no winner shall be declared if the margin of victory between two parties with the highest number of votes is less than the cancelled or invalid votes. The decision is in line with the Margin of Lead Principle derived from Sections 26 and 53 of the 2010 Electoral Act (as amended) and 43(b) of the INEC Regulations and Guidelines INEC, 2019). The incidence of violence, over-voting, hijack of electoral materials and officials are seen as the main reasons elections were problematic in many places in Nigeria, thereby raising a chance of supplementary elections should the number of cancelled votes exceeds margin of win upon final collation (Premium Times, 2019). Cancelled votes usually arise when registered voters are unable to cast their vote for reasons such as violence, or due to lack of voting materials and officials. It can also arrive if the numbers of ballots exceed the number of accredited voters.

A re-run of elections in the affected states -Bauchi, Benue, Kano, Plateau and Sokoto was scheduled for 23rd March 2019. The supplementary election for Adamawa state was slated for 28 of March 2019 to give room to resolve observed case of omission filed in court of law. The table below shows the tabulated results from the six states in which gubernatorial results were declared inconclusive by the Electoral Body INEC.

Table 1.1 Breakdown of votes polled by APC and PDP, the margin of lead and cancelled votes in six states Gubernatorial Elections of 9th March 2019 Inconclusive Elections.

S/No	State	Political Party	Votes	Lead Margin	Cancelled Vote
1.	Adamawa	APC PDP	334,996 367,471	32,476	40,988
2.	Bauchi	APC PDP	485,453 489,512	4,059	45,312
3.	Benue	APC PDP	329,002 410,576	81,554	121,011
4.	Kano	APC PDP	987,819 1,014,474	20,655	141694
5.	Plateau	APC PDP	583,255 538,326	44,929	49,377
6.	Sokoto	APC PDP	486,145 489,558	3,413	75,403

Source: www.premiumtimes.com, 2019, Dailpost2019& authors tabulation and compilation April 2019.

The results of the gubernatorial elections and votes polled by the two leading political party in six of the affected states in Nigeria is as captured in alphabetical order in the table above. It shows that in Adamawa State, PDP's presidential candidate polled a total of 367,417 votes while the APC candidate had 334,996 votes, and a vote margin of 32,467. This vote margin is lower

than the 40,988 cancelled votes. The electoral officer in the state Professor Andrew Haruna said that, votes were cancelled in 44 polling units throughout the state and specifically it affected 12 out of the 21 Local Government Areas of the State. Bauchi state also had an inconclusive election as declared by the INEC returning Officer Professor Mohammed Kyari on the basis that the margin between the winner and opponent was less than the total number of votes cancelled in some polling units. Prof Kyari emphasized that his decision was in line with section 26, part 53 of the electoral Act. The number votes polled by each of the political parties shows that PDP polled 489,512 and APC 485,453 and a margin of 4,059. While a total of 45,312 votes were cancelled and it is on this basis that the election was declared inconclusive since 4,059 margin of win is lower than the cancelled votes.

The votes polled by these two political parties in Benue, Kano and Sokoto shows that PDP polled more votes than APC. In other words PDP candidates in these states had the following votes 410,576 against APC 329,022; 1,014,474 against APC 987,819 and 489,558 against APC 482,146 in Benue, Kano and Sokoto states respectively. The margin of lead and cancelled votes in Benue, Kano and Sokoto are: 81,554 and 121,011; Kano 20,655 and 141,694 and Sokoto 3,413 and 75,403 respectively. The lead margin from all indications in these three states is far below the cancelled votes in each state. As such we could on the basis of our Electoral Act provision which all the Returning Officers in these states relied on to declare the elections as inconclusive is legitimate. Relatedly, Plateau state inconclusive governorship election falls within this legitimate action by the Returning Officers. We could say that INEC declaration of governorship elections in the six states is justified since all cancelled votes in each of these states were higher than the margin of lead between the two main parties and the candidate in each state.

Logically, elections are meant to be conducted and concluded but when they are declared inconclusive and the phenomenon becomes too many that is six in an electoral cycle it tends to affect the confidence that the electorate have in the electoral body INEC. Furthermore, it has social and financial implications for the electorate and government resources. And from our experience in past four years inconclusive elections is gradually becoming a common feature of our electoral process. Indeed, there has never been any major election organised by this current electoral body that has not been marred by inconclusiveness.

Inconclusive Elections and Outcome of Supplementary Elections in Six States of Nigeria

The results of the gubernatorial elections held on the 9th of March 2019 were declared inconclusive in six states of Nigeria namely Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Kano, Plateau and Sokoto. The basis for this development lies in the provision of our electoral act and related documents. Under sections 26 and 53 of the Electoral Act elections are declared inconclusive where the margin of lead between two leading candidates is not in excess of the total number of registered voters of the polling units where elections were not held or were cancelled. It means that votes of eligible voters, who could not cast their votes, could when given a second chance during a supplementary election, at least in theory alter the election result.

Supplementary elections was conducted on the 23rd of March 2019 for five of the affected states while that of Adamawa took place on 28 of March 2019 because one of the political parties MRDD had gone to court and obtained an injunction that its logo was omitted from the ballot paper. However it later turned out that this party did not validly nominate a governorship ticket in the first place. The media as well as local and international observers all affirm that the supplementary elections were peaceful in Plateau and Benue states. But that of Kano state was marred by pockets of violence orchestrated by political thugs. The result shows that the PDP's 26,000 vote lead was overturned by APC candidate. In Sokoto state there was a keen contest and the PDP candidate won the supplementary election with only 341 votes. This has been observed as the narrowest in the whole country. While in Adamawa and Bauchi states, the incumbent APC Governors who trailed in the March 9 2019 election were defeated in the supplementary elections. The PDP candidates in each of these state won the supplementary elections (see Daily Trust April 1 2019).

From the forgoing outcome of the supplementary elections we are of the view that the electorate in these states made their choice despite the fear and concern raised by PDP members that the INEC body was acting in favour of the APC candidates. However, PDP fear was justified in the Kano governorship supplementary election. Media reportage and even international observers have reported that there was violence and voters were intimidated in this regard.

Inconclusive Elections and its Implications for Democracy and National Development in Nigeria.

Inconclusive elections have now become a characteristic feature of the electoral process in Nigeria. The electoral administrative body INEC which was set up in 1998 by the General Abdulsalam Abubakar's regime has conducted six general elections. It has however declared between 2009 and 2019 declared over seven inconclusive gubernatorial elections. Available literature shows that in 2009 under Professor Maurice Iwu Ekiti State had a case of inconclusive election. Professor Iwu was succeeded by Professor Attahiru Jega in 2010 and under him in 2011 there were two instances of inconclusive elections involving Anambra Central Senatorial constituency and governorship election in Imo State. In addition in 2013 Oguta constituency in Imo State had an inconclusive election, while Anambra recorded an inconclusive governorship election. The incumbent chair of INEC Professor Mahmood Yakubu on October 21, 2015 succeeded Anima Bala Zakari (who was appointed acting chair of INEC from July 30-October 21, 2015). Under the current chair of INEC, about eight inconclusive elections have been declared in Imo 2015 and Kogi governorship elections, Bayelsa 2016 governorship election, the 2018 Osun governorship election and the 2019 inconclusive governorship elections in six states.

The implications of 2019 inconclusive governorship elections are among others

- Generally the 2019 election is said to have been the most expensive elections ever conducted in Nigeria. it cost the country
- Over 90 political parties participated in the governorship elections but Nigerians had eyes for only two of these parties APC and PDP candidates
- In Kano state APC candidate is said to have won via election fraud. The supplementary was seen as a farce and brazen murder of democracy (Characterised by voter harassment, vote buying underage voting and violence and political thugs unleashed mayhem without being resisted by the police). Observers are of the view that the antecedent and political behaviour of APC point out that it would never allow PDP take control of Kano as it has the highest number of registered voters and as such APC needs to keep it in bag against 2023. Furthermore it is stressed that APC went all out to retain Kano in order

to bury arguments that the presidential election was rigged (see Omoshola, 2019)

- INEC has been constantly accused of siding with the ruling party APC and presidency in circumventing the smooth operation of laid down procedures. It has in some instances erred by short-circuiting the entire process in such a way that it became difficult for the public to endorse its impartiality and independence (see Leo, 2019)
- Another round of tax payers' money or funds had to be used to conduct supplementary elections as a result of the misdemeanor of the same politicians who control the state resources. INEC has been applying the margin of lead principle in a bit to further its credibility and transparency.
- Loss of human resource through election violence as witnessed in Kano during the supplementary. However, the Police DIG Anthony Ogbizi Michael debunked social media reports of killings and called it fabrication of social media. The DIG of police also said that the police command arrested 10 suspected thugs for allegedly carrying weapons in the metropolis. These thugs he referred to as human beings found in group with weapons like sticks and other things but he was not specific on what the other things were thus contradicting the report that voters were seen being dispersed while journalist were attacked by thugs of APC (see ThisDAY and report by Ibrahim Shauibu 23 of March 2019 10:30 am). It is not new that politicians through thugs, agents and loyalist are usually the culprits and perpetrators of electoral violence in a desperate move to swing voter's decision in their favour (Moshood Isah Punch News).
- Subverting the people right to free and fair elections- voters become discouraged in supplementary elections
- Businesses have suffered and people loss income during the postponement as well as the elections and then the supplementary in affected states. The financial and material loss is quantified in billions of naira in our democracy.
- The postponement of the election in the first place made businesses suffer n2.737tn (see ThisDay editorial February 17 2019)

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper examined the inconclusive elections in Nigeria by focusing on the factors in six of the affected states and the conclusion is that inconclusive elections as declared by INEC in Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Kano, Plateau and Sokoto states shows that the ruling party had serious challenge in terms of personality and acceptability of candidates by the electorate. In kano the supplementary was marred by violence and it rendered the elections process in some wards illegitimate but still the APC candidate was declared to have won the rerun elections despite the recorded violence and intimidation of voters. Even though the police DIG denied the fact that the election was marred by violence and voters intimidation, he contradicted himself when he stated that 10 human beings were arrested as suspected thugs with sticks and other things without being specific of what the others things were in the possession of thugs as claimed by the DIP of police on Saturday the 23 of March by 10;30am in Kano Metropolis. INEC however did not see this development as unfair and truncated the democratic process in the affected areas of Kano state. The implication of inconclusive elections has both economic and social cost for people in the affected state as they had to go to the polls twice and three times close the businesses and social endeavour to exercise their civic responsibility. We recommend that any election marred by violence or ballot box snatching in future elections should be cancelled and parties involved should be disqualified in such polling units and not for INEC to declare the results of such election as inconclusive and then a supplementary election be conducted. This should be included in INEC electoral laws so that politicians will cut down on the use of thugs as a desperate move to win an election.

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