

Non-Thematic Edition -

Studies in
Politics
and
Society

Volume 8, December, 2019



A Journal Publication of the Nigerian Political Science Association

STUDIES IN POLITICS AND SOCIETY
A Journal of the Nigerian Political Science Association

SIPAS
NON-THEMATIC
Volume 8, Number 1&2, December, 2019

Studies in Politics and Society; Volume 8, Number 1&2, December, 2019
www.npsang.org

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GOVERNMENT DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND HUMAN SECURITY CRISES IN NIGERIA, 2005-2017

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Abstract

Nigeria's defence expenditure has constituted a significant portion of its public spending in the last decade mainly due to the ongoing counterinsurgency operations across the country. Recent literature has investigated the impact of excessive military expenditure on economic growth, foreign direct investment and human development. None has investigated the linkage between defence expenditure and human security in Nigeria. Therefore, this study analyzes how excessive defence expenditure has impacted on human security in Nigeria. The study argues that the exponential growth in the military spending has negatively affected government expenditure in health, agriculture, education and critical infrastructure, thereby increasing vulnerability to diseases, starvation, inequality, poverty, degradation, illiteracy, and attacks. As people are increasingly becoming susceptible to these socio-economic threats, the fabrics of the society are equally destabilized, while individual livelihood is endangered. This study therefore recommends overhauling Nigeria's budget architecture in line with the demands of human security, usually seen as key to resolving national security.

Keywords: Defence expenditure, human security, Nigeria, threats, national security.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War signalled a paradigm shift from the state-centred notion of security to an expanded version which priority and focuses on human beings. The former which is ideologically rooted in the theoretical postulations of political realism, approximates security in terms of the capacity of state to protect its national sovereignty from external attacks, international espionage, nuclear proliferations and internal insurrections (Owen, 2008). This approach suggests using the coercive state apparatuses to safeguard national

territory from external aggression or rebellious activities of armed non-state actors. Given this development, states security architecture was adapted and streamlined to respond to emerging threats through foreign intelligence, military build-up and nuclear stock-piling. This inevitably informed the expansionary pattern of global defence budget as states appropriated substantial share of their budgets to the acquisition and building of military hardware, training and retraining of military personnel, and procurement of other military equipment. As states continue in this idea of security without corresponding decrease in threats to human lives, emerging realities indicate that majority of death occurrence around the globe are not directly linked to interstate hostilities. On the contrary, they logically emanate from widespread violence, outbreak of pandemics, occurrence of natural hazards and perpetuated communal clashes. Thus, the swift progressions in the identified primary threats, the rapid pace of globalization, the collapse of the neoliberal states in the developing countries as well as the rise in the propagation and consolidation of democracy, suggest a considerable modification in the conventional security thinking (Okolie & Nnamani, 2017). Accordingly, it is argued that the only means of safeguarding the global system against existential threats is by merging development and security, i.e., prioritizing the emancipation of the individual at the core of the security agenda, otherwise known as human security (UNDP, 2004).

The idea of human security was conceived and nurtured in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report of 1994 as a dynamic and practical policy agenda for understanding widespread threats facing individual. In the report, UNDP evolved a 'New Dimension of Human Security' where it conceptualized human security as 'a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode into violence, and a dissident who was not silenced' (UN, 2004, p.22). Human security is universal, interdependent, preventive, and intrinsically people-centred (UN, 2004, p.23). Basically, human security is based on the notion that security is not just limited to the protection of states and the people within their jurisdictions; it also encapsulates protection of individuals from violent extremism, freedom from fear, wants, hunger and physical assault and most importantly, protection of civil and political rights. It specifically interrogates how environment, poverty and social interaction generates conflict and increasingly, poses threat to human existentialism. These threats are subsumed in seven core areas including: economic security,

food security, political security, community security, environmental security, personal security and health security. Critical to this thinking is the idea that human security deprivations have the capacity to undermine peace and stability within and between states. This is because “the feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Therefore, job security, income security, health security, environmental security, and security from crime, are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world” (UN, 2004, p.22).

However, while many states such as Norway, Japan, Denmark, Switzerland and Australia have devoted attention towards concretizing the agenda and goals of human security, emerging evidence suggest that majority of others including Nigeria are still inclined to state-centric security approach in managing the scale of violence that characterize the present global system. This development is directly linked to the expansionary pattern of global defence to the tune of \$1.7 trillion only in 2011. At the crest is the United States whose biggest military expenditure of \$711 billion in 2011 accounted for 41% of the entire global defence spending. The United States military expenditure is hierarchically followed by China, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Japan, India, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Brazil whose defence spending stood at \$143, \$71.9, \$62.7, \$62.5, \$59.3, \$48.9, \$48.5, \$46.7 and \$35.4 billion respectively in the same year (International Peace Bureau, 2012). Altogether, these ten countries with massive military expenditure (MILEX) take about 74.3% of the GDB (Obasi, Asogwa & Nwafee, 2018).

As nations are increasingly pursuing elaborate defence budget, only inconsequential sums are expended on human-oriented global development projects. For instance, the analysis of the global military expenditure revealed that it was 2508 times higher than the joint spending of the International Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Organizations of the United Nations (\$0.65 billion), 604 times higher than the normal UN expenditures on Peace and Security, Development, Human Rights, Humanitarian Affairs and International Law and 12.7 times higher than the Official Development Assistance (\$128 billion) in 2011 (Archer & Willi, 2012). Indeed, this trend has invariably created socio-economic gaps which in no small measure has increased peoples’ vulnerabilities to both conventional and non-conventional threats like drought, hunger, poverty, unemployment, organized violence, displacement, wars, kidnapping, inequality, pandemic diseases, environmental degradation and repressive governance. Although there is an agreement that

the emerging security challenges cannot be adequately addressed through massive military expenditure, nonetheless, many national budgets priorities are still inclined to the state-centric notion of security with obvious manifestations in the worsened security situations.

Nigeria presents a typical illustration of country plagued with multifaceted traditional and non-traditional threats such as banditry, trans-border crimes, religious skirmishes, poverty, environmental degradation, incessant physical assaults, right abuses terrorism, pandemics, and hunger. Particularly, the Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen uprisings have heightened the spate of insecurity in Nigeria. These two deadly groups have competed favourably in dominating the national and global security challenges in the recent time. Apart from the destruction of property worth billions of dollars, Boko Haram's campaign of terror has led to 37,530 deaths, while Fulani Herdsmen violent clashes accounted for the deaths of 1,949 Nigerians in just 2018 (Campell & Harwood, 2018; Ilo, Jonathan-Ichaver & Adamolekun, 2019). Given the degree of their sophistication as well as the lethality of their operations, Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen have acquired reputation as the second and fourth most deadly groups respectively in the world. In the same vein, the intensification of deadly diseases such as Ebola, HIV/AIDS, Lassa Fever, Avian Influenza, Cholera and tuberculosis in Nigeria have earned Nigeria the largest contributor of global mortality according to the Minister of Health, Prof. Isaac Adewole (Akinkuotu, 2018). Also, with an embarrassing figure of 86.9 million citizens living below \$1 per day, Nigeria was designated as the international headquarter of poverty while shocking report revealed that 124,620,000 people representing 67% of the entire population were living without viable means to support themselves (Kazeem, 2018).

The foregoing traditional and non-traditional threats have fostered an atmosphere of despair, anguish, frustration, fear and most importantly, complicated the security situations in Nigeria. As a country deeply rooted in the state-centric notion of national security, the Nigerian state has continually relied on military operations to contain traditional and non-traditional threats against its national sovereignty. As these threats persist and complicate the insecurity situations, they directly or indirectly exert positive impact on the budgetary allocations to the defence sector. The consequence of this development is usually evident in drastic cut in other critical areas of development. Although the relationship between military spending and development implications has dominated intellectual discourses since the end

of the Cold War, these studies have specifically focused on MILEX and economic growth or development in some selected countries (Fontanel, 1990; Biswas, 1992; Berthelemy, Herrera & Sen, 1995; Feridun, Sawhney & Shahbaz, 2011; Chairil, Sinaga & Febrianti, 2013; Farzanegan, 2014; Awawory & Yew, 2014; Korkmaz, 2015; Ahad & Ahmad Dar, 2017; Obasi, Asogwa & Nwafee, 2018).

While Vignard (2003) explored the tripod linkage between disarmament, development and security, the study only provided theoretical explanations of these relationships. In the same vein, Soherwordi (2005) examined the implication of MILEX on human security in India and Pakistan, similar study has not been replicated to extend the frontier of knowledge to Sub-Saharan Africa which is replete with human security crisis. Given the wide pre-eminence which the concept of human security has gained in the Post-2015 Development Agenda as well as the crisis generated by the intensification of traditional and non-traditional threats in Nigeria, the locus of this study is clearly delineated. Thus, this study systematically examines the interaction between government defence expenditure and human security implication in Nigeria. The study argued that Nigeria must overhaul its defence budget to align with the demands of human security.

Nature, Trends and Prevalence of Conventional Insecurity in Nigeria

Security of lives and property is critical to man's existence, and to a greater extent, the organization and development of the productive forces (Okolie & Nnamani, 2017). Therefore, the ultimate goal of the state is to guarantee the security of its citizens. Achieving this very fundamental goal especially within the realist persuasion entails total reliance on the state security architecture to quell latent conspiracies and glaring threats from non-state armed groups. Under this model, nation-states are the relevant actors who maintain power and stability in line with the idea of *si vis pacem para bellum* (If you want peace, prepare for war). Although many states are still conservatively inclined to this realist paradigmatic orientation, the escalation of non-traditional threats across the globe has raised important concerns for the need to evolve and implement inclusive security strategies for sustainable peace and development in adherence to the goal 16 of Post-Millennium Development Agenda (Vietti & Scribner, 2013).

In Nigeria, the achievement of independence in 1960 was essentially seen as a catalyst that will reunite the competing nationalities whose grouse

stemmed from the unsystematic manner through which the amalgamation was foisted on them. Nevertheless, emerging realities within this era contradicted the expectation. The nascent Nigerian state was immediately caught in a war-with-itself mainly due to the widespread division aggravated by rapid socio-economic changes and deteriorating economic conditions, military intrusion into politics, extended periods of military rule, political and civil disorder, human rights violations, and unbridled crimes and criminalities. The Western Region's political crisis of 1963, the Tiv riot of 1964 and the military intervention of 1966 were classical events which heightened tensions and traumatized the security architecture of the Nigerian state. Above all, the Nigerian Civil War was the climax of security disruption in that era. Apart from the humanitarian crisis which it generated, including gruesome killings of more than two million citizens, displacement of about five million people and destruction of property worth billions of naira (Diamond, 2007; Heerten & Moses, 2014); it also fostered ethno-religious acrimony and hostilities among the already divided ethnic groups. The escalation and resurgence of ethno-religious uproar such as the Maitatsine riot of the 1980s which claimed the lives of 5,581 persons; the Kafanchan crisis of 1987 which resulted to the death of 25 persons and; Zagon-Kataf riot of 1992 where thousands of Nigerians lost their lives, were the logical upshot of the hostilities which existed among the nationalities.

Meanwhile, Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 has been a turbulent era; among other things, the fourth republic has been plagued by endemic security challenges which have defied all known diagnostic measures. Despite the increasing visibility of the security forces in the management of internal security, the spate of insecurity has grown progressively and reached alarming magnitude. From the security threats posed by the Niger Delta militants and pirates in the South-South to the Boko Haram in North East as well as Fulani Herdsmen carnage in the North Central, including the recent banditry in north west and not forgetting the incidence of cybercrime, kidnapping and ritual killings in the South West and the resurgence of separatist movements in the South East; the Nigerian state is undoubtedly seen as one of the most insecure nations in the world. Official reports revealed that while 50 cases of violent conflicts led to the death and internal displacements of over ten thousand and three hundred thousand persons respectively between 1999 and 2003; the communal clashes in Jos resulted in the killings of over three hundred and eighty persons (USAID, 2005; Adinoyi, 2009; ICG, 2009).

On the other hand, the violent extremism orchestrated by the Boko Haram terrorist group has been acknowledged as major threats to both internal and international security architecture with ever-increasing violence and attacks on worship centres, unarmed citizens, media houses, public infrastructure as well as international organizations such as the United Nations office in Abuja. Despite the recent government's declaration of the sect's technical defeat and dislodgement, Boko Haram insurgency has sustained its global notoriety as one of the most lethal terror group mainly due to the increased numbers of cadres, improved and sophisticated weaponry, suicide bombings, and well-organized guerrilla tactics. Starting from 2009 when the group successfully transformed itself from a relatively nonviolent fundamentalist religious movement into the lethal and resilient force it is today (Okolie & Nnamani, 2016; Matfess, 2018), the group has successfully perpetrated acts of violence which claimed thirty-five thousand (35,000) lives, kidnap of tens of thousands and displacements of 2.3 million persons particularly women and children (Thurston, 2016; Matfess, 2017). Just recently, Human Rights Watch (2019) reported that following series of attacks coordinated by the sect, close to 1,200 persons died in the northeast geopolitical zone of Nigeria in 2018 while an estimated 84 worshippers were killed in Mosque by Boko Haram suicide bombers in the same year. Given the lethality of its operations as well as the unpredictable nature of its tactics, the government and citizens still contend with the humanitarian crisis and economic cost which the sect imposed on Nigeria.

Further, the incidence and spate of kidnapping and armed robbery in Nigeria has intensified the security challenges in the country. The major targets include foreigners, high-profiled government officials, first class traditional rulers, business moguls and renowned clerics. According to the available statistics, while Nigeria witnessed 353 cases of kidnapping in 2008, 512 in 2009 and a record-breaking figure of 1,177 in 2017; over six hundred million Naira ransom fees was paid to kidnappers in 2009 (Ngwama, 2014; Eagle Online, 2017). A further breakdown shows that out of 512 cases of kidnapping in 2009, an approximate 200 victims were expatriates. In South East alone, about 989 kidnapping cases were recorded between 2012 and 2015; while ransoms valued at one billion, two hundred million naira was reportedly paid (Oparaku, Nwaneri & Egbe, 2017). In the South West, a study by CLEEN foundation in 2013 found that the region has the highest incidents of kidnapping and hostage taking in Nigeria with five percent of the

participants reporting that they have either been kidnapped or attempts have been made to kidnap them. Also, the prevalence of militancy and maritime piracy in the oil rich Niger Delta has heightened the menace of kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom in the area.

Recently, the security situation of Nigeria has further been complicated by the transmogrification of Fulani herdsmen from mere pastoralists to a deadly. Although the Fulani herdsmen have been historically embroiled in seemingly intractable altercation with the sedentary farmers over scarce resources occasioned by ecological misfortunes in the north east, the nature of this disagreement has metamorphosed from a rudimentary communal skirmishes to an organized armed confrontation, while its contemporary manifestations has further transformed itself into a genre of guerrilla warfare characterized by immense brutal sophistications (Okolie & Nnamani, 2017). The scope of operation has transcended the boundaries of the north central geopolitical zone of Nigeria (the hotbed of the crisis) to other zones including the South East, North West, South West and South South. With the tacit support of the Nigerian state and its security operatives, what began as land conflict between the herdsmen and crop farmers has developed into banditry, with grave human and economic cost, ranging from attacks on villages, kidnapping and hostage-taking of victims, displacement of persons, rape of women, to cattle rustling and armed robbery.

The increasing availability of small and light weapons produced and smuggled in from outside, complicates the carnage. Clashes between Fulani herdsmen and crop farmers accounted for the death of one thousand six hundred (1,600) persons and displacement of over three hundred thousand (300,000) individuals. In Benue state, the enactment of Grazing Law in 2017 which outlawed unrestrained grazing in the state heightened tension between herders and crop farmers. From 1st to 7th January 2017, armed men widely believed to be herders angered by the law invaded some agrarian communities in Guma and Logo local government areas, killing over 80 people (ICC, 2018). The attack has continued with over 300 casualties in the state since then. Recently, the intensification of armed banditry and cattle rustling in some northern states such as Katsina, Kaduna, Sokoto, and Zamfara has not only created palpable fears among the inhabitants, it has also led to the kidnapping and killings of defenceless citizens. Reports from Kaduna State Police Command observed that no fewer than 17 members of vigilante group were killed by the bandits on March 12 2019 in Jan Ruwa Village in Birnin

Gawri Local Government (*Premium Times*, 2019). In Zamfara state, bandits also coordinated attacks in Kware village in Shinkafi district leading to the death of 30 people (Punch, 2019).

State-centric Responses to Security Challenges in Nigeria and Limitations

Designing and implementing effective mechanisms for managing and countering security threats is the preoccupation of any progressive-minded state and indeed, a *sine qua non* for its development. In most cases, the constitution usually specifies the institutions and modalities for responding to threats against the state. In Nigeria, Section 217 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, provides for the existence of military institution and further empowered it to: defend the country from external aggression or threats, maintain its territorial integrity, suppress internal insurrection or tensions, secure the borders from infiltration, and perform other functions as may be prescribed by the Act of National Assembly. In terms of *modus operandi*, Section 8(1) of the Armed Forces empowered the President to determine the operational use of the Nigerian military in maintaining security, public safety and order. These constitutional and other legal provisions presuppose that Nigeria's official strategy for responding to or suppressing crimes, criminalities and other soft actions by belligerent organizations targeted against public order, security and sovereignty of the state is anchored on the state-centric notion of security – intensified crackdown and offensive operations by the military against the supposedly enemies of the state. The underlying idea of this approach is that flashpoints of insecurity have to be matched with instruments of violence, coercion and brutality. Succinctly put, the use of the coercive apparatus including the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and other intelligence agencies, to deter aggressive behaviour or counter latent or conspicuous threats.

Nigeria's historical quest for a relatively stable environment has remained largely unrealizable given the plethora of crisis, crimes and violent conflicts which it has continued to grapple with since independence. Badmus (2005) noted that the emergent Nigerian state which basked in the euphoria of self-determination on 1st October 1960, was soon entrapped in the web of altercations and skirmishes. From the Western Region political crisis of 1963 to the Tiv riot of 1964, down to the military disruption of democratic process in 1966, the nascent Nigerian state resorted to the use of military to contain violent and non-violent actions of individuals or groups whose discontent and

grievances stemmed from the dysfunctional political system imposed on them by the colonialists and sustained by local surrogates. Similarly, the Civil War experience of 1967 exposed government's inability to meaningfully engage and resolve the feeling of alienation, marginalization, injustice and dissatisfaction by the defunct eastern region. In its characteristic manner, the state responded through warfare engagement with the region. The humanitarian crisis and economic cost which the war imposed on the Nigerian state remains underestimated till date.

Also, the state-centric leaning of Nigeria in resolving conflicts is evident and demonstrated in the crude style in which the state has managed the renewed Biafran separatist agitation under the umbrella of the Indigenous People of Biafra. At the heat of the agitations, the Nigerian government labelled the agitators 'troublemakers' and further proscribed the movement. It deployed massive military operations under the '*Operation Python Dance*' to suppress or restrain the activities of the group in the South East and some parts of South-South zones. These military-based actions not only translated to casualties, it escalated ethnic tensions and solidified separatist agitations in the zones. Reports from Amnesty International revealed that under the *Operation Python Dance* campaign, the Nigerian armed forces orchestrated crackdowns and extrajudicial killings in some parts of Abia State, leading to the deaths of at least one hundred and fifty pro-Biafran agitators.

In the same vein, the uprising and resurgence of Niger Delta hostilities which led to the proliferations of sub-national entities including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, Niger Delta Vigilante, Niger Delta Liberation Front, Niger Delta Avengers and Niger Delta Salvation Front, were natural responses to government's negligence, degradation, exploitation, injustice and complete alienation of the region (Okeke-Uzodike & Ojatorotu, 2006; Ibaba, 2008; Udoh, 2013; Abang, 2014; Onuoha, 2016; Moses & Olaniyi, 2017; Chikwem & Duru, 2018). Although these militant organizations perpetrate various crimes and acts of violence such as hostage, oil bunkering and bombing of oil facilities, which have exacerbated insecurity and undermined the economic stability of Nigerian state; government's counter-offensive measure as exemplified in the recent directive of President Muhammadu on 20th May 2016 to the Chief of the Naval Staff to ruthlessly deal with the Niger Delta Avengers, has once again confirmed the state-centric posture in handling conflict situation in the country.

Government's reliance on offensive approach in managing Niger Delta militancy is indeed not a recent invention. Udoh (2013) argued that the use of corrective measure in the Niger Delta involves the mobilization of coercive state instruments to punish individuals and non-state actors whose activities are seen as jeopardizing the interest of the state. The suppression of Ken Saro-Wiwa led Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and execution of its leader is a leading attestation. The penchant by the state acting in an unholy alliance with the Multi-National Oil Companies, to confront peaceful protesters with lethal military raids and corrective measures as seen in Odi village, Bayelsa state on 20th November 1999, has further complicated the security situations in the region. Moreover, the use of Joint Task Force code named Operation Pulo Shield to secure oil infrastructure in Niger Delta left the region as a theatre of war, dire humanitarian and economic consequences.

Similarly, Nigeria's major strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism posed by Boko Haram has been intensified with an offensive crackdown by the coercive apparatus and other security agencies of the state. This military approach led to the inauguration of Joint Task Force comprising mainly of Nigerian Army, Navy, Air-Force, Police, Directorate of State Security, Immigration and Directorate of Intelligence Agency. The Joint Task Force was empowered to conduct military operation in most Boko Haram occupied areas in order to tame, degrade and over-run the group. Meanwhile, the local military campaign was further boosted by the assistance of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a multilateral contingent drawn from Niger, Chad and Cameroun. Also, the local youths operating under the umbrella of Civilian Joint Task Force were enlisted to assist the conventional military operation in information gathering and arrest of suspected Boko Haram members. Pérouse De Montclos submitted that the repression of the Boko Haram terrorist group in 2009 was accompanied by actions such as extra-judicial killings, massacres, and arrests without trials, which broadened the gap between communities and the security forces. Meanwhile other non-military conflict engagement strategies in Nigeria although rarely resorted to, include policy and legislation.

Nevertheless, this study argues that the military approach to violent conflict in Nigeria is fundamentally flawed in many ways. First the military-based strategy is reactive rather than being proactive and pre-emptive, given that it focuses on addressing the problem after the crime and violent act have

been perpetrated. Ideally violent conflict measures prioritize political, social and economic contexts which generate or predispose people to aggressive behaviour. Through contextual and situational analyses, incubating factors are identified while feasible and holistic strategies are designed to synchronize with the prevailing realities. It involves identifying, uprooting and overhauling the structure which bequeaths and sustains untoward outcomes on the society. In most body of conflict literature, there is tendency by scholars to explore the contextual factors that fuel violent conflict. To some, violent conflict is an expression of resentment, frustration and desperation arising from indices of dysfunctional socio-economic system such as poverty, inequality, ethno-religious skirmishes, hunger, and unemployment (Haider, 2007; Uadiale, 2012; Abbas, 2013; Amaraegbu, 2013; Meagher, 2014; Usman, 2015). Contrastingly, peoples' predisposition to aggressive or violent behaviour according to other studies, is a logical outcome of perceived and structural imbalances in a political system which conduces deprivation, subjugation, injustice, inequity and marginalization of the oppressed or minority groups (Osita-Njoku & Chikere, 2015).

This indeed is the missing gap in the Nigeria's counter-insecurity measures. For instance, the Fulani herdsmen/farmers conflict has been historically attributed to the ecological misfortunes (desertification and rainfall variability) in some parts of the North which prompted southward migration of the cattle breeders in search of means of livelihood. The growing widespread appeal of secessionist Biafra movement in the south-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria was occasioned by the long years of negligence and marginalization of the Igbo nationality. Niger Delta militancy was essentially driven by the alienation caused by ethnicity-based political domination, oil based environmental degradation and seemingly gap between oil resources and living conditions of the people. On the other hand, the poor socio-economic indicators of Nigeria have been implicated in the proliferation of small and light weapons and the attendant intensification of crimes and other criminalities including banditry in many parts of the country. The identification of the foregoing socio-economic cum political contexts presuppose that rather than the usual military crackdown on aggressive behaviours which normally address the surface of the problem, appropriate counter-insecurity strategies prioritize the adoption of measures that logically correspond with the nature and character of the conflict (Okolie & Nnamani, 2019).

Secondly, outcome of many studies confirmed that ‘hard-line’ approach to counter-insecurity provides a fertile ground for the perpetration of various forms of human right abuses including torture, plundering of resources, seizure of private property, extra-judicial killings, rape, forced disappearance, detention without trial, and draconian restrictions on freedom of assembly, movement and expression (Sperotto, 2009; Hayes, 2012; Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014; Odomovo, 2014; Mosabala, 2016; Amnesty International, 2016; Gogoi, 2018; Amnesty International, 2018). Part IV (2) of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288 corroborated by the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 2396 of 2017 reiterated member states’ obligation to ensure that measures adopted in response to armed conflicts comply with the extant international human rights. Similarly, the UN Human Rights in 2018 had expressed commitment towards monitoring human rights violations perpetrated during armed conflicts, including civilian casualties and incidents of sexual and gender-based violence.

Although the foregoing restrictive measures were reaffirmed and prioritized by the United Nations, of which Nigeria is a signatory to and by implication, bound to adhere; Montclos (2014) argued that the country has not only contravened the rules of engagement in response to armed conflicts, it has also poor record of protecting civilians, and a pattern of human rights violations which go across the country. A detailed report by the Amnesty International (2018) found that between 2015 and 2015, the military forces under the *Operation Python Dance*, mobilized to respond to the non-violent agitations of the proscribed Biafran separatist movement recorded the deaths of more than 150 members of the Indigenous People of Biafra. In 2017, members of the Nigerian armed forces masterminded the killings of 12 IPOB enthusiasts in Umuahia, Abia State. Also, an offensive crackdown launched against members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (the umbrella body of Shia sect in Nigeria) who were observing religious rites in the northern city of Zaria, led to the deaths of more than 350 adherents including women and children. The report further note that the outcome of the confrontation resulted to the arrest and incarceration of the leader of the group, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, and his spouse on December 2015. Although several court orders have been issued for the release and compensation of the El-Zakzaky in 2016, the government has continually defied these directives.

Similarly, further evidences documented by the Amnesty International suggest that the military operations launched against the Boko Haram

insurgents recorded series of human rights violations including arbitrary arrest and torture of over 20,000 people, deaths of more than 7,000 detainees arising due to excessive over-crowding, denial of medical care and starvation, forced disappearance of thousands of detainees, and extrajudicial killings of over 1,200 suspects (Amnesty International, 2016). Again, the coordinated attacks on the Giwa barracks in Maiduguri by the Boko Haram terrorist group in March 2014 led to the execution of more than 640 men and boys, unlawful detention of 4,900 people and deaths of 580 detainees including children, women and babies. The latter's death was probably linked to starvation, dehydration and diseases, attributed to overcrowding at the detention facility. In 2009, Dode (2012) reported that the heavy and offensive military operations involving conventional warfare tactics such as land, sea and aerial bombardment, targeted against the Niger Delta militants in Gbaramatu Kingdom, Warri South West Council of Delta state, resulted to the deaths of 50 and several thousands of innocent civilians. Also, Amnesty International found that between 20 to 30,000 civilians caught in the cross fire, were object of internal displacement. Meanwhile Human Right Watch (2016) reported that military forces in a crackdown against the Niger Delta Avengers, demolished 43 houses and other properties in Peremabiri, Akamabugo, and Tikogbene communities in Bayelsa State.

Most fundamentally, the military repressive approach to armed conflict imposes economic cost on the state. The Institute for Economics and Peace (2018) argued that although military response to violence is a critical aspect of public good, it is mostly economically wise for nations to minimize expenditure on offensive campaigns in order to divert the resources to other economically viable activities. This is because when public funds are excessively expended on violence containment, it has the potentiality of undermining the economic growth of a nation. Nigeria's military campaign in containing violence and other armed conflicts validates the foregoing extrapolations. In the last two decades, the Nigerian state has deployed its coercive apparatus in prosecuting offensive campaigns against insurgency, militancy, ethno-religious uprisings, and other forms of criminalities. As such, the budgetary allocations to the security have grown exponentially from N37,490,000,000 billion in 2000 to 444,098,000,000 in 2016 (SIPRI, 2017). As the security budget is expanding, there is concomitant decline in the budgetary allocations to other areas vital to human development including job creation, qualitative education, social security, critical infrastructure and

economic development. Lack of jobs and other social services conduce frustration, and threaten the survivability of people.

Excessive Defence Budget, Human Security Cost and Recycling of Traditional Threats in Nigeria

Inclusive and human-centred security strategy with women, children and youth at the centre of analysis, is at the core of the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda. Human security is a deviation from the traditional security architecture which hinges on national security. It is strategic approach which integrates the ‘human components’ of security, rights and development. It is context-specific, multi-sectoral, people-centred, comprehensive and prevention-oriented (United Nations, 2012). Human security is based on the right of people to live in freedom and dignity; thus, the inter-linkages between peace, development and human rights. It addresses the unending questions of survival, livelihood and dignity of people in response to present and emerging threats – threats that are extensive and cut across seven specific areas, including: food, health, community, politics, economy, environment, and dignity of individuals. In relational term, human security seeks to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by tackling the root causes of persistent poverty; supporting resilience to climate change and natural disasters and reinforcing the shift from humanitarian crisis to long term sustainable development.

As a corollary of the above, it is therefore expected that nations particularly the developing ones, would leverage on the human security principles to evolve development strategies that would liberate individuals from poverty, hunger, disease, want, threats, repression and hurtful disruptions; provide equitable and universal access to quality education, health care and social protection, potable water and sanitation; boost food sufficiency; and most fundamentally, foster a safe, resilient and sustainable habitat (United Nations, 2015, pp.2-3). Achieving these goals entail revolutionizing the traditional security architecture in line with the new security thinking, through demilitarization of the societies, redefinition of budget priorities, and diversion of public funds from military-related expenditure to development-oriented endeavours. Succinctly stated, it is the acceptance that ‘*national security*’ is basically no longer the preoccupation of the state and its coercive apparatus; rather it is the understanding that political,

social, economic and environmental issues affecting individuals should primarily constitute the locus of public expenditure.

Nigeria's grand framework for security governance is enshrined in the 1999 Constitution as amended. Section 217 and 218 provided for the existence, functions and *modus operandi* of the Nigeria's armed forces. Particularly section 217 subsection 2(a-c) clearly empowered the armed forces to defend Nigeria from external aggression, secure the borders from violation on land, sea, or air; and most importantly, suppress insurrection from belligerent organizations. The 1999 Constitution as amended is further complemented by the National Defence Policy, initially developed by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2006 and recently reviewed by the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2017. The defence policy guideline encapsulates Nigeria's short to medium term policy framework for security and defence especially as it relates the deployment of the military institution in particular and national resources in general to uphold the country's territorial integrity and shield it from external antagonism. It provides support for the growth and strengthening of the armed forces and other elements of national power in order to engage in conventional warfare and low intensity conflicts, and as well, respond to the whole gamut of threats from armed non-state actors (NDP, 2006). The overarching goal is to provide a solid, flexible and most importantly, a battle winning Armed Forces that jointly meet the security needs of Nigeria. In the same vein, like the NDP, the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) encompassing a coordinated action plan and guideline for countering terrorism and violent extremism, evolved in response to the rising wave of terrorism starting from 2009, also adopted a military-based approach (Ramdeen, 2017).

The implication of mainstreaming the armed forces at the hub of Nigeria's security architecture as seen in the foregoing constitutional provision and policy documents is the inevitable increase in the military expenditure for the provision of logistic backup, procurement of arms and provision of the welfare of the personnel. As seen in the table below, Nigeria's military expenditure rose from ₦37.5 billion in 2000, ₦75.9 billion naira in 2003, ₦122 billion naira in 2007, ₦299 billion naira in 2010, ₦381 billion naira in 2013, to ₦495 billion naira in 2017. These figures are outside other unaccounted and un-appropriated security expenditure including the controversial security votes.

Table 1: Military Expenditure of Nigeria, 2000-2018

Year	Military Expenditure (in billion naira)
2000	37.5
2001	63.5
2002	108
2003	75.9
2004	85.0
2005	88.5
2006	99.9
2007	122
2008	192
2009	224
2010	299
2011	369
2012	365
2013	381
2014	374
2015	397
2016	444
2017	495
2018	654

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019.

Also, further analysis revealed that Nigeria appropriated the sum of 6 trillion naira representing ten (10.51) percent of the entire budget to the defence sector in the past eleven (11) years (Ndujihe, 2018). A breakdown of these appropriations revealed that the Ministry of Defence received the sum of ₦444.6 billion (20.09%) of the ₦2.213 trillion budget in 2008; 921 billion (18.90%) of 5.248 trillion budget in 2012; 1.05 trillion (21.16%) of the ₦4.962 trillion budget in 2013; and 968.127 billion (19.51%) of the 4.962 trillion

budget in 2014. Although the defence budget was trimmed down to N429.128 billion (7.08%) of N6.061 trillion budget in 2016, it further appreciated to N465.87 billion in 2017 and N580.145 billion in 2018. The increases in defence budget between 2012 and 2014 coincide with a period that Boko Haram terrorist group committed high-level atrocities against the Nigerian state. Moreover, the further defence budget expansion witnessed between 2015 and 2018 could also be attributed to the rising waves of Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani herdsman militancy, rising waves of kidnapping, and resurgence of separatist movement.

Table 2: Budgetary Allocations to Nigerian Defence Sector, 2008-2018

Year	Total Budget	Budgetary Allocation to Defence Sector	Percentage
2008	2.213trillion	444.6 billion naira	20.09%
2009	3.049trillion	233 billion naira	7.64%
2010	5.248 trillion	264 billion naira	5.03%
2011	4.972 trillion	348 billion naira	7.0%
2012	4.877 trillion	921.91 billion naira	18.90%
2013	4.987 trillion	1.055 trillion	21.16%
2014	4.962 trillion	989.127 billion	19.51%
2015	5.068 trillion	388.459 billion	7.67%
2016	6.061 trillion	429.128 billion	7.08%
2017	7.444 trillion	465.87 billion	6.26%
2018	9.12 trillion	580.145 billion	6.36%

Source: Ndujihe, 2018.

While these huge allocations to the defence sector is justified on the basis of the conventional thinking that the military institution is by and large the defender of the socio-cultural, economic and political interest of Nigeria; there is however an established argument that the redirection of public spending priority from human-oriented endeavours to defence sector greatly undermines the development of a state. As Nigeria prioritizes defence sector, its rippling effect is evident in the declining percentage share of other human-

development based sectors to the entire budget. A recent study observed that Nigeria’s military spending has consistently surpassed those of the health and education sectors respectively from 2001 to 2014 apart from 2006, 2007 and 2013 when it was slightly overtaken by education expenditure. A survey of government’s approved budget indicates that the percentage share of the education sector decreased from 12.05% in 2014, 9.17% in 2016, 7.39% in 2017 to 7.38% in 2018 (Budget Office, 2019). In the same vein, the percentage share of the health sector to the entire budget declined 7.23% in 2014, 6.85% in 2015, 5.83% in 2016, 5.11% in 2017 to 5.9% in 2018.

Similar budgetary allocation to agriculture shows that the sector’s percentage share of the total public expenditure shrank from 2.5% in 2010, 2.3% in 2015, 1.25% in 2016, 1.82% in 2017, 2.23% in 2018, to 1.56% in 2019 (Eke, 2019). On the other hand, although UNICEF’s report shows that more than 69 million Nigerians do not have access to improved and safe water, government’s commitment in bridging this gap has remained largely poor as water sector’s percentage share of the entire budget stood at 0.87% and 1.49% in 2016 and 2017 respectively (Adebowale, 2018; Budget Office, 2019). In the sphere of environment, available statistics show that only 7.7% of the total Nigerian land area is under forest cover.

Table 3: Deforestation Statistics in Nigeria, 2010-2015

Year	Forest Area (as % of Land Area)	% C h a n g e i n R a t e o f Deforestation
2010	9.9	-4.33
2011	9.5	-4.53
2012	9.0	-4.75
2013	8.6	-4.98
2014	8.1	-5.24
2015	7.7	-5.53

Source: CSJ, 2016.

With these statistics, Nigeria presently has the highest case of deforestation in the world as against 85.4% in Gabon, 75.4% in Guinea Bissau, 44.9% in Benin Republic and 39.2% in Ghana (Eze, 2016). Beyond the deforestation imbroglio, Eze (2016) reported that more than 15 states in the northern region are currently faced with desert encroachment. Underscoring the extent of desertification in Nigeria as illustrated in the table below, the Center for Social Justice (2016) observed that a sum of 580,541 km representing 63.83% of the total land area of Nigeria, is under the ecological misfortune of desertification with varying degrees.

Table 4: Desertification Statistics in Nigeria

State	Land Area (km²)	Land Area (as a % of Nigeria)	Rate of Desertification
Sokoto	27,825	3.06	Extreme
Zamfara	37,931	4.17	Extreme
Katsina	23,561	2.59	Extreme
Jigawa	23,287	2.56	Extreme
Kebbi	36,985	4.06	Extreme
Borno	72,609	7.98	Extreme
Yobe	46,609	5.12	Extreme
Kaduna	42,481	4.67	Moderate
Bauchi	41,119	4.52	Moderate
Gombe	17,100	1.88	Moderate
Adamawa	38,700	4.25	Moderate
Taraba	56,282	6.19	Moderate
Niger	68,925	7.58	Moderate
Plateau	27,147	2.98	Moderate
Total	580,841	63.83	

Source: Center for Social Justice, 2016.

Evidently, while these terrifying environmental statistics impact negatively on rural livelihood, biological diversity, agricultural yield, water availability, economic growth, and agricultural productivity; government’s response has remained insignificant. A review of government’s annual budget shows that the appropriation to the Ministry of Environment has continuously declined from 2013 to 2016. In 2013 and 2014, the Nigerian government allocated the sum of 27.253 billion and 23.113 billion naira respectively, to the Environment Ministry (Budget Office, 2017). Meanwhile, the 2016 allocation to the same ministry stood at an absolute figure of 19.473 billion naira, representing only 0.32% of the entire budget. Just recently, the figure plummeted to 17.88 billion naira representing 0.19% in the 2018 appropriation.

Table 5: Budgetary Allocation to the Ministry of Environment, 2013-2018

Year	Nigeria’s Budget (Naira)	Share of Environment Ministry	% Share of Environment to the entire Budget
2013	4,987,220,425,601	27,253,838,609	0.55
2014	4,695,190,000,000	23,113,862,156	0.49
2015	4,493,363,957,158	17,499,334,341	0.39
2016	6,060,677,358,227	19,473,373,106	0.32
2017	7,441,175,486,758	16,108,983,841	0.22
2018	9,120,334,988,225	17,885,452,791	0.19

Source: Budget Office, 2015; 2018.

Also, a perusal of the budgetary allocations to two Ministries (Ministry of Labour & Employment and Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investment) vital to job creations and human empowerment demonstrates government’s lack of commitment in tackling the growing incidence of unemployment and poverty as well as bridging the growing social inequality in the country. Government’s appropriations to the Ministry of Labour and Employment stood at ₦8,305,830,880 in 2015; ₦7,735,604,366 in 2016; ₦8,626,186,611 in 2017

and; ₦7,712,063,655 in 2018. Meanwhile the percentage share of Ministry retrogressed from 0.18% in 2015; 0.13% in 2016; 0.12% in 2017; and 0.08%. On the other hand, the percentage share of the budgetary allocation of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment to the entire budget depreciated from 0.24% in 2015 to 0.14% in 2018.

Table 6: Budgetary Allocation to Ministry of Labour and Employment & Ministry of Trade, Investment & Industry.

Year	Nigeria's Budget (Naira)	Share of Ministry of Labour & Employment & % share to the entire budget	Share of Ministry of Trade, Investment & Industry & % Share of Environment to the entire Budget
2015	4,493,363,957,158	8,305,830,880 (0.18%)	10,941,859,480 (0.24%)
2016	6,060,677,358,227	7,735,604,366 (0.13%)	10,410,294,458 (0.17%)
2017	7,441,175,486,758	8,626,186,611 (0.12%)	10,797,165,779 (0.15%)
2018	9,120,334,988,225	7,712,063,655 (0.08%)	12,613,911,662 (0.14%)

Source: Budget Office, 2016; 2019.

Nigeria's prioritization of state-centric security architecture which reflected in the consistent rise in military expenditure and the concomitant negligence cum underfunding of the critical areas of human development including education, health, environment, water, agriculture and jobs, has impacted negatively on human security. Among other things, this development has emboldened the resurgence of non-traditional threats to security in Nigeria such as poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, human trafficking, drug trafficking, resource scarcity, illiteracy, outbreak of deadly diseases, food shortages, drought, cybercrime, political subjugation of minority groups etc. For instance, a damning report released by the Brookings Institution in 2018 shows that Nigeria displaced India as the poverty capital of

the world (Kharas, Hamel & Hofer, 2018). To overtake the initial occupier, the number of Nigerians living in extreme poverty moved to 87 million as against India's 73 million. It is estimated that Nigeria will continue to retain this position till 2030 (Kazeem, 2018). In the same vein, further report indicates that while four out of every ten people in Nigeria's workforce were either unemployed or underemployed in 2017, more than 7.9 million people became unemployed between 2016 and 2017 (NBS, 2017). These trends have not only undermined the economic security of Nigerians but also an indication that the country may not achieve the Sustainable Development Goals 1 and 8 – end poverty, and promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.

Similarly, a recent survey revealed that Nigeria has the worst health indicators globally. Health-related reports indicate that Nigeria bears the global burden of malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, meningitis, diarrheal diseases and other deadly diseases. For instance, malaria and HIV/AIDS accounts for 300,000 and 150,000 deaths respectively per annum while maternal mortality accounts for 59,000 deaths of women annually (Muhammadu, Abdulkareem & Chowdury, 2017; Olonade, Olawande, Alabi & Imhonopi, 2019). Also, with an average life expectancy pegged at 54.5 years, Nigeria has the lowest not only in all of West Africa (World Population Review, 2019). Indeed, the foregoing unfortunate statistics depict the enormity of crises and weak state of health system in Nigeria, and by no means, stands as an albatross to the health security and achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 3 – ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. Also, the rot in education sector is directly responsible with the Nigeria's disastrous contribution to global illiteracy rates and out-of-school children.

Furthermore, although Nigeria is considered an agrarian country, the level of food crisis and its obvious manifestations resulting in hunger, malnutrition, stunting etc has remained worrisome. In fact, the 2019 Global Report on Food Crises jointly facilitated by the European Union and United Nations indicates that Nigeria was one of the countries that experienced the worst food crises in the world in 2018. Additional information noted that the northern section of the country constitutes two-thirds of the 113 million people who are currently grappling with acute hunger in the international system in 2018. In the same vein, the Global Hunger Index of 2018 scored Nigeria 31.1, an indication that Nigeria is suffering from severe famine. Other mind-

blowing data denoting the state of food crisis in Nigeria include that: one-third of children under five experience stunted growth, 5.1 million people suffer malnutrition, 8.5 million are in dire need of food especially in the north east ravaged by Boko Haram insurgency etc (Borgen, 2017). This scenario undermines food security and the SDG 2 & 3.

On the other hand, government's lack of commitment in addressing the anthropogenic and natural-induced ecological misfortunes – climate change, drought, desertification and deforestation – plaguing Nigeria has been identified as a major driver of conflict across the country. The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action (2012) reiterated that the tripod factors of climatic shift, environmental degradation and population explosion arising from the undue pressure on diminishing renewable resources (water and land) has increased peoples' tendency to compete over scarce resources for survival. In Nigeria the adverse effect of climate change particularly along the Lake Chad River basin, the growing violent campaign of Boko Haram, the rural banditry and the associated cattle rustling in the northern region collectively imposed a forced southward migration of the Fulani herdsmen in search of not only alternative pastures and sources of water, but also the security of cattle. As herdsmen migrate and settle in the rainforest and savannah of the southern and Middle Belt states for grazing purposes, it has a unique way of instigating, fuelling and sustaining hostilities and violent eruptions between the visitors and the host communities.

However, report from International Crisis Group revealed that the intensification of attacks and counter-attacks has generated grave humanitarian and economic crises in Nigeria, with potentially grave consequences on political and economic security. According to report, from September 2017 through June 2018, the pastoralists-farmers confrontations led to the death of at least 1,500 people and the internal displacement of more than 300,000 (ICG, 2018). The breakdown of the internally displaced persons within this period include: 176,000 in Benue state; 100,000 in Plateau state; 100,000 in Nasarawa state; 19,000 in Taraba state. There is however consensus in the existing literature that the frequent violent clashes between the cattle breeders and crop farmers were mainly due to factors ranging from the destruction of farmlands by cattle, overgrazing of fallow lands, scarcity of freshwater, assault of non-Fulani women by the herdsmen, cattle rustling, defecation on roads and streams, to blockage of stock routes and water points (Folami 2009; Ofuoku & Isife 2009; Adekunle & Adisa 2010; Blench 2010; Odoh & Chigozie 2012;

Solagberu 2012; Audu 2013, 2014; Bello 2013; McGregor 2014, cited in Olayoku, 2016). Given the preeminent role of environment in shaping human and societal development, it is by no means an incontrovertible fact that the ecological misfortunes in Nigeria have serious implications on the entire gamut of human security – personal, community, political, food, health, environmental, and economic.

Indeed, the resurgence of non-traditional threats which primarily originate from demographic trends, climatic shift, chronic poverty, environmental degradation, illiteracy, food shortages, economic inequality, infectious diseases, repressive governance etc conduce frustration and trigger violent behaviour in people. In other words, as people become increasingly susceptible to non-traditional threats occasioned by government's negligence to prioritize their socio-economic needs, they are usually predisposed to violent or aggressive behaviour which has the tendency of destabilizing the security architecture. The intensification and sustenance of traditional threats – Boko Haram insurgency, ethno-religious skirmishes, banditry, militancy, piracy, and other secessionist movement – in Nigeria are rooted in government's state-centric stance to conflict which among other things, relegated the socio-economic cum political drivers of conflict and rather prioritized bogus military expenditure as key to achieving stability and progress in the country. Corroborating this perspective, Cahill-Ripley (2018) reiterated that tackling violence and building peace requires determined attention to the economic, social and cultural rights of the people since the denial of these rights can be a major driver of conflict. In the same vein, Annan (2014) identified socio-economic crisis, politics of exclusion, human rights violation, poverty, ethnic marginalization, bad governance and corruption etc as major triggers of traditional threats in most West African states, including Nigeria. Humphreys (2003) therefore argued that if socio-economic cum political issues were in part responsible for the outbreak of conflict, then resolving the original triggers would require an evolution of context-driven policies that correspond with the nature and character of the conflict. Also, Swearingen (2010) observed that since political, cultural and socioeconomic inequalities among distinct groups could potentially stimulate violent behaviour, policy efforts should move beyond military approach and accommodate actions which address the differences among the groups. In other words, addressing fundamental rights can be a part of the solution and

can be a key element of preventing conflict as well as post-conflict peace building and development.

Mainstreaming Human Security Agenda into Nigeria's Priority (National Budget): A Feasible Approach to Peace-Building and Development

Sections 13-20 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria overtly or covertly identifies human security as the cornerstone of the fundamental objectives and directive principle of the state policy. Broadly Section 14(2a) provides that the security and welfare of the people shall be the *raison d'être* of Nigerian government. Specifically, Section 16 (2d) of the same legal document clarified that the Nigerian state shall provide suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, reasonable minimum living wage, and unemployment, sick benefits and welfare of the disabled for all citizens. To promote the political component of human security, Section 17 (1&2a) provides that the state social order shall be founded on ideals of freedom, equality and justice in a way that enhances citizens' equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law. To actualize this provision, subsection 3 states that the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that all citizens without discrimination on any group whatsoever have the opportunity for securing adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure suitable employment. Meanwhile subsection 3 (c-d) maintained that the health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment are safeguarded and not endangered or abused through the provision of adequate health and other infrastructural facilities. Conversely Section 15 (2) prohibits discrimination of citizens on the basis of sex, religion, place of origin, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties in line with the community dimension of human security.

On 'educational objectives', Section 18 of the constitution reiterated government's readiness to direct its policy towards promoting science & technology and eradicating illiteracy through free, compulsory and universal primary education; free secondary education; free university education and; free adult literacy programme. Most importantly, the constitution recognized the preponderant role of environment in shaping the existence of people. Thus section 20 declared that the state shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the air, water, land, forest and wildlife in Nigeria. Environmental protection is imperative due to the realization that ecological misfortunes such as flood, water scarcity, pollution, climate change,

desertification, drought etc has the propensity to induce migration and provoke conflict. It is also based on the recognition that the realization of social, economic and political rights of the people cannot be possible in an unfriendly environment. Therefore, protection of land, water, air and wildlife were accorded due relevance.

While the recognition and further encapsulation of these vital aspects of human security is commendable, it is rather unfortunate that the political leadership has not mustered the courage to concretize these ideals in line with dictates of human security and by extension, Sustainable Development Goals. Presently, Nigeria's public spending as seen in the previous sections still reflect serious commitment to the traditional security architecture as against prioritizing human capital development. Integrating human security into the fiscal architecture of Nigeria is deliberate and determined efforts aimed at overhauling and refocusing the budget priorities from state-centric to human-oriented development programs. It entails integrating education, health, agriculture, human rights, job creation, environment, public infrastructure, and other pro-poor policies, at the core of the national budget. In concrete term, it means allocating substantial portion of the national budget to address issues of human security in order to protect and empower people against existential threats. Indeed, when people are: protected from infectious diseases, torture, repression, malnutrition, malnourishment, hunger, and environmental crisis; the possibility of living a healthy and fulfilled life is certain. Also when people assured of basic income, jobs, resources for survival, food, inalienable rights, due process, and equality before the law; justice, development and peace will prevail.

Conclusion

The study analyzed the relationship between defence budget and human security in Nigeria. Specifically, the study highlighted the impact of the excessive budget on the burgeoning human security in the country. It argued that the constant increase in military budget or expenditure has tremendously decreased investment in critical spheres of human development. As a result, the deficit arising from underfunded agriculture, education, health and critical infrastructure, has intensified people's vulnerability to non-traditional threats such as diseases, repression, hunger, poverty, inequality, resource scarcity, degradation and attacks. Thus, the resurgence of non-traditional threats provided fertile ground for the proliferations of traditional threats as evident in

Boko Haram Insurgency, Fulani herdsmen militancy, Niger Delta agitations, armed robbery, secessionist movements and other forms of criminalities.

In view of the prevalent human security crisis in Nigeria, the study recommends that the security architecture of the country should be overhauled and designed to prioritize mostly, non-kinetic approach to security. This is in recognition of the fact that traditional threats do not originate or operate outside the realm of non-traditional threats. Thus, policies should be evolved to prevent the eruption of non-traditional threats. Most importantly, one major way of preventing the resurgence of non-traditional threats is to mainstream national budget priorities within the framework of human security. This entails allocating substantial aspect of the resources to various aspects of human security. When people are free from fear and wants; relative peace and development will be guaranteed.

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INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ACHIEVING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA AND THE WAY FORWARD

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Abstract

Free and fair elections constitute the basis of any true representative democracy. This is so because in such a democracy, political power derives from popular consent obtained through periodic competitive elections. But votes do not often count in Nigeria as elections are usually not free and fair due to various electoral malpractices such as rigging, ballot box snatching, vote buying, violence, bribery among other irregularities. Consequently, Nigeria is facing a crisis of democracy because the sanctity of the vote is not guaranteed thereby undermining electoral legitimacy. Adopting the qualitative research method, as well as descriptive/contextual analysis, the paper interrogated salient impediments to free and fair elections in Nigeria from mainly the institutional perspective focusing on election management body, security (law enforcement) agencies and the judiciary with a view to proffering actionable suggestions on the way forward.

Keywords: democracy, election, institutional, rigging, votes

Introduction

Though electoral legitimacy, rooted in free and fair elections, provides the basis for democratic accountability, elections in Nigeria are mostly a perversion of democracy as votes do not often count. Nigeria has a history of deeply flawed elections. Elections held in the country particularly since 1960 when she attained flag independence had generally been perceived as far from being credible, free and fair. This explains why election results are usually vigorously contested in the election tribunals and law courts. According to Omotola (2010), Nigeria has not been able to organize credible elections acceptable to all democratic players, particularly the opposition parties.

Iwu (2008) rightly observed that the integrity of elections in Nigeria has remained largely questionable. He further posited that the integrity of an election process is fundamental to the overall integrity of the democratic

process as well as the stability of the political system. On his part, Ikpe (2010) noted that violence, thuggery, rigging and other forms of electoral malpractices reign supreme during elections in Nigeria. Evidence abounds that politicians could boast openly and make well such boasts, that whether they were voted for or not, they would win the election (Dudley, 1981).

Consequently, Nigeria is facing a crisis of democracy due to the fact that she could not guarantee the sanctity of the vote. A situation whereby the outcome of an election becomes one party out- rigging other parties negate the ideal of democracy. Fraudulent elections constitute a big threat to democratic accountability as it subverts the will of the electorate. Without electoral legitimacy, it would be naïve to expect accountability and good governance from political office bearers. In fact, politicians that come to public office by electoral fraud have no accountability to the people. This paper therefore interrogates salient institutional impediments to free and fair elections in Nigeria with a view to proffering actionable suggestions on the way forward.

The qualitative research method was employed in this paper incorporating basically secondary data sourced from textbooks, journals, newspapers, internet materials and other published works. Data analysis was also mainly descriptive\contextual. According to Mc Nabb (2008) the qualitative research method is a set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena. The essence of descriptive research, according to him, is to specify the properties of the problem under investigation. In terms of research scope, the paper focused on institutional impediments to free and fair elections in Nigeria pertaining particularly to national governmental institutions notably the Election Management Body (EMB), security agencies, and the judiciary.

Conceptual Clarification

Three key concepts namely democracy, election, and institutional that are germane to this discourse are hereby clarified.

Democracy

Democracy, according to Appadorai (1978), is a system of government under which the people exercise the governing power either directly or through representatives periodically elected by themselves. Shively (2002) defined democracy as a state in which all fully qualified citizens vote at regular intervals to choose, from among alternative candidates, the people who

will be in charge of the state's policies. In the view of McCormick (2007), a democracy is a political system in which government is based on a mandate from the people. Democracy, to Maclean and Wood (2010, p.61), is a "political system based on the principle that governance requires the assent of all citizens through participation in the electoral process, articulation of views, and direct or indirect representation in governing institutions" As Lively (2001) pointed out, the true goal of democracy is to ensure popular rule. Thus, democracy is synonymous with majority rule. Simply put therefore, democracy means government of the people since it is a system of government in which political power rest with the mass of the people.

The complexity, geographical vastness and large population of most modern states have ruled out the possibility of direct democracy as was practiced in the ancient Greek city states. Thus, all modern democratic states adopt the representative system of government. A political system in which voters elect others to act on their behalf is called representative democracy (Maclean & Wood, 2010). The elective principle is central to the notion of representative democracy and as such, there can be no democracy without free and fair elections. "Democracy is based on the principle of consent and not coercion. The bullet is replaced by ballot.... Democracy believes in a change of government through constitutional methods and not through violence" (Mahajan, 2008, p.796). In the words of Appadorai (1978, p.138) "the opportunity for political participation, political equality and the possibility of an alternative government – these make a state democratic in form". In the same vein, Roskin, Cord, Medeiro and Jones (2010) describe democracy as a political system of mass participation, competitive elections, human and civil rights. The typical features of a democracy, according to McCormick (2007) include: government by elected officials, regular elections at which all eligible voters can make their choices, few (if any) restrictions on the rights of all adults to vote, competing political parties offering a variety of ideological platforms, multiple channels through which citizens can express their views and influence government (such as interest groups and a free press), freedom of speech, an independent court system and a constitution.

Election

Free and fair elections are important principles that characterize a credible electoral system and a sustainable democracy (Reno, 2011). Election is a competitive procedure by which candidates are voted into elective offices

by the electorate. Heywood (1997) defines election as a device for filling an office or post through choice made by a designated body of people called the electorate. Ikpe (2010, pp.419-420) states that “election is the process of choosing political leaders in a democracy, and the vote or ballot is the instrument for making this choice. Thus, voting is the actual process of indicating one’s preference through the ballot”. Election is therefore truly the heartbeat of democracies because there is the firm recognition of election as the only legitimate source of political power. This suggests that election is the primary means by which eligible citizens or voters exercise popular sovereignty in democracies.

Essentially, for an event to be called an election, the voters must be presented with alternative candidates to choose from. The presence of alternatives is therefore a necessary condition for an election to be described as competitive. Shively (1999, p.204) writes that election:

...serve two main purposes, the purely democratic purpose of allowing the mass of people to have some direct say in the choice of leaders and policies... and the more or less universal purpose of allowing the state to mobilise its people and build up their support for the state by acting it out and participating in the process of government.

Institution

Institution, in the context used in this paper refers to the formal structures of government saddled with the delivery of credible, free and fair elections in both line (direct mandate) and staff (supportive) capacities. Institutional relates to the structures put in place to achieve certain specified objectives. Abell (1995) defines institution as a more or less agreed upon set of rules that carry meaning for and determine the actions of some population of actors. Jepperson (1991) maintains that all institutions simultaneously empower and control as they are vehicles for activity within constraints. According to Gbervbie (2017), the institutional approach focuses on the institutions of government and what they do. Since institutions have no life of their own but are given life by their members; then the attitude, actions and behaviour of their institutional members in the course of discharging their statutory responsibilities are salient. Some of the most notable institutional bases of democracy are political parties, election management bodies, security agencies, and the judiciary; of these four key institutions, political parties are

somewhat non-governmental and as such are excluded from our consideration in this discourse.

Theoretical Framework

The liberal democratic theory provides the theoretical guide for this work. John Locke the progenitor of liberal democracy defines it as “rule by the majority” and considered the consent of the people as the basis of political power. His contention was that political power is the trust of the people in the hands of the government (as cited in Udokang and Awofeso, 2002). It is the basic assumption of the liberal theory of democracy that election is a process by which the general masses are given the opportunity to participate in the political system, and election results reflects the public opinion (Mahajan, 2008).

Hague and Harrop (1992) conceive of liberal democracy as a qualified form of democracy based on popular elections and representative government with strong concern for individual rights. Varma (1975, p.432) posits that the liberal democratic theory “is based on the principle of liberty and equality, and in the superiority of the voluntary principle over force”. Merkl (2008) highlights four key principles of the liberal democratic theory thus: the first principle is that democracy is a government by popular consent. The second principle is that it depicts majority rule as decisions are taken by majority vote based on the principle of one person, one vote. The third principle is the recognition of minority rights; as legal safeguards are provided to protect the interests of the minorities. The fourth principle is that it denotes constitutional government, which means a government by laws and not by men - In other words, there are definite processes and procedures to carry on the government.

The liberal view of democracy, as Joseph (1991) affirms, usually embraces such notion as popular sovereignty, consent, equality and representative government. The liberal democratic theory is adopted as the basis of analysis in this paper because Nigeria’s democratic experimentations at various periods: First Republic 1960 – 1966, Second Republic 1979 – 1983, the aborted Third Republic 1986 – 1993 and the Fourth Republic 1999 to date, have all been patterned on western liberal democracy. However, as Salami (1994, p.80), rightly observed “the practice of democracy in Nigeria has revealed disobedience to both constitutive and regulative rule of democracy”. Consequently, countries like Nigeria with defective or jaundiced democratic practices are now properly classified or labeled as illiberal democracies.

Roskin, Cord, Medeiro and Jones (2010) define illiberal democracies as regimes that are elected but lack democratic qualities such as civil rights and limits on government. Given Nigeria's flawed elections and other undemocratic tendencies, it will be strange if her democratic practice is called anything but illiberal.

Conditions for free and fair election

Mollah (2018) argues strongly that free and fair election is one of the prerequisites of sustainable democratic governance. An electoral process that is free and fair, according to Ikpe (2010), gives the voter the confidence that his/her vote will count in determining the electoral outcome. The credibility of an election is therefore largely dependent on the extent or degree to which the electoral process is perceived as free and fair. Mackenzie (1967) advanced four essential conditions for free and fair election as follows:

- i. An independent judiciary to interpret the electoral laws.
- ii. An honest, competent non-partisan electoral body to manage the elections.
- iii. A developed system of political parties.
- iv. A general acceptance by the political community of the rules of the game.

In the same vein, Rajasingham (2015) outlined three elements of free and fair election as follows:

- i. An enabling legislative framework.
- ii. An impartial and neutral administration including the election commission, and
- iii. Competitive electoral process acceptable to all the political parties.

In essence, the notion of free and fair election refers to an electoral process in which:

- i. All the citizens who are eligible to vote are enabled to do so.
- ii. Voters make electoral choices without illegitimate inducement and coercion.
- iii. Electoral institutions, processes and outcomes are not manipulated by the government, groups and individuals.
- iv. Outcomes of electoral process are determined purely by the votes of the electorate (Udosen, 2013).

Dundas (1994) likewise submitted that the assessment of an election as to whether it is free and fair or not, can be done by answering the following questions:

- i. Is the legal framework adequate to ensure that the organisation of free and fair multi-party elections can be achieved in a given situation?
- ii. Has the potential to contribute to the holding of free and fair multi-party elections been reflected in the provisions of the constitution and those of the electoral laws?
- iii. Have the courts been given the fullest possible role in assisting aggrieved persons who complain about failures in the procedures of major election processes?
- iv. Are the election safeguards satisfactorily balanced with the facilitation measures in place and aimed at delivering high quality election services at cost effective levels?

On a general note, when conditions for free and fair election are met, the first promise it holds for the polity is winning or gaining the confidence of the people in the electoral process. Moreover, free and fair election confers on the constituted government the legitimacy to govern as well as the moral responsibility of being accountable to the people that gave it the mandate to govern. The failure or inability to achieve free and fair elections will definitely bring about post-election conflicts, crisis and violence that can prove costly and dangerous for democratic consolidation and the electoral process.

Common electoral malpractices in Nigeria

Some scholars and researchers (Akor, 2010; Udosen, 2013; Umoh, 2018) have identified a number of ways in which elections are rigged in Nigeria, and these include:

- i. Illegal printing of voters' cards.
- ii. Illegal possession of ballot boxes.
- iii. Stuffing of ballot boxes with fake ballot papers.
- iv. Falsification of election results.
- v. Illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers.
- vi. Use of under -age voters.
- vii. Illegal compilation of separate voters' lists
- viii. Compilation of fictitious names on voters' lists.

- ix. Illegal printing of forms used for collation and declaration of election results.
- x. Deliberate refusal to supply election materials to certain areas.
- xi. Announcing results in places where no elections were held.
- xii. Unauthorized announcement of election results.
- xiii. Change of list of electoral officials.
- xiv. Ballot box – switching and inflation of figures
- xv. Miscounting or non-counting of ballots
- xvi. Vote buying and selling.
- xvii. Bribing of electoral officials, the police and other security agents to rig election
- xviii. Use of partisan party supporters by the election management body as electoral officers to man polling stations.
- xix. Use of armed thugs to harass and intimidate opponents, rival party agents and voters.
- xx. Forcing party agents to sign forged election results at gun point.
- xxi. Deliberate disfranchisement of targeted sections of the electorate.
- xxii. Corrupt practices of electoral officers.
- xxiii. Judicial injustice
- xxiv. Outright disregard for the rule of law
- xxv. Political thuggery
- xxvi. Brutality by police and the military.
- xxvii. Starting voting very late and ending early.
- xxviii. Passing of obnoxious electoral laws which put the opposition parties at disadvantage.
- xxix. Multiple voting and cheating.
- xxx. Unnecessary declaration of inconclusive elections.

Institutional impediments to free and fair elections in Nigeria

The problem of lack of election credibility in Nigeria is attributable to weak institutionalization of the major government agencies involved, either directly or indirectly, in the administration of elections in the country. Notable governmental institutions in this regard are the election management body – the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the security services (especially the military, police, civil defence and the department of state security) and the judiciary. We shall at this juncture examine some major

impediments to free and fair elections as it concerns these aforementioned institutional actors.

Election Management Body

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the main election management body at the national level in Nigeria. Election management bodies are ideally expected to be neutral and independent from any of the electoral stakeholders. However, the independence of the election management body is mostly determined by the mode of appointment of its principal officers. Section 153(1)(f) of Nigeria's 1999 constitution (as amended) listed INEC as one of the federal executive bodies established by the constitution. Section 130(2) of the same constitution states that the President shall be the Head of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the federation.

This implies that the executive powers of the federation are vested on the president and since INEC is recognized constitutionally as a federal executive body, it is therefore answerable and accountable to the president, technically. Section 154(1) of the constitution declares that "Except in the case of ex-officio members or where other provisions are made in this constitution, the chairman and members of any of the bodies so established shall, subject to the provisions of this constitution, be appointed by the president and the appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the senate." Section 154(3) further stipulates that in exercising his powers to appoint a person as chairman or member of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the president shall consult the council of state.

Since the president, who is normally a partisan politician, appoints the principal officers of INEC, then it stands to reason that the body will find it difficult, if not impossible, to be neutral, impartial and truly independent. This is so because being the appointing (and firing) authority, the president would naturally expect his appointees who are in charge of INEC to be loyal to him and favour him/his party during elections. But for INEC to creditably perform its statutory responsibility of conducting free, fair, transparent and credible elections in Nigeria, it is important for the body to operate completely free from political interference and manipulations as well as outside pressures in a totally objective manner.

An example of such interference can be seen in the reported case of INEC receiving a directive to postpone the 2019 general elections in Zamfara

State from the incumbent Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) Abubakar Malami. Though the AGF denied the allegation and said his office would not in any way interfere with INEC's mandate to conduct free and fair elections, he however admitted that all he did was to draw the attention of the commission to the need to consider the judgment of the Court of Appeal in favour of his party, the All Progressives Congress (APC) (keke, 2019).

In addition to lack of institutional autonomy, INEC also lacks financial independence. As such, INEC relies on the executive for adequate funding, and as the common saying goes "he who pays the piper, dictates the tune". Moreover, INEC's manipulations of the process of voters' registration and distribution of permanent voters' card (PVC) constitute another impediment to free and fair elections. Rigging usually start at the voters' registration and PVC collection stages. The registration and PVC collection procedures put in place by INEC often inhibits rather than facilitates mass participation in the electoral process due to the many inconveniences people are subjected to. The cumbersome and often time-wasting procedure for voters' registration as well as collection of PVC invariably means that many people are disenfranchised through no fault of theirs but due to the frustrating bottlenecks created by INEC. Lots of complaints from aggrieved members of the public were reported before the 2019 polls concerning difficulties in PVC collection. Indeed, a respectable national daily reported an alleged conspiracy by INEC to deny Igbos, minority tribes their PVCs (Nairaland, 2019). In this same report, it was alleged that PVCs were denied Christians in Southern Kaduna with the excuse that their PVCs were yet to be printed and levelled against the electoral umpire that unscrupulous INEC Personnel were undertaken discriminatory distribution of PVCs by withholding the cards of non-indigenes largely suspected of being unsympathetic to the ruling party (APC) in Lagos (Nairaland, 2019). Paradoxically, INEC claimed that millions of PVCs were not collected by their owners prior to the 2019 general elections: the total number of registered voters was put at 84,004,084 million while the number of PVCs collected nationwide was 72,775,502 million representing 86.3 percent of total number of registered voters (Nseyen, 2019). Whereas, it is a well-known fact that unclaimed PVCs are later used for rigging elections.

Furthermore, corrupt (permanent and ad hoc) staff of INEC undermines the integrity of elections by involving themselves in aiding and abetting rigging and other electoral malpractices usually under inducement by politicians for monetary and other considerations. INEC chairman, Mahmood

Yakubu was reported to have expressed disappointment over the conduct of some INEC staff, admitting that they failed in their duties (Ugwu & Orji, 2019). In this same connection, it was reported that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) indicted 202 INEC staff for allegedly receiving part of the ₦23 billion bribe money ahead of the 2015 elections (Soriwei, 2017). We make bold to say that the situation was not different during the 2019 polls.

During a recent press conference, former President Olusegun Obasanjo gave a damning verdict on today's INEC declaring that INEC lack integrity, impartiality and competence to oversee a free, fair and credible elections (Obasanjo, 2019). Similarly, Professor Attahiru Jega, former chairman of INEC was quoted to have said: "I think the major crisis in Nigeria's democracy is that our electoral integrity has been under assault, compromised and undermined by those who have control over the process (Jannah, 2019). It is therefore no surprise to read the report that some protestors under the aegis of Save Nigeria Democracy Group (SNDG) stormed the headquarters of INEC at Abuja declaring that the just concluded 2019 general elections did not reflect the true voting direction of Nigerians (Ajayi, 2019).

Security Agencies

One prime attribute of democratic governance is the notion of free and fair elections whereby the electorate are not intimidated or feel insecure in participating in electoral process particularly when casting their votes. The security agencies are expected to provide a peaceful atmosphere and safe/secure environment for voters to exercise their franchise freely without fear or intimidation. Security agents are supposed to provide security to all electoral stakeholders in order to guarantee the voting process and ensure that votes actually count.

Security personnel are expected to be neutral, and they are not supposed to interfere with the people getting to the polling units or prevent election observers/monitors from having access to the polling stations. But available evidence indicates that security agents sometimes collude with unscrupulous politicians to commit electoral malpractices in Nigeria (Idowu, 2010; National Democratic Institute, 2012). According to Alemika (2003), given their authority and access to firearms, the security personnel have in many occasions been used to intimidate eligible voters particularly in areas

where the opposition has support base thereby curtailing their constitutional right to balloting.

The heavy militarization of the 2019 General Elections is a derogation of Nigeria's democracy. There were reports of voters being harassed by security personnel. Some voters stayed away from the polls to avoid intimidation, harassment and threat to life. Thus, the militarization of polls portends danger for democracy. It was alleged that "rogue elements in the armed forces and security agencies now join unscrupulous politicians to foul elections and get them declared inconclusive to pervert the people's mandates" ("Scourge of inconclusive elections", 2019). The chairman of the main opposition party, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) Uche Secondus was likewise reported to have flayed the alleged use of the military to harass the electorate in some parts of the country in the course of the 2019 elections (Yakubu, Idio & Uwandu, 2019). In the same vein, soldiers were alleged to have interfered with the electoral process in Rivers State (Kilete & John, 2019).

The Centre for Transparency Advocacy (CTA), the body of election observers, appears to confirm the alleged interference of security personnel in the elections process when it submitted that:

While we generally commend members of the security services for helping with maintaining law and order during the election, we cannot overlook the fact that the deployment of the military was unlawful and uncalled for. Our laws do not give soldiers any role to play in our election and our courts up to the highest level have ruled accordingly. Their deployment and brazen partisanship against the opposition was an affront on decency... (Election Scorecard, 2019) The CTA further averred that some security agents interfered in the elections process and engineered violence (Election Scorecard, 2019).

Judiciary

The rule of law is the foundation of any democratic society. As such, democracy is at the heart of social justice. As Justice Chukwudifil Oputa puts it:

Democracy and justice make democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy very necessary... Justice thus seems to be the most acceptable credential of democracy. There seems to be umbilical cord linking democracy and justice. If that cord snaps the result will be injustice. It will also be failure of democracy (Oputa, 1998).

The right to use peaceful and legal means to address election disputes had always been provided in Nigeria's electoral process. For instance, the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) provided for the setting up of election tribunals and cases received are to be dispensed of within 180 days after the polls. Aggrieved litigants who are dissatisfied with the tribunal ruling are free to approach the appeal court and, in some cases, even the Supreme Court. The judiciary is normally expected to be objective and is usually required to take final decision to uphold the verdict and mandate of the people (as expressed through elections) in the event of electoral fraud.

However, judicial intervention in election matters in Nigeria has been less than satisfactory. This is because many election petitions tend to be struck out on spurious and flimsy technical points rather than the substance or merit of the case. Often time, technicalities are used as the basis to deny the aggrieved parties justice. Since this situation neither serves the cause of justice nor that of democracy, speculations and rumours became rife that justice has been put on sale to the highest bidder.

Though it is a truism that judges are under judiciary oath to do justice to all manner of persons, without favour or ill-will, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) Walter Onnoghen admitted that there a few bad eggs in the judiciary as far as corruption is concerned. To fight corruption among judicial officers, the Buhari's administration cracked down on some serving judges that were alleged to be corrupt. The former CJN Justice Onnoghen himself was eventually targeted and was later convicted by the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) for non-declaration of his assets and barred from holding public office for ten years. But there are insinuations that Onnoghen's travails and subsequent conviction was politically motivated as it was scripted to achieve a pre-determined political end that has to do with the adjudication of election disputes by the courts: the motive, as widely alleged, is to use the fight against corruption to cow judicial officers to do the bidding of the APC-led federal government. The onslaught on the Judiciary by the federal

executive has further weakened the institution to the extent that it now appears to have been annexed by the executive branch of government. Another pertinent issue is that just like INEC, the National Judicial Council (comprising of top judicial officers) is also classified as a federal executive body by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Perhaps, this explains why the executive branch of government appears to wield undue heavy influence on the judiciary in the country.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Election management in Nigeria has a long history of being characterized by electoral fraud. So much so, that free and fair election is now considered the exception rather than the rule. The chronic failure to conduct free and fair elections in Nigeria is traceable to weak institutionalization and resultantly, the poor performance of key electoral institutions. Consequently, elections in Nigeria do not usually reflect people's choice over the years.

In a democracy, it is imperative for elections to be competitive so as to allow the electorate to freely exercise their right to give or take power from politicians. But votes can only count when elections are free and fair. A situation whereby results are known before election will only engender voters' apathy and bring about low voters turn out. This is because the electorate would then see voting as a meaningless exercise and mere formality.

In order to help make the conduct of free and fair polls a realizable dream in Nigeria, the following suggestions are hereby put forward:

- i. There is the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of state institutions (such as INEC, security agencies and the judiciary) that are in charge of election administration, security and adjudication. The election management body (INEC) should be granted both institutional and financial autonomy. To guarantee its independence and impartiality in the discharge of its mandate, INEC should be delisted from the list of the federal executive bodies as specified in the 1999 constitution (as amended). As a way of enhancing its financial autonomy, the funding of INEC should come directly from the consolidated revenue of the federation. The capacity of the security agencies should also be strengthened in order to enhance their competence and professionalism with regard to providing protection for the electoral process as well as for all stakeholders during elections.

- The judiciary should be sanitized and strengthened in order to restore its institutional credibility.
- ii. Adequate measures should be put in place to check the deliberate disenfranchisement of eligible voters based on religion and/or ethnic profiling.
 - iii. The voting system should be simplified and strengthened to make it less cumbersome for voters. A situation whereby voters stay in queue for a long time just to cast their votes would discourage many people from voting therefore leading to voters' apathy.
 - iv. There should be non-interference of security agencies in the electoral process other than the provision of adequate security to guarantee the safety of all electoral stakeholders and materials on polling days. The security operatives should be re-oriented, through appropriate training, to see themselves as national symbols that are expected to act professionally by being neutral and impartial during the course of discharging election duties. It is important to investigate the actions of the military and other security personnel during elections and hold to account those of them that violates the electoral and other laws of the land.
 - v. There should be strict adherence to the rule of law in all activities involving election administration and adjudication.
 - vi. A specific and dedicated body to try electoral offences should be set up. Justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais's electoral reform committee's recommendation for the establishment of an electoral offences commission should be revisited in this regard.
 - vii. The armed forces should be excluded from performing election duties.
 - viii. Electronic voting system (EVS) should be adopted in order to achieve a more reliable election outcome. Audio-visual voting method can reduce if not totally eradicate electoral malpractices in Nigeria.
 - ix. Disputes arising from elections should be resolved by the courts before the swearing into office of politicians so elected. Undue delays in election cases tend to create legitimacy problem for the person occupying the elective office under dispute.
 - x. Corrupt electoral officials, security operatives, and judicial officers should be swiftly and harshly punished in accordance with the laws of land to act as deterrent to others.

- xi. There should be a new provision in the Electoral Act to shift the burden of proof from litigants to the election management body. INEC, rather than the litigants, should be required to prove certain facts within its knowledge. Since INEC is the institution that takes custody of materials used for elections, it should be in better position, than the litigants, to prove whether or not a particular election has been conducted in substantial compliance with the provisions of the electoral Act.
- xii. The legislature should enact electoral law which guarantees a level playing ground to all parties and contestants.
- xiii. There should be greater co-ordination of the roles of security agencies during elections to avoid conflicts and ensure effective operational command.
- xiv. All unclaimed PVCs should be enumerated in the presence of all party agents and kept in banks for safekeeping until after the elections, to ensure they are not used to rig.
- xv. As a way of ensuring the independence of the election management body, its principal officers should be professionally appointed through open and competitive recruitment system involving a special joint committee of the Federal Civil Service Commission, Federal Judicial Service Commission, and the National Assembly Service Commission.

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**INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CAUSES, EFFECTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
OF THE ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)**

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Abstract

This study examined the intra-party conflict rocking the All Progressives Congress (APC) in Nigeria. The objectives of the study are: to examine the causes of the intra-party conflict in the APC; the effect of the intra-party conflict and the effectiveness of conflict management strategies adopted. The study adopted documentary content analysis by reviewing secondary sources and personal observation of the researcher. The paper adopted frustration aggression theory as a theoretical framework to explain the intra-party conflict in the APC. The study found out that purported congresses, rancorous party primaries, impunity, imposition, injustice and intolerance are the causes of intra-party conflict in the APC. The study also revealed that cross-carpeting court litigations, disorganization, ineffective campaigns and lack of concentration on governance are some of the effects of the intra-party conflict. The intra-party conflicts are severe in Zamfara, Rivers, Imo, Ogun, Ondo, Kaduna, Bauchi, Adamawa and Niger States leading to movement of party stalwarts to other platforms as well as resignation of some executives of the party. The study further revealed that the Fact-Finding, Reconciliation and Peace Committees appointed by the President, Chief Adiegun and Adams Oshiomhole did not yield concrete result because the mediators were seen as interested party to the various conflicts in the APC and also the desire of State Governors and various leaders to control the party structures make the committees fail. The paper recommended for strict adherence to the constitution of the party on the conduct of congresses and party primaries.

Keywords: Political Parties, Intra-Party Crisis, Party Primaries, Internal Democracy, APC

Introduction

Political parties in modern world are the drivers of democracy. In fact, Schattschneider (1942) aptly affirmed that political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the political parties. Omotola (2009) similarly opined that political parties are makers of democracy such that no democratic settings can exist without them. Internal party democracy implies support for the general interest of the party membership, the public and the state. It means that party structures and organization are participatory and inclusive, essentially vehicles for the exercise of nascent democratic leadership and values (Salih, n.d). Competitive party politics are expected to provide quality leadership recruitment through well-functioning political parties essential for democratic governance. Political Parties are by all standards, the cardinal, outstanding and most distinguishing component of modern government (Danbaba, 2017). In spite this important role, political parties find it difficult to manage crises arising from internal disagreements and misunderstanding. Many political issues have been moving from inter-party rivalry to intra-party arena causing divisions and and conflicts within parties (Amusan, 2011). Incessant intra-party conflicts, which come in varying magnitudes and intensities, have become the hallmark of party politics in Nigeria's Fourth Republic (Momodu & Matudi, 2013). This scenario has been the picture of political parties in Nigeria particularly in the fourth Republic.

The crises that bewildered the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) leading to its defeat in 2015 could have been a lesson to the All Progressives Congress who benefited from the fractionalization of the PDP. Unfortunately, the APC was unable to manage its success and did not learnt much from the woes of the PDP as can be seen on how it conducted congresses and primaries across Nigeria. It is therefore worth mentioning that, intra-party politics is more severe than inter-party politics in the All Progressives Congress. This paper therefore, examines the causes, effect and conflict management strategies of the All Progressives Congress in Nigeria from 2013 to 2019.

Methodology

The study depended on secondary sources by way of documentary content analysis where records and personal observation of events directly involving happenings in the APC were analysed qualitatively by the researcher. APA 6th edition referencing style was adopted in acknowledging the sources of information cited.

Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored on Frustration Aggression Theory as framework of analysis. The proponents of the theory are John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Orval Mowrer, Robert Sears and Leonard Berkowitz. The central argument of Frustration Aggression Theory is that, aggression is always as a result of blocking or frustrating a person's effort to attain a goal (Friedman & Schustack, 2014). Baron and Byrne (1997) aggression is a behaviour directed toward the goal of harming another living being. Aggression therefore, is an intention to harm others either directly or indirectly. It does not necessarily mean a physical attack or violent action, but it could be verbal acts, insults or threat to hurt other human beings. The theory is relevant to this study because it tries to give an explanation as to the cause of internal party conflict. Running the affairs of political parties has been tasking particularly the ruling party where individuals want to grasp the ticket to run under a ruling party because of the advantage attached of winning as a ruling party. The political gladiators see controlling of party structure as a matter of life and death. The conflict in the APC is as a result of power tussles among the political gladiators and the inability of the party leadership to resolve them amicably. The conflict has been allowed to fester for a longer period in some of the States and they are beyond redemption.

The Concept of Political Party

A political party is an organised group of people with at least roughly similar political aims and opinions that seek to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected to public office (Shale & Matlosa, 2008). Political parties are largely organised with the sole objective of competing for and capturing political office (Hague & Harrop, 2007). However, political parties that want to succeed in the general election should not go into an election divided. A major feature of the Fourth Republic is the proliferation of political parties, that primarily do not seek to contest elections, but which are in more ways limited and self-serving in roles and interests.

The Concept of Conflict

Conflicts are unavoidable aspects of human interaction. They arise from the pursuit of divergent interests, goals and aspirations by individuals or groups (John, 2011). According to Sani (2007) conflicts moments or times of danger or great difficulties. Conflict is a confrontation between two or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends (Miller, 2005). Coser (1968) defined conflict as a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. It is an existing state of disagreement or hostility between two or more people (Nicholson, 1992). Conflict also means a situation where the objectives of any individual or group perceive reality in a manner that is opposed to that of other individual or group (Neal, 1982). The term represents a disharmony, antagonism, or hostility in a relationship, which could arise due to incompatibility of the chosen goals (Imobighe, 2006). Conflicts may, perhaps paradoxically, promote and increase peace and diminish violence if the conflicting parties negotiate in good faith to reach solutions to problems that are achievable and tolerable, if not ideal (Webel, 2007). Most of these struggles are on selfish grounds, sometimes collective but are carried out through the processes of sycophancy, name-calling, sabotage, sellouts, and other negative behaviours in order to be noticed, settled or destroy the collective gain of the party (Awofeso, Obah-Akpowoghaha, & Ogunmilade, 2017).

The Concept of Intra-Party Conflict

Scarrow (2004) opines that internal democracy describes a wide range of methods for including party members in intra-party deliberation and decision-making. Nkechi (2011) sees intra-party conflict as a period of great shock, distress or difficulty within a political party, resulting from the inability to resolve internal disputes and reconcile internal differences. Likoti (2005) opines that, "Lack of intra-party democracy is likely not only to weaken the parties internally, but also to adversely influence their effectiveness in driving

democracy nationally”. However, intra-party conflict appears to thwart orderliness in any democratic setting, by serving as impediments to proper and objective nomination of candidates for party primaries (Clement & Unaji, 2016). Intra-party violent conflicts have been particularly heightened during election periods because of the imposition of favoured and dubious consensus candidates, and the swapping of nominated candidates by party chieftains. The absence of equalitarian platforms and the subversion of the will of ordinary party members and delegates in party primaries, have grieved several party leaders and members and underlined numerous defections and cross carpeting (Ikelegbe, 2013).

Okoli cited in Clement & Unaji (2016) enumerated factors that are responsible for intra-party opposition as follows: personality difference, clash of socio-economic interests, ideological incompatibility, etc, among politicians. Intra-party conflicts in Nigeria have reduced political parties to a liability than an asset to the common man and the system at large (Omotola, 2010). Intra-party conflict fractures party’s cohesion and create instability in political parties and by extension in the democratic process (Momodu & Matudi, 2013). Lack of intra-party democracy is likely not only to weaken the parties internally, but also to adversely influence their effectiveness in driving democracy nationally (Likoti, 2005). Shale and Matlosa (2008) identify favouritism – promoting one’s kith and kin; unequal sharing of resources (leader’s constituency gets a lion’s share); lack of regular meetings and centralised authority – power concentrated at the top as factors causing intra party conflict.

The Concept of Conflict Management

Conflict Management refers to measures that limit, mitigate and/or contain a conflict without necessarily solving it (Swanström and Weissmann, 2005:25). Best (2005) sees conflict management as, “the process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties involved in that conflict”.

Strategies of Conflict Management

Peace Mediation: According to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (1999) is a method of conflict resolution that requires the use of a third party (Intermediary). Mediation is a process through which a third party provides procedural assistance to help individuals or groups in conflict to resolve their

differences (Shale and Matlosa, 2008). The aim of peace mediation is to ensure returns of normalcy. A mediator is someone who mediates between conflicting parties and does not have the power or authority to coerce them to accept the verdict.

Negotiation: This is the process whereby the parties within the conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2008). It is a bargaining process that involves discussion, give and take between two or more disputants who seek to find solutions to common problems. It encompasses explicit processes of dialogue designed to bring both sides' objectives into harmony (Tuck, 2016).

Conciliation: It is a peaceful means of settling disputes arising between parties by choosing a conciliator to reach a dispute settlement through approximating different points of view without extending his role to issuing a binding decision for the disputants (Mousa, 2005). Conciliator do this by lowering tensions, improving communications, interpreting issues, encouraging parties to explore potential solutions and assisting parties in finding a mutually acceptable outcome. Conciliation can also contribute to maintaining agreements and preventing future conflicts over other issues. The impartiality of the third party is central to the conciliation process (Miller, 2005).

Collaboration: This is defined as the mutual engagement of participants in a coordinated effort to solve a problem together (Lai, 2011). It is based on constructive co-operation and dialogue between parties in conflict. It involves the parties in conflict to work on their own desires to resolve the conflict. It is borne out of the personal conviction of the parties concerned that adversarial relationship is not going to help matters on the long run, that it is better to create suitable environment for friendly relations.

Peace Building: This refers to a process of restoring normal relations between people that require the reconciliation of differences, offering apology and forgiveness on past harm or misdeed (Usman, 2014). Peace building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution, durable peace; reconciling opponents; preventing conflict from restarting; integrating civil society; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, creating rule of law mechanisms; rebuilding governmental institutions and stabilizing society politically and economically.

Adjudication: This is non-violent method, which involves the use of courts and litigation processes. Parties to conflict may in this respect decide to resolve their disagreement in the court of judicial process with legal representatives, solicitors or advocates. The aggrieved party who chooses this nonviolent method is ready to take the verdict or judgement of the presiding judge of competent jurisdiction either good or bad or either in its favour or against it. The judgement is binding and will be legally enforced through the state apparatus for resolving conflicts. This means of resolving conflicts is usually marked with winner and loser, bitterness and joy as the case may be. Legal counsels are engaged in adjudication processes. The court gives verdict at the end; judgment is binding on all parties, as it will be enforced accordingly.

Overview of Intra-Party Conflicts in Nigeria

In the First Republic, there were splinter political parties that emerged from the intra-party crisis in AG, NCNC, and NPC. Leadership rivalry between Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola and Chief Obafemi Awolowo which did not only bring voluntary exit of some important members of AG, but also made the expulsion of some of the party card carrying members to look for alternative political parties (Amusan, 2011). The rift was so grave that the political scandals were publicly disclosed and birthed myriad of conflicts leading to massive violence and state of emergency in the Western region (Adetayo, 2017).

The United Progressive Party (UPP) formed by Chief Akintola and his supporters broke away from AG as a result of personality and ideological differences between Chief Awolowo and Chief Akintola later the UPP dissolved into the Fani Kayode led new NNNDP. The end result of this was the crisis/violence that greeted the Western Region election that produced Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola as the Premier of the region when the breakaway members of the party formed a new political party, Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNNDP) (Anifowose, 1982). Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) led by Malam Aminu Kano which champion the course of the *talakawas* or less privilege Hausa people in the Northern Nigeria and the United Middle Belt Congress led by Joseph Tanka which came out to protect the interest of minorities of middle belt are break away parties from the NPC dominated by Hausa- Fulani Oligarchy.

In the Second Republic, five political parties were eventually registered including the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) headed by late Awolowo, the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) whose flag bearer was late Azikiwe, the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) under the leadership of late Aminu Kano, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led by Shehu Shagari and the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) with late Waziri Ibrahim as the leader (Simeon, 2014). The Second Republic was not free from intra-party conflicts in the political parties. In this period, intra-party relation was a mixture of cooperation and conflicts (Adetayo, 2017). The cases in point include: the resignation of Chief Moshood Abiola from NPN following the re-nomination of Shehu Shagari by NPN special convention; Alhaji Aminu Kano left the party and form People's Redemption Party (PRP) to enable him achieve his presidential ambition; the leadership crises between Ibrahim Waziri and GNPP senators over the removal of Alhaji Kadi as the party's leader; the leadership struggle within PRP between party executive and the two PRP Governors over refusal to refrain from attending the meeting of the nine governors under the auspices of Progressive Party Alliance (PPA).

The fourth Republic witnessed the registration of three Political Parties that contestant in 1999 General Elections. The parties are Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian People's Party (APP) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). According to Akubo and Umoru (2014) these parties were largely affected by "deep internal crises, disorder, recurring tensions and turmoil manifested in factional fighting, expulsions and counter expulsions, multiple executives and dual offices. Only the PDP was able to survive and avoid disintegration. However, the PDP suffered from different intra-party conflicts. The major intra-party conflicts in the PDP were between Obasanjo and His Vice President Atiku Abubakar got to its peak in 2007 when the former was forced out of the PDP. The 2013 National Convention crisis led to the creation of the popular new Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) under Kawu Baraje faction from the Bamanga Tukur led PDP. The Kawu Baraje led faction includes the Governors of Sokoto, Aliyu Wamakko; Niger, Babangida Aliyu; Kano, Rabi'u Musa Kwankwanso; Adamawa, Murtala Hammanyero Nyako; Kwara, Abdulfatah Ahmed and Rivers, Rt. Hon. Rotimi Amaechi defected to APC. These Governors were joined by the former Vice President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, Senators: Bukoka Saraki, Shafa Lafiagi, Muhmmad Danjuma Goje, Mohammed Ndume, Abdullahi Adamu, Magnus Abe, Wilson Ake, Bindo Jibrilla, Abdullahi Gobir, and Alhassan Aisha Jummai.

Alliance for Democracy (AD) was also not immune from the intra-party conflict that rocked the major political parties in the Fourth Republic. The financial muscle of some of the members and their urge to control the party caused some members such as Bola Tinubu, Olusegun Osoba, Niyi Adebayo, Lam Adesina and some of the members of *Afenifere* to move away from AD and formed a new political party Action Congress (AC) which later changed to Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) (Amusan, 2011). This allowed the former Vice President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar to run for the office of the President in 2007 under the ACN. The ACN was among the three main opposition parties that formed the APC in 2013.

Origin and Formation of the APC

The All Progressives Congress (APC) was formed in 2013 as a result of a merger of three (3) major opposition parties – the Congress for Progressives Change (CPC) led by General Muhammadu Buhari; the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) led by Ahmed Bola Tinubu; the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) led by Chief Ogbonnaya Onu; a faction of All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) led by Governor Rochas Okorocha of Imo State; and a faction of the new Peoples Democratic Party (nPDP) led by Atiku Abubakar, Kawu Baraje and State Governors of Rivers – Chief Rotimi Amaechi, Kwara – Abdulfatah Ahmed; Sokoto – Aliyu Magatakarda Wamakko; Kano - Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso; and Adamawa – Murtala Hammanyero Nyako. In 2014, the APC conducted its first National Convention and produced Muhammadu Buhari as its flag-bearer in the 2015 General Elections. The APC defeated the incumbent PDP under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan.

Overview of Intra-Party Conflicts in the APC

Governors at loggerhead with the party leaders in Imo, Kaduna, Zamfara, Ogun, Ondo, Kwara, Adamawa, Bauchi. The disqualification of Adebayo Shittu the Minister of Communication over NYSC certificate and Aisha Alhassan the Minister of Women Affairs over disloyalty were not handle property. This led to resignation and decamped of the later to United Democratic Party (UDP) thereby weakening the strength of the party in Taraba State. In Adamawa State, the APC crisis pitched the former Governor Murtala Hammanyero Nyako against the incumbent Governor Mohammed Jibrilla Bindow. This led to the defeat of the APC in the President and Governorship

Election in Adamawa in favour of the opposition PDP. In Bauchi State, the crisis between the Speaker Rt. Hon. Yakubu Dogara, Senator Sulaiman Nazeef and Senator Hamma Misau and the Governor led to the decamp of the former to the PDP. Even though, the two Senators lost their re-election however, the APC lost the Governorship to the opposition PDP in Bauchi State.

In Rivers State, the crisis pitched the long-time friends, Rt. Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi with Senator Magnus Abbey over congresses and primaries. This is the worst intra-party crises witnessed in the Fourth Republic. The crisis led to several litigations in Court that at the end, the APC was not allowed to field a candidate in the 2019 General Elections in Rivers State. In Imo State, the crisis pitches Governor Rochas Okorocha against the National Organizing Secretary of the APC, Osita Izunaso and Senator Hope Uzodinma over congresses and primaries in Imo State. The Governor supported his Chief of Staff and son in-law Uche Nwosu while the NEC supported Senator Hope Uzodinma. This crisis led to Okorocha's son in-law to decamp to AA while Izunaso to APGA. This created serious challenges to the APC to retain the Governorship seat in Imo State. The gubernatorial seat was won by the opposition, PDP candidate Rt. Hon. Emeka Ihedioha.

In Ogun State, the State Governor fought a seemingly battle with the National leadership of the APC over the choice and support of his preferred candidate who later decamped to APM. Though the APC candidate won, however, the country witnessed its worst embarrassment during the Presidential Campaign where the National Chairman and other party stalwarts were stone with sachets of pure water. In Zamfara State, the crisis pitches Governor Abdulaziz Yari against Senator Kabiru Marafa. In Kaduna State, Senator Shehu Sani and Hunkuyi complaint bitterly about the behaviour of Governor Nasir El-Rufai on how the Ward, Local Government and State Congresses were flawed in Kaduna State which the party under Odigie-Oyegun National Working Committee failed to correct.

CAUSES OF APC INTRA-PARTY CRISES

Purported Congresses: The congresses of the APC did not go well in some of the States. Those who feel that they are the leaders of the party hijacked the sale of the forms in favour of their favoured candidates. At the end of the congresses, there were grudges among parties members who after making payment, they were denied forms to participate in the congresses. This was why in Zamfara State; Senator Kabiru Marafa insisted that there were no

congresses. In Rivers State, Senator Magnus Abbey and his supporters were also denied forms after making payment thereby denying them the right to contest in the congresses.

Rancorous Party Primaries: Party primary is an internal affair of a political party to nominate candidates to stand with other political parties in the general elections. The conduct of primaries is more intense in parties in power than in oppositions. The adoption of direct/indirect primaries by the APC has been one of the sources of intra-party crises. However, the constitution of the APC allows for direct, indirect or consensus; but the rejection of direct primaries by some Governors created crises.

Impunity: The APC led National Working Committee of the APC under the stewardship of Comrade Adams Oshiomhole is accused of impunity. One of those accused the APC Chairman of impunity has been the Director General, Voice of Nigeria Osita Okechukwu who accused Adams Oshiomhole of promoting impunity in the APC primaries. He accused the Chairman for stopping the Enugu State Gubernatorial Primary mid-way without reasons after a smooth electoral process in four out of 17 LGAs. He blamed the Oshiomhole for unilateral reversal of indirect primary mode of election chosen by Enugu State to direct primary, without proper resort to the National Working Committee, which approved the direct primary for Enugu State (Sanni, 2018). The controversy that has trailed the Zamfara primaries, as well as Ogun, Niger, Adamawa, Enugu, Delta, Kaduna, Bauchi, Imo, Rivers, Nigeria have created so much mess in the party. However, all these did not deter Adam's Oshiomhole's believes that what he is doing in the best interest of the party and those who are crying foul are just doing so for their personal interests (Amaize, 2018).

The National Chairman of the APC Adams Oshiomhole said the APC would win the 2019 elections in Imo and Ogun States without Rochas Okorocha and Ibikunle Amosun. He described the two governors as poor student of their own history who had forgotten they lost elections before winning on the platform of the APC (Ogundele, 2018). Unfortunately, Oshiomhole himself is not a good student of history as he claimed, he is supposed to know that Rochas Okorocha won his first term governor under APGA in 2011, Ibikunle Amosun won under ACN in 2011 and Abdul'aziz Yari won in Zamfara in 2011 under ANPP. The three governors threaten by Oshiomhole were governors even before the merger of the APC in 2013.

Imposition: Some of the crises in the APC are caused by imposition of candidate particularly by State Governors. This happened in Borno, Kaduna, Niger, Kogi, Katsina, Bauchi, Oyo etc.

Injustice: Even though the coming of Adams Oshiomhole has entrenched some discipline, however some of his actions further created unresolved crises in the APC. For instance, the First Lady Aisha Buhari complains bitterly on how the APC under Adams Oshiomhole's leadership denied some members opportunity to contest despite the fact that they had coughed huge amount of money to purchase nomination forms. She regretted that Oshiomhole despite coming from labour background that requires staying on the side of the people, presided over impunity. Aisha Buhari tweeted that: It is disheartening to note that some aspirants used their hard-earned money to purchase nomination forms, got screened, cleared, and campaigned vigorously, yet found their names omitted on the Election Day. These forms were bought at exorbitant prices. Many others contested and yet had their results delayed, fully knowing that AUTOMATIC tickets have been given to other people (Nda-Isaiah, 2018).

Intolerance: The APC as a political party is becoming intolerant of its members. The widening gap between those who formed the party at its rudimentary level and those who joined after the 2015 elections.

Effect of Intra-Party Conflict in the APC

Cross-carpeting/Decamping: The rancorous congresses held nationwide led to a gale of defections of top party members in the National Assembly to opposition parties. Those cross-carpeted include: The Senate President Dr. Bukola Saraki, Speaker, House of Representatives, Rt. Hon. Yakubu Dogara, Senator Dino Melaye, Senator Usman Bayero Nafada, Senator Hunkuyi, Senator Shehu Sani. The cross-carpeting of the members of the APC handed over the leadership of the National Assembly to the PDP. All efforts by the National Chairman of the APC to remove the Senate President prove abortive as the APC lacked the required number of the two-third to remove the Senate President Dr. Bukola Saraki.

Court Litigations: The congresses and primaries of the APC resulted to too many court cases across the country. The worst of the court cases has been that of Rivers and Zamfara State.

Lack of concentration on governance: The intra-party conflict in the APC created distraction on governance as those involved lack concentration on governance.

Ineffective Campaigns: The intra-party crises divided the APC as different faction campaign for their preferred candidates. There was lack of coordination on the rightful candidates in many states. This affected the party's chances and leading to poor outing in the 2019 elections. This scenario was worst in Enugu, Rivers and Cross Rivers States.

Threats of Violence: The intra-party conflict within the APC created tensions and threats of war by aggrieved members. This scenario played out in Zamfara State where the chief security officer of the State, Governor Abdulaziz Yari threatens to go to the graveyard with the National Chairman of the Party Comrade Adams Oshiomhole, his words:

We heard that the committee of the chairman is not in consultation with any working committee. He (Oshiomhole) is trying to be a kind of mini-god. The committee he sent to Zamfara State, I want to say it categorically, they should never step into Zamfara for a minute... I , Abdulaziz Yari, Governor of Zamfara State, head of government and security, I am saying that the committee sent by Oshiomhole to come and do a dirty job should not dare come into Zamfara State. We are ready, including myself, to be taken to the graveyard tomorrow ... it's fight to finish.

Conflict Management Strategies of the APC

The conflict management strategies of the APC are appointment of reconciliation committees to meet with aggrieved party parties. The Ngige fact-finding committee on Bauchi, the Tony Momoh fact-finding committee on Kogi State, the Bola Ahmed Tinubu Committee and the Peace and Reconciliation Committees in each of the geopolitical zones.

The Ngige Fact-Finding Committee on Bauchi State

The crisis in Bauchi State was between the Governor Mohammed Abubakar and the Speaker Yakubu Dogara of the House of Representatives, who are the arrowheads of the two warring camps. The governor controls the State Executive of the party and his commissioners while the Speaker leads some members of the National Assembly including Senator Hamma Misau, Senator Sulaiman Nazif and late Senator Ali Wakili. The committee's findings

revealed the causes of Bauchi conflict to include: the complaint by Yakubu Dogara group that the governor did not support his emergence as Speaker; unpaid workers' salaries, improper utilization of the Paris Club refund, power sharing in the transition committees among all constituencies and the need to consider federal appointment (Olaniyi, 2017). However, the committee recommended that:

- (i) The committee should recognize the two warring parties, see Rt. Hon. Dogara one side and Governor Abubakar one the other side to sit together and resolve their differences.
- (ii) The National Working Committee to meet all party members to restore confidence;
- (iii) There should be a rally at the state's township stadium, which should be attended by the Governor and Speaker Dogara and well-meaning members of the party.
- (iv) The National Working Committee should remember some members of the party whom are grumbling at state and national level for appointment.

The reconciliation in Bauchi State did not yield the desired result because the Speaker Et. Hon. Yakubu Dogara and Senator Hamma Misau, Senator Sulaiman Nazif cross-carpeted to the PDP. Though, Hamma Misau and Sulaiman Nazif did not return to the Senate, the governor on the other hand, failed his second term bid as he was defeated by Senator Bala Muhammad of the PDP.

The Tony Momoh Fact-Finding Committee on Kogi State

The conflict in Kogi State was between Governor Yahaya Bello, Falake group and the members of National Assembly led by Senator Dino Melaye. The Tony Momoh fact-finding committee's findings blamed the National Working Committee and skewed political appointments among others as reasons why the crisis degenerated (Olagoke, 2017). The committee also cited absence of communication, missed communication or even inadequate communication and total breakdown of communication in the Kogi APC. However, the NEC jettisoned the recommendations of the Tony Momoh led committee and constituted another committee under the chairperson of Idris Garba. The conflict in Kogi State continue to fester which led to the cross-carpeting of Senator Dino Melaye to the PDP.

Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu Reconciliation Committee

The Bola Ahmed Tinubu Reconciliation Committee was appointed by President Muhammad Buhari to resolve the various conflicts in the APC. However, the team did not record much success, as some of the aggrieved members were said to have expressed reservation in the team, particularly with Tinubu as its head. At that time, it was alleged that the politician needed to be reconciled himself, being at the centre of some of the impasse (Agomuo, 2018). The reconciliation Committee by Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu failed because, some party stalwarts saw Tinubu as an interested party in some of the crises bedevilling the APC. For instance, in Kogi State, Tinubu supported Falake against the candidature of Yahaya Bello. Tinubu himself complaint of insubordination of this national assignment given to him by the President by the National Chairman of the APC Chief John Oyegun.

The National Peace and Reconciliation Committees

The conduct of the APC primaries was rancorous in many States of the federation. This prompted the he National Working Committee to appoint National Peace and Reconciliation Committees to address the post-primary elections disputes in the party. The Committees were appointed to visit the six geopolitical zones to reconcile aggrieved party members. However, these committees failed to reconcile some of the major conflicts within the APC particularly those in Imo, Cross River, Adamawa, Bauchi, Kaduna, Rivers, Ondo and Ogun State. Some of the conflicts were severe before the inauguration of the peace committee. Some of the mediators are party to the conflict in their various States. Therefore, while they were appointed to reconcile other members, their States were also on fire. The committee of the South West headed by the Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima and Deputised by the Governor of Kaduna State Malam Nasir El-Rufai was unable to reconcile the Governor of Ekiti State Kayode Fayemi and the former Governor Segun Oni.

The committee also failed to reconcile the Minister of Communication Adebayo Shittu and Governor Abiola Ajimobi faction and the national leadership of the party under Adams Oshiomhole for wrongly disqualifying him from the gubernatorial contest as a result of his non-participation in the mandatory National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). The Communications Minister in an interview with reporters categorically said that, he would be “a bastard” to work for the party’s success in the forthcoming gubernatorial

election. The friction within the APC led to its defeat in the gubernatorial election in Oyo State.

In the South East, the committee failed to reconcile Governor Rochas Okorocha and the flag bearer of the gubernatorial ticket Senator Hope Uzodinma. When the Chairman of the reconciliation for the South East, the Kano State Governor Engr. Abdullahi Umar Ganduje visited his Imo State counterpart, Okorocha was categorical that the situation in the Imo State chapter of the APC had made reconciliation impossible. He specifically said that Imo people were short-changed in their choice of who to govern them in 2019 and that “Adams Oshiomhole singlehandedly meted grave injustice to Imo APC members and stole the mandate of Imo people” (Adibe, 2018). The APC inability to reconcile the National Chairman Comrade Adams Oshiomhole, the flag bearer Hope Uzodinma and the Imo Governor Rochas Okorocha led to the poor performance of the party in Imo State and its defeat by the opposition PDP in the 2019 gubernatorial election. The reconciliation committee also failed to amicably resolve the conflict in Enugu State Chapter of the APC.

In the North West where the conflict was severe, its reconciliation committee failed to reconcile between Governor Nasir El-Rufai and Senator Shehu Sani. In Zamfara State, the committee failed to reconcile between Governor Abdulaziz Yari and Senator Kabiru Marafa.

Conclusion

The intra-party conflicts rocking the APC were caused by purported congresses, rancorous party primaries; impunity, imposition, injustice and intolerance are the causes of intra-party conflict in the APC. The conflict resulted to cross-carpeting, court litigations, disorganization, ineffective campaigns and lack of concentration on governance. The intra-party conflicts are severe in Zamfara, Rivers, Imo, Ogun, Ondo, Kaduna, Bauchi, Adamawa and Niger States leading to movement of party stalwarts to other platforms as well as resignation of some executives of the party. The Fact-Finding, Reconciliation and Peace Committees appointed by the President, Chief John Oyegun and Adams Oshiomhole did not yield concrete result because the mediators were seen as interested party to the various conflicts in the APC and also the desire of State Governors and various leaders to control the party structures make the committees fail. The paper recommended for strict

adherence to the constitution of the party on the conduct of congresses and party primaries.

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**TRANSACTIONAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA:
TRANSFORMING CITIZENS' ELECTORAL ROLE IN THE 2019
GENERAL ELECTIONS**

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Abstract

This paper examined how politics of self-interest conceptualised as transactional politics has transformed citizens' role from shaping electoral outcomes based on governance issues articulated by political parties and candidates to clients whose voting power is purchased off during elections and consequently lose the capacity to demand good governance and accountability. Data were drawn from 1000 respondents from six states, one from each geo-political zone with analysis anchored on normative political theory. Nigeria's democracy is structurally undermined by transactional politics, where corruption through vote purchase has weakened the ability of citizens to determine electoral outcomes in their interest. Political elites otherwise referred to as godfathers, and their sponsored candidates have transformed politics from the use of public resources to provide public goods to the marketisation of voting power as a means of stealing public resources. Citizens through transactional politics have been short-changed and have become objects of influence rather than influencers of the electoral process in the national interest. In this way, citizens have been shut out of governance and hence the weakening of Nigeria's democracy. While vote-buying is the worst form of transactional politics, it has proved as a new tactic in manipulating elections with the implication that votes count more than corrupting electoral and security agencies during elections. Through effective voter education, citizens can be empowered to resist the temptation to convert their votes into financial gains that undermine their noble duty of participating in elections to shape governance in the public interest.

Keywords: democracy, transactional politics, governance

Introduction

At no time in Nigeria's electoral history was the shadow of money politics thicker hanging above party activities and elections than in 2019. It was a grave concern that corruption and money politics have assumed excessive roles in elections with the potential of transforming citizen's role in shaping the electoral outcome (Ibrahim, 2018). The traditional role of citizens at the election is to cast votes for candidates of their choice whom they are convinced would offer effective representation without undue influence. Uncompromised voting by citizens speaks to the role of legitimising the electoral process that gives meaning to democracy as a system of rule that prioritises the sovereignty of the citizens. Democratic governance is about meeting citizen's aspirations and expectations by elected representatives whose selection through an uncompromised process vents citizen's right to demand good governance. This right threatens representatives without the commitment to public service who then resort to the adoption of mechanisms that permit the vitiation of the power of voters to shape electoral outcomes that may not be favourable thereby revealing them as pretentious democrats. One of these mechanisms is money politics which equates transactional politics which permits the corrupting of voters to compromise their votes (Charles & Schedler, 2005).

In Nigeria, elections have increasingly been turned into an economic activity in which the citizen's vote is accepted as a commodity with a market price competed for by political parties and candidates. The highest bidder controls the voter who must vote for a specific candidate having being paid for to do so. Once bought, the citizen loses an independent voice and capacity to choose whom to vote for. In this way, politics becomes a transactional activity in which the electoral market offers citizens votes for sale to politicians for purely private gains. This transactional arrangement is at the root of the debasing of democracy in Nigeria by the fundamental radicalisation of the transformation of the role of citizens in elections and democratic governance.

The monetisation of electoral outcomes is the latest strategy in the manipulation of elections after the violence, monetary inducement of security personnel and electoral officials and imposition of candidates on the electorates. With an improvement in Nigeria's electoral process since the 2015 elections, politicians have risen to the reality that citizens votes have begun to count. Desperate politicians have come to terms with the inevitability of losing elections, and hence something must be done to reverse the possibility where bribing security agencies, electoral officials and use of thugs to disrupt

elections and allow for rigging fail. Citizen's right to vote can be bought and in turn, be forced to vote for them.

It is argued here that democracy is based on the principles that those who govern are more popular with citizens and are mandated to do so through uncoerced voting for candidates of citizen's free choices (Schedler, 2005; Walecki, 2006; Ibrahim, 2019). Where citizens voting rights are exchanged for financial gains, democracy is undermined because citizens' role has been compromised, and hence they lose the right to demand good governance. This paper argues further that with the prevalence of money or transactional politics in Nigeria, citizens' role at elections has been transformed from determining electoral outcomes into affirming predetermined winners who owe no allegiance to the citizenry in governance.

Transactional Politics: Theoretical Notes

In a democracy is found a chain of delegations and implied accountability between elected executives and citizens with their unending wishes. Between citizens and elected representatives are then exchanges that are determined by transaction costs. For example, citizens may lack relevant skills, capacity, and even time hence would delegate authority to elected representatives and executives to implement policies that meet their aspirations. In this way, citizens delegate decision making to a set of public authorities that act on their behalf and interest (Coleman, 1994; Moe, 1990). The development of modern democracy has overtime evolved governance institutions to manage societal problems with clear obligations between delegated authority and accountability (Berg, 2017). These institutions include legislatures, elections and independent statutory bodies. These institutions "affect the degree and volume of political transaction costs as well as the governance of political organisations" (Caballero & Soto-Onate, 2016, p.331).

Transaction costs have a critical role to play in the political life of any society but more vehement in liberal democracies where citizens are sovereign and must necessarily extend their mandate to any set of individuals to exercise on their behalf. It is in this sense that a transaction cost theory of politics was built on the assumption that information needed for effecting transactions and the "subjective models on the part of actors to explain their environment and of imperfect enforcement of agreements" are all costly (North, 1990, p.355). Transaction costs appear to be irregularly very high in political markets; hence they are central to understanding political governance. The astronomical

transaction costs are due to the opaque and non-transparent nature of political markets. Deals are vague and non-accessible to public influence in addition to the secrecy attach to their consummation.

The political market is regulated by institutions which are the “rules of the game” that determine the level and extent of transaction costs in each deal. Caballero and Soto-Onate (2017) have argued that the level of transaction costs is predicated on the features of each transaction and as much as on the nature of the institutional environment in which the deal is being made. Each society evolves its own rules that would determine transaction costs and even regulate by keeping them as moderately low as possible through a set of institutions that allow exchanges over time.

Conceptually, transaction costs refer to the resources used to establish, maintain and transfer rights. Put differently; these represent the total cost required to carry out a transaction function (Allen, 1991, North & Wallis, 1994). Institutions which are rules of the transaction game help to regulate deals and play this critical role of mediating the political markets. These institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions. They consist of formal rules and informal norms and enforcement mechanisms. In these institutions are embedded incentives for compliance without which instability or public disorder may ensue. Simplified, institutions range from customs, norms, behaviour, codes or habits and laws that underpin the conduct of organisations, groups and individuals. In a democracy, lobby groups, civil society, political parties and firms are incentivised to play by the rules of the game as major actors in the political market.

In the political market, there are voluntary exchanges of political rights which are the main commodities for sale. Broadly conceived, political markets are implicit or explicit in relation to the different forms of political markets. This is in consonance with a diversity of political rights. For instance, in the political markets are available commodities such as the right to vote, legislate or govern. Actors in these markets are as diverse as the markets. They include citizens, and candidates at one level, legislators and political parties at another level, with trade unions and governments at yet another level. For exchange may be votes, bills, political promises and political support. The outcome of political exchanges consists of public policies, budgets, laws, constitutions and programmes.

In neoclassical economic theory, the forces of demand and supply determine the price of any commodity and hence the value of any good is expressed in its price. In the political market, however, the value of any political good is not necessarily determined by money but by a comparable public good. The unit of account in political markets is the mediated barter system of exchange where political favours are exchanged in return for comparable favours. In a political market, there exists a political transaction akin to vote-trading. Citizens in a given constituency accept to vote for a candidate who in turn will ensure the formulation and implementation of a particular public policy. In extreme cases, representatives seeking re-election will influence the execution of certain projects in particular constituencies in order to gain their votes (Lancaster, 1986). In an ideal democratic society, citizens demand various political goods and political parties and candidates offer policy choices to win support through votes in return. Once elected, citizens demand accountability in governance by seeking to have promises made at campaigns fulfilled. In this way, the delegate-accountability interface work to enthrone good governance where democracy meets citizens' aspirations. Nigeria's democratic experience has transformed this notion of transaction cost framed around political goods to fiscal cash transfers as a unit of transaction. Electorates are wooed with cash bribes in return for votes. This tendency undermines democratic accountability and good governance as governance performance is compromised, leaving the citizens as mere spectators without the power of expectation and demand for accountability. This is expressed in Nigeria in the classical vote-buying transaction.

Political markets are vulnerable to inefficiency; hence transaction costs are higher than in economic markets (North, 1990). To try to achieve efficiency, political institutions are made too complex to minimise the loopholes that may be exploited by participants in the political market. This explains why politics revolves around less safe rules that hamper the elaboration of an order that favours exchange (Majone, 2009). Underlying the complexity of rules and political institutions is the lurking coercion in the fight for authority which elections represent. More often than not, political transactions are never voluntary, given that many deals are reached through the instrumentality of coercion.

Citizens and Democracy

Democracy as a political system of rule is predicated on representative government, citizen participation, and activation of the freedoms for citizens and the prevalence of transparency in all public acts (Eremenko, 2010). This broad outlay of democracy is a summation of two contending views of the system. The first conceives democracy narrowly as any political regime erected through universal suffrage in a “competitive, free, fair and regular elections” (Przeworski & Limongi, 2008). Under this narrow and minimalist notion of democracy, what is prime is elite consensus that leads to their emergence in government through a process that treats mass preferences as unimportant (Wetzel & Inglehart, 2008). Under this democracy, effective social mobilisation of citizens to participate in the electoral process is irrelevant. Very few citizens are sufficient to give vent to a semblance of an election to produce a government. This kind of sham electoral exercises abounds in Africa, and the 2003 or 2007 elections in Nigeria are suitably illustrative. The principal character of democracy is regular elections which suitably qualifies electoral democracies and set the minimum requirement as regular competitive elections, whether fair, free or not.

This leads to the second contention of democracy which is a government erected through free, fair and regular elections but which mass preferences determine public policies. Here citizens can pressurise the government to respond to their concerns through public policies. This is what is called genuine democracy synonymous with liberal or representative democracy, where mass voice is the driving force of governance (Schmitter & O'Donnell, 1986). Thus, the emergence and sustainability of effective democracy are predicated on the active vote of citizens expressed through robust participation in the democratic polity under a free atmosphere that prioritise freedom of choice. Liberal democracy is what it is because it prizes citizens' freedom to make choices including at elections of political parties and candidates to form government in which their voices are essential to public policy responses to their concerns. It is in this sense that democracy can be meaningful and effective and would remain so only if power is invested in the people (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008; Lues, 2014). Put differently; democracy cannot be effective on its own unless it relies on the government and citizens to sustain it through a mutually reinforcing process. The government in a democracy is established by citizens who must focus on the people by generating governance outcomes that meet their aspirations. Citizens work to achieve effective democracy that is instrumentalised by

accountability and transparency and is, therefore, able to provide quality public goods such as security and public infrastructure as well as social services provisioning to the citizens.

An effective democracy values mass voices as these shape public policy and governance. Mass voices are expressed under free choice that encapsulates the synergy between citizenship, participation and democracy. In other words, a citizen's role in enthrone effective democracy lies in active participation in the polity and remains the defining character of the democratic citizen. Citizen participation in the democratic life of the state is central to democratic practice and theory (Mannheim, 2006).

Citizen participation in a democracy is expressed through voting as a major activity and duty. This is supported by working in and contributing to electoral campaigns, contacting government officials, attending public protests, demonstrations and marches. Other forms of citizen participation consist of service to community by way of solving community problems informally that may attract no payment even after serving on boards to local organisations. Citizens are also to be actively involved in voluntary organisations' activities that benefit the state, including private donations to public courses (Almond & Verba, 1965). These forms of participation allow citizens to disseminate information to public officials on issues that bother them and to express their preferences in ways that put pressure on government officials to respond. Citizen participation in a democracy involves activating the right to expression of views on any public matter to get public officials to respond through public policies.

The role of citizen participation in a democracy has, however, been contentious. Schumpeter (1976) had argued that citizen participation in a democracy is not essential and should be limited to choosing leaders. To Schumpeter, representative democracy prime elected officials to act on behalf of the citizens once elected and given the feebleness of the electorates they have no business in democracy beyond voting. This contradicts the basis of citizen participation in a democracy laid by Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1762) that each citizen's involvement in political decision-making is essential. In this way, citizens become public because they participate in political decision making otherwise, they would remain private citizens with no influence on the government. In a democracy, therefore, voting is essential for free choice of leaders which may result in changes in policies and by this measure citizen participation assumes an instrumental function in public affairs (Dahl, 1971).

With representative government, elections which give vent to voting make participation an expressive role and as a value beyond producing a government (Michels, 2006). Active and substantial participation by citizens through voting in a representative democracy is highly desirable as a fundamental way of expressing collective preferences to achieve the general will. The role of citizen participation is therefore summed in transforming citizens into public-oriented individuals, who are functionary integrated into the democratic polity with the sole desire to impress on representatives to deliver good government (Michels, 2006). This is the role of citizen participation in a democracy which is instrumental in producing and implementing rules that are acceptable to all. In contemporary language, the role of citizen participation in a democracy is to elect a government to respond to citizens pressures as a responsive and responsible government delivering on good governance. Democratic governments should therefore be responsive to citizens as a consequence of citizen participation via elections, public pressure and deliberations as well as petitioning. As has been succinctly argued by Warren, (2010), democratic deficit ensues normatively or empirically when citizen participation fails to achieve government responsiveness and more tragically when citizens conclude that their participation cannot elicit government responsiveness. In many emerging democracies, voting as a form of citizen participation is distorted in ways that it can hardly achieve government responsiveness. The case of vote-buying in Nigeria is instructive.

Vote Buying and Nigerian Elections

An examination of the prevalence of vote-buying in the 2019 elections and likely implications on voter's role in the democratic choices they make require a peep into the build-up to the elections going back to 2007 and beyond. Particular emphasis will be laid later on the governorship election in Ekiti State in 2018. The vote-buying phenomenon has been part of Nigeria's electoral process since colonial times. The idea of the dispensation of material gifts to potential voters has been part of the campaign culture in Nigeria rooted in the tradition of gift-giving. The party focused electoral system of the late colonial era to early post-independent Nigeria downplayed the candidate and hence the deployment of personal vote-winning strategies such as cash payments (Dudley, 1982). The distribution of material gifts with party emblems during campaign rallies also had a relatively remote bearing on vote influence-parties mobilised and spent money on elections directly thereby

reducing the projection of candidates as the focus of electioneering campaigns and the canvassing for votes. Besides, the three dominant regional political parties left little or no room for opposition fray into their strongholds, thereby reducing the deployment of vote-buying tendencies.

The politics of the Second Republic, especially the 1983 general election, witnessed the upping of the conditions and deployment of vote-buying tendencies mostly cash for votes having escaped the military scrutiny of 1979. Massive corruption of the second republic raised the stake for elections as no politician was willing to concede defeat and hence the resort to all means to win the 1983 general election. Politicians turned contractors and business moguls financed party activities and displayed ostentatious wealth. All the leading political parties indulged in excessive use of money, including vote-buying and violence, to obtain electoral victories (Davies, 2006; Lucky, 2014). The ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) at the national level, the United Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) controlled states in the West and East drew on public resources to finance elections and elaborately expended these on the grant of material benefits to voters in return for votes.

The ostentatious display of money by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) right at the level of intraparty competition and Presidential and gubernatorial elections exposed candidates as the focus of elections rather than political parties, which boosted personal campaign strategies including vote-buying. The excessive use of money estimated at N2.1trillion by the two parties and their candidates would be used by the military to annul the June 12 General Elections in 1993 (Onuoha & Ojo, 2014).

The general elections that paved the way for the return of democracy in 1999 and subsequent elections have witnessed a gradual but steady rise in the phenomenal deployment of cash for vote strategy of seeking support. The 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections saw the obscene utilisation of vote-buying as a major strategy for electoral victory. Since 2003, politicians approached elections as a personal project without a blink for decorum and regard for the law or normative concerns. Thus, victory was primed at all cost, including violence and intimidation, coupled with the vote-buying strategy. The impunity with which these acts of electoral fraud are exercised instrumentalise practices including the electoral system of first past the post. Against this background, vote-buying was reported higher in 2007 over 2003, as the survey

by Afrobarometer, noted that 12 per cent of interviewees accepted that they were offered something in return for votes (Bratton, 2008). It appeared that money as the unit of exchange progressed from N1750 to N10,000 depending on the location of the voter and level of education (Bratton, 2008).

The run-up to the 2015 general elections also witnessed the dazzling display of the use of the money during intraparty competitions and the subsequent general elections. Intra-party competitions were driven by personal votes and delegates were targeted by all candidates offering varying sums in line with their capacities. At the APC Presidential Primaries in Lagos, it was reported that delegates were offered \$3,000 and \$2,000 by Buhari and Atiku Abubakar respectively (Matenga, 2016).

Vote-buying would assume a more horrendous level in the off-cycle elections in three states between 2016 and 2018 when governorship polls took place in Ondo, Edo and Ekiti states. In Ondo and Edo, the cost of votes ranged between N3,000-N4,000 and the target was poor rural dwellers, urban slum inhabitants and civil servants. The exchange point was proximate to polling units on election days and the preceding night to polls. The payment mode oscillated between cash for vote or vote for cash and party agents or thugs dispensed the cash in fulfilment of the contractual agreements (Onuoha & Ojo, 2018).

Open conduct of vote-buying was also witnessed in the Anambra governorship elections in 2017. The elections in Ekiti saw the offer of cash for votes rose from N2,500 to N10,000 and was competitively offered by candidates of both parties; the APC and PDP. The exchange took place in the open under the watch of electoral officials and security agents. It was reported that the state government paid N4,000 into the accounts of State civil servants a day to the polls before the cash payments to voters on queues and after voting. The 2007 election had witnessed a high level of vote-buying, but the 2018 elections in Ekiti dwarfed the experience of 2007 with vote-buying (Nwankwo, 2018).

The personalisation of elections, the high incidence of poverty in the country, coupled with the level of impunity has boosted the phenomenon of vote-buying. It has assumed a dimension that voters look forward to it as election approaches. The 2019 election had promised a new and higher level of vote-buying with the creative deployment of strategies by go-betweens to ensure that voters delivered on their promises at the polls.

Vote Buying and the Changing Role of Citizen Participation in the Democratic Process

Vote buying has appeared entrenched and formidable as an electoral fraud mechanism across democracies and from one region to the other. Indeed, vote buying has become pervasive (Nelson, 1998; Golden, 2009). The phenomenon is highly complex both in the context of its causes and consequences on democracy, especially the role of the voter in the democratic process (Hicken, 2006). Vote buying is a form of persuasion of voters to cast a vote for a particular party or candidate (Cox, 2006; Dunning & Stokes, 2008). Schedler (2002) describes it as a “distributive strategy of electoral mobilisation”. Cox would instead focus on the motive behind buying votes while Schedler shifted emphasis to the act itself as a strategy which then fulfils the purpose of persuasion. Dunning and Stokes (2008) would describe vote-buying as a specific form of “clientelist persuasion” in order to change a citizen’s vote choice through the offer of a personal reward. The individualisation of reward and the potential outcome are emphasised by Schedler (2002, p.3) for vote-buying as “apparent efforts by parties or candidates to influence electoral choices through the delivery or promise of material benefits to voters”. These material benefits are distributed by politicians using particularistic criteria. In this way, vote-buying is simply the dispensation of material favours in order to obtain electoral support.

In most democracies, vote-buying is a strategic mechanism for electoral mobilisation in which political parties and their candidates treat the phenomenon as a legitimate commercial transaction where “the exchange of private material for electoral support” is consummated (Etzioni-Halevy, 1989). Vote-buying involves “cash payments, distribution of goods and services, public program benefits and even employment” (Nichter, 2010, p25). Substantially, vote-buying is the delivery of selective material private benefits to potential voters during electoral campaigns. This ranges from cash payments to food items, cloths, machines, mattresses and payment of utility bills in Argentina, Taiwan, Brazil and the Philippines (Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes, 1994).

One of the major defining characteristics of vote-buying is its timing. Vote buying is most effective when material benefits, including cash payments, are made prior but close to voting and maybe on or a day to voting. Given this timing, any material benefits distributed before voting is considered vote buying because of its motive to persuade voters to cast votes for a

particular party or candidate. In this sense vote buying “is a last-minute effort to influence electoral outcomes that are taking place days or hours before an election or maybe on election day” (Schaffer, 2007, p.6). In addition to cash payments and distribution of material benefits in exchange for electoral support, vote-buying also includes the provision of transportation to voters on polling day. An offer of transportation to voters to be conveyed to polling units to vote is also a form of vote-buying. This simply is considered as a cheaper form of bribery by political parties or their candidates (Heckelman, 1998; Cornelius, 2014; Valenzuela, 2002). This form of vote-buying is commonly reported in Mexico, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya and the United States.

There is a whole range of political and constitutional incentives to the choice of a given form of vote-buying. A wide range of some economic factors such as education, income and urbanisation have a tremendous capacity for shaping the market for votes (Hicken, 2006). These factors are in themselves, not exclusive. Social values and norms also play a crucial role in the effectiveness of vote-buying. The gift system in Africa, for instance, encourages vote-buying. Rural poverty and inequalities evidence in urban slums also fuel vote-buying. Political parties and candidates target rural areas and urban slums for vote-buying by exploiting the inhabitant’s chronic poverty conditions with low incomes.

There are also institutional and rule expressions that influence vote-buying. For example, an electoral system that focuses on candidates emphasises personal networks in seeking votes hence vote-buying features prominently in such an arena for electoral mobilisation. Thus, where voters can vote for individuals or cast multiple votes for individual candidates, the incentive for candidates to cultivate a personal vote is hugely higher and favours vote-buying as a strategy for electoral support (Hicken, 2002). Intra-party competition at primaries for instance, also promotes the personal vote, and candidate focused campaigning, making intra-party competition fiercely open to the deployment of vote-buying as a strategy (Hicken, 2006). In general, therefore party rules and organisation, access to government resources and the nature of competition faced by candidates determine the extent of use of personal campaign strategies which vote-buying may feature prominently. These and other institutional and political factors shape and condition the pursuit of personal votes by candidates, including vote-buying.

At the disposal of candidates to solicit for electoral support are strategies such as government patronage of a candidate’s constituency where

the candidate is a member of a ruling party, reliance on the candidates' fame, exploitation of patron-client networks and use of violence and intimidation against voters and candidates. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, as they are open to being deployed collectively. For instance, a candidate can coerce voters by using violence to intimidate them into accepting cash payments to vote as directed (Hicken, 2006). While government patronage and the reliance on fame or client-patronage networks are amenable options, all of these have drawbacks. Where a candidate is in opposition, government patronage is out of reach. Also, where a candidate has no established name or fame in terms of the link to a family name, it is not a plausible strategy. Patron-clients relations take time and resources dispensed continuously making it out of reach for low income and new candidates with little resources. Violence and intimidation are also expensive and risk criminalisation. Considering all of these drawbacks, vote-buying appear cheaper and susceptible to use by candidates with a greater degree of results. Political, cultural and socio-economic features have therefore shaped commercial transactions involving votes, and its market has been far more than ever opened to candidates than political parties. In most democracies in Africa and Latin America, the election has been personalised, making vote buying a preponderate strategy for exploiting the conditions of voters.

In Nigeria as in many other countries in Africa, elections are the fierce arena for the struggle for access to state resources hence candidates turn to all kinds of means as strategies for winning elections (Bratton, 2008). Voters have largely lost confidence in candidates who are mostly non-different in terms of what the electoral programmatic promises they offer. The absence of programme and policy focus soon to alter campaigns into battlegrounds for personal attacks, devoid of issue-based programme options for policy-based outcomes in governance should the candidates win (Bratton, 2007).

In the absence of robust public debate on political issues and policy options, candidates tend to mobilise electorates through any means and quickly become involved in the manipulation of electoral rules. One major strategy adopted for electoral mobilisation is vote-buying which Bratton, (2008) argues "deny citizens the freedom to express their electoral preferences." Vote buying is considered inevitable in the face of the ineffectiveness of persuasions to achieve adequate support that may guarantee electoral victory. In Nigeria, vote-buying has assumed a phenomenal proportion since 2003.

Prevalence of Vote Buying in the 2019 Elections

In the 2019 general elections, vote-buying was widely expressed in the distribution of food items, other gifts and outright cash handout. In a nationwide survey taking from one state in each of the six geo-political zones randomly (Nasarawa, Sokoto, Taraba, Enugu, Akwa-Ibom and Osun) 70% respondents confirmed that offer of money was made to them; while 11% and 10% received offers of items including food while 6% received threats of violence should they vote the opposing party. These offers targeted vulnerability of individuals in income conformability and security. Besides, the pursuit for votes by politicians saw the deployment of money, material gifts and violence as alternative strategies in extreme cases.

Table 1: Prevalence of Offers in different forms

Item	Frequency	Percentage
Money	674	70
Food	106	11
Other gifts	96	10
Threats with negative consequences	58	6
Job offer	28	3
	962	100

Field Survey, 2019, n=1000

Purposes of Offers

Vote-buying targets favourable outcome for candidates making monetary or other material offers to potential voters. This primary objective can be achieved by influencing voters to cast votes in favour of a candidate or prevail on voters to abstain from voting should they be living in an opposition candidate's stronghold. Yet again voters may be monetarily induced to cast damaged votes that would be voided at collation thereby providing an advantage for the candidate that offered monetary rewards. These areas of influence by vote-buying are of strategic concern to parties and their candidates to ensure victory (Schedler, 2012). The survey reveals that 46% received offers to vote in favour of a particular candidate; 38% to abstain and 36% to damage the vote.

Table 2: Purpose of Offer

Items	Frequency	percentage
Return vote	443	46.04
Abstain from voting	366	38.04
Damage vote	153	15.90
	962	100

Field Survey, 2019, n=1000

Prone Areas to Vote-buying

Vote-buying occurred in both rural and urban areas in 2019 with a high prevalence rate in rural areas, mainly due to the dominance of the vulnerable rural poor and the absence or reduced risk of sanction on intermediaries. Political thugs and party militia enjoy unrestrained operations in rural areas especially in locations of their partisan stronghold. Thus, 41% of the rural poor accepted money in exchange for votes while 14% of urban and 15% of urban slum dwellers also accepted money for votes. Residential location has then featured as a criterion for distribution of money and other materials for sourcing for votes (Shuggart and Nielsen, 1999).

Conditions of Vulnerability

Poverty and level of education as a determinant for vulnerability played out significantly in response to vote-buying. Seventy-six of those who accepted offers of money were those with meagre incomes majority of who were in rural areas and urban slums; while 15 were urban elites with a measurable degree of education such as a first degree.

Table 3: Condition of Victims of Vote-buying

Item	Frequency	Percentage
Poverty	731	75.98
Education	231	24.01
	962	100

Field Survey, 2019, n=1000

Table 4. Spatial distribution of victims of vote-buying

Item	Frequency	Percentage
Rural	394	40.95

Urban	144	14.96
Urban Slums	232	24.11
	962	100

Field Survey, 2019, n=1000

It appears that the barriers to voting buying in terms of the socio-economic conditions of victims are closing up. In previous studies, Bratton (2008) in the study of vote-buying in 2003 and 2007 showed that educated people were more likely to reject monetary offers to sell their votes, especially those with paid employment. Indeed, they were considered “immune to even temptation”. In 2019, 24% had been approached. Overall, most Nigerians believed that it is morally wrong for politicians to offer money for votes and for citizens to collect such offers and vote in compliance. This tendency undermines democracy and citizens find it morally and legally reprehensible (78%). 40% of those that felt morally strong against vote-buying would reject the offer, but 38 would accept and vote their conscience.

Table 4: Reactions to Vote Buying

Item	Frequency	Percentage
Renege	420	43.65
Comply	300	31.18
Refuse	242	25.15
	962	100

Field Survey, 2019, n=1000

Though many Nigerians found vote-buying repugnant, its prevalence leaves them with few choices. 43% indicated that they collected and voted their conscience in order to punish politicians who seek to manipulate the electoral process this way. Also, one interviewee noted, “its part of the national cake, so I collected but voted my conscience because it is our commonwealth”. Tragically enough 19% that indicated they refused did not consider reporting the matter to any law enforcement agency for the reason that nothing will be done about it. This is an apparent lack of confidence in state institutions accounting for the reign of impunity, which is exploited by politicians to perpetuate the illegality that is vote-buying. Accepting the offer itself put citizens at a crossroad of criminality, and the hope that should many citizens do so, politicians would desist from the practice as it would not pay off.

Reneging on the agreement to receive money and vote one's conscience is predicated on several factors. Where voters are certain that the ballot would be real, secret reneging is promising. Where this is compromised as in the 2019 election in many rural areas where voters were intimidated to pretend they needed assistance from party agents, reneging was risky. This strategy was widespread in use in rural areas, and urban slums and go-betweens and thugs ensured that the vote for money principle was activated on the polling day. Another determinant to reneging is the probability that others who had collected would also renege. This predicate on collective action is volatile, and once a victim senses that others would not renege, compliance is most likely for fear of attack.

Implications for Democracy and Governance

In 2018, Nigeria was declared the poverty capital of the world, with nearly 87million people in extreme poverty (Balogun, 2019, p.2). This is a classic case of misgovernance in Nigeria. However, this is undoubtedly not what Nigerians asked for in return to democracy. However, by deepening poverty, politicians have developed and created plausible conditions to exploit potential voters unrestrainedly in the pursuit of power through the ballot box by inducing the poor and vulnerable with money to sell their votes to the highest bidder whose only qualification for public office is ill-gotten wealth and not the capacity for governance.

The flash of the 2015 election result held the promise that somehow Nigeria was getting away from fraudulent elections where vote-buying and other malfeasance were beginning to be checked. Unfortunately, as the Ekiti outcome buoyed by vote-buying had shown, the 2019 election held no promise of a non-compromise with vote-buying. This tendency was championed by the ruling APC policy on social reinvestment with the trader-moni scheme and N-Power for unemployed youths. As elections approached, the tempo of disbursement of N10,000 trader-moni to market women intensified with Vice President Yemi Osinbanjo on hand supervising the disbursement to ensure effective delivery with visits to major markets across Nigeria (Aminu, 2018). Considering the number of market women and unemployed youth benefitting from cash transfer of N10,000 and the N-Power employment stipend of N30,000 to benefiting youth which disbursement intensified just before the elections, the implication is evident in influencing

voter turnout and electoral outcome in favour of the ruling APC and its candidate.

The presidential and National Assembly elections held on February 23 were reported to have been influenced by vote-buying on the day of polling. The International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI) in a joint report noted emphatically that vote-buying and electoral violence were major setbacks of the polls (NDI-IRI, 2019). This was further confirmed by the Nigerian Bar Association Election Working Group (NBA-EWG) that the general elections including the Governorship and State House of Assembly were marred by shortcomings including “violence, vote-buying and intimidation of voters”. Political parties indulged voters with money, food items and other materials to influence voters in favour of their candidates. The Group noted that these acts occurred before security agents and within the precinct of voting across the country.

The act of vote-buying during the election was perpetrated by all political parties on a competitive basis either to influence voters to cast ballots in favour of their candidates or to abstain from voting. Where vote-buying was ineffective or perceived to be unable to achieve the desired results, violence and intimidation were deployed. The free reign of go-betweens in the conduct of the vote-buying transaction speaks volumes about impunity and the degree of compromise of security agencies. Overall, the brazen prevalence of vote-buying attacks the very foundations of democracy, free choice and governmental legitimacy. This further worsens citizens’ confidence in the state and its institutions and also entrench the transformation of the role of citizens from choosing representatives out of a free will to subtle coercion in order to legitimise the democratic process.

Conclusion

The deployment of vote-buying as a strategy for mobilisation of votes and to influence voting pattern has gained momentum in the contestation for elections in Nigeria. In the 2019 elections, this phenomenon has assumed ‘official’ acceptability with the trader-moni scheme. While the rural poor and the most uneducated are more vulnerable to the strategy, the urban elites are gradually being absorbed by the scheme, thereby deepening the manipulation of the electoral system. The prevalence of this strategy in campaigning for votes has troubling implications for democracy and good governance. Vote-buying vitiates the quality of democracy by seizing the right to freedom of

choice by citizens as a critical expression of political liberty. By its nature, it intensifies political inequality between wealthy and poor citizens and wipes off any form of accountability embedded in free and fair elections as a measure of selecting leaders bound by the responsive code to electorates. Fundamentally, vote-buying promotes corrupt governance when those who occupy government positions do so by fraudulent means.

Vote buying is perpetrated by all political parties and candidates depending on the financial capacity of either the party or the candidate. The candidate centred electoral campaign approach in Nigeria encourages this practice which lends itself to use by the reduced risk it embodies. State institutions, including electoral management bodies to deal with the phenomenon, are structurally too weak and have been absorbed in turn by the criminal manipulation of the electoral process by politicians. Profoundly, vote-buying ensures the rigging of future governance having successfully radicalised the transformation of the role of voters from the free choice of candidates to coerced legitimization of manipulated electoral outcomes. To overturn this, massive voter education by mass parties and civil society groups of the essence of the right to vote in a democracy is critical to saving democracy in Nigeria. Closely related is the provision of overall security for voters with the strengthening of the secret ballot to guarantee free choice which voting entails for citizens. These premises hold the promise to defend the role of voters in establishing a democratic government made up with people of citizens' choice.

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NOTES ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2015-2019

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Abstract

Between 2015 and 2019, Nigeria had the first term of the Buhari government. The electoral victory of President Buhari over the then President Goodluck Jonathan was greatly aided by the perception that he would have zero tolerance for all things that were wrong with Nigeria. This, naturally, extended to the sphere of international relations where the push of the Jonathan government was in decline. In line with people's expectations, he took certain steps that included reducing the number of the diplomatic missions, embarked on shuttle diplomacy, among others, which gave the initial impression about a new dawn in Nigerian foreign policy. He followed this up to become a champion of the war against graft on the African continent. However, worth noting also was the issue of strained relations that the country has had with her traditional friends in the West that showed in their undue interest in the nation's 2019 elections with a lot of unfriendly acts taken against the ruling party, APC and the government it formed. As informed by the Linkage Theory, the downturns in the country's foreign policy were caused mainly by the agitated domestic environment. This paper, therefore, examines Nigerian foreign policy under the Buhari government, 2015-2019. The objective of the presentation is to draw attention to certain issues in the nation's foreign policy under Buhari in his first term in office. A combination of primary and secondary sources of data propelled its tentative conclusion that, in terms of the personal image of the President, there is much to cheer about, but only little of that has impacted on Nigerian foreign policy as a whole between 2015-2019. Based on that, the paper recommends that there should be a shift in the personified pursuit of Nigerian external relations to that of institutionalized foreign policy pursuits that will require more use of structures in responding to international issues.

Keywords: Foreign policy, Jonathan, Buhari, anticorruption, strained relations

Introduction

Nigeria's foreign policy in contemporary times is bedevilled by some problems. The foundation of all the problems is the little seriousness that informed the country's approach to the international system. Over time, the country has approached the global system in an absent-minded manner (Garba, 1987; Saliu, 2015). She believes that the international system is always there for her to toss around and still record a bumper harvest from it.

Based on our understanding of the issues, interests and especially the way the international system is fashioned, no country can gain any sustainable advantage from it when she is lackadaisical in her approach to global issues. One also notes the tendency by Nigeria to always approach the system with her old kits and assumptions that were derived from the Cold War realities into which she was released for independence in 1960.

Many changes have, however, taken place in the global environment which successive Nigerian presidents have not paid much attention to. For instance, globalization and interdependence are spreading like a bush fire which every nation is struggling to cope with. Surprisingly, Nigerian foreign policy is poorly funded in the age of momentous changes in the global system. However, the nation wants to be considered as an important actor on the global scene, to be worshipped and adored especially by her fellow African countries.

Mention must also be made of the legendary level of lack of coordination in the pursuit of her interests outside her borders. That seems to be a tradition in Nigerian foreign policy for the country's delegations to be pursuing different interests if they care to attend international meetings after collecting huge allowances for them (Lamindo, 2018).

A number of other inhibiting factors are prevalent such as lack of adequate democratic context for formulating the foreign policy, over-possession of it by the executive arm of government, absent-mindedness of the National Assembly, among other problems that are facing Nigerian foreign policy. The expectation in 2015 when President Buhari was sworn-in as the President of Nigeria was that he would show more interest in external relations relative to his overall posture when he served as a military Head of State between 1983-1985. Indeed, in his major speeches before the 2015 presidential election and even after, he had assured Nigerians that his Presidency would restore the glory of the country in external relations (Buhari, 2014).

Four years after, opinion is divided whether he has done much to rehabilitate the country's foreign policy. While his key functionaries hold the view that the Buhari phenomenon is the best to have happened to Nigerian foreign policy (Adesina, 2015; Onyeama, 2018), others hold a contrary view (Punch, 2019, Jonathan, 2015).

This background motivated us to embark on this article in examining Nigerian foreign policy under him in the period between 2015 and 2019. To achieve the objective of the paper, which is to find out critical issues in the implementation of Nigerian foreign policy between 2015 and 2019, the paper adopts the Linkage Theory.

The paper tentatively concludes that while the Buhari government cannot be denied some achievements in the pursuit of Nigerian foreign policy, its efforts both domestically and internationally, have also created some gaps and even widened some other well-known gaps in Nigerian foreign policy. What are these accomplishments and gaps? Data sourced from both primary and secondary sources are our guide in answering the central question posed in this paper. We will endeavour to make some suggestions and recommendations to help in the better delivery of Nigerian foreign policy both within and outside the nation.

The Linkage Theory

The Linkage Theory represents one of the theories one can use in analyzing the foreign policy of a state. Its popularity arose from the understanding that nation-states behave the way they do outside their borders because of the influence of their domestic environment.

Also, their reactions to international events are necessitated by certain developments in the global system. Therefore, to understand the foreign policies of states, one must pay attention to their internal and external environment(s). One stands the chance of understanding better the thrusts of foreign policies being pursued by the basic units of political analysis when one gazes at the two levels of engagement.

Over time, studies have revealed that in contemporary times, no insight will be gained into the foreign policy of a state if one holds onto the rigid demarcation line that separates domestic policies of a state from its international pursuits. A better approach is to understand their inter-connectedness and reflect it in our analyses.

As profitable as the theory is, some scholars and observers have levied some criticisms against it. Their main grouses are two: one, it has failed to recognize the class structure within a nation-state that can influence its external pursuits. So also, is the structure of the international system; no matter what the third world nations do, the imperialist states/affluent states are always out to exploit and oppress them both within and outside their countries. Notwithstanding, the Linkage Theory offers us the opportunity to appraise the totality of the environment of Nigeria under Buhari in his first four years in office and know how the interplay of forces at the two levels has impacted on his foreign policy choices on behalf of Nigeria.

Internal Environment

The Buhari government was ushered into an office with a myriad of problems that had a profound impact on the domestic environment that produced some downturns for the country's foreign policy (Elaigwu, 2017). It was, therefore, a lot of Buhari administration to turn things around for the largest economy in Africa. A combination of policy actions has been taken to address the identified problems. These include finalizing the Treasury Single Account, TSA, which was initiated by the Jonathan government. Its main thrust was to warehouse all hitherto several accounts of government and its agencies in one single account ostensibly to promote more openness and transparency in government's financial transactions.

Although hues and cries were raised against the policy by some critical minds, who believed such an action would slow down the running of government as an undue delay is being experienced as a result of the long processes of getting approvals which have made some government agencies to seek for approvals to be exempted from the policy. One of these is the military, while the universities are still groaning under the TSA's policy with a loud complaint about exemption so as not to grind the wheel of progress on the country's many campuses.

There is also a subsisting agitation over the commissions being paid to the company that is managing the account (Melaye, 2017). In fairness to the policy, there is a significant reduction in the level of public corruption, but sanctions have not been seen being meted out for the many infractions of the law, and that has been making people wonder if all dimensions to the policy had been thoroughly considered before its implementation.

Meanwhile, the Buhari government has continued to announce humongous money that it has saved from implementing the policy. The TSA's policy complements the work of the anti-graft agencies to reduce the level of corruption in the country, which the APC government believes requires drastic measures in order to release more money for critical needs of the nation (Buhari, 2019a). Despite the complaints and counselling that corruption is not the only problem of Nigeria that requires attention and the charge of a selective approach to fighting the war against corruption being levied against the Buhari government, the administration has not indicated any intention of slowing down; it is indeed talking tough (Buhari, 2019b)

As a cardinal policy plank of the government, more intensity is being seen in the war that has drawn some external interests into the foray by supporting the main opposition party, PDP, in its belief that the war is being waged solely against its members and sympathizers (USA Embassy, 2019; Secundus, 2018). However, only a few corruption cases have been successfully prosecuted. President Buhari has, therefore, blamed the slow level of prosecution on the corrupt judicial system and lack of diligent prosecution (Buhari, 2018a; NBA, 2018).

There are also the angles of the extent of adhering to the rule of law on the war and the tendency to slow down on corrupt persons once they defect to the ruling party. Some of them instantly become regular visitors to Aso Rock, the seat of power in Nigeria (Ologbodiyan, 2018a). Arising from lack of consensus in the way the war against corruption is being waged, especially given its negative impact on the national economy, it has not made the domestic environment to be in a position to propel the external pursuits of the nation to be as profound as anticipated by the Buhari government and thus the initial enthusiasm and applaud the war had received are giving way to concerns being expressed on it both within and outside the country (Atiku, 2019a; Kukah, 2018; Obi, 2019; EU, 2019).

After about two years in office, the government announced what looks like its blueprint for addressing economic issues in the country. The launching of the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan in 2017 was greeted with mixed feelings as observers believe that it has not gone far enough in addressing the fundamentals in the economy (Soludo, 2017; Leigh, 2017; Taiwo, 2017). Meanwhile, the government is full of praises for its efforts as the phenomenal growth in agriculture is attributed to the document and other initiatives by the Ministry of Agriculture that have found expression in the increase in the level

of rice production and thus brings prosperity to rice farmers. The government has loudly announced that the country is virtually at the point of not importing rice again from other countries (Buhari, 2019b). The assertion may be true, but rice smuggling is continuing, and the price of rice is not showing any sign of going down to make it more available to poor Nigerians.

The unemployment rate is high (about 21 per cent) to the extent that people have attributed democracy to be the grower of unemployment, and by implication, poverty (Utomi, 2017). Under the administration, there has been a resolve by some Nigerian youths to be migrating to Europe with the government giving the impression that the affected youths are on their own (Buhari, 2016b, 2019c). There seems to be a consensus that the government has failed in its campaign promise of providing many jobs for jobless Nigerians, a situation that had been doubted before now by Soludo (2015).

Another mark of failure in tendering the national economy is the rising level of poverty. Despite many initiatives such as Anchor Borrower, TraderMoni, N-Power and many others, Nigeria still parades a considerable number of poor people (about 86m or about 50 per cent of the population). Although the new minimum wage bill has been assented to by the President, people still doubt its capacity to do much in alleviating poverty based on the colossal fall of the national currency, naira. Most Nigerians are comfortably living in poverty, with the fear that the implementation of the new minimum wage may lead to some other worsening proposals such as increases in Value Added Tax and prices of petroleum products to enable the government pay the new minimum wage (Udoma, 2019).

There seems to be a renewed commitment to developing an infrastructural climate of the country. The government had used its over one trillion-naira national budget on infrastructure as a justification for its re-election in 2019. This represents the highest allocation to the sector since the country achieved independence in 1960 (Osinbajo, 2019). Some roads have been fixed, while many others are going on with new ones included in the 2019 national budget (Buhari, 2019d). Laudable as the efforts of the government are, there are allegations on the skewness of the infrastructural projects that are being executed across the country (Abaribe, 2018).

Two other issues bordering on the domestic environment of the country are also important in knowing the extent to which the government has gone in making the domestic environment to enable Nigerian foreign policy. The first has to do with the hydrated *Boko Haram* phenomenon that President

Buhari inherited from two previous administrations in its most threatening form. The government, upon being inaugurated, changed all the Service Chiefs and ordered that the Chief of Army Staff should re-locate to Maiduguri, the hotbed of *Boko haram*. He has also appealed to the world, especially the World Bank, to concentrate its interventions in the Northeastern part of the country. He was not done; he has made more money available to fight the scourge of *Boko haram* in the Northeast. The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were not left out as his interventions have seen many of them returning to their original homes (Buhari, 2019c). This is in addition to visiting Borno State which made 2019 general elections to be held in all *Boko haram's* infested areas. For all the efforts of Buhari's government that have indicated its commitment to ending the menace of insurgents including negotiating for the freedom of the abducted girls, most observers have given him a pass-mark on that as no part of Nigerian territory is still under the control of the dreaded *Boko haram* group (Shettima, 2019).

However, some people though have recognized the efforts of the government are still worried that what the government has claimed to be its achievements on *Boko haram* are not achievements as the insurgent group still strikes with a fury that has tended to show that it is very much in business (Buhari, 2019c; El-Kanemi, 2019, Buratai, 2019). One major step required in turning the tide against the insurgents as being demanded by observers is the change of guards at the level of Service Chiefs. Since they have given their best and their best is not good enough to end *Boko haram*, the next logical thing to do is to change all of them (Senate, 2018; Buhari, 2019e).

The Buhari government though agreed with the perspective judging by the open remarks made by the President; he still went ahead to extend the tenures of the Service Chiefs except that of the former Inspector General of Police, Ibrahim Idris (Buhari, 2019e). Among other issues, the *Boko haram* menace has revealed the level of vulnerability of Nigeria with major actors in the international system unsparing in ridiculing the country over the matter (Punch, 2018). The most unfortunate is the disappearance of Chibok school girls' where the whereabouts of a significant number of them remain unknown to the government. Leah Sharibu is a constant face of the helplessness of the Nigerian state in rescuing the remaining 107 girls who are still being held by the *Boko haram* machinery (Jonathan, 2015; Atiku, 2018b; Buhari, 2019g).

The interest being shown on the issue of insurgency in Nigeria's backyards by the rest members of the international community corresponds to the feeling of disappointment among Nigerians in Federal government for its failure to bring the menace to a close. Up till today, Nigerians are divided on the mission of the militant Islamic group.

For the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, SCIA, an influential Islamic group, the *Boko haram* members are not Muslims as there is nothing in Islam that supports the blood-thirsty approach. On the other hand, the Christian Association of Nigeria, CAN, another influential religious group for the Christians maintains that the real mission of the Islamic set is to islamise Nigeria. All assurances given to the contrary are not enough to change the mindset of the Association (Abubakar, 2016; Buhari, 2018b; Oritsejafor, 2016; CAN, 2019).

As Nigerians are divided on the mission of Boko haram, so also is the lack of consensus on the war itself with allegations that some Nigerians and certain foreign interests are funding it and banditry in the country (Buratai, 2019; Trump, 2018). The war against *Boko haram* is a big business to some military officers whose attitude is being held responsible for the prolongation of the war as high-ranking officers are being accused of turning the war into a kind of ATM machine (money-making) as approved allowances, and weapons are not visible on the battleground and the rights of citizens are continuously being violated (Ologbodiyan, 2018b; Amnesty International, 2017).

These, together with desertions and prolonged stay of non-commissioned officers in Maiduguri and its environs who are on a tour of duty, have all the more made the war against terror a complicated matter. Where is *Boko haram* getting its weapons from? Why is Nigeria experiencing difficulties in accessing weapons, while the Boko haram group finds it easier to access markets, transport their wares and have access to military intelligence reports in planning their activities? All these have turned the issue of *Boko haram* into a kind of a nightmare to the nation and its foreign friends (Jonathan, 2015, Adibbe, 2018).

Two is the issue of the Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB, whose leader, Nnamdi Kanu, has escaped to other parts of the world, making inflammatory statements against the present Constitution of Nigeria—going by his consistent demand that a referendum is organized on Biafra by the government to know the feelings of the Easterners on whether or not they want to remain in the country, which he has called a zoo with a cloned

president. Judging by the way events are playing out, Kanu is becoming a jester, but the message of his agitation is bigger than him.

Most people in Nigeria agree with him that there are injustice and marginalization of the Igbos and the Niger Deltans in Nigeria. Where the problem lies is on what is to be done? Kanu and his band of youth followers are convinced that seceding from Nigeria is the logical end of age-long marginalization of the Igbos. Others think secession is not the solution as Igbos have their investments scattered all over Nigeria and thus making it impossible for all of them to abandon their investments and race down to their natural Igboland (Ohanaeze, 2017, 2018). The feeling of most parts of Niger Delta and parts of the North-Central that Kanu has appropriated and turned into Biafra land does not seem to jelly with IPOB's leader.

As a counter-narrative, most Igbo groups have been advocating for restructuring, another testy concept in Nigeria's nation-building effort (Saliu, 2017a, Ohanaeze, 2019). By restructuring, its advocates are calling attention to the need to adjust the governance structure of the country to give satisfaction to all its constituent parts. Others are viewing restructuring from the perspectives of devolution of powers, economic restructuring, return to regionalism, among others (Saliu, 2017a; Taiwo, 2017; Saliu, 2018a).

While we await what the Nigerian state will do in confronting the issue of restructuring which its flame appears to have gone down with the victory of President Buhari, an ardent critic of the term in the 2019 presidential election, its implications for undermining Nigeria's development efforts cannot be ignored. Four of such implications are relevant to this paper.

First, the necessary consensus in moving the country forward is lacking. It hardly can the North versus South dichotomy that has characterized the debate on restructuring make Nigerian elites to agree in aggressively pursuing the goal of national integration that the country urgently needs.

Second, the Niger Delta, the area that lays the golden egg, will continue to be restive with a potential threat to oil money that comes into the national purse that fuels the Nigerian nation. Although its agitation over resource control began much earlier before the current phase of restructuring, it has found it convenient to embrace the agitations for restructuring Nigeria as a way of drawing more attention to the issue of Niger Delta's underdevelopment.

Third, with the world attention that the issue of restructuring Nigeria has attracted, it will be difficult for the international community not to read

instability into the whole issue with a consequence on the push of Nigeria in the international system.

Fourth, given the dynamism that characterizes the world system, frustration may later drive the consideration of some other dangerous options that may prove fatal for the continuous existence of Nigeria (Saliu, 2017b).

As the country grows in democracy, there is little evidence that the process of arriving at external options for Nigeria has been impacted upon by the democratic environment prevailing in the nation as Nigerian foreign policy has been further withdrawn from the reach of the people. Foreign policy issues are hardly regular in the country's periodicals neither do they excite the people's assembly, the National Assembly whose members are more interested in what puts instant money in their pockets (Lamindo, 2013; Owasanoye, 2019).

The Presidency can, therefore, do whatever it wants on foreign policy. The only notable interest ever shown to foreign policy by the National Assembly is in the direction of appointment of ambassadors and a further reduction in budgetary allocations to foreign policy (Alli, 2014). With this attitude, it is little surprising that the nation has been returned to the era of personalized foreign policy pursuits, with many errors committed in the process.

External Environment

During the period under review, the external environment of Nigeria showed a mixed bag though the impact of the unhealthy domestic environment has been revealed and that suggests that in no small extent the texture of the domestic environment indicates what a state does outside its borders. Traces of disorderliness at home will also show in the external pursuits of a state. Nigeria's experience between 2015 and 2019 showed this eloquently.

The foreign policy agenda of the Buhari government was kick-started with several foreign trips the President embarked upon that initially embraced the West African sub-region and later, the broader international community. The trips inevitable as they were, did not, however, find favour among Nigerians and in the press (Punch, 2016; Oyegun, 2016).

For the West African edition, they were intended to repair the damage that the Jonathan administration had done to Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy expressed in the lukewarm attitude of Chad and Cameroon to the menace of *Boko haram* ravaging the country. The trips later injected the

needed elixir in Nigeria-West African relations as the visit of the President to Chad energized the concept of a multinational joint task force that had been on the drawing board before the inauguration of Buhari's government (Ismail and Kife, 2018).

Cameroon, Benin and Niger were equally visited, and that led to the claim of degrading the *Boko haram* war machine by functionaries of Abuja authorities (Buhari, 2019c). During his first term in office, some substantial assistance was rendered to Togo, Niger, Sao Tome and the Benin Republic in conducting their countries' rounds of elections and other concerns. Surprisingly, the elections that were held in Ghana and Niger had Buhari's phenomenon as an issue as candidates for the elections were proud to associate with Nigeria's President in their campaign posters. Ghana, which shares a lot in common with Nigeria's political history, was proud in inviting President Buhari to her independence anniversary in 2018 as a Guest of Honour and the main speaker for the occasion after her President had adopted the change mantra of the APC and its presidential candidate as a model for the incumbent President of Ghana when he was vying for the office in 2016. Notably, however, is the incidence of deportation of Nigerians from Ghana and other unfriendly acts targeted against Nigeria and her citizens that still dog their relationship. One also observes a kind of retaliatory measure taken against Ghana by Abuja in the form of deporting Ghanaians contrary to ECOWAS's stand on the free movement of persons and goods across the sub-region (Babandede, 2019).

Nigeria, during the period under review, re-enacted her concern for political stability and security in the sub-region when she served as part of the ECOWAS' mediation team to The Gambia and later contributed significantly to the peacekeeping mission established in the country to force out the defeated President Yahya Jammeh who had refused to vacate office for Adamu Baro who defeated him in the presidential election. Some critical observers have criticized Nigeria's second fiddle role in The Gambia given the history of warm relations between the two countries that should have made her single-handedly dealt with the political logjam in The Gambia (Sesay and Ifedayo, 2017).

The point to note is that Nigeria is counted among the countries that are providing security in The Gambia and that should be pleasing to the ears than her lesser level of recognition in Mali or her total absence on the issue of

the Central African Republic (CAR) (Sesay and Ifedayo, 2017; SIRA, 2013; Adebajo, 2013).

However, Nigeria jolted the history of her relations with her neighbours through the instrumentality of ECOWAS when Buhari's government continued with the policy of withdrawal of funds due to inevitable disagreements bordering on funds utilization on the part of the sub-regional organization (Buhari, 2016a). One only hopes that the recent assurance given by the President when he received in audience the new Chairman of ECOWAS and the President of Togo on Nigeria's preparedness in meeting her financial obligations to the organization will change the country's attitude towards the organization (Buhari, 2019f).

Buhari's policy towards West Africa would be incomplete without remarking on the attitude of his government towards Morocco, a North African country, in her bid to join ECOWAS that is meant for West African countries. On this, one has to rely on the body language and a few indirect comments made by key officials of the government to know where the Nigerian President stands on the issue. Nigeria that was expected to provide the leadership in maintaining the sanctity of the Charter of ECOWAS on membership has been ambivalent and lost her voice among those countries that were opposed to the bid. This has been interpreted to mean that Buhari's government is well at home with Morocco's membership bid (SIRA, 2017; Buhari, 2019c). For instance, in faraway Jordan, the President was full of appreciation to Morocco for her contributions to the country's economic recovery programmes, and that suggests that the country has no qualms with Morocco's bid for membership of ECOWAS (Buhari, 2019c).

It seems that the Nigerian government is more persuaded in defraying the cost of running ECOWAS, the most massive burden which it carries and that is not however what keen watchers of events expect from the country in relating with ECOWAS. The idea of Nigeria being among the debtors to the organization is anti-climax that she needs to do something about and give a practical demonstration to her manifest destiny that shows in her power and influence in the organization (Adebajo, 2013).

On the whole, Nigeria's relations within West Africa are significant though greatly troubled with the ongoing war against terrorism and the low turn in her relations with ECOWAS. The poor economic situation at home has been cited for Nigeria's change in policy towards the organization and the frustration that she has in having a commanding presence in the sub-regional

organization (Buhari, 2016a; 2016b). One would like to add the reduced level of appreciation for the geostrategic importance of the sub-region to Nigeria. We think and advise that the country should show a better understanding of her historic role in West Africa by getting more deeply involved in the affairs of the sub-region.

By extension, Nigerian foreign policy has been hallmarked by its deep level of concern for the African continent. During the period under review, Nigeria continued with her preoccupation with African affairs. The current Nigerian President has visited countries such as Cameroon, Ethiopia, South Africa and other countries to renew the country's interest in the affairs of the continent. Symbolic of his concern for African nations, President Buhari has personally attended most of the African Union-sponsored conferences and meetings. He has aligned himself with the AU's position on the trial of past African Heads of State at the International Criminal Court, ICC, and this has not been fancied by some traditional friends of the country that are always in the mood of dictating to African leaders (Saliu, 2018b). Remarkably, President Buhari was invited to ICC's programme in 2018 which his media aides considered as an endorsement for his government contrary to insinuations by opposition elements that he was in the wrong book of the court for sundry issues bordering on human rights abuses (Adesina, 2018; Ologbodiyan, 2018c).

At the bilateral level, Nigeria-South African relations have been most significant for its turns and twists. Two major issues have featured in the relationship. One, the continuous xenophobic attacks in South Africa in which Nigerians have been targeted have punctured the otherwise good relations between the two countries. So alarmed were members of the National Assembly on the issue that in 2018, two separate committees were set up apparently because they were not pleased with the reactions of the Presidency to the issue.

Although only the House Committee was able to make it to Pretoria, the desired impact was not made as to the executive arm also dispatched a committee to South Africa to find out more about the attacks on Nigerians. It is possible that nobody paid any serious attention to the two committees as the agreement reached with the executive committee has been continuously breached by Pretoria that seems not to be perturbed by the persistent complaints lodged by Nigeria on the ill-treatment of her citizens who are resident in South Africa. It only took another round of attacks on Nigerians in

South Africa for Nigerian citizens to lament about lack of influence on the part of their country to re-direct events in her relations with South Africa. Keen observers have implicated the too many diplomatic missions of the nation for the ill-treatment that Nigerians are exposed to on the world stage for the incompetence of their staff and the general sloppiness with which they carry out their functions (Saliu, 2016; Alli, 2019). The second being the issue of MTN, a South African company that violated the law on sim cards registration in Nigeria. It only took the visit of the former President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, to Nigeria to reduce the heavy fine that was imposed on the company.

Nigeria under Buhari, as was witnessed under Jonathan especially over Libya, has broken camps with other African countries this time on the issue of Continental Free Trade for Africa. The government has cited some reasons bordering on inadequate consultations. Only a few are, however, impressed with the Nigerian position after all the preparatory works for the agreement led by Yemi Osinbajo, Vice-President of Nigeria.

Meanwhile, about 49 other African countries have already signed the agreement, leaving the country in the bracket of a few countries that are yet to sign into it. All the good works of the country under Buhari, including being the champion of the war against corruption in Africa, maybe put in jeopardy by the time action rolls out on the agreement (Adetula, 2019). It is quite unfortunate for the giant nation in Africa to once again be ostracized from the main African position as it was the case on Libya. Not many are impressed that the nation is now dwelling on details and procedures that she ought to have done before now given her pioneering roles in knocking the agreement into shape (Obasanjo, 2018a).

From the foregoing analysis of Buhari's foreign policy towards the larger Africa, it is evident that nothing significant has changed in the country's relations on the continent. It has been characterized by visitations but what would have been an ace in terms of free trade is still under consideration. The adoption of the President as a model in the fight against corruption is, however, noteworthy.

Over the years, Nigeria has attached a greater level of importance to her relations with the larger international system. The rationale for this apart from the historical realities of colonialism is that the country strongly believes that as a continental leader, she will always require the support and goodwill of other nations outside Africa as was experienced during the anti-apartheid and liberation struggles. Also, the prospects of getting economic assistance,

especially from the western world and China is another factor why her relations with the wider world cannot be ignored. Nigeria's relations with the USA and China are however only considered under this heading.

The USA warmly supported candidate Buhari of the APC in Nigeria's 2015 presidential election at the expense of President Jonathan. Several reasons have been given for her support to Buhari who four years earlier was not a favourite candidate of the West (Jonathan, 2015; Saliu, 2017c). Among the list of factors was Jonathan's lukewarm attitude towards fighting corruption and terrorism, shift to China and others. Thus, after the swearing-in ceremony, President Buhari barely six weeks in office, went to the USA to pay a thank-you visit. Kind words were used by President Obama to describe the Nigerian President whom he considered to be a man of integrity.

A new vista was thus opened in Nigeria-USA relations. Buoyed by the warm reception received in the USA, the President was encouraged to embark on other visitations including a repeat of the official visit to the USA under President Donald Trump. He instantly became the toast of the international system, a development that was much detested at home (Punch, 2016). Unlike his first visit to the USA that was dogged by controversy about the real intentions of President Buhari for accusing the USA of complicity in the war against *Boko haram* in Nigeria, the second visit was mostly successful. However, Chief Obasanjo holds a different opinion on the matter (Obasanjo, 2018b).

Once again, President Trump publicly acknowledged the excellent works that President Buhari was doing in Nigeria. Barely a few months after especially with the adoption of a currency swap with China and after the refusal of the country to be intimidated into re-locating her embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem there emerged deterioration in their level of relationship to the extent that the concept of 'lifeless human being' came out of the blues, marking a low turn in the two countries' relationship.

As remarked in 2017, when President Trump was coming into power, we did warn Nigeria to be prepared for unfriendly acts coming from America under Trump (Saliu, 2017c). Nothing in contemporary times has brought signs of strained relations other than the 2019 general elections. As was observed in 2015, the USA was practically a political combatant with his ambassador and the USA's embassy in Abuja regularly counselling but most times threatening and interfering in Nigeria's electoral process (Kerry, 2015). It was quite clear that President Buhari was not a favoured candidate in the 2019 presidential

election. All pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding. Her suspected candidate was Atiku Abubakar of the PDP who has a subsisting corruption case in America but who was still allowed to visit the USA under controversial circumstances without being first clear of the corruption allegations against him (Mohammed, 2019). As the end of the first term in office of President Buhari in May 2019 approached, the relationship was unsung though the USA had congratulated the President for his second term in office.

Nigeria's relations with China, unlike what we have observed with the USA, were relatively warmer as further penetration of Nigeria's economy is being witnessed. The Buhari government has borrowed substantial amounts of money from China, and that makes her indebted to China, (Nigeria currently owes about 24.3 trillion debts, a great chunk of which is owed to China) which is causing concerns in some circles (Atiku, 2018a; Ologbodiyan, 2019). A currency swap agreement is being implemented between the two countries. The name China is synonymous with the re-modelling of the railway in Nigeria. As proof of the warm relations between them, President Buhari has visited China twice with other countless numbers of official delegations sent to China. From all indications and despite several warnings, President Buhari is irrevocably committed to Nigeria's policy shift to China for its economic benefits to the nation (Sheu, 2018; Alli, 2018).

It needs to be noted that Nigeria, right from the time of Abacha, has been shifting to China with virtually all presidents in the current Republic have visited China, indicating that Abacha must have seen something good in shifting to China (Oche, 1999). There are issues with Nigeria's shift to China, which the government is not interested in raising with the Chinese, the 'new suitor' of Nigeria. These are; low-quality products, turning Nigerian into a dumping ground, negative impacts of Chinese products on Nigeria's local industries, etc. (Alli, 2018).

For this paper, its interest is the likely impact of Nigeria's dependence on China on her leadership position in Africa on which the country has staked everything, including her economic health. One cannot understand why Nigeria is taking the backseat on foreign relations in Africa when the payback period is here with us. While we support the diversification of Nigeria's external relations, we are worried that due care is not being taken in engaging with China on whose behalf Nigeria had shoved aside Taiwan when she suddenly remembered the One China policy and cast aside all the historical concessions that were hitherto granted Taiwan in Lagos on the altar of her hot

romance with China (Press release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). The question of why Nigeria is a centre of penetration in this era of scrambling for African resources in place of her being one of the designers of the game needs to worry about the current leaders of Nigeria.

Suggestions and Recommendations

Based on the foregoing analysis in this paper, some suggestions and recommendations are necessary to improve Nigerian foreign policy. They are as follows:

1. Nigeria needs to come out clearly in defining her interests in the international system in a way that reflects her level of harnessed resources, not resource potential.
2. Communication is important in the international system, and only appropriate communication strategies can increase the country's stock in the system.
3. China is, no doubt, a rising giant in the global system, but the country needs to approach her cautiously, given the structure of Nigeria's political economy.
4. No foreign policy can be adjudged successful unless the domestic environment is propelling; it is playing a complementary role.
5. Nigeria needs to pay more attention to ECOWAS and her neighbours in West and Central Africa for her self-enlightened security interest; her wide-ranging investments deserve to be preserved.
6. There is an urgent need to come up with a framework that can ginger more co-operation and collaboration between her and South Africa than hostility and antagonism that is being seen.
7. The nation should expedite actions on the signing of the Continental Free Trade Agreement so that it is not isolated on the continent.
8. Nigeria should attach more importance to international relations by always being anticipatory of events and cultivate the habit of building scenarios so that she will not be dragging other countries down for her failure to do all the needful.
9. The level of antagonism with the USA and the West generally should be watched and moderated to make the reach of Nigeria more expansive than contracting in the global system.
10. The issue of restructuring though somewhat resolved through the victory of President Buhari and his party in 2019 presidential election,

one still feels that after the euphoria of election victory, those who have been elected should look at it again dispassionately to reach a broad consensus on the matter.

11. *Boko haram's* war is taking much longer to bring to a close. The Nigerian state should revitalize the war by changing the Service Chiefs and field commanders to bring about a new resolve to end the war.
12. The signs coming from the economy are not too bright and comforting. Efforts must be made by the Presidency and the National Assembly to reduce the level of suffering in the land through appropriate initiatives and legislations.
13. The dangers that are inherent in personified foreign policy need to be appreciated. The Presidency is thus advised to move along the line of institutionalizing Nigeria's foreign policy by adopting a more structural approach.
14. The Nigerian state should prioritize its concerns and attach more importance to her external relations by devoting more resources to its pursuits.

Conclusion

The paper has tried to make a submission on Nigerian foreign policy between 2015 and 2019. Relying on the Linkage approach, it went through the internal environment as well as the external environment of Nigeria in understanding her external relations during the period under review. Its major submissions are: the country has improved slightly in her image index as the positive image of the President as a man of integrity has rubbed on the country. Nigeria's policy towards China is waxing stronger under President Buhari; her relations with the West were generally troubled; and the nation's policy towards ECOWAS needs rejuvenation, among others. Some recommendations were made notable of which is that the country should re-jig her foreign policy apparatus and be prepared to fund it more adequately for her push to be more noticeable in the international system.

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GLOBALISATION AND THE COLLAPSE OF TEXTILE INDUSTRIES IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Globalisation has become the defining process of development as it contributes on one hand not only to the rapid integration of global economies, but in the development of specific sectors and countries. On the other hand, globalisation negates and endangers local development initiatives and economies. Against this rather divergent and seemingly disgruntled polar-opposite conclusion, the study thus examines the extent to which globalisation perhaps in collaboration with local politics contributed to the collapse of textile industries in Nigeria. Thus, the study argues that globalisation has influenced the collapse of textile industries as domestic political actors destroyed the capacity of these local industries to locally and internationally compete in an open – capitalist market. The explanation could be drawn primarily from the comprador and petty-bourgeoisie character of the Nigerian economic formation.

Keywords: globalisation, industrialisation, industries, textile industries

Introduction

Globalisation is a reality. It represents the current picture of the current complex world, which has become a global village, and a global market. Globalisation is a networking process that is self-propelling. The growth of globalisation has not had an equal effect everywhere. It is not expected to have even impacts on countries, regions, economic groupings and corporate enterprises on the world economic system. Gain or loss is just a function of what roles and strategy every actor has for the single global market regime (Akpuru-Aja, 2001). The era of old imperialism and colonialism has gone, resting in the bosom of history. Since the 1980s, changing lines of imperialism

has taken centre stage. The highly industrialised countries are targeting one another for Foreign Direct Investment and universal banking and finance. The endemic crises in the vast areas of Africa, Latin America and Asia do not present any longer attractive investment climate for the more sophisticated Multinational Corporations (MNCs) with networking strategies, including trade creation and diversion, location behaviours, strategic trade policy and intra-firm linkages across borders. In many ways, globalization has been disharmonic, asymmetric and inequitable within individual countries and between countries. According to Held (1999), globalisation has widening, deepening and speeding up global interconnectedness. It could therefore be asserted that globalisation has become the defining process of development because it contributes on one hand not only to the rapid integration of global economies, but in the development of specific sectors and countries. On the other hand, globalisation negates and endangers local development initiatives and economies. Against this rather divergent and seemingly disgruntled polar-opposite conclusion, the study thus examined the extent to which globalisation perhaps in collaboration with local politics contributed to the collapse of textile industries in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

Globalisation

Globalisation is more than the flow of money and commodities. It is the growing over dependence of world people and activities through shrinking space, time and disappearing borders. Globalisation could also be described as the harmonization of social, political, economic and cultural spheres of life. Globalisation creates a global village based on shared values. Technology and market integration processes have dominated the world economic system. Globalisation implies changing in the way production is organized as required by the general dismantling of trade barriers and the free mobility of financial and productive capital, in the context of accelerated technology change. Robertson (1991) observed that globalisation involves the process of growing interconnection and interdependence in the modern world. It is generated by growing economic, cultural and political cooperation and links, as well as the need to respond together to global problems which can be solved only on a planetary scale. According to Shodunke (2010), globalisation de-emphasizes national boundaries thus engendering greater movement of people, goods,

capital and ideas. Globalisation is like moving towards living in a borderless world. As Maria (1998) asserts that:

Globalisation implies changing in the way production is organized as required by the general dismantling of trade barriers and the free mobility of financial and productive capital, in the context of accelerated technology change... technological development in the sphere of information and electronic services has been a catalyst for speeding the process, bring about global production, distribution and consumption (as cited in Akpuru-Aja, 2001, p.143).

From whatever angle one views it, globalisation assumes the emergence of a single market system, dominated by international capitalism. It connotes changes in the way production is organized and the integration of national economies into the global market. One of the basic vehicles for speeding the process of globalisation was technological development in the sphere of information science. Revolution in transportation and electro-communication technologies is so ubiquitous that it affects in a large way the global level of production, distribution and consumption between the rich and the poor countries. Not only this, the ever-growing economic giants – MNCs exert a considerable influence on political affairs within and between states by virtue of their dominance on the economic, technological, monetary and fiscal policies across national frontiers. Put differently, national governments of the leading industrialized countries have struck balance between free trade philosophy and protectionist policies in favour of their MNCs.

Africa in general, stands out as the region with the lowest levels of integration into the global economy. Africa has no production but buying and selling. The region has retained quite high and dispersed trade barriers which inhibits its full integration into the global economy.

Industrialisation

Industrialisation is a process that fundamentally seeks to combine science, technology, capital, workers, and raw materials to produce goods that consumers would buy (Yaqub and Maikudi, 2014). Industrialisation is also a process in which a country transforms from a primarily agricultural and handicraft society into one based on the manufacturing of goods and services (Ladan, Abdullahi, and Haruna, 2012). It is a period of social and economic change that transforms a human group from an agrarian society into an

industrial one, involving the extensive re-organisation of an economy for the purpose of manufacturing (Arthur and Steven, 2003).

Industrialisation also involves vast economic and social changes, being manifested in urbanization, a growing body of wage-earners, increased technical and advanced education. Individual manual labour is often replaced by mechanized mass production and craftsmen are replaced by assembly lines. Industrialization is most commonly associated with the European industrial revolution of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Industrialization which is a deliberate and sustained application and combination of an appropriate technology, infrastructure, managerial expertise, and other important resources, has attracted considerable interest in recent developmental studies (Dazie, 2012) because of the critical role it plays in economic development. In fact, industrialization acts as catalyst that accelerates the pace of structural transformation and diversification of economies; enables a state to fully utilize its factor endowment and depend less on foreign supply and finished goods or raw materials economic growth, development and sustenance (Udah, 2010).

Industrialisation is central to the sustained development of an economy and improves the prospects of human well-being. The benefits of industrialisation could be seen from the range of consumer goods available to the efficiency of the transportation system and outstanding advances made in computer and communication technology.

England of the 18th century for instance, had more chances in pioneering Industrial Revolution compared to other countries because of the geographical situation which favours Sea transport. This has helped the growth of British overseas empire to expand its market. The empires served as sources of raw materials to service the industries and as well as market for the disposal of the industrial goods being produced in the state. Not only this, the presence of “feudal class” and the “gentry” (landowners without feudal titles) have also contributed to having favourable and competitive attitude towards economic change and capital accumulation (Yavuz, 2010). Hence, throughout its history, political (imperial power) and institutional framework to facilitate the above-mentioned aspects had also developed in England.

Furthermore, England also had in its territories, the necessary raw materials like coal and iron ore its overseas superiority as at that time also helped to a better access and control of raw materials and a cheap labour besides the slaves in the overseas territories. Manufactured exports of England since the beginnings of the industrial revolution had been wool, cotton and

hardware. If compared for example to France's silk and other luxury goods, England's goods had a steady demand and larger access to other markets. In summary, the following are some of the general conditions necessary for industrial development which also accelerated industrial revolution in England. These include: Sufficient and accelerated capital accumulation; availability and sufficient size of domestic and foreign market; access and control of raw materials; free and cheap labour; and a political and institutional framework facilitating innovation. England, as compared to the other countries was in a more advantageous state for the above-mentioned conditions.

Theoretical Framework

Rentier state theory is the theoretical framework that guided and informed discussion and analysis in this study. A Rentier state is a state which derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients. This theory was first postulated by Hossein Mahdavy in 1970. The theory is most frequently applied to states rich in highly valued natural resources such as petroleum but can also include states rich in financial instruments such as a reserve currency and those that trade on their strategic resources, such as an important military base.

The major characteristic of a rentier state is that its main relationship with the society is mediated through its expenditures on the military and state security, development projects, consumption subsidies, construction, etc. (Luciani, 1982). Specifically, Beblawi (1987, pp.87-88) avers that the rentier economy has four characteristics which include: First, rent situations must predominate in that there really is no such thing as a pure rentier economy. Second, the state relies on a substantial external rent- therefore, does not require domestic productive sector. Third, in a rentier state only a few are engaged in the generation of rent, while the majority is involved in its distribution and consumption. Translated, this means that state's officials make the deals and take in the revenue and then allocate to the public, which is not involved in the creation of the wealth. Fourth, the government must be the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy.

Moreover, in a rentier state, production efficiency is relegated to the background and, in fact, there is at best a tenuous link between individual income and activity. Getting access to the rent circuit is a greater preoccupation than attaining production efficiency (Beblawi and Luciani,

1987). The importance of access in a rentier economy leads to what has been termed a rentier mentality which embodies a break in the work-reward causation. Reward-income or wealth is not related to work and risk bearing, rather to chance or situation. For a rentier, a reward becomes a windfall gain, an isolated fact, situational or accidental as against the conventional outlook where reward is integrated into a process of the end result of a long, systematic and organised production circuit (Beblawi, 1987). There is thus a glaring contradiction between rentier and production ethics. The rentier state is oriented away from the conventional role of providing public goods that have been extracted from the people through taxation; it is a provider of private favours. It becomes what Luciani (1987) has called an allocation (as distinct from a production) state. At least 40 per cent of state income must be derived externally (usually from oil). Luciani argues that the fact that rentier states do not have to wrest taxes from their citizens has serious implications for political reform or, rather, the lack of it.

Nigerian state has a rentier character because; its economy revolves around oil revenues. The windfall from oil revenues allowed the state to go on spending spree on virtually everything conceivable. The corollary of all this is to turn the state into an allocation state overnight thereby setting in motion a major economic crisis. As the crisis was in full swing, Nigeria lost much of the production capacity of its economy (Ibrahim, 2003). By virtue of this fact, the export staples of pre-oil boom era ceased to be exported in anywhere near the quantities that they were prior to the oil boom (Usman, 1988). It is interesting to note that when oil boom was at its zenith the general view among the ruling elite was that 'finance was not a problem to Nigeria' (Ayagi, 1990).

To this end therefore, the suitability of the theory for the study lies in the fact that the Nigerian state is among the rentier states and one of their characteristics is that they rely heavily on substantial external rents while neglecting the domestic productive sector. With the oil boom around 70s, the Nigerian state focused attention solely on the rents generated from the exploration of oil and neglected the domestic productive sector.

The Role of Nigerian State in the Development of Industries

At the beginning of the post-independence era, the industrial policy thrust continued with the colonial policies relating to trade and industry. The policies centred on the law of comparative advantage. The law of comparative advantage was a confidence trick, perpetrated and enforced by 'core' countries

to prevent 'peripheral' countries from industrializing (Oyedele, 2009). Like in many other developing countries, import-substitution industrialisation was the policy agenda in Nigeria. The policy was aimed at achieving industrialisation through direct import restrictions and the establishment of state-owned industrial enterprises. The growing prominence of the oil sector diverted the attention of policy-makers from the industrial sector as well as agriculture where, according to Usman (1988), fell in contribution to national output with the advent of petro-dollar in public finance.

Despite substantial adjustments during the past decades, Nigeria's industrial policy adopted since independence in 1960 was dominated by the goals and instruments of the 1970s. The goals were centred on reducing the burden on the exchange rate and giving Nigerians advantage of consuming foreign goods locally manufactured (Ladan, Abdullahi, and Haruna, 2012). The policy emphasized import substitution strategy, which was necessary and inevitable for Nigeria due to its colonial experience in the area of economy and trade. The basic thrust of the Import Substitution Strategy was to: lessen overdependence on foreign trade; save foreign exchange by producing those items that were formally exported; create tempo for industrialisation in Nigeria by bringing foreign technology home; empower Nigerian business men and women; accelerate the pace of development through an increased GDP of the country; and create employment opportunities in the country through industrial sector (Oyedele, 2009). This strategy could however, not be sustained due to both internal and external forces like political crisis in the country; change of government; corruption; effects of globalisation etc. For instance, in the 1980s, it was felt that the strategy ought to have advanced to the stage of import displacement, i.e. producing locally made goods which are different from or at least only similar to former inputs, but which are based on locally available inputs and technology and on real needs (as distinct from imported consumption patterns) of the economy. Such a strategy of import displacement was meant to significantly replace the then strategy of simple import substitution, which involved the importation of inputs for local production of goods (Imevbore, 2010).

One philosophy which was utilised with the hope to promote economic development in the 1970s was the Indigenisation Decree of 1972 which was subsequently amended, repealed and replaced by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act of 1977. The inability of import-substitution policy to achieve its requisites occasioned by many factors including corruption, made the

government to strengthen the Nigerian economy through indigenisation policy (of 1972) with the objective of transferring ownership and control to Nigerians of those enterprises formally, wholly or mainly, owned and controlled by foreigners; fostering widespread ownership of enterprises among Nigerian citizens; creating opportunities for Nigeria indigenous businessmen; and encouraging foreign investors to move from the unsophisticated area of the economy to the areas where large investment is needed (Oyedele, 2009). The indigenisation Act of 1972 which targeted at giving Nigerians ownership in principle was amended and replaced by the Nigeria Enterprises Act in 1977. It was this Act that gave rise to the Indigenization policy of 1977.

Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was adopted in June, 1986 with the support of the Bretton Woods's Institutions. SAP was regarded as the universal recipe that would bring the desired transformation of the economy from agrarian to industrial. In particular, this policy came into being in order to remove the weaknesses, and ineffectiveness of earlier policies. Its aim and objectives include to promote investment, stimulate non-oil exports and provide a base for private sector led development, promote efficiency of Nigeria's industrial sector, privatisation and commercialisation of public investment, develop and utilize local technology by encouraging accelerated development and use of local raw materials and intermediate inputs rather than depend on imported ones. The SAP induced industrial policies include interest rate deregulation, debt conversion (equity) swap, privatisation and commercialisation policy and the new export policy incentive (Udah, 2010).

By 1989, Trade and Financial Liberalisation policies were enacted purposely to foster competition and efficiency in the financial sector. The aim and objectives of the policies include: stimulating competition among domestic firms and between the domestic imports, competing firms and foreign firms. The policies were intended to promote efficiency, reduction of levels of both tariff and nontariff barriers, scrap the commodity marketing boards and market determination of exchange rate as well as deregulation of interest rates, meant to foster efficiency and productivity. The National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) was set up in the same year by Decree No. 2 of 1989 as complementary institution to the industrial policy. NERFUND sought to address the medium and long –term financial constraints experienced by small and medium scale entrepreneurs and the required financial resources to participating merchants and commercial banks to lend to small and medium scale firms and provide Naira or foreign denominated loans

to participating firms for a period of five to ten years with a grace period of one to three years (Amina, Maria, and Haruna, 2012). In pursuance of these objectives, government considered the policies with a number of incentives aimed at positively influencing the sector. These included: tax holiday; tariff protection; import duty relief; reduction of excise duty; Duty Drawback Scheme (Oyedele, 2009); total ban on certain Foreign Goods; provision of supportive activities; provision of loans; provision of accelerated depreciation allowances, direct Government participation approved user Scheme; export incentives among others.

Bank of Industry (BOI) established in 2000, was introduced as a development institution to accelerate industrial development through the provision of long-term loans, equity finances and technical assistance to industrial enterprises. The bank has the combination of the following institutions: Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI), Industrial and Insurance Brokers (IDIB), Leasing Company of Nigeria Limited (LECON). The objectives include providing long term loans, assist in employment generation and promote industrial dispersal indigenous entrepreneurship. As a complement to the Bank of Industry, Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment Scheme (SMIEIS) was also set up in 2000. The objective was to assist in the co-ordination of the Scheme with a guideline that 60 per cent of the SMIEIS fund should go to core real sector, 30 per cent to services, and 10 per cent to micro enterprises through NGOs. The other objectives of SMIEIS include increased per capita income/output and initiating changes in the structure of business and the society through growth, increased output and employment opportunities, enhanced regional economic balance through industrial dispersal, moderate rural/urban migration, easy adaptation to local technology and promote efficient utilization.

A major move, towards industrialisation of the Nigerian economy was the implementation of a new industrial policy, which focused on the competitiveness of the industrial sector, finance, technological advancement, incentives to industries, research and development, among others. The National Integrated Industrial Development (NIID) was adopted by the Federal Government in 2007 as the new policy. The NIID is a country service framework developed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in collaboration with Federal Ministry of Industry and other stakeholders. The framework comprised four integrated programmes

which include: industrial governance and public/private sector partnership; strengthening industry's institutional support base: a cluster development initiative to grow the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) using common facilities; environment and Energy: the challenge of low power generation and utilization to be addressed through rural renewable energy; and rural private sector agro-industrial development.

The Federal government inaugurated a Presidential Committee on Revival of the Textile Industry in Nigeria in 2007 with the task of assessing the state of the textile production in the country and providing guidelines that could help the government in take further informed steps to facilitate the recovery of the industry. Those that constituted the committee included: Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation; Debt Management office; Ministry of foreign affairs, Bank of Industry; Ministries of Finance and Power; United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO); and Cottage and Textile unions. An attempt was the made by the government to implement the committee's recommendations with the approval of 50 billion Naira loan to the textile sub-sector (Ladan, Abdullahi & Haruna, 2012) though with no significant effect because, there was no transparency with regard to who get what amount. The actual beneficiaries of the fund were also not made public.

To support this initiative, the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) issued 14 new licenses in 2007 to private operators for the establishment of independent power plants with varied capacities and expected total output of 6,010MW. Among the operators were: Aba Power Distribution Company limited; Abuja Electricity Distribution Company limited; Agbara Shoreline Power limited; Transmission Company of Nigeria; AES Nigeria Barge limited; Afam Power Plc; Akufe Power limited; Alaoji Generation Company limited; African Oxygen & Industrial Gasses limited etc. (Udah, 2010). The proliferation of Power Holding Company into these private operators could not yield the needed result as industries keep collapsing in the country with epileptic power supply being among the major forces responsible for scenario.

In pursuance of these objectives, the government introduced a number of incentives aimed at positively influencing the performance and productivity of the industrial sector. Some of these incentives include tax holidays, tariff protection, outright ban on certain commodities to encourage domestic production, building of industrial estates (export processing zones) and Industrial Raw Material Research and Development Council (IRMRDC), etc.

The incentives therefore, succeeded in increasing the financial capacity of manufacturing firms. They also increase the availability of funds to finance capital projects among manufacturing firms in Nigeria. However, tax incentive does not necessarily increase the productivity level of firms in Nigeria. This is evident in the fact that the Nigerian economy is still an import-dependent economy.

Collapse of Textile Industries in Nigeria

There is no gainsaying that the textile industries in Nigeria had the potentialities of contributing profitably to human capacity development, revenue generation as well as promoting the sustenance of the national economy. Unfortunately, the over reliance on the external rents and the influx of substandard goods in connivance with the petty-bourgeoisie in the country resulted to the neglect of the Nigerian industrial sector and its eventual collapse. In line with this, this paper examined the factors responsible for the collapse of textile industries. These factors include but not limited to irregular power supply, inadequacy of locally-produced raw materials, manpower development, taste and fashion for foreign textiles, dependency on foreign technology, inconsistent trade and industrial policies and porous Borders which aided smuggling activities among others. The paper also argues that these factors could not be unconnected with the current trend of globalisation.

Problem of Power Supply

Electricity is a significant component of virtually any production process. As such, its limited supply by the state has the potential to directly and/or indirectly affect the economic activities of industries. One of the fundamental contributors to the large productivity gap between developed and developing countries are low quality infrastructure, and the fundamental example of infrastructure failure is electricity supply. This is because, electricity is an essential input - most industries could not produce anything without electricity for lights, motors, and machines - shortages could significantly reduce output (Allcott, Allan & Stephen, 2014). It should also be taken into cognizance that industries could technically suffer from two types of power disturbances: poor quality, and power outages. The first refers to the fluctuations in voltage, which could result in severe damage to machinery and

equipment, and a corresponding high cost of frequent repair and replacement. The second relates to a complete loss of power, lasting from one second to hours.

Power outages could affect industrial activities through a variety of channels, which eventually lead to negative effects on productivity. First, there is the efficiency channel, through which discontinuous power provision is synonymous with disruption in the production process, causing productive resources to lie idle, resulting in lower output level. Second, there are the costs associated with the replacement or repair of broken machines and equipment on the one hand, and the cost related to the spoilage of finished products or inventory on the other. Furthermore, power shortages lead to extra cost to firms because they often have to rely on alternative sources of energy, like rented or self-owned generators. Third, there is the quality channel, which is related to the rush to meet deadlines due to anticipated power outages, spoiled inventories, or malfunctioning machines (Cissokho & Seck, 2013).

Another fundamental way by which the problem of power affected the industries is the uncertainty channel. This is a situation where industry could not predict with any accuracy the occurrence of power outages. This situation translated into uncertainty in meeting deadlines, getting materials from suppliers on time, or profiting from new market opportunities. In the end, the situation rendered the capital base of the industry idle which contributed to reducing the number of workers needed.

To this end, therefore, it could be argued that power failure serves as a deterrent not only to the industry but to the economic growth of the Nigerian state. This stems from the fact that power outage causes a lot of damages to the industries whose activities would be limited due to non-availability of regular power to power the equipment and machine used in the process of production. In a nut shell, the problem of power supply has been identified to be the greatest challenge which contributed to the eventual collapse of the textile industries in Nigeria.

Inadequate Locally Produced Raw Materials

There is no doubt that availability of raw materials is a major factor taking into cognisance when proposing the establishment of an industry. Not all the basic raw materials for effective textile productions like cotton, silk, dyestuff, chemicals among others are readily available in the country. Where

available, the quality might be low, inadequate and not of commercial quantity for the industry's full production capacity (Oloyede, 2014). This is because globalisation has virtually made the production sector of the Nigerian economy to be a consuming one. The production of cotton which is the major raw material for textile production remains far below the national requirements of the textiles and the oil mills.

According to Mshelia, (1991) cotton production in the country took a downward trend as the gap between demand and supply widened every year because the supply did not equate with demand. If such situation persists, it means that the demand for the raw material cannot be met by the local industries. This had endangered the future of the Nigerian textiles thereby causing an unnecessary drain of the country's foreign exchange. This problem was further exacerbated by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the Nigerian economy that led to the scrapping of the commodity marketing boards by the Federal Government in January 1986.

In Nigeria, the cotton Marketing Board is the monopoly and institutionalised market geared towards marketing cotton for local consumption by textile industries, feed mills and for export. The reduction in cotton production has necessitated the use of other materials like polyester, silk and linen in the production process. It could therefore be asserted from the above that the level of raw materials in the country could not feed the textile industries and therefore resorted to using imported raw materials like polyester, linen, synthetic fiber from Japan and Asia and China. The situation could not be unconnected with the epileptic power supply which also the productive capacity of the industry and the market of raw materials produced by the cotton producers.

Dependence on Foreign Technology

Textile industry is a labour intensive and thus, requires manpower and technological devices, especially in form of machines and accessories for efficient operation of the production process. Some of the technological devices especially machines and equipment used in are usually imported and without required technical knowhow of repairing them. This practice becomes

problematic and costly to the nation's economy due to high cost of importation of materials and tools. Non-availability of spare parts for the replacement of worn-out or damaged tools was also another problem. Consequently, these machines wear out with too long usage and age while the unserviceable ones are often cannibalized in an attempt to put the working machines in good shape (Ohiorhehuan, 2001). This invariably affects production and quality of products, thus lead to abandonments of local textiles for the imported ones as better option.

Smuggling activities and Low Patronage

Smuggling could be described as the clandestine transportation of goods or persons past a point where it is prohibited, such as across an international boarder, in violation of applicable laws or other regulations (Ogundele, 2000). In textile trade, much smuggling occurs when enterprising merchants attempt to supply demand for a particular textile that is illegally or heavily taxed. Smuggling is an attritional problem, an evidence of corruption, greed and disrespect for due process. It does not encourage the growth of local industries. The activities of smugglers have posed a serious threat to the survival of the textile industry. This is because the foreign textile materials are always cheaper and they are considered superior to local textiles even when the local textiles are more expensive. These factors make foreign textiles more marketable than the locally produced ones.

As earlier pointed out, high cost and epileptic supply of electricity, old and dysfunctional machinery and brand designs are factors responsible for high cost of production which cause the prices of products to rise. By implication, high prices of the locally produced textile materials compelled consumers to look for relatively cheaper products. This has led to the importation of substandard textile materials which are sold at a cheaper rate. This paper argues that the state deliberately made its borders porous with a view to giving undue advantage to a particular class of individuals to smuggle in goods and services for exploitative motive. The concomitant effect of all these is that smuggling has become a "booming industry" to the few privileged class of citizens and has drastically affected the level of production of those textile industries that produce finished products for consumer, because, the attention of the consumers has turned to smuggled textile products which they consider to be cheaper and more attractive.

Ineffective Trade and Industrial Policies

It has been asserted that Nigerian state has not been able to make an appreciable progress in industrial development due to policy failure (Duru, 2012). This is why from the import-substitution industrial policy of the 1960s to the Small and Medium Industries Investment Scheme (SMIEIS) of 2000, the state has not repositioned the sector to contribute meaningfully to GDP in particular and development of Nigeria in general. These failures accordingly emerged and re-emerged from policy formulation, implementation and precisely lack of continuation.

Suffice to say that, prior to Nigeria's independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy was predominantly agrarian, both in the production for domestic consumption and exports as industrialization was not part of the British colonial economic policy. Rather, the colonial economy was geared towards making the colony producer of primary raw material and consumers of imported manufactured goods. Besides, the construction of roads, collection of taxes and maintenance of law and order to aid trade, no particular industrial policy was initiated by the erstwhile colonial administration to promote industrial development in the state (Duru, 2000). Early manufacturing activities predating independence were limited to the semi-processing of agricultural products as complementary to the trading activities of foreign companies. The first task the new indigenous administration had after attaining political independence in 1960 was the transformation of the country into a modern industrial economy and for this, import substitution industrialization policy was employed behind protective barriers. This strategy entails manufacturing local goods that were previously imported into the country by the colonial companies. One of the major factors for the lacklustre performance of the policy was that the structure of tariff protection (low tariff on imported inputs and high tariff on imported finished products) encouraged the concentration on light consumer goods and has at the same time contributed to the inefficiency in the industrial sector and the inability of most domestically manufactured products to be competitive.

Currently, there is no linkage among the sectors of the economy, rather giving the economy mono-cultural status as a petro-dollar economy. Another issue was inputs structure which was highly importing intensive. This succeeded in creating balance of payment problem and lack of patronage of local raw materials which made most of the Nigerian industry assemblies that

put finishing touches from imported inputs up till date. With this bad beginning, today the manufacturing sector is a failure for its lacklustre performance over the years.

The manufacturing sector is a creation of misfortune through industrial policies. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had the aims of promoting investment; stimulate non-oil exports and providing a base for private sector led development; promote efficiency of the Nigeria's industrial sector; Privatization and commercialization of the economy towards the promotion of industrial efficiency; and to develop and utilize local technology by encouraging accelerated development and use of local raw materials and intermediate inputs rather than depend on imported inputs (Oyedele, 2009) In summary, SAP aimed at diversifying the productive base of the economy and eliminating the observed structural distortions, the most significant overvalued currency (Onwioduokit & Nwachukwu, 1998). This culminated in the establishment of the auction system in 1986 as a mechanism through which the real value of naira would be determined in which Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) was established. What is important at this point is the fact that the operation of SFEM led to a huge devaluation of naira such that from an exchange rate of N1.55/35 to dollar on 25th September 1986 the naira depreciated by 71.00% to N5.35/30 = \$1:00 at the last bidding session held in December 1988. In 1993, the average official exchange rate stood at about N22.40/84=\$1:00.

However, between the first foreign exchange auction in September, 1986 and December, 1994, the exchange rate depreciated by about 93.0% (Onwioduokit & Nwachukwu, 1998). The depreciation of naira heightened the cost of production and deepened the sectoral alexia. Currently, one US Dollar (\$1:00) is exchanged for more than three hundred Naira (N300:00) thus causing imbalance of payments at the long-run in Nigeria. With this development therefore, it could be submitted that industries policies are largely responsible for comatose status of the manufacturing sector.

The issue above is contended by Oyedele (2009) to manifest as a result of Nigeria's dependence on the external sector which did not reduce as expected; thus rendering the import substitution industrialization impotent. Accordingly, this paved way for export promotion industrialization strategy in the mid-1980s. The private indigenous entrepreneurs relied on crude technologies for the production of these light consumer goods that are scattered across the country. From the 1970s and early 1980s, large-scale

capital-intensive industries in petroleum refining, petrochemicals, iron and steel, textiles, fertilizer, pulp and paper and automobile spare parts were established mainly by the government to produce basic inputs for the downstream industries. However, owing to the very poor performance of these basic industries, attributable to poor management, most of them collapsed.

For instance, in the case of textile industries, it was reported in one of the national dailies (*Daily Trust*, February, 2016), that it was the reluctance of the state to implementing the recommendations presented to it on the Cotton and Garment schemes that has further deteriorated the conditions of textile production in the country.

Effect of the Collapse of Textile Industries on Nigerian Economy

The textile industries form a major part of manufacturing production, employment and trade in many developing states. This section examined implication of the collapse of textile industries on the political economy of the Nigerian state. Textile industry offers a range of opportunities including entry-level jobs for unskilled labour. The industry absorbed large numbers of unskilled labour, typically drawing them from rural agricultural households to rural locations. Despite relatively low start-up investment costs, expansion of the sector provides a base upon which to build capital for more technologically demanding activities in other sectors. Growth of the sector allows imports of more advanced technologies to be financed through revenues gained from garment exports.

Furthermore, the Sector is important in economic and social terms. It provided incomes, jobs, especially for the teeming unemployed youths, and foreign currency receipts. The sector provided opportunities for export diversification and expansion of manufactured exports for the state. However, in spite of the great importance of the sector to the economy, it was undermined to the extent that it eventually collapsed. For instance, In the Kaduna-Kano-Gusau axis, one recalls with nostalgia several large textile companies employing thousands of Nigerians. It used to be an intriguing experience to be close to a textile mill. At the close of business, several employees were seen trooping out of the premises of the industry.

The industry used local materials that further employed thousands of farmers. At the same time, it contributed significantly to an estimated 25 to 30 per cent of production for export, making the industry an important earner of foreign exchange for Nigeria (Usman, 1988). At that time, instead of being a

consumer of foreign exchange, the textile sector earned the state some foreign currencies that added to the build-up of the nation's external reserves. Looking back on those golden years, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)'s Annual Report (1999) showed that out of 13 sub-sectors in the Manufacturing sector, the Textile sector (Cotton, Textile and Synthetic Fabrics) accounted for a significant proportion of the overall growth of manufacturing production (as cited in David, Michael & Ajiboye, 2015). The sector was saving a lot of foreign exchange for the state as between 60 and 70 per cent of the raw materials used in the industry were sourced locally. As the sector is labour-intensive, it provided an estimated employment of around 1,500,000 direct jobs for Nigerians. Despite the fact that global textile trade is booming, these industries are gradually diminishing in the Nigerian state. The reason behind this is the influx of smuggled foreign textile products into Nigerian markets which the Nigerian state fails to address despite the establishment of Department of Customs and Excise. Huge quantities of both new and second-hand garments from Asian countries flood the Nigerian markets. Domestic markets are facing a major threat from smugglers importing cheaper textile fabrics from other countries and selling them at a price, which is lower than the market price of garments manufactured locally. Where do these smugglers get their foreign exchange from? Of course, the parallel market which many Nigerians are now using as the reference exchange rate (David, Michael & Ajiboye, 2015). Data quoted by a Nigerian Garment union states that more than one million people, whose jobs were indirectly related to the textile industry like cotton farmers, traders, suppliers etc have lost their sources of revenue as a result of these shutdowns. It is unfortunate that there are only about 30 operational textile mills which are running at an average of 40 per cent of installed capacity in Nigeria today. The influx of cheaper fabrics from China and India has been highlighted as one of the reasons for underperformance in this industry. It is Nigerians that are buying these imported goods, killing the local industry, sending several Nigerians out of jobs while increasing the job opportunities in Asia, Europe and America by patronising their products. Thus, Nigerians are using the country's scarce foreign exchange to import these goods. Yet, they bend backwards to accuse the state and CBN of not making enough foreign exchange available to private sector operators. The annual global output of textile firms is estimated at \$400billion. China's production accounts for half of this figure. According to the CBN Statistical Bulletin (2014), the value of cotton production in Nigeria

contracted by -1.1 per cent year on year in 2014 and accounted for 5.1 per cent of crop production GDP in the same quarter. The Bank of Industry blames state governments' failure to implement the National Cotton, Textile and Garment policy in their respective states for the collapse of textile industries across the country.

By implication, this has resulted to the increase in the number of unemployed youths in the state. This adversely affects the security of the state and security is the basic ingredient in the survival of strategies and development plans of any given society. Security means the assurance of future well-being and freedom from threat. National security should ideally be seen as the ability of the Nigerian State to successfully achieve its national interests. It is a fact that when jobs are not secure, the individual is not secure. When the individual is not secure the State could not be secure, and if the state is under attack from an external force, the state and individual could not be secured. This is the case of textile factories in Nigeria.

Availability of jobs plays an important role in wiping away crisis, which could escalate into gargantuan with momentum. This becomes more desirable as Nigeria today faces numerous threats to its stability. It could therefore be concluded that employment of youths is in favour of the survival of peace, harmony, stability, well-being, the sense of self confidence, and a clear vision of the future for the people of the Nigerian state. Employment is a prime security consideration. Armed robbery, cattle rustling, banditry kidnapping including armed urban burglaries, Area boys, and other violent crimes are now rampant and increasing daily. The collapse of the industries is of course major cause of social restiveness among able bodied youths. Unemployment now looms in the state and has become a threat to the nation's quest for development. The surge of crime and the increasing incidence of violent tendencies by the youth were attributable to unemployment in the country. Without employment (security), no nation would be able to contain the various forms of uprising necessitated by hunger and abject poverty. Security today is truly pervasive and, as such, controls human thinking and behaviour.

Conclusion

The general argument of the paper is that the causes of the collapse of textile industries in the country could be located within the context of the effect of globalisation and the inability of the Nigerian state to provide

infrastructural arrangements necessary for industrial development. This is due to the fact the Nigerian state gave much emphasis on the external rents as against the domestic industrial development. Extensive smuggling activity, which the state has so far failed to address because is aided and abetted by its very officials and that the influential members of the governing class in the state, regardless of their ideological and party affiliations have been acting in accord with the needs of the international capital rather than the needs and aspirations of the citizens for better life. This explains why they pursue policy measures, which deprive the state the electricity to power its industrial development and efficient infrastructural development. The overall effect of which has led to the collapse of the textile industries in the country.

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**GENERATING FRESH VISION OF DEMOCRACY FOR NIGERIA:
THE POSITION OF SOUTH-SOUTH NIGERIA ON POLITICAL
RESTRUCTURING**

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Abstract

The study explored fresh visions for democracy for Nigeria based on socio-economic and political restructuring. It is qualitative research, it applied 'participant-observation' method and adopted the David Easton's theory of 'post-behavioral revolutions as the theoretical framework. It observed that restructuring is expected to engender the desired security, peace and sustainable development (SPD). It however argued that the stability and viability of Nigeria have been threatened by the continued practice of a defective federalism. This has been inherited from British colonial government in 1954, magnified by the 1999 Constitution and has resulted in several agitations led by South-South, Nigeria where the effect is mostly evident. The finding indicated that the present model of government, along with the exclusive, concurrent and residual legislative lists among others have suffocated the federating units. Thus, socio-economic and political restructuring remain the viable option for the desired stability, allay fears of ethnic nationalities and promote good governance. It then proposed inter alia an actionable socio-economic and political restructuring programme hinged on devolution of powers and re-classification of the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists.

Keywords: democracy, federalism, political restructuring, south-south geopolitical zone

Background/Introduction

The Nigerian federation was made up of 250 ethnic nationalities at the time of amalgamation in 1914. Unfortunately, the Arthur Richard's Constitution of 1946 divided the country into three major regions along ethnic lines in favour of three dominant ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani (North), Igbo (East) and Yoruba (West) – leaving the remaining 247 ethnic groups as minorities (Etekpe, 2007a, pp.13-16). The minorities, especially, South-South protested, and spearheaded the crusade for the adoption of federalism in Nigeria in 1954, as against unitary and confederation. It was then enshrined into the 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican Constitutions.

The South-South geo-political zone was created along with five other zones by General Sani Abacha, Nigeria's former head of state and government, to cushion the negative consequences of the defective federalism controlled by the three majority ethnic nationalities of Hausa/ Fulani (North), Igbo (East), and Yoruba (West) in 1985. The zone, loosely referred to as the historical Niger Delta region, comprise Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Delta (BRACED) states. It has 122, out of, the 774 local government areas (LGAs) in the country. The creation of the zone did not address the fundamental pillars of Nigerian federalism. The zone has been the economic livewire of Nigeria over the centuries, beginning with trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic (slave and legitimate) trades at pre-and-colonial eras; and now, crude oil/ gas at post-independence.

According to Toby (2008, cited in Etekpe, 2009, p.3), a one-time deputy governor of Rivers State (1999-2003):

...the region was prominent in the trans-Saharan trade in the 15th century, and by the time it dwindled, the slave trade took over in 1730. The region became one of the most leading slave markets in West Africa. By 1830 when the slave trade was abolished, palm oil and kernel (PKO/PKC) became prominent. Between 1830 and 1850, the region exported 18,000 tons of palm oil to Europe and earned £800,000, out of the total of £1,500,000 earned by Africa. Palm produce remained one of the foremost foreign exchange earners in Nigeria until when the country started recording an unprecedented boom in crude oil trade. Presently, oil is fading away and gas has emerged... thus, in every century, the region remains the economic mainstay of the country...

In spite of the foregoing economic indices, the zone (region) remained “poor, backward and neglected” (Henry Willink’s Commission Report (HWC), 1958), due mainly to the defective federal system of government. The system has led to series of agitations and demand for political restructuring that culminated to the convocation of the 2014 National Conference, and All Progressive Congress (APC) Committee’s report on ‘true federalism’ in 2017.

Although there are several definitions of federalism, the people wanted the Constitution to provide for a loose federal structure and recognized devolution of power, fiscal federalism and revenue allocation in favour of the federating units. Unfortunately, it was set aside by Decree 34 of 1966 and replaced with a unitary system of government, following the 1966 military coup. The unitary system has so jettisoned the practice of federalism that prevailed in the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions that even though the name, federal, is still retained and the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions have brought in some elements of federalism, the country largely remained a unitary state (The South-South position – TSSP, 2018, pp.3-4). Thus, the centre has become unduly powerful and aggregating 68 items as exclusive and 34 concurrent legislative lists to itself, revenue allocation instead of distribution through derivation principles, non-adherence to the principles of federal character; and deliberate exclusion, marginalization and underdevelopment of the South-South. In essence, the present federal structure has:

- a) heightened spate of tension, agitation, feeling of exclusion and marginalization;
- b) increased inter-ethnic group rivalry, conflicts and upsurge in the incidence of outright criminality, brigandry and banditry;
- c) in extreme cases, encouraged strong and violent demand for cessation along geo-political lines, especially North-East, South-East and South-South;
- d) led to underutilization of natural resources found in each of the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja; and
- e) resulted in steady deterioration of socio-economic conditions of the people.

The report traced the predicament of the zone (region) to the awkward federal structure, and emphasized that until a drastic measure is taken to review the model and practice of federalism in the country by returning to the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, the situation shall get worse – leading to severe

insecurity and demand for cessation. After 23 years, the report of the World Bank has become the most contentious public policy issue. The report of the 2014 National Conference and APC Committee on 'true federalism' of 2017 have heightened the demand for political restructuring.

Oyiam, a social critic, seems to have summarized our position when he wrote in the book, *The trouble with Nigeria* that: "Our federal structure is rooted on injustice, hence instead of the component states, controlling and managing their resources, it is controlled and distributed by the federal government. This violates the cardinal tenets of federalism" (Oyiam, cited in Etekpe, 2007b, p. 4).

As Etekpe, (2007b, pp.4-6) pointed out, these were the problems (fears and grievances) of the people of the zone that the Rivers Chiefs and Peoples Conference (RCPC) brought before the Henry Willink's Commission (HWC) in the pre-independence London Conference of 1957/1958. The Commission "felt that the problems (fears) were not in connection with the central government, but was rather in relation to the three regional governments". After 46 years of practicing a defective federation, it is obvious that the British colonial government was wrong and the central government itself has become the predator in strangulating the component units - reverberating the demand for restructuring.

Based on the foregoing, the paper examined fresh visions on democracy for Nigeria based on social, economic and political restructuring for the desired stability, viability and survival of the country. It made use of 'participant-observation' method as the lead author has been involved in several aspects of the agitations and/ or campaigns over the years. It included participation in the South-South People Conference (SSOPEC) position on restructuring (2002), national political reform conference (NPRC, 2004), the Yenagoa, Bayelsa State Accord on restructuring (2006), national conference (2014), South-South Mega Rally on restructuring at Yenagoa, Bayelsa State where he was the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Programme and Documentation (2018). Holdaway (1980, pp.79-100), a scholar on the subject, argues that "the method allows in-depth study of the whole target group".

The participant-observation was complimented by document study where we:

- a) examined the Constitutions of Nigeria – 1960, 1963, 1979 and 1999;

- b) reviewed the most recent efforts at restructuring as contained in the reports of 2014 National Conference (2014), and APC Committee on restructuring, 2017;
- c) analyzed relevant international treaties/ obligations, especially the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNLOS), 1982; and
- d) conducted focused group discussions (FGD) with eight carefully selected target populations across the 6 South-South states. The groups were drawn from: politicians, academia, traditional and community leaders, student union governments, civil society organizations (CSOs), civil/ public servants, market men/women, and security agencies at the state capitals – Yenagoa, Port Harcourt, Uyo, Calabar, Benin City and Asaba.

To further achieve objectives of the paper, it has been divided into four broad sections, with introduction, followed by an in-depth analysis of theoretical issues and evidenced-based arguments on the framework, methodology, and relevant literature. Section three discussed the contending issues, especially the South-South position on restructuring and findings (results) that formed the recommended legislative action plan for the Presidency and the National Assembly. It concluded with four far-reaching recommendations in Section 4.

Theoretical Issues

There are several theoretical frameworks that can be adopted in this study. They range from ‘institutionally-induced frustration-aggression’ (Dollard, 1939 & Lorenze, 1966), and ‘systemic’ (Johnson, 1966 & Etekpe, 2018, p.5) to ‘structural conflict’ (Galtung, 1990) theories. Based on the experience that these and similar theories would not give the desired explanations, the authors turned to the “theory of post-behavioural revolution” propounded by David Easton (1953/1969). The theory is a departure from undue dependence on other social sciences, especially, psychology and economics in explaining critical issues of national stability, integration, security, peace-building, and sustainable development (SPD).

The post-behavioral revolutionary framework (argument) encourages the evolution of actionable (implementable) solutions in political science for an in-depth understanding of the ‘linkage’ between federalism and SPD in the country. This framework is appropriate for the study as it is a radical departure from the popular pattern of merely summarizing known types of states and

forms of government. Already, the country has moved from capitalist to multi-purpose state, and parliamentary to presidential form of government; and it is not ideal to go back to them as solution to modern Nigeria.

The framework is based on four stages that were experienced in Nigeria, beginning with endurance of hardship under regionalism (1960 - 1966), followed by intermittent agitations (1966 – 1967 and 2003 -2009), to constructive dialogue at amnesty period in 2010. The failure of the federal government to successfully address the foregoing two stages led to the third stage, which is, limited violence from 2011 - 2013. The final stage is ‘full-blown violence’ as the case of North-East, South-East and Niger Delta region in Nigeria.

Review of Relevant Literature

Several conceptions of federalism are available. However, that of Kenneth C. Wheare’s (1950) fits into this study. Wheare stated that:

the principles of federalism are rooted on well-defined division of powers among the federal government and the other federating units, distribution of resources on the principle of derivation, and pursuance of the rule of law in recognition of the financial autonomy of a federal state...

J. S. Mill (Sabine &Thorson, 1973, pp.635 - 49), went further to advocate for these basic attributes, and emphasized the need for equity amongst the component units of the federal form of government. In essence, federalism hinges on the distribution of power, resources and responsibilities between the federal and other levels of government so that the system shall combine representation and authority, unity and diversity, and freedom and obligations – to enhance the welfare of the citizens in the federal state.

Unfortunately, the British colonial government handed over a peculiar custom-tailored federalism to Nigerians where the features highlighted by Wheare, Mill, etc., are basically absent. “Thus”, as Ofiaja (1979, pp.60-70), puts it, “since the introduction of federalism in the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, there has been perennial conflict that have led to series of protests, struggles and sustained demand for review (restructuring) that can no longer be ignored”. He went further to recall that Alhaji Aminu Kano, the then federal commissioner for health in General Gowon’s military government, delivered a lecture in London in 1974 and made five (out of which four are relevant here)

important statements about Nigeria, its constitution and federalism as follows: a) there has been no Nigerian Constitution so far; b) the Independence Constitution of 1959 was written by people who did not represent Nigeria. They represented themselves; c) what happened on October 1, 1960 was not independence but declaration of independence; and d) the first real Constitution will be the one to come after army rule because all Nigerians will have the chance to play a part in its making (Ofiaja, 1979, p.79).

The foregoing is clear that Nigeria never had a well-defined Constitution that ushered in 'true federalism'. The closest to it was the 2014 National Conference where every segment of Nigerians played a part in evolving the resolutions. Unfortunately, it was not implemented to achieve the desired goal. Thus, the APC (2017) has taken a different position, and pointed out that the federal government has carried out several measures to cushion the negative effects of the federal structure. Some of the specific measures, included:

i) National Reconciliation Conference convened by General Yakubu Gowon (then head of state and government – HOSG) in 1967;ii) The Constituent Assembly made up of 230 appointed and elected members to draw up the 1979 Constitution in 1978;iii) The Constituent Assembly made up of 371 members to draw up the 1999 Constitution in 1994;iv) The National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) made up of 391 appointed members to resolve the problems of the Niger Delta and other structural imbalances in the Nigerian polity in 2005;v) Justice Mohammed Uwais' Committee on electoral reforms made up of 22 members in 2007;vi) The National Conference made up of 498 appointed members to basically restructure Nigeria in 2014; andvii) The Committee on Restructuring set up by the ruling APC Party, headed by Mallam Nasiru El-Rufai, Governor of Kaduna State in 2017.

The common denominator of these measures is that they were far apart from the spirit and letter of the original dreams, visions and aspirations of the founding fathers. Thus, the people of South-South gathered in Yenagoa, Bayelsa state to analyze the issues on 10 -11 February 2006, known as the **Yenagoa Accord**. It deliberated and resolved that:

- v. The brazen insensitivity of the federal government and multinational oil companies (MNOCs) to the developmental needs and aspirations of the zone (region), particularly, completion of dualization of East-West road, coastal railway, undue politicization of the interventionist agencies, especially, NDDC, MNDA, River basin authorities, etc;

- vi. The near-neglect of human capacity building, especially, women and vulnerable; and
- vii. The emerging negative role of local bourgeoisies, i.e, political executives, etc.

As these problems linger, the South-South organized another mega rally on restructuring in Yenagoa, Bayelsa state on 24 March 2018. The rally, which attracted elders, leaders of thoughts, and traditional rulers of other geo-political zones of Southern Nigeria (South-East and South-West) and Middle Belt, called on the: federal government to take immediate steps to ensure that the Presidency and the National Assembly take concrete steps including the needed time lines for legislative agenda to ensure the implementation of restructuring.

Political Restructuring and the Position of South-South Zone

The position of the zone is the reinstalment of the 1960 and 1963 constitutions which have the principle of federalism, namely: division of powers amongst the federal government and the federating units, distribution of resources on the basis of derivation, enforcement of the rule of law, recognition of financial autonomy, combination of representation and authority, unity and diversity, and freedom and obligations to enhance the welfare of the citizens, etc. that are presently not practiced in Nigeria. Thus, federalism has become the most contentious issue facing the country; and yet, it has been treated by the northerners and APC party with disdain. They argue that since there are divergent concepts of restructuring, the demand is futile.

This argument of APC or the northern Nigeria is not evidence-based as the report of the Committee of the South-South on Restructuring (2018, p.3) is clear and specific on it. It states that:

socio-economic and political restructuring is timely and urgent measures to re-configure, and remake and reorder the present political structural foundation of the country. As much as possible, to be in tandem with the spirit and letters of the dreams, visions and aspirations of the founding fathers of the country, for the purpose of enthroning equity, fairness, justice and egalitarianism. This will entail clearly specifying the number of federating units and detailing the ways and means for their creation, merger and inter-relationships through a totality of non-coerced but democratic efforts, enthronement of true

federalism, which guarantees two-tier structures of sharing of powers/ governance between the federal and federating units, and consequently operating a fiscal regime which clearly provides for full resource ownership/ control of both onshore and offshore resources vested in the federating units which must pay prescribed taxes to sustain/ maintain the federal tier holding a lean set of issues under the exclusive legislative list as a well as make/ cater for the federal distributive pool.

The South-South, in particular, and the Niger Delta in general, reacts to the issue of political restructuring with great passion. This is understandable as the area and the region are not only isolated but encumbered by several ecological /environmental challenges. It is for this reason, Henry Willink Commission (HWC) reported in 1958 that:

we are impressed by the arguments indicating that the needs for those who live in the creeks and swamps of the Niger Delta are very different from those of the interior. Not only because the area involves the regions, but because it is poor and neglected...We agree that it is not easy for a government or a legislature operating far inland to concern itself, or even fully understand the problem of a territory where communication is difficult, building so expensive and education so scanty.

God changed the destiny of the zone by depositing “an unusual quantity of 34 billion barrels of crude oil and about one trillion cubic feet of gas in the swampy lands, creeks and rivers...,” beginning with Oloibiri in the present Bayelsa state on 04 June 1956. By this, the area/ region has become the ‘treasure base’ of the country, accounting for over 95 percent of the GDP since 1973. According to the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) report, by January 2018, crude oil has generated total revenue of about ₦96 trillion. Going forward, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) also stated in its report in January 2018 that proceeds from the gas export between 2004 and 2014 stood at ₦2.20 trillion (US\$10.18billion) (Fubara, 2018).

Whereas the huge amount of revenues from oil and gas have enabled the federal government to embark on massive infrastructural, economic and socio-political development of other parts of the country, it has neglected the

development imperatives of the zone. The entire zone is sparsely developed and almost excluded from participation in the ownership or management of the industry. Of the 70 licenses for oil production (i.e, oil blocs) in the zone, the people have only 8, and the 62 other oil blocs are owned by people mainly from the northern and western Nigeria.

This is where the need for political restructuring comes in, to among other dynamics (issues), redress the ‘neglect, frustration and abandonment of the people/ zone caused by faulty federalism’. On 24 March 2018, the South-South in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, proclaimed the zone’s position on the key defective structures/ institutions for restructuring as follows:

- 1) **Model of Government:** The presidential model be retained at the federal level but with clear prescriptions to curtail high cost of running federal and state governments;
- 2) **Federating Units:** The states should constitute the federating units. Here, local governments should no longer be part of the federating units. Nevertheless, the principles of federal character in the constitution be retained. Furthermore, states should adopt their constitution to cater for their peculiar needs within the concurrent list;
- 3) **Devolution of Powers:** The 68 items on the exclusive legislative list be reduced to 27 items; concurrent legislative list be raised from 34 to 53 items; and residual legislative list be equally raised from ‘0’ to 12 items (Table 1-1) to make the center weak in line with the practice of ‘true federalism’, without prejudice to onshore/offshore mineral resources exploration, exploitation and management (in Table 1-1, where we have indicated those items transferred from the exclusive legislative list (ELL) to concurrent legislative list (CLL), as well as, those from the CLL to the residual legislative list (RLL));
- 4) **The Geopolitical Zones:** The six zones should be retained to drive further intra-national and sub-national interactions, as well as, socio-economic integration and development;
- 5) **Federal Character Principle:** Be retained in the constitution. In addition, state and local governments character principle be adopted at the state and local government levels;
- 6) **Creation of States:** Following the recommendations of the 2014 National Conference, 3 additional states be created in the zone namely: Toru-Ebe (Bayelsa state), Oil Rivers (Rivers state), and Ogoja state (Cross River state);
- 7) **Rotation of Political Office:** Key principal offices at the federal and state levels should rotate among the senatorial districts or federal constituencies;

- 8) **Fiscal Federalism/ Resource Control:** Here, the demand is for full resource control of all natural resources located onshore and offshore of the federating units. This is the practice of democracies and federations in other countries, including USA, Canada, Australia and India;
 - 9) **Secular Status of Nigeria:** Nigeria shall guarantee freedom of worship and be strictly a secular state;
 - 10) **Derivation, Fiscal Federation and Resource Allocation:** The federating units be allowed to retain royalties, revenues and profits from the proceeds from resources and assets within their territory and territorial matters and pay prescribed tax to the federal government;
 - 11) **The Question of Offshore Resources:** The conclusions of the UN Law of the sea (UNLOS) in 1982 has answered the question that reaffirmed and codifies very clearly that the customary rights of littoral states to their contiguous zone (EEZ) (12 nautical miles), Littoral Sea (12 nautical miles), EEZ (200 nautical miles) and continental shelf, which Nigeria is a signatory;
 - 12) **Environmental Pollution/ Degradation Issues:** Resulting from the oil-induced environmental degradation, there should be the creation of special funds for the development of special infrastructures in oil-producing communities (OPCs) as remediation measures in the zone;
 - 13) **Special Development Areas for Niger Delta:** This should be reinvigorated through proper constitution of the NDDC board – putting technocrats and professionals as members instead of the prevailing scenario where politicians are appointed as members to compensate their loyalty to strangle the commission and frustrate the region; and redirecting the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDAs) to be pro-active in addressing the developmental imperatives of the region as against the on-going political patronage;
 - 14) **Legislative Issues:** That all obnoxious Acts, Decrees, etc, on oil/gas exploration and exploitation, as well as, revenue allocation be abrogated;
 - 15) **The Legislature:** The present cost of running the National Parliament and State Houses of Assembly are too high and cannot be sustained. Thus, Parliamentarians should be on part-time basis; and
 - 16) **Judiciary:** States should establish ‘States Judiciary Council and States Courts of Appeal’ to improve the administration of justice.
- 2) **Results:** The study found two key areas (a & b), along with an actionable legislative programme (c) to promote the expected good governance. They are:

(a) **Devolution of power, along with reduction of the exclusive legislative list.** In Table 1-1, we have identified the key structures/ institutions for restructuring and proposed fresh (new) structures in line with the items 1-16 above. Where this is done in line with Table 1-1, the other issues, i.e; resource control, etc, shall fall in line. The issue is that as the federal government presently controls 68 items, covering literally all spheres of the socio-political life of the citizens, it has strangulated every segment of the economy/country. The exclusive and concurrent lists have to be streamlined to give responsibilities to the grassroots, thus, the residual list has also been increased from the present '0' to 12 items.

(b) **'Trickle' down restructuring.** For restructuring to be meaningful, the state and local governments have to be equally restructured. It is at this phase controlled by, what we describe as 'local bourgeoisie (i.e, leaders)' the force or agitation for restructuring shall be most pronounced. This is because, 'the local bourgeoisie' in the zone (s) have so manipulated the receipts and applications of the monthly federal allocations and thereby impoverished the people that they would sponsor 'counter-insurgency' to stop the restructuring at their domain-state and LGA levels. They are miscalculating because, it is the common experience that 'mismanagement of resources' is most pronounced at the state and LGA levels.

(c) **Actionable Legislative Programme.** The following plans have to be followed for the realization of restructuring:

- i. The Presidency shall transmit the resolutions of the 2014 National Conference and APC party reports of 2017 on restructuring to the National Assembly with time frame. The legislative programme be mutually agreed upon by both arms of government.
- ii. The National Assembly shall conduct a referendum on what and how to restructure from the reports to elicit massive participation of the citizenry. This is to forestall the usual hijacking by parliamentarians from the majority ethnic nationalities to maintain the status quo.
- iii. The National Assembly shall pass the results of the referendum to the Committee on Constitutional amendment in both Houses, which in turn, shall further call for public hearing to ensure that they followed the results of the referendum;
- iv. The entire amendment process should not exceed six months from the date of transmission of the instruments.

(d) Promotion of Good Governance. It is believed that political restructuring usually promotes good governance in the following four ways, namely:

- i. Citizen participation in the political processes and socio-economic development programmes thereby overcoming poverty and apathy;
- ii. Provision of social infrastructure as the governor and governed are conscious of their rights to good welfare;
- iii. Transparency and accountability to eliminate wastages; and
- iv. Enforcement of the fundamental human rights of the citizens and rule of law.

In expatiating these attributes, Etekpe, et al (2018, p.7) stated that good governance stimulates:

- viii. Sustainable socio-economic development; and
- ix. Qualitative and quantitative education for manpower planning and development.

The discussions and results point to the fact that restructuring shall engender peace to close the SPD gap as peace is a prerequisite for sustainable development. This, therefore, negates the proposition, and rather supports the position that ‘there is a strong relationship between federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria’.

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

The study has identified restructuring as the ‘most contentious’ socio-economic and political dynamics of the South-South zone and Nigeria, and found that the present system of federalism is like a keg of gunpowder ready to explode within the next twenty years. The signs are everywhere in the country. Thus, political restructuring is a panacea to address the SPD nexus.

The actionable legislative programme should begin by the Presidency transmitting the resolutions and recommendations of the 2014 National Conference and APC Committee report on restructuring of 2017 to the National Assembly as there were no sharp disagreements between the two documents, except on onshore/offshore dichotomy that has already been resolved by the UNLOS, 1982 which Nigeria is a signatory. The programme or agenda should be accompanied with specific time lines and procedures outlined in Section 3.2(c).

Based on the discussion and results, the study wishes to suggest that:

- (1) The Presidency transmits the resolutions of the 2014 National Conference and report of APC to the National Assembly with time line

- and ensure that there is a national referendum to forestall members of Parliament from majority ethnic nationalities hijacking it as the case in previous exercises;
- (2) The political restructuring process in Nigeria should follow the South-South position as outlined in Section 3.1 and Table 1-1;
 - (3) The restructuring has to trickle-down to state and local governments for it to be meaningful to the country as stated in Section 3.2(b);
 - (4) The 1999 Nigerian Constitution should be further amended to reflect the restructuring; and
 - (5) Political restructuring is a panacea for national stability, integration and survival.

Table: 1-1 Proposed Restructuring of Legislative Powers (2nd Schedule), 1999 Constitution (As Amended)

S/N	Part I: Exclusive Legislative List (68 to 27 items) (ELL)	Part II: Concurrent Legislative List (30 to 53 items). (CLL)	Part III: Residual Legislative List (0 to 12 items). (RLL)
1.	Accounts of Government of Federation Officers, courts, authorities and auditing those accounts (ELL)	1. Drugs and Poisons (CLL)	1. Collection of tax of local government council (LGC) (RLL)
2.	Arms, ammunition and explosive (ELL)	2. Evidence (CLL)	2. Elections to LGC (RLL)
3.	Aviation (ELL)	3. Fingerprints, identification and criminal records (CLL)	3. Organization of a co-ordinated scheme of statistics. (RLL)
4.	Awards of national titles of honour (ELL)	4. Fishing and fisheries (CLL)	4. Primary and pre-primary education, vocational education, etc. (RLL)
5.	Bankruptcy and insolvency (ELL)	5. Insurance (CLL)	5. Chieftaincy matters. (RLL)
6.	Banks, banking bills of exchange, etc. (ELL)	6. Labour (CLL)	6. Acquisition of tenure of land. (RLL)
		7. Meteorology (CLL)	7. Inter-intra communal conflict management/ resolution (RLL)
		8. Mines and minerals (CLL)	8. Primary health care (RLL)

7.	Citizenship, naturalization and aliens (ELL)	9. Pensions, gratuities, etc. (CLL)	9. Professional occupations (RLL)
		10. Police and other security services, etc. (CLL)	10. Formation, annulment and dissolution of marriages (RLL)
		11. Ports, telegraphs and telephones (CLL)	11. Water from source. (RLL)
		12. Prisons (CLL)	12. Preservation of archives (RLL)
8.	Copy right (ELL)		
9.	Creation of States (ELL)	13. Regulation of Political parties (CLL)	
10	Currency, coinage and legal tender (ELL)	14. Railways (CLL)	
11	Customs and excise duties (ELL)	15. Establishment/regulation of authorities (CLL)	
12	Defense (ELL)		
13.	Diplomatic consular and trade representation (ELL)	16. Traffic control on truck roads (CLL)	
		17. Weights and measures. (CLL)	
		18. Legal proceedings between governments of states or state and federal government (CLL)	
		19. National parks (CLL)	
		20. Powers of National Assembly/ immunities of members (CLL)	
		21. Public relations of the federation (CLL)	
		22. Service/execution in a state of civil/criminal processes (CLL)	
		23. Trade and commerce (CLL)	
		24. Census (CLL)	
14.	Exchange control (ELL)	25. Any matter incidental/ supplementary (CLL)	
15	Export duties (ELL)	26. Division of public revenue (CLL)	
16.	External affairs (ELL)	27. Grants or loans (CLL)	

17.	Extradition (ELL)	28. Antiquities and monuments (CLL)	
18.	Immigration into and emigration from Nigeria (ELL)	29. Archives/public records (CLL)	
19.	Implementation into treaties (ELL)		
		30. Collection of taxes, etc. (CLL)	
		31. Regulate liability of persons to such tax (CLL)	
		32. Registration of voters/ procedures (CLL)	
20.	Military (ELL)	33. Power on electricity, etc. (CLL)	
		34. State House of Assembly powers on electricity, etc. (CLL)	
21.	Nuclear energy (ELL)	35. Censorship of cinematograph	
22.	Passports and Visas (ELL)	36. Industrial, commercial or agricultural development (CLL)	
23.	Patents, trademarks, etc. (ELL)	37. Co-coordinate scientific and technological research (CLL)	
		38. Establishment of scientific and technological research institution (CLL)	
24.	Public debt of the federation (ELL)	39. Trigonometrical, cadastral and topographical surveys (CLL)	
		40. University education, technological education, professional education, post-primary education, etc. (CLL)	
25.	Public service of the federation (ELL)	41. Borrowing of moneys within and outside Nigeria (CLL)	
		42. Commercial and industrial monopolies (CLL)	
		43. Construction/maintenances of federal roads (CLL)	
		44. Control of capital issues (CLL)	

26.	Stamp duties (ELL)	45. Deportation of persons (CLL)	
27.	Taxation of income/profits, etc. (ELL)	46. Designation of securities (CLL)	
		47. Election to federal offices and governors (CLL)	
		48. Incorporation, regulation, of companies, etc. (CLL)	
		49. Any other matter National Assembly has power.... (CLL)	
		50. Wireless, broadcasting, television (CLL)	
		51. Quarantine (CLL)	
		52. Maritime shipping and navigation (CLL)	
		53. Public holidays (CLL)	

Source: Culled from the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended, 2011), second schedule, pp 170-180

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DELINQUENT POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

Retrograde politics is the type which evinces and valorizes that kind of governance that breeds delinquent politicians. Since 1960 to date delinquent political leadership has been the order of the day, whereby leaders at the local, state and national levels only engaged in rabble rousing, fighting over pots of porridge and the sharing of national cake without focusing on the indices or indicators of national, social, political and economic development, production and modernization. Data were collected using secondary analysis. The theoretical framework was based on the theory of imperialism and under development by Claude Ake (1986). The following hypotheses were tested. A delinquent leadership creates a delinquent societal anomie. A delinquent leadership spurns delinquent and sprawling economic and social system in society. Delinquent political leaders create poor agricultural and economic systems. The economic break down of any system is caused by the delinquent political leaders of the nation. The findings demonstrate that delinquent leaders breed health, social, educational and economic mismanagement. The study recommends that political leadership must be matured citizens who are mentally stable. Leaders should be well educated, experienced, can debate on issues with open minds and be able to see things from a wider perspective, so that the current prismatic politics of personality, tribe and discrimination which hinder development in any nation can be arrested.

Keywords: Delinquent leaders, retrograde governance, rabble rousing politics, underdevelopment and immaturity.

Introduction

The development of a country depends on the quality of its leadership. Some countries have developed faster than others because of the quality of leadership involved. They may be other secondary indices or factors of development such as poverty, inequality, lack of water supply and electricity; poor infrastructures, unemployment etc. A country stands to be developed if the leadership is matured, mentally sound and properly educated. The development of any nation is largely dependent on the leadership. The leaders must be matured enough or have the requisite characteristic to carry the people along and must be sensitive to their needs. Dike (1999) observed that a leader is one which exerts unusual influence and considerable power and is committed to accomplishing the desired change in the society. He buttresses that a nation without resourceful, visionary, talented and committed leaders will regress or at best remain stagnant.

Some nations have changed, and modernized because of the vision and commitment of their leaders and so, have moved from the third world to the first world. Examples are China, Malaysia, India, Japan, and so on because of their leader's ingenuities. Akinmumi (2009), states that George Washington's vision of one united and indivisible nation made the United States of America what it is today. Churchill's determination to safeguard the territorial integrity of Britain against all odds is still remembered today. Ihechukwu (2007), argues that in Asia, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore respectively, have provided the necessary impetus that established their countries as major global economic powers as at now. It is on record that in the sixties, Nigeria was at the same level of development with these countries mentioned above. Now, these countries are referred to as Asian tigers while Nigeria is derogatively referred as a giant without strength or power.

Governance is not a new word but it has been made popular in the literature on African development by the World Bank (1989), which sees the African nations' problems as the crises of governance or leadership. Of course, there are crises in Nigerian, in all ramifications. This paper is attributing the crises in the society to the delinquent nature of leadership which pervades and

prevails in the country. Nigerian political leaders have been examined and characterized as delinquent leaders. From 1960 to date, there have been abnormalities in the behaviour of political leaders of the country which can be attributed to adult delinquency. As a result of the adult delinquent leadership the development of the country is retrogressing. Delinquency is a problem in the sense that it disobeys or neglects the rules and laws of the society. A child that is delinquent participates in abnormal and illegal behaviours. He never grows up in behaviour since his conducts and behaviour are retrograde and remain like that of a child. Nigerian leaders are not responsive neither are they responsible to the needs of the people in the society. Their accountability and transparency are zero. These adult delinquent political leaders are characterized by corruption, abuse of office and failure to deliver dividends of democracy. They finally failed when they could not manage efficiently the resources of the state. Furthermore, Audu (2016) says that, there is a growing consensus that good governance is known by democratic processes, political participation, equality, accountability, effectiveness and transparency. He concluded by saying that, in the absence of all these, governance could be said to be bad.

The Nigerian type of governance is the opposite of the above. The constitution is kept under the table where it becomes a mere façade. The Nigerian leadership or rulers are known as people who disobey the laws of the society. It takes a delinquent to do what he or she wants, irrespective of the law or order. I would like to mention some of the adult delinquent characteristics of our political leader's vis a vis, bad governance, little or no national security, retrogressive economy, high rate of unemployment, stinking poverty, environmental degradation and lack of social amenities. A responsive and good political leadership must provide all these and keep them maintained. In the absence of these, we have adult delinquent political leaders. Indeed, the failure of the leaders to provide what they promised during their election campaigns is a major source of concern and a contradiction to the tenets of good governance and leadership.

Statement of the problem:

Good leadership is a very necessary factor in every sphere of life, especially at the National level of governance where all decisions taken by the leadership affects all the members of the society. Oyelowo (2011) defined leadership as the power of leading and the gradual growth of something so that

it becomes more advanced and stronger. But when the power of leadership is generally seen as negative, which leads to underdevelopment, poverty, depression, hunger, unemployment, corruption, selfishness, disobedience and conflict; in short, such leadership becomes a delinquent one.

A very important factor which every leadership or government practices is the decision-making process for the Nation. If the consequences of decision-making by leaders go against all the expected norms and laws of the Nation's desires, needs and wants; to the point that the leaders seem not to care, then such leaders should be classified as bad leaders and therefore delinquent.

Delinquents are abnormal people. Abnormal people, juveniles or adults, are often socio-pathic, that is they lack a sense of responsibility and morality and have no concern or affection for the citizens or those they are responsible for.

A major strand of this leadership delinquency and irresponsibility can be demonstrated in some areas of national life, namely poor African life styles; and the poor economy and consequent social anomie as expressed in social and political violence, aggression, criminality and other sundry vices such as kidnapping and hostage taking in Nigeria. A delinquent leadership therefore creates a delinquent and abnormal society.

Based on the above-mentioned problematic scenarios, the following questions are put forward for solutions.

- a) Does a delinquent leadership create a delinquent societal anomie?
- b) Does a delinquent leadership spurn delinquent and sprawling economic and social system in society?

Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to investigate how delinquent leadership creates delinquent societal anomie such as criminality, disobedience, corruption. To know how delinquent leadership spurns delinquent and sprawling economic and social system in society.

Conceptual Definition:

Delinquency has its origin from the Latin word "delinquere" of the late 15th century, it means one who fails to perform a duty or discharge an obligation; he is also generally, "an offender against the law". Behaving in a way that is illegal or that the society does not approve of; such as negligence,

irresponsibility, and slack, carelessness in one's duty, robbery, assault and criminality.

Delinquency means in the context of this paper, the act or conduct which violates the law of the society. It is an unwelcomed action of omission or immoral behaviour which is socially not permitted in any society. Generally, if one fails to meet certain social obligations anticipated from him by the people, then he is considered to be delinquent. Delinquency is a behavioural disorder which can be seen as foolish; which can cause a serious worry, concern and a total hardship to the society since it is unacceptable.

Finally, a psychiatrist suggests that a delinquent behaviour is an activity which deviates from the normal, it's disappointing and beyond reasonable expectation (Shakti, 2014). He concluded that delinquent conditions include violations of any law or ordinances, habitual truancy, association with thieves, vicious or immoral persons and are often incorrigible and beyond control.

Retrograde

Retrograde refers to reverting to an earlier and inferior condition of existence. Going back on the progress that has been made, if any, will be a retrograde step. A retrograde leader is one who is unprogressive, regressive, unwelcome, deteriorating, degenerating and declining.

Delinquent Leadership Creates Delinquent Societal Anomie

Based on the concept of statistical and behavioural normality, delinquents are abnormal. Abnormal people, juveniles or adults, are often socio-pathic, that is, they lack a sense of responsibility or morality and have no concern or affection for others; their behaviour is often determined almost entirely by their own ego needs. In other words, delinquents lack conscience, they are sub cultural, gang oriented and are ready to violate the laws and rules of moral responsibility. The delinquent both adult and juvenile, behave impulsively and lack self-control (For example, a Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria recently was caught on a close-circuit camera, assaulting a shop keeper openly and shamelessly. What is distinguished about that behaviour? He is an adult delinquent, simple). When judged against the typical behaviour of people of the same age, delinquents are often immature, ineffective and lack constructiveness. They are prone to aggression and violent behavioural responses as can be witnessed, quite often inside most African and Nigerian Parliaments or Houses of Assembly. Frustration tolerance levels are

often low among delinquents as they demand immediate attention, satisfaction and gratification.

Furthermore, delinquents often exhibit weaker internalized controls which may sometimes be linked to faulty home backgrounds and poor temperament qualities, which become disastrous in adult hood. A nation that has a preponderance of adult delinquents as leaders or rulers is on its way to extinction and oblivion. According to Bandura and Walters (1993 and 1999), delinquents are more likely to engage in socially disapproved forms of behaviour, be it political, social or otherwise. Also, Glueck and Glueck (2000) present a picture of a typical delinquent (juvenile or adult) as one who lacks self-control, and therefore is more predisposed to anti-political and social behaviours even in public places, such as in politics, governance; the executive, legislature and judiciary arms of society.

Characterizing Normal Political Behaviour

- i) **Efficient Perception of Reality:** The normal person in politics or governance is fairly realistic in the appraisal of his own reactions and abilities. He is able to know and assess or even analyse, what is going on around him in the nation and the world. He does not misperceive other people's words or actions but evaluates others in a fairly realistic manner. He does not ever over rate his or her abilities nor tackle more problems than he or she can solve at a time.
- ii) **Self-knowledge:** A non-delinquent who therefore is a well-adjusted person as a politician, demonstrates awareness of his motives and feelings. He tries to understand himself properly without hiding the most important feelings and motives, he can express himself or herself logically, succinctly and efficiently.
- iii) **Ability to Exercise Voluntary Control Over Behaviour of All Types:** A normal individual who therefore, is not a delinquent, feels fairly confident that he or she can control and direct his own behaviour, whether in private places (eg family) or in public places (like the parliament, shops and so on); (Goffman 1987).
- iv) **Self-esteem and Acceptance:** A well-adjusted person, be he a politician or otherwise, has an appreciation of his own self-worth in private and public places. He feels accepted by those around him without being arrogant, pugnacious or pugilistic. He is comfortable, humble and simple with other people. He is able to react spontaneously in political, social

and cultural situations, without bias or feeling of xenophobia and bigotry. Delinquents, on the other hand, always have feelings of worthlessness, alienation and lack of acceptance by others. Hence the exhibition of defense mechanisms.

- v) **Ability to Form Affectionate Relationships:** The normal person even in politics, or in any field or profession, is able to form close and satisfying relationships with other people, irrespective of race, status, culture, creed or colour. He is always sensitive to the needs and feelings of others; he is not self-centred or kleptomaniac.
- vi) **Productivity:** A normal person is able to use his or her potentials and ability, skills or capacities, however meagre, in productive activity. He obeys the Godly injunction that “He who does not work should not eat”. Unlike the adult delinquent who wants to eat without working or engaging in any productive work, the normal person is well adjusted and enthusiastic to living through production and work.

Adult Delinquency and Nigerian Politics

- 1). **Conspiracy Case Histories and the Hoisting of political misfits and adult delinquents:** In 2015, Audu Abubakar won the gubernatorial election to become Governor of Kogi State. Unfortunately, he died and should constitutionally have been replaced by Abiodun James Falake, his running mate. That was not to be. The Attorney General of the Federation Abubakar Malami, undermined the Nigerian constitution by hoisting an outsider, Yahaya Bello, who today is the ‘bete noire’, adult delinquent Governor of Kogi State. According to the Sunday Nation of May 21st, 2017, Yahaya Bello is not only a misfit but presides over a cabinet of gruelling and deluded misfits that have rendered Kogi State to be horrendously misgoverned.
- 2). On 6th April 2015, Kayode Komolafe, reflecting on the political events that occurred that week of April 2005 in Nigeria, stated that the then president OBJ, using his Banana Peel conspiracy theory, had flushed out Senator Adolphus Wabara from his job as Senate president.
- 3). Before Wabara of Abia State, Senator Evan Enwerem of Imo State and after that Senator Chuba Okadigbo of Anambra State were all flushed out of their jobs as Senate Presidents by OBJ, using the “Banana Peel” conspiracy theory. Of course, Senators Anyim Pius Anyim of Ebonyi State

and Ken Nnamani of Enugu State, had broken the jinx of the Banana peel while serving as Senate Presidents of Nigeria, between 2000 and 2007.

- 4). A Classical case of adult delinquency in politics can be observed in the scenario sketched in Kogi State as follows

Kogi is probably the worst governed State in Nigeria. It's governor and Cabinet have no idea what governance is all about. The cabinet is inexperienced without ambition, has no design for the present or future, is totally devoid of any feelings for the dying unpaid workers and shut down tertiary institutions and is incapable of conceiving even newest plans for the state as a whole (Sunday Nation, May 21st 2017, p56; Vol 11; No3980).

- 5). The constant bouts of presidential ailments in Nigeria had created a climate of political kleptocrats and political cut pockets surrounding the presidency, who have succeeded in putting on hole, any form of purposeful governance in the country, since 2015. Productive politics and politicians are in very short supply in the meantime; leading to the politics of “henchmen”, tomfoolery and jerrymandering. In the end, all we get are adult political delinquents on parade. The consequence is that the Nigerian politicians, who are adult delinquents cannot heal the “open sore” of the country nor dress its suppurating wounds. Nigerian politicians are ultra-selfish; they are bleeding the country to a painful death. The concomitant implications include a sprawling or comatose economy which has paralyzed all other sectors of national life, such as health, education, agriculture and so on.

Leadership Consequences

Achebe (1992) had quipped that the problems of Nigeria are squarely at the door of leadership. This assertion is made because the leader makes all the difference in society. In the jungle, the lion is the leader not because he's the biggest but because of his attitude, beliefs and personality perspectives. Every other animal, however big, is a launch and can be brought down by a team of hunting lions. For a great leader, nothing is impossible because he believes and acts out what he thinks and brings it to come to pass. Quality of leadership determines everything in the society, such as, morality, positive and negative attitudes or behaviour, commitment and performances.

It is often said that an army of sheep led by a lion can always defeat an army of lions led by sheep. A retrograde or delinquent leadership downgrades the moral tone of society, introduces lawlessness, ethnic and religious sentiments, criminality, corruption and pervasive anomie and normlessness in society as we have today in Nigeria, under a clueless retrograde leadership at the centre.

Leadership can transform society as in Malaysia under Mohammed Bhakthir, or in Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew or Dubai under Mohammed Makatoun; or destroy and degrade a society as in Nigeria, especially since 1999 under delinquent, corrupt and 'lootocratic' leadership.

It goes without saying that successive governments in Nigeria since independence and especially since 1999, has practiced "lootocracy", kleptocracy and profligacy, mingled with lawlessness. The apt saying that 'as above so below' clearly applies to Nigeria and their citizens who have watched yearly the looting of their country by the leadership. A government of looters by looters for the looters characterize the leadership and governance of Nigeria. This governance and leadership style has bred lootocracy in public and civil services, thereby pushing the helpless and hopeless masses into poverty, despair, animosity, suicide, kidnapping, armed robbery and other sundry vices that are all socio-pathological to good governance, security and peaceful coexistence in the country.

Governors organize hoodlums around themselves like in Borno and Rivers State. When the largesse fail, the powerfully armed hoodlums take to the harm way, plundering, looting, killing and murdering innocent Nigerians. A country at peace with itself cannot have large population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as found in Nigeria. Agitations against delinquent leadership have snowballed overtime into Boko Haram, Niger Delta militants, MASSOR, IPOB etc, whose membership are millions of unemployed Nigerian youths who are very angry with the National leadership.

The latest spin off is the attack on Senator Ike Ekweremadu in Nuremberg, Germany. The poor must speak truth to power, at least to caution them and bring them back to reality. The Nigerian masses are very poor and angry with the Nigerian delinquent leadership. Certainly, there are limits to every human endurance.

Methodology

The study used ex-post facto research design to carry out the study because the events under study had already taken place before the study came to be. Qualitative method of data collection from documentary evidence of secondary sources are judged as quite appropriate and scientific in the Social Sciences.

Secondary data constitute a vital aspect in data collection of research when the data evidence sought for can be taken from published works, journals, books, and other published works as appropriate to the research. It is a highly recommended alternative to primary data research in the social sciences.

A Delinquent Leadership Spurs Delinquent and Sprawling Economic and Social System in Society

According to Transparency International (2019), Nigeria in 2019 was still as corrupt as ever, without clear politics to address the cankerworm. In 2018, Nigeria scored 27 points out of 100, thereby maintaining its corrupt position as in 2017. Out of 180 countries polled Nigeria ranked 144, which shows that the country is still very corrupt.

A study of the Human Development Index of Nigeria, between 1980-2013, shows that Nigeria has steadily lagged behind the world in HDI. The Human Development Index issued by the UNDP in 2017, (United Nation Development Programme) states that life expectancies, access to education, health services and decent standard of living, clearly show that Nigerian citizens are still not the real value of the country. Indeed, the government has not demonstrated in any clear language that the richness of human lives in Nigeria is of any priority. Daily, citizens are slaughtered in Nigeria, from the North East to the North West, North Central to the South West, South East and South South, yet the government simply does not seem to care. Some have even suggested complicity in the genocidal melee. Internally Displaced People and Farmers (IDDF) are on the increase and no constructive strategy to curb this menace is in sight.

There are the very high human development index countries such as Norway and Australia; the high human development countries like the Russian Federation and the medium human development countries. Sadly, Nigeria is found among the low human development nations of the world, ranking lower than countries such as Kenya, Angola, Swaziland and Tanzania. Nigeria's HDI value for 2017 was 0.532, when some countries were scoring 0.999. (The

highest score is 1.0). As a low human development index country Nigeria ranks 157 out of 189 countries of the world (UNDP Notes; [hdr.undp.org/country notes](http://hdr.undp.org/country-notes)). The meaning of all this analysis is that the standard of living, education, health and the quality life or values attached to lives in Nigeria, are very low.

The 2019 Index of Economic Freedom Report further states that “Nigeria’s Economic freedom score is 57.3; making its economy the 111th freest in the 2019 index. Overall, Nigeria’s scores have decreased over the years, with a steep drop in Fiscal Health, and even lower scores on Judicial Effectiveness and Trade Freedom. According to the Heritage Foundation Report ([heritage.org.index](http://heritage.org/index)) the Nigerian governments which have successively mismanaged the state scarce resources, especially since 1999, have empowered political elites who fear that deep structural reforms in the politics and economy, will push up consumer prices, stoke political instability and antagonize the middle classes who rely on government subsidised goods, and private sector companies that depend on State handouts and protectionist policies. Of course, to do otherwise is to commit class suicide since the ruling class in Nigeria’s politics and economy would rather tighten than loosen the strangle holds on the citizens.

According to the World Banks’ Doing Business Survey of 2018, corruption is still rife in Nigeria, and is hardly investigated or prosecuted when reported; and impunity remains widespread at all levels of Government – Federal, State and Local Governments, as well as in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Arms of Government. In consequence, rule of law is very low, public debts have risen over the years. Over the past three years, government spending has amounted to 20% of the country’s GDP and budget deficits have averaged 5% of the GDP, (i.e, Gross Domestic Product or the country’s output for a year).

According to the World Trade Organization Report of June 30th, 2018; Nigeria has maintained only one nontariff measure and lingering barriers to trade and investment continue in the forms of bureaucratic delays, corruption and official cynicism. Nigeria is highly under banked as only about 40% of Nigerians having bank accounts. Banks remain weak with increasing non-performing loans. The Insurance Industry is even in a worse shape as only about 5% of Nigerians are insured. Health Insurance is almost non-existent; as well as Property Insurance. Life Insurance is a huge joke.

A highly delinquent leadership has remained insincere in many sectors of the Nigerian economy. A vibrant private sector that should have absorbed the millions of the young unemployed is not in sight. Rather, the “go slow” government have chosen to “subsidize” the dying and struggling oil and electricity sectors because those in government are interested only in suffering Nigerians. These adult delinquents seem to be sadomasochists, nihilistic hedonists. They want to keep Nigerians perpetually sad.

According to a report on Nigerian agricultural outlook in the last few years, as reported by the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA), published by the Agricultural Affairs Unit of the USA Embassy Lagos 2018; the country’s agricultural fortunes under the delinquent political leaders of Nigeria, have slipped down the hill.

With a total estimated 80 million hectares of arable land, Nigerian’s can only cultivate about 30 million hectares. Small holder’s farmers working on rain fed agricultural platforms, based on old fashioned traditional farming systems, can hardly produce enough for the over 200 million Nigerians, not to talk of exports. Below is the total overview of agricultural imports from the USA alone in the last 4 years, (2015-2018).

Table 1: Overview of Agricultural imports from the World and USA. (USD Thousands)

	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total Exports	0	0	0	0
Total Imports from the world	67,000	30,000	50,000	60,000
Average Imports from USA	11,181	4,757	10,087	12,000
Exchange Rate ₦ to USD	197	197	359	359

All imports are denoted in US Dollars; thousands

Source: USDA-LAGOS 2018

Nigeria has been talking of the diversification of the economy, through agriculture and away from petroleum and gas, ad nauseum. In 2015, food imports totalled some 11 billion dollars and forced the country to embark on yet another set of agricultural lingos; namely

- a) Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP)
- b) Presidential Fertilizer Initiative (PFI)

- c) Presidential Economic Diversification Initiative (PEDI)
- d) The Youth Lab
- e) Food Security Council

These laudable initiatives notwithstanding, Nigeria still imports food heavily in the area of:

- i) Live stocks; e.g. poultry and fish farming
- ii) Food Crops; eg. (a) Wheat; b) Rice; c) Dairy Products; e) Sea Foods
- iii) Wine

Post-harvest losses of about 70%, and lack of preservative techniques remain a major setback to constant food availability. Moreover, farm implements and techniques have remained primitive and the selfish Nigerian governments over the years have not cared to offer solutions. This attitude of government is perhaps due to their current heavy dependence on oil and gas exports up to about 80% of the country’s revenues or GDP. Bread made of wheat is eaten in the remotest villages of Nigeria. Wheat imports stood at \$ 1.5 billion in 2017 and 1.7 billion in 2018. Nigeria remains the largest wheat importer from USA, in Africa; and the 4th in the world.

Table 2: Wheat Imports USD Thousands – Into Nigeria

	2016	2017	2018	2019 (projected)
Total Exports	0	0	0	0
Total Imports from the world	1,200,000	1,484,500	1,634,000	1,683,700
Imports from the USA	300,000	400,000	530,000	540,000
Exchange Rate I.USD	450	400	360	365

Source: USDA, LAGOS, 2018

Another area that our delinquent leaders have not cared to improve is rice importation, probably because of their selfishness and stake holding shares in the business.

Table 3: Parboiled Rice Importation in USD Thousands

	2016	2017	2018	2019(projected)
Total Exports	0	0	0	0

Total Imports from the world	1,950,000	2,540,000	3,020,000	(Milled Rice) 2,700,000
Imports from the USA	2,000	3,000	6,000	(Milled Rice) 7,000
Exchange Rate I.USD	450	400	400	365

Source: USDA; LAGOS, 2019

Although Nigerian government in 2018, proclaimed the state of self-sufficiency in local rice production, the country still spends on average \$4.5 billion on parboiled rice annually. More than 95% of rice consumed in Nigeria come in from the very porous borders that constitute smuggling channels. This is because local initiatives at rice production and sufficiency is yet a pipe dream.

In 2017, the Nigerians dairy market was worth over \$ 1.5 billion with over 85% of the market met by imports. Yet the country is being asphyxiated with cows all over the place that produce no milk.

Table 4: Dairy Imports in USD Thousands

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total Exports	0	0	0	0
Total Imports from the world	720,000	1,300,00	1,380,000	1,400,000
Imports from the USA	10,500	12,000	15,000	20,000
Exchange Rate I.USD	450	400	360	365

Source: USDA; LAGOS, 2019

As at today, domestic milk production is grossly underdeveloped. How this can be improved should be a major concern of the delinquent government in power, not other diversionary issues of no relevance to the citizens of Nigeria.

Seafood, such as Mackerel, Herring, Crocker etc. are delicacies in Nigeria, found in all nooks and crannies of the country. They come in frozen and constitute the cheapest protein source in Nigeria with a consumption rate of about 2.5 million metric tonnes of fish annually, worth about \$ 3 USD billions. Cat fish and tilapia varieties of fish are widely farmed by individual

small holdings in Nigeria but their combined output remains insignificant for the growing population, hence importation, because those in government would not give enough encouragement to local farmers.

Table 5: Seafood Import in USD Dollars

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total Exports	10,000	30,000	7,000	1,500
Total Imports from the world	520,000	910,000	1,024,000	1,150,000
Imports from the USA	300	15,000	18,000	20,000
Exchange Rate I.USD	450	400	360	365

Source: USDA; LAGOS, 2019

Over the years the consumption of wine and other alcoholic beverages in Nigeria, has jumped from 0.05 liters to about 18 liters in 2017. Local wine processing is also growing but as yet it is very underdeveloped, hence the near total dependence of Nigerians on the importation of alcoholic beverages. The wine market in Nigeria increased by 20% in 2016, to \$ 320 million but jumped to \$ 385 million in 2017.

Table 6: Importation of Wine Beverages in USD Thousands

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total Exports	0	0	0	0
Total Imports from the world	290,000	345,000	420,000	420,000
Imports from the USA	10,000	17,000	30,000	40,000
Exchange Rate I.USD	450	400	360	365

Source: USDA; LAGOS, 2019

From the above tables it is easy to see that the future of Nigeria has been mortgaged by the delinquent rulers in the past two decades. The facts are there and yet not many efforts have been made to reverse the tide of capital

flight for the purchase of food which can comfortably be grown in Nigeria, if only the governments were less selfish and atavistic. It is worthy of note that all these imported food items are not often within the reach of about 80% of Nigerian citizens who are classified as chronically poor. Even among the so called middle class, local substitutes are very much to be preferred over the so called imported varieties. In my family Ebonyi Rice is staple and all our dishes on the menu are of local sources. It is Ebonyi Fish, Garri, Yams and other ingredients all the way.

According to the Nigeria Economic Outlook (2019) published by Pricewaterhouse Coopers Ltd (PWC), Nigeria is not among the fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by percentage growth in GDP. Outside the proceeds from Oil and Gas (Handouts) diaspora remittances have continued to sustain the economy, with an estimated US \$ 25 billion in remittances in 2018, representing 6.1% of the GDP. Remittances are handouts too, which shows that production, processing, manufacturing and industrialization barely exist in Nigeria. Secondly, sluggish economic growth and slow recovery have characterized Nigeria in the past decades, despite all the noise made by governments.

Also, government's fiscal deficit has expanded above the national budgets, widening by 80% to NGN4.55 trillion. Issuance of bonds have not made matters better. A country that cannot produce the food consumed by her citizens can hardly do anything else. Moreover, lackluster government policy implementation over the years, has impacted negatively on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and other Foreign Private Initiatives. FDI flows have continued to decline since 2016 and fell by 19% in 2018, due to uncertainty, instability and insecurity in the country. What Nigeria loses other African countries like Ghana, South Africa and Egypt are gaining, because Nigeria is ruled by delinquent politicians. Besides, unemployment figures are trending upwards, especially since 2016 to about 25% in 2018, even as the youth population is expanding rapidly. Right now, in 2019, more than half of the country's population is under 30 years. The World Economy is driven by youths who are trending in high octave ICT based knowledge economies built on nanotechnologies, artificial intelligence and mechatronics. Cars of the future would not be driven on oil but on electricity. Other sources of energy are seriously being explored by the rest of the World. Sadly, all we hear in Nigeria is about youthful cattle herders totting guns all over the place,

maiming, raping, kidnaping and killing outrageously. Yet, those who rule care less because they are delinquents in power.

Oil prices have been slowing down making the Nigerian economy very vulnerable to external shocks. What is more, OPEC has lowered Nigeria's oil production to 1.685 million barrels per day and this may affect the implementation of the 2019 budget negatively. Also, the USA, hitherto a big buyer of Nigeria's crude oil, has suspended purchase because of their new fracking method for getting oil in the USA. Over here, we are still cracking to get our crude oil to be refined. The domestic pricing of petroleum products have not been very stable either, with kerosene which is used mostly in rural Nigeria costing higher than petrol that is used by middle class Nigerians who own cars and generators. NNPC, the sole importer of petrol has not curbed incessant fuel scarcity and long queues in the country. Besides, increases in inflation rates have risen by some 20% or more in some cases, and this shows that there is a food insecurity challenge in the country.

Exchange rate of Nigeria Naira to the US Dollar remains unstable, this is despite the injection of some 40 billion US Dollars by the Central Bank into the foreign exchange market in 2018. Nothing shall be stable in Nigeria unless there is political social and economic stability in the country. Since 2015 the country has not settled at all and the uncertainty level is growing higher by the day.

Recently, it was reported in the Sunday Guardian of Nigeria (July 14th, 2019, p15) that Nigeria has joined other 52 African countries to form the AFCFTA; African Continent Free Trade Area, which is aimed at lifting Nigeria and the rest of Africa from the morass of economic failure. However, the General Secretary of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC); Dr Peter Ozo-Eson had said on p15, that for the AFCFTA to succeed, the provision of infrastructure is the key in Nigeria. He stated that AFCFTA can only create new jobs and consolidate the old ones when the current challenges of poor infrastructure, power, roads, insecurity and other necessary variables are put in place and addressed squarely. In the AFCFTA regime, no country is expected to trade on what that country does not produce, he added. That means a hitherto unproductive country like Nigeria must wake up and put the teeming millions of her youths to work. Insecurity, according to Hassan S. Labo (writing on p9 of Sunday Vanguard of July 14th, 2019) has progressively degenerated in Nigeria, to the level of anarchy.

According to Barbara Tuchmann of Harvard University, Nigeria's debt profile has risen to ₦24.95 trillion between March 2017 to March 2019. By March 2017, total debts stood at ₦19.16 trillion; so in about 24 months, debts had increased by 30%. (these findings were reported in the Sunday Vanguard of July 14th, 2019; p9). Tuchmann adds further that for the 2019 budget to be implemented another tranche of ₦2.3 trillion debts have been added to the existing ₦24.95 trillion. Tuchmann is emphatic that the Nigerian economy is unproductive because the country borrows to spend (at all levels) and not to invest. A country becomes productive if borrowing is for investment in Education, Infrastructure, Technology, Health and Good Governance, sectors that will generate more wealth, not the enrichment of the pockets of few kleptocrats in government. The current policy of "Borrow and Spend" rather than "Borrow and invest" is detrimental to economic development and growth in any country.

According to the News Report of October 11th, 2018, Federal Government of Nigeria had released sum ₦460 billion for capital projects. Yet, the federal Government could not fund its capital projects of 43 days after the budget assent. (News Report July 11th, 2019)

In 2016, the Federal Government of Nigeria had budgeted the sum of ₦500 billion for the "Social Investment Programme", SIP. The same year ₦203 billion was provided for capital expenditure. By October of that year only ₦77 billion had been released for capital expenditure and ₦90 billion for the SIP project which had the target vote that year. Yet the Federal Government borrowed over ₦2 trillion the same year. The SIP was designed to be a Federal Government legacy project created for rapid industrialization and productivity in investments in the country. Unfortunately, the Government of adult delinquents could not support their own pet projects so that Nigerian citizens will not benefit.

The story is the same in the area of health. Muanya C, (2017) quoting a study on health published in the medical journal, Lancet, the 18th Edition, stated that Nigeria lagged behind other leading African nations in a new global healthcare report. Based on the quantification and quality of health personnel in 195 countries from 1990 – 2015, Nigeria ranked 140th, with the score of 51 points on "Healthcare Access and Quality Index", (HAQI). The HAQI index was created based on 32 diseases causing deaths in Nigeria and Africa; that could have been avoided by "timely and effective" medical care. All other

countries had improved within the study period and indeed some African countries ranked ahead of Nigeria, such as Namibia, South Africa, Gabon. Etc.

In another related study by World Health Organization (WHO), published in February 19th, 2017, Nigeria was ranked 187 out of 190 in World Health Systems, only ahead of the DR Congo, Central African Republic and Myanmar. The study was done using such performance indicators as overall level of health, distribution of health facilities in the populations, responsiveness and distribution of finances. Clearly, the Nigerian delinquent, neo imperialist political rulers prefer to go outside the country with their families, to receive medical and health attention. The result is that Nigeria loses about \$ 1 billion USD in medical tourism yearly, including our presidents. The Millennium Development Goals on Health (MDG 2000 – 2015) never fared any better. And now, the country has hoisted the SDG 2015 – 2030 (Sustainable Development Goals – which do not reflect consolidation of successes scored on the MDG; but the admission of national failure.

Theoretical framework

The concept of imperialism and underdevelopment theory was developed by Paul A. Baran in 1957 with the publication of his “Political Economy of Growth. It shares many points with earlier Marxist theories of imperialism by Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin. It also arose out of the quest by Latin America and African political scholars (Claude Ake, Walter Rodney, Andre Gunder Frank) to explain the underdevelopment in the third world countries.

This theory of imperialism and underdevelopment by Claude Ake is the theoretical foundation and framework of this paper. There are many types of imperialism namely, direct and indirect; exogeneous or endogenous. The type found in Nigeria since independence in 1960 is the endogenous variety, where some groups of people, whether in ‘Khaki or Agbada’ have tended to monopolize power in order to dominate and control others in ways very detrimental to the citizens of Nigeria.

This theory is of the opinion that imperialism is an irrational, objectless disposition in people who rule to force others to do their will, unlimitedly. This theory therefore suggested very strongly that imperialism is in the psychology of certain rulers who only care about the projection of their peoples’ archaic, hedonistic and unworkable non progressive pre-capitalist social structures and not the modern economic, social, educational, health or

infrastructural interests of the country they claim to rule. In another decisive view, the imperialists behave in a 'hog cycle' style, which leads to foreseeable but undesirable outcomes. Outcomes are not just necessarily good simply because they were reached democratically. For example, all election results may not be good simply because they were pronounced democratic. Such perceptions create near-democracies such as Nigeria where nothing good happens after the ballyhoo or madness called elections.

Similarly, delinquents, cultists, or drug addicts in politics in Nigeria, behave in a 'hog cycle' manner, which leads them and the people around them, especially citizens, to forecastable, predictable but inevitably undesirable outcomes and disasters. Delinquent imperialists which the Nigerian political rulers have been over the decades, have wrought undesirable and disastrous outcomes in the areas of Agriculture, Health, Education, Infrastructure, the Economy and indeed, all significant areas of the country's existence. Political adult delinquents as they are, Nigerian rulers over the decades have only kleptocratically sought to enrich themselves through corruption, sleaze and shameless abandonment of their political, social and economic responsibilities to the country. During electioneering campaigns, the politicians promise heaven on earth only to lead the citizen to hell on earth after the elections have been fought and won. According to Schumpeter (1943), imperialistic, adult delinquent politicians have psychological problems, Nigerian politicians and future rulers (not leaders) who are easily detached and disconnected from the citizens, need to be examined for mental fitness and psychological motivations for going into politics before ever they can pick up forms to contest elections in Nigeria. The current spate of political elegy is humongously highly dangerous and unhealthy; the mere survival of the country is now openly questioned and debated. No country can develop in the midst of confusion and misdirection or aimlessness.

Our leadership has failed Nigeria since independence. Current scientific analysis of their attitude, behavior and perception of governance indicates that they are delinquent, retrograde and socio-pathetic which means the leadership goes against the society.

The leadership has also corrupted the society leaving the masses delinquent, hopeless, jobless and without direction. In consequence, the mechanism of self-help has developed within society whereby people have socio-pathetic avenue, such as corruption, armed robbery 419ners, ritual

murders and many other sundry vices which only the delinquent can occupy themselves with.

Osuntokun (1987) had suggested that since Nigerian society creates mentally sick leaders, they should be mentally examined before going into governance as it is so in advanced countries. If they are not mentally stable, the country will as well not be stable. An unstable leader will create an unstable country as we have today in Nigeria.

The recent attack on Senator Ike Ekweremadu in Germany by a delinquent mob clearly indicates that there is a limit to every human endurance. Even, in Nigeria very soon, delinquent politicians must expect to be attacked by angry delinquent mobs created or socialized by the delinquent leaders no matter how tight the leaders' security systems are.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Since 1999, the detached delinquents in power have always been detached and disconnected from the very public they came from who voted them in, in the first place. That kind of irresponsibility can only be explained as a delinquent retrograde behavior.

Sanatoriums should be established in all the 774 local government areas of Nigeria so that degraded and delinquent youths as well as politicians can be mentally stabilized and brought back to reality. Keep in mind that 99% of this degraded delinquent youths have been on drugs and have participated in several cultic rituals overtime since 1999. These youths need to be mentally sanitized and detoxified.

Party bureaucracy should be restructured and trimmed down in line with best practices in Europe and America where parties install governments and withdraw behind the scene and allow the political leaders installed to govern. In this way, fantastic amounts of money raised by parties during electioneering time can be drastically cut down.

In future, party leaders should be apparent and transparent business men who are self-sufficient and therefore will not have to depend on party money for their sustenance.

Once the youthful population is sanitized, it should be quickly deployed in factories, farms and several other meaningful jobs created for them so that they will never be attracted again into politics as touts

Finally, once the youths and politicians are sanitized, then it becomes easier for the wider society to take a queue from the political leadership who

have hither to been detoxified and sanitized in order to return sanity back to Nigeria.

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NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT AND LEADERSHIP
QUESTION: INTERROGATING THE TOUT THEORY OF POLITICS

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Abstract

One of the greatest problems facing the Nigerian political science community is how to unravel the mystery surrounding the leadership question in Nigeria. In fact, no issue has attracted the volume of literature and academic discourse like this phenomenon. The central question is: how can we explain the political behaviour of Nigerian politicians? This question is necessary because there is no classical or contemporary political theory that can adequately explain the abnormal behaviour of our leaders, either in military uniform or white flowing gown. Certainly, there is something fundamentally wrong with our politicians that require serious academic theorizing. For instance, what theory will help an average political scientist to explain why our leaders revere culture of impunity, snatch ballot boxes, loot public treasury, engage in vote buying and disregard for the rule of law. Is there any theory that can explain why Nigerian legislators behave more like conscienceless crooks than responsible law makers? Nigerian lawmakers have been notorious for fighting in the legislative chambers, and attacking each other with any available weapon, including the mace. In this study, I want to adumbrate on Tout Theory of politics. Like any other contemporary political theory, the aim is to offer a platform for understanding and analysing our indigenous political problem from African perspective. My main motivation for the study is anchored on my recent interaction with motor park touts. Even though the concept of tout appears derogatory and people look down on them, I discovered three psychological traits we need to admire. Average motor park tout is fearless, shameless and ruthless. I quickly tried to compare, these traits

with those of Nigerian politicians and discovered that an average politician is a tout. They are fearless, shameless and ruthless. These traits can be acquired by nature or nurture. On deeper reflection, I discovered that there are categories of touts, namely, tout-tout, corporate tout, and chief touts, usually addressed as godfathers or generalissimo. The chief tout determines who gets what, how and when. He is seen as a demi-god and in most cases God himself that must be obeyed. Anybody he blesses is blessed and anybody he curses is cursed. Further reflection revealed that there is circulation of touts in Nigeria politics. Consequently, it is possible to classify Nigerian leaders since 1960 as either conservative touts or revolutionary touts. Incidentally, political touts have little or no regard for education. The less education you have, the better. They are not creative and productive. There are vicious, lawless and adopt do or die strategy to get power. The study revealed that what Nigeria is currently practicing is toutocracy rather than democracy. Toutocracy is a primitive variance of democracy. It is government of the touts, by the touts and for the touts. This implies that if you are a non-tout, or “gentleman”, you have no business in Nigerian politics. If you attempt, they will swallow you. The study concludes that circulation of touts will continue in Nigeria until the non-touts mobilize massively and confront them. As long as these predators continue to prey on us, there is no hope for Nigeria.

Introduction

The political class of any nation to a large extent determines the level of development it can record over a period of time. As Martin Luther King Jr. noted that the prosperity of a nation depends not on the strength of its fortification, not on the beauty of its public buildings, but it consists on the number of cultivated citizens, its men of character and enlightenment. The paradox is that we have political office holders who are meant to perform their duties creditably well, but begin to do the contrary. These political office holders pledge on one hand to uphold the law, on the other hand, they break the law with impunity. This scenario calls for a serious philosophical review. Madu (1993) graphically painted the picture of the prevalent impunity in our society in these strong terms: “Few rich and strong in the society are apparently above the law. But for occasional military intervention, themselves

dictatorial, these self-acclaimed owners of the country get away with everything- killing, bank frauds, embezzlement...”

The central question is what is the matter with Nigerian politicians? In other words, why do they behave the way they do? Every generation of Nigerians have heard those questions asked in one form or the other and felt the intense pain, frustration and anger it generates. Nigeria since 1999 has been able to evolve a different kind of democracy. The Nigerian brand of democracy has given world intellectuals and local political think- tanks a reason to think that their basic or elementary definition of democracy is, after all, questionable and inadequate. As Ibrahim Mohammed (2012) has noted, ours is democracy that thrives on impunity, leaders are selected rather than elected, electorates are subjected rather than liberated; and result of vote cast are cooked up in someone’s living rooms rather than from the honest votes of electorates. Individuals are maimed and killed each time they attempt to defend their rights to bring to power leaders of their choice.

Nigerian politicians have imposed poverty on the masses. Unlike poverty of many other countries, ours is poverty created out of wealth, a manufactured poverty. The raw material from which the poverty monster is created is the vast wealth of the nation. The country’s treasury is being brazenly looted in broad day light by a tiny class and the rest of the nation, especially the youth is reduced to white and blue-collar beggars. Majority of Nigerians are forced to eat sand while sitting on a heap of gold.

To worsen the situation, Nigerian politicians, revere culture of impunity, snatch ballot boxes, loot public treasury, kill or kidnap their political opponents, engage in vote buying and intimidation of the electorates. What type of theory can explain this political behaviour? Is there any political science theory that can explain why Nigerian legislator who stole the mace from the legislative chamber in broad day light is rewarded with juicy political appointment rather than punishment? Nigerian legislators, once elected, become careless about the problems of their constituency. They have become notorious for looting money meant for constituency projects, budget huge

salaries for themselves, organise kangaroo impeachment, skip their oversight functions and sleep on duty. Many of them have been notorious for fighting on the floor of the legislative chambers and attacking each another with any available weapon, including the mace. Recently, a sitting senator forced a returning officer at gun point to declare him elected or face the consequences. The returning officer returned him, but raised alarm. Nothing happened. What kind of country is this?

Despite this obvious gap in the literature, Nigerian political scientists seem not to be worried. No serious efforts have been made to develop a theoretical framework that explains this abnormal behaviour of our leaders. We have been busy interrogating and contributing to the development of theories developed in America and other developed countries, even when they cannot explain our peculiar existential condition. In fact, one issue that has not received the required academic attention from the Nigeria Political Science community is the issue of theory building and theory testing. Theory explains why things are the way they are. It is a systematic way of organizing and building body of knowledge and viewing the world around us. For us, theory is a lens through which we view the world. It helps to interpret, clarify and differentiate the known from the unknown. Consequently, a scholar without deep knowledge of theories in his field can hardly make a breakthrough. Such a scholar is blind.

Apart from developing indigenous political science theories that can explain our peculiar problems, Nigerian political science community should be alarmed that what we teach our students in the classroom seem to be different from what actually happens in the society. In my first year as a political science student, I was told that the difference between political science and political philosophy is that political science focused on “what is”, while political philosophy emphasized “what ought to be”

In the last 59 years after independence, Nigerian political scientists have been teaching “what ought to be” rather than “what is”. This explains why politicians will prefer to engage a professor of history as chairmen of

INEC, instead of political scientist. We have lost so much because what we are teaching our students cannot help them possess their possession. For instance, while we teach our students that political parties need to campaign to convince voters to vote for them, we find out that parties and candidates engage the service of touts to intimidate the voters and rig elections in their favor. While we teach our students that their votes must count for the election to be credible, we observe in reality that our votes do not count. While we teach that electoral bodies need to be impartial and fair to all, we find in reality that electoral bodies have been compromised. This for me has been a great challenge as teacher and researcher. I have suddenly discovered that political party leaders and candidates will prefer to consult motor park touts, criminals and cultists for advice during elections, instead of consulting political scientists. There is a believe that one's hand must be stained in blood if one is to acquire leadership position. It is only in Nigeria that you find those who have no work enter into politics and rise to determine the fate of all.

In our attempt to succumb to the threat of publish or perish, political science community have not illuminated our collective experience as a nation. We have continued to teach our students theories propounded in Europe and America, even when those theories cannot explain our collective experience as a nation. To be frank, these issues have bothered me greatly. I have been thinking about how to develop an appropriate theory that can explain Nigeria's unique predicament in the last ten years.

While I was brainstorming on the issues raised, I had an encounter with motor park touts at Ifesinachi motor park Onitsha, Anambra State. About five years ago we actually left Lagos in Ifesinachi luxurious bus and arrived Onitsha at about 11pm on that day. Our driver parked and said the journey would continue the next day by 5:00am. It was while I was looking for a place to relax and take a drink that I ran into motor park touts. For avoidance of doubt, motor park touts are a bunch of illiterate thugs, extortionists and notorious young men who work in the motor park. Some of them have nowhere to lay their heads at night. Even though the society look down on

them, I discovered three personality traits we should study about them. The truth is that an average tout is shameless, fearless and ruthless. On deeper reflection, I discovered that an average Nigerian politician is also **shameless**, **fearless** and **ruthless**. By implication, Nigerian politicians are touts. I discovered through in-depth interview and Focus Group Discussion among randomly selected touts that Nigerian politicians behave the way they do because they are touts. Nigerian politics shares many things in common with the sociology of the motor park; especially the thuggery and violence that goes with it. The very language of politicians in Nigeria is one in common with those of thugs and touts. Due to the activities of touts, Nigerian voters experience a sense of compulsion and the whole democratic space becomes constricted. The language of electioneering campaigns and the slogans crafted to market candidates, all show some portrayal of motor park culture. If the language of electioneering campaign is thuggish, the campaign rallies and processions are boorish and violent. The processions are often disorderly and noisy like life in the motor park.

This theory will help Nigerian political science community to analyse and understand peculiar personality traits of their leaders and why we must not expect much from them. Perhaps, the new theory will provoke debates and move the discipline of political science to the next level. Before we continue, let us interrogate the relationship between the leadership question and democratic experience in Nigeria.

The Leadership Question and Democratic Experience in Nigeria - Literature Review

Nigeria's project is not working despite every effort. The country is at standstill. It is unfortunate we are still where we were more than 50 years after independence and have not been able to move away from where our colonial masters left us (Ango Abdullahi, Reported 12, February 2017).

The above lamentation from Ango Abdullahi - a former Vice chancellor of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and the Chairman of the Northern Elders Forum summarizes the frustration, anger and disappointment of most Nigerians about the failure of leadership in Nigeria. Within the period of about 59 years, Nigeria has witnessed six military regimes, one interim National Government, endless transition programmes and seven republics: The country has navigated from parliamentary democracy to our current democratic experiment.

At the time of the political handover in 1999, many Nigerians expressed hopes for a “democracy dividend” that would expand political liberties, improve the performance of government, encourage accountability among leaders and revive the ailing economy. Unfortunately, after waiting for about 20 years (1999-2019), the anticipated benefits of democracy have been slow to emerge. As Ogbonna (2012) noted, even though Nigeria has recorded a long breadth of democratization, the development imperative of democracy is not only thin, but the polity suffers from the potentialities of reversal. Analysts, commentators and average citizens have expressed deep concern about political violence, corruption, ineffective government, unresponsive leaders and economic deprivation. This has raised the question on whether Nigeria can survive another one hundred years as a united sovereign entity.

The frustration arising from poor governance has generated serious agitation for restructuring, fiscal federalism, resource control and threat of secession. These demands attained their apotheosis in 2015 when president Buhari took over the mantle of leadership in Nigeria. In fact, the demand for restructuring and secession has led to the emergence of new armed groups in Nigeria. A report by the crisis monitoring group puts Nigeria as the country with the highest number of armed dissident groups ahead of any other African nation (*Premium Times*, April 8, 2018).

This explains why Akintola Aguda (2002), a respected Jurist noted as follows; “one thing is certain; the present edifice called Nigeria as we know it today has nearly come to the end of its life. The cracks on the wall are too great for the edifice to continue to stand.” In 2006, the United States central intelligence Agency, (CIA) predicted that Nigeria would no longer be in existence by the end of 2015. According to them, Nigeria as a corporate entity was likely to disintegrate along tribes and sectarian lines by the year 2015, if some of the inherent fault lines were not properly managed and controlled. Even though Nigeria survived the 2015 general election, the quality of leadership has not improved. Infact it has worsened. Nigerians are indeed suffering. The controversy surrounding the results of the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria has reinforced the question “Can Nigeria survive?” To interrogate the above question, three schools of thought have emerged namely, the integrationist, disintegrationist and eclectic schools of thought.

The Disintegration School

This group is made up of radical intellectuals, ethnic war lords, violent militant groups and regional based politicians. There is consensus among members of this school of thought that Nigeria is an artificial creation and a historical accident. Their main argument is that the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria was a sort of forced marriage which was consummated without the consent or approval of the indigenous ethnic nationalities. They therefore argue that the current configuration of Nigeria makes leadership impossible. Thus, the only way forward is for Nigeria to disintegrate.

A leader of this school, Larry Diamond, in an article titled “Explaining democratic failures in Nigeria” (1986) noted that ethnic conflict, political culture, federalism and economic statism are to be blame for the failure of democracy in Nigeria. The author particularly fingered asymmetrical federal structure of Nigeria as the main culprit. According to him,

In virtually giving the North a unilateral mandate over the whole of Nigeria, this bizarre version of federalism destroyed genuine guarantees of inter-segmental equivalence and engendered an explosive contradiction between the North Political predominance and southern socio-economic predominance.

The main thesis of Larry Diamond is that the current structure of Nigerian State is not sustainable and a recipe for disaster. To be very candid, the Northern domination of the Nigerian state has generated the greatest controversy since the emergence of Nigerian state in 1960. It should be noted that this domination was extracted from the British government as a condition for accepting British authority. It is on record that Chief Anthony Enahoro was the first to move for Nigeria's independence in 1953. This resulted in a walk out of by Northern parliamentarians who were of view that Nigeria was not ready for independence. The walk out and the crisis it generated helped them to bargain with the British government for domination. Since then, Northern political predominance has become the rule. Today, Northern Nigeria has 19 states, out of 36, and 419 local government areas out of 774. The southern part on the other hand has 17 states and 357 local government areas. The implication is that every month, the 19 northern states receive a minimum of 57% of 100% revenue to which they contributed less than 5%. This has generated a lot of envy among other component parts of the Nigerian state.

Contributing to the debate, Wogu *et al* (2015) noted that Nigerian and western observers often blame inter-ethnic competition, known locally as tribalism for the instability and weakness of Nigeria democracy. On the contrary, according to him, Nigeria's constitutional democracy is weak because it is an imported ideology imposed on an artificial political unit. They noted that the territory known as Nigeria springs not from an African, but European logic from lines drawn on a map over 100 year ago at conference table in Berlin. Consequently, Nigerians have no common history and no communal symbols. The only thing they share consist of rigged elections and

violent political confrontation, largely as a result of regional rivalry. According to them, the government's redistribution of petroleum revenues according to constituent territorial units fosters this rivalry.

Supporting the views of Diamond, Wogu and others, Ogbonna (2012) noted that the British sole interest in putting Nigeria together was solely commercial. As Ayoade, (2010) has noted, this explains why Nigeria was amalgamated without integration. Ogbonna further noted that the holistic structural lop-sidedness that was foisted on Nigeria paved a fertile pathway for political rancour that soon graduated into incessant military interruptions of the political order.

Eyo (1986) in a discussion of what he considered to be the psychological bane of Nigerian politics, states that Nigeria as a political entity stand precariously on tripod which serves as the pillars on which distorted attitudes and perceptions are founded. These include (a) Ethnicity (b) religious intolerance and (c) personal greed for political power and wealth. He noted that Nigerian leaders have been infected by the social diseases of ethnicity, religious bigotry and inability to resist corruptive self-gratification. The enigma is how to insulate future Nigerian leaders from these diseases. The task according to him, is, to say the least, extremely difficult particularly because new leaders cannot be bred outside the existing socio-structural context. Through the natural processes of socialization, new leaders have to learn from what is operative in their socialization context.

Asadu (2014) seems to support the argument that it will be extremely difficult to breed new leaders who will be free from corruption because in the view of many Nigerians, a public office holder is a failure if he does not steal from national treasury to favour his primordial public interest, or his people while in office. As Babalola (2010) rightly noted, as long as we keep having followership that demands patronage, handout and favours, our search for true leadership will be long and winding. He queried: how can a society get a true leadership fix when the people celebrate failed leaders. A society where public officers who enriched themselves with pension funds (i.e. money of those who

have served the country with their productive years) and walk freely on the streets or use the stolen money to buy chieftaincy titles.

Apart from radical intellectuals, some world leaders have joined the demand for disintegration of Nigeria. In March 2010, the former Libyan strongman, Muammar Gaddafi joined the debate while commenting on the Jos pogrom. He called for splitting of Nigeria along religious lines in order to avert further bloodshed. The former United States of America Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell reiterated his earlier prediction that Nigeria would not exist beyond 2015. He made the first controversial prediction in 2011. According to him;

My view has not changed about the serious challenges Nigeria faces. I think the challenges are more pronounced than they were before. The Boko Haram insurrection began in the north. Political life is also unsettled by the approach of 2015 election. In spite of the predictions by the prophets of doom, the 2015 general election in Nigeria was one of the most successful elections and Nigeria has remained a non-divisible sovereign entity. This shows that American predictions are neither sacrosanct nor infallible. It is important to note that no section of this country has really desired to secede despite all pretences, not even the Odumegwu Ojukwu. If Ojukwu of the Biafra group really wanted to secede, he would not have accepted the Aburi Accord. He was forced to attempt secession because the Accord was not implemented, hence, the slogan on 'Aburi We Stand'.

The Niger Delta militants also use the threat of secession and militancy to attract the attention of government to the region. You will discover that each time they are settled; they relax and wait for another opportunity. Many of these groups are sponsored by politicians who want to attract attention of the government to their region. As soon as political power is achieved, the pressure from the dissident group dims.

The Integrationist School

Members of this school include past leaders and those who are benefiting from the status quo. This school shares the sentiments expressed by the disintegrationist school, particularly the widespread concern that something is fundamentally wrong with the configuration of the Nigerian state, not only in terms of political marginalization, but also in terms of socio-economic exclusion and enduring injustice in all spheres of life. In spite of these observations, the school argues that Nigeria has come to stay. According to them, within the 59 years of existence, Nigeria has survived six military regimes, 30 months civil war, Niger-Delta insurgents, Boko Haram Attacks, the historic June 12 crisis and cattle herdsman invasion, among others.

Accordingly, this school argues that only the most die-hard separatists can still talk about the mistakes of the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and southern Nigeria. To them, the Nigerian project has come to stay, for good or for ill. With their slogan of “on Nigeria, we stand”. They advised the disintegrationists to learn how to make Nigeria work, and co-exist with one another. It will be recalled that General Yakubu Gowon was the military Head of state between 1966 and 1975. Between 1967 and 1970, under his leadership, Nigeria fought 30 months civil war to keep the country one. At the end of the war, he declared “no victor, no vanquished”. Since then, Gowon has continuously maintained, "on one Nigeria We Stand."

Another prominent member of this school of thought is Chief Joseph Oke. In a public lecture delivered at Lagos state university titled “Can Nigeria survives another century as a corporate entity? He noted as follows; taking another look at our past, one must assume that we have survived the most critical periods of agitations for dissolution of the federation. The federating units must however be encouraged and empowered to remain within the union through sound policies that will lift individual and collective aspirations (Oke, 2017). He further noted that there is strength in our diversity and what God

has joined together, no man should put asunder". As far as this school of thought is concerned, the political future of Nigeria as one indivisible nation has been resolved with the end of the civil war. The question is, if it the issue has been so resolved, why are people still demanding for restructuring of Nigeria?

The Eclectic School

The eclectic school, mostly populated by the nationalists is of view that, even though there are threats to national unity, these threats cannot lead to disintegration if there are properly managed. The school appreciated the positions of the disintegrationist and integrationist schools of thought, but argues that the unity of the country cannot be taken for granted. Consequently, the school argues that the resolution to the national question should be based on reason, dialogue, negotiations and conferences. Chief Oke summarized the view of this school when he noted as follows;

In summary, what I have said, and what I am still saying is that Nigeria has a potential to be a great country. The union can continue for the next 100 years, or on the other hand, it can disintegrate within the next few years. It all depends on us all as a people to find the right answers and introduce the right policies that will guarantee even and sustainable development.

Predictably, the Nigeria State seem to have accepted the prescriptions of the eclectic school. This explains why numerous constitutional conferences have seen convoked as a platform for conflict resolution.

Under President Jonathan, the 2014 constitutional conference was inaugurated with 496 members. Incidentally, Jonathan failed to implement the recommendations of the conference. Today, Nigerians are still demanding the

implementation of the 2014 constitutional confab. It is important to note that in spite of the Full or partial implementation of the various recommendations of National Constitutional Conferences, Nigeria's problems have multiplied. This shows that even if we implement the 2014 Constitutional Conference Recommendations, we will still harvest leadership problems. The questions; what is wrong with Nigeria? What is the missing link?

The missing link is that Nigerians have neglected the "the Human element" in the whole analysis. Institutions do not run themselves. They are run by human beings. This explains why the problem that have dogged Nigeria's elections over the years remained more or less constant despite numerous Constitutional and Political Conferences attended by ethnic Nationalities. These are problems steeped in personal indiscipline and inordinate ambition. It is anchored in individual tendencies and behaviours that are substantially at variance with the norms and values that obtain in a healthy democracy. In fact, every other problem of Nigerian State, including the inconclusive elections derive either substantially or tangentially from there.

Our main point of departure therefore, is that Nigerian leaders-whether military or civilian are the same. They harbour abnormal personality traits which compel them to behave the way they do. The predominant political behaviour in Nigeria does not have value or regards for the rule of law, dignity of labour, the sacredness of human lives, and respect of Constituted authority. They act with impunity, intimidate the people, loot treasury and still behave as if everything is normal. They are touts, I mean political touts. The question is how did they emerge in Nigeria's political space? Is the nature-nature controversy implicated in the emergence of political touts in Nigeria? Our next section will x-ray this phenomenon.

Nature-nurture controversy: Explaining how the Nigerian environment breeds touts

An American based consultant on matters of leadership, management, and psychology, Dr. Ozodi Osuji recently raised alarm that many Nigerians have antisocial personality disorder. According to him, the typical Nigerian personality, at least observantly, suffers from impoverished moral sense of conscience, broadly enjoys not conforming to social norms with respect to lawful behaviour, love conning others for personal return or pleasure, recklessly disregard the suffering of others, especially nonfamily members, consistently and repeatedly have no remorse for hurting anyone and buys into mistreating everyone through acts of venality and deceitfulness.

The Nigerian style of personality appears to feature heavily among the unreliable statistics of 170 million people, marked with unhealthy greed, and the need to protect one's status quo at all cost. In fact, the Nigerian style of personality appears formed within, between and around religious violence, health concerns, devastating poverty, ailing institutions, and death – designed roads; yet this style of personality appears happy both in the mood and spirit (John Oshodi, 2019). The above characterization summarizes the political behaviour of Nigerians. The central question is, how did Nigerians acquire these abnormal psychological traits? Is it through nature or nurture? To answer the above questions, we shall anchor the analysis on *Nature-Nurture Controversy*. Mcleod (2018) observed that the nature versus nurture debate involves the extent to which particular aspect of behaviour are product of either inherited (i.e genetic) or acquired (i.e. learned) influences. Essentially, nature refers to all the genes and hereditary factors that influence who we are – from our physical appearance to our personality characteristics. On the other hand, nurture refers to all the environmental variables that impact who we are, including our early childhood experiences, how we were raised, our social relationships, and our surrounding culture.

Our basic problem here is to ascertain how Nigerian leaders acquired their abnormal traits. Are these traits products of nature or nurture? The nature-nurture debates is concerned with the relative contribution that both influences make to human behaviour, such as personality, cognitive traits,

temperament and psychopathology. Those who adopt an extreme hereditary position are known as nativists. Their basic assumption is that the characteristics of the human species as a whole are a product of evolution and that individual differences are due to each person's unique genetic code.

At the other end of the spectrum are the environmentalists – also known as empiricists. Their basic assumption is that at birth, the human mind is tabula rasa (a blank slate) and that this is gradually filled as a result of experience. In practice, hardly anyone today accepts either of the extreme positions. Consequently, instead of asking whether psychological traits are influenced by nature or nurture, the question has been reformulated as “how much”. One thing is for sure, Nigerian environment, with its uncertainties and injustices, lax rules, inability to punish or to hold anyone accountable for their actions, has produced overtime, generations of individuals with psychopathic tendencies. Both leaders and the citizens exhibit anti-social behavioural tendencies which curiously have become proven to guaranty success in Nigeria. The true position is that if one is devoid of empathy, if one is ruthless to the point of madness, violent and altogether unstable, one is ironically more likely to achieve success in a country where rationality, truth and facts no longer hold the promise of a better life. Nigerians have been trained to evolve negative trait as a survival strategy in a society that clearly rewards all manner of corruption. we have also been trained to look down on ‘gentlemen’, I mean those Nigerians who dress properly, speak the truth, obey the law, work for their money and condemn atrocities. We call them dreamers, the worst set of fools, and lazy. This group is yet to find its champion, one who will fight for them not in words but in deeds by bringing to book those whose actions have brought shame and agony.

It is important to root this abnormal behaviour in our colonial past. From available historical facts, the British government tolerated and did nothing to prosecute or punish in anyway those found wanting in character while occupying public offices. Today we hear much of rampant corruption at all levels of government. It has a long history in Nigeria, even before our

independence in 1960. It started in 1956 when the Foster-Sulton tribunal investigated the premier of Eastern Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe for his involvement in the affairs of African continental bank (ACB). Under the code of conduct for ministers a government official was required to relinquish his holdings in private business when he assumed public office. The Foster-Sulton tribunal found Zik guilty for not severing his connections to the ACB when he became a minister. The tribunal believed Zik continued to use his influence to secure loan from ACB while he was a minister contrary to the code conduct. This action led to the collapse of ACB.

In spite of his indictment, the colonial government failed to punish him or ban him from participation in politics. That was the origin of impunity in Nigeria. When Zik called for a general election in 1957 as alternative to resigning in the face of Foster-Sulton tribunal verdict, the people gave him their votes. The colonial correspondence revealed that the government supported the NCNC as the only party to embrace National Unity and without Zik, the NCNC would collapse, thus, the National Interest of the colonial government demanded that Zik continue as the leader of the party despite grievous allegation of corruption. This case made Zik of Africa the first politician to be found guilty of corruption in Nigeria. In the words of colonial official; “the Africa background and outlook on public morality is very different from the present-day Britain. The African in public service seeks to further his own financial interest.” From the analysis so far, our colonial experience coupled with long history of military rule made Nigeria a breeding ground for corruption, impunity, and other abnormal behaviours. In Britain, responsible government began with the emergence of people who entered government after they had amassed substantial wealth in their businesses or chosen profession. They joined government not to increase their fortune, but to serve. Incidentally from the beginning, those who occupy our political space are sons and daughters of civil servants or petty traders. They see government offices as a means of production and loot without mercy.

Apart from Nnamdi Azikiwe, another good example of chief tout who laid the foundation of corruption in Nigeria was Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the first premier of Western region. He was found guilty of corruption by the Coker Commission in 1962. The Coker commission found Awolowo guilty for all the ills of the Western Region marketing Board. Awolowo like Azikiwe looted the funds of the Marketing Board and failed to adhere to the standards of conduct which are required for persons holding such a post. Despite his indictment, nothing happened.

The first Republic with Nnamdi Azikiwe as president was also marked by widespread corruption. Government officials under his watch looted public funds with impunity. A good example was the then representative and minister of Aviation Chief K. O Mbadiwe who flaunted his wealth by building a palace in his home town. When he was asked to explain the source of his wealth, he replied "from sources known and unknown". The then minister of finance, Chief Okotie Eboh also looted, while responding to charges of accumulation of wealth, he quoted from the bible as follows "to those that have, more should be given, from those that do not have, shall be taken even the little they have". The point to note here is that despite the obvious acts of corruption, nothing was done to punish these key government officials.

The military coup of January 1966 was presumably a direct response of the corruption of the First Republic. In spite of the brutality of the killings of the First Republic politicians, there was widespread jubilation in the country for the coup. The assassination of the minister of the finance, chief Okotie Eboh who was notorious for flaunting his ill-gotten wealth, Premier of the Western Region Samuel Akintola popularly known as "Mr Rigging" and Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, the premier of Northern Nigeria, whose wardrobe was the most elaborate in their time, were applauded. In fact, the zeal to punish the wrong doers of the First Republic died with the Gowon coup of July, 1966. The politicians in detention were released. Corruption became the norm and standard of behaviour. Youths knew no other life than corruption. It was not considered an offence if one could steal and share the

loot with those in right places. However, the coup of 1975 was another attempt to end corruption in Nigeria. Murtala Mohammed began by declaring his assets and requested all other government officials to follow his example. The Murtala's administration instituted a series of probes of past leaders. The Federal assets investigation panel of 1975 found ten out of the twelve state governors guilty of corruption. It is important to note that all over the world, former presidents who have been found guilty of corruption are being prosecuted, then sentenced to jail. In most cases, they are forced to refund whatever they illegally acquired. Only in Nigeria are sacred cows allowed to enjoy their loot with the support of the masses who eagerly expect their own share.

Apart from the environmental variables that have dominated this study, the impact of nature on the production of touts in Nigeria cannot be over emphasized. While the politicians of the early 1960s and seventies learnt their behaviour from the environment, their children and descendants acquired the traits through hereditary. Some philosophers such as Plato and Descartes are in agreement that certain things are inborn, or that they occur naturally regardless of environmental influences. Nativists take the position that all or most behaviour and characteristics are the result of inheritance.

Advocates of this point of view believe that all our characteristics and behaviour are the result of evolution. Genetic traits handed down from parents influence the individual differences that make each person unique. As John Oshodi (2019) has noted, the Nigerian style of personality appeared formed early in children by parents who show a display of morally and socially damaged behaviour openly or misleadingly. According to him, the Nigerian style of personality, like most personality styles are difficult to change resulting in such acts like dishonesty, manipulation, exploitation and abusiveness which remain seductively charming and admired at all times.

Essentially, the Nigerian personality or traits of touts are in born and in DNA of average Nigerian. Certainly, there are no known mediations or psychotherapies that exists that can alleviate these traits. The true position is

that if you have these traits in your DNA, it will manifest anywhere you go. This explains why Nigerians are singled out for attacks anywhere they go due harshness, wickedness and suffering in their country Nigeria. It is on record that those Nigerians who travelled to South Africa are facing Xenophobic attacks on daily basis. Those who travelled to Ghana have been asked to go. Nigerians in the United States of America are not finding it funny and those at home are killing and kidnapping themselves. However, if the trait is not in your DNA, it is possible for you to behave differently outside Nigeria. Nigerians tend to fear and respect touts. Thus, in Nigeria today, if you behave like a gentleman, people will molest, rob and attack you for no reason. You need to be a tout to survive here, or gain political position. The central question is, are there species of touts? If yes what are there? The next section of the study will analyze the species of touts in Nigeria.

Species of touts in Nigeria

The Nigerian environment breeds two kinds of individuals namely, touts and non-touts. The non-touts are those that do not possess the traits of touts. They are usually referred to as 'gentlemen'. Non-touts are polite, courteous, well-dressed, well-spoken, non-violent and scholarly men. They speak with passion and will only resort to violence when it is the final option. Incidentally, this breed of Nigerians is dying, despite every effort by the Nigerian institutions of higher learning and churches to keep the specie. In Nigeria, they are mostly despised. Most of them are docile, easily contented people who have been brow-beaten by decades of missed opportunities, lies and political manipulations. This group of people has been brutally excluded from politics and administration. In political sphere, they are considered

objects, rather than subjects of politics. Their opinions, ideas and suggestions are never sought on the crucial issues of who gets what, how and when.

This group of people never participates in the formation of political parties, even when they attempt, they are rooted out. They have been crushed, degraded, drenched, blinded and divided by the poor of money. Nigerian society has nothing for them, but contempt. They have been continuously excluded from politics because of the assumption that they are incapable of snatching ballot boxes or intimidating the voters. Even when they vote, their votes do not count. This explains why voter apathy is huge in Nigeria. To lure them, the political touts have resorted to vote buying. Vote buying occurs when a political party or candidate seeks to buy the vote in an upcoming election. Vote buying can take various forms such as monetary exchange, as well as an exchange for necessary goods and services.

A brazen act of vote buying in Nigeria was reported during the 2018 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State. Voters have accused political parties of offering up to 5,000 Naira to those who had permanent voter cards to secure their votes. This demonstrates how the political rights of the non-touts have been commodified and monetized. The touts on the other hand have four main species, namely; tout-touts, corporate touts, chief touts and supreme touts.

Tout-touts

As explained earlier, a tout is known by his behaviour. Unlike other species of touts, tout-touts are the most fearless, most ruthless and most shameless. They are mostly crude, rude and desperate group of people who are ready to fight for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all. To operate as a successful tout, you must be notorious for your exploits in banditry, savagery and extreme wickedness. These social dregs boast of how many times they have been in and out of prisons. In the motor park, touts are kings, they forcefully collect taxes, half of which goes into their private pockets. Agbiboa (2018) has

revealed that you must be feared in your area/street to stand a chance of being counted by the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). This group of miscreants constitutes voting block and potential source of violence for desperate politicians. This explains why the motor park has fascinated me as a social laboratory of the urban milieu. In the park, one often wonders who is mad and who is sane. Everybody experiences his obligatory daily moments of madness.

In Nigeria today, whoever controls the motor park, controls politics in that town. The relationship between the National Union of Road Transport Workers and most state governments are well known. In Lagos State for example, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the ruling party, All Progressive Congress (APC) have been engaged in endless struggle to control the motor parks. Tout-touts can also be recruited from the army of unemployed school leavers, area boys and vigilante organisations. Their basic motive is survival. In Nigeria today, anybody can do anything to survive.

Corporate touts

A corporate tout is known by his unique way of dressing. He can ordinarily pass as a gentleman due to his high level of education and corporate attires. However, whenever you relate with him, all the traits of touts manifest. This group of Nigerians dominates Nigeria's political space. They recruit the tout-touts as foot soldiers. They dominated the 79 presidential candidates in the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria. They are found in large number among the 1803 candidates who contested to fill the 109 senate seats. They are among the 4,848 candidates who vied to fill the 360 house seats. The corporate touts recruit their members from Nigerian Universities and polytechnics, mostly cult members and social deviants.

A good example of a corporate tout in current dispensation is Dino Melaye, a senator and member of the 8th National Assembly representing Kogi

West Senatorial District. His drama of jumping out of a moving bus conveying him for trial in Lokoja is well known. His numerous arrests and his ability to manoeuvre the Nigerian police is legendary. The true position is that unless you belong to this category of Nigerians you will not contest and win any election. You can never be a vice chancellor of any federal or state University in Nigeria, unless you have a godfather, your academic contributions notwithstanding. Most of the corporate touts are ministers, Governors, vice-chancellors, and General-Overseers of most Pentecostal churches in Nigeria. To belong to this group, you must be highly educated and exhibit abnormal psychological traits.

Chief Touts

The most important specie in the tout family is the Chief Tout. First, they have financial muscle and access to political power. These wealthy individuals, usually hijack the political machinery in a state by wooing the operators with money in order to achieve their objectives of planting a puppet that would do their bidding. By virtue of their immense wealth or political goodwill, the chief tout can determine not only the persons that are nominated by their political parties to contest election, but in most cases also guarantee the victory of such candidates. The guarantee may come in the form of the purchase of votes or outright intimidation of voters if the need arises. This explains why most politicians will do anything to gain the support and favour of the chief tout. The true position is if a chief tout is with you in politics, nobody can be against you. Whoever he blesses is blessed, and whoever he opposes cannot make it.

The second and most important indicator of a chief tout is that he must be a conflict entrepreneur. A conflict entrepreneur refers to a group or individuals who promote conflict for profit, or political relevance. Every violent conflict has its beneficiary. These beneficiaries are chief touts who hide behind the iron mask to stoke the fire of violence for political gains. These are the “war lords” whose selfish interest must be satiated irrespective of whose ox is gored. Most chief touts have their ‘private armies’ they use to

make their area of domain ungovernable if they fail to achieve their goal. They can also be used to intimidate opponents and voters when the need arises. They also protect their principals during campaigns and other political activities.

Interestingly, the activities of chief touts in Nigerian politics did not start today. It started in the first Republic when Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, chief Obafemi Awolowo and Alhaji Tafawa Balewa wielded enormous influence within their domain. Through their political parties, they were able to determine who gets what, where and how. The chief touts of old were mostly interested in bringing developments and dividends of democracy to their regions. Consequently, in choosing or selecting protégés, they were not motivated solely by material gains such as bags full of foreign currency or award of contracts. However, since the return to civil rule in 1999, Nigerian political space has been plagued by the overbearing presence and influence of chief touts. Most politicians see them as the most convenient means of winning elections. In other spheres of life, particularly in business world, such a process which is tantamount to offering a protégée a ladder to climb to the top of the business empire could pass off as help rendered by a mentor to mentee.

In Nigeria's political environment, the initiative of planting in office of a surrogate with no political weight, as president or governor is an egregious way of perpetuating self in office by a political gadfly after constitutionally allowed tenure is over. Numerous examples abound of politicians who have successfully handed over the functions of their offices to their political benefactors with the effect that most political office holders are hamstrung in the performance of their duties. They must defer to their political godfathers for matters such as appointment of commissioners, appointment into the board of statutory corporations and other key offices.

A good example of a chief tout in Anambra state was Chris Uba. Chris Uba was a wealthy member of the powerful Uba political family and a member of the PDP Board of trustees. Chris Uba was at the apex of his power

during the 2003 elections when he ‘sponsored’ PDP candidates and rigged their election to offices across Anambra. After that election, he publicly declared himself ‘the greatest godfather in Nigeria nothing that “this is the first time an individual single-handedly put in position every politician in the state’. Among the politicians Chris Uba “sponsored” was PDP gubernatorial candidate, Chief Chris Ngige. The terms of their relationship, were spelt out in a remarkably explicit fashion in a written “contract “and declaration of loyalty. Ngige promised in writing to “exercise and manifest absolute loyalty to the person of Chief Chris Uba as my mentor, benefactor and sponsor”, and agreed to allow Chris Uba control over all important government appointments and the awarding of all government contracts. Later on, conflict erupted between the Godfather and God-son.

In an interview conducted by Human Rights watch, Ngige did not deny that Chris Uba rigged his election, but claimed that he tried to break away from Uba’s control immediately after 2003 election. This was not an easy task. Ngige confessed that from the moment he assumed office, Uba was continually making personal demands on him. Ngige also noted that shortly before his inauguration, armed men broke into his home and forced him at gun point, to sign a pledge that he would pay Chris Uba the sum of 3 billion Naira (\$23 million), immediately after assuming office.

Relationship between Ngige and Uba deteriorated rapidly. In July 2003 Governor Ngige was kidnapped by armed police men and forced at gun point to sign letter of resignation. Ngige successfully petitioned to have his resignation thrown out by the Federal court and remained in his office. However, he quickly found himself under siege. In 2004, thugs armed with fire arms and crude explosives attacked Government House in Awka and burned part of it to the ground while the policemen stood aside and watched. Other gangs then staged several attacks on other government buildings throughout the state and as many as 24 people were killed during the crisis. Chris Uba was neither arrested nor questioned. The drama continued until the governor was removed from office.

From the analysis so far, it is clear that Chief touts are not mere financiers of political campaigns. Rather, they are individuals whose power stems not just from wealth, but their ability to deploy violence and corruption to manipulate national, state or local government systems in support of the politicians they sponsor. In return, they demand substantial degree of control over the governments they help bring into being-not in order to shape government policy, but to extract direct financial returns. Chief touts also require their sponsored politicians to use government institutions to generate patronage for other protégés. In fact, public officials who owe their positions to the effort of a political godfather incur a debt that they are expected to repay without end throughout their tenure in office.

Supreme touts or generalissimo

The supreme tout is the highest-ranking specie in the tout family. Unlike the chief touts that have territorial control over local governments, states or region, a supreme tout has territorial control over the Nigerian state as a whole. The most distinguishing character of a supreme tout is that all the chief touts bow before him. Due to his absolute control of the chief touts in the various geo-political zones in Nigeria, he determines who becomes president of Nigeria and when he should be removed. The supreme tout enjoys absolute immunity and act with impunity. Nobody can arrest him, even when he commits criminal offences. Supreme touts have the ability to mobilize the international community for or against any candidate who aspires to be president of Nigeria and when such candidate emerges, he takes control. A supreme tout, or generalissimo can easily change public opinion by instigating conflicts. Every Head of state must bow before him for peace to reign. It will be recalled that during the 2015 presidential election Obasanjo massively campaigned and ensured the victory of President Mohammed Buhari.

Recently, Obasanjo declared himself as the “watchman of Nigeria politics” Since 1999, Obasanjo has played a major role in the emergence and

removal of presidents of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He was the key player in the removal of Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and the emergence of President Buhari among others. Incidentally, as soon as Buhari emerged, the president declared that he belongs to “everybody, and nobody” thereby refusing to take orders from the supreme tout. This explains the current face-off between the two retired army generals. Let us analyse the role of political touts in democratic experiment in Nigeria.

Democracy or Toutocracy: Touts and Politics in Nigeria

Democracy has gathered momentum across the globe as a result of its immense advantages and by implication, because of negative consequences of bad governance. Nigeria is not an exception, because no state can operate in isolation. Unfortunately, our history reveals an epileptic attempt at democracy with tragic consequences. Nigeria returned to civil rule in May 1999 after three decades of military rule, interrupted only by 1979-83 Second Republic. Since 1999, the country has held five general elections. In spite of all efforts, the quality of leadership has declined considerably to the point where the April 2007 elections that brought President Umaru Yar'Adua to power were described by the international observers as “failed and discredited”. Contrary to popular participation, democracy in Nigeria means the ability of few touts to effectively take control of the power and authority of governance with or without the votes of those they represent. This raises the question, are we really practising democracy or toutocracy.

The true position is that, if you remove credible election, popular participation and obedience to rule of law, you have “toutocracy”. Toutocracy is the government of touts, by the touts and for the touts. When an individual exists, as is still found in Nigerians today, who single-handedly picks all the candidates for a political party in all elections, the views and preferences of majority of the party members notwithstanding, the meaning of toutocracy becomes apparent. In toutocracy, elections must be won at all cost. Every weapon-money, influence, intimidation, blackmail, media assault, false news and physical violence exist to be deployed to ensure victory of the chief tout.

who controls the area. Everything is done to ensure that chief tout is not “disgraced” in any election within his domain. Not surprisingly, every election result that did not favour him must be challenged to the highest available court in the land. It has to be so considering that a “big man” is not expected to lose election. Not with all his money, influence and power. More often than not, popularity and ability to persuade the electorate is not considered a crucial ingredient necessary for a chief tout and his anointed candidate to win. Infact, the only election in Nigeria that ended without its result being challenged was the 1959 federal election which preceded independence in 1960. That election was directly supervised by the Britain (then) the colonial power.

Another characteristic of toutocracy is culture of impunity. When people can act without fear of punishment, they frequently act in ways that are exceptionally brutal and such act oppresses freedom within the state. As Francis Ekanem,(2012) has noted, the resultant consequences of people acting without fear of being punished has made impunity a norm or culture which has produced such strange bed fellows as torture, arson, murder, embezzlement, assassination, corruption, greed, thuggery and rigging of elections.

The happening in Nigeria of late suggests that they are some people that are above the law. They can do anything in Nigeria, no matter how horrible, once you have a chief tout behind you, nothing will happen. This explains why about seventy-two people were killed and buried one day in mass grave in Benue state, yet nobody has been arrested. No day passes in Nigeria without bad news of killings, kidnapping and invasion of communities by miscreants. You can be harassed, raped, attacked, killed and robbed, yet nothing will happen. If you report to the Nigerian police, they will request for money before they can do their job. Consequently, Nigeria is currently in a Hobbesian state of nature, where life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. The truth is that any system built on the canons of self-interest is an invitation to chaos and anarchy. Nigeria has reached the end of the road. The analysis so far explains why every election since 1999, has been trailed by one controversy or the other. In reality, the process has been far from being fair

and has been characterized by rigging, ballot snatching and stuffing, brigandage and all manner of violence.

Some scholars have blamed the abnormal behaviours of Nigerians on prolonged military rule; which displaced most of the extant values and mindset of Nigerians. This is farther from the truth. As I explained earlier, the activities of corporate touts were observed before the first military coup in 1966. It is on record that Ladoke Akintola, the former premier of western region mobilized touts to stop his removal as the premier of western region. Akintola's supporters in the parliament started a riot in the chambers of the parliament. Chairs were thrown and one member grabbed the parliamentary mace and wielded it as a weapon to attack the speaker and other members. Eventually, the police with teargas moved in to quell the riot. Akintola survived the impeachment. In subsequent attempts to reconvene the western parliament, similar disturbances broke out. The unrest continued in the west and contributed to the Western region's reputation for violence, anarchy and election rigging.

It is possible that other chief touts like Wike, the governor of Rivers state must have learnt the art of mobilizing touts to invade the state legislative chambers from Akintola. Akintola did it, nothing happened. Nigeria is anchored on survival of the fittest. From the analysis so far, it is clear that democracy failed to flourish in Nigeria due to the quality of its operators. The same operators also failed to manage the first republic which was anchored on parliamentary system. They equally failed to make positive use of three decades of military rule and Interim National Government. Until the quality of our leaders change, nothing can change in Nigeria. This analysis exposes the fallacy in the argument, that the problem of Nigeria is ethnicity. Nigerians can live in peace only if the chief touts in each region will not instigate conflict. Nigeria is not the only country in the world with so many ethnic groups. Rwanda had the same explanation, but today the story has changed. Ghana had the same challenge, but, today, Ghana is on the move. Nigerian scholars

should stop fanning the embers of ethnicity and religion in their desperate attempt to publish.

Motion without Movement: How the Governing tout circulates in Nigeria

Whereas under the administration of Obasanjo, there was a lot of motion without movement, now there is no motion, there is no movement. The ship of the state has dropped its anchor and the helmsman has gone under the deck to hibernate (Lai Mohammed, cited in Onuoha, 2008).

As the oath of allegiance was being administered on President Mohamadu Buhari and 29 state governors on May 29, 2019, pertinent questions hit the public arena, first, will this dispensation drive prosperity, more importantly, will these set of elected representatives learn from the past and work for common good? Nigerians have very good reason to worry. Twenty years of uninterrupted democratic experience has not changed anything at all. The Nigerian state is not only trapped in compound complexity, but portrays an image of audacity of hopelessness.

The true position is that nothing about Nigeria will ever change for the better as long as the quality of leadership remains the way it is. Two categories of political touts have dominated Nigeria's political space since 1960. The first is the "**conservative touts**" and the other is the "**revolutionary touts**". The circulation of these brands of leaders has made development impossible; paralysed war against corruption, made the war against poverty unattainable and turned our democracy to toutocracy. Before we interrogate the circulation of touts, it is apropos to differentiate between the two typologies of touts. One distinguishing characteristics of the conservative touts is that they do not generally see corruption as evil, as long as the money circulates. They generally believe in "chop and let me chop". They are driven by their self-

interest and most of their programmes in government are not pro-poor. The suffering of the masses makes no meaning to them. The dominance of this group in Nigerian politics is the reason why corruption has become a culture. In the view of many Nigerians today, a public office holder is a failure if he does not steal from the nation treasury to favour his primordial public interest, or his people while in office. As Babalola (2010) rightly espoused, as long as we keep having followership that demands patronage, handouts and favours, our search for true leadership will be long and winding. Since they are not interested in production, they run corruption induced economy that creates false sense of economic boom. Money circulates in the economy through chop and let me chop. It does not matter whether you are employed or not, you will somehow find money to spend.

Due to their democratization of corruption, conservative touts have little or no interest to fight the menace. Consequently, anti – craft agencies merely exist as a platform to intimidate and humiliate political opponents rather than catching criminals. This category of leaders, have little or no regards for education. The less educated you are, the better. This explains why highly educated Nigerians have been excluded from politics. Even though school certificate is the minimum requirement for participation in politics, many of them have not been able to present it. A recent study has revealed that eight of the ten Heads of state/Heads of government in the period between January 1966 and May 1999 were military officers without the knowledge, ideas, insights, orientation and perceptions needed to manage government or society as a whole. The second category of governing touts is the Revolutionary Touts. Revolutionary touts have zero tolerance for corruption. This group of leaders will not "chop" and will not allow you to "chop". To them corruption is evil and the root cause of underdevelopment. This group of governing touts usually set example in their own behaviour for their followers to imitate. They abhor luxurious life style and encourage other to do so.

More importantly, revolutionary touts usually pursue pro-poor policies in government. They aspire to have a major sudden impact on society or some

of aspect of human behaviour. In most cases, they attempt to change the mindset of the people. In fact, revolutionary touts are prone to radical change, which may or may not be beneficial to them as individuals. Just like the conservative touts, revolutionary touts revere impunity and have little or no regards for education. To them, the rule of law is a mere declaration that must not be followed. This category of governing touts usually does not last long in power, because most of their actions often threaten the status-quo. In fact, since 1960, Nigeria has only succeeded in producing two revolutionary touts.

Incidentally, part of the reason why Nigeria is not moving forward despite all efforts can be attributed to the circulation of these two categories of governing touts. From all indications, Nigeria has reached cul-de-sac. Nigeria started its journey after independence with two conservative touts, namely Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as governor-General and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as prime minister. Consequently, they handed power to other conservative touts such as Aguiyi Ironsi, 1966, Yakubu Gowon, 1960-1975. Between 1975 and 1976, Murtala Mohammed, a revolutionary tout reigned supreme. Due to his radical change in the polity, his regime, was cut short. The conservative touts recaptured power during Olusegun Obasanjo regime, 1976-1979. He handed over to his godson, Shehu Shagari – a conservative tout; 1979-1983. Between 1983-1985, the revolutionary touts took over power during Mohammed Buhari regime. He made radical changes and stepped on sensitive toes of the conservative touts. Consequently, his regime was cut short by Ibrahim Bangida, administration 1985-1993, a conservative tout. Between 1993 and 2015, the conservative touts blocked the revolutionary touts out of power. For instance, Ernest Shonekan, 1993-1994, handed over to Sani Abacha, 1994-1998. Abacha handed over to Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1998-1999. Other conservative touts that have dominated Nigeria's political space include Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999-2007, Musa Yar'Adua, 2007-2010, and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, 2010-2015. In fact, in 2015, Muhammadu Buhari presented himself again after he had been blocked by conservative touts three times. Incidentally, he won thereby returning to power revolutionary touts once again. The battle between conservative and revolutionary touts attained its

apogee during the 2019 presidential election. All the conservative touts in Buhari's administration resigned and joined People's Democratic Party. At the end of election, Buhari was declared re-elected. The conservative touts refused to accept the result and it became a matter for the courts to decide.

In all these capture and recapture of state power by the governing touts, the non-touts have been subdued. Governing touts are able to control and manipulate the non-touts by resorting to violence, intimidation and brutality. Unlike Europe or America who recruit people of high intellectual ability, integrity and character into political power, Nigeria has no room for intellectuals with character. You must be able to carry ballot boxes and escape into the bush before you are given political appointment. There is no room for a gentleman in Nigerian politics. In advanced countries, not only do they allow their graduates to feature in governance, but they equally front their best brains to take charge of the state affairs. The United States of America, for instance, ensured that from the war of Independence, through its early Statehood to the present day, its leaders have been selected from among the best educated. In the words of Professor Ben Nwabueze;

The America revolutionary leaders have been described as civic-minded philosopher statesmen, an extra ordinary galaxy of men of good character, good education, integrity, honesty and sincerity, with deep concern for the public good and scorn for self-enrichment. They were able to implant in American society an enlightened ethic, ethos and values through the brilliance of their thought, the creativity of their politics, and their extraordinary ability to combine ideas and power, intellectualism and politics without getting alienated from the people and without becoming obsessed with votes.

In contrast to the intellectualism and high educational qualification of the American founding fathers, which enabled them to provide the kind of

leadership the country needed to create a new society in place of the old colonial society, the leadership in charge of the management of the affairs at the federal level in Nigeria is characterized by intellectual poverty, lack of vision, poor exposure to civic culture and educational inadequacy. The true position is that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with our democratic experiment. However, everything is wrong with the operators.

The abnormal psychological traits of our leaders explain the wanton disregard for constitutional and legal provisions by public office holders, a culture of bureaucratic and criminal impunity and abuse of office, high incidence of violent crimes, insurgency and terrorism. Today, various criminal gangs are carving out spheres of influence in some parts of the country. More importantly, their political behaviour explains the deeply entrenched crippling corruption and treasury looting, dismal failure of numerous empowerment and poverty reduction programmes, abject poverty and malnourishment, decaying infrastructure and the prevalence of the so-called resource curse. The central question is what is the way forward? The true position is that as long as the conservative and revolutionary touts continue to circulate in our political space, Nigeria can never move forward. We will continue to witness motion without movement.

To move the country forward, I paint two scenarios. The worst-case scenario is to allow the two social forces – the conservative and revolutionary touts to fight to finish. Until one group swallows the other, Nigeria cannot move forward. The current revolutionary touts in government are threatening to deal with their opponents. It may even take the form of military coup, or palace coup or revolution. The best-case scenario is that Nigerian intellectuals should mobilize the civil society organizations and the non-touts to mount pressure for leadership change in Nigeria by showing the contending social forces “red card”. The red card group led by intellectuals remains the only option to rescue the Nigeria state from the grips of the contending social forces. Nigerian intellectuals have abandoned activism to touts. It is time for the intellectuals to show the way, so that the masses will follow. The

intellectual are capable of making Nigeria ungovernable through mass mobilization and political education. It is only when philosophers become kings that the Nigerian State can move forward.

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FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: INTERROGATING THE SHIFTS IN GLOBAL POWER STRUCTURE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURYS' WORLD ORDER

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Abstract

Ever since the emergence of state as primary actor in the international system, the quests for primacy in global distribution of powers have been one of the most salient features of successive world order. Thus, the global system has undergone significant transformations from one form imperium to the other. At the dawn of the 21st century, significant developments around the world have provoked scholars of International Relations (IR) to posit that there is a transfiguration in global power structure from the post-Cold War unipolar movement to multipolar system of hegemony. This paper examined these developments, specifically the extent to which the rise and growing influence of countries such as China, Japan, Germany, India, United Kingdom, France and Russia have shaped the international system in the 21st century. The study adopted the descriptive research approach and assembled data from documentary evidence. Building upon the realist paradigm, the study argues that the current international system is no longer dominated by a single state – the United States, instead, it is controlled by dozens of states in possession of various capabilities. Though multipolar world order has been criticized to be more unstable and unpredictable, the rebirth multipolarity in the 21st century would ensure greater stability in the international system and serves as a vehicle for sustainable development and durable peace.

Keywords: Unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, international system, 21st century.

Introduction

Over the centuries, international system has experienced tremendous transformation in terms of its structure, configuration, inclusiveness and exclusiveness as well as basic characteristics. Structurally, international system has always been connected with the role and positions of great powers

relevant at a time (Levy, 1983; Kennedy, 1987; Harrison, 1998; Zinbo, 2006; Black, 2008; Freeman & Macau, 2017). This however, depends on the various ways in which power is distributed within the system – an idea known as ‘polarity’ (Jackson, 1978; Brecher, James & Wilkenfeld, 1990; Dickson, 2011). Thus, an international political world order is defined in terms of the polarity set-up. Although the concept of polarity has been subject to imprecise and often diverse use, it has been traced to denote “the degree to which the global system revolves around one or more extremely powerful states or ‘poles’ as power concentrates in a single (unipolar) centre of power or is distributed between two (bipolar) main power or among three or more (multipolar) system of hegemony” (Kegley, 2007, p. 250). Consequently, the international system has been characterized by dynamics and complexities in states’ relations and distribution of capabilities as manifested during the First World War (1914-1918); the Second World War (1939-1945); the Cold War era (1945-1989); as well as the post-Cold War era (Kennedy, 1984; Harrison, 1998; Yazid, 2014; Chilaka & Oyinmiebi, 2018).

Historically, powers have ranged from highly concentrated on one end of the continuum to highly dispersed power distributions on the other. The former has included regional empires, for example, the Roman Empire, which became the most powerful state in the world by the first century BCE through a combination of military power, political flexibility, and economic expansion (Brooking, 2011; Schroeder, 2019). An example of the latter is the approximate equality of power held by the European powers at the conclusion of the Napoleonic War in 1815 (Dickson, 2011). Hence, the Roman Empire, its successor - the Holy Roman Empire, the post-Napoleonic settlement of the Congress of Vienna Treaty (1815), the Treaty of Paris (1919) and San Francisco Conferences (which brought World War [WWII] to an end in 1945) could be regarded as global structure of power of these eras (Johnstone, 1945; Langhorne, 1986; Koskenniemi & Strath, 2014; Sharp, 2014; Lesaffer, 2019).

Soon after the Second World War, which marked the beginning of a new era, defined by the decline of all European colonial empires, the United States (US) found itself in an extraordinary situation in power calculation. Of note, US stood in a preponderant of both military and economic position as she was the only nation with nuclear weapons, while her economy accounted for roughly half the combined gross national product (GDP) of the nations of the world (Kegley & Raymond, 1994). In other words, “the United States had unprecedented materials preponderance over every other state or combination

of states in the international system” Voeten, 2011, p. 111). However, the immediate post-World War II distribution of power was short-lived as the rapid recovery of the Soviet Union introduced a new power configuration into world affairs. This solidified a bipolar system of hegemony – with the United States and the Soviet Union playing a decisive role in the international scene characterized with ideological rivalry as well as peace among major powers supposedly imposed by the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons (Lemke, 1997; Ghosh, 2009). Indeed, one scholar commented that “these developments presage the end of a distinct period in the evolution of the international system” (Woodley, 2015, p. 6).

However, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, ideological rivalry between the two blocs officially ended, bipolarity was dismantled and efforts were extended toward a less nuclear future. Put differently, the collapse of the Soviet empire, economy, state and ideology spelled the end of the bipolar system of power distribution. The event has been explained more graphically thus, “the end of the Cold War, the collapse of bipolarity, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the East bloc and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact had led to complete transition to the New World Order” (Akindele, 1992, p. 33). As argued by Nye & Welsch (2017, p. 382), “the end of the Cold War certainly altered the international system, but claims of the dawning of a “New World Order” were undermined by the profoundly different ways in which scholars, writers and practitioners interpreted the word order”. In most cases, ‘new world order’ refers primarily to the structure or distribution of power among states, but in this case, it implies that “power would no longer play significant role in international relations; the role of the state would vanish, and the main actors of international relations would become international organizations and economic entities” (Gaiser, 2012, p.3). In other words, power politics and realism will give way to the cooperation and liberal perception of international relations – a situation described differently and theoretically by scholars as ‘neo-idealist moment’ (Kegley, 1993), ‘neo-Wilsonian idealism’ (Fukuyama, 1992), ‘idealpolitik’ (Kober, 1990), and ‘neo-liberalism’ (Nye, 1988; Grieco, 1990).

Consequently, the change had provided the United States with a unipolar movement - with unrivalled power and resources for the execution of its unilateral foreign policy thrust around the globe. In the words of Krauthammer, “the collapse of the Communist bloc led speedily to the

proclamation of America's 'unipolar moment' - an opportunity for the United States to use its unchallenged global pre-eminence to shape the international order by buttressing and extending the Pax Americana that prevailed even in the non-Soviet world in the past years" (1990, p. 23-33). Thus, some authors proclaimed the post-Cold War era as Pax Americana (Maravchik, 1991) and others as American Hegemony (Layne & Benjamin, 1993). This implies that, unipolarity objectively described the distribution of power in the international politics from the Cold War's end up till the beginning of the 21st century.

Since then, of course, unprecedented developments around the world have provoked scholars, writers, analysts and practitioners of IR to posit that there is a transfiguration in global power structure from unipolarity to multipolarity system. Clearly, the solo superpower status of the United States have been increasingly confronted with the growing influence of major nations such as China, Russia, India, Germany, Japan as well as regional organizations or blocs, particularly the European Union (EU) and the BRICs, thus signalling the rebirth of multipolarity. The problematique or intriguing questions are: Is the 21st century international system unipolar or multipolar? Given the rise and influence of these nations in international affairs, how would the 21st century's concert of great powers be fundamental to maintaining international peace and security? In other words, how would the likely rise of countries such as China, Russia, Japan, Germany, India, United Kingdom, France and Russia shape the international system and the nature of international relations in the nearest future?

Conceptual Clarifications

This paper revolves around a number of concepts, namely – 'polarity', 'unipolarity', 'bipolarity', 'tripolarity' and 'multipolarity', among others. There is the need therefore, to expound on these concepts for purposes of clarity. It is equally important to state from the outset that relevant operationalization or demystification of these concepts have been well documented by scholars and writers.

In international relations, the concept of polarity is a rather recent phenomenon, with no earlier historical roots than the end of World War II (WWII). Before that time, traditional realists analysed the relations between great powers in terms of balance of power - a much older concept that goes back several centuries (Wagner, 1993; Buzan, 2004). In other words, though bi-, uni- and multipolar are commonly used in natural sciences, medicines and

technical publications, references to polarity were not found in the context of international relations before the end of the Second World War (Keersmaeker, 2017). Hence, it was probably Morton Kaplan (1969) who gave polarity a central place in realpolitik ...and literally makes the transition from balance of power to polarity when he describes six different international systems of which two are bipolar (in a loose and a tight version). Therefore, the concept of polarity has been defined variously by international relations experts and writers. For instance, Goldstein & Pevehouse (2008, p.55) posit that “the polarity of an international or regional power distribution refers to the number of independent power centre in the international system”. This however, encompasses both the underlying power of various participants and their alliance grouping.

Similarly, Mingst (2004, p.86) has maintained that “system polarity refers to the number of blocs of states that exert power in the international system”. Flowing from the above definitions, it is clear that most scholars relied generally on polarity to measure the distribution of power among states in the international system. Thus, polarity cannot be assessed only in terms of the distribution of power, but should incorporate the notion of autonomous decision centres such as international and regional organizations as well as power blocs (Brecher, James & Wilkenfeld, 1990; Harknett & Yalcin, 2012). Alternatively, Ikenberry, Mastanduno & Wohlforth (2009, p.5) view polarity as “a theoretical concept, that is, a threshold value in relation to the capacity to be reached by the power of states in order to be considered ‘polar actor’ in the international system. Polar actor “is a state that enjoys considerable level of resources or opportunities to achieve its goals. It is a state that exceeds other states in every element of capacity conventionally defined as population, territory, natural resources, economic clout and military strength as well as organizational – institutional competence” (Waltz, 1979, p.131). Other authorities such as Rose & Jones (1980) and Ekpe (2012) have noted that although there are many elements which contribute to the power potentials of a given state in the international arena, power is a mixture of capabilities derived from both domestic sources and international activities. These include, geography or what some scholars prefer to call ‘natural factor’, political, economic, ideological, military strength. Therefore, according to Rapkin, et al (1979), “while polarity refers to the distribution of power among states, polarization implies the tendency for actors to cluster around the system's most powerful states”.

As earlier indicated, unipolarity refers to a distribution of power in which one state exercises the most cultural, economic, and military influence. For Hansen (2000, p.80), “it is an international system with only one great power in existence”. From the standpoint of Waltz, (1979, p.131), “great power is a state with a qualitative edge relative to the other states based on the aggregate score on the size of territory, population, economy, military, resource endowment, political stability and political competence”. Therefore, great powers can be differentiated from other states by their military power, interests, their behaviour in general and interactions with other powers, other powers' perception of them and some formal criteria. These criteria, according to Heywood (2015, p. 86; cited in Dickson, 2019, p. 169) are military prowess, economic clout, have global sphere of interest, adopt a 'forward' foreign policy and have actual impact in international affair.

However, it is pertinent to clarify that “unipolarity is not merely about pinpointing the strongest power in the system, it is also about distinguishing it from other notions of international systems and about the identification of the unipolar dynamics” (Hansen, 2011, p.5).

At the dawn of the 21st century, scholars of global politics uses unipolarity interchangeably with hegemony, which implies the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system, so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic relations are conducted (Rupert, 1995; Kapstein, & Mastanduno, 1999; Nye, 2002). Such a state is also called a ‘hegemon’. Primarily, hegemony means “domination of the world by a certain nation or group of nations in a particular era” (Goldstein & 2008, p.57). In practical terms, an Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci used ‘hegemony’ to refer to the complex of ideas that rulers use to gain consent for the legitimacy and keep subject in line, reducing the need to use force to accomplish the same goal (Gramsci, 1959; Gill, 1993). In international relations and international political economy, this refers to the hegemony of ideas such as democracy and capitalism, and to the global predominance of a State culture. Thus, in a unipolar international system, a hegemon does not only make and enforce order unilaterally but also coerce states whose domestic political processes significantly interact with the dynamics of international system to obey such order (Ikenberry & Nexon, 2019).

In a similar vein, bipolarity is a system of hegemony with two predominant states, or two great rival alliance blocs, or a distribution of power

in which two states have majority of economic, military and cultural influence globally or regionally (Chilaka & Oyinmiebi, 2018, p.290). According to Waltz (1964, pp. 882,888), “bipolarity is a system with only two world powers with no peripheries and marked by the presence of two distinct and hostile blocs or alliance systems”. As earlier stated, Morton Kaplan – a trail blazer on the frontier of international relations’ theory delineated loose bipolar from the tight bipolar system. According to him, in the former, supranational (bloc) actors such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Communist Warsaw Pact or the universal actors – the United Nations (UN) participate within the international system, while in the latter, non-bloc member actors and universal actors either disappear entirely or cease to be significant (Kaplan, 1969, pp.297-8). Thus, “bipolarity refers to the distribution of power that accounts for both that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union and the fact that antagonism, though intense, did not lead to major war between them” (Wagner, 1993, pp.77-106). Drawing from what has been said, it is observed that the argument for bipolarity is dual: First, it is allegedly desirable international order; and second, it is a continuing state of affairs. This juxtaposition however, entails a vital interest and involvement in all the outcomes of world politics (Rosecrance, 1969).

The above viewpoints have been countered by scholars and writers. For instance, as Serfaty (2008, p.175) writes, “bipolarity is potentially more dangerous because any regional conflict can escalate into an unwanted global confrontation”. To that extent, bipolarity can only be a short-lived moment of geo-political transition during which one of the two preponderant powers surpasses the other on grounds of capabilities, will, values, and legitimacy unless they first reach an arrangement, or condominium, that creates two parallel empires poised for a more or less peaceful coexistence until final convergence or confrontation. The core critique of bipolar world could be it did not reduce the motivations for expansion or increase of capabilities over others, which ultimately cause threat to a large extent.

In recent past, a new system of power configuration that has found itself into the lexicon of polarity in the contemporary international relations is “tripolarity” and lies between bipolarity and multipolarity. As argued by Goldstein & Pevehouse (2008, p.56), “tripolarity is a system with three great centres of power and are usually rare, owing to the tendency for a two-against-one alliance to form”. Evidently, aspects of tripolarity coloured the “strategic triangle” of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the 1960s

and 1970s. This study has imagined a future tripolar world with rival power centres in North America, Europe, and East Asian region.

Before the emergence of tripolarity, multipolarity was taken to mean the distribution of power in which more than two nation-states (that is, three states and above) have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence. In the later times, “multipolar system typically has come to mean a system with five or six centres of power, which are not grouped into alliance and each state participates independently and on relative equal terms with others” (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008, pp.55-56). Under multipolarity, two major facts are discernible: First, the decline of hegemonic powers due to the rise of other centres of power in the international system; and second, alternative sources of power such as blocs in the UN and coalitions would provide alternative sources of influence to check on and balance the distribution of power. Hass (2014, p. 715) asserts that the decades after the Napoleonic Wars and the years leading up to the Second World War were multipolar in terms of great power relations. In a similar vein, the classification by Brecher, James & Wilkenfeld (1990, p.49-80) have been: multipolarity (1929-1939), bipolarity (1945-1962) and polycentricism (1963-1985). A polycentric world order is an international system based on several major centres of power not equal in might and have different social systems, which are not stable yet in many respects (Gadzhiev, 2007; Arbatov, 2014).

Theoretical Framework

Two major theoretical traditions provide the frames for the analysis and interpretation of the shift or transformations in global power structure in the 21st century. These are Realism and Power Transition Theory. Realism as an approach to the study international relations has a long history that is typically traced back to the great Greek historian - Thucydides in the fifth century BC. However, the most famous theorists of classical realism, particularly Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Neibuhr, George F. Kennan, John H. Herz, Arnold Wolfers and E. H. Carr, among others, sometimes drew on the supposedly timeless wisdom of statecraft outlined by political theory giants of the distant past – Thucydides, Nicollo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacque Rousseau, etc. Specifically, Hans J. Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations* (1967, first published in 1948) paid attention to material power, which according to him is one of the major capabilities for measuring a superpower

status. Morgenthau focuses on two phenomena, nation-states and the struggle for power and peace. In doing so, he makes three fundamental assumptions. The first is that nation-states are the most important actors for understanding international relations. The reason for this assumption can be demonstrated by a simple syllogism – international politics consists of a struggle for power, and in order to be world power, a state or group of states must wield significant political power. According to Graffiths (1992, p.60-61), Morgenthau's oft-quoted and somewhat blunt assertions that international politics is a continual struggle for power presupposes that the goal of each state is to maximize its power, either as an end in itself or as a means to an end. 'The aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics...international politics is of necessity power politics...nations must actually aim not at a balance - that is, equality of power, but a superiority in their own behalf.

Therefore, since no nation can foresee how large its miscalculation will turn out to be, all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of power...the desire to attain a maximum of power is universal'. The theory outlined in *Politics Among Nations* leads one to expect that all states will expand their power, given sufficient capabilities and opportunities to do so. This prediction is based on the second principle of Morgenthau's interpretation of 'political realism', according to which 'statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out'. Secondly, in international politics, during the modern state system, only nations wield significant power; thirdly, therefore, in international politics, during the modern state system, only nations are actors. Given the first two premises, the conclusion follows logically. Morgenthau's second assumption is that there is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics. The use of the concept international politics as a way of demarcating the field assumes by its definition that there is something about politics that occurs outside nations that makes it different from politics that occurs inside nations (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 27, 38; 1973, p. 27, 40). The third assumption is that international relations is the struggle for power and peace. According to Morgenthau (1960, p. 38; 1973, p. 40), "all history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war."

Similarly, the power transition theory originally put forth by A. F. K. Organski in the early years of the Cold War is not a purely realist theory, because it is not exclusively concerned with power (although power

considerations do play a prominent role in it). The theory focuses on the strongest states, and draws implications from their interactions for war, and for the maintenance of and changes to the structure of the international system (Lemke, 1997). Organski (1958) argues that a powerful nation tends to set up a system of relations with lesser states which can be called an 'order' because the relations are stabilized. In time, everyone comes to know what kind of behaviour to expect from the others, habits and patterns are established, and certain rules as to how these relations ought to be carried on grow to be accepted by all parties. Thus, the dominant country or countries establishes an international order with rules that direct political, economic, diplomatic and military interactions. The dominant country establishes this order because it derives benefits in the form of wealth, security, and prestige from doing so.

According to Lemke (1997), power transition theory rests on the belief that each nation's power determines its role on the world stage. The result is a hierarchical international system with an uneven balance of power. Those with the most power are defined as dominant powers and assert enormous influence on the international system as a whole. Corroborating the above viewpoint, Waltz (1971, p. 131) asserts that dominant states must have the following power components – economic clout, military strength, natural resources, large territory and population size. However, this study argues that the sources of power are, in general, moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. This is owing to the fact that in recent years, factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important. This argument notwithstanding, all the capabilities played dominant role in determining great power status of states in the international system. Consequently, a dominant nation or group of nations establishes an international order with rules that direct political, economic, diplomatic and military interactions and play a crucial role in setting up and influencing world politics. Applying these theories in the context of the 21st century's world order yields to the general proposition that contemporary global politics is marked by the struggle of multipolar forces to balance IR at the same time as the existing unipolar ones are aggressively resisting and fighting to retain their hegemony define in terms of capabilities.

Overview of the Evolution of World System and distribution powers

Until the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the pre-existing international system did not feature the existence of independent sovereign states as the modern meaning of the term entails. The Treaty, among other things, ended the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) in Europe and established the independence of several states, and a number of other protestant political entities from the secular authority of the Holy Roman Empire and its Roman Catholic dynasty (Rourke & Boyer, 2003, p.25). This however, eclipsed the overarching authority of the early centuries and marked the founding of modern states (Cioffi-Revilla, 2000) thus representing the benchmark for the transformation of the international system from the medieval to modern form (Buzan & Little, 1999; Watson, 2009; Dickson, 2019). Consequently, the emergence of the sovereign state as the primary actor marked a major shift in the international system with the advent of popular sovereignty as well as the westernization of the international system where the multipolar system emerged and reached its zenith (Rourke, 2008). Clearly, the multipolar system, which governed political relations among major European powers from 1648 through the mid-twentieth century, reached its peak during the period of the global dominance of the European powers.

Of note, during this era, the international system was multipolar in the sense that political affairs were dominated by numerous powers. For example, in the period between the final defeat of Napoleon (1815) and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the major powers were Great Britain, France, Prussia/Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and to a lesser extent Italy and Ottoman Empire/Turkey (Rourke & Boyer, 2003). Walt (1996, p.109) assert that the multipolar system that existed between 1648 and 1945 was characterized by shifting alliances designed to preserve the balance of power by preventing any single power or combination of powers from dominating Europe. It is pertinent to clarify that Balance of Power is a valued political objective that promotes national security, upholds order among great powers, and makes the independence of states and their peoples possible. Therefore, global power structure during WWII had Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan which attempted to impose their separate hegemonies on Europe and Asia on the one side; and Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States which formed an alliance to counter those attempts and restore a balance of power on the other (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013).

The outbreak of WWII (1939-1945), which was a tragedy of huge proportions eventually, altered the power structure of that era. Evidently, “the

war overturned the world and led to the decline of Europe as the epicentre of international politics and subsequent destruction of the European-based multipolar structure” (McMahon (2003, p.1). Therefore, the end of the war marked major changes in the nature and operation of the world political system, particularly the transition from multipolar to bipolar system of hegemony. However, the emergence of a bipolar international system of hegemony witnessed the United States of America as a military and economic superpower and the leader of one power pole and the Soviet Union as the superpower leader of the other pole. Peu Ghosh describe the scenario graphically thus: in the aftermath of the WWII, the world was engulfed in a different sort of a struggle for global leadership between the two former allies, the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union and both emerged as superpowers. Great Britain was exhausted and no longer was able to hold on the position of a global power. Germany, being partitioned and Japan being devastated by atomic bombs, failed to emerge as great powers. This left only the United States and the Soviet Union to play a decisive role in the international system (Ghosh, 2009, p.129). Notably, the Cold War international system was characterized by a number of features. The first was ideological contest between the unchallenged leaders of two mutually exclusive blocs with the United States championing democratic capitalism (liberal democracy) and the USSR promoting totalitarian communism (Marxism-Leninism).

It has however, been argued that the conflicting ideologies were irrelevant to the cause of the Cold War. According to Kramer (1999, p.539), “the Cold War was about two ‘structural’ features of international politics which arranged the interactions between states in general and superpowers in particular”. As a result, many events during the period were constrained and determined by US and Soviet foreign policy decisions. The argument is that Cold War happened as the need to create the balance of power in the world as a strategy of the superpowers to widen their strategic interests. Thus, the era was generally portrayed as a bipolar balance of power based on nuclear weapons (the race to develop and possess nuclear weapons) and often referred to as a balance of terror- between the United States and the Soviet Union (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Jackson & Sorensen, 2013).

An alternative argument is that Cold War was a conflict between two rival social systems, which caused many things such as nuclear weapons and wars in the Third World countries. Consequently, many Third World countries

such as Central America, Angola, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Indochina, and Korea became main victims of the Cold War through the extension of the superpower tensions their territories. This group of thinkers argues that the Cold War was more than great power conflict, which greatly altered the sphere of international politics and consequently the nature and character of the international system and plunged the world into the era of bipolarity and ended with the fall of Berlin wall (Irungu (2014; Fanani, 2015).

Analysis

Overall, there has been great variation over time in the general pattern of power distribution in the international system. In other words, the international system has been characterized by dynamics and complexities in states' relations as well as composition in power configuration. For instance, from the post-Westphalian system to the outbreak of WWI, where the central powers fought against the Allied Powers and up till 1945, the international system was multipolar - always with six great powers (namely, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR). The Cold War era (1945-1989) was characterized by the bipolarity with the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union, most structural realists tend to see the international system as unipolar – with the United States as the single preponderant power (Hansen & Heurlin, 2000; Sorensen, 2011). Accordingly, unipolarity is a novel condition in world politics, and has the following unique characteristics: First, the unipole or hegemon enjoy greater freedom of action and be less dependent on allied support, enabling it to rely more readily on *ad hoc* “coalitions of the willing”; second, lesser powers will be concerned about the concentration of power held by the unipole, but they will also face larger barriers to concerted action to contain it; third, hard balancing against the unipole will be unlikely - unless the unipole begins a major effort to expand - but lesser powers will engage in soft balancing to contain the latter's influence; and fourth, medium powers may pursue alliances with others in order to reduce dependence on the unipole, but weaker States are likely to ally with the unipole in order to use its power against local security challenges.

Fifth, bandwagoning will remain rare even under unipolarity, but disputes over burden sharing and alliance leadership will continue; sixth, weaker States will prefer multilateral arrangements that enhance their own influence, while the unipole will prefer bilateral or *ad hoc* “coalitions of the

willing” that it can more readily dominate. The US unilateral use of force in the immediate post-Cold War era, particularly during the *Operation Enduring Freedom* against Afghanistan in 2001 and the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 buttressed these points (Dickson, 2008a; Dickson, 2008b; Ezirim & Dickson, 2012, p.151). Of note, these wars were waged without *prima facie* authorization by the UN Security Council and above all, in flagrant breaches of the UN Charter. Thereupon, the United States had, in effect, created a situation in which its interest was also a universal interest and therefore not to be challenged (Duong, 2017)

Other authorities have argued that despite the US primacy as of that time, US neither play the role of one remaining superpower nor exercised its power potential (Art, 1991; Rice, 2000). Hence, due to the lack of the US exercise of its unique role in the early 1990s, the world was not unipolar, but rather it was multipolar (Gaiser, 2012). Eventually, these arguments, among others, coincided with the prediction by Krauthammer (1990) that a unipolar moment was already giving way to an unstable multipolar world at the dawn of the 21st century. As the 21st century progresses, the framework of international system is assumed to have moved completely from unipolar to a multipolar structure or what Dickson (2011, p.80) call “the rebirth of multipolarity”. As earlier stated, in the multipolar world, global system does not rest with a couple of significant nations but rather with numerous nations with varying capabilities. Therefore, it is contended that the revivification of multipolarity is a means of ‘restoring balance’ in the international system, or of ensuring that major powers and regional blocs have a position equal to that of the United States in the running of world affairs (Amin, 2006). In recent past, scholars have posited that the rising profile and influence of large countries or powerful states such as China, Russia, Japan, Germany, India, United Kingdom, and France, perhaps even some more or less ‘emerging’ countries in the South, in terms of power capacities buttressed the resurgence of a multipolar world in the present century.

The most widely used measures of capability are GDP and military spending. Table 1 the economic indicators for the major powers in the early 21st century.

Table 1: Economic Indicators for the Major Powers in the early 21st century (2006)

	GDP Current Prices (\$ Billion)	% Great Power GDP, Current Prices	% World GDP, Current Prices	% World GDP, PPP	GDP per Capita, Current Prices
USA	13,245	46.1	27.5	22.5	44,190
China	2,630	9.2	5.5	9.7	2,001
Japan	1,367	15.2	9.1	7.4	34,188
Germany	2,897	10.1	6	4.6	35,204
Russia	979	3.4	2	3.1	6,856
France	2,232	7.8	4.6	3.4	35,404
Britain	2,374	8.3	4.9	3.5	39,213

Source: Ikenberry, Mastanduno & Wohlforth, 2009, p.7.

From table 1 above, it is clear that in the early, that is, in the first five years 21st century, the United States accounted for roughly one-quarter of global GDP and nearly 50% of GDP among the conventionally defined great powers. This surpasses the relative economic size of any competing state or group of states in modern history, with the sole exception of the United States itself in the early Cold War years, when WWII had temporarily depressed every other major economy (Ikenberry, et al, 2009, p.6). This was followed by China, Japan, Germany Russia, France and Britain. These authors noted further that by virtue of the size and wealth of the U.S. economy, its massive military capabilities represented only 4% of its GDP in 2006 as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Defense Expenditures for the Major Powers in the early 21st century (2006)

	Defense Expenditures (\$ Billion)	% Great Power Defense Expenditures	% World Defense Expenditure	Defense Expenditure % of GDP	Defense R&D Expenditure (\$ Billion)
USA	528.6	65.6	46	4.1	75.5

China	49.5	6.1	4	2	n.a.
Japan	43.9	5.4	4	1	1.1
Germany	36.6	4.6	3	1.4	1.1
Russia	34.7	4.3	3	4.1	n.a.
France	53	6.6	5	2.5	3.9
Britain	59.2	7.3	5	2.7	4.4

Source: Ikenberry, Mastanduno & Wohlforth, 2009, p.8.

From table 2, it is shown that US military expenditures on R&D were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France and Britain combined. By some estimates, over half of the military R&D expenditures in the world are American, a disparity that has been sustained for many years. Currently, the US though still remains the leading country in the world, its superpower status has been heavily challenged by China, Japan, Germany India the United Kingdom. Table 3 shows the economic and demographic ranking of major powers in recent times.

Table 3: Countries Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Demographic Ranking in 2019

Ran k	Country	GDP (IMF'19)	GDP (UN'16)	GDP Per Capita	Population
1	United States	21.34 trillion	18.62 trillion	\$64,865	329,064,917
2	China	14.22 trillion	11.22 trillion	\$9,915	1,433,783,686
3	Japan	5.18 trillion	494 trillion	\$40,802	126,860,301
4	Germany	3.96 trillion	3.48 trillion	\$47,462	83,517,045
5	India	2.97 trillion	2.26 trillion	\$2,175	1,366,417,754
6	United Kingdom	2.83 trillion	2.65 trillion	\$41,895	67,530.172

7	France	2.76 trillion	2.47 trillion	\$42,402	65,129,728
8	Russia	1.61 trillion	1.25 trillion	\$11,040	145,872,256

Sources: IMF: World Economic Outlook Database, 2019.

From table 3, it is clear that based on UN and IMF figures, the United States has the largest GDP in the world at \$20.4 trillion (IMF) and \$18.6 trillion (UN). The second-largest GDP is China's at \$14.1 trillion (IMF) and \$11.2 trillion (UN). However, the US has a population of 327 million, while China's population is the highest in the world – a massive 1.42 billion (although despite the significant difference, the US also has the third-highest population in the world, behind India in second place with 1.35 billion. Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom make up the rest of the top five countries with the largest GDPs at \$5,167,050, \$4,211,640 and \$2,936,290 trillion (US\$), respectively (based on IMF figures). As the world's second most populous state and largest democracy, there has often been the expectation that India will naturally emerge as a great 'Asian' power alongside Japan and China (Hewitt, 1997).

Militarily, the latest figures from the Global Firepower Index (2019) identify the strongest militaries in the world. Accordingly, US maintained number one position in most of the directly comparable metrics, such as total aircraft strength with 13,398 aircraft, including 5,760 helicopters in service, which is the most out of any nation in the world. At \$716bn, the US also has the world's largest defence budget, \$492bn more than China – the world's second largest defence spender. The US falls short of first place in only a few metrics, such as the number of combat tanks with 6,287 (ranked 3rd); the number of self-propelled artillery equalling 992 (7th), and the number of rocket projectors (15th). In terms of naval assets, the US is second only to China, with 415 and 714 respectively. Russia holds first place in certain metrics. It is the top nation in terms of number of combat tanks with 21,932 – more than three times the US's total – and also armoured fighting vehicles (of which it has more than 50,000) and self-propelled artillery. For every other comparative metric, Russia holds either 2nd or 3rd place.

Moreover, this is all made possible with a relatively small defence budget of \$44bn. Russia also has a strong navy, with a total of 352 assets. This includes 82 corvettes, more than the US (15) and China (42) combined. China performs better in some areas than in others. In terms of total naval assets, it is

the top nation on the list with 714 vessels, including 119 patrol vessels, 76 submarines and 52 frigate ships. It is also top of the list in terms of the number of towed artillery in its arsenal with 6,246. The Global Fire Power Index ranked China 2nd for its number of combat tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, jet fighters and attack aircraft, while China's score fell in terms of its number of aircraft trainers, where it achieved its lowest ranking of 5th place overall. At \$224bn, it has the second largest defence budget in the world in 2019.

India maintains a strong air force and navy, according to the index, ranking 3rd for the number of transport aircraft, at 248, and in 4th place in terms of total aircraft strength, including jet fighters and attack aircraft, and in 5th for total helicopter strength. The Indian Navy also maintained a good number of assets at 295 including all primary and auxiliary vessels, which placed the nation in fourth position. India is also top of the list in terms of its number of patrol vessels with 139, 20 more than China. For armoured fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery, the Indian Army ranks 25th and 26th respectively, much lower than its overall ranking. India has a defence budget of \$55.2bn for 2019, smaller than the US and China, but slightly larger than Russia's spending. In early 2019, France military budget stands at \$40.5bn in total. The nation's strengths lie in its air capabilities. For example, the nation is ranked 8th in terms of total aircraft strength and 7th in terms of total helicopter strength. The French Armed forces operate 1,248 different aircraft and 566 helicopters. It has a relatively medium sized navy with 118 naval assets in total, including four aircraft carriers – more than Russia, China and India. The French Army is relatively weak in terms of its total equipment, having been ranked 44th for combat tanks with only 406; 55th for towed artillery, and 61st for the number of rocket projectors.

Next on the list of strongest militaries in 2019 is Japan, which has a defence budget of \$47bn for 2019. Similar to France, Japan's military strength lies in its aircraft and naval assets. Japan is ranked in 6th place for total aircraft strength with 1,572 aircraft, and for total helicopter strength with 636. This includes 119 attack helicopters, for which is only bested by three other nations. It also owns 131 naval assets in total including four aircraft carriers, and 37 destroyer warships – the second highest number of destroyers owned by any nation. However, in terms of the number of combat tanks, self-propelled and towed artillery, Japan is ranked lower – at 25th place. It is important to state that with its growing arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, North Korea today presents threats for which US and allied

forces lack satisfactory answers (Ochmanek *et al*, 2017). Therefore, as the unipolar order declines, various states have already become an important force in constructing a new multipolar world order.

Conclusion and Policy Prescription

One of the persistent trends in international system is the transfiguration in its structure of power. From the analysis of this study, it is established that the current world order is multipolar in nature, with a number of superpowers such as the US, Russia, Germany, Japan, India, China, United Kingdom, France, among others. Clearly, as previously indicated, the system is functioning under the concept of currencies of power with the United States retaining both enormous military capability (though being challenged by the military development of North Korea in the area of Nuclear Weapon) and economic clout, Russia with enormous military power, Germany and Japan are economic and financial giants while India has demographic power. China, in addition to its military capacity has demographic strength. Consequently, US have lost its global hegemony due largely to the influence of these states define in terms of capabilities. Aside from the European Union that is undoubtedly a heavy-weight in economic terms, the increasing weight and assumed growing political muscle of a combined states (Brazil, Russia, India and China – collectively referred to as the BRICs – have added to the shift in power structure of the contemporary international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. It has been argued that the return to multipolarity implies more instability among great powers, though great power rivalry would not be the only source of possible instability for the multipolar world.

Moreover, the current distribution of power allows not only great powers but also middle, small powers and non-state actors to have military capabilities that could threaten the global security (Varisco, 2013). In particular, the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes a further reason of concern and implies that the future world could carry not only the potential instability of multipolarity and great powers rivalry, but also the dangers entailed in nuclear proliferation. Thus, the current multipolar world would be potentially more unstable than all the other multipolar periods history has experienced. For the first time in history, the world could become both multipolar and nuclear (Varisco, 2013). Contrary to some current thinking, it has been argued that as a renewed system of power configuration, multipolarity would ensure greater stability in the international system and

becomes a vehicle for sustainable development and durable peace. In the light of these mutually recognized constraints, multipolarity is a preferred world order as in the 21st century.

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VOTE BUYING AND FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION IN RETROSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Election is the process of peaceful transition of state power from one political party to the other or retaining state power by the ruling party in office if the electorates considered the party to have represented them well during its first tenure in office. Over the years, vote buying during elections has been common in Nigeria. Political office seekers habitually resort to buying votes from vulnerable electorates. The 2019 general elections in Nigeria was not an exception. This study investigates the influence of money during the 2019 general election and the future of democracy in Nigeria. Based on the political economy theory of the post colonial state and using documentary method of data collection and analysis, this paper is set to explain how vote buying influenced voters in their choice of candidates in the 2019 election in Nigeria. The implication is that democracy is jeopardized in so far as political class consciously impoverishes voters in order to influence their voting behavior during elections.

Keywords: Vote buying, election, democracy, electorates, Nigeria.

Introduction

Election is globally acknowledged as the hallmark of democracy. Conduct of free, fair and credible elections to effect change of government and political leadership is an uncompromising principle of liberal democracy. The credibility of elections is determined by mainly the capacity and honesty of the electoral body to be transparently impartial and non-discriminatory to all contesting political parties and candidates; the capacity of the electoral umpire to regulate the financial spending of the contesting political parties and candidates to avoid vote trading by contesting political parties and candidates during, before and after elections are critical functions of electoral body in modern democracy. Unfortunately, democracy which is adjudged the best form of government all over the world is consistently assaulted in Nigeria due to the phenomenon of vote trading.

In a representative democracy, elections represent the primary means of leadership recruitment whose main task is decision making on behalf of the generality of the people, and it is therefore inconceivable to think of democracy without the very idea of election (Lindberg, 2006). It is for this reason that modern democratic practice is very particular about the way elections are conducted; perhaps because of its centrality in the determination of who becomes in charge of what David Easton (1965) describes as authoritative allocation of values. Elections, in most parts of the world, continue to be dogged by a lot of challenges. One of them is vote buying. It is argued that, across time and space, political parties distribute material benefits to people in preparation for election, so as to look good in their estimation (Azeez, 2019). This practice has been variously explained as exchange of cash for votes before election, distribution of 'particularistic benefits to individuals' (Nitcher, 2008, p. 19) or 'pre-election provision of gifts of goods and money' (Cruz et al., 2016, p. 3); with the purpose of influencing voting decisions. It is a feature that is prevalent in emerging democracies with pronounced levels of poverty and mass illiteracy, particularly in Africa, where study confirms that 45% of the people are offered bribes in exchange for their vote (Kramon, 2009).

Nigeria returned to democratic governance on 29th May 1999. However, the dividends of democracy to the people are still very scanty. This

is because the precepts and practice of democracy are at variance in Nigeria. Indeed, money politics and vote buying have vitiated the good qualities of democracy in the country. The negative power of money politics has been considered as one of the factors that undermine good governance in Nigeria. Vote buying and selling in Nigeria have earned most political office seekers unmerited political offices where they preside and authoritatively decide on who gets what, when and how. Although money politics appears to be a global political process, however, in Nigeria, the phenomenon is, regrettably, playing a dangerous role in Nigeria's nascent democracy. The consequential effect of this situation is that the electoral process is often compromised resulting in elections not being free, fair and credible. It is not suggested in this paper that the use of money by political parties or any person or group of persons in politics has inherent corruptive influence. Indeed, money is needed for sundry services and logistics such as mobilization for political campaigns and rallies, printing of posters and manifestoes, production of party emblems and other symbols etc. The only worry, however, is the noticeable corrupting influence of money and vote-buying, and their negative impact on future of democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

Nigeria's electoral process has always been known for its chaotic nature, and at the heart of this predicament, as Onapajo et al. (2015, p. 2) argue, is the predominance of vote buying. The problem is really a post-colonial development, which has evolved over the years, manifesting in different styles and forms. In the First Republic, the style was distribution of food items to prospective voters during rallies, before the democratic project was put in abeyance by military coups (Ovwasa, 2014). In the Second Republic, the same method became intensified, however with the addition of pre-election money distribution to induce voters, security operatives and electoral officials (Hassan, cited in Okakwu, 2019). This trend led to massive rigging in several parts of the country, which also triggered violent conflicts, especially in Oyo and Ondo states in the 1983 elections. In the primary elections that heralded the popular 12 June 1993 elections, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) confirmed that between N120 million

(\$309) and N1 billion (\$2.575 million) was spent to buy votes (Hassan, cited in Okakwu, 2019). The return to democracy in 1999 intensified the practice of vote buying and selling in Nigeria. Videos and images have appeared showing politicians distributing money, food and other material items to eligible voters in exchange for votes in different parts of the country (Onuoha & Ojo, 2018). Specifically, elections in Nigeria's Fourth Republic have been characterised by vote buying to the extent that it was described by Bratton (1999) as an epiphenomenal dimension of the Nigerian election process. According to Idayat Hassan of CDD, between 2003 and 2007 the price value of one vote ranged between N1700 and N2500, but in 2019 it skyrocketed to between N2500 and N14,000 (as cited in Okakwu, 2019). This practice continues to influence, if not determine, election outcomes in many cases.

Quite expectedly, the growing incidence of vote buying in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has attracted the attention of scholars, and this has resulted in a number of insightful analyses on the contributory factors. Specifically, factors such as high incidence of poverty, desperation of politicians, illiteracy, high return of elective posts, complicity of security operatives and electoral officials as well as willingness of electorates to sell their votes have been identified to be at the base of vote buying (Adamu et al., 2016; Matenga, 2016; Onuoha & Ojo, 2018; Ovwasa, 2014).

Vote Buying and Secret Balloting: An Overview

In essence, Nitcher sees all the monies and materials being distributed to voters before election as mobilisation strategies to bring supporters out for voting on election day. Before Nitcher's work, Schaffer and Schedler (2007, p. 25) had mentioned 'participation buying' in their work on vote buying. The perspective of turnout buying has gained traction in the literature, with a number of scholars subscribing to it. Studies have emerged to prove that vote buying enhances voter turnout. In the same vein, Adeagbo and Olumide (2019, pp. 121–122) call attention to the problematic nature of the concept of vote buying, describing it as 'concept stretching'. To them, what is being referred to as vote buying is nothing but election gifting. The argument is based on the fact that the word 'buy' connotes a sort of consensual or legal contract or agreement between two parties, which is absent in the case of vote buying. Vote buyers are not under any obligation to fulfil their own side of the bargain. In that sense, whatever politicians give to people can only be regarded as gifts, which cannot be criminalised. This perspective still flows from the problem of

commitment, identified earlier by Simon Nitcher. But the arguments of ‘turnout buying’ and ‘election gifting’, as plausible as they are, may not be a sufficient explanation. They do not take into consideration several strategies put in place by vote buyers to overcome the problem of commitment. According to findings by Finan and Schechter (2011), Paraguayan politicians bought votes through third parties. The strategy involves reaching out to voters through hired respected community leaders. Money and other material incentives are passed to the voters through these community leaders who in turn will monitor the voting patterns of the voters who have received money. Voters now cast their vote out of respect for the community leaders. In Pakistan, voters, after collecting money, are made to take an oath on the Quran to vote for them and also ‘invoke something far graver in terms of socio-cultural and religious significance’ (Ali, 2018). In this circumstance, ‘candidates make them pledge that if they don’t vote for them, their marriages would stand annulled and wives divorced through the Talaq – a rite of divorcing a spouse that comes with the weight of social and religious sanction’ (Ali, 2018). To overcome the problem of commitment, the Argentine Peronist party uses the strategy of ‘deep insertion in voters’ social networks’, which entails rewarding weak opposition parties for switching votes (Nitcher, 2008, p. 19). In this instance, opposition parties are bought over so as to weaken them and bring them to the side of government party. It is in the context of working around the problem of commitment that the vote buying phenomenon in Nigeria’s 2019 general election is best situated.

Vote Trading pattern in the 2019 Nigeria’s General Elections

Vote buying has emerged as a major scar of elections in Nigeria. The practice comes in two formats: ‘cash for vote’ and ‘vote for cash’, also known as ‘prepaid’ and ‘post-paid’ (Onuoha and Ojo, 2018). Under the prepaid or cash for vote strategy, prospective voters are given some money before the election with trust that the receivers will deliver on their promise. At times, the voting pattern is monitored by agents of the giver. This pattern of contract is based on hope and trust. The problem with this strategy is that there is a limitation to the amount of punishment the money giver can muster in the event of a breach of contract by the receiver. There are several instances where people collected money and failed to deliver on their promise, or even failed to turn up for voting.

As opposed to the prepaid approach, the post-paid method involves giving money only after voting is done. Under this approach, money is not

given until it is proven that the voter actually voted for the party of the patron. It is always preceded by a gentlemen's agreement between the patron and the client. To show evidence, the voter either stylishly displays a thumb-printed ballot paper for party agents to see or uses a smart phone to take a photo of the ballot paper after thumb-printing, which will be presented to collect an agreed amount at designated places located within the vicinity of the polling station or inside the house of the party leader (Onuoha & Ojo, 2018). Another expression for the prepaid option is 'see and buy', meaning paying for what you have verified. Here, evidence of the thumb-printed ballot paper must be seen before payment is made to the voter. In the 2019 general elections, both prepaid and post-paid methods of vote buying were employed, and it occurred before, during and after voting.

The period leading to the 2019 elections was characterised by prepaid forms of vote buying. At the People's Democratic Party (PDP) presidential primary election held in Port Harcourt, newspaper reports indicated that delegates to the primary election were offered inducements, with amounts ranging from 1000 to 5000 US dollars, with some of the delegates going home with about 9000 US dollars, having collected from many aspirants (Fabiya et al., 2018; Vanguard, 2019). During campaigns the two major parties, All Progressive Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), engaged in the distribution of materials such as T-shirts, food items and alcohol to electorates as a way of mobilisation. In Ekiti state, one of the parties even distributed TVs and handsets to people as part of the campaign. Also, a pre-election field report conducted by YIAGA revealed that politicians engaged in outright purchase of permanent voters cards (PVCs) at N10,000 and N20,000 each in states such as Edo, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Niger, Imo, Rivers, Oyo, Yobe. Kogi and Nasarawa (YIAGA Africa Initiative, 2018, p. 7). Two major factors explain why politicians buy PVCs: the first is that the cards can be distributed to supporters for multiple voting, with the connivance of electoral officers; the second is to remove the possibility of people voting for their opponents. In the thick of the campaign, Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo was also promoting what is called the Tradermoni scheme of the federal government. The programme involved giving a soft loan of N10,000 to female petty market traders. There is a debate whether this kind of scheme could be regarded as vote buying. However, the fact that the scheme was stopped immediately after the election suggested some political undercurrent behind the scheme.

The dominant form of vote buying in the 2019 elections was the post-paid method. But the method was not a sudden accident. It had been tested in earlier elections in Ondo and Ekiti states. In the 2017 governorship election in Ondo state for example, it was code-named ‘dibo ko s’ebe’ (vote and cook soup) and was said to have swayed the victory in favour of the APC candidate. Each vote attracted a sum of N5000. However, prepaid vote buying attained a disturbing climax during the 2018 governorship elections in Ekiti state when the two dominant parties made it an integral part of balloting under the slogan ‘See and Buy’ (Nwankwo, 2018; Punch, 2018). Early on the morning of the election, state workers were credited with N3000 by the state government led by the PDP. Again, as the election progressed, it was observed that the two dominant parties paid between N5000 and N3000 to each voter, after the voters showed evidence of their thumb-printed ballot papers to party agents who were stationed around the polling stations (Punch, 2018; in essence, APC won the election as a result of offering a higher price for votes, which is why YIAGA described the APC victory as ‘hard bought’ (YIAGA Africa Initiative, 2018)).

The contribution of post-paid vote buying to electoral victories in Ondo and Ekiti states gave impetus to politicians to make more use of the strategy in the 2019 general elections. As a result of the post-paid vote buying, electoral outcomes in the 2019 elections became a matter of the highest bidders (Maclean & Egbejule, 2019). Various field reports by local and international nongovernmental organisations, observer and monitoring groups show the prevalence of this practice. In their joint international observation report, officials of the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute (IRI/ NDI) identified vote buying as prevalent in different polling units across the country. Various reports by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD, 2019a) revealed proven cases of post-paid vote buying during governorship elections in several polling units in Bayelsa, Enugu, Kano and Osun states. In these places, party agents not only wooed eligible voters and negotiated with them over prices of their votes, they were also seen writing down names and phone numbers of eligible voters for the purpose of paying them after being shown evidence of voting for their parties. Indeed, according to Idayat Hassan, a director of the CDD, a single vote purchased by politicians in the 2019 elections ranged between N250 and N14,000. According to the CDD (2019a), prices of votes in the Governorship and State Assembly elections stood between N3000 and N4000 in some

polling units in Madobi LGA in Kano and, as ridiculously, at N1500 in some places in Epe and Lagos states. In the supplementary elections conducted in Sokoto state, voters were paid between N14,000 and N15,000 after lifting their thumb-printed paper for party agents to ascertain their voting preferences (CDD, 2019b).

A study of elections since the return of democracy in 1999 shows a gradual increase of vote buying as a determinant of electoral fortunes. While it was not so pronounced in the 1999 elections, it started becoming pronounced in subsequent elections. It did, however, assume a dangerous dimension in the 2019 general elections when politicians resorted to the post-paid method of vote buying.

Conclusion/Recommendations

This paper focused on vote buying in the 2019 general elections and future of democracy in Nigeria. It has identified vote buying as one of the most prevalent and dangerous tactics adopted by politicians in the 2019 election. Studies bordering on poverty of the populace, desperation on the part of political actors, compromised security operatives; complicity of the electoral body and the zero-sum nature of elections in Nigeria have been given as contributory factors to vote buying and selling. This phenomenon has ridiculed democratic process and portends danger to future of democracy in Nigeria.

The paper recommends that in addition to the electoral reform so far put in place, which has made it impossible for politicians to engage in the traditional rigging method of ballot snatching, ballot stuffing and figure manipulation, the electoral body has to devise further strategy to eliminate before, during and after election vote buying. Again, experience has revealed complicity of security operatives like the police, army and civil defence in vote buying and selling. Furthermore, the complicity of electoral body and the ad hoc staff has also been identified and the electoral body must desist from this unwholesome act of ridiculing elections and democracy in Nigeria. As long as the security operatives and the electoral body remain acquiescent to the political class, the problem of vote trading before, during and after elections will persist and the future democracy and good governance put in jeopardy.

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POLITICAL VERSUS ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING: THE TWO BIG QUESTIONS IN NIGERIA

Michael I. Ugwueze

Abstract

The study interrogated the issues of political and economic restructuring which have divided Nigerians along ethnic, religious and regional lines since 1914 amalgamation is how to define the parameters for belonging to a union that was foisted on the people through colonialism. This laid the foundation for restructuring debate in Nigeria. It observed that each time there is a heightened call for political and economic restructuring, there is a profound fear that equates it with the breakup of Nigeria; leading people to interrogate whose interest is the debate designed to protect. It contended that the factors that undermine a genuine production-oriented political and economic restructuring are still under-explored. The finding indicated what stands between the majority of Nigerians and political restructuring are some issues which showcase the life of denial adopted by the post-military elite class, the local and international conspiracies that deny the Nigerian system its progress, and the deceits that were designed to perpetuate the grips of the new elites in power. It therefore made a case for the resolution of the apparent lack of consensus on whether or not to restructure Nigeria politically and economically as the country is running out of time.

Introduction

Since Nigeria got independence in 1960, the country has been ensnared in the crisis of governance that undermines genuine nation-building. Many explanations have been given by scholars, analysts and other concerned

stakeholders as to why Nigeria has continued to mark-time without moving forward over five decades after its independence. Existing literature blames this on the colonial legacy (Udombana, 2017; Abutudu, 2010; Adejumobi, 2010; Tamuno 1998; Ugwueze, upcoming) and prolonged military rule (el-Rufai, 2017; Agbaje, 2010). However, with the return of democracy in 1999, expectations were high. Adejumobi (2010, p.2), notes that this period “ushered in a renewed hope that the lost opportunities for political progress and economic development squandered by successive despotic military regimes would be regained with the unleashing of the creative energies of the people in a new era of governance and democracy.”

Meanwhile, the continued failure of the Nigerian State to deliver on public goods after this period is responsible for the resonation of the restructuring debate in the country. Soludo (2018) observes that Nigeria can never move forward with the current unitary-federalism that obtains in the country. There is, therefore, an entrenched feeling of marginalization from nearly every geopolitical zone given the suffocation of the constituent units by the central government (Soludo, 2018; Obaze, n.d). As such, the debate on restructuring Nigeria “keeps returning like a snake that is never slain” (Udombana, 2017, p.1).

If there is anything that Nigerians have agreed on, it is that the Nigerian State, currently structured, cannot deliver on public goods and should urgently be restructured both politically and economically. El-Rufai (2017, p.3) argues that “Nigerians are neither happy nor content with the current political structure, the 1999 Constitution, and virtually all the institutions of governance at the federal, state and local levels,” despite the country’s huge natural resource endowments. Ironically, there is an entrenched suspicion that any call for restructuring is insidious and masked with ulterior motives; either to primarily balkanize Nigeria (Obaze, n.d.) or to score a cheap political point (el-Rufai, 2017). As such, how the country should be restructured remains subject of intense opposition and disagreement among various groups in Nigeria. Abutudu (2010, p.24) argues that “the elusive search for stability and

development in Nigeria is usually traced to the absence of a consensus on how the coexistence of the diverse peoples that make up the country should be managed.” Regrettably, those who should initiate the process of restructuring Nigeria have chosen to play politics with it instead of genuinely addressing the desire for national progress, which it could bring (el-Rufai, 2017; Moghalu, 2018). This explains various national conferences organized in Nigeria starting with the 1994/95 constitutional conference. None of the recommendations of these conferences genuinely saw the light of the day neither were they adopted and constitutionalized; thus, making them mere avenues for satisfying the calls for national dialogue by the conveners.

It is against the backdrop of deepening the restructuring debate and developing an acceptable formula for restructuring Nigeria that this paper undertakes to examine the two big problems of political and economic restructuring. Three fundamental questions were raised: first, can political restructuring of Nigeria be complete without economic restructuring? Second, can economic restructuring of Nigeria endure in the face of the present political/national composition? Third, can Nigeria survive the next two decades without political and economic restructuring? The paper aims to conclude that the apparent lack of consensus on how to restructure Nigeria both politically and economically issues from three fundamental problems of denial, conspiracy and deceit.

The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: the first section theoretically looks at the drivers of restructuring debate in Nigeria. This is followed by the section that addresses the primacy of political restructuring as a foundation for economic development and progress. The next section looks at the factors that threaten Nigeria's restructuring efforts. It embodies within it the primary fears that incubate the opposition to restructuring agitations in Nigeria. I proffer a workable formula that could address the apparent lack of consensus on Nigeria's political restructuring in the following section. The final part of the paper contains the concluding analysis.

Understanding the Drivers of Restructuring Debate in Nigeria: A Theoretical Insight

Several factors engineer the recurrent restructuring debate in Nigeria. Ola-David (2018) argues that the national debate and calls for restructuring are nothing new in Nigeria, but they continue to grow amid economic stress, political uncertainty and recurrent violent conflicts. Therefore, agitations for restructuring Nigeria issue basically from three main factors: marginalization or political uncertainty, development deficits or economic stress, and insecurity or recurrent violent conflicts. The entire three are rife across Nigeria, and they constitute the broad frameworks upon which the drivers of restructuring debate in the country have been explained.

Marginalization theorists argue that, just like secessionist movements, political uncertainty and economic deprivations spur people to demand structural changes either for a complete breakaway from a system or for relative political autonomy that guarantees their participation (Abutudu, 2010; Wimmer *et al.*, 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Anderson 2004; Jega, 1996; Horowitz, 1981). As Abutudu (2010) observes, tensions between the component units and the centre, and among the constituent units themselves, as well as of various interests groups often fuel demands for restructuring. Thus, “demands for equity and justice in the allocation of political space from minorities and marginalized groups have all made for a consistent and perennial stream of agitations for restructuring ... in Nigeria” (Abutudu, 2010, p.24). Jega (1996) also identifies marginalization based on inequalities, regional imbalances, relations of ethnic domination, cultural and religious antagonisms, as well as competition and perceptions arising from these to be responsible for both the debate and the struggle for restructuring Nigeria. Obaze (n.d.) argues that post-independent Nigeria had four regions that were self-sufficient in food and production of various cash crops and other exportable commodities without oil wealth. These regions were funding the central government, and most institutions in Nigeria currently were those built

by them (Ebiziem & Onyemere, 2018; el-Rufai, 2017). However, the advent and reliant on oil wealth and military take-over of power reversed the order and made the constituent units dependent upon the central government. This reversal created an overbearing central government and made control of federal power highly juicy. As a result, there is increased “feelings of marginalization, of being short-changed, dominated, oppressed, threatened, or even targeted for elimination” and so long as these feelings exist, the clamour for restructuring will persist (Obaze, n.d., para. 8).

Other scholars and analysts align their thoughts along with the argument that insecurity is the driver of restructuring debate in Nigeria. Those that subscribe to insecurity as the driver of restructuring debate in Nigeria argue that when the State (central government) is incapacitated at providing security, the tendency to demand greater control and autonomy for the constituent units becomes high. Essentially, the literature on the Nigerian Civil War observes that eastern region was pushed to secede from Nigeria because of insecurity occasioned by the pogrom against the Igbo across the country, especially in the North between 1966 and 1967 (Aremu & Buhari, 2017; Heerten & Moses, 2014; Achebe, 2012; Perham, 1970). Those who still subscribe to this argument in the contemporary times note that the rise in terrorism, insurgency and secessionist agitations owes its foundation to the faulty structure of the Nigerian State (Ugochukwu-Uko, 2019; Clark, 2018; Farayibi, 2017). An opinion poll conducted by Abimbola Akosile of the *Thisday* newspaper on 17 May 2018 reveals that majority of Nigerians believe that restructuring will address the insecurity problems bedeviling the country, including marginalization and injustice. According to one of the respondents, Miss Apeji Patience Eneyeme from Badagry in Lagos State, “restructuring Nigeria will curb injustice and balance all existing insecurity. Restructuring is like equity and equality; you give those that need what and balance those that want that. If that is done, automatically injustice will be taken care of, and insecurity handled.” Various socio-cultural organizations also express this position in Nigeria such as the Afenifere, Ohanaeze Ndigbo as well as the Association of Middle Belt Ethnic Nationalities (ASOMBEN). Soludo (2018)

argues that it would be difficult for the security situation in Nigeria to improve where Governors answer chief security officers of the states; yet, they have no control over the police. Similarly, Kwasau (2018) opines that Nigeria cannot tackle the current wave of insecurity without restructuring because those who know are not in control.

Some scholars also note that the way Nigeria is currently structured is unfriendly to development and therefore creates deficits (Soludo, 2018; Moghalu, 2018; Yaqub, 2016). Soludo (2018), for instance, recounts that with its limited institutional capacity, the central government is mandated to micromanage the entire country, which has stalled the development of institutional capacity at the lower levels of government, including the state and local governments. The 1999 Constitution empowers the Federal Government with exclusive right over all minerals, while the Land Use Act grants the state government the right over land. As Soludo (2018) observes, to get to the solid minerals, you must have access to the land and the conflict between State and community powers over land vis-a-vis the federal right to what is underneath it has not been resolved. This arrangement inherently breeds conflict and explains the resource control crises in the Niger-Delta, as well as the failure to tap into other natural resource endowments, including the gold deposit in Zamfara, the tin in Plateau, and the coal in Enugu, among others. Yaqub (2016) also holds the view that the departure from adequate remuneration of the federating states (from where the enormous revenues are generated) and the accompanying lack of equity in giving what is due to the states by the Federal Government combine to fuel the agitation for restructuring. Yaqub's statement aptly explains the lopsided revenue sharing formula in Nigeria that leaves the federal government with 52.68%, state governments 26.72% and local government 20.60%. Holders of this view could be more susceptible to economic restructuring. El-Rufai (2017, p.3-4), for instance, notes that:

The political giants that led the old regions competed to do their best for their respective peoples: the Western Region launched the first public television service in Africa, a few years after adopting a free

education policy that consolidated its head start in western education by extending universal access to the masses. Each of the three original regions founded its university, built industrial estates, and developed hospitality businesses; and they tried to build the physical infrastructure needed for a modern economy. These regional governments built some of the most enduring institutions in Nigeria, hence the understandable nostalgia in some quarters for the currently-dysfunctional federal structure of Nigeria to revert to the regions of old.

These three theoretical perspectives are, no doubt mutually reinforcing and germane in explaining the current wave of restructuring in Nigeria. However, the perspective on development deficit appears to have summarized the debate in two major ways. First, marginalization is pronounced where people feel they are not progressing the way they should economically. Second, when development is in short supply, unemployment and poverty – the two major drivers of insecurity – become rife. These two socio-economic conditions reignite the old narrative about restructuring, which aims to create room for more centres of economic opportunities. Both marginalization and insecurity are therefore embedded in economic stress.

Between Political and Economic Restructuring: Any Magic Wand?

Before answering this question, it is important to clarify what I mean by political and economic restructuring in this paper. Although restructuring as a concept is subject to various interpretations, a political scientist cannot claim, entire, ignorance of what it represents politically. It is therefore erroneous to argue that we do not understand what is political restructuring as some analysts posit. We may disagree on how to restructure but not on what to restructure or what is restructuring. Undertaking to argue that I have an

indubitable universal definition of political and economic restructuring could also be defeatist. This is because it is not only challenging to proffer a universally acceptable definition of the concepts but also impossible to do so. This explains why the term political restructuring has been subjected to intense delineation, including in the use of such concepts as true federalism, devolution of power, resource control, regionalism, self-determination, and balkanization to either represent or replace it. In the same vein, economic restructuring has manifested in different designations, including as privatization, commercialization, structural adjustment and liberalization, deregulation, regulation, and down-streaming, among other nomenclatural attachments.

However, in the Nigerian context and for the sake of clarity and empiricism, political restructuring as used in this paper has to do with structural changes that issue from the foundation of the State; aimed at ensuring balanced federalism and production-oriented resource control. Balanced federalism explains political restructuring based on the relative autonomy of the constituent units and devolution of power. At the same time, production-oriented resource control details political restructuring from the threshold of economic indices that sustain the viability of the constituent units. Thus, political restructuring means the process of divesting the central government of certain powers contained in the concurrent list and limiting its areas of influence to issues of currency, defence, foreign policy, and immigration.

Although scholars have viewed economic restructuring from different perspectives, including as flexible specialization (Piore & Sabel, 1984), neo-Schumpeterian/longwave (Perez, 1983; Freeman & Perez, 1988), regulation (Nielsen, 1991), or even the tripartite combination (Dietrich, 1999), I will not restrict my explanation to these theoretical viewpoints. First, they do not represent the interest of a developing state that is struggling to find its bearing, and second, there is the tendency to relapse into the same schism of regulation in terms of privatization, commercialization and liberalization. In this study, it

believed that these theories will not deliver on their genuine intentions if the restructuring is not completed politically. The economic correlate of the restructuring that is discussed in this paper is what is often referred to as resource control. Therefore, economic restructuring is seen in this context as the guaranteed constitutional provision for the constituent units to own and control the resources within their territorial enclaves while remitting certain percentage of their earnings for the preservation of the federal union. This, in my view, lays the foundation for the development of catharsis and economic progress that is desired by the people, including the federating units. This process cannot be completed without political restructuring. Soludo (2018) underscored this when he argued that "institutions lead the economic transformation." Therefore, brandishing economic blueprints for Nigeria without the concomitant legal-political governance infrastructure to deliver such plans will not work. Thus, economistic plans either seek to legislate politics out of public policy or misunderstand change to be a push-button technocratic process (Soludo, 2018). Essentially, it presupposes that economic restructuring alone does not deliver the needed changes that could spur Nigeria into progress.

Nigeria has witnessed a series of restructuring, both politically and economically. Most of the political and economic restructuring took place during the military era. However, the question remains whether the type of restructuring delivered met the aspirations and yearnings of Nigerians. Notably, state and local government creations by the military were a form of political restructuring, but the pattern of creation might have defeated the intention for the creation. Essentially, as states multiplied, they became smaller and less fiscally-independent, and a powerful centre emerged in a Federal Government that assumed more powers and responsibilities, as well as appropriates the largest share of national revenues but delivers very little (el-Rufai, 2017). The state and local government creations, in most cases, only served the purpose of political settlement and cabal calculation. It is believed in some quarters that states and local governments were created either to buoy the sagging legitimacy of the military in power (Ukiwo, 2006) or to serve

some inordinate interests. Although refuted severally by the former military president, Ibrahim Babangida, it was alleged that citing of Delta State's capital in Asaba instead of Warri was to satisfy Babangida's wife, Mariam who hailed from Asaba. As such, the series of political and economic restructuring that was hitherto delivered failed to touch on the fundamental issues of Nigeria's federalism or governance architecture that is production oriented.

Having explained both concepts of economic and political restructuring, asking which possesses the magic wand between the two is therefore begging the question. In my opinion, political restructuring possesses the magic wand because it goes with economic restructuring, although not all economic restructuring goes with political restructuring. Thus, political restructuring of Nigeria cannot be complete without economic restructuring, and economic restructuring of Nigeria cannot endure in the face of the present political configuration. Political restructuring alone produces notable foundational consequences, unlike economic restructuring, that hardly drives the political structure. It was against this backdrop that Nkrumah (1970) called on African states to first seek political freedom, and every other thing shall be added. This dictum has proven incontrovertible. Take, for instance, the military incursion into Nigerian politics and the attendant discordant state creation distorted the development trajectory that placed Nigeria along the same path and level with Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Singapore in the 1960s. Of all these countries, it is only Nigeria that is performing below expectation. This is because military-style of political restructuring in Nigeria, which manifested in the form of state and local government creation, restructured the economic system out of context. Thus, the economy moved from being production-oriented to consumption typified. Meanwhile, various economic restructurings in Nigeria which were all driven by neo-capitalist or neoliberal philosophies such as Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), privatization, commercialization, and deregulation, among others neither touched on the (consumption-oriented) structure of the State nor bettered the lives of the citizens. While production-oriented countries like China, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Singapore and Brazil are progressing,

consumption typified countries like Nigeria is becoming “the poverty capital of the world” (Kharas, Hamel & Hofer, 2018).

Significant Threats to Political Restructuring in Nigeria

Some certain groups and factors constitute a severe clog in the wheel of political restructuring in Nigeria. Moghalu (2018) identified two major groups. The first group is made up of those who are ignorant of what restructuring means, and therefore are susceptible to arguments that cast the idea falsely as a "breakup" of the country. The second are those who know the truth but are wedded to vested interests and self-serving agenda that have nothing to do with Nigeria's real progress. They are synonymous to what Abada, Okafor and Udeogu (2018, p.1590) christened the “Parasitic Oligarchic Class”. This is mostly a problem created by colonialism and military intervention in Nigerian politics. Udombana (2017, p.9), for instance, observes that colonialism encouraged the formation of an elite group that is alienated from their cultures and are therefore susceptible to western assimilation. This practice produced a heterogeneous elite class that survives by living in denial, conspiracy and deceit. Military intervention in politics in 1966 and the subsequent rules completed the cycle of building elites that not only live in but are also parasitic, unpatriotic, self-centred, consumption-oriented and brutal in politicking. These people have consolidated their grips of power such that it may take many decades to extricate their structure from the Nigerian system. The fastest road to their extrication is to embark on political restructuring of the Nigerian State that is production oriented. This will not be an easy task, mainly because those that will make this happen are the very people that benefit from the faulty foundation of the State in Nigeria. Many, especially the parasitic elite class, will lose in the short and medium terms of this restructuring, but all will gain in the long run. This explains why the fiercest opposition to political restructuring comes from the consumption-oriented parasitic elite class, who use their privileged position to build a mass

of uninformed Nigerians willing to die for no cause. Regrettably, the cocks are coming home to roost. The results are seen as Boko Haram insurgency, Niger-Delta militancy, separatist agitations, armed banditry and many other challenging security situations across Nigeria.

Meanwhile, the parasitic elite class is found among the Igbo, the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba, among other minority groups. What is interesting about the situation is that these people are in the minority. The majority of Nigerians are anxiously waiting and demanding political restructuring. Following this explanation, the study demonstrates how the parasitic and consumption-oriented elite class threatens political restructuring in Nigeria through denial, conspiracy and deceit.

Denial

Denial comes in a chain, which builds from colonialism and its false consciousness to military intervention and its forced governance, and then to tele-guided democracy and the attendant misrule. Thus, Akintunde-Johnson (2019, para.1) argues that:

In countries where people are well-ruled, the prevailing criticisms surround the issues of vaulting ambitions of leadership, war-mongering, tendencies towards global domination, immigrants exodus, etc. However, amongst the misruled, the anger is fuelled by suspicions that the leaders are deaf, dumb, in denial of both ailments, and thus are impervious to issues, ideas and situations that may lift and promote the well-being of their citizens – even if these ideas are condensed in perfumed cream and stuffed into their nostrils.

In Akintunde-Johnson's view, anybody that thinks the above observation is an exaggeration must have either dropped from the Mars or other planetary

habitations different from the earth. Denial is a complete ostrich game that will claim it has hidden in the soil while its entire feathers are outside. People like Obafemi Awolowo, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe that fought for Nigeria's independence were very clear about the type of society they wanted. They were not ready to deny or deceive the people they were leading. Their factual position on the project 'Nigeria' helped them to build regional governments that were competitive and production-oriented. For instance, Chief Obafemi Awolowo once argued that 'Nigeria is only a geographical expression to which life was given by the diabolical amalgamation of 1914; that amalgamation will ever remain the most painful injury a British government inflicted on southern Nigeria' (cited in Nze, 2017). According to him, 'if rapid political progress is to be made in Nigeria, it is high time we were realistic in tackling its constitutional problems. Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are English, Welsh or French' (Awolowo, 1947, p.47-48). Nigeria being a mere geographic expression implied that the southern and northern protectorates that were joined together had no cultural affinity, and as such, could not have harmoniously cohabited. Therefore, the East remained for the easterners, the North for the northerners, the West for the westerners and Nigeria for nobody (Awolowo, 1947). Similarly, while addressing the Northern House of Assembly in 1952, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa publicly stated that:

The Southern people who are flocking into this region (northern region) daily, in such large numbers are intruders; we do not want them, and they are not welcomed here in the North. Since 1914, the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country. However, the people are different in every way, including religion, custom, language and aspirations. We in the North take it that Nigeria unity is only a British intention for the country they created. It is not for us (cited in Nze, 2017 online).

Aligning his thought with those of Awolowo and Balewa, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello called the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria, ‘a colonial mistake’ (Bello, 1962). Bello in an interview granted to *Parrot Newspaper* on 12 October 1960, argued that ‘the new nation called Nigeria should be an estate from our great-grandfather, Othman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities of the North as willing tools, and the South as conquered territories and never allow them to have control of their future’ (cited in Nze, 2017). These comments coming from those that inherited power from the colonialists reflected the deep-seated conviction of the two regions that they were not meant for each other, and by implication, should not have been brought together into an irreconcilable marriage of colonial making (Ugwueze, upcoming). These regional political demagogues pursued governance along with the will of the people within their regional enclaves. Chief Awolowo is forever remembered for his free education and health care for the poor through cocoa production. The North, headed by Ahmadu Bello and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, is remembered for the groundnut pyramid, and the East, led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, had the command of palm produce that revolutionalized their regions.

However, those that have been leading Nigeria since the military interregna continue to feed people with lies. This explains why a popular Frank Talk column in *Sun* (Nigeria) newspaper of 14 September 2016 queried, “how do you tell your elder that he is lying?” In a typical African traditional system, elders do not lie. Therefore, you watch and shudder as your ‘very respected’ elder lies without doing anything, lest you be chastised for being rude. The above assertion has become entirely different in contemporary Nigeria. Agbaje (2010, p. 62) rightly argues that:

Informed Nigerians and students of Nigerian politics and governance at home and abroad are daily confronted with the startling possibility that much of the country's recent and current history has been manufactured to ensure a triumph of form over content and a separation of lived reality from reported reality. In

effect, the Nigerian elite appears to have perfected the idea and practice of a life lived in denial at the level of official/public discourse, attempting to hegemonically foist the practice of lying in State and political society on the Nigerian polity.

Recent events in Nigeria have continued to permeate this, instead of reversing the trend to better the future of the country. Some people's names are increasingly becoming synonymous with lies which do not speak well for a country that genuinely yearns for national integration. The current crop of Nigerian politicians continually sings the song of unity, but dances the tune of oppression and disunity; yet, preventing genuine desire for national dialogue. To them, the empire called Nigeria should be maintained at all cost without recourse to genuine agitations. Thus, there is a perfection of a life lived in denial in Nigeria.

Conspiracy

Nigeria has been labelled in several unprintable names, including as a patrimonial, predatory, patronage and vampire State (Udombana, 2017, p.8) that is driven by local and international conspiracies. Conspiracy explains the beliefs about a group of actors that collude in secret to reach malevolent goals (Bale, 2007; Prooijen and Douglas, 2018). The first major political restructuring that started the destruction of Nigeria was the Decree No 34 of 1966 promulgated by Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, which sort to unify Nigeria's public service much to the opposition mostly from the northern region (el-Rufai, 2017). This Decree heralded the death of regionalism in Nigeria and set the path for what Soludo (2018) called "unitary federalism". Ironsi's promise that the Decree aimed to ensure the advancement of public service through efficiency and merit did not hold water, especially for the northern and mid-western regions whose military governors: Major General

David Akpode Ejoor and Major General Hassan Usman Katsina, respectively immediately kicked against.

Although General Yakubu Gowon repealed the Decree 34 through Decree 9 of 31 August 1966, a large portion of the Decree is still effective in Nigeria till date. Destroying further Nigeria's regional configuration, General Gowon promulgated Decree 14 of 1967, which broke Nigeria into twelve states and provided for Military Governors for each of the states. With the centralization of power through Decree 34 and its suspension through Decree 9, as well as Decree 14, which further laid the foundation for division of Nigeria into unviable federating units, regionalism was finally buried (Teniola, 2017). While Decree 34 is believed in many quarters as a product of local conspiracy designed to perpetuate the Igbo in governance, Decree 14 is believed to be the manifestation of an international conspiracy between western powers that never wanted Nigeria to develop and their local surrogates that never wanted to lose influence. Both Decrees fundamentally touched on the foundation of the Nigerian State, though wrongly. Conspiracy guided political restructuring during the military era and the same conspiracy is responsible for the failure of the rapacious elite class to bend towards a production-oriented political restructuring, especially since 1999 when the military officers technically returned themselves under a civilian cloak.

Conspiracy creates fractious politics and competing interests, which el-Rufai (2017) argues that risk muddying the waters of the current restructuring debate. Conspiracy is a major legacy used to preserve colonial and capitalist stratagems of forced governance, false consciousness and divide-and-rule system in Nigeria. See table 1 for the linkage.

Table 1: The linkage of colonial legacies with governance and insecurity in Nigeria

Colonial legacy	I m p l i c a t i o n f o r governance	Security risk
F o r c e d governance	Military rule	Military intervention in politics
	Poor governance	Elite rivalry and corruption
	Electoral malpractice	Political apathy
	Violent political culture	Political violence
F a l s e consciousness	Ethnic politics	Ethno-religious conflicts
	Prebendalism	Corruption
	Lack of national cohesion and marginalization	Separatist agitations, militancy, insurgency, terrorism
	Heterogeneous ruling class	Suspicious government
Divide and rule system	Unity in diversity	I n d i g e n e - s e t t l e r dichotomy
	Unclearly established sphere of influence	Boundary disputes and corruption
	Social atomization	Mutual distrust
	Structural imbalance	Minority agitations

Source: Ugwueze (upcoming) and modified in 2019.

Every colonial legacy has implication for governance and insecurity in Nigeria. Colonial patterns of administration that thrived on forced governance laid the foundation for military rule through military intervention in politics, poor governance through elite rivalry and corruption, as well as political apathy through electoral malpractice and political violence through violent

political culture. False consciousness laid the foundation for ethnoreligious conflicts through ethnic politics, corruption through prebendalism, separatist agitations, militancy, insurgency and terrorism through lack of national cohesion and marginalization, and suspicious government through the heterogeneous ruling class. The British divide and rule system laid the foundation for indigene-settler dichotomy through unity in diversity, boundary disputes through the establishment of an unclearly defined sphere of influence, mutual distrust through social atomization, and minority agitation through structural imbalance.

There is a continuation of the British gunboat diplomacy in Nigeria which accounts for why Nigerians are forcefully held down, dealt with and still given no room to even complain by their internal colonizers – the political elites class. This class of elite foisted the current Constitution on Nigerians, which represents the height of conspiracy between foreign powers and their local surrogates. As such, they injected the notion of indivisibility and indissolubility of the Nigerian State; yet ignoring the social justice and equity that would have given these principles the necessary teeth to bite. With such teeth lacking, nails were manufactured to hold Nigeria together.

Deceit

Right from the period of military rule, Nigerians have been deceived. The climax of the deceit was in 1986, when Nigerians, in a nationwide debate, roundly rejected SAP and insisted on *Socialist Transformation of Nigeria* (STN). Against the rejection, the federal military government, led by General Ibrahim Babangida, went ahead to adopt SAP. Meanwhile, the report of Nigerians' rejection was contained in the federal government's established Committee on the National Political Debate (NPD). This action demonstrates that no wing of the Nigerian ruling class would want a transformation towards a genuine liberation of Nigeria to happen. Their masters in Brussels, London or Washington, who are the originators of World Bank and International

Monetary Fund (IMF), would not allow it either (Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), 2019). This action is both deceitful and conspiratorial. It is deceitful because the federal government merely convoked the NPD to satisfy the agitation of the moment while it was never ready to adopt whatever recommendations or report that would issue from such debate if they were not in line with its predetermined agenda. Following the manner the rejection came, it was also evident that neoliberal financial institutions – World Bank and IMF – had concluded plans with their local surrogates in Nigeria to unduly and wholly packaged the country for the global capitalist environment that Nigeria was ill-prepared for.

However, the beginning of the deceit in contemporary times started with the first clause in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), which reads:

We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, having firmly and solemnly resolved: To live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God, dedicated to the promotion of inter-African solidarity, world peace, international co-operation and understanding; And to provide for a Constitution to promote the good government and welfare of all persons in our country, on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, and to consolidate the unity of our people; Do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following Constitution.

First, the people of Nigeria never resolved anywhere, whether under colonialism, military rule or the current democratic dispensation to give themselves this kind of a constitution. Second, this was a constitution assembled by the military junta in collaboration with their civilian accomplice(s) and given to Nigerians without either their consultation or their consent. Third, the Constitution was made to first hold Nigerians together (by force) in order to promote inter-African solidarity, world peace, international

co-operation and understanding. It is after this must have been achieved that Nigerians will begin to talk about good governance, welfare, freedom, equality and justice for all. This could explain why Nigeria is operating below its citizens' expectations. The country is yet to be through with promotion of world peace and other global objectives. The question remains, "should Nigerians continue to exercise patience?"

Place this preamble side-by-side with the opening clause in the Constitution of the United States of America (as amended), and you will understand why there is a constitutional crisis in Nigeria. The opening clause of the US Constitution reads:

WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

This is how a constitution that emanates from the people is couched. It must first address the welfare of the people (citizen-centric) before projecting an outward objective(s) which must have a direct impact on the people still. Why are Nigeria's constitutional provisions different if not because the Constitution did not emanate from the people?

Deceit, which issues from false consciousness, is one of the legacies of colonialism that denies Nigeria the road to genuine national integration. It continues to threaten efforts to restructure Nigeria politically. The military perfected this act through the abrogation of the Aburi Accord, the *no victor no vanquished* slogan, and the 3R policy of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. The result of the Aburi Accord, which was reached to strengthen regionalism in Nigeria, was the further division of the country into 12 states to limit their influence and viability. The *no victor no vanquished*

was another post-civil war slogan manufactured to deceive a people into believing that they did not lose when everything around them suggested complete loss. Finally, the promise of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation was followed with property confiscation, 20 pounds initiative whereby for everything an Easterner had before the war whether, in terms of cash in the bank or property outside their domain, they were handed a paltry 20 pounds in return. To the Easterners, the indigenization policy, which combined to shoot the Igbo entirely from bidding for those indigenized firms. In this same regard, Nigerian leaders have continued to tell Nigerians that they do not need political restructuring. Instead, they should be asking for good governance. The question in the lips of many people is: why are Nigerian political elites afraid of restructuring? The answer is simple. They are afraid of losing their grips on power in Nigeria. This is the primary factor that spurs them into the hands of the foreign enemies who foisted the faulty foundation on Nigerians and made them believe it was the best they could anticipate at the moment.

Entering the Next Level: Building a Befitting Model of Political Restructuring for Nigeria

Abutudu (2010, p.30) notes that “the spate of calls for the restructuring of the country suggests that Nigeria has yet to find an acceptable formula for managing (its) national diversity.” In the same vein, Moghalu (2018) also agrees that many decades after independence, Nigeria continues to be confronted with the imperative of defining a future that escapes its past. It is against these backdrops that this paper suggests a formula that is deemed germane to Nigeria if it must survive the next two decades. To move forward in its efforts to achieve balanced federalism that is production oriented, and which will solve the problems of marginalization, economic stress and insecurity, urgent steps must be taken to address four fundamental issues in Nigeria. These issues are the economy, national composition, oriental defence

and electoral system. These factors will help to address the problem that is holding Nigeria down.

Economy

The economy addresses the fundamental issues of production, exchange, and consumption. Therefore, for Nigeria to move forward, it must embark on restructuring its economy to make it production oriented. This can only be possible when the federal government is divested of the control of resources within the territorial jurisdictions of the constituent units. In the same regard, all the issues under the concurrent list must as well be relinquished to the constituent units. The central government must be left with the management of currency, defence, foreign policy, and immigration. As such, the federating units must be made to remit a certain amount of their earnings as tax to the central government for the maintenance of these institutions. This will also encourage the viability of the federating units and those that cannot survive may, depending on their geographical contiguity, open negotiation with others for a possible merger. This is the beginning of a hybrid bottom-up restructuring process, which has never been tried in Nigeria since the destruction of regionalism by the military governments.

National Composition

On national composition, issues of regionalism and power-sharing must be addressed. Hence, Nigerians must decide whether to make the six geopolitical zones the new federating units with their constituted regional governments. At the national level, a collegial presidential system will be established, where each geopolitical zone elects one person that will represent them at the presidential college. The tenure of office of these elected regional representatives shall be six years (if Nigeria decides to retain the six geopolitical zones) and subject to re-election by their regional members for a

full 12 years of two terms. The presidential college shall have a chairmanship position, which must be occupied by a member on a rotational basis for one year each.

There shall be a National Assembly whose membership must be drawn equally from the geopolitical zones on part-time bases. Minimum qualification of a member of both the National Assembly and the Presidential College should be established at the national level. However, each zone shall have the power to raise the bar to suit their condition. Composition of the judiciary shall follow the same line of national and regional configuration.

Each regional government shall have its court system, including up to Regional Supreme Court (RSC) that will adjudicate on all issues relating to the region. The Federal Supreme Court (FSC) shall have the power to adjudicate only on those cases that affect the collective interest of the federating units, such as cases involving the centre and the constituent unit(s) (vertical adjudication) or constituent unit qua constituent unit (horizontal adjudication). Proper composition of the FSC shall be an equal number of judges drawn from the geopolitical zones and chosen by the regional government.

Oriental Defence

Nigeria needs to have a second look at its oriental defence system. The oriental defence has to do with the outmoded or ancient security formation that is no longer valued in modern time because it is too centralized. Centralization of internal and external security management on the hands of the federal government denies the constituent units the opportunity to police their environments adequately. As such, Nigeria must restructure its security system by allowing the central defence system (the armed forces) to manage external threats. At the same time, the constituent units take care of the

internal security issues. This means that the police service (force) will wholly be owned and managed by the constituent units. The practice will help to inject local content in security management and curb the system of human and material waste, characteristic of the current oriental defence system in Nigeria. In oriental defence system, every security agent is an all-rounder with or without the necessary training.

Electoral System

The final issue to be touched is the electoral system. Nigeria must undertake to unbundle the electoral body (INEC) and make election management regional based. As such, there shall not be a central electoral umpire conducting elections for all the federating regions. Each region shall have the power to organize its election within the period nationally established for conducting elections. Including those to represent each region at the Presidential College and National Assembly shall be decided by the regional electoral umpire based on nationally established guidelines.

The initiative might appear impossible and utopian, but that is the only option for Nigeria's survival as a united country in the next two decades. Notably, this could be a hard way of building a nation, but nation-building is always hard. Meanwhile, it needs not to be as challenging as we make it look in Nigeria (Moghalu, 2018), especially because it is an international project which does not happen by accident (Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2014). As Moghalu (2018) rightly notes, the real test of nation-building is in the leadership and the actions that create a real spirit of nationhood, and the willingness of every stakeholder to build a united, stable and cohesive nation.

Conclusion

This article looked at the critical issues of economic and political restructuring in Nigeria and discovered that what stands between the majority of Nigerians and political restructuring are some issues which showcase the life of denial adopted by the post-military elite class, the local and international conspiracies that deny the Nigerian system its progress, and the deceptions that were designed to perpetuate the grips of the new elites in power. Thus, Nigerian political elites are the greatest enemies and obstacles to political restructuring in Nigeria. This is due mainly to the fear emanating from losing their rapacious and parasitic hold to power and using same to better the lives of only their dependants, generations and cronies, which has been variously described by Joseph (1987) and others as “cronyism” and “prebendalism”. No doubt, this class of people will lose in the short and medium terms of the suggested political restructuring, in addition to causing national upheaval. However, in the long term, all including the elite will benefit maximally from a restructured political system.

Addressing the problem of restructuring, the study suggested that for Nigeria to move forward, it must revisit its economy, national composition, oriental defence and electoral system. The economy has to be production-oriented, national composition, including its political system, has to be reshaped, the oriental (ancient) defence system must be in line with modern approach and the electoral system, including its umpire has to be unbundled and decentralized.

What will continue to engage scholars in the foreseeable future is how to achieve this form of political restructuring, whether through the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC), national conference, constitutional review, legislative enactment, or revolutionary overthrow of the existing status quo. Whichever way, time is not on the side of Nigeria. If Nigerians insist on SNC, how can members of such conference be drawn to avoid ethnic conflagrations and how can they convince their political class to listen to the voice of reason? Meanwhile, if Nigerians fail to execute the project of political restructuring now consciously, they may be risking a

revolutionary overthrow of the existing status quo given the mass of desperate and unemployed youths in the country. With Nigeria as the poverty capital of the world, time is not on its side.

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**CAUSES OF STREET BEGGING IN NORTHERN NIGERIA:
A STUDY OF GOMBE METROPOLIS**

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Abstract

Street begging is the act of soliciting arms or assistance in cash or kind normally on the street by individuals or group of individuals without any exchange for service been rendered. This activity is usually carried out by children, youth, elders and mostly a routine activity of physically challenged persons on the major streets or public places and gatherings like markets, churches, mosques, offices, filling stations and motor parks among others that prevails many cities of Northern Nigeria. The paper attempted to investigate the causes of street begging in Gombe using social learning theory as a tool of analysis. To achieve this objective, a total number of 110 respondents were administered systematically within the context of our multistage sampling technique in the area. The data were also analysed empirically using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The results revealed that poverty and laziness, illiteracy, conditional necessity and cultural orientation are the major causes of street begging in Gombe. It is therefore recommended that more employment should be provided, skill acquisition centres should be effectively established, public orientation should be enhanced, proper education should be ensured and government should enact law or policy that will deter street beggars in Gombe.

Keywords: culture, employment, poverty, social learning and street begging

Introduction

Street begging is generally believed as a universal social, economic and cultural phenomenon in most urban centres. The problem is not specific to developing but also developed countries today. As such, street begging is an

act of soliciting arms or assistance in cash or kind normally on the street by individuals or group of individuals without any exchange for service been rendered. Many cities in the US and Mexico have a significant level of begging as Smith (2016) and Chima (2015) observed that in major cities of Britain and China especially London and Shanghai have been described as home of different categories of beggars and they constitute security threat with certain number of criminal records as well as vulnerable to victims of crime.

Similarly, street begging in Africa is among the old-age activities mostly as occupations of the poor population in many societies. In their studies Olagunju (2015) and Adugna (2013) revealed that begging has become one of the most challenging security threats because poorest of the poor population and less privilege lived in a deprived condition and are unable to obtain their basic needs of life. It makes them vulnerable to disease and criminal tendencies so as to meet their daily needs. The menace is dominated by street children as beggars mostly in West Africa countries such as Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Burkina Faso.

The Nigerian experience is not far different from other African and world countries. United Nation Report of 2016 states that in 2015, Nigeria hosted about 9.5 million street beggars, with over 80 per cent concentrated in northern Nigeria. Accordingly, in North-Eastern part of Nigeria, street beggars are exploited and used by the politicians as thugs and hoodlums to foment trouble, cause a riot, disrupt peace and achieve selfish political interest (Oladosu, 2012). Abubakar (2018) and Ofongo (2016) believed that the menace of Kalare in Gombe, Sara Suka in Bauchi, Ecomog in Borno and Shunku or Daukan Amarya in Adamawa benefit from begging and are fuelled by politicians in their struggle for power that pose security threat in the region.

In Gombe State, street begging has grown. World Bank Report (2015) stated that Gombe State has a total estimated population of 10,000 street beggars found in the main streets, public places such as worship places, markets, banks, motor parks, road junctions, filling stations, restaurants, venue of ceremonies and campuses of institutions. These populations have been unable to turn their education into productive jobs, thereby turning them into “social misfits” who pose a security risk. Street begging was and is still a major societal problem which is becoming not only pervasive, alarming but also endemic. As such, Smith (2015) concludes that some deviant behaviour such as theft, thuggery, violent and criminal behaviour, and vandalism are listed as some of the vices associated with street begging.

Street Begging

The term “street begging” has been defined differently by scholars in order to align with world realities. In his famous attempt, Jelili (2006) argued that “to beg” is to simply ask people for money, food or clothes as a gift or charity. In addition to this view, Olawale (2007), Ojo (2010) regarded alms begging as the habit of someone soliciting for favour from others for survival and enrichment. It is also a clear practice whereby a person obtains money, food, shelter or other things from people they encounter by request. In a more elaborate manner, Bukoye (2015) viewed it as the practice of imploring others to grant a favour, which could be in form of gift like money, clothes or food with no expectation of reciprocation or refund. Stephen (2009) however believed that begging is presented as requesting something in a supplicating manner with the implication that person who is begging will suffer emotional and or physical harm. Thus, one can simply say that begging is seen as an act of requesting for material or immaterial gift or favour such as money, food, clothes or services without an exchange for the work been done. The question is what is street begging?

Any beggar on a street is called street beggar. Street begging is an asking for money or food without an exchange of service in a public place (Mortimer, 2005); it is often regarded as anti-social behaviour in which an individual or group of individuals on the street, house, road junction, worshipping centres and restaurant, beg for alms either in cash or kind in order to sustain their living (Lynch, 2005). John (2010) and Chukwulobe (2011) stressed that begging on a street is seen as an act of stopping people to beg for help either be in form money or food in which usually aimed at securing a material benefit either for a gift donation or charitable donation. It is therefore, summarized that “a street beggar is a person who relies on the financial graces of strangers without providing food or services in return (Balogun, 2012).

Jelili (2013:13,) asserted that it is important to state that while “street and house-to-house begging” and “panhandling” are synonymous, and may represent the general idea of asking people for money, food, among others, mendicancy and vagrancy connote more than street begging. Mendicancy, as an art of begging is usually associated with religious members. Vagrancy, on the other hand, refers to begging activity of the jobless, homeless, and wanderers or vagabonds. To localize street begging, Mumuni (2001) and Mijinyawa (2001) state that it is a practice in the Northern part of Nigeria,

whereby parents pack their children and put them in care of poor Qur'anic teachers in form of boarding systems without paying any fee for their upkeep that cannot promote any qualitative learning. In the absence of the payment of fees that would have taken care of their welfare, the boys are sent to the street by their teachers to beg for alms. Batagarawa (2000) said, street begging is surely not supported by any religious belief as erroneously being portrayed and peddled. This invariably means that despite the good intentions of the practice of the Traditional Qur'anic School, it must not be one that allows children to be forced out of their homes, where there are no boarding facilities to cater for their welfare. He said "let us therefore not jeopardize the future of our children and condemn them and our society to a peripheral status, a future of permanent servitude and wide spread impoverishment". Therefore, who are street beggars?

Street beggars are however, conceived differently. In his words, Jelili (2009; 2013) described that they included the disabled, the poor, and the destitute. To a considerable extent, the able-bodied, healthy and physically strong individuals who take the advantage of the sympathy of the society for them to remain jobless and at times perpetrate evils (like crime) in the name of begging in the street. The issue is that those who engage in begging have one reason or the other to support their stand. While some may be claiming to be performing religious role by moving round and offering prayers to people who pay them in turn, others may claim to be taking their own share of the national cake, especially the jobless followers of certain political office holders (Jelili, 2009; 2013).

Mijinyawa (2001) stated that as a derogatory habit brought about by unrestricted movement of the "street beggar," children especially in the North, are now associated with touting. In Nigeria, beggars are called by other names where Hausa people called them *Almajiri*, the Ibo people call them *Onyeariri* while Yoruba call them *Onibara*. It is therefore, stated that begging is the most distracting aspect of social behavior. The system takes beggars out of the control of *Mallams* and exposes them to negative habits as they come in contact with people of low virtue like prostitutes, cultists, drug addicts, traffickers, terrorists, arsonists, etc. These are some of the features of the street beggars of nowadays who are victims of neglect and exploitation. They are seen everywhere singing and begging for food and money, being vulnerable to abuse, drugs, trafficking and various forms of exploitation. Their conditions of living is less than average as reflected in their torn, dirty looking cloth, hungry

stomach, and unkept body (Obi, 2017). He further added that these beggars are outside their place of domiciliation in search of Islamic knowledge, which means they are not staying with their biological parents, who for religious permissiveness, marry as many wives as possible and produce scores of children. These children are dumped in street beggar schools because Islamic education is free; some of the parents will not show up again, let alone caring for their children.

Furthermore, Namwata (2012) conceived “street beggars” as individuals, including children, elderly people, who normally beg or make their living from the streets or public spaces such as shopping areas, churches, and mosques by asking people for money and food. To Adugna (2006), street beggars have generally been categorized in terms of their abilities and disabilities based on how they make their living from the streets. Meanwhile, in northern Nigeria, a child beggar is believed to be pupil or student called *Almajiri*. The word is derived from the Arabic term *Al-muhajir*, meaning the migrant. The origin of *Almajiri* is dated back to the famous migration of the Prophet Muhammed and his compatriots from Makkah to Madinah in the early days of Islam. In its Nigerian usage, the word street beggar means those who left their villages or town, parents, relations, and friends in search of Islamic religious knowledge and scholarship (Khalid, 2006).

Talking in the same direction, Zakir (2014) stated that street beggars are young, homeless, poor, neglected and maltreated children found in almost every streets, corner, junctions (especially in the north), seen roaming the streets ask for food and alms. In Hausa-land, these young children are called the “street beggar” (a student who leaves his parent for Qur’anic education). They come mostly from rural areas to urban centres for the purpose of acquiring Qur’anic education. They are sent to study Qur’an under the care of a Mallam (Teacher of the Qur’anic school) or Alaramma (Teacher of the Qur’anic school who memorizes and writes all verses of the Quran) who mostly comes from other village (Zakir, 2014).

The general beliefs of most scholars such as Sa’id, 2016; Haruna, 2014; Ibrahim, 2014; Nasir, 2013; Taiwo, 2013; Sani, 2003 and Katagum, 2000 is that a street beggar in Hausa land has gradually acquired a completely single meaning. To them, any child beggar is more or less referred to as *Almajiri* who is roaming the streets in our towns and cities. These children whom are young pupils they left the comfort and protection of their parents and relations at a very tender age for the purpose of Qur’anic education. Their

teachers who are called Mallams are mostly not responsible for their feeding. The children move around either singly or in group from door to door, street to street begging for food and other necessities of life. Some of these children attach themselves to seller of food items like *Massa/Waina*, beans cake (*kosai*) or groundnut cake (*kuli/karago*), moving about looking for buyer who will share to them voluntarily. Street beggars mostly sleep on the bare floor in the night and engaged in various odd jobs such as washing clothes, carrying load in market places and a time involved in criminal activities.

However, this paper holds its thesis that the scope of street begging is broader than it is where majority of the population are involved. This could be understood by looking at its general causes in a holistic manner. Street begging is therefore a product of social, economic, cultural, psychological and biological conditions in every political entity. It also believed that street begging has no any religious connectivity in northern Nigeria as some scholars believed. This is because in spite of the fact that Islam and Christianity preach against begging but totally discouraged begging. It is on this view that Jelili (2013) argued that no religion encourages begging. He further stated that if the well-to-do understand the scriptures and their supposed roles in the life of the poor and wretched persons, we would hardly have street beggars in cities. There exist in each society individuals who are rich and can singlehandedly relieve a considerable number of beggars and other wretched persons of their miserable life. He added that this is perhaps why most Islamic scholars that have written on the issue (begging) affirm that it is a misconception to attribute begging to Islamic culture. They support the argument with a quote from the words of the Holy Prophet (SAW) to his followers that “it is better for any of you to take his rope and tie firewood with it to be carried in his back than to ask people for alms”. Cited by Jelili (2013) categorized the street begging into destitute beggars, disabled beggars, mother of many beggars, settle me road lords beggars, stranded professional beggars, entrepreneur beggars and child beggars.

Causes of Street Begging

Abubakar (2018) argued that street begging is caused by illiteracy whereby most parents who send their children to beg are not educated. Unemployment and poverty in some places contributed to street begging. Jelili (2013) believed that begging would continue to thrive as an urban activity. This is because without prejudice to the influencing roles of the composite

variables of culture, urbanization and socio-political, most (if not all) beggars (including part-time and full time as well as conspicuous and veiled ones) are lured into begging first by the factor of poverty. He added that this is an undisputed fact to most scholars in the emerging school of thought (study of begging) including Adedibu (1989), Hanchao Lu (1999), Jordan (1999), Osagbemi (2001), Kennedy and Fitzpatrick (2001) and Jelili (2006, 2009), among several others. He cited example that while Jelili, (2006, 2009) has described begging as an activity of the wretched poverty-ridden individuals, Kennedy and Fitzpatrick (2001) have associated begging with such poverty indicators as homelessness (which they describe as rough sleeping) and dirty street job (which they describe as big issues). Kennedy and Fitzpatrick (2001) therefore concluded that to nearly all scholars, the highly visible poverty indicator of physical disability is one of the characteristic features of beggars. What is certain is that, though when many beggars taste begging especially as evidenced in Nigerian cities, they do not want to stop irrespective of whether or not they have overcome the poverty hardship. Thus, none of the certified full-time, part-time beggars actually take to begging without first tasting poverty (Jelili, 2013). In another development, Khan (2014) stated that poverty, illiteracy and caste contribute a large share to causes of poverty as compared to handicap, disease, old and death of parent. Poverty is a single factor which pushes about half of beggars towards their activities.

Social Learning Theory

Social learning theory branches from the general approach in psychology called cognitive behavioural approach. Studies of social problems affecting political communities led to the creation of scientific tools for analysis. From the 19th century onwards, scholars began to come out with different scientific methods to analyze social and political phenomena with the purpose to find the lasting solutions. Bandura (1979) noted the effects of the environment on behaviour; and emphasised that human behaviour is entirely a product of learning. Bandura (1979) also understood that concepts like *stimulus*, *response*, *reinforcement*, *extinction* were developed and called operant conditioning to explain human behaviour in different environments. This cognitive-behavioural approach largely focused on individuals on how aggression, abuse and violence that are transferred among individuals from one generation to other generations.

Bandura (1979) developed a model after the broader approach of cognitive behavioural approach called social learning model explaining why individuals behave the way they do. Against the general background that cognitive-behavioural theory focused on the individual-level factors which contribute to any behaviour that Bandura amassed a large quantity of evidence on the importance of 'learning from role models' in human development. Thus, Social learning posits both direct conditioning and observational learning from role models as basic processes in development.

Social learning model maintains that individuals learn social behaviours by observing and imitating other people. Imitation of role models is the most important element in how children and individuals learn. This process can be seen in the development of language, aggression and moral decision-making. Social Learning Model argues that individuals become aggressive toward family and society members because of their aggressive behaviour learnt from the role models. The operant conditioning is the strength of behaviours through positive and negative reinforcement, as well as the suppression of behaviours through punishment. In fact, corporal punishment may be chosen as a discipline method simply because it typically brings about children's compliance with parental demands. It is pointed out to both short-term and long-term negative effects associated with the physical punishment, such as increased physical aggressiveness, antisocial behaviour, criminal behaviour, mental health problems and partner or spousal abuse in adulthood.

Social Learning Theory establishes certain significance to the studies of human behaviours in their environments. The theory provides the following points to the study of social violence: The theory is important because it focuses on individual behaviour as the level of analysis specifically to examine the causes of street begging in Gombe State. The theory therefore sufficed the background that individuals learn and transmit social behaviours by imitating the role models. This is important because imitation of role models serves as the major mechanism through which individuals behave in their respective environment. Street beggars in Gombe State learn their behaviours of begging over a period of time where they earned their daily income as business points. Finally, the theory suggests that any abusive and aggressive behaviour such as street begging might be disciplined through the physical and corporal method of punishment or creation or any mechanism

that might curtail the menace such a creation of employment opportunity and skill acquisition centres.

Methodology

Data

Primary and secondary sources of data were employed in this study. The primary sources of data are used in obtaining first-hand information. The secondary sources of data were employed because of the need in using the existing literature on street begging which included books, journals, articles, magazines, newspapers and periodicals or reports both print and electronic.

Method of Data Collection

A survey research was employed. The instrument of data collection used was questionnaire. Questionnaires were administered to the street beggars in Gombe metropolis. Similarly, the researchers used and reviewed relevant text books, newspapers; journal articles and reports to complement the findings. These documentations were obtained from internet and the libraries of Federal University of Kashere and Gombe State University, Gombe State and personal library.

Research Population and Sampling Method

This study purposely sampled 110 street beggars at different locations in Gombe metropolis. This is because the population of beggars is not known and there is no official data even from Gombe State Bureau of Statistics office. The author also used a multistage sampling technique in determining sampling.

Method of Data Analysis

The technique of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was used to analyse the data obtained through questionnaire administration in the field with the help of STATA software. Equation (1) represented the model specified for this study.

$$STBG = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 PTLZ_i + \gamma_2 ILTC_i + \gamma_3 CTNC_i + \gamma_4 CLOT_i + \mu_i(1)$$

Where STBG, PTLZ, ILTC, CTNC and CLOT denote street begging, poverty and laziness, illiteracy, conditional necessity and cultural orientation

respectively. The letter γ represents the parameters estimated in the model. The symbol μ_i is the error term.

Empirical Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shown descriptive statistics of the basic variables. This analysis is aid to detect the existence of outlier in the data and points to the possibility of having heteroscedasticity in the regression analysis. Therefore, the mean values signified the average of each variable in relation to its total observations. The standard deviation displayed the degree of dispersion among observations. In Table 1, it is seen that the standard deviation is characterized by low dispersion with a highest value of 1.636. This implied the absence of outliers and less expectation of heteroscedasticity problem in the model.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
STBG	3.739	0.612	-2.739	10.943
PTLZ	3.652	0.566	-1.361	3.873
ILTC	2.891	1.636	0.207	1.363
CTNC	1.082	0.190	3.043	13.479
CLOT	1.109	0.315	2.514	7.322

Note: STBG represents street begging; PTLZ means poverty and laziness; ILTC stands for illiteracy; CTNC signifies conditional necessity; and CLOT denotes cultural orientation.

Source: *Authors' computations, 2019.*

The normality of data is investigated by skewness and kurtosis. The statistics in Table 1 has shown that only STBG and PTLZ are negatively

skewed. Moreover, the most negatively high skewed variable is STBG. Nevertheless, all other variables in the model are found to be positively skewed. The most positively high skewed variable is CTNC and it is followed by CLOT; while the least in the model is ILTC. Even though these statistics are far from the threshold standard of zero and the absolute value of 1.96 bound suggested in Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and absolute value of less than two as in Curran, West and Finch (1996). Yet, the values are found not beyond the value of three proposed by Kline (2011) which is argued to cause a problem of non-normal distribution. Hence, one might established that there is no satisfactory evidence to accept the fact that the data are not found to be normally distributed.

Accordingly, the normality of the data is also investigated based on kurtosis statistics. The data is characterized by leptokurtic, mesokurtic and platykurtic distribution. The highest kurtosis statistics in this model is given by the value of CTNC,13.479. It is highest above the yardstick value of three (3) as indicated in Bai and Ng (2005) and seven (7) in Curran *et al.* (1996). Though, Kline (2011) opined that kurtosis statistic is considered severely non-normally distribution when the value exceeds twenty (20). Therefore, the data employed is believed to be normally distributed.

Correlation and Multicollinearity Analysis

In this presentation, the direction and degree of association between variables is investigated using correlation analysis. It similarly assists in evaluating the presence or otherwise of high-order linear association which results to multicollinearity in the modeling process (Hair Jr., Black, Babin& Anderson, 2010).

Table 2
Correlation and Multicollinearity Analysis

Matrix	LGEC	INEB	AFIN	CQEO	FAER
STBG	1.000				
PTLZ	0.220 (0.021)	1.000			
ILTC	0.207 (0.067)	0.454 (0.002)	1.000		

CTNC	-0.014 (0.827)	0.534 (0.004)	-0.037 (0.008)	1.000	
CLOT	0.035 (0.019)	-0.293 (0.048)	-0.021 (0.8091)	0.026 (0.062)	1.000

Note: The values are the correlation coefficients whereas the figures in parentheses represent the probability values of the correlation coefficients.

Source: *Authors' computation, 2019*

Table 2 revealed that all the variables in the model are positively related to STBG except for CTNC which was found to be negatively related to the variable of interest. Though, CTNC is statistically not significant. The correlation coefficients are mostly significant at the conventional levels of significance. The correlation among the regressors foresees the existence of multicollinearity in the model. The coefficients are mostly found to be statistically significant (Kennedy, 2008). Therefore, the preliminary analysis revealed that there will be no severe problem of multicollinearity among the regressors. However and where applicable, a preliminary analysis should not be used for hypothesis testing and any other inferential reasoning. This is because it indicates only the magnitude and direction of pairwise association between the dependent and independent variables which can suddenly change when non-normality is observed (Cohen & Lea, 2004) and when more than one relationship is considered in a model.

Inferential Analysis

The relationship between street begging and its factors causes is illustrated in Table 3. The results from the estimations as contained indicates that the joint significance of the variables in the model is statistically significant at one per cent level of significant as revealed by the *F*-statistics, 5.84 with probability value ($p=0.000$). This shows the overall adequacy of the model. Likewise, the various indicators used in the regression explain about 52 per cent of the variation causes of street begging. Thus, the variables have shown the expected signs in the Table 3.

Table 3
OLS Regression Result with Street Begging as Dependent Variable

Variables	Coefficients	Standardised Coefficients	Standard Errors	T – Values	Probability Values
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CONS	0.441	-	0.872	0.51	0.308
PTLZ	1.511	0.450	0.397	1.33	0.000
ILTC	0.225	0.183	0.169	1.45	0.096
CTNC	0.289	0.372	0.108	0.76	0.006
CLOT	0.085	0.108	0.124	2.67	0.248
<i>Diagnostics</i>					
R-Square	52%		Skewness	10.62 (0.101)	
F-Statistics	5.840 (0.000)		Kurtosis	1.46 (0.227)	
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)	1.460		Interquartile Range for Normality	2.17	
B-P Cook-Weisberg (Heterosc)	1.530 (0.217)		Model Specification ($\hat{_}$ square)	-0.19 (0.849)	
Cameron &Trivedi IM-Test	13.710 (0.102)		RAMSEY Omitted Variable Test	6.27 (0.002)	

Note: CONS means constant, STBG signifies street begging; PTLZ means poverty and laziness; ILTC symbolizes illiteracy; CTNC connotes conditional necessity; and CLOT stands for cultural orientation. The values in parenthesis under the diagnostics tests represent the probability values that correspond to their respective statistics. B-P means Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity.

Source: *Authors' Computation, 2019.*

The coefficients revealed that increase in poverty and laziness will lead to higher street begging in Gombe metropolis. The coefficient is statistically significant at one per cent level. Therefore, the more the poverty and laziness among people, the higher will be the level of street begging and number of beggars in Gombe metropolis. Furthermore, the result also indicated illiteracy will also lead to increase in the level of street begging. This is also statistically significant at 90 per cent level of confidence. This suggests that street begging is seriously influenced by high level of illiteracy in Gombe metropolis.

More often than not, Table 3 further revealed that increase in the conditional necessities lead to increase in street begging. The coefficient is statistically significant at one per cent level. Cultural orientation also leads to increase in street begging in Gombe metropolis. But, this is found statistically not significant at any conventional level of benchmark. This may not be unrelated to the indifference attitude of beggars due to the traditional norm, religious beliefs, and modernization in our contemporary social and political settings.

The validity of the regression model is investigated using the diagnostic test presented at the lower part of Table 3. These include test for multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, variable omission, model specification and normality of residuals. The multicollinearity among the independent variables is assessed based on variance inflation factor (VIF) which can be translated to variance cause factor (VCF). The variance cause factor indicated absence of multicollinearity in the model.

Discussion of Results

The result presented shows that street begging is caused by multiple factor in Gombe metropolis. These included poverty and laziness, illiteracy, conditional necessity and cultural orientation.

Firstly, it is clearly revealed from the correctional analysis that poverty and laziness caused street begging in Gombe metropolis. It shows that the more people are poor, the higher the level of street begging and number of street beggars in Gombe as indicated in Table 3. This result is not different from the presentation of famous street begging scholars particularly the contribution of Jelili (2013) who stated that begging would continue to thrive as an urban activity because without prejudice to the influencing roles of the composite variables of culture, urbanization and socio-polity, most (if not all) beggars (including part-time and full time as well as conspicuous and veiled ones) are lured into begging first by the factor of poverty. Khan (2014) had similar result where he affirmed that poverty is a single factor which pushes about half of beggars towards their activities. Jelili (2013) further believed that what is certain is that, though when many beggars taste begging especially as evidenced in Nigerian cities, they do not want to stop irrespective of whether or not they have overcome the poverty hardship, none of the certified full time or part time beggars actually take to begging without first tasting poverty.

Secondly, it is also indicated that street begging is caused by high level of illiteracy in Gombe metropolis as shown in Table 3. Khan (2014) stated that apart from poverty, illiteracy and caste contribute a large share of street begging compared to handicap, disease, old and death of parent in India.

Thirdly, it indicated in Table 3 that conditional necessities caused street begging in Gombe metropolis with a high level of significant. This is because most people engaged in begging because of necessity as natural hazard such flood, fire disaster, accident or even amputation of body part of natural disability and old age.

Finally, it also revealed that cultural orientation caused street begging in Gombe metropolis but it was insignificant. This is shown in table 3 as cultural orientation also leads to increase in street begging in Gombe metropolis. But, this is found statistically not significant at any conventional level of benchmark. This may not be unrelated to the indifference attitude of beggars due to the traditional norm, religious beliefs, and modernization in our contemporary social and political settings. This is similar to what Jelili (2013) stated that street begging has no any religious connectivity in northern Nigeria as some scholars believed. This is because in spite of the fact that Islam and Christianity preach and give but totally discourage begging. He further stated that if the well-to-do understand the scriptures and their supposed roles in the life of the poor and wretched persons, we would hardly have street beggars in cities, as there exist in each society individuals who are rich and can singlehandedly relieve a considerable number of beggars and other wretched persons of their miserable life (Jelili, 2013).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Street begging is therefore a product of social, economic, cultural, psychological and biological conditions in Gombe metropolis. It is also believed that street begging has no any religious connectivity in northern Nigeria as some scholars believed. This is because in spite of the fact that Islam and Christianity preach and give but totally discourage begging. It is on this view that Jelili (2013) argued that no religion encourages begging. He further stated that if the well-to-do understand the scriptures and their supposed roles in the life of the poor and wretched persons, we would hardly have street beggars in cities, as there exist in each society individuals who are rich and can singlehandedly relieve a considerable number of beggars and other wretched persons of their miserable life. It is added that this is perhaps why most Islamic scholars that have written on the issue (begging) affirm that it is a misconception to attribute begging to Islamic culture. They support the argument with a quote from the words of the Holy Prophet (SAW) to his followers that “it is better for any of you to take his rope and tie firewood with it to be carried in his back than to ask people for alms”. Hence, street begging in Gombe metropolis is caused by poverty and laziness, illiteracy, conditional necessity and cultural orientation. Accordingly, it is therefore recommended that more employment should be provided, skill acquisition centres should be effectively established, public orientation should be enhanced, proper

education should be ensured and government should enact law or policy that will deter street beggars in Gombe metropolis.

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**POLITICAL GODFATHERS, WOMEN EMPOWERMENT AND
EMERGENCE OF FEMALE CANDIDATES FOR GENERAL
ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA, 2011-2018**

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Abstract

The level of women representation in national legislature and appointive ministerial positions in Nigeria falls below the global recommendation of 35%. This is in spite of the fact that the female population is 49.8% of the country's population and recent data indicate that more females are receiving higher education than males. A critical factor in leadership recruitment in the country, is the role of the political godfathers, who sponsor candidates for public offices as a result of the highly monetised nature of the political process. A large number of women are reported to lack the financial resources to fund their political campaigns given the enormous resources required. The study examined the role of political godfathers, and women empowerment programmes in the emergence of female candidates of the major political parties in the country. Being a qualitative study, it employed in-depth interviews and documentary review as methods of data collection. It utilized data from the country's 2011, 2015 General Elections as well as the primaries of the various political parties in 2018, to interrogate the significance of the role of political godfathers and women empowerment in the emergence of female candidates for General Elections in Nigeria. Political godfathers showed preference for male candidates, especially incumbents, as against female contestants in the three major political parties during the primaries. There was high level of pre-election violence which served as inhibitory factor to the emergence of women as candidates of the major political parties. The preference of the political godfathers for male candidates for public political

offices served as impediment to the emergence of female candidates of the major political parties. The study recommended that women organizations should pull their resources together to sponsor female aspirants to emerge as candidates of major political parties. The major political parties should adopt quota system in which particular proportion of the national assembly seats (constituencies) should be reserved for only women.

Key words: Female candidates, general elections, political godfathers, political parties, women empowerment

Introduction

The low level of women political participation at gladiatorial levels in Nigeria, since the return to civilian rule in 1999, has been a major source of concern to scholars, analysts, policy makers and international organizations. In spite of the agitations by various women advocacy groups, the level of women political participation at the gladiatorial levels appears to be declining instead of increasing. While recent population projections speculate that women are more in number than men, the numerical strength of women had not had any significant effect on the number of women being elected to legislative and executive positions at the different levels of government across the country (Nwogwugwu & Iyanda, 2015).

The low level of women participation in decision making and governance is not a Nigerian problem, it is indeed a global problem. In the Middle East, women participation in politics is very low with the average level of women political participation at 6.5%, which is far below the world average of about 15%. Pande & Ford (2011) write that in spite of significant advances in education and political participation, women remain underrepresented in leadership positions in politics and business across the globe.

Although successive administrations have tried to improve on the level of gender balancing in governance through the appointment of women to political positions, there have not been any deliberate efforts at ensuring that more women emerge as candidate so the major political parties and win elections into public offices.

The level of participation of women in the politics, decision making and governance has been a major issue in the both national and international discourse from the late 20th century to the 21st century. Women arguably make – up about half of the world’s population if not a little above. Several

conferences, congresses, conventions and summits have been held at national and supra-national levels, towards ensuring equitable representation of women in governance and decision making at various levels.

In spite of their numerical strength and the improved level of education women in the state have attained, Abosede (2011) stated that women still suffer from sex discrimination and rarely break through the so called “glass ceiling” separating them from top-level managerial political positions. Abosede 2011 (cited Akiyode-Afolabi, 2003 & Momodu, 2003) as having identified the factors militating against women participation in politics in Nigeria to include the following: Gender and cultural patterns; ideology; pre-determined social roles assigned to women and men; male-dominance and control; women’s lack of confidence to run for elections; godfatherism; money politics/pay off syndrome; the way women are portrayed in the mass media; women’s perception of politics as a dirty game; lack of funds and other resources; effects of violence against women; illiteracy; limited access to education; dual burden of domestic task and professional obligations; ignorance; lack of confidence in other women; and lack of access to information. Given the very key role that political godfathers have been playing in determining who wins General Elections into various elective offices in Nigeria since the return to civilian rule in 1999, it becomes imperative to examine the position of political godfathers on the emergence of women as candidates of political parties during the period under review. The study therefore focused on political godfatherism and women empowerment in interrogating the emergence of female candidates of major political parties in Nigeria.

Being a qualitative study, the study employed interviews and documentary reviews as data collection methods. Among those interviewed were female politicians who had contested primary elections in the three major political parties in the country, namely, All Progressives Congress (APC), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) in Abia and Lagos States. In all, twelve key informants were interviewed, seven in Lagos State, and five in Abia State. All the interviewees contested the 2018 primaries of their various political parties for either the House of Representatives or State Houses of Assembly. Secondary data for documentary review were sourced from scholarly journals, relevant textbooks, newspapers, magazines, and materials downloaded from the internet. Narrative-interpretative approach was adopted in the analysis of data.

Nature and dynamics of Political Godfatherism in Nigeria

Political godfatherism is one of the concepts that open narrow doors when it comes to deciding who gets what on the political scene. However, for the purpose of this study, the literary meaning and attributes of godfather needs to be emphasized. The concept of godfatherism is synonymous with intermediary, mentoring, benevolence, and support and sponsoring. In a political setting, the concept is an ideology that is championed on the belief that certain individuals possess considerable means to unilaterally determine who gets a party's ticket to run for an election and who wins in the electoral contest (Chukwuemeka, Oji, & Chukwurah, 2013 cited in Rasak, Oye, Ake, & Raji, 2017). Godfathers are men who have the "power" and influence to decide both who gets nominated to contest elections and who wins in the election. In this sense, Godfatherism means office seekers getting connected to an individual who is believed to have the ability to deliver a desired outcome in an electoral contest. It is the tradition to look for a political father to help promote one's political aspiration. Basse and Enetak (2008 cited in Rasak, Oye, Ake, & Raji, 2017) conceptualised godfatherism to connote the power and influence of people who are politically relevant in deciding who gets nominated to contest elections and who eventually wins the election. Godfathers are highly politically mobile and can sway political support to the political party and/or candidate behind which/ who they throw their political weight.

Literarily, godfathers are seen in Nigeria to be men who have the power to personally determine both who gets nominated to contest elections and who wins an election (Abdullahi & Shakariyu 2013, p. 5). According to Audu (2006, p. 8), "godfathers are people of questionable wealth and influences who rob political parties of their conventional and legitimate functions of presenting clear and coherent programmes on the basis of which the candidates presented by them are chosen by the voters". He observed that ideally, government that is freely and fairly instituted by the people must be accountable to them as the source of its moral authority to rule. However, this is not possible with people of questionable wealth whose major concern is to recover the money spent for installing their candidates in power and thereafter share certain percentage of what comes to the government purse as their share of the economy.

In the argument of Akpan (2004 cited in Abdullahi & Shakariyu 2013), godfathers are people that finance political parties' activities and individual electoral campaigns as actively throughout investment outlet to be recorded through frivolous and bloated government contracts, appointment of cronies into choice public offices and other prebendal returns by the beneficiaries. The emphasis here is because of the enormous financial resources required to contest elections in Nigeria, politicians can only achieve political offices with the backing of the so called "godfathers". Indeed, godsons become mere surrogates and remain totally subservient to their godfathers.

In reviewing the past, it is evident in literature that godfatherism is not a recent phenomenon in Nigerian politics (Ishaku & Jatau, 2014). It was a strong political instrument employed by the Nigerian notable nationalists, mostly late Chief Obafemi Awolowo to disengage the colonialists from governance on October 1, 1960. Specifically, in 1953, late Chief Anthony Enahoro, the godson of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo moved the motion for the nation's independence. The motion Babalola and Shobiye, (2010) was a thunderbolt that rocked the then Federal House of Representatives in Lagos and later sent the colonialists parking from the political terrain of Nigeria. At that point in time, there were credible, visionary and focused leaders, heavily backed up by committed followers. According to Albert (2005) Political godfatherism started with nationalist activities of the 1950s. The educated elite who constituted just six percent of the total Nigerian population championed this struggle for Nigerian independence. The educated elites, most of whom had only primary education, were respected for their knowledge and bravery in confronting the white man. They became idolised by their people and their personal opinions became the formal interests of the ethnic groups they claimed to represent.

The style of political godfatherism in the First Republic was extended to the Second Republic. Therefore, godsons of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo were able to win Ondo State, Oyo State, Ogun State, Lagos State in the gubernatorial election while many others won nearly all the seats in the Federal House of Representatives. That was when Alhaji Lateef Jakande (Baba kekere-small Awo), Chief Adekunle Ajasin, Chief Akin Omoboriowo (the author of Awoism), Chief Ebenezer Babatope, late Chief Bola Ige ('the Cicero' of Esa Oke) etc were ardent followers of the late sage and they succeeded in implementing his policies in their respective states for the betterment of common man.

The menace of political godfather in Nigeria could be perceived as a political battle which the elite class has been waging against democracy, the masses and the entire nation in order to fulfill their economic self-interests. In ensuring this evil desire, the reward systems are highly skewed in favour of the political class compared to salaries and allowances of workers in other sectors of the economy. Nigerian politicians have turned democratic elections into ventures and battle fields where money, private armies and thugs are employed to create enabling environments that guarantee returns on investments and accelerated access to primitive accumulation of wealth (Agba, Achimugu, Chukwurah & Agboni, 2012).

The problem of godfatherism has resulted in outright exclusion of credible people from the decision making process. Many political office seekers are often robbed of their independent and rational sense of judgment. When the right choice is denied during elections, wrong persons assume leadership. Such persons are not materials for leadership. This usually results in maladministration and lack of accountability. This could be used to explain the scenario in the Second Republic, when Alhaji Shehu Shagari was imposed on Nigerians as the president and the nation was robbed of the wealth of leadership experience of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, an agent of development. Consequently, the rule of law, due process, and transparency in the management of public affairs has all been abused, because credible persons are edged out of governance. To worsen the situation, godfathers are being protected with the state resources while the poor masses are being exposed to all sorts of dangers on daily basis.

Why should the Nigerian government protect notorious godfathers more than the suffering masses? It is simply because the nation is developing in a wrong direction. In fact, it is obvious that the state does not value the life of any common man. And none of them has ever been sanctioned by the court of law, whereas armed robbers and petty thieves are being sentenced to death and life imprisonment by the nation's judiciary. This must have prompted the notorious godfather of Anambra State politics (Chris Uba) to boast that "I am the greatest of all godfathers in Nigeria" *Sunday Champion*, (2003) as cited by Familusi (2012). According to Albert (2007), Uba for the first time, single-handedly put in position every politician in the state. These included the state governor and his deputy, the 3 senators to represent the state at the National Assembly, 10 out of 11 members of the Federal House of Representatives and 29 members of the State House of Assembly. Because of the protection he

enjoyed from the discredited Obasanjo's administration, Uba as reported by Albert, (2007) boasted of having the power to remove any of his political nominees who did not perform up to his own expectations anytime he liked. This could be regarded as an insult to democracy and development. Indeed, it gives the picture of a nation developing in a wrong direction as observed by Omonijo Nnedum, Ezeokana (2011).

Women Empowerment

Empowerment can be defined as a "multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power (that is, the capacity to implement) in people, for use in their own lives, their communities, and in their society, by acting on issues that they define as important" (Page & Czuba 1999, p. 26). Kabeer (2005) defined empowerment as "a process of change" or "the processes by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such an ability" (p. 437). The implication of Kabeer's definition is that the process of empowerment must improve women's social, political, and economic choices. There are circumstances where the process may require men to relinquish some of their power over women; eventually, both men and women and the entire society benefits when full potentials of all members of a society are utilized (Ehrhardt, Sawires, McGovern, Peacock & Weston, 2009).

According to the UN Population Fund, an empowered woman has a sense of self-worth. She has the ability to determine her own choices, and has access to opportunities and resources providing her with an array of options she can pursue. She has control over her own life, both within and outside the home. She has the ability to contribute in the public sphere by influencing the direction of social change to create a more just society that ensures equity for all at both the domestic and international levels (Page & Czuba, 1999).

Women's empowerment is a process of personal and social change, taking place over interlinked and mutually reinforcing psychological, political, social and economic domains, and through which women individually and collectively gain power, meaningful choices and control over their lives (O'Neil, Domingo, & Valters 2014). In attempts to operationalize the concept of women's empowerment, some scholars have identified indicators for measuring women empowerment to include: women's education, income, employment, and participation in politics (Malhotra, Schuler & Boender, 2002). For the purpose of this study the indicators of empowerment that are

focused on are: education, economic/finance and decision-making/participation in politics.

Theoretical framework

Elite theory

Elite theory holds that there exists in each society, “a minority of the population which takes the major decisions in the society” (Parry 1969, p. 30). Keller (cited in Mahajan, 2007, p. 820) states that “elites are those minorities which are set apart from the rest of society by their pre-eminence in one or more of these various distributions.”

Mahajan (2007) stated that an elite group should possess three vital qualities; group consciousness, coherence and conspiracy for it to be effective. There are two categories of elites; strategic elites and segmented elites. Whereas the strategic elites are those who claim or exercise wide influence over the entire spectrum of social set up, the segmented elites are those who have influence or responsibilities only in a sub-domain in society. Although the strategic elites are the more important of the two groups, both groups derive their elite status from a combination of heredity, excellence in arts and literature, position in ruling class or party or bureaucracy hierarchy, material influence and physical powers.

The major proponents of elite theory are Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Roberto Michels, and Jose Ortega Y. Gasset. Pareto’s (1848 – 1923) proposition is that in every society, a small minority possesses the qualities required to ascend to full social and political power. This group known as the elite are the ones who get to the top and are always the best. The elite are at the top of every profession/occupation and stratum of the society (Varma 2004).

In his treatise, Pareto provides a classification of the society into two. The higher stratum, composed of the elite; which he subdivided into the governing elite, and the non – governing elite. The lower stratum of the society is the non-elite. Pareto’s focus of enquiry however is the governing elite, which he believes, rules by a mixture of force and cunning (Varma, 2004). The “membership of this ‘governing elite’ or ‘political class’ – composed of those who occupy the posts of political command and more vaguely, those who can directly influence political decision is rarely fixed” (Adekanye, 1999, p. 160).

Pareto is also credited with originating the concept of circulation of the elites. According to Pareto “history is a graveyard of aristocracies”. As a result of continual movement of individuals and elites from one level to another; higher to lower and lower to higher which results in increase of the elements of the classes that hold power. There are changes in the composition and operation of different elites as a result of psychological changes in the characteristics of the elites, which occur from time to time. This leads to some elites replacing others with this circulation of elites sometimes causing political instability (Johari 2009; Varma 2004).

Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), a political scientist, “further developed the theory of political elites as well as the concept regarding the circulation of the elites” (Varma, 2004, p. 146). Mosca strongly repudiated the classification of governments into monarchy, aristocracy and democracy by Aristotle, positing that only one kind of government existed; oligarchy (Varma, 2004). “Mosca’s elite theory is contained in his affirmation that in every society two classes of people exist – a class that rules and a class that is ruled” (Johari, 2009, p. 266). The first class which is usually fewer in number, performs all the key functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, while the second, which is usually more numerous is directed and controlled by the first (Mosca, 1935).

According to Mosca, “a minority class is always better; its members are the grand electors; they distribute tickets, launch canvassing campaigns and go to the final length of determining the range from which the electorate must exercise its supposedly free choice” (Johari, 2009, p. 266). He further explains his approval of the rule of the minority over the majority on the basis of “the fact that it is organized, whereas the individual in the majority stands alone before it, and also by the fact that the minority is usually composed of superior individuals” (Varma, 2004, p. 147).

Kifordu (2011 cited Mosca, 1939) when he stated that the elite are usually defined as those groups with excellent access to resources or capacities, a characteristic that sets them apart from other (non-elite) members of society. The interpretations of superiority based on the access to valuable resources lead to the justification of elite dominance and social inequality. The possession of excellent resources and capabilities is exemplified in their ability to organize, which makes the masses to look up to them for direction.

Roberto Michels (1876–1936) on his part enunciated his “iron law of Oligarchy” which he declares to be “one of the iron laws of history, from

which the most democratic modern societies and, within those societies, the most advanced parties have been unable to escape” (Michels, 1949, p. 142 cited by Varma, 2004, p.148). According to Michels (1949) leadership is central to the success and survival of any big organisation. Organisations by their nature, give power and advantages to their leaders who cannot be held accountable by their followers, in spite of the fact that the leaders are elected and are supposed to be the agents of the those who elected them. The technical indispensability of leadership is the reason why the control of the party passes into the hands of its leading politicians and its bureaucracy. The central tenet of elitism is that power breeds power (Johari 2010).

Ortega Y. Gasset (1883–1955) further highlights the theory of political elite by propounding his theory of the masses. According to Gasset, a nation’s greatness depends on the capacity of the people, the public, the crowds, the masses to find their symbol in certain chosen people, on whom it pours out the vast of its vital enthusiasm. The chosen people are the ones that are outstanding.

When the aristocracy becomes corrupt and inefficient, the masses revolt, and the motive of the revolt, in the proposition of Gasset, is an expression of an interest in being ruled by a more competent aristocracy and not a complete rejection of the rule by the aristocracy. To emphasize the relevance of elite theory to political analysis, Lasswell and Lerner (cited in Johari, 2010, p. 264) write: “by this time recognition is widespread that the world-inclusive study of power elites is indispensable to all serious inquiry into political processes.”

Elite theory has been criticized as being undemocratic, as it contradicts the basic assumption of democracy that power belongs to the people. Birch (2007, p. 226) posited that elite theory “challenges most western liberal assumptions about politics and the organization of government.” Johari, (2010, p. 264), asserted that “elite theory stands on the classical doctrine of the natural inequality of mankind and it there by leads to the tendency of irresponsibilism and self-perpetuation as conceived by the doctrine of a liberal-democratic state.”

Impediments to women active participation in politics

The entrenched socio-cultural and religious practices in Nigeria skewed in favour of men and against women constitute serious challenges to women active participation in politics. Women (including Nigerian women),

according to Muoghalu and Abrifor (2012), are discouraged from participating in public life from childhood through adulthood by authority figures such as husbands, fathers, mothers and other relations due to cultural image of a virtuous woman defined as quiet, submissive who should be seen and not heard. Because of the patriarchal nature of the Nigerian society, most Nigerians including women still believe and accept the traditional perspectives that view women as inferior to men, second class citizens, weaker sex, to be seen and not heard, child bearers/ primary care-givers, etc. In most cases, they feel the game of politics is an exclusive reserve of men and dare not venture into it and those who manage to venture are usually contented with the back seats (Ngara & Ayabam, 2013).

Likewise, religious practices are used as powerful instruments of stereotype against Nigerian women political aspirants/politicians from active participation in politics. For instance, in Northern Nigeria, the purdah system (i.e. house seclusion of women) of the Islamic doctrine strictly bars women from participating in politics either as voters, political aspirants or even participating in campaigns/other electoral activities (Nwabunkeonye, 2014).

Gender perspective to Electoral Contests in Nigeria

Candidates for Public Office in the 2011 general elections

Table 1 below, titled contestants in the primaries of political parties for the 2011 General Elections, provide gender distribution of those who contested the primaries of various political parties ahead of the 2011 General Elections.

Table 1: Contestants in the Primaries of Political Parties for the 2011 general elections

Office	Total	Men	Women
President	40	35	5
National Assembly			
Senate 109 seats	897	805	92
House of Representatives (360 seats)	2,444	2,220	224
Governorship (26 States)	719	646	73
House of Assembly (990 seats)	6039	5,512	527

Source: Compiled from Research and Documentation Department of INEC (cited in Olurode, 2013, p. 20).

Data shows that only 224 women out of 2444 contestants ran for the House of Representatives and 92 women out of 897 contestants ran for the Senate in 2011. The low level of women participating at these levels can be attributable to the various impediments highlighted above.

Table 2: Women Representatives in the National Assembly in 2007 and 2011

Election year	Number of women	% of women
House of Representatives		
2007	26 /360	8.3
2011	12 /360	6.4%
Senate		
2007	9 /109	7.2%
2011	7 /109	3.3%

Source: National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2012, p. 46)

Table 2 above shows the number of women elected into the senate and House of Representatives in 2007 and 2011 and the percentage of the women representatives to the total number of seats in each legislative house. The table reveals that number of women elected to both the senate and House of representatives in 2011 were lower than those elected to the two chambers in 2007.

Table 3: Women Contestants in 2015 general elections

S/N	Election Type	Male	Female	Total
	Governors & Deputy	293	87	380
	Senate	625	122	747
	House of Representatives	1517	266	1774
	State Houses of Assembly	4520	755	5275

Source: Compiled by authors from Sogbesan (2015) and Akpan (2018).

In reality, a very small proportion of women contested the 2015 elections, given their population as being about half of the Nigerian population. As stated by Osori (2017), in her analysis of the outcome of the various party primaries conducted ahead of the 2015 general elections and its implications, the concern of many gender advocates was that with only an average of 15 per cent women contesting for the primaries for (National Assembly seats) contesting, then at the end the number of women elected even if all of them succeeded would be far less than 35 per cent.

Osori (2017) in analysing the state of position of parties ahead of the 2015 election of fielding women contestants, stated that the Mega Progressive Peoples Party had the highest number of women vying for seats, with 30 women contesting for the House of Representatives and 16 for Senate. However, it is not one of the major political parties in Nigeria, and at the end none of its candidates succeeded in winning a seat in the National Assembly during the 2015 general elections.

According to Akpan (2018, p. 105), “the number of women who scaled through the parties’ primaries was very low in the 2015 election compared to the number of women who aspired”. Very large number of women contested primaries of various political parties, where they were edged out by the party leaders who preferred male candidates as consensus candidates. They deliberately scuttled internal democracy mechanism of the parties, by selecting their preferred male candidates, why the women were either asked to wait for political appointment, or were forced to go to any of the smaller parties to pick their tickets and contest the election.

Table 4: Contestants for Senate and House of Representatives in 2019 general elections

S/N	Male	Female	Total
1.	1,632 (88.12%)	220 (11.8%)	1851
2.	4120 (89.3%)	496 (10.7%)	4616

Source: Compiled by authors from data available in INEC website (2019).

Table 4 above, shows the gender distribution of candidates that contested the national assembly election during the 2019 general elections. The number of women who contested the general elections for House of Representatives

increased from 266 in 2015 to 496 in 2019, while that of the senate increased from 122 in 2015 to 220 in 2019. The trend has been that of increase of the number of women contesting elections into the legislative houses at every general election in Nigeria. However, smaller number are elected as they are usually not able to clinch the ticket of the major political parties. Most of the women who emerge as candidates of any of the major political parties are either wives or daughters of the party leaders of the major party leaders and political godfathers.

Political godfathers and emergence of female candidates

Political godfathers control the party machinery in the constituencies, state and at national levels. The implication of such control is that they determine who emerge as the candidates of the political parties for general elections. Given the enormous resources that are required for contesting election, the average professional in Nigeria would ordinarily lack the ability to mobilize resources to prosecute their political ambition. It is only the candidates that are supported by the political godfathers, both financially and with the party apparatus that emerge as the candidates of the political parties to contest election in the general elections.

The Political godfathers who control the party leadership manipulate the process of selection of party candidates against the women. The Nigerian women are not likely to be voted into key positions in the political party hierarchy. The highest position held by women in a number of key political parties include most insignificant posts of ex-officio members and women leaders whose importance is only for mobilizing womenfolk to vote for men.

Those who occupy the position of women leader of the major political parties do not wield any powers to influence the emergence of female candidates. Oshori (2017), recounted how even the Women Leader was not even willing to push her candidacy in the presence of the party chairman. When people were referring her to those who should be consulted to support her candidature, no one mentioned the National Women Leader. Both female House of Representatives candidate and the State House Assembly candidate for 2019 primaries of APC, Lagos State, as well as two female House of Assembly aspirants on the platform of PDP in Abia State, stated that no one

referred them to the Women Leaders in their states as being important in pushing forward their candidacy.

The political godfathers who control the major political parties as if they are extensions of their private businesses, in which they and their associates serve as shareholders, have marginalized the women within the structure of the parties. As such women politicians cannot make any meaningful input into the management of the parties. As such the determination of candidates of parties for general elections are no go areas for the female members of executive committee of the political parties. They are usually unable to assert themselves or push for the interest of women during nominations leading to marginalization of women during election. In addition, most Nigerian political parties marginalize and discriminate against female political aspirants by excluding them from politics through traditional methods based on male-centred interpretation of culture, religion and sharp practices of “zone out” and “step-down techniques mainly for women” (Nwabunkeonye, 2014, p. 287).

Political godfathers/party elders either select candidates for the parties or endorse and present a consensus candidate, with intent of not allowing acrimonious competition that would destroy the party. One of the former State House of Assembly contestants from Abia State recounted how she received a call two days before the primary from one of the party leaders in the state, not to border about the primary that she would be given political appointment, as the leadership had decided that the incumbent should be returned for another term.

Economic Empowerment and Selection of female candidates

Nigeria’s electoral process is highly monetized requiring expenditure of humongous amount of money before one can clinch the party ticket to stand for election under the banner of any of the major political parties. A female contestant for the Lagos State House of Assembly on the platform of APC, stated that she was shocked when she was asked by a group of party officials if she had N30 million to prosecute her aspiration. When they saw the expression on her face, they asked her if she could afford to raise at least N20 million for the race.

Money is thus a major factor in party primaries and is used both to induce officials and encourage voters to support particular candidates. “Since male aspirants have more money than female aspirants, many women are

eliminated because they simply cannot match their male opponents Naira for Naira” (Ibrahim & Salihu 2004, p 10). One female aspirant from Abia State remarked that their male opponents were ready to go to any extent to raise money, “even if it meant borrowing from the devil”. Whereas, it is difficult for a female aspirant to throw caution to the win in efforts to raise money.

Many female aspirants and candidates complained that while their initial application fees were waived, other fees were still required. They also said their parties failed to provide them with sufficient support for campaigning, and some were even actively discouraged or intimidated into withdrawing from the election in favour of male colleagues (National Democratic Institute, 2012).

All the female former aspirants interviewed acknowledged that money is a major obstacle. At every stage of the process aspirants are required to keep spending money, for anything under the sun, including given money to some party officials when they are visited on “courtesy calls”. The aspirants from both Abia and Lagos States from the two political parties commented that they could not remember the number of ceremonies they were invited to and which they had to attend after declaring their interest to run for elective political offices. One of the aspirants from Lagos State, a Muslim said she could not recount how many invitations from different churches in her constituency that she had to attend. At each of the ceremonies, an aspirant was called to the high table and expected to part with a handsome amount.

The political godfathers have over the years shown their preference for sponsoring male candidates for public political offices. By supporting people of their own gender, they perpetuate gender inequality within the political system, and the women who are the larger population of party members are pushed to the political backyard. Most of the time, when political godfathers sponsor female candidates, such candidates are either their wives or family members. There are no prominent political godmothers who have the resources to fund the election of female candidates, as such female candidates are marginalized and denied the chance of contesting general elections as candidate of the major political parties.

This is in spite of the fact that the Electoral Act stipulates spending limits for various offices. However, no candidate or political party stays by the spending limit.

Table 5: Official spending limit for contestants for general elections in Nigeria

Elective office	Electoral Act 2006	Electoral Act 2010
President	500,000,000.00	1,000,000,000.00
Governorship	100,000,000.00	200,000,000.00
Senate	20,000,000.00	40,000,000.00
House of Representatives	10,000,000.00	20,000,000.00
State House of Assembly	5,000,000.00	10,000,000.00
Local Government Chairmanship	5,000,000.00	10,000,000.00
Councillorship	500,000.00	1,000,000.00

Source: Electoral Act 2006/2010

Table 5 above shows the officially approved spending limit for contestants for general elections in Nigeria. However, all the interviewers asserted that it only exists in paper as candidates for the various offices spend way beyond the approved limits. Whereas the act the Electoral Act 2010 stipulates the spending limit of 10 million for State House of Assembly, the female aspirants stated that no serious aspirant for State House of Assembly whom make any meaningful impact with expenditure of less than 25 million. There had not been any report of INEC or the security agencies prosecuting any politician belonging to any political party for spending more than the stipulated amount.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The highly monetized nature of politics in Nigeria makes it very difficult for many qualified and competent women to be able to emerge as candidates of political parties. The party nomination form alone for APC for those who desired to emerge as candidates of the party in the Lagos State House of Assembly was N750,000. No concessions were granted to women. This did not include the enormous amount that was required for campaign, mobilization of party faithfuls, and production of various kinds of party souvenirs, as well as media publicity expenses. Even in the other two parties where women were granted concessions, of either free nomination or reduced amounts, the other campaign expenses were not affordable. A party chieftain was reported to have told a female aspirant that she needed about N30 million

to emerge as a House of Assembly member. Women therefore need enormous economic empowerment to be able to mobilize the kind of resources that are required to contest and win elections in Nigeria.

The preference of the political godfathers for male candidates for public political offices had served as impediment to the emergence of female candidates of the major political parties. The patriarchal nature of the Nigerian society makes it difficult to adopt political god-daughters, as it is un-African for a man to begin to bargain with a woman to meet up with the terms of agreements that are reached to facilitate the sponsorship of candidates. The belief is that women are usually more morally upright and less inclined to engaging in corrupt activities. As such they would be difficult for the political godfathers to use them as conduit for the looting of public treasury.

The high level of pre-election violence serves as inhibitory factor to the emergence of women as candidates of the major political parties. Cases of violence breaking out at party rallies with some people getting shot or killed, usually scare qualified and competent women from the political process. A professional woman who is desirous to serve the country, will not choose to go and be killed at the party rally, and leave her children motherless, simply because she wants to serve her country.

Women should be given equal access to credit facilities and factors of production like land and labour just like men to enhance their output and income generation. The discriminatory laws of inheritance, succession and land tenure; and collateral of husband's consent for granting loans to women which deny them the legal ownership and possible access to credit facilities should be eliminated.

Women organizations need to pull their resources together to sponsor female aspirants to emerge as candidates of major political parties, as that is the only way they would stand the chance of winning the general elections.

Women political empowerment programmes must involve the collaboration of the political godfathers, who must view the female candidates as credible enough to bring about good governance and the envisaged national development when elected into public offices.

The major political parties should adopt quota system in which particular proportion of the national assembly seats (constituencies) should be reserved for women, such that during the party primaries, only women will contest to be candidates for such constituencies.

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CATTLE GRAZING AND THREAT TO SECURITY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Grazing of cattle is one of the major boosts to economic prosperity and development but the process has in recent times been generating tension and threat to security across the country, Nigeria. This derives largely from the alleged troubling tendency of the herdsmen through their truculent grazing of their herds on farmlands. On the other hand, the tension surrounding cattle grazing in Nigeria is fuelled by the hostility of the agrarian communities hosting the cattle grazing. The resultant clashes between the cattle grazers and crop farmers ultimately result in untoward consequences of unprecedented loss of lives and properties. Yet the government and the relevant security agencies appear to lack requisite ideas on how to curb the incessant herders and farmers clashes in parts of the country. This is an exploratory study geared towards ascertaining the driving force of threat to security occasioned by cattle grazing in Nigeria with a view to exploring a new path to tackling the threat. Both primary and secondary sources were adopted in generating data through interviews and documents while the study anchors on weak state theory to recommend the strengthening of security architecture and the criminalization of prohibited firearms and crop destructions in Nigeria.

Keywords: Cattle grazing, security threats, development, banditry, crisis management

Introduction

The incessant mayhem occasioned by the sporadic clashes between cattle grazers and crop farmers constitute one of the major threats to security in Nigeria. Yet, cattle grazing and crop farming contribute to economic

prosperity and cannot be abandoned. More so, both categories of food production are mutually dependent for viability and mutually assured existence. This for instance, derives from the fact that the crop farmers depend largely on cattle dung to manure the land for bumper harvest just as the cattle grazers depend on crop residue for the nutritional needs of their herds. Notwithstanding this obvious interdependence and symbiotic relationship between cattle grazers crop and farmers, the unequal resource endowment amongst the various parts of the world, makes it inevitable that both cannot avoid each other. This is why Taddon (2000) had asserted that

Throughout history, people have moved from food-deficit to food-surplus regions taken with them their families and flocks, sometimes, conquering the areas to which they moved, sometimes getting absorbed in them and losing their separate identities.

The movement has usually eventuated into deadly quarrels between the crop farmers and the cattle grazers which often escalate to a complex dimension that approximate to Boko Haram insurgency, leading to loss of numerous lives and properties. For instance, the now seeming perennial clashes between the cattle grazers and crop farmers in parts of Nigeria has claimed an estimated death toll of approximately ten thousand people between 2016 and 2019 for which record is available (Crisis Group, 2019)

Studies (Crisis Group, 2017; Ahmadu, 2011) attributed this trend to pressures on land and frustration with conflict management officials, urban expansion and industrialization while the immediate trigger arises from the mutual bellicosity of both the crop farmers and the cattle grazers. The loss of a grazing land is a product of desertification and urban expansion while the mutual antagonism between the crop farmers and cattle grazers is a consequence of crop destruction by the herds and the resultant repulsion and rustling of the cattle by crop farmers in lieu of the damaged crops. But it is the poor handling of the conflict that is largely attributable to the deepening security threats as both parties resort to self-help that is always catastrophic.

Several measures have been adopted by both the federal and affected state governments in Nigeria to contain the security threat associated with cattle grazing. These measures range from the usual reactive approach involving arrest and prosecution to the proactive initiatives aimed at forestalling further deadly clashes between the two farmers such as the

proposal for Ranching or Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) Settlement policy and the establishment of Herder's Radio to maintain fluid communication with the nomadic herders through transmission in Fulfulde. But these attempts could not materialize because of the emerging ethno – religious dimension of the trend which has the potentials of threatening the corporate existence of Nigeria. For instance, every attempt made by the federal government to mitigate the farmers/herders clashes has been deflated on the ground of being motivated by ethno – religious sentiment (inclination) of the regime in power. This explains for instance, why the proposal by the federal government for ranching and establishment of herders' radio station have been criticized as being not only discriminatory but also complimentary of the herders' attacks and therefore a confirmation of the conspiracy for Fulanisation and Islamisation of the country (Obasanjo, May 19, 2019). Specifically, Obasanjo (2019) alleged that:

It is no longer an issue of lack of education and lack of employment for our youths in Nigeria which it began with. It is now West African Fulanisation, African Islamisation and global organized crimes of human trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking, gun trafficking, illegal mining and regime change.

More so, there is a preconception by most Nigerians of the southern extraction that cattle grazers are Fulani who are merely pursuing their age long territorial ambition to spread Islam across the leaps and bounds of Africa. As a result, most analysts perceive the seeming endless menace by cattle grazers as an extension of the Jihadization agenda by the Boko Haram insurgents. This in fact, informs the rejection of the Ranching Bill and its proposed alternative-the Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) Settlement policy since the Fulani has the antecedent of establishing Emirate and Islamising territories they settle in.

This paper therefore, attempts to explore a new path to the management of security threat engendered by cattle grazing in Nigeria with a view to achieving a fertile ground for harmonious coexistence and fruitful intercourse between farmers and herders.

Deconstruction of Concept

Efforts at ascribing a meaning to the keywords of cattle grazing and security threat have been widely documented in many literatures and do not require occupying further attention here. Instead, attempt is made here to

deconstruct the meaning of security and establish the nexus between cattle grazing and threat to security in Nigeria. To begin with, cattle grazers refer to those whose occupation revolves around rearing and taking livestock, particularly cattle to grassland for arable fodder to feed their animals. Their major areas of interest are mostly what Williams et al's (1999:184) identified as "open range lands, and wetland regions." As a result, most cattle grazers settle while others migrate from within and outside the area, especially to the wetlands during the dry season to feed their flock. This perhaps might have informed Williams et al (1999) description of the cattle grazers as pastoralists, implying that they look after their flocks beyond feeding them to ensuring their safety. In agreement with this assertion, Ahmadu (2011:39) maintained that pastoralism involves an open grazing not put under cultivation. According to him, the whole gamut of livestock management, particularly as it affects ruminant species production is pastoralism. Meanwhile, Amans et al (1992) quoted in Williams et al (1999) observed that the Fulani in Nigeria and elsewhere are mainly pastoralists as they own more than 90% of the livestock. Essentially, the decreasing rainfall and scarcity of grazing land in the arid zone necessitate the migration of the Fulani pastoralists to the flood plains and wetlands to fend for their flocks which depend largely on fodder. Perhaps, this explains the nomadic nature of the pastoralists who are as earlier noted, Fulani. In any case, this movement usually tends to threaten security as the pastoralists often run into hostile crop farmers resulting in violent clashes that culminate in deaths and destruction.

As lucidly explained by Ahmadu (2011), this arises because "animals stray into a farm and crops are damaged... (resulting) in some cases in the seizure of herds of cattle." Naturally, as good shepherds bound to look after their flocks and secure their safety, the pastoralists' attempt to rescue the flocks from captivity leads straight to bloody clashes that always claim the lives of many humans and animals in the process before the untoward situation is brought under control. But the perennial threat would have been avoided if there was no pressure on lands and if the grazing reserves were preserved. For instance, studies (Ahmadu, 2011; Crisis Group, 2017) reveal that virtually all grazing reserves gazette as far back as the first republic, northern Nigeria have all been turned into farmland while the migratory routes and routes meant for daily routine are virtually being taken over by urban expansion and industrialization thereby forcing the pastoralists to leave their herds of cattle through the highways and exposing the animals and the

teeming road users to mortal danger and resultant hostile reaction. As Ahmadu (2011) unequivocally lamented, this is coupled with the incessant harassment by security agents, extortion, torture and even lynching of the pastoralists whose only concern is the welfare of his animals and nothing else. In the same line of thought, Crisis Group (2017) observed that “the growth of human settlements, expansion of public infrastructure and acquisition of land by large – scale farmers and other private commercial interests, have deprived herders of grazing reserves”, and spurred them to aggressive behavior towards crops farmers and communities that attempt to resist their migration to where they could graze their herds. Thus “as cattle herds migrated southward, so did conflicts between pastoralists and farmers” (Crisis group, 2017). This endless antagonism has presently escalated to a catastrophic dimension and poses a threat to security similar to threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents. This is because, what was usually regarded as herders – farmers had suddenly graduated to both national and global threat as churches and Christian faithful have become targets of attack by the herders who have been discovered to be from foreign countries such as Niger, Chad, Sudan and Libya (FGN, 2017; Spring, 1993). Consequently, the trans-border dimension of the herders’ rampage in parts of Nigeria constitutes a threat to national security as it amounts to subversion capable of undermining the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. A corollary to the subversion threat is the weaponisation of the grazing process based on the flimsy excuse of protection. But as it has turned out, the arms are not only vended by the herders through the porous land borders, but are often unleashed on defenseless crop farmers. When non- state actors possess and brandish lethal weapons to harass others into subservience; it sends the chilling signal of the weakness of the state and the prevalence of security threat which is an infraction of peace and order. Adducing a holistic meaning to security threat (Alli, 2010) argued that it includes the gamut of activities and condition that undermine the feeling of safety and generate fear, anxiety, tension, danger, poverty, and oppression. This implies in the opinion of Imobighe (1990) that security has to do with freedom from danger or from threats to a nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests. In general terms, every action and human activity that destabilizes and makes the society uncomfortable, vulnerable and insecure, amounts to security threat. Thus, such issues as environmental degradation, poverty, ethno – religious conflict, political succession, bad governance, political dispute, human rights violation, and migration constitute

threat to peace and security. As Alli (2010) noted, “most of the threats to security in Africa are caused largely by the absence of development while in the wider world, most of the threats to peace and security also emanate from real or imagined injustice, oppression, exploitation, etc.” This explains why the emphasis now is on the securitization of peace because a country where a section of the citizens are constantly exposed to harm’s way and brutalized by the powerful cannot be considered to be peaceful and free from security threats.

Imobighe (1990) explained that “threat has to do with danger, either real or perceived by a state based on its pattern of relationship with other states.” This is why threats can both emanate from within a state and from outside the state. In other words, all threats have both internal and external dimensions. While the internal aspect of threat could easily be dismantled, that of external outlook usually escalate to unmanageable proportion and exhibit the potentials to assault the integrity of the state, and undermine its strength. Some of the security threats in Nigeria that have external platform include terrorism, herdsmen – farmers’ clashes, banditry, money laundering, human trafficking, drug trafficking, cybercrimes, including internet fraud amongst others. Most of these threats are predominantly associated with cattle grazing, prominent among which include kidnapping, rape, terrorism, attacks and impunity in parts of the country. Their frequent occurrence tends to expose the weakness of the institutions which are saddled with the core mandate of keeping the country safe and secured (Abati, 2019). Essentially, influx of bandits masquerading as herdsmen into the country from the neighbouring countries informs the conclusion of this paper that the Nigerian state appears weak to repel them and contain the security threats triggered by the bellicosity of cattle grazers in parts of the country.

Explanatory Framework

Attempts at explaining the security threats associated with cattle grazing in Nigeria have been generating varied and competing perspectives. This has divided analysts into different schools of thought. Prominent amongst these explanatory tools include social exclusion theory which attribute security threat to the exclusion of segment of the society from enjoying the fair share of social benefits. According to the proponent of this view, the cattle grazers are stigmatized by the larger society, especially in the Christian dominated areas and southern part of the country on the flimsy ground of professing

Islamic faith and being dirty in persons. As a result, they are not welcomed in most parts of the country, thereby creating a fertile ground for mutual hostility. In a related argument, proponents of deprivation theory contend that the major source of herdsmen's threat to security is encroachment on grazing reserves and routes through urban expansion and industrialization. According to them, this development has robbed the grazers of the gazetted grazing land and routes. As a result, the animals were denied of fodder. The frustration theorists while agreeing with both the social exclusion and deprivation theories, stressed that the open clashes between the herders and farmers is a product of frustration occasioned by stigmatization of the herders and the deprivation of grazing lands and routes from their animals which leave them with no option but to resort to self-help to assert their right to existence and to secure the welfare of their cattle by whatever means practicable including armed struggle. According to the frustration theorists, this is why the nomadic cattle grazers encroach on crop farms to feed their animals and lead their flocks along the highways and cities in the absence of the grazing routes that have been converted to farms. This ultimately culminates in bloody confrontations with crops farmers and road users (Ahmadu, 2011). The theories were able to give an insight into the driving forces of herders' threat to security but none of them mentioned the action and inaction of the government in fueling or ameliorating the security threats associated with cattle grazing in Nigeria.

This lacuna in the extant theories informs the choice of the weak state theory as the suitable explanatory framework. This derives from its ability to connect the roots of the security threat to the sheer inability of the state to rise to the occasion and plug its authority leakages with a view to emasculating the purveyors' threat to security in Nigeria. The thrust of the theory is that insecurity thrives in a state bereft of the capacity to ward off and manage conflict and threat to security. In essence, weak states lack the capacity to ensure maximum welfare and security of its citizens (Eze, 2010).

Developed by the World Bank and popularized by Coyne (2006), the theory describes countries under stress and displays the inability to maximize pleasure and minimize pains for the greatest number of the populace. In view of such states' lack of capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction and development and to safeguard the security and fundamental rights of their citizenry, such states experience authority failures and diminution of legitimacy (Menocal, 2008; Stewart and Brown, 2008). This

is why proponents of weak states theory characterize weak states as exhibiting institutional weakness, legitimacy failures, and authority failures.

The Nigerian state aptly fits into the weak states characterization given the incessant assault on the integrity of the country by bandits and terrorists masquerading as cattle grazers. More so, the security architecture saddled with the core mandate of keeping the country safe and secure have proven themselves weak and incapable of living up to its mandate as cattle grazers unleash strings of attacks and impunity in parts of the country. The weakness of the Nigeria state is equally evident in the sheer influx of bandits armed with assorted weapons and illegal migrants from neighbouring countries with the relevant security agencies at the borders and major highways doing nothing to repel them to keep the country safe and secure (Abati, 2019). Consequently, the cattle grazers are having a field day sacking communities, kidnapping and raping defenseless women while the security agencies in Nigeria are stupefied by the overwhelming capacity of arms in possession of the cattle grazers. Even the judiciary that is another institution of the state saddled with the procurement of justice display aberrant bias and compromise in the dispensation of justice. This ultimately erodes and corrodes every concerted effort deployed to bring the disturbers of security to justice chiefly because of the seeming collusion and compromise of the judiciary to derail the efforts by letting the enemies of the state off the hook on the conspiratorial ground of technicality.

The Radicalization of Cattle Grazing in Nigeria

Threats to security have become a worldwide phenomenon. But the security threat generated by cattle grazing is assuming a monstrous dimension because of its transnational character. This is why the mention of cattle grazing sends shivers down the spines of most Nigerians, particularly from the southern and north central axis of the country. In fact, the carnage characterizing cattle grazing in Nigeria shroud this cardinal and existential economic activity in controversy even when the process ironically promotes economic prosperity.

At the incipient stage, the security threats revolve around the hostility between the cattle grazers and crop farmers over destruction of farm crops and the consequent attacks on the herds and herders by the crop farmers. But

presently, the erstwhile limited hostility between the pastoralists and crop farmers has snowballed into inter-communal and ethno – religious chicanery due to the fact that the cattle grazers are predominantly Muslim Fulani and the farmers are predominantly Christians (The Observatory, 16 July, 2015).

This may not be avoided, given the nomadic nature of cattle grazing which is understandably a product of resource inequality. For instance, nature did not endow the world equally with resources. Instead, the world is polarized between the resource – rich and resource – scarce areas, thereby necessitating the people from the resource scarce region of the world to migrate to the resource – abundant area of the world for greener pasture (Omemma, 2010). In the same vein, the need to obtain some of the resources, especially fodder which lie outside their territories, prompted the movement of cattle grazers from desert-prone localities to the grassland region. But in the course of caring for the well-being of their flocks, the animals stray into farmlands and wreak havoc on the crops, thereby provoking hostility between the crop farmers and the cattle grazers across the parts of the world. Consequently, the process of cattle grazing has been fraught with violent clashes and sundry security threats such as kidnapping, murder, arson, armed robbery and rape.

Therefore, based on their nomadic nature, and the dependence of the cattle on plants for feeding, it is safe to assert without any fear of contradiction that cattle grazing has an age-long dark history of destruction and violence. To that extent, it is erroneous to claim or regard the radicalization of cattle grazers as an emerging security threat. Instead, their menace across the parts of Africa have been grossly under reported and carelessly glossed over by victims and opinion leaders alike until recently. As Agbede (2016) clearly pointed out, incidents of herdsmen – farmers clash are not new in Nigeria. For instance, between 1991 and 2013, available statistics reveal that over eight hundred people have been killed by rampaging cattle grazers across parts of the country (Agbede, 2016). The harrowing trend deteriorated in 2014 leading to an exponential rise in the number of deaths occasioned by herdsmen attacks. This prompted the Global Terrorism Index of 2015 to categorize the militant cattle grazers as “the fourth most deadly terrorist group of 2014” (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). But even with the global attention the report attracted, the herdsmen threat to security has not declined. Instead, the menace of the militant herdsmen in Nigeria has assumed a complex dimension by dovetailing into ethno–religious debacle which is threatening the foundation of

the Nigeria state. For instance, many deaths resulting from attacks by herdsmen who are predominantly Muslim Fulani are recorded virtually every day and most of these deaths are mostly witnessed in the Christian dominated North Central states of Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Plateau, Kogi and Kaduna as well as the southern parts of the country, particularly in Enugu State, Delta State, Ekiti State, Ondo State, and others. The torrents of these killings give a gloomy impression of Nigeria being a land of blood littered with decapitated and mutilated corpses. In a seeming reinforcement of this assertion, a study by The Foreign Policy (2019) indicate that “between 1999 and 2018, farmers – herders violence in Nigeria has taken the lives of over ten thousand (10,000) and displaced hundreds and thousands more. A breakdown of the fatalities is captured in the table below.

Table 1. Annual Fatality Figures from Herdsmen Attacks in Nigeria.

S/N.	Year	Fatality
1.	1991 – 2013	215
2.	2014	1,229
3.	2015	800
4.	2016	1,169
5.	2017	116
6.	2018	2,075
7.	2019	1,300
	TOTAL	6,804

This is in an addition to properties worth millions of naira lost in the fracas and hundreds of thousands of people internally displaced. As a result, the country’s economic development is being thwarted as enormous potential revenues are lost annually to herdsmen attacks (Sunday Sun, September 4, 2016). The question that agitates curious minds and observers is why the carnage, why the endless herdsmen – farmers clash?

Opinions are divided amongst analysts over the driving force of the incessant clashes between cattle grazers and crop farmers in Nigeria. But there

is a consensus that the clashes constitute a threat to security and national cohesion and that it has a multi-causal drivers. Crisis Group (2017) for instance, offers a broad view of the principal aggravating factors behind this escalating conflict to include “climatic changes (frequent droughts and desertification), population growth (loss of northern grazing lands to the expansion of human settlement); technological and economic changes (new livestock and farming practices); crime (rural banditry and cattle rustling); political and ethnic strife (intensified by the spread of illicit firearms); and cultural changes (the collapse of traditional conflict management mechanisms).” In a different point of view, Muazu, Kaoje and Ekeh (1999) attributed the violent conflict between livestock and crop farmers to “the tendency to force Fulani pastoralists to move after decades of settlement in a location”. In other words, the aggressive attribute of the cattle grazers is a product of frustration arising from denial of rights to land. Drawing insight from the divergent explanations, the paper identifies three factors that work in combination to induce and aggravate the violent clashes between the crop and livestock farmers across the parts of Nigeria. These are drought and desertification; urban expansion and loss of grazing land; and weaponization of cattle grazing for purported self-defence.

Drought and Desertification: As earlier pointed out elsewhere, nature endowed parts of the world differently. Some are richly endowed with natural resources while others wallow in resource scarcity (Omemma, 2010). This largely explains why people from resource deficit area constantly move to resource surplus area as economic refugees to scavenge resources vital for their well-being. When extrapolated to cattle grazing, resource scarcity becomes the driving force for nomadism which is invariably the stimulant to herdsmen threat to security. In Nigeria for instance, livestock farming is the exclusive preserve of the Fulani whose organic base of existence is predominantly the semi-desert and arid topography of the north. According to Amans et al (1999), “more than 90% of the livestock in Nigeria are owned by the Fulani pastoralists. In the face of the climate condition of increasing drought and desertification, the pastoralists are compelled to migrate to the wetlands and forests of the south and north central which are irrigated by a network of rivers and lakes. In the course of the migration, the pastoralists run into hostile farmers bent on warding them off to reduce pressure on their farmland.

Urban Expansion and Loss of Grazing Land: The migration of the cattle grazers to the resource rich wetlands of the country results in population explosion of both human and animals each dependent on same land for nutrition and survival. This naturally triggers off violent competition between the pastoralists and crop farmers over the shrinking land space for cultivation and grazing. The struggle over the usership and ownership of land between the crop and livestock farmers has sparked off claims and counter-claims of encroachment on farmland and grazing land respectively. For instance, the crop farmers accuse the pastoralists of encroaching on farm crops to feed their animals while the pastoralists on the other hand accuse the crop farmers of converting grazing reserves to farmlands. In support of this claim by the cattle grazers, findings, (Ahmadu, 2011; Crisis Group, 2017) reveals that Northern Region Government (1965) in the First Republic Nigeria provided for grazing reserves including the grazing routes (Ahmadu, 2011). This was reinforced by the National Policy on Agriculture (1988) which in recognition of the plight of the landless pastoralist recommended that “a minimum of 10% of the country’s mass be legally acquired and constituted into grazing reserves for lease allocation to grazers. Before then, 1978 Land Use Law empowered customary right of occupancy over 500 hectares for farmland and 5,000 hectares for grazing land. But with the passage of time, these extant laws and proposals were flagrantly overlooked by most state and local government authorities who carve out the gazetted grazing reserves to farmers and private individuals for residential building and cultivation respectively.

Therefore, in the face of shrinking open land space for grazing, the herdsmen felt shortchanged and resorted to self-help to access fodder for their animals. By so doing, the animals stray into farmlands and convert crops to fodder, and thereby provoking the hostility (Williams et al, 1999). In a related manner, the conversion of acclaimed grazing reserves and grazing routes to farmlands and buildings has necessitated the common sight of cattle using highways with all the attendant hazards to the animals and road users alike (Ahmadu, 2011). This expectedly elicits resistance and resilience on both the road users and cattle grazers that eventually culminate in deadly quarrels that leads to destruction of lives and property.

Weaponization of cattle grazing: The frustration arising from the shrinking land and the alleged encroachment on grazing reserves and routes coupled

with the unpretentious hostility by the crop farmers and stigmatization by the larger society have been attributed to the belligerent attitude of cattle grazers through the weaponization of cattle grazing. As a result, cattle grazers who usually bear arms particularly bow and arrow or sword for self defence against wild animals and to ward off cattle predators, now bear sophisticated arms to attack and maim crop farmers and perceived obstructors to their movement and grazing anywhere. According to the Amnesty International cited in Aluko and Alagbe (2018), “these attacks were well planned and coordinated with the use of weapons like machine guns and AK-47 rifles”. These is compounded by the discovery that most of the attacks are perpetrated by herdsmen that migrated to Nigeria from neighbouring countries (Spring, 1993). The reason for their belligerency derives from frustration and insistence on plying their trade anywhere on the surface of earth because pastoralism implies “open grazing of animals on all lands in the savannah not put under cultivation” (Ahmadu, 2011). Based on this assumption, the herders audaciously traverse every nooks and crannies of Nigeria for pastures to feed their livestock and invariably regard every of their challengers as enemies to be crushed. More so, the cattle grazers take up arms to protect their animals from rustlers and sundry threats to their pastoral life such as killing of their animals by poisoning and physical attacks. The influx of illicit arms through the porous borders has availed the rampaging herdsmen easy access to small and light weapons and also emboldened these erstwhile timid and placid herders to assume the posture of monster menacing the lives and properties of the Nigerian populace in particular and the national security in general,

The Management of Cattle Grazers’ Threat to Security

There is no gain stressing the fact that the violent attacks by cattle grazers in most parts of the country has become a thorn in the flesh of the various governments in Nigeria. As a result of this disturbing security threat, both the federal and state governments have initiated several steps to contain the menace of the cattle grazers in Nigeria. But three of these measures are considered critical to be discussed below.

- **Reactive approach:** This involves response to security threat based on reported incidents with a view to apprehending the perpetrators to face the long arm of the law. This particular approach is so called because it is limited to the actual threat and the offender and does not extend to a looming threat or plans to breach security. As a result, the approach is

too cosmetic to solve or manage raging security challenge such as the menace of cattle grazers. This perhaps explains the resurgence of same security threat or conflict soon after the cursory attention to it by the relevant security agencies. Some of the reactive methods employed in managing herdsmen menace in Nigeria include arrest and harassment as well as killing of stray animals.

- **The Juridical approach:** This measure is an accomplishing side of reactive approach to tackling the menace of cattle grazers. It involves the prosecution of the herdsmen that threaten security through violent attacks on crop farmers and host communities. Under this circumstance, the court is the theatre for the administration of justice since it has the authoritative say in the determination and pronouncement of what justice demands in every situation involving claims and counter-claims to legal rights and award of punishment for the breach of security or breach of law and order. The judicial method has however, not been sustainable and therefore, is bereft of the capacity to tackle the herders threat to security in Nigeria. For instance, the justice administration system is ensnared by obsolete and ambiguous laws that are estranged to reality. Consequently, the arrested offenders are flagrantly let off the arm of the law on the ground of technicality and want of prosecution. This unfortunately has emboldened the law breakers as they soon resume offensive with impunity and walk audaciously free on the street to the chagrin of their victims and the entire populace.
- **Proactive approach:** This is the management of herders' threat to security through the neutralization of malicious intent to unleash mayhem on the society. Incidentally, this approach is supposed to be the first port of call in the management of security as it involves early warnings and intelligence report on the dastardly plans to threaten security of lives and property. It also involves ascertaining the remote and immediate drivers of the threat and exploring measures to thwart and eliminate the looming security threat. To that extent, the proactive approach supersedes both the reactive and legal initiatives to managing cattle grazers' threat to security. But this has usually been glossed over and only resorted to when the preferred militarist and legal initiatives have failed to yield the expected result. This explains why since 2014 when the menace of militant cattle grazers in Nigeria assumed a

complex dimension and attracted global attention (Global Terrorist Index, 2015), the Nigeria government is just waking up to the imperative of proactive approach to tackling the challenge. First, it initiated a bill to National Assembly for Cattle Ranching/Colony, which was filibustered. Thereafter, it fiddled with the idea of establishing herders' radio, and presently, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture has announced implementation of a Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) Settlement policy across the states of the federation beginning with twelve pilot states. These initiatives have however been strongly rejected by a wider segment of the country, particularly from the Southeast, North Central and the Southwest. According to Kayode (2018), the rejection becomes necessary because "historical facts testify to the fact that giving colonies and settlements to people under the guise of land for grazing is very dangerous". Apart from the adduced reason there is a strong indication that the initiatives are being politicized and viewed from both ethnic and religious spectacles. Therefore, there is potential probability that the proposed programme may become still birthed following its abrupt suspension. Against this backdrop, the implication is that the development could exacerbate the herdsman threat to security in Nigeria.

Conclusion and recommendation

The study was motivated to reconcile the contradiction surrounding the threat to security by cattle grazers who ironically are critical components in the economic production process. Based on empirical analysis of the phenomenon, the paper concludes that the festering violent conflicts between the cattle grazers and crops farmers across the country is a consequence of shrinking land for cultivation and cattle grazing. But the threat is being aggravated by the combined weakness of the relevant institutions saddled with the statutory responsibility of tackling the menace such as the security architecture and the judiciary coupled with the ethnicization and politicization of the initiatives put in place to address the burgeoning security challenges. Against this backdrop, it is recommended as follows.

Establishment of cattle colony: That the proactive initiative in tackling the herders' threat to security should be sustained as it is the sustainable mechanism capable of neutralizing and forestalling the further menace of

cattle grazers on the social life of the host communities. To that extent, the various governments in the country should demonstrate commitment to achieving a permanent solution to the challenge by convening a conference of ethno-religious, political and economic stakeholders to harmonize interests and modalities for establishing cattle ranching or colonies in line with international best practice as encapsulated in the Report of National Conference 2014 which stipulates that:

In the long term, cattle routes and grazing reserves be phased out to lay emphasis on ranching. Cattle rustling is however a disincentive to ranching and must be brought under control by better policing. In the meantime, States which have large livestock population should endeavour to maintain grazing reserves (The Report of the National Conference, 2014).

Strengthening of institutions of governance: That the relevant security architecture and the judiciary that have the statutory mandate to combat security threat and administer justice are weak and need to be strengthened in line with current reality of security challenges. This has become necessary based on the discovery that arms proliferation is fueling the herdsmen menace and that these arms are easily brought into the country through the porous borders and circulated to the eager hands of the militant herdsmen who employ them to audaciously unleash mayhem on the society. Therefore, there is the need to beef up security at the land borders and equip relevant security agencies with state-of-the-art logistics and devices for detection and neutralization of malicious intents and activities in the country. In addition, the judiciary should be reformed and the extant laws in the country to be amended to reflect the trend of security challenges while the judiciary should assert their independence to administer justice as the last hope of the common man.

Mutual tolerance and accommodation: That both the livestock farmers and crops farmers are indispensable components of economic production that enhance the prosperity and development of the country. As a result, their persistent clashes and attendant loss of lives and properties undermine economic progress and drain national revenues. Both producers should therefore, stress on symbiotic relationship rather than on rivalry. This could only be possible when they tolerate each other and become accommodative rather than combative. For instance, the crops farmers benefit from the animal

dung to manure their farms much as the cattle grazers need crop residues to feed their animals during dry season.

In the event of crop destruction by stray animals, the crop farmers should resort to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism to seek redress rather than resorting to self-help that provoke the cattle grazers to reprisal attacks and the resultant catastrophic consequences. But through the instrumentality of ADR, both aggrieved and offending parties may easily reach a truce for reparation and accommodation of defective tendencies.

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RETHINKING CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The examined campaign financing of the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria. Data for the study was generated through an objective review of relevant literature including sections 88 to 92 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as Amended) that made provisions for the regulation of the finances and expenditure of political parties. The study reviewed presidential campaign financing using the indices of campaigns and rallies; expenses on bill boards and electronic and print media expenses. It observed that, in Section 91/9 Act the Electoral, it is stated that “no individual or other entity shall donate more than one million naira (N1,000,000) to any candidate” while Section 91/2 indicates that “the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate at a Presidential election shall be one billion naira (N1,000,000,000)”. However, the findings showed that contrary to the stipulation of Sections 91/9 and 91/2, the stipulated limits were far exceeded by the two major political parties, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC). Based on the earlier stated four indices, the study revealed that the PDP spent a total of Eight Billion, Seven Hundred and Forty Nine million, Six Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand, and Two Hundred and Ninety Six Naira only (8,749,685,296.00) while the APC spent Two Billion, Nine Hundred and Fifteen Million, Eight Hundred and Forty Six Thousand, and Seven Hundred and Thirty Seven Naira only (2,915,846,737.00). Thus, due to the cost of campaigns, only the PDP and APC out of the fourteen political parties that contested the presidential election in 2015 were able to engage in viable campaigns nationally. It further discovered that the campaign financing abuse of these two parties was made possible by the gap in Sec. 91/8c which stipulates that “in determining the total expenditure incurred in relation to the candidature of any person at any election, no account shall be taken of political party expenses in respect of the candidate standing for a particular election”. The paper recommends an upward review of campaign financing limit to cover candidates and political party’s expenditure.

Keywords: Campaign, Election, Finance, Presidential Election, Political Party.

Introduction

The return to democratic rule in 1999 was greeted with fanfare and it was hoped that it would guarantee an enabling environment for popular participation through affordable electioneering. Political parties desirous of capturing and controlling the machinery of government at different levels of governance (National, State and Local Governments) deploy various means to raise money to fund its campaigns without due regards to the provision of the Electoral Acts 2010 (As Amended). The centrality of funds to political party's survival, visibility and relevance cannot be overemphasized. Printing of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials, jingles on print and electronic media outlets, campaigns and rallies as well as the administrative cost of managing political parties constitute some of the major reasons why funds are considered the livewire of political parties. It is thinkable from this perspective, that people desirous of controlling the processes of governance would 'invest' in political parties with the intent of generating returns on such 'investments'. Evidence in history show that such attempts at funding/investing in political parties have often challenged the entire spectrum of governance.

Between May 2003 and March 2006, Dr. Chris Ngige, the Governor of Anambra State rode to power through the funding of his campaign by Chief Chris Uba. It is recorded that Chris Ngige entered into an agreement with his benefactor Chris Uba on how he could recoup money committed into the processes that led to his victory as governor. Part of this agreement according to Onyekpere (2014, p.2) revolves around the Governor handing over certain percentage of the state's monthly allocation from the Federation Account to Chris Uba through a process of Irrevocable Standing Payment Order (ISPO), about two thirds of the Commissioners, Special Advisers, Special Assistants and other political office holders to be appointed by Ngige were to be nominated by Chris Uba. When Chris Ngige upon assumption of Office as Governor couldn't live up to the terms of agreement, Anambra State was made ungovernable until Chris Ngige was eventually removed as Governor. A similar scenario played out in Oyo State from 2003 to 2006 between Chief Lamidi Adedibu (funder/Godfather) and Senator Rasheed Ladoja (Governor). The implication of leaving campaign finances unregulated is perhaps,

typically reflected in the cases above. In the above cases, the funders/godfathers harnessed or attempted not only to harness the commonwealth but also demonstrate considerable influence over who gets what, when and how and who is left out. The downside of a situation as depicted is made even more frightening when consideration is given to the possibility of campaign financing creating processes conducive to money laundering. Clearly therefore, the need to raise money to maintain expensive political campaigns diminishes ties to a representative democracy because of the influence large contributors have over politicians (Holtz-Bacha, 2008) and political processes.

Today, one can hardly argue that the cost of election in Nigeria is not a major factor in narrowing the space for elective political participation. Although campaign financing in Nigeria occupies prominent position in electoral debates, it has however, attracted little systematic research. It is within this context that the paper examines campaign financing of the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. It speaks to the need to review the ceiling for campaign financing in line with prevailing realities and ensure a more robust monitoring and implementation of relevant laws where such laws are breached. It is also, a modest attempt to contribute and extend the discourse on campaign financing generally. The specific objective of the study is to examine if relevant laws that moderate campaign financing appropriately structured and conditioned political parties' campaign spending in the 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria. It is hoped that the study would lay a foundation for a new research endeavour and also hopefully provide a background for a much broader future exploration of campaign financing in Nigeria. The study thus comprises eight sub-topics; an introduction is followed by a statement of methodology and scope of the study. Other subtopics focus respectively on examining the frameworks for regulating campaign financing, unpacking the concept of campaign financing, review of 2015 campaign expenses (under the sub-headings of Campaigns and Rallies, Expenses on Bill Boards, Expenses on Electronic and Print Media). This is followed by the analysis of matters arising from the 2015 campaign expenses and concluding remarks and recommendations

The study employs the documentary method of data collection, which entails the use of materials from secondary sources. Data for the study is therefore, generated through an objective assessment and analysis of literature on campaign financing. Examination of political parties' campaign financing is narrowed to the presidential campaign of the All Progressives Congress

(APC) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The justification for this revolves around the evidence that out of the fourteen political parties that contested the presidential election in 2015, only the APC and PDP were able to engage in viable campaigns nationally. The study reviewed presidential campaign financing using the indices of (i) campaigns and rallies; (ii) expenses on bill boards and (iii) electronic and print media expenses.

Frameworks for Regulating Campaign Financing

There are both national and international legal instruments for the regulation of campaign financing. Section 153 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that establishes the National Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) empowers it under Part 1 of the Third Schedule to:

- xxxi. monitor the organization and operation of political parties, including their finances;
- xxxii. arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information

The Constitution as a regulatory framework further empowers INEC through sections 88 to 92 of the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended) to ensure the regulation of the finances and expenditure of political parties. Through these legal frameworks, INEC set a ceiling for candidates and political parties campaign finance, a limit beyond which it becomes unlawful. At the international level, are enabling instruments such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC, 2003) which prescribes under Article 7 (3) that:

Each State Party shall consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this Convention and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to enhance transparency in the funding of candidates for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties (General Assembly Resolution 58/4, 2003). Covenant of Civil and Political Rights – General Comments No. 25 under Paragraph 19 advocates that reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be

justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1996). The African Union Charter on Preventing and Combating Corruption under Article 10 admonishes State Parties to adopt legislative and other measures to:

- iv. proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties;
- v. incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties.

The Venice Commission on the Financing of Political Parties Paragraph 2 declares that:

State Party should provide for the formation and free functioning of political parties, possibly regulate the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns, ensure the separation of party and state, and establish the conditions for competition in legislative elections on an equitable basis. Paragraph 12 declares that the transparency of electoral expenses should be achieved through the publication of campaign accounts (Venice Commission Guidelines on the Financing of Political Parties, 2001).

The Organization of American States Inter-American Democratic Charter under Article 5 notes that:

the strengthening of political parties and other organizations is a priority for democracy and special attention should be paid to the problems associated with the high cost of election campaigns and the establishment of a balanced and transparent system for their financing (Organization of American States Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001).

Council of Europe Paragraph 8 (ii) declares that:

political parties should receive financial contributions from the state budget in order to prevent dependence on private donors and to guarantee equality of chances between political parties. Article 14 further prescribes that States should provide for independent monitoring in respect of the funding of political parties and electoral

campaigns; the independent monitoring should include supervision over the accounts of political parties and the expenses involved in election campaigns as well as their presentation and publication (Recommendation, 2003).

Southern African Development Forum Article 3(1) declares that: “the electoral law should prohibit the Government to aid or to abet any party gaining unfair advantage” (Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region adopted March 25, 2001).

The Concept of Campaign Financing

The livewire of any political party revolves around its ability to fund its campaign. Campaign financing which is an element of political finance is generically used to refer to funds that are mobilized and used by political party in its bit to meet allowable standards prescribed by relevant laws for the recognition and operation of political parties’ campaigns. The term campaign finance is often used more comprehensively in some climes to mean political finance, here reflecting the entire gamut of funds raised to promote candidates, political parties or policy initiatives. Campaign finance is described by Heard (1960) as “the cost of democracy”. In the United States for instance, political parties and charitable organizations are vehicles used in aggregating funds to keep campaigns alive.

Specifically, and as used in this study, campaign financing refers to funds mobilized and used by political parties in funding its campaign especially before and during elections. Campaign financing which is often interchangeably used with campaign expenditure is defined as any “expenditure incurred by a party for electoral purposes; that is solely for the purpose of enhancing the standing of or promoting electoral success for a party at a forthcoming or future election” (INEC’s Political Parties Finance Handbook, 2005). This is also expanded to cover goods and services for which payments are made prior to the campaign period, for use during the campaign period. Campaign expenditure according to INEC’s Political Parties Finance Handbook (2005) include any expenditure incurred by a political party in connection with the following items: political party broadcasts, advertisement, distribution of unsolicited materials to the electorate, circulation of manifesto and other policy documents, market research and canvassing, media publicity, transportation and rallies and other events.

It is obvious by now that the conceptualization of campaign finance or expenditure leaves much to be desired. Some of these unanswered questions may include:

- What is the limit of expenditure placed on candidates and political parties?
- How are political parties to generate their funds?
- Who supervises the account of political parties?
- Are political parties to make public their accounts?
- Are there penalties for violating existing relevant laws?
- What incentivizes people to fund political parties or candidates?

These posers are pointers to the evidence that there are gaps in the conceptualization of campaign finance including existing policies and laws which are supposedly designed to ensure its enforcement. Pareto (1935) had argued that people funding candidates and parties do so based on a range of reasons including ideological or idealistic drive, social - aiming at social honours or access to men of power; financial, striving for material benefits. Other motivations may include; protection from prosecution and the full weight of the law, which motivates criminal gangs and corrupt money to fund politics. This line of reasoning coheres with the position of Kallaand Broockman (2015), Gill and Lipsmeyer (2005) and Ansolabehere, John and James (2003) where it was argued that although political science literature indicates that most contributors to campaign funds give to support parties or candidates with whom they are already in agreement. There is however, wide public perception that donors expect government favours (such as specific legislation being enacted or defeated) in return. So, some have come to equate campaign finance with political corruption and bribery. These views clearly reinforce the need for a more context specific and effective system to regulate campaign finance with the intent of checking big money influence.

The funding and expenditure of political parties' campaigns has however, generated a lot of interest from the concerned public with the intent of regulating campaign financing. This is because if campaign financing is left unregulated, slush funds may be deployed into prosecuting elections. The downside of allowing slush funds into the polity through campaign financing can be located within the context of the possibility that such funds and funders would be given legitimacy, accorded an unusual stake and influence in the

polity and may therefore, generally affect the delivery of good governance. To regulate campaign financing, the Electoral Act 2010 (as Amended), Sec. 91/9 stipulates that ‘no individual or other entity shall donate more than one million naira (N1, 000,000) to any candidate’, Sec. 91/2 provides that ‘the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate at a Presidential election shall be one billion naira (N1, 000,000,000)’. The segment below reviews the 2015 general elections with the intent of determining whether or not the provisions of the Electoral Act 2010 (as Amended) were met. The review is done using the indices of (i) campaigns and rallies; (ii) expenses on bill boards and (iii) electronic and print media expenses. While this may not be an exhaustive barometer for measuring campaign expenses, it however, provides a critical baseline for examining campaign expenses.

Review of 2015 campaign expenses

It should be recalled that out of the fourteen political parties that contested the presidential election in 2015, only the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) were able to engage in viable campaigns nationally. The reason of course was the cost implication of prosecuting a national campaign by other parties with weak financial support base. The review of the 2015 campaign expenses would therefore, revolve around the activities of the APC and the PDP. The indicators for review are *campaigns and rallies; expenses on bill boards and electronic and print media expenses*.

1. Campaigns and Rallies

This segment covers expenses by candidates/parties on campaigns and rallies nationally. Items covered include hiring of venues, podiums, public address and music systems, branded shirts, caps, posters and other Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials and logistics. Others include food, drinks and payment for entertainers. This review incorporates the understanding that there were other expenses incurred by the campaign organizers that are not documented. Such expenses may include allowances paid to campaign officials and delegates, feeding/accommodation and monies for public relations. This gap simply suggests that details of expenditure as presented here are hardly exhaustive.

Table 1.1: Campaigns and Rallies Expenses for the All Progressives Congress (APC)

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Presidential Rally at Uyo Township Stadium	Uyo, Akwalbom State	January 6, 2015	Items covered include: Venue, podium, PAS and music set, canopies, chairs, entertainment/performances, digital banners, hiring of vehicles, costume, video coverage, APC symbols	11,966,000
Rally at Omagwa Stadium	Ikwere, Rivers State	January 6, 2015	Venue, podium, PAS and music set, canopies, entertainment/performances, digital banners, hiring of vehicles, branded vehicles, consumables, costume, posters, digital screen, video coverage, APC symbols campaign brochure etc.	42,331,500
Campaign Rally at Atu Secondary School Field	Calabar, Cross River State	January 7, 2015	Sound system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, party symbol (broom), performance, banners, chairs and tables, costume, hiring of vehicles, disbursement of funds, campaign pamphlet etc.	28,772,800
Campaign Rally at Warri Township Stadium	Warri, Delta State	January 7, 2015	Sound system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, consumables, party symbol, performance, banners, chairs and canopies, costume, lodging of delegates, hiring of vehicles, disbursement of funds, campaign pamphlet, handbills, cooling van etc.	21,850,500

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Presidential Rally at Samson Siasia Stadium	O v o m , Yenagoa, Bayelsa State	January 8, 2015	Public Address system, music, generating set, platform and decoration, banners, posters and advert boards, cardboard papers, consumables, venue, chairs and tables, costumes and vehicles etc.	4,696,600
Yemi Osibajo organizes walk for change for the APC	A k u r e , Ondo State	January 8, 2015	PAS, cultural troupe, costume, banners, bike riders, hiring of vehicles, feeding allowance etc.	8,350,000
Campaign Rally at Okpara Square, Independent Layout	E n u g u , E n u g u State	January 9, 2015	Sound system and generating set, masters of ceremony, platform and decoration, venue, consumables, canopies, chairs, posters and handbills, costume, hiring of vehicles etc.	6,124,000
Campaign Rally at People's Resort Hotel	Abakiliki, Ebonyi State	January 9, 2015	Sound system and generating set, masters of ceremony, platform and decoration, venue, consumables, canopies, chairs, posters, costume, hiring of vehicles, disbursement of funds etc	2,997,500
Campaign Rally at Etche Road Primary school football field	Ward II, Aba South LGA, Abia State	January 9, 2015	Sound system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, brooms, banners, consumables, chairs and tables, costume, hiring of vehicles	3,830,400
Presidential Flag-off campaign at Emmaus Field	A w k a , Anambra State	January 10 , 2015	Venue, podium, PAS and music set, canopies, chairs, musical performances, digital banners, hiring of vehicles, costume, bill boards, advert placards, banners, snacks/ drinks, vehicle branding, sharing of money (mobilization fee), cooling van etc.	24,275,000

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign Rally at Dan Anyiam Stadium	Owerri, Imo State	January 12, 2015	Music system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, music performance, consumables, party symbol, canopies, banners, posters, costume, hiring of vehicles etc.	24,080,000
Campaign Rally at MKO Abiola Stadium	Abeokuta, Ogun State	January 13, 2015	Sound system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, musical performances, consumables, party symbol, canopies, chairs, banners, posters, costume, hiring of vehicles, branding of vehicles etc.	10,846,000
Campaign Rally at Old Lokoja Stadium	Lokoja, Kogi State	January 16, 2015	Music system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, party symbol, banners, costume, hiring of vehicles etc.	5,986,000
Campaign Rally at Old Parade Ground	Lafia, Nassarawa State	January 17, 2015	Music system and electricity generating set, platform and decorations, venue, consumables, party symbol, performance, banners, chairs and canopies, costume, hiring of vehicles, hotel lodgement etc.	6,500,000
Campaign Rally at Aminu Kano Triangle	Dutse, Jigawa State	January 20, 2015	Music system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, party symbol, banners, costume, hiring of vehicles etc.	7,700,000
Campaign Rally at Old Airport Gusau, Tudun Wada Ward	Gusau LGA, Zamfara State	January 21, 2015	Music system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, consumables, party symbol, canopies, chairs, banners, posters, costume, hiring of vehicles, branding of vehicles etc.	6,207,000

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Presidential Rally at ShehuKangwiSquare	Sokoto North, Sokoto State	January 22, 2015	PAS, venue, musical performance, decoration, costume, hiring of vehicles, chairs and canopies etc.	22,370,000
Campaign Rally at Jalingo Trade Fare Complex	Taraba State	January 28, 2015	Sound system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, consumables, party symbol, canopies, chairs, banners, posters, costume, hiring of vehicles, ushers etc.	10,561,500
Campaign Rally at Samuel Ogbemudia Stadium	Benin City, Edo State	January 29, 2015	PAS, music system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, brooms, banners, costume, hiring of vehicles	6,990,000
Presidential Rally at Teslim Balogun Stadium	Surulele, Lagos	January 30, 2015	Venue, Podium, PAS, musical set, chairs, entertainment/performances, digital banners, hiring of vehicles, branded vehicles, consumables, costume, posters, digital screen, video coverage, APC symbols, campaign brochure, disbursement of fund etc.	64,102,400
Campaign Rally at Metropolitan Square	Ilorin, Kwara State	January 31, 2015	Music system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, consumables, party symbol, banners, posters, costume, hiring of vehicles, branding of vehicles etc.	8,460,000
Edo Women Rally: Aisha Buhari Canvasses for support for the APC	Samuel Ogbemudia Stadium, Edo State	March 18, 2015	Venue, stage and decoration, costume, PAS, generator, hiring of private jet, hiring of vehicles etc.	14,500,000
Presidential Campaign at Dan Anyiam Stadium	Owerri, Imo State	March 23, 2015	Music system and generating set, platform and decoration, venue, musical performance, banners, costume, hiring of vehicles, branding of participants, youth groups etc.	13,770,000

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign Rally at IBB Square, Bauchi	B a u c h i , B a u c h i State	March 2 4 , 2015	Sound system, generating set, platform and decoration, canopies, chairs, costume etc.	13,795,000
Yemi Osibajo organizes walk for change for the APC	A k u r e , Ondo State	January 8,2015	PAS, cultural troupe, costume, banners, bike riders, hiring of vehicles, feeding allowance etc.	8,350,000

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Total campaigns and rallies expenses of the APC = **N371, 062,200**

Table 1.2: Campaigns and Rallies Expenses for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign Rally at Tafawa Balewa Square	Lagos State	January 8, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, canopies, plastic seats, tables, consumables, costume, musical performance, special celebrity appearance, banners, posters, generating set, hiring of vehicles, entertainment, mobile advert, BISCON CREW	44,055,500

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign Rally at Nnamdi Azikiwe Stadium	Enugu State	January 9, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, costume, chairs and canopies, banners, musical performances, comedy performances, celebrity appearance, generating set, fuelling of official vehicles, fuel for hired buses, disbursement of funds, mobile advert, BISCON CREW.	52,359,000
Campaign Rally Umuahia Township Stadium	Abia State	January 16, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, tables, chairs, consumables, costume, performances, banners, generating set, fuel for hired buses, media coverage, mobile advert, BISCON CREW	40,041,000
Campaign Rally at Abakiliki Township Stadium	Ebonyi State	January 17, 2015-	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, costume, chairs and canopies, banners, musical performance, generating set, hiring of buses, disbursement of funds, mobile advert, BISCON CREW.	20,974,000
Campaign Rally at Holy Trinity Field	Onitsha, Anambra State	January 17, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, costume, chairs and canopies, banners, posters and handbills, musical performances, generating set, mobile, BISCON CREW.	17,564,000

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign Rally at Dan Anyiam Stadium	Owerri, Imo State	January 17, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, consumables, costume, banners, posters, party symbol, party symbols, costume shirts, chairs, hiring of vehicles, mobile advertisement, BISCON CREW, cooling van.	53,668,000
Campaign and Rally at Zamfara Trade Fair Complex	Gusau, Zamfara State	January 19, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, chairs, canopies, costume, entertainment/performances, consumables, banners, posters, generating set, hiring of vehicles, mobile advertisement, BISCON CREW, disbursement of funds.	16,217,500
Campaign Rally at Aminu Kano Triangle	Dutse, Jigawa State	January 21, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, canopies, plastic seats, tables, consumables, costume, banners, generating set, hiring of vehicles, disbursement, BISCON CREW mobile advert	23,858,000
Campaign and Rally at Metropolitan Square	Kwara State	January 26, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, consumables, musical performance, banners, posters, generating set, hiring of vehicles, mobile advert, BISCON CREW.	20,422,000

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign and Rally at Lafia Stadium	Nassarawa State	January 27, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, consumables, costume, banners, posters, party symbol, generating set, canopies, chairs, hiring of vehicles, BISCON CREW, mobile advert, disbursement of funds, cooling van.	25,908,000
Campaign Rally at Omagwa Stadium	Ikwerre LGA, Rivers State	January 28, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, consumables, costume, banners, posters, generating set, canopies, chairs, musical performance, hiring of vehicles, branding of vehicles, BISCON CREW, mobile advert.	53,398,000
Campaign Rally at Jolly Nyame Stadium	Jalingo, Taraba State	January 29, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, consumables, chairs and canopies, costume, banners, posters, generating set, hiring of vehicles, mobile advertisement.	19,247,500
Campaign Rally at the U.J. Esuene Stadium	Calabar, Cross River State	January 30, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, party symbol, consumables, chairs, costume, entertainment and performance, traditional drummers, celebrity appearances and performance, banners, posters, souvenirs, generating set, hiring of vehicles, mobile advert, BISCON CREW, disbursement of funds, sharing of gifts.	90,290,000

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign Rally at International Stadium	Uyo, AkwaIbom State	January 31, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, party symbol, consumables, costume, entertainment and performance, banners, posters, souvenirs, generating set, hiring of vehicles, mobile advert, B I S C O N C R E W, disbursement of funds.	111, 630,000
Campaign Rally at Minna Trade Fair Complex	Niger State	February 2, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, party symbol, chairs, costume, traditional horse riders, banners, generating set, hiring of vehicles, mobile advert, B I S C O N C R E W, disbursement of funds.	18,805,000
Campaign Rally at Rwang Pan Township Stadium	Jos, Plateau State	February 3,2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, party symbol, consumables, chairs, costume, entertainment and performances, banners, posters, souvenirs, generating set, hiring of vehicles, mobile advertisement, B I S C O N C R E W, disbursement of funds	18,072,000
Campaign Rally at Confluence Stadium	Lokoja LGA, Kogi State	February, 3, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, consumables, costume, banners, posters, generating set, canopies, chairs, hiring of vehicles, B I S C O N C R E W, mobile advert.	20,308,000

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Campaign Rally at Samuel Ogbemudia Stadium	Benin City, Edo State	February 4, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, costume, banners, posters and handbills, generating set, disbursement of funds, mobile advert, BISCON CREW.	18,070,000
Campaign Rally at Cenotaph Court Road	Asaba, Delta State	February 4, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, consumables, costume, entertainment/ performances, special celebrity appearance, comedy appearance, banners, posters, hand bills, souvenirs, generating set, canopies, chairs, hiring of vehicles, BISCON CREW, mobile advert.	46,520,000
Campaign Rally at Samson Siasia Sport Stadium	Ovom, Yenegoa, Bayelsa State	February 6, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, canopies, plastic seats, tables, consumables, costume, musical performance, celebrity appearance, banners, generating set, BISCON CREW, mobile advert.	29,291,500
Campaign Rally at MKO Abiola Stadium	Abeokuta, Ogun State	February 12, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, sound system and generating set, video coverage, canopies, plastic seats, tables, consumables, costume, musical performance, banners, generating set, mobile advert, BISCON CREW.	15,767,500

Expenditure Head	Venue/ Place	Date	Item Description	Aggregate Cost
Kogi Women Rally: First Lady campaigns for President Jaonathan at Old Stadium	Lokoja, Kogi State	March 3, 2015	Venue, podium and decoration, PAS, generator, performances, costume, refreshment van, consumables, mobilization, hiring of private jet, hiring of vehicles, bags of rice.	36,768,000
Edo Women Rally: First Lady Campaigns for President Jonathan at Samuel Ogbemudia Stadium,	Benin City, Edo State	March 14, 2015	Venue, platform and decoration, PAS and generating set, mobilization, consumables, hiring of private jet, hiring of vehicles.	18,500,800
Nassarawa Women Rally: First Lady Campaigns for President Jonathan at City Hall	Lafia, Nassarawa State	March 14, 2015	Venue, decoration of venue, PAS performances, mobilization, souvenirs, consumables, campaign organization.	14,218,000
Ondo Women Rally: First Lady Campaigns for President Jonathan at Arcade Cultural Centre	Adegbemile, Ondo State	March 16, 2015	Venue, decoration of venue, PAS performances, mobilization, souvenirs, consumables.	28,250,000
Rally for the empowerment of women at Samson Siasia Stadium	Yenegoa, Bayelsa State	November 14, 2014	Venue, chairs, bags of rice, groundnut oil, wrappers, sewing machine, and tricycle.	24,930,800
Women Group in meeting with the First Lady	Bayelsa State Cultural Centre.	December 24, 2014	Podium and sound, canopies, chairs, bags of rice, groundnut oil, wrappers, cartons of tin tomatoes, consumables.	30,178,570

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Total campaigns and rallies expenses of the PDP = **N909, 312,670**

Total campaigns and rallies expenses of the APC = **NN371, 062,200**

Table 1.3: Hire of Aircraft, APC and PDP

Party	Rate per day	No of days	Total
APC	N6,000,000	50	N300,000,000
PDP	N6,000,000	50	N300,000,000

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Table 1.4: Summary of Expenses of Campaigns and Rallies, APC and PDP

Party	Total expenses
APC	671,062,200
PDP	1,280,374,870

2. Expenses on Bill Boards

Bill boards constituted one of the major means through which political parties ensured its visibility during the 2015 general elections. Bill boards were seen in major cities across Nigeria in most instances conveying the images of the presidential and governorship candidates of political parties. The sizes¹ and quality of such bill boards varies according to cities. A summary of the cost of these bill boards were verified through a research conducted by Onyekpere (2015) to include the following:

Table 2.1: Bill Boards for APC and PDP

State	Party	Aggregate cost
Adamawa	APC	14, 490,000

¹The sizes of the bill boards across major cities mostly ranged between 6/12, 2/3 and 3/6 feet. Details of the distribution can be accessed at Onyekpere (2015) online at: www.csj.org/publications/political-finance-reforms/.

State	Party	Aggregate cost
	PDP	3,650,000
Akwalbom	APC	350,000
	PDP	1,050,000
Anambra	APC	1,750,000
	PDP	1,750,000
Bauchi	APC	4,950,000
	PDP	400,000
Bayelsa	APC	NIL
	PDP	5,660,000
Benue	APC	NIL
	PDP	3,100,000
Cross River	APC	19,000,000
	PDP	1,050,000
Ebonyi	APC	NIL
	PDP	1,750,000
Edo	APC	600,000
	PDP	1,540,000
Enugu	APC	1,150,000
	PDP	3,950,000
FCT	APC	106,750,000
	PDP	421,970,000
Imo	APC	1,750,000
	PDP	NIL

State	Party	Aggregate cost
Kano	APC	17,400,000
	PDP	620,000
Kogi	APC	1,750,000
	PDP	1,750,000
Kwara	APC	NIL
	PDP	1,000,000
Niger State	APC	9,360,000
	PDP	3,780,000
Ogun	APC	2,700,000
	PDP	2,500,000
	APC	500,000
	PDP	5,900,000
Osun	APC	3,500,000
	PDP	1,050,000
Oyo	APC	1,400,000
	PDP	350,000
Plateau	APC	NIL
	PDP	3,500,000
Rivers	APC	2,050,000
	PDP	2,100,000
Sokoto	APC	NIL
	PDP	2,000,000
Taraba	APC	2,740,000

State	Party	Aggregate cost
	PDP	930,000

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Table: 2.2: Summary of Expenses on Bill Boards

Party	Aggregate cost
All Progressives Congress (APC)	190,380,000
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)	473,160,000

3. (a) Expenses on Electronic Media

Electronic media constituted a primary means through which political parties shared their programmes with electorates in the 2015 general election. This was done through radio and television, jingles, advertisement and documentaries. While the details of the expenses as presented here may not be exhaustive, it how reflects record of expenses on the subject as captured in a study conducted by Onyekpere (2015). The session covers details of expenses on campaign and advertisement.

Table 3 (a).1 Expenses on Campaign Coverage - All Progressives Congress (APC)

Campaign Venue	Date	No of Media Houses	Duration of Coverage	Aggregate Cost
Omagwa Stadium, Ikwere, Rivers State	06/01/2015	2	2 Hours each	19,000,000
Atu Secondary School Field, Calabar, Cross River	07/01/2015	3	2 Hours each	23,000,000
Warri Township Stadium, Delta State	07/01/2015	1	1 hour, 30 mins	2,250,000
Ovom, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State	8/01.2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
People’s Resort Hotel, Abakiliki, Ebonyi State	09/01/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
Okpara Square, Independence Layout, Enugu	09/01/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000

Campaign Venue	Date	No of Media Houses	Duration of Coverage	Aggregate Cost
Etche Road Primary School Football Field, Ward 11, Aba South LGA, Abia State	09/01/2015	1	2 hours	9,000,000
Samuel Ogbemudia Stadium, Benin City, Edo State	09/01/2015	4	2 Hours for 3 and 1 hour for 1	32,000,000
Emmaus Field, Awka, Anambra State	10/01/2015	3	2 hours each	22,000,000
Dan Anyiam Stadium, Owerri, Imo State	12/01/2015	5	2 hours each	30,700,000
MKO Stadium, Abeokuta, Ogun State	13/01/2015	1	2 hours	9,000,000
Old Lokoja Stadium, Lokoja, Kogi State	16/01/2015	1	2 hours	9,000,000
Old Parade Ground, Lafia, Nassarawa State	17/01/2015	7	2 hours each	25,800,000
Aminu Kano Triangle Dutse, Jigawa State	20/01/2015	1	2 hours	9,000,000
Old Airport Gusau, Tudun Wada Ward, Gusau LGA, Zamfara State	21/01/2015	1	2 hours	9,000,000
ShehuKangiwa Square, Sokoto State	22/01/2015	3	3 hours each	24,300,000
Jalingo Trade Fair Complex, Taraba State	28/01/2015	1	2 hours	10,000,000
Teslim Balogun Stadium, Surulere, Lagos	30/01/2015	5	2 hours each	38,000,000
Total				410,050,000

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Table 3(a).2 Expenses on Campaign Coverage - People's Democratic Party (PDP)

Campaign Venue	Date	No of Media Houses	Duration of Coverage	Aggregate Cost
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TafawaBalewa Square, Lagos	08/01/2015	6	2 hours each	47,000,000
Umuahia Township Stadium, Abia State	16/01/2015	3	2 hours each	18,700,000
Holy Trinity Field, Onitsha	17/01/2015	4	2 hours each	33,000,000
Abakiliki Township Stadium, Ebonyi State.	17/01/2015	4	2 hours each	28,500,000
Dan Anyiam Stadium, Owerri, Imo State	17/01/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
Zamfara Trade Fair Complex, Gusua	19/01/2015	3	2 hours each	23,000,000
Aminu Kano Triangle, Dutse, Jigawa State	21/01/2015	3	2 hours each	19,700,000
Ilorin Metropolitan Square, Kwara State	26/01/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
Lafia Stadium, Nassarawa State	27/01/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
Omagwa Stadium, Ikwerre LGA, Rivers State	28/01/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
Jolly Nyame Stadium, Jalingo, Taraba State	29/01/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
UJ Esuene Stadium, Calabar, Cross River State	30/01/2015	3	2 hours each	23,000,000
International Stadium, Uyo, Akwalbom State	31/01/2015	6	2 hours each	34,700,000
Minna Trade Fair Complex, Niger State	02/02.2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
Confluence Stadium, Lokoja, Kogi State	03/02/2015	2	2 hours each	19,000,000
Rwang Township Stadium, Jos, Plateau	03,02/2015	4	2 hours each	23,000,000
Cenotaph High Court Road	04/02/2015	3	2 hours each	28,000,000
Samuel Ogbemudia Stadium, Benin City, Edo State	04/02/2015	2	1 h r , 3 0 mins.	9,000,000
Samson Siasia Stadium, Ovom, , Bayelsa State	06/02/2015	7	2 hours each	53,000,000
MKO Abiola Stadium, Abeokuta, Ogun State	12/02/2015	4	2 hours each	33,000,000

Old Stadium, Lokoja, Kogi State	03/03/2015	2	2 hours each	17,000,000
Samuel Ogbemudia Stadium, Benin City, Edo State	14/03/2015	1	1 hour	5,000,000
Total				532,100,000

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Table 3(a).3: Summary of Electronic Media Campaign Expenses, APC and PDP

Party	Aggregate cost
All Progressives Congress (APC)	410,050,000
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	532,100,000

Table 3(a).4 Electronic Media Advert – All Progressives Congress (APC)

Media House	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
Pyramid Radio, Kano	7 Slots	15,000	8 Days	840,000
Radio Kano	7 Slots	8,000	18 Days	1,008,000
Freedom Radio Kano	5 Slots	5,000	54 Days	1,350,000
‘	2hr Radio program per week	150,000/hr	8 Weeks	2,400,000
Radio Kano	12 Slots	3,500	54 Days	2,268,000
‘	2hr Radio Program per week	120,000/hr	8 weeks	1,920,000
NTA Benin	One Slot	30,000	29 Days/1min (Jan 20 th –Feb 17 th)	870,000
EBSTV, Benin	One Slot	30,000/min	29 Days/2min (Jan 20 th -Feb 17 th after mid news)	1,740,000
EBS, Benin	One Slot	18,000/min	29 Days/2min (Jan 20 th -Feb 17 th Outside news advert)	1,044,000

Media House	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
NTA Benin	One Slot	30,000/min	37 Days/1min (Feb 18 th -March 26 th) mid news advert	1,110,000
EBS TV	One Slot	30,000/min	37 Days/2min (Feb 18 th -March 26 th) Outside news advert	2,220,000
EBS TV, Benin	One Slot	18,000/min	37 Days/5min (Feb 19 th -March 26 th) Outside news Advert	3,330,000
FRCN, Enugu	5 Slots	12,000	3 Days	180,000
Total				20,280,000

Table 3(a).5: National Adverts sponsored by the APC and its various support groups from November 17th 2014 till March 26th 2015

Sponsors	TV Station	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
APC	AIT	87	393,000	30 Sec.	34,191,000
APCPCO	“	42	393,000	30 Sec.	16,506,000
All GMB Support Groups	“	42	315,000	15 Sec.	13,230,000
Others (Anonymous)	“	30	315	15 Sec.	9,450,000
Live Coverage	“	36	7,000,000	1 Hour	252,000,000
Total					325,377,000
	Channels				
APC	“	150	528,185	30 Sec.	79,227,750
APCPCO	“	260	528,185	30 Sec.	137,328,100
All GMB Support Groups	“	120	369,730	15 Sec.	44,367,600
APC Controlled State Governments	“	90	528,185	30 Sec.	47,536,650
Others (Anonymous)	“	75	369,730	15 Sec.	27,729,750
Documentary	“	30	4,410,000	30 Min.	132,300,000

Live Coverage	“	36	5,000,000	1 Hour	180,000,000
Total					648,489,850
	NTA				
APC	“	42	472,500	30 Sec	19,845,000
APCPCO	“	42	472,500	30 Sec.	19,845,000
All GMB Support Groups	“	42	367,500	15 Sec.	15,435,000
Others (Anonymous)	“	42	367,500	15 Sec.	15,435,000
Total					70,560,000ss

Table 3(a).6: Electronic Media Adverts – Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)

Media House	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
ITV, Benin	1	36,750/min	2 Days/5Min (Feb. 2 nd – 3 rd)	367,500
ITV, Benin	1	36,750/min	29 Days/1Min (Jan 20 th - Feb. 17 th after mid news)	1,065,750
ITV, Benin	1	36,750/min	2 Days/5Min (March 12 th – 13 th)	367,500
ITV, Benin	1	36,750/min	37 Days/1Min (Feb. 18 th – March 26 th -Daily mid News Advert)	1,359,750
ITV, Benin	1	36,750/min	36 Days / 2 Mins (Advert, Out News Hours)	2,646,000
NTA, Benin	1	30,000/min	24 Days/1Min (Feb. 18 th – March 13 th . Mid News Advert)	720,000
NTA, Benin	1	15,000/min	14 Days/2Min. (Advert Outside News)	420,000
NTA, Benin	1	30,000/min	29 Days/1Min (Jan. 20 th – Feb. 17 th -After Mid News)	870,000
Pyramid Radio, Kano	10	3,000	54 Days	1,620,000

Media House	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
Freedom Radio, Kano	5	5,000	54 Days	1,350,000
PRTVC, Jos	5	3,500	10 Days	175,000
Pride FM, Gusau	30Min Documentary	35,000,00	26 Days (Dec. 11 th – Jan. 05 2015)	910,000
FRCN, Enugu	5	12,000	1 Day	60,000
FRCN, Enugu	5	12,000	5 Days (Nov. 28 th – Dec. 2 nd 2014)	300,000
Total				15,539,000

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Table 3(a).7: National Adverts sponsored by the PDP, APC and its various support groups from November 17th 2014 till March 26th 2015

Sponsors	TV Station	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
Wake Up Nigeria	AIT	42	315,000	15 Sec.	13,230,000
Truth Never Dies	“	56	393,000	30 Sec.	22,008,000
Ayo Fayose	“	30	625,000	60 Sec.	18,750,000
CAWAN	“	108	393,000	30 Sec.	42,444,000
PDPPCO	“	262	584,000	45 Sec.	153,008,000
Legends of Nollywood	“	87	315,000	15 Sec.	27,405,000
#Moving Forward	“	131	393,000	30 Sec.	51,483,000
TAN	“	262	393,000	30 Sec.	102,966,000
Move on Nigeria	“	42	315,000	15 Sec.	13,230,000
Good House	“	108	393,000	30 Sec.	42,000,000
GLGP	“	87	393,000	30 Sec.	34,191,000
Protectors of Nigerian Posterity	“	131	584,000	45 Sec.	76,504,000
MDAs (Hidden Adverts)	“	131	584,000	45 Sec.	76,504,000

Sponsors	TV Station	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
All GEJ Support Groups	“	262	393,000	30 Sec.	102,966,000
Others (Anonymous)	“	131	315,000	15 Sec.	41,265,000
Documentary	“	42	1,925,000	30 Min	80,850,000
Live Coverage	“	108	7,000,000	1 Hour	756,000,000
Total					1,655,248,000
	Channels				
PDPPCO	“	90	528,185	30 Sec.	47,536,650
Beneficiaries of Local Content in Oil Sector	“	45	528,185	30 Sec.	23,768,325
#GEJ Going Forward	“	45	369,730	15 Sec.	16,637,850
TAN	“	75	528,185	30 Sec.	39,613,875
Good House	“	30	369,730	15 Sec.	11,091,900
GLGP	“	60	369,730	15 Sec.	22,183,800
MDAs (Hidden Advertisement)	“	15	528,185	30 Sec.	7,922,775
All GEJ Support Groups	“	105	369,730	15 Sec.	38,821,650
Others (Anonymous)	“	45	528,185	30 Sec.	23,768,325
Documentary	“	45	4,410,000	30 Min	198,450,000
Live Coverage	“	36	5,000,000	1 Hour	180,000,000
PDPPCO	“	90	528,185	30 Sec.	47,536,650
Beneficiaries of Local Content in Oil Sector	“	45	528,185	30 Sec.	23,768,325
Total					681,100,125
	NTA				
PDPPCO	“	393	630,000	45 Sec.	247,590,000
Truth Never Dies	“	42	472,500	30 Sec.	19,845,000
Ayo Fayose	“	15	787,500	60 Sec.	11,812,500

Sponsors	TV Station	Slots	Unit Cost	Duration	Aggregate Cost
TAN	“	131	630,000	45 Sec.	82,530,000
#Moving Forward	“	42	472,500	30 Sec.	19,845,000
Move on Nigeria	“	42	367,500	15 Sec.	15,435,000
Good House	“	30	472,500	30 Sec.	14,175,000
GLGP	“	87	472,500	30 Sec.	41,107,500
Protectors of Nigerian Posterity	“	42	630,000	45 Sec.	26,460,000
MDAs (Hidden Advertisement)	“	131	472,500	30 Sec.	61,897,500
All GEJ Support Groups	“	262	472,500	30 Sec.	123,795,000
Other (Anonymous)	“	131	367,500	15 Sec.	48,142,500
Documentary	“	72	1,025,000	30 Min	73,800,000
Live Coverage	“	108	7,875,000	2 Hours	850,500,000
Total					1,636,935,000

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Table 3(a).8: Summary of Electronic Media Advertisement

Party	Amount
All Progressives Congress (APC)	1,064,706,850
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)	3,988,822,125

3 (b) Print Media Expenses

This title present summary of advert placed on various print media either by political party’s campaign organizations or by third parties. Full details of adverts placed on print media during the period under examination can be accessed at www.csj.org/publications/political-finance-reforms/. A snapshot of the adverts is therefore, as presented below.

Table 3(b).1 APC Summary of Newspaper Adverts for December 2014 and 2015

APC Summary of Newspaper Adverts for December 2014			
Newspapers	Aggregate Advert Rate	Aggregate Discount (20%)	Aggregate Cost
Daily Trust, Daily Sun, Guardian, Punch, The Nation, Thisday, Tribune and Vanguard	50,597,058	10,119,412	40,477,646
Summary of APC/Pro GMB Support Groups Newspapers Advertorials from January 1st – February 14th 2015			
Business Day, Blue Print, Daily Trust, Daily Sun, Guardian, Leadership, Nation, Punch, Tell, Thisday, Tribune and Vanguard	365,131,635	73,026,362	292,105,309
Summary of APC/Pro GMB Support Groups Newspapers Advertorials from February 15th - March 26th 2015			
Daily Independent, Daily Sun, Daily Trust, Guardian, Leadership, New Telegraph, Nigerian Pilot, Punch, The Nation, Thisday, Tribune and Vanguard	308,830,916	61,766,776	247,064,732

Table 3(b).2 PDP Summary of Newspaper Adverts for December 2014 and 2015

PDP Summary of Newspaper Adverts for December 2014			
Newspapers	Aggregate Advert Rate	Aggregate Discount (20%)	Aggregate Cost
Daily Sun, Daily Trust, Guardian, Punch, The Nation, Thisday and Tribune	132,857,930	26,571,586	106,286,344
Summary of PDP/Pro GEJ Support Groups Newspapers Advertorials from January 1st - February 14th - 2015			
Business Day, Blue Print, Daily Sun, Daily Trust, Guardian, Leadership, Nation, Nigerian Pilot, New Telegraph, Punch, Tell Magazine, The News, Thisday, Tribune and Vanguard	1,161,359,166	232,271,833	929,087,333

Summary of PDP/Pro GEJ Support Groups Newspapers Advertorials from February 15th – March 26th 2015			
Business Day, Daily Sun, Daily Trust, Guardian, Leadership, News Watch Time, New Telegraph, Nigerian Pilot, Punch, The Nation, Thisday, Tribune and Vanguard	1,799,815,780	359,963,156	1,439,852,624

Source: Extracted from Onyekpere (2015)

Table 3(b).2 Summary of Print Media Expense, APC and PDP

Party	Amount
All Progressives Congress (APC)	579,647,687
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)	2,475,228,301

Analysis of Matters Arising from the 2015 Campaign Financing

The framework that regulates campaign financing in Nigeria is the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended). The Act under Section 91/9 clearly stipulates that ‘no individual or other entity shall donate more than One Million Naira (N1, 000,000) to any candidate’. Section 91/2 provides that ‘the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate at a Presidential election shall be One Billion Naira (N1, 000,000,000)’. The table below presents a summary of the campaign expenses for the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in prosecuting the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. This summary however, incorporates the understanding that there were other campaign expenses that were incurred in the process of the election but knowledge of such transactions were not in the public domain, it was therefore, difficult capturing such expenses. A portrait of the expenses as reported in a detailed 2015 election campaign spending by Onyekpere (2015) and as captured for our analysis is as reflected in Table 4.

Table 4: Summary of Overall Campaign Expenses for the APC and the PDP

Campaign Expenses	All Progressives Congress (APC)	Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP)
Campaigns and Rallies	671,062,200.00	1,280,374,870.00

Expenses on Bill Boards	190,380,000.00	473,160,000.00
Electronic Media Campaign	410,050,000.00	532,100,000.00
Electronic Media Advertisement	1,064,706,850.00	3,988,822,125.00
Print Media Campaign	579,647,687.00	2,475,228,301.00
Total	2,915,846,737.00	8,749,685,296.00

It is obvious drawing from the evidence of the summary of campaign spending above that the limit of one million naira (1,000,000) placed on individual donations to campaign funds and one billion (1,000,000,000) presidential campaign spending was exceeded. The APC exceeded the limit by One Billion, Nine Hundred and Fifteen Million, Eight Hundred and Forty Six Thousand, Seven Hundred and Thirty Seven Naira only (1,915,846,737) while the PDP by Seven Billion, Seven Hundred and Forty Nine Million, Six Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand, Two Hundred and Ninety Six Naira only (7,749,685,296).

It is appropriate therefore, to ask drawing from the above if the flagrant disregard of relevant sections of the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended) is a product of the gaps in the Act, or manipulations by political actors. In other words, relevant Sections of the Act regulating campaign funds and expenditure are observed more in breach because the Acts itself creates gaps that undermine its full implementation or the political actors are ingenious in manipulating the Electoral Act. There is ample evidence however, that suggest that the background that created conditions conducive to exceeding established limits of campaign funding and expenditure is located within Section 91/8c of the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended) which stipulates that “in determining the total expenditure incurred in relation to the candidature of any person at any election, no account shall be taken of political party expenses in respect of the candidate standing for a particular election”. This provision inadvertently, throws up the following unanswered questions:

- xvi. Is the candidature of any person seeking elective political office independent of the political party?

- xvii. Is the task of funding campaigns the exclusive responsibility of the candidate standing election?
- xviii. Is fostering the interest of political parties through funds generated by it not fostering the interest of the party's candidate/flag bearer?
- xix. Are funds donated by corporate individuals and organizations not committed to campaigns for political party's candidate?

The above posers inevitably brings to question the sanctity of certain provisions of the Electoral Act and the urgent need to interrogate with the intent of reviewing certain provisions of the Act to conform to emerging realities. There is a budding consensus around the evidence that due to some reasons which include landmass, cost of running a national campaign through advertisements on electronic and print media, including logistics, branding, bill boards, refreshment and other related costs makes the limit of one billion naira (N1,000,000,000) for presidential campaign funding unrealistic.

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

This paper examined the vexing issues associated with the implementation of the regulation in Section 91/9, of the Electoral Act 2010 (As Amended) which limits individual donations to candidates standing elections to One Million (N1, 000,000) Naira only and, Section 91/2 which provides that the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a presidential candidate must not exceed One Billion (1,000,000,000) Naira only. Evidence has shown that these provisions stipulating limits for donations and election expenses have fallen flat on the faces as a result of Section 91/8c which provides on the contrary, that “in determining the total expenditure incurred in relation to the candidature of any person at any election, no account shall be taken of political party expenses in respect of the candidate standing for a particular election”. The character of the above provisions, the landmass of Nigeria, the reality of the cost of running national election through campaigns in bill boards, electronic and print media outlets, branding, logistics, and mobilization makes the objective of effective regulation of campaign financing evidently unattainable. Based on emerging realities, it is therefore, safe to conclude that as long as the provisions of Section 91/8c interact with the provisions of section 91/2 and 91/9, regulating campaign financing in Nigeria remains a wild goose chase. To reverse the seeming ugly situation

surrounding the framework for the regulation of campaign finance, the following recommended actions are however, proposed.

The civil society with relevant institutions of government should mobilize for the review of the Electoral Act to enable the upward review of the limit placed on individual donations to candidate from One Million (N1,000,000) Naira only to Five Million (N5,000,000) Naira only and the maximum expendable amount for presidential candidates from One Billion (N1,000,000,000) Naira only to Seven Billion (N7,000,000,000) Naira only in line with prevailing reality. To close the gap created by the provision of Sec. 91/8c, the determination of campaign finance should take into cognisance expenses incurred by political parties in respect of the candidate standing for election. The Election Management Body (EMB), the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) should deploy a strategy of monitoring and regulating strict compliance with the regulation on campaign finance and ensure regular report by candidate/political parties on funds and expenditure. Candidates and political parties culpable of infringement should be barred from fielding candidates for elections for one electoral/political dispensation. A robust partnership between INEC and the media would help sustain sensitization and advocacy in this regard.

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FIRSTLADYISM AND THE POLITICAL AMBITION GAP BETWEEN THE GENDERS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Since Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999, the number of women vying for political offices has not been very impressive. Such an unimpressive result is not just among women with little political exposure, but strong female contenders are actually pulling away from partisan politics. Whereas the political environment has been penetrated by godfathers who can do anything to make sure that their godsons, run and indeed win elections, women have few female politicians or mentors to look up to. This is even made worst by the fact that they still have to cope with traditional constraints such as socio-cultural factors, limited funds and unfriendly political environment, provoking a fundamental question; does the office of the first lady impact positively on women political ambition? Though first ladyism, as a phenomenon has attracted more criticism than praise; does its presence affect women in any way? A comparative analysis of statistics of female contestants when first ladies were actively involved in women empowerment programmes shows a slight improvement in the number of female aspirants for competitive elective political positions than when they were not. This suggested a positive impact of the presence of the first lady on women's desire to run for office, but lack of continuity of some laudable programs is a major challenge. The paper recommended the legalisation of the office with some lay down organisational arrangements, since first ladies automatically become part of the ruling elites once their husbands elected president in Nigeria.

Keywords: first lady, political ambition, gender, women participation

Introduction

The continued viability of Nigeria's nascent representative democracy as a form of government is predicated on the sufficient numbers of citizens that are vying for political offices. Not only is this necessary, but it has become urgent as more Nigerians are becoming politically conscious and are anxious to have their own in political offices.

This is reflected in research which shows the growing political agitations among the different ethnic groups who feel that they are being marginalised at the federal level. In fact, scholars have emphasised the importance of presenting candidates from all segments of society. Some others even argued that beyond the sheer number of citizens vying for offices, it is also desirable, indeed necessary, that the issue of gender and religion in the country be taken seriously (Osaghae, 1998; Nnoli, 1980; Burkhalter, 1993).

Less frequently examined, however, is the issue of political ambition, a trait that is a necessary prerequisite to candidacy, but not a sufficient one in itself. It is the desire that individuals have to compete for electoral positions. Such desire on the other hand is either nurtured or watered down by culture, tradition and the type of political environment men and women do find themselves in. In Nigerian culture for instance, men are given the advantage to learn partisan politics while women are not. Even before independence, Colonial policies encouraged the socialisation of males and women in ways that promote the domination of the male over the female. And as such, women lose not just their pre-colonial political power but the desire to be active in partisan politics (Izugbara, 2004).

At independence therefore, power was handed over to Nigerian men, who had acquired the experiences necessary for active participation under colonial tutelage. Women on the other hand never had such training in Schools or the professional experiences that are needed to actively be involved in decision making. Examples abound to show that colonial policies entrenched women with low political efficacy. Nigerian women after independence with few exceptions therefore never had the zeal to vie for offices as a result of their being relegated to the background for decades; raising a fundamental question. Do Nigerian men and women have equal interest in seeking elective office?

Scholars such as Niven (1998) and Fowler and McClure (1989) have noted that recruitment and encouragement lead many individuals who otherwise may have never run for public office to become candidates. Political mentors may serve to bring in candidates who have little or no ambition to

participate in politics and even guide such individuals on how to campaign and win an election. In Nigeria for instance, men are encouraged by ‘political god fathers’, a term that connotes lots of negative attributes yet it has dominated the Nigerian political scene where candidates can hardly emerge in the two major political parties in this political dispensation (the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)) without a political godfather.

Women with few exceptions on the other hand, do not have political mentors, neither do they have “godmother’s who could sponsor or even mentor them. Furthermore, parties worldwide are known to approach fewer women to run than men (Carroll 1985b, p.44), which means that women need other forms of support to overcome their marginalisation in politics. But lack of successful female politicians can constitute a negative incentive on strong female contenders who ordinarily would have loved to vie for office; suggesting the need for mentorship if women are to bridge the present political ambition gap in the country. Will the presence of a first lady encourage women to run for office?

We begin our investigation with an examination of the degree to which potential candidates’ interest in office holding has changed over time, drawing on theory and empirical evidence from the literature on political ambition and political participation at the mass level in Nigeria. But in achieving this evaluative goal, the time frame in terms of regime scope will then, span through the First Republic to other administrations predating the Forth Republic. The essence of this evaluation over a period of time is to set a concrete basis for judging the progress made over the years since the First Lady’s office was ‘revolutionised’ by Maryam Babangida in terms of status, focus, orientation and role in governance and politics.

Conceptual Issues in Firstladyism and Political Ambition Gap in Nigeria

Concepts are identified as the most basic tools that science has at its disposal (Dinwerth & Pattberg, 2006). Political ambition, godfatherism and firstladyism have therefore been conceptualised to provide their operational use among other concepts. In this attempt to clarify these terms, we begin with political ambition which basically entails the desire of officeholders to run for a higher office or for those who do not hold office the desire to run. Having ambition is the pre-condition to exercising ambition; that is, actually running

for office. However, the most established thread in the political ambition literature concerns the concept of progressive ambition.

In this regard, Schlesinger (1966) argued that the accountability of democratically-elected politicians to citizens is ensured because individual politicians are ambitious to remain in their political position (which he termed static political ambition) or, if conditions are right, advance to the next highest position available to them (what he identified as progressive political ambition). As such, incumbents are more likely to have progressive desire to establish a political career than those who have never held any political office. Politician who are likely to run for office for the second term in Nigeria, for instance, are very mindful of how they handle public projects and, in the process, promotes public accountability. Progressive political ambition in this instance focuses on current officeholders and assumes that once an individual has achieved an elected position, he or she will aspire to a higher office.

However, explaining ambition within the framework of progressive ambition tends to overlook the early stages of the candidate emergence process, and in order to understand fully the decision involved in moving from “potential candidate” to actual office holder, it is necessary to assess nascent ambition or general interest in considering a candidacy (Fox & Lawless 2005; Barber, 1965). According to Fox and Lawless (2011), this distinct phase of the development of political ambition occurs before the actual decision to enter a specific race, ever transpires. That is, if the idea of running for office never really occurs to an individual, then he/she will never be in a position to assess a specific political opportunity structure or identify the level of office in which he/she is most interested.

Fox and Lawless (2011) posit that nascent ambition is also influenced by factors such as a politicised upbringing, race, and sex, each of which falls outside of the political opportunity structure. Even in Schlesinger’s (1966) original conception of political ambition, it was clear that ambition for office, like other ambitions, develops with a specific situation, that it is a response to the possibilities which lie before a person. As a result, before assigning progressive ambitions to a particular group such as women, we should consider the restrictions facing women” and other racial/ethnic minorities, how for instance can a Nigerian woman develop the desire to run for office with socio-cultural challenges without a godmother or someone to look up to.

For the purpose of this paper, political ambition is the desire to run for office which in turn, is influenced by so many factors such as a politicised

upbringing, race, and sex, each of which falls outside of the political opportunity structure. It may also be progressive where politician may desire to run for higher offices.

Conceptualising Godfatherism

The concept of godfatherism has been establishing itself as a guiding principle in contemporary Nigerian politics. Godfathers are generally understood to be men who have both power and personality to determine both who gets nominated to participate in elections and who wins elections at all levels in the country. Olarinmoye (2008) views godfather as a broker, a middle-man who offers to political parties and politicians seeking to control political power his ability to enforce voter compliance based on his intuitive grasp of voting structure in return for economic profit. They serve as gatekeepers who groom eligible candidates to run for office. For many individuals, the support from a godfather serves as the key ingredient in fomenting their thoughts of running.

Bassey and Enetak (2008) on the other hand, defined godfatherism to describe the people who have the power to determine who is nominated to run and who eventually wins the election. These sponsors are politically mobile and can influence the political support to the political party and or candidate behind which they decide to support. While they are often called godfathers, the term can be used interchangeably with sponsors. Those who benefit from their generosity are known as godsons or referrals.

The advent of godfatherism in Nigerian partisan politics dates back to the First Republic when leaders of the three main political parties, Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), Action Group (AG) and the Nigerian Citizens National Congress (NCNC), carefully and meticulously cultivated the belief that godfathers were part and parcel of political processes. Accordingly, Ahmadu Bello and his NPC, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo of the NCNC and AG respectively were motivated not just to use referrals as substitutes to promote parochial interests, but to promote people's development aspirations (Uzoamaka, 2010). They were more interested in promoting policies that will benefit the people of their respective regions than their personal interest.

Unlike the current crop of political godfathers today, the first generation of sponsors were essentially progressives, today sponsors abuse their status imposing excessive demands on their godsons. They are seen in

Nigeria today to be men who have the power to determine both who is designated to participate in elections and who wins in the long run.

The Concept of First Lady

The term first lady is a woman who is married to the political leader of a country or a part of a country. To Simpson and Weiner (1989), the first lady is the most important lady and particularly the wife of a President or Head of State or even Governor of a state. Since antiquity, the wives of certain princes, monarchs and presidents have played significant roles in the national and international politics of their time, and Africa has been no exception. In Nigeria however, the office of the first lady gained prominence when Mrs. Maryam Babangida moved the office of the first lady in Nigeria from its traditional inactiveness to assume a vanguard role in female advocacies in 1985. From that period onward, several first ladies have encouraged the promotion of women into positions of power, no matter how dubious their motives are. They have provided access to political skills and resources that will enable the pool of women politicians to become more competitive in the cut-and-thrust of campaigning and actually gaining victory in elections. At the same time, it has created a new trend in which political space has been appropriated and used by the wives and friends of men in power for purposes of personal aggrandisement, rather than for furthering the interests of women in some instances. This new trend, is to augment the power of the First Lady through the creation of specific state and non-state structures that provide her with independent instruments, a phenomenon which has been christened femocracy.

Femocracy, according to Mama (1997), is an anti-democratic female power structure, which claims to exist for the advancement of ordinary women, but is unable to do so because it is dominated by a small clique of women whose authority derives from their being married to powerful men, rather than from any actions or ideas of their own (Mama, 1997). Using the office of the first lady, these women exploit the commitment of the international movement towards greater gender equality in the interests of small female elite. In so doing, they end up reinforcing patriarchal social systems. After all, the basic assumption of the femocrats is that they should have power because their husbands are in power.

Phil Okeke (1998) corroborates this view by arguing that the Better Life for Rural Women (BLP) of Maryam Babangida's pet project was simply a

forum for the display of power, influence and prestige by privileged women. Indeed, her style of running the BLP was not democratic in fact it was militaristic. She issued orders and expected them to be obeyed with no regards for people's opinions much less criticism.

Notwithstanding this new trend, of first lady is viewed here as the wives of certain princes, monarchs and presidents who play significant roles in the national and international politics of their time. Since in Nigeria candidates are more representative of the will of the elite ruling class then first ladies may serve as a bridge between women and these elites, an issue that is currently handled by the godfathers.

Theoretical Framework

For insightful and robust discourse, the study is anchored on role model and elite theories. The role model theory that was developed by Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) contends that the presence of female politicians and candidates is essential to increasing political involvement of women and young girls. Several studies have found overwhelming support for the theory that visible and competitive female candidates increases women's political engagement (Atkeson, 2003; Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006; Hansen, 1997; Sapiro & Conover, 1997; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007). The visibility of female candidates and politicians in offices is important to signal that women are viable and credible (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006)

For instance, women have been evolved in non-partisan politics in areas like voting and campaigning for male politicians as a result of the lack of self efficacy in the past. But with the emergence of new female in positions of power, they now feel more comfortable to run for office even if what they have is just an appointive position. We had candidates like Dora Akulenyi and Ezekwesili vying for elective positions because of the confidence they developed after holding appointive positions. In this vein, a number of activists, policymakers, and scholars have posited that the election of more individual women to office and the presence of more female candidates on ballots hold crucial promise to help close gender gaps in participation. This was demonstrated by Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) whose work show how visible female candidates led to increased likelihood of teen girls indicating their intention to be politically active.

The study further illustrates that visible female candidates leads to increased political discussion within families (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006).

Increased political discussion can have a positive effect on political involvement with political knowledge being one of the most powerful predictors of future political involvement (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). The presence of more female members in political office leads to the greater likelihood that women would not only discuss politics more frequently but would also participate as an adult (Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007; Verba et al., 1997). In Nigeria, there is no doubt that the First Lady syndrome has placed women in the public eye.

Elite Theory

From the standpoint of elite theory on the other hand, a small minority consisting members of the economic elite, policy planning networks and military institutions holds the most power in any society. And because power is not evenly distributed, power is said to be concentrated on the ruling minority elite otherwise known as the political elites. In Nigeria, power is concentrated in the ruling minority or in the hands of the political elites in the ruling party who would deploy political authority to structure convenient choices that include the banishment, weakening or manipulation of democratic political institutions. They form a cohesive group that is difficult to penetrate by outsiders who want to venture into the political arena, and particularly women

Thus, the process of political elite recruitment is fraught with manipulations by the political elite, just as the political elite theory postulates, they devise a variety of methods for maintaining themselves perpetually in power, elite circulation or re-cycling of leaders through brokers, god fathers or political mafia. This ability is exceptionally enhanced by their common appearances and interests that facilitate cohesion, esprit de corps and mass control. (Pareto, 1935; Rothman, 2001).

Ekundayo (2017) made us to understand that the political elite dominance in Nigeria aligns with the central thesis of the elite theory. Ironically, the first ladies in Nigeria automatically become member of the political elite to the extent that some members of the ruling elites go through them. First ladies in the country even have the ears of political party leaders suggesting that they can breach the gap between women and the political elites not just as models but the fact that they acquire the status of elites by virtue of their positions as first ladies. For example, during her last year as First Lady, Maryam Abacha, was widely reported to have imposed an affirmative action

policy on political parties. She “unofficially” directed them to ensure that they each nominated one female gubernatorial candidate for the 1998 elections (Ibrahim, 2004). This would have encouraged more women to vie for office if not for the death of her husband.

Furthermore, women are more likely to be politically knowledgeable and care about politics when they live in an environment where they seek and hold political office, be it appointive positions or the office of the first lady or been recommended by a first lady to run in a particular political party. Such an approval from the first lady gives women the confidence to vie for office as they are more likely to win. Thus it seems plausible that “where Nigerian women win, Nigerian women run.

An Analysis of the Impact of First Ladies on the Number of Female Contestants in Nigerian Elections in the Fourth Republic

The above theoretical assumption, and empirical findings, suggest that the presence of female political mentors and in this case the first lady, prompt more participation by women. To demonstrate whether some of the initiatives by first ladies in Nigeria produced the desired outcomes of enlisting better women’s participation in the electoral process, a comparative analysis of statistics of women contestants for elections in the Fourth Republic whether there was an active First Lady in office or not had been undertaken.

First a brief overview of the active first ladies in different regimes and administrations will suffice here. In the First Republic, 1960-1966, women’s marginality was virtually sustained as there was only one (2.8%) woman senator in the 36-seat Senate (Ukeje 1998, p.179) and no female member in the 312-seat House of Representatives. At the federal level, there were also no regional female ministers. The low involvement of women in governance in the Republic was a reflection of historical legacy of political prejudice against women by the colonial regimes; it also negated the spirit of political independence as male nationalist sidelined women.

After the military coup of January 1966 which overthrew the government, both the Ironsi and the Gowon regimes, 1966-1975, maintained the exclusion of females from the federal cabinet but, at the regional level, at least one woman was appointed to the regional cabinets. The first woman commissioner was Floral Nwapa, appointed in 1970 as a member of the East Central State cabinet (Ajayi, 2010).

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime which succeeded the Yakubu Gowon in 1975 liberalised the electoral process, which for the first time, in 1976 through the Local Government Edict No.189, which granted Nigerian women nationwide universal adult suffrage. While the Second Republic was under President Shehu Shagari continued with gender injustice that was established by Murtala/ Obasanjo regime in the new Republic. As a result, both the President and Vice-President were men.

Of the four women that contested Senate seats in 1979, three were defeated by their male counterparts and as such, the Second Republic's Senate had only one female member out of 57 while the House of Representatives had 11 females out of 445 members. Despite being a non-military rule, the Shagari regime could only produce two female ministers.

The Shagari administration was overthrown and the Buhari/Idiagbon regime that took over in 1983-1984 was not interested in appointing women, as there was no single woman in the regime's cabinet, the Supreme Military Council. It was the Babangida regime, 1985-1993 which brought women to the corridors of power. The First Lady, Maryam Babangida, brought glamour and radical changes to the First Lady's office in terms of its roles in the nation's administration and politics. Mrs. Babangida significantly utilised the office to introduce the public to the plight of women and she also used the platform to mobilise Nigerian

Notwithstanding, the transitional Senate elections outcome in 1992 had only one female senator out of 91 while there were 12 women in the 638-seat House of Representatives. The 8 women who ran among the 91 presidential aspirants, did not succeed. And in 1993, there was only one female presidential aspirant. The two candidates contested at the state level but there were no female governors, deputy governors, speakers or deputy speakers. Of the 1,172 members for the entire 30 Houses of Assembly, only 206 women were elected as councillors out of the 1,297 that were elected

However, First Lady used her influence and got President Babangida, to establish the National Commission for Women in April, 1990. The regime made it a matter of policy that women would also be appointed into strategic policymaking positions of corporate bodies as chief executives and heads of ministerial divisions in government. It was under this initiative that Professor Grace Alele-Williams was appointed the first female vice-chancellor of the University of Benin in 1988.

When General Sani Abacha succeeded Shonekan, the interim leader who took over from Babangida as Head of State, the regime's First Lady, Maryam Abacha, played a very vibrant role similar to Maryam Babangida. In fact, the regime can be regarded as having the same thinking as the Babangida regime in respect of gender policies. The National Commission for Women, established by the Babangida regime, was converted into a full-fledged Ministry named Ministry of Women Affairs in March 1995. The regime mandated all the military governors to establish a similar ministry at the state level (Ajayi, 2010).

Though it made an insignificant impact on promoting gender consciousness and justice, it appointed 3 women as Ministers in a 38-member cabinet. It maintained a policy of appointing a woman commissioner at the state level. A few women were also appointed as local government chairpersons. In a paradoxical move, the First Lady, Maryam Abacha, established another program named the Family Economic Advancement Program (FEAP), which shifted attention from the purely female-orientated goals of her initial pet program, Family Support Program, to families. But the most outstanding performance of Maryam Abacha was her interest in getting women quotas within political parties (Ibrahim, 2004).

The General Abdulsalam Abubakar regime, which succeeded the Abacha administration, was no better than the latter in redressing the gender imbalance in governance and politics. The regime appointed only three women as members of a thirty-one member Federal Executive Council. Though, in addition to having Fati Abubakar on the other hand did not do much as a first lady.

While women's participation in the transition to civil rule programs were adjudged to be very low, compared to men, More males were observed to have participated in the transition programs since 1996 (Simbine 2003). Despite recording a lower participation than men, it was however observed that more women took part in the transition processes than in the past (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs 1999; Oluwole 2001).

When President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed power in May 1999, he indicated that the office of the First Lady would cease to exist (Orji, 2003; Obi, 2004). This threat did not materialise, as the First Lady, Stella Obasanjo, like the previous first ladies, established a pet project named Child Care Trust.

In the aspect of women political participation, no woman secured her party's ticket to contest the election. In the election to the National Assembly

for 109 seats in the Senate, out of the 5 women who contested, only 2 won seats. In the 360-seat House of Representatives 29 women contested but only 13 (3.6%) won their seats (Ajayi, 2010). The Senate President and Speakers of two Houses of Assembly respectively were men. This was despite the high rate of turn-over of the leadership of the houses between 1999 and 2003 as a result of incessant impeachment. At the state level, all the 36 governors were men (Ajayi, 2010). The six women that contested as governorship candidates lost in their respective states. There was only one female deputy-governor who was later forced out of the government of Lagos State by way of resignation. In the Houses of Assembly, of the available 990 seats, 39 women contested with 12 (1.2%) of them emerging as winners (Ajayi, 2010).

The Speakers of the Houses were all men. Of the 774 chairmanship seats contested at the local government level, 46 women contested and 9 (1.2%) emerged victorious. Similarly, in the council elections, of the 8,800 seats, 510 women contested and only 143 (1.6%) won female (Simbine, 2003).

Out of the three women who ran for office against twenty-seven men in the presidential election in 2003, none won. At the state level also, no woman was elected as governor in any of the 36 states. Only 2 of females won as deputy governors as against one in 1999. Two women stood as presidential candidates while three other women stood as vice-presidential candidates. The opportunity for more women to contest elective positions was made possible because of the expansion of the democratic space in terms of increase in the number of political parties, which rose from just three in 1999 to thirty in 2003 (Ajayi, 2010).

The comparative analysis of women contestants in the 2007 and 2011 General Elections, by Olurode (2013) shows that there was an impressive rise in the number of women seeking competitive elective positions in 2011. In 2007, only 516 women vie to be members of State Houses of Assembly, the National Assembly or governorship and the presidential positions, whereas in 2011, 921 women contested elections into those offices, an increase of 78 %. By far, women were keen at becoming governors in the 2011 General Elections (Olurode (2013). Election into that office witnessed an upsurge of women contestants by over 400% increase the highest for any office contested for by women in 2011.

Yet the governorship primaries were no better, with women either losing or being advised to step down. Notwithstanding, the number of women who declared their intentions was one of the highest ever if one is to go by the

information gathered outside INEC's record. As a former Senatorial aspirant in Lagos State, Chief Onikepo Oshodi, observed that female participation is commendable, 'but it is more of men's affair'. Thus, women turned out in large numbers for the primaries (more than 10,000 stood), however, they were mishandled by the party machinery. That is why she noted that women encounter hostilities from political heavyweights, pressures on them to step down in spite of their popularity in their various constituencies and those delegates were wooed with cash which these women could not afford (Ashefon 2011).

In the 2015 General Elections few women emerged as candidates after the political party primaries. In the 29 states where gubernatorial elections held that year, the representation of women vying for the office of governor and deputy governor was 87 out of the 380 candidates. In the contest for senatorial seats, 122 women out of 747 candidates were cleared by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to run in the March 28 election. The number was not better in the contest for the lower chamber of parliament.

Female political representation in the 2019 elections was slightly better than that of the previous once if taken at face value. 28 women ran for presidency a huge increase when compared to that of 2015, similarly there was another increase the number of women vying for the position Governorship there were 349 as against 87 in 2015. 235 ran for seats in Senate while 533 ran for a position in the House of Assembly and 1,825 vied for seats in the various Houses of Assembly. Overall, 2,970 women were on the electoral ballot, representing only 11.36% of nominated candidates. Details are presented in table 1 below.

Table 1: Gender Analysis of female Contestants in the 1999 to 2019 General Elections

	Type Of Election	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015	2019
1.	Presidential Election	-	6	1	5	14	28
2.	Governorship Election	-	13	14	73	87	349
3.	Election in to Senate	5	-	61	92	122	235
4.	House of Representatives	29	-	137	224	267	533

5.	State House of Assemble Election	39	-	303	527	755	1825
TOTAL				516	921	1245	2,970

Source: Computed by Authors with Data from INEC’s Website and Other Sources

A comparative analysis of statistics of female contestants that were cleared by INEC between 1999 and 2019 shows no significant differences in the number of women vying for offices when we had an active first lady and when they are not particular about female political participation. The number of women vying for political offices kept increasing with every round of elections since Nigeria return to democratic rule in 1999 as shown in table 1 above. This trend is noticeable despite the non availability of complete data for the 1999 and 2003 elections as the figures keeps increasing. In 2007 a total of 516 women that were cleared by INEC for the elections. The 2011 elections showed another increase when 921 declared their interest to run for office. This figure increased to 1245 in 2015 and 2970 in 2019.

However the above data does not capture the entire picture as other sources besides INEC showed higher figure different from the number of candidates that were cleared in 2011. With this therefore, the 2011 election had one of the highest number of female aspirants. As a former senatorial aspirant in Lagos State, Chief Onikepo Oshodi, observed that (more than 10 000 stood) but they were badly treated by the party machinery where there was pressures on them to step down despite their popularity in their various constituencies .

Several scholars and observer corroborate the fact that the turn out for the 2011 election by women was impressive. In her analysis Taiwo (2011) underscored the fact several factors that were responsible for these increases. Prominent among them was the special interest of the first lady that was aimed at encouraging women to run for office. It was noted that before the 2011 political party primaries the president’s wife, Dame Patience Jonathan, initiated the Women for Change Initiative (WCI) as her pet project. The first lady had called on Nigerian women to stand for election in 2011 and urged men to support those who had already made their intentions known. Interestingly, she assured the men that the women would not neglect their primary responsibilities at the home front; while advising women to shun discriminatory practices against themselves and to unite in their quest for equitable political representation.

Also, events leading up to the 2019 elections on the other hand dampened some of the positive sentiment around these large turnouts of female contestants. Specifically, all six female candidates stepped down before the General Elections. Furthermore, the two leading parties did not field a woman for either position on the presidential ticket. Arguably the most popular female candidate, Dr. Oby Ezekwesili stepped down from the ticket of the Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN), allegedly over issues of party finance. Almost immediately after her withdrawal, ACPN announced the adoption and backing of incumbent and APC candidate Mohammmadu Buhari.

On the one hand, the disparity between Presidential and Vice-Presidential figures could suggest female candidates are being fielded as tokens by fringe parties. Such a phenomenon could also represent shifting societal views on gender norms seeping into politics or the fact that female aspirants are only interested in the financial benefits they will be compensated when they step down for their male counterparts in other parties.

Conclusion

Looking at the figures at the INEC disposal, one could conclude that the presence of the first lady does not add value to women political participation even though figures from others sources suggest a contrary conclusion. Also, when viewed from the framework of progressive political ambition, one would agree that most women who contested for higher offices did so when there was a proactive first lady in office. This implies that first ladies may serve as a role model which gives women the confidence of not just vying for offices but to demonstrate that they have already breached the caucuses formed by the elites in ruling parties by running for higher offices.

Notwithstanding, first ladies in Nigeria will continue to play significant roles, if laudable programs such as those initiated by first ladies like Maryam Babangida, Maryam Abacha and Patience Jonathan are sustained over a long period of time. There is therefore the need to formalise the office of the First Lady in Nigeria as this will go a long way to provide high impact programs for women and also promote accountability and other undemocratic practices in the office.

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**DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT
OF PUBLIC SERVICE SYSTEM IN NIGERIAN STATES: THE
EBONYI STATE EXPERIMENT, 2015-2019**

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Abstract

The study examined the operational relationship between democratic governance principles, institutional development and the roles of state public service system. Governance whether in democratic or military system draws heavily on the functions of efficient and effective public service system and therefore any governance system that undermines the efficient functioning of its public service has overall weakness regardless of the transformation it may have engendered. It employed content analytical approach anchored on secondary data in an ex-post-facto design, in creating a nexus between democratic governance and institutional development. The paper employed social contract theory as its model of analysis. It revealed that there has been absolute underdevelopment of the public service system in Ebonyi state; that there is no motivation of the public service system by the government of the state. Hence, promotions are only notionally carried out, gratuity not paid in full to retirees, pensions not regularly paid, total absence of training and re-training of workers since 2015 till date and absence of the full complement of Permanent Secretaries in the public service of the state; thus virtually all duties and roles of the public/civil servants are hijacked by the State Executive Council Committees. The study therefore, recommended a process for strategic institutional reforms by the state government and re-orientation of

the political class to the real meaning of development rather than euphemistic modernization in the state.

Keywords: democratic governance, public service, underdevelopment, Ebonyi

Introduction

An efficient and effective functioning public service is not only fundamental but a sine-qua-non in ensuring that democratically elected leaders are able to safeguard the rights of citizens, promote and protect public goods to strengthen democratic governance. Suleiman (2016) affirms that this assertion stems from the realisation that, public confidence in a political system and political legitimacy is increased where the public service system is fully empowered and functional, with public officials accessible to local citizens and the executive, agencies and departments complementarily governing in cohesion. This implies that governance is profoundly reliant on the functions of a resourceful and efficient public service system. Therefore, any regime in power in a given democratic dispensation, whose action or inaction undermines the efficient and effective functioning of its public service, is culpable of under-developing its public service system regardless of the supposed development of that State.

Comprehensively, governance is defined as the use of public authority and resources to meet the people's needs in the most efficient and effective manner. In other words, governance is the process of allocating resources through the instrumentalities of the state, for the attainment of public good (Akhakpe, 2019). Democracy itself is about peoples mandate; an insistence on the expression of the will of the people, by maximising the responsiveness of the rulers to the expressed interests and needs of the public (Udeh, 2017). On the foregoing premise, it can be innocuously argued that when the masses and their needs are not the primacy of decision-making and resource allocation are not distributed to promote equality, but to achieve personal motive, then the essence of democratic governance which approximates good governance and the essence of the state, is completely defeated.

Indeed, a combination of democracy and governance concomitantly culminate in good governance and as vividly put by Otoghile and Igbafe (2014), good governance is the ability of the state to identify the needs of the citizens and equitably deliver necessary quantity and quality of public goods

to meet those needs in an effective and reliable way. Good governance, therefore, forms the philosophical foundation upon which democratic governance is built. Effectually, democratic governance is deeply-rooted in such principles as: the rule of law and constitutionalism, legitimacy of the government in power, fairness, transparency and accountability by those exercising political power, liberty/right of the citizens to exercise civil and political activities, decentralisation of power and resources in the State, independence of the judiciary, freedom of associational groups from the State among others (Suleiman 2016; Udeh, 2017).

In the same clime, it is widely held that a properly equipped Public Service is a precursor to good governance, since it compels virile public servants who ensure that those core principles and values of democratic governance are pursued and realised in the interest of the people and society. On this note, Manume (2016) described the Public Service as the pulsating heart-beat of democratic governance, which keeps the governmental machine running via impactful policies and programmes articulation and attainment. Accordingly, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria under the Executive Part I (D) and Part II (c) (as amended), provide for a fully equipped and functional public service system at both the federal and state levels of government. It therefore behooves on the federal and state government to ensure the continuous development of its public service.

Nevertheless, it is however disheartening and worrisome that rather than development, there has been absolute underdevelopment of the Public Service system in Nigeria at large and Ebonyi state in particular by the attitude and approach of the political class; as the manifestation of the core principles of democratic governance in themselves, have continued to elude the state. Irrespective of the natural resources discoveries and other socio-economic potentialities replete in Ebonyi state, the state public service is obviously undeveloped and the entire state bedeviled with abject penury with its correlates of illiteracy, widespread poor health conditions, acute youth unemployment and the state public service system politically manipulated.

Apparently, human capital development is profoundly undermined with virtually no motivational approach towards the public service system. The government of the state continues to pay lip-service to the outcry of the public servants over the closed system devoid of career advancement, with promotions speculatively carried out instead of actual upgrades. Likewise, the gratuities of retirees are punitively withheld and when they are eventually

released, they are not paid in full but in their minutest percentages to no avail to the retirees. Also of note, is the irregularity in the payment of pensions to pensioners in the state public service. Most questionable, is the apparent or near absence of training and re-training of Ebonyi state workers since the dawn of 2015 till date. The role of Permanent Secretaries and other senior officials in the state public service system are constantly undermined and virtually hijacked by the State Executive Council (EXCO) Committees. These foregoing anomalies have turned the public service system of the state into an apparition that exists in theory, but in actuality, its services have been rendered comatose. It is in view of the foregoing background that this paper inquired into how effectively the public service of Ebonyi state has been empowered to fully exert its democratic governance roles, as well as probed whether the principles of democratic governance are manifested in Ebonyi state. Meanwhile, from a broad perspective, the paper examined the implications of democratic governance in Nigeria and the underdevelopment of the public service system in Ebonyi state.

Methodology and Theoretical framework of Analysis

The study employed content analytical approach anchored on an ex-post-facto survey design, so as to create a nexus between democratic governance and institutional development; vis-à-vis the underdevelopment of Ebonyi state public service system from 2015 to 2019. To this end, the paper sourced secondary data from published academic journals, conference papers, articles, mainline textbooks and other relevant materials on the internet to build a formidable qualitative study. Effectively, the paper anchored its theoretical framework on the social contract theory as the key theoretical assumption and model of analysis.

The study is theoretically analysed based on the social contract theory, which posits that the true basis of any political society is subsumed in a 'pact of a social contract' in which all citizens in a political society enter into a social union/agreement under equal condition. The social pact or agreement demands that everybody relinquishes all natural rights and liberties; each man gives up his freedom in order to empower the collective. Nevertheless, an individual does not submit or relinquish his liberties to the general will or to the leviathan for nothing but to ensure that his security, needs and comfort will be adequately promoted and protected. The leviathan is therefore under obligation to work assiduously to promote the welfare of individuals that

constitute the public community, while at the same time enjoying support of individuals. This reciprocal interface forms the contractual basis of individual and constituted authority relationship, with various responsibilities and obligations as far as each party to the contract is concerned (Friend, 2016).

Historically, the social contract theory is nearly as old as social and political philosophy itself but has been rightly associated with modern moral and political theories, with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679); John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1478) as best known propounding scholars. The theory is a widely acceptable, reasonable and influential ground for explaining a constituted authority and individual citizen relationship (Adewole, 2014). Hence, it can be argued that democratic governance is a binding social contract (agreement) between the citizens and their representatives, statutorily entrusted with the responsibilities to control the affairs of the people and allocate resources without jeopardizing the principles of fairness, justice, equity, freedom, liberty, accountability, openness and transparency in governance. It is therefore on the basis of these principles that the criteria for distinguishing between good and bad democratic governance is presupposed. Mukoro (2015) avows that by constituting democratic government and its public service, people lend, alienate, or give up their power to governing authorities on condition that it is used to guarantee their wellbeing by satisfying their felt needs. Thus, the public service of the state is the hub of government policies and programmes aimed at promoting the welfare and well-being of the people and the corporate existence of the state. A fully equipped and functional public service is therefore fundamental in ensuring the continuous fulfillment of the 'social contract' via the manifestations of good governance.

Conceptual Discourse and Explications

The services rendered by governments the world over, are being provided through a group of individuals known as public servants under an umbrella of a system called the public service. According to Yaro (2014), the public service is defined as the totality of the organisational structures within which the work of government is carried out. Agbodike, Osawe, and Igbokwe-Ibeto (2015) vividly described the public service as government apparatus designed to manifest the properly articulated desires and aspirations of the common man such that government objectives are defined, policies formulated and programmes designed there-upon for implementation. The

public service encompasses the federal and state civil service in the strict sense of the Ministries and Departments of the Civil Service and the Field Administration; Legislatures and the Judiciary including their Agencies and Parastatals; it also covers Local Governments, the Military, the Police and other Security Agencies; as well as covers Advisory Governmental Bodies and the Public Enterprises (Marshall & Murtala, 2015).

Historically, the public service is as ancient as the emergence of public administration and political systems itself, which emanated in part and indeed largely from the earliest system of social interactions in which individuals by themselves or as a collectivity, saw the need to provide for and cater for one another through an organised system termed 'social contract'. As a result, the social contract is solidly deemed to have contrived the foundation of public administration and the public service, giving it more content and purpose (Omeje, 2012). The Nigerian Public Service itself is an offshoot of British creation; as the entire system as a whole is an amalgam of various nationalities fused together into an incompatible union by colonialism (Okpata, 2011). But between the attainment of independence in 1960 and the subsequent democratisation process in 1999, the Nigerian public service system evolved to take-up more responsibilities of democratic governance, aimed at promoting the welfare and well-being of the people and the corporate existence of the State.

Democratic governance according to the United Nations Development Programme (1999) cited in Oguniye (2010) is a complex mechanisms, process, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. In other words, democratic governance is based on the people's mandate, which portrays an insistence on expression of the will of the people. On this note, Suleiman (2016) posits that democratic governance coincides with the essence of good governance which is described as the efficient management of state institutions and resources in accordance with the principles of democracy to promote the general welfare of the citizens. Hence good governance is the likely outcome of democratic governance and as Akhakpe (2019) rightly pointed out, democratic governance thrives better where good governance is the rule and not the exception. Hence it is not subsumed in ingenuous processes or course of a political rule; rather it exerts effects, portraying such principles as the due process, rule of law and constitutionalism, independence of the judiciary, political legitimacy,

accountability, openness, equity, citizen's liberty and political participation, decentralisation of power and resources in the state, respect for public opinion, freedom of the press and of associational groups among others.

Public Service System in Nigeria: The Development and Underdevelopment Question

In Nigeria, the general populace look up to the public service (which encapsulates the civil service) to initiate developmental strategies, policies and programmes that would transform the country and bring about the much desired changes in the level of employment, poverty and overall wellbeing of the people. Udeh (2017) affirms that it is through the public service that values of democratic governance are manifested, because the public service constitutes the machinery for the delivery of public goods and development to the people. The delivery processes thus requires an innovative and resourceful performance of duties by public servants.

The performance of these duties is guided by such core values as: professionalism, diligence, honesty, prestige, selflessness, impartiality/impersonality relations, political neutrality, etc. But as Okpata (2014, p.15) vividly points out, "The Nigerian public/civil service today is a battered institution which has virtually lost its attributes and core values". Hence, the public/civil service presently has become an apparition of its former grandeur due to the parochial attitude and approach of the regime in power. When core values of the public service are undermined by the approach of the governance system, it signifies that the public service system is underdeveloped; on the other hand, when such core values are preserved, then it means the public service system is developed. Practically, the underdevelopment of the public service is manifested where there are no motivational incentives for public officials. In situations where such vital aspect of training and re-training of workers, development of personnel innovativeness and resourcefulness are lacking, what obtains is policy dictation by the government; hence it is no more an effective and efficient public service system. Agbodike, Osawe and Igbokwe (2015) argue that the public service is the bedrock of governance that is supposed to mastermind the formulation and implementation of policies and programs of any government at any particular time. This is the purpose of public administration in national or state development, but the moment there is no resourcefulness and creativity in the entire governance system, the entire purpose is defeated.

The post-independent public service in Nigeria were not state-centric, neither were they regionally bond, such that prominent Nigerian political leaders in their right such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, M. I. Okpara and Sir. Francis Ibiyam, looked beyond their states or regions in the development of the public service. These were governors whose legacies in the Nigerian public service transcended history and are landmarks till date. The governing system of these past governors relatively upheld the values of uniformity, standardisation, transparency and meritocracy in public service recruitment and/or appointments. But these core values have been truncated in recent times. Yaro (2014) avows that this is manifested as a result of consistent encroachment and dictatorship of political office holders in public/civil service recruitment and selection processes. Usman and Okafor (2014) argue that the delegation of the onerous task of recruitment/appointment to extra-ministerial departments, constitutes a cog in the wheel of public service development in Nigeria; as such acts lack proper control which in turn gives room to the political class to influence the process based on their parochial and sentimental-will, without adherence to the core values of the public service.

Hence today, in a federating state like Nigeria that is shrouded in plurality and heterogeneity, indigenes and statism still prevail in our public service recruitment, selection, deployment and promotion, etc. With states like Abia disengaging non-indigenes from the civil service in 2016 and even within a given region, unemployed Nigerians are required to sign and bring along with them state/local government identification letters. While some recruiting/appointing institution will go beyond state/local government identification to ask for identification from traditional or community leaders to be employed even in a public service system. These are vestiges of public service underdevelopment which invariably enhances lack of knowledge and technological transfer; encourages death of innovation, resourcefulness and expertise in the development of the public service; leaving the State with an uninformed and redundant public service. The same aberration and confusion contributing to the underdevelopment of the Nigerian public service is evident in neglect of due process by Buhari-led government. Instead of a clean break at the expiration of his first tenure, the presidency continued using same personnel midstream like: the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), Personal Aides, Special Advisers and Ministers, before some of them were officially re-nominated and reappointed. The foregoing violation of the

norm has largely contributed to the misplaced core values, ethics and ethos of the Nigerian public service.

Governance System and the Underdevelopment of the Public Service System: The Ebonyi State Experiment

Nigeria's Federalism is made up of 36 federating States (including the Federal Capital Territory) and 774 Local Government Council Areas. Accordingly, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for a public service system both at the federal and state levels of government and it is expected that both tiers of government should interdependently ensure the continuous development of the public service system. Ironically, rather than the continuous development of the public service system as envisaged, there has been outright underdevelopment of the public service system in Nigerian states and Ebonyi state in particular. Apparently, the state governance system is deeply smeared in an 'alien governance-public service relationship'. Virtually all the policies and programmes of the state are not within the range of the public service to make its input. This subjective move away from the norm has culminated in the brainwashing of the masses, a mirage of developmental schemes, with no genuine interest in the development of the crop of public officials, except in aesthetic projects and other areas of interest that benefit the regime in power. These projects (street lights, glass tunnels, flyovers, double cell mini-bridges, the new skyscraper city, etc.) are executed at huge financial cost and sacrifice of the development of an innovative and resourceful public service system. The prevailing governance circumstance in Ebonyi state, is a reflection of the assertion that underdevelopment does not imply the absence of somatic development, but represents an ironic reversals where there exist no significant relationship between quality of public personnel and the state of development (Aloko & Abdullahi, 2018). Thus, the attainment of development in democratic governance requires enhancing the capacity and capability of the public service to be effective and efficient.

There are personal and widely held views that the public service in Ebonyi state is not technically empowered to fully exert its democratic governance roles. According to Eze (2018, p.2) the former Secretary to Ebonyi State Government, in his controversial resignation and/or dismissal from office in April 2018, categorically stated that "the state public bureaucracy is completely neglected in the governance of the state". This assertion is not far-

fetches from the truth considering that the concept of application for Permanent Secretaries is not within the rank of the administrative cadre but from the technical class, which is against the civil service rule. The implication is that the Directors of Administration in the various Ministries that were supposed to become Permanent Secretaries were completely neglected while Engineers, Pharmacists, Vet Doctors, etc. were picked over them to head the various Ministries in the State Civil Service which is career service. Consequently, the role of recruitment/appointment of pure Civil Servants in Ebonyi State, has gradually tilted from the Civil Service Commission to the Executive Council Committee (EXCO). The recent appointment of 26 Permanent Secretaries Designates and some newly recruited Protocol Officers by the State Government, whereby candidates were not interviewed by the Civil Service Commission, but by the Executive Council in their chamber clearly undermines the functions of the Civil Service Commission. Likewise, the present application for public position appointments from Commissioners to Coordinators of local government development centers, are aberration of Public Service appointment procedure.

The motivation of Public Servants in Ebonyi State has been at its lowest ebb from 2015 till date. For instance, in the State University, promotion is now notional such that an employee will be promoted to the rank of a Professor but will still be receiving salary of a Senior Lecturer. This has entrenched brain-drain in the entire State Public Service as many are leaving for federal institutions. The training and retraining of public personnel, has become a herculean task for the state governing system and this further culminates in an underdeveloped public service system devoid of resourceful and innovative public servants. Worthy of note again, is the reduction of the man-hour in the public service by the state government in the name of 'public servant agricultural empowerment'. Hence, public officials are asked to use Fridays to go to their farms in order to spearhead agricultural revolution in the state. Nonetheless, this approach not only undermines ethics and ethos of public bureaucracy but the efficiency and effective of the service as well, which is not fair for a developing public service system. Likewise, local government public officials cannot on their own initiate programmes/projects of rural development, unless they receive approval from the state government via the Commissioner for Local Government and not even the Local Government Service Commission.

Indeed, in place of impersonal relations there is primordial relations in Ebonyi state governance system, where key positions such as: Accountant General, Commissioner in the ministry of Local Government, PDP Southeast Zonal Chairman, PDP State Vice Chairman, etc. are immediate blood relations or from the same community of the regime in power. In this approach to public service, Ebonyi state chapter of Nigeria Labour Congress is a pro-government union and appears to have been divided into anti and pro-government unions; which further constitutes a cog in the wheel of an effective and efficient public service system in the state. The objectivity of the essence of public service and the selflessness that characterize the system necessitate that the governance system should be operated based on the core value of impartiality and impersonality relations. Therefore all official conducts must be devoid of selfish attachment to the policy programmes for recruitment, promotion, staff training and development.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is no gainsaying the fact that any governance system that does not preserve the core values of the public service, is culpable of the underdevelopment of its public service system irrespective of the transformation seemingly canvassed or entrenched. The poor remuneration of public servants, lack of training and development as well as absence of other motivational incentives in Ebonyi state public service system and Nigeria at large have culminated to the lack of innovativeness and resourcefulness of our public service system. Presently, the governance system is enmeshed in pride of superiority, encroachment of roles and policy dictation by government. As a result, instead of empowering its public service, the state bureaucracy is hindered from playing its crucial role of formulating and administering functional strategies and policies of government. Hence, if immediate concerted efforts are not made to correct these inherent anomalies in the governance system, so as to restore the core values of democratic governance and that of the public service, the much desired social and economic development needed in our polity, will continue to elude us.

It therefore becomes necessary to point out to the governing authority, about the indispensability of the public service in governance. It is a service that requires due recognition, economic and social wise; hence the motivational incentives of public servants should be upgraded and properly dispensed. To this end, remuneration of public/civil servants should be

attractive as well as reflect equity and fairness, to ensure that there is no differential in pay packages. Government should initiate functional training and development programmes that would propel an innovative and resourceful public service system in the state. Promotions and advancement in the public service should be standardised to match the salary structure, in order to cushion the effect of the erosion of intellectual resources from the public service. Scientific recruitment and selection process should be imbibed and strictly adhered; so as to eschew any form of personal bias, political or tribal inclination. Finally, there is need for a reform policy in the state public service system and a reorientation for the entire governing system of the state to the real meaning of development rather than euphemistic modernisation in the state.

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DOES DEMOCRACY MATTER FOR NIGERIA?

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Abstract

Much expectation has been hinged on the benefits of democracy to national development. Indeed, solutions to Nigeria's human rights crises as well as the crises of development were hinged on Nigeria's transition to democracy. However, since 1999 the dividends of democracy measured by accountability, transparency, equality, participation among others have eluded Nigeria. Rather than development, Nigeria has witnessed rapid decline in living condition, increasing insecurity and violation of human rights. Among countries of the world, Nigeria now has one of the highest misery index and has been classified as the poverty capital of the world. The question therefore remains: does democracy matter for Nigeria, particularly when judged against the experience of countries of Latin America which experience rapid growth under benevolent dictators between the 1970s and 80s. Latin American benevolent dictators ensured rapid industrialization of their countries, which resulted in massive job creation and rising income for the mass of the people, thus, facilitating the establishment of a viable middle class. Just as the case of industrial Europe, the establishment of the middle class is essential for the demand for democratic rights. For sure, without and guaranteed food and income, people are severely limited in their attempt to participate in the political process.

Keywords: democracy, socio-economic development, dividends of democracy, benevolent dictatorship

Introduction

Democratization in Africa appears to be fraught with enormous challenges as the states or nations in the continent are still grappling with its adoption and indeed, entrenchment. African countries are only making concerted efforts in recent times to practice democracy as a form of government which considers as its tenet, the involvement of the majority of the populace in the government processes.

According to Oluwaseun (2017, p.321) democracy “has been widely accepted as the best form of government because of its underlining principles of liberalism and pluralism that give [s] majority of citizens the opportunity to have a say in the manner their country is being governed”. Suffice it to say that the nucleus of democracy is the people. This form of government was not in the practice in Africa before now but has begun to gain acceptance in recent years as African leaders have over the years been pressured to practice democracy in order to ensure that the people benefit from governance. Nigeria was not left out, hence the return to democratic governance. Though, democracy may not provide all that people may want but paramount is the strength of it providing the possibility of making adjustment and re-adjustment of the institutions in line with the prevailing circumstances of economic and socio-political realities as well as providing the enabling environment for effective participation from the people.

Recall that time and events changes and so there is the need to adjust and indeed re-adjust the institutions in a democratic state to meet with the realities of the time. This has been the trend in the Western World that results in what Ajayi and Ojo (2014) refer to as “political good to humanity”. Gyong (2012, p.2) says democracy remains the most powerful avenue to deliver human rights, justice, rule of law and equality to all and sundry. Democracy thrives better in a situation where the citizens of a state are guaranteed their basic rights and freedoms. The people therefore, have a clear understanding of the ways in which the governmental system functions and thus, have the opportunity of making inputs on how they are governed. This denotes that the people have to be included in the activities of governance. It thus, portend that inclusiveness is one important element in a democratic setting following that the government is for the people.

However, the meaning of democracy has changed from participation by the majority to rule by representatives in which a few elites are chosen by political parties through periodic elections to represent the people in the various organs of the government. In this way, the power of the people becomes usurped by few elites who control the political parties. Thus, the people systematically lose control over their representatives and over the political process and rather than political parties proving the needs of the people, it now serves the desires of the elites who manipulates the political process at will. Consequently, democratic politics becomes alien and alienated from the mass of the people in society.

It is the task of this paper to examine whether the advancement of democracy in Nigeria has come with the capacity to meet the needs of the people providing for inclusion, participation, transparency and accountability, which are widely acceptable as the dividends of democracy and the principles upon which good governance can be assessed.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted in this paper is the participatory democratic theory. In any democracy, it is the expectation of the citizens to be part of the decision making processes be it in terms of budget preparations, elections, and voting with respect to policy and program implementations among others. Thus, participatory democracy has over time been viewed as that which gives the people the chances to be active in societal issues that affects their lives and in fact, their relationship with the government. Terchek and Conte (2001, p.165) put that for a successful democracy emphasizes should be laid on devising expanded avenues for people's participation in the political space. According to them, the practice of localized self-government where citizens have the hope of governing themselves can only be attained when public arenas for such practice is reclaimed. Therefore, expanding opportunities for discussions and indeed, persuasion throughout the society is needed for active participation of the general public in the affairs of the government. The distinguishing feature of participatory democrats from others is: "their fundamental belief that the real benefits of democracy can only be appreciated and sustained by a society that is characterized by relative high levels of citizen intervention in the tasks of governing" (Terchek & Conte, 2001, p.165).

The emphasis here is that, beyond the issues of voting and elections, the peoples' inclusion in the activities of government is importation. In addition to this are transparency and accountability. Indeed, the government has to be transparent in its dealings as well as accountable to the people. Transparency and accountability therefore translate into good governance for which the masses expect from the government of the day. In Nigeria however, the issues of transparency and accountability on the part of the government is lacking and therefore, amounts to her inability to deliver the dividends of democracy to the generality of the populace.

Democracy in Nigeria

Nigeria had long years of military rule and only gave way to a democratic regime between 1979 and 1983. However, the first wave of Nigeria's democracy can be traced to the period of anti-colonial struggle and the immediate post-colonial times. The people got involved in the process that led to their emergence few years after political independence. The second was between 1979 and 1983 when Alhaji Shehu Shagari was elected an executive president of the country. Nigeria's first and second democratic dispensations were however, truncated by military coup headed by Kaduna Nzeogu and General Muhammadu Buhari respectively; an indication that democracy was still a strange phenomenon to the people as the military governance mentality was like something infused into her 'blood stream'. Notwithstanding the botched democratic government in 1963 and 1983, most Nigerians have had cause to call for the practice of democratic rule in the country.

The general election of 1993 that produced M.K.O Abiola as the acclaimed winner was another era when Nigeria would have witnessed another democratic reign but it was annulled by the then Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida. This act led to protests and indeed, incarceration of Abiola, which eventually led to his death. Thirty five (35) years of military rule resulted in the decay in infrastructure and the deepening of poverty. For instance, the Babangida-led administration adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1985, even against the desires of the people, which culminated in perpetual debt payment rather than providing the needed succor for which it was sought for. This among other major challenges prompted Nigerians to prefer a democratic system over the military regime that had been experienced over the years. It was expected that democracy would resolve these problems, thus, the yearning for a return to democratic rule.

Series of calls, which were not restricted to one single regime but persistent over the years, necessitated a transition to civil rule in 1999 led by General Abdusalam Abubakar's military regime that saw the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo as the elected President of Nigeria and his subsequent swearing-in on May, 29, 1999. It was a promise fulfilled. Ubani, Edioho and Nwaorgu (2007, p.232) put that General Abdusalam made a promise and commitment to return Nigeria to civil rule as expected by Nigerians and the international community. In line with his promise, Abdusalam stated that the administration, considering the factors that led to the destruction of the credibility of the previous electoral exercise, will not interfere with the formation of parties and the electoral process. This was another milestone in

the country's political history as democracy and Nigeria were like a strange bed fellow because of decades of military rule. At the time, democracy was described as "nascent" but twenty years down the line, it is hoped that it has been strengthened and deepened, thus, can no longer be viewed as a "nascent" democracy.

The present uninterrupted democratic dispensation since 1999 has witnessed change in baton from one administration to another. From Obasanjo to Yar'Adua, to Jonathan and Buhari who is the current president. Democracy in Nigeria between 1999 and 2015 has experienced difficult times as the long years of military rule molded the attitude and character of those who believe that democracy cannot be practiced. Following the promise made by the military, under the leadership of Abdulsalam Abubakar in 1998, to hand over power to a democratically elected government, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo emerged the elected president and was sworn-in on May 29, 1999. The Obasanjo-led administration tried the much it could to ensure that Nigeria's democracy benefited the masses. The administration introduced economic and social reforms to revamp the economy and improve the living standards and ethical conduct of the people. Every effort made yielded no positive impacts as the people were not involved in business of government and governance. Decisions were only taken by the elites with government functionaries and or elected officers and very few individuals on behalf of the people.

It is interesting to note that the consciousness of the people about democracy increased over time to such an extent that allowing one man to run the affairs of the state and nation was tantamount to breaching the tenets of democracy. The consequence of this was the transfer or transmission of power to Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in 2007 by Olusegun Obasanjo. The administration of Yar'Adua raised a seven point agenda to run the country, which he did not live to complete. The mantle of leader was later transferred to his vice, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan via the 'doctrine of necessity' as proclaimed by the then Senate President, David Mark. Although, the emergence of Jonathan raised some eye-brow, he was slow and steady to win the race of completing the tenure of the Late Yar'Adua. It is instructive to note that change in administration of government has been orderly with periodic elections - the Obasanjo-led administration (1999-2007), Yar'Adua/Jonathan (2007-2011), Jonathan (2011-2015) (Ajayi, 2015) and even to the present Buhari's administration (2015-2019). Acknowledging this, to what extent has

democratic rule and practice in the country brought the needed good governance for which the people can say the government is doing good?

Democracy and Socio-Economic Development

The difficulty of democratic transition and albeit democratic rule in Nigeria may have rising from the weak socio-economic foundation on which it was built. Years of military rule and therefore, centralized administration and control has resulted in unprecedented level of infrastructural decay, corruption, human rights abuse, high poverty rate and then inequality. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2018) there has a worsening inequality in Nigeria between 2004 and 2013 from 0.356 in 2004 to 0.41 in 2013. According to the report, the share of the upper class in national income has been increasing between 2004 and 2013 and responsible for 58%.39 of national income/expenditure while the middle class is systematically wiped out. Again, in Nigeria, the high level of unemployment and destitution cannot sustain democratic culture. The rate at which it is increasing is alarming. For instance, the unemployment in Nigeria rose to 23.10% in the third quarter of 2018 from 22.70% (NBS, 2018).

Indeed, democracy in Nigeria is viewed as merely choosing representatives from the elite class that should rule over the masses. However, democracy should be focusing on democratizing the economy and giving chances to the majority of the citizens to have economic power the awell-established industrial based which will produce a middle class that would provide the platform for democracy to thrive. The World Bank (2019:2) posited that though the national poverty rate in 2012-2013 was 33.1%, the rate in the rural areas was 44.9% and the urban areas 12.6%. The more disturbing, according to the report, was the variation that existed between the geopolitical zones of the country. For example, poverty headcount in the relatively industrialized western part that had the lowest rate fell from 21.2% in 2010 to between 11and 16% while for the North-east, it increased from 47.1% to 50.2% in 2012 and 2013. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Nigeria between 2006 and 2016 according to the World Bank had an average growth rate of 5.7% per year with oil price dominating the growth pattern of the country. Noted is that the North-east which has the highest poverty rate is the most affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. This insecurity situation is not capable of galvanizing public support for and active participation and inclusion in governance and indeed, democratic processes.

It is therefore, not surprising that the growing inequality in income as well as 'voicelessness' and 'powerlessness' of the mass of the people resulting in the low culture for accountability, transparency and responsiveness is responsible democratic governance in Nigeria not standing on a strong footing. For instance, Nigeria since the inception of democratic rule in 1999 has witnessed low rate or low political participation which has constrained the capacity of the people to hold leaders to account. Democracy therefore, in the words of Claude Ake (1992) became the democratization of disempowerment in which elections became a matter of vote buying and vote selling. This was further constrained by rising incidence of political and ethnic violence in the country. These are prominent issues confronting Nigeria's democracy today and evidence abound. The resultant effects of all these have been rising docility of the mass of the people and the rising rapacity with which the political elites have looted the national treasury by selective allocation of resources to members of the national executive and legislative arms of government at all levels.

These also led to low level of economic development and rising despair and destitution in Nigeria with the implication that democracy cannot be sustained in an environment of poverty and destitution neither can weak democratic systems provide for socio-economic development. The experience of England in the eighteenth century clearly showed the necessity of a strong economic base through the role played by a strong middle class in the democratization of the political system. In England for instance, the emergence of industrial capitalism occurred side by side with the emergence of a new class of merchants, capitalists and entrepreneurs who used their new found wealth to demand for democratic rights, privileges and participation and therefore, strengthening democratic culture.

The emergence of benevolent dictators in Singapore, Malaysia, Brazil, Argentina, Libya and Rwanda among others saw to the rising level of industrial development in these countries and through that, was the emergence of a strong middle class who pushed for reforms leading to democratic governance. Indeed, people must put food on their tables by accessing jobs and therefore, earning incomes before they can participate fully in the democratic process. In Nigeria, the nexus between the poor masses and the elites who control the instrumentality of the country are blurred. They are not in any way aware of the dealings of the government and thus, do not have knowledge of the workings of government. The issue employment has been a

challenge over time. Benevolent dictatorship according to Amaral (2010, p.1) is a “form of government in which an authoritarian leader exercises political power for the benefit of the whole population rather than exclusively for his/her own selfish interest or benefit or for the benefit of only a small portion of the population”. That is to say that the benefits from the government spread to everyone in the society and not selective in reach.

In Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi for instance, democracy was not all about political parties and elections but about the spread of power and wealth to the ordinary citizens or downtrodden of the country instead of just a few individuals and privileged ones. Chengu (2013, p.5) puts that Libya recorded the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy as far as Africa was concerned as was designated the 53rd highest in Human Development in the world by the United Nations Development Program. The African Economic Outlook (2012:12) affirm that most Libyans “had access to basic sanitation facilities and essential drugs making her second in the UN Human Development Index (HDI) in Africa in the year 2009 with rising GDP from 0.741 in 2005 to 0.760 in 2011.

Interestingly, Libya was organized into communities of “mini-autonomous states” with authority to allocate oil revenue and budget funds. There were three stages of representations – the Local Committees, People’s Congress and the Executive Revolutionary Council (Chengu, 2013, p.2). At these levels of decision making, the citizens were actively involved. The formation of the Local Committees was to establish a national consensus across the country, where “everyone is involved in every decision and vote on everything from foreign treaties to building of schools” (Chengu, 2013, p.1). The importance of this was to ensure representations from all parts of Libya and involve all Libyans in the meetings of the Local Committees.

This approach to governance in Libya attracted criticisms as Gaddafi’s proposals were most often time rejected by the people through popular votes giving way to alternate views from the masses. For example, his proposed abolition of capital punishment and home schooling met stiff opposition by the people as the People’s Congresses insisted on death penalty and classic schools. Another case in point was Gaddafi’s intention to abolish the central government in its entirety and proceeds from oil directly to each family but was opposed by the People’s Congresses as well. For the Executive Revolutionary Council, Chengu (2013, p.3) says it was accountable to the ordinary citizens only. This council implemented the decisions reached at the

People's Congresses, which portrayed the sovereign will of the masses. Indeed, Libyans never took to voting but elevation, allowing every citizen to contribute to the decision making processes with respect to domestic, economic and foreign policies. The peoples' participation in a military regime accounts for benevolent dictator's desire to meet the needs and aspirations of the citizens.

In Rwanda, the situation under Kagame has provided some dividends to the people as they have benefited from his benevolent style of leadership. A success story has been recorded in many facets of the economy according to Russell (2012, p.17) Rwanda secured almost 100% food security for the first time in her history. The government made available better seeds, fertilizer and cattle for the village dwellers with an increasing level of harvest in rice, sweet potatoes wheat, cassava and maize. Russell quoted the president as saying "we're selling food to Burundi, Tanzania and Congo" (Russell, 2012, p.17). In the health sector, expenditure increased by twice from the 1994's 4.5% to 9% in 2012 and expectancy rose from 26.8 in 1993 to 54.7 in 2010. There was also increase in access to improved sanitation facilities from 52.4% to 60.6% in 2009 (World Bank cited in Russell, 2012, p.17). Kagame has been described as a 'progressive leader' and one who promotes gender equality (Sundaram, 2014, p.2) with 64% of lawmakers in the parliament of the country as women (Rodney, 2019, p.1).

The education sector has not been left behind as it received a slight increase in expenditure from 4.3% GDP in 1999 to 4.9% in 2009. The country was ranked 10th out of 35 in 1999 and 13th of the 33 countries in Africa in 2009. Enrollment in primary school was 85% while literacy rate of males and females rose to 77%. There has been an improvement in teachers' training from 48.6% in 1999 to 93.9% in 2009. The country's GDP per capita in 1994 was \$4, 507 but rose to \$9, 216 in 2010. Indeed, Kagame is seen as the "good guy" as he takes the economy and welfare of the people as a priority not minding other areas of low performance such as human rights. While Bill Clinton had described Kagame as "one of the greatest leaders of our time", Tony Blair said he is a "visionary" leader. Similar comment was made about him by former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Mon when he said "I hope many African nations will emulate what Rwanda is doing" (Sundaram, 2014, p.1).

Lee Kuan Yew, as a benevolent dictator governed or ruled Singapore as Prime Minister for thirty one (31) years and molded the country with a brand

of “soft authoritarianism”. Meadows (1988, p.1) had asserted that “Singapore had achieved the American Dream, but not in the American way. That is, the dream of achieving national development through the adoption and practice of democratic rule. Singapore is a prosperous, clean city, with imposing skyscrapers and glittering centres. At the head of this thriving free-market is [was] a clever socialist dictator”. Carlton (2015, p.1) had described Singapore as having a government that is corrupt-free, and has excellent schools and healthcare services that is affordable, high home ownership, safe streets, clean air and ranked as the third highest with per capita income in the world. The concern of Lee Kuan Yew was “whether his plan would work and whether it would ensure the survival of Singapore and ensure its success” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019, p.1; Miller, 2012, p.2).

Before the recorded successes of Singapore, the country had an experience of war that ravaged it with an increasing growth in poverty and uneducated population dwelling mostly in houseboats and slums (Meadows, 1988; Carlton, 2015). Twenty years after her independence, the economy of Singapore grew tremendously at eightfold with an average income per capita of more than fourfold. With a life expectancy of 71 years, families living in poverty dropped to 0.3%. There was stability in the population of the country and almost everyone having a job. Indeed, the new labour laws put in place by the government gave rise to the setting up of the Jurong Town Corporation to provide development for Jurong and the likes. Consequently, 271 factories that were set up in 1970 employed 32, 000 workers, while over 100 factories were under construction. This situation of improved labour relations and tax relief for five years attracted foreign investors particularly from the United States with its firms accounting for 46% of new foreign capital investment in Singapore. Companies originating from other countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Western Europe also had capital investment in Singapore by 1972. By this time, the companies were either owned by foreigners or joint-venture with Singapore.

The rapid industrialization of the country resulted in the creation of a middle class that fed the upper echelon of the government. It is interesting to note that to sustain the government requires the efforts of the middle class. Thus, for democracy to thrive the middle needs to be created; a situation that is not easy to come by in Nigeria. The boost in the economic industrialization of Singapore culminated in the high performance as can be seen in the table below.

Table 1: Showing the performance of Singapore

	1965	1975	1985	1995	2005	2013
Singapore	\$2, 915	\$7, 013	\$12, 193	\$21, 651	\$29, 870	\$36, 898
United States	\$2,915	\$22, 886	\$29, 307	\$35, 117	\$44, 308	\$45, 710
Philippines	\$763	\$948	\$907	\$993	\$1, 201	\$1, 581
Zimbabwe	\$495	\$695	\$641	\$647	\$453	\$475

Source: Allison (2015). These uses constant 2005 U.S Dollars (World Bank)

Allison (2015) insist as recorded in the above table that the real per capita income over fifty (50) years grew tremendously in 12-fold. The average income of a Singaporean grew from \$500 a year in 1965 to \$55, 000. The real capita GDP as recorded over same period according Allison was catching up with that of the United States of America. Indeed, Singapore has been described as the best place to do business following its economic improvement.

Singapore was by the mid-1970s the third largest oil-refining centre in the world having been described as “the oil storage centre” of that region. Again, the conversion of former King George VI Graving Dock to Sembawang shipyard enabled the employment of 3,000 former naval base workers in ship building and ship repairs. Interestingly, it engaged in shipping with Neptune Orient Line culminating in making Singapore the container transshipment center of the Southeast Asia. Just like Nigeria, Singapore embraced global firms with the aim of tapping from its resources such as training, technological transfer and creation of jobs (Miller, 2012, p.1).

The resultant effects had been growth in real terms reaching an average of eight percent a year between 1965 and 2010 and as such attracted several countries and became the top choice for firms in Asian markets. Eighty percent (80%) of people living in Singapore virtually owned houses of their own through mortgage assistance from the government as it was the aim of the state to build assets and bring about positive social behaviour that flows with ownership. With similar opportunity, Nigeria as a democratic state has not been able to catch-in on the opportunity of having multinational oil giants to get effective training and transfer of technology for the development of the industry as well as national development. The question of democracy as a

form of government if practiced would be a driving force for national development becomes a matter of concern looking the Nigerian case. According to Allison (2015, p.4) “the claim that an autocratic state can govern more effectively than a democratic one sounds heretical. But in the case of Singapore, it is hard to deny that the nation Lee Kuan Yew built has for five decades produced more wealth per capita, more health, and more security for ordinary citizens than any of his competitors”. This goes to explain that even though people had doubted the workability of other forms of government, the example of Singapore has proven that apart from democracy, the people of a state can be well reached with their priorities needed to make life more meaningful to them.

The periods 1821 – 1823 for instance, Brazil witnessed dictatorship under Jose Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, November 1937 – October 1945 under Getulio Vargas among others. Jose Bonifacio in his short period of leadership took some actions that were inflexible, firm and irreconcilable with the views of those who opposed his reign but at the same time were in favour of the people he had sworn to defend. The military dictatorship in Brazil as at the 1970s engaged in fixing her energy problem and thus made provision for certain stringent rules and regulations to provide the platform for the development of ethanol and success was achieved and the distribution system was well coordinated as result of government planning and implementation plan.

Jose Bonifacio’s regime was devoid of greed and materialism as he never gave concern for material things, money nor noble titles and the likes. He was however, interested in the well-being of society. Industrially, the ministry of aeronautics played an important role in creating the enabling environment to the development of the aerospace and defense industry. It created the Embraer in Brazil which employed over 500 Brazilians. Indeed, Amaral (2010, p.5) had noted that “some of the best policies adopted by the Brazilian economy” were done under the periods of benevolent dictatorship.

The argument here is not that military dictatorship, democracy nor does any other form of government appear to be the best but that a government must show commitment, accountability, transparency and participation to attract legitimacy from the people and thus, make them willingly do anything to promote government policies and programs. So, any government that does the will of the masses is termed the best as can be assessed based on its achievements. It is therefore submitted that a country

must take into account its resources and the best approaches to adopt in a bid to meeting the yearnings and aspirations of the people and engender national development through participation enhanced by transparency and accountability. Amaral had argued that Brazil did very well in economic terms for a decade which propels her to stand out in decades to come.

Conclusion

The quality of democratic governance is most often assessed based on the level of participation by the citizens, the exercise of political rights, the effectiveness on the part of government in attending to the needs confronting the citizens, making policies and executing them, prevention of corruption, performance in producing people-centred wants or needs, which includes health services, rising income and safety. However, an assessment on the above criteria in the case of Nigeria does not portray that democracy has provided the enabling environment for national development and participation in the decision making processes as well as providing the platform for an industrial based for the evolution of a middle class that an drive democracy. The people are still languishing in poverty, unemployment and low standard of living *inter alia*. No wonder, Nigeria was in recent time described as “the poverty capital of the World” and also hoping to bag “World capital for open defecation” in the near future.

It is recommended that nations and indeed, Nigeria, should look inward at the domestic environment and embark on programs that are people-oriented and tackle corruption headlong. Nigeria should adopt ‘a home-grown democracy’ where people can actively participate in decision making and contribute to the development of the country. The form (s) of government in practiced by the various countries does not really matter but how the leaders drive the system through stringent policies and commitment at ensuring that the demands of the masses are met for an improvement in their standard of living and therefore, providing them with the greatest happiness they desire.

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**VOTE TRADING AND CREDIBILITY OF ELECTION IN NIGERIA:
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES, 1999-2019**

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Abstract

The electoral processes in Nigeria are characterized by many aberrations. This has made the credibility of elections in our contemporary democratic dispensation to be threatened to a large extent. These perceived menaces have demonstrated its ugly and unpleasant posture in so many ways, including vote trading. The act of voting, which is the most overt form and the commonest measure of political participation in democratic and pseudo-democratic nations has been inflicted grievously. Thus, the study interrogated the effects of vote trading on the credibility of elections in Nigeria. The theoretical framework is anchored on political clientelist exchange theory. The study relies on documentary method of data collection. The method adopted for data analysis is content analysis. The study argued that vote trading depicts a practical example of electoral fraud, which undermined the integrity and credibility of elections in Nigeria. The study recommended among others, that the electoral officials should be proactive to implement rules for their engagement during election, and should further seek the cooperation of respective security agencies to ensure strict compliance to electoral norms.

Keywords: clientelism, credible election, democracy, vote trading, voting

Introduction

Electoral process in Nigeria is characterized by many aberrations. Seeing election as the heart of democracy yet can be derailed through numerous types of flaws, frauds, failures and among other social vices. Worthy of note is the fact that the integrity and credibility of elections are extremely crucial in determining the extent to which people can truly determine those who will represent them in a democratic government. This unhealthy development demonstrates evidently with the growing trend of vote trading, which is gradually becoming a new mantra in the nation's political lexicon. Similarly, seeing Nigeria as one of the countries in the world, where inequality, social disparities pervade with astronomical increase in the incidence of poverty, people do all sort of things or are easily lured into all manner of illegalities in order to survive. This has ultimately resulted in many irregularities and aberrations in Nigeria political system, and even, manifest in the form of vote trading.

Sometimes, people find it difficult to distinguish between vote trading and social assistance program. There is a clear difference between the two concepts as the former is characterized by irregularities and does not conform to the acceptable norms of democracy; while the latter is characterized with fairness, equity, and social justice, which is in line with the tenets of democratic principle (the concept of social assistance programs shall be given a more detailed and distinctive explanations as we progress in this study). Against this backdrop, this study is poised to interrogate the effects of vote trading on the credibility of elections in Nigeria from 1999 to 2019.

Conceptual Articulation

The electoral process is an ideal and integrated part of the democratic process, whether in developed or developing societies. A mal-functioning of electoral system inadvertently produces mal-administration. The mal-function of electoral system is caused by the incident of leadership failure and political violence. In most developing countries, crisis of governance is usually the major problem because of the kind of people chosen into elective position.

Election

It could be seen as institutionalized procedures for the choosing of office holders by some or all adult members of a society (Eminue, 2005). Elections in Nigeria, though seen as a means of controlling the government,

within the context of electorate's participation reveal a rather disturbing state that has called for serious concern. This ugly situation has compelled many to see elections in Nigeria as a mirage or a mere selection. An electoral system exists to provide the electorate with opportunity and the right to choose their representative and maintain contact with them. Hence, for an electoral system to be democratic, it must provide for equal electorate and the freedom by them to make real and meaningful choice devoid of coercion or intimidation (Agi, 2006). Election is the process whereby the electorate chooses by voting officers either to act on its behalf or represent it in an assembly with a view to governing or administering. This could be seen as a systematic process of choosing between two or more alternatives of candidates, policies, and programme. Electorate refers to a class of citizens entitled to vote in election, by whatever procedure.

Credible Election

Credible election refers to an electoral process that is termed free and fair, without any form of violence and victimization before, during, and after the actual voting exercise (Duru, 2002). This must be devoid of intimidation, malpractice, and falsification of results.

Democracy

Democracy is a political system that is characterized by the following:

- v. Two or more political parties (bipartism or multipartism), that compete in periodic elections for control of the governing apparatus.
- vi. The party or coalition of parties winning a majority of votes gains control of the governing apparatus until the next election.
- vii. Losing parties never attempt to prevent the winners from taking office, nor do winners use the powers of office to vitiate the ability of losers to compete in the next election.
- viii. All sane, law-abiding adults who are governed are citizens, and every citizen has only one vote in each election.

Vote Trading

Capitalism, with its basic ethos, has turned the global community into a competitive market. Sequel to this, and with the ever-growing quest for and/or unnecessary desire to make money by all means, people have now gone even to the extreme to make merchandise of everything within and around

them, including their votes, hence, the advent of the concept of vote trading in our today's political lexicon. In principle, the core notion of trading (buying and selling) is not problematic. Trading refers to a commercial transaction, the exchange of goods and services. On the other hand, votes are formalized expressions of preference by individual members of decision-making bodies. Here, the commodity that changes hands in acts of vote trading carries a well-defined institutional meaning. Thus, vote trading could be seen as economic transaction, involving political parties and candidates in distributing money and other material benefits to electorates in exchange for support in polling units. Additionally, we may define vote trading in the electoral terrain as a market transaction in which parties, candidates, or intermediaries pay either in cash or in kind for electoral services delivered by individual citizens. The logic involve here implies;

- a) Mutual exchange exist: The actors involved - buyer(s) and seller(s) engage in effective exchanges of money for goods and services. In the absence of mutual exchange, if buyer(s) do not pay or seller(s) do not deliver, no transaction is made, but instance of fraud or robbery.
- b) Mutual understanding exist: Buyer(s) and seller(s) understand what they are doing, that there is a reciprocal relationship of exchange.

Electoral System

This refers to a process by which citizens of a given democratic society elect representatives to handle their machinery of government. Electoral system is the only factor in the evolution of a party system, but the effects of different electoral system can be found in the structure, ideology, and the pattern of the party interaction, as well as the members of the parties that compete in the political system (Beetse, 2008). An electoral system consists of more than the method of counting votes. A full description of an electoral system would include such factors as the extent of franchise that is, who is entitled to vote, the rules relating to the candidates and parties, and those regulating the administration of election, especially the provision against corruption and other social vices. Electoral system is the institutionalized arrangements of means by which an election is conducted, and the purpose of the election fulfilled the term and covers the legal and practical realities of voter registration and election administration, as well as the price rule for translating.

Methodology

The study adopted the time-series research design within the analytic framework of the political clientelist exchange theory. The method of data collection used for this study is documentary method which involves the consultation of textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, official gazettes periodical documents and internet sources. Data generated were logically analyzed using content analysis method.

Theoretical Framework

The study adopted the political clientelist exchange theory. The major proponents of this theory are Piattoni (2001), Wantchekon (2002) and Stoke (2007). This theory sees politics at large, electioneering and voting in particular as a transaction with emphasis on the politicians' exchange of material goods for support of the voters at the polls (vote trading). Piattoni (2001) asserts that clientelistic vote buying is therefore, "the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient's vote". Clientelist relationships involve two sets of actors: patrons that seek to maintain and build power and clients that seek protection, access to benefits and services, or insurance against risk (Stokes, 2007). Political clientelism more broadly, seek to identify the mechanisms that promote contract fulfillment by both buyer and seller (Mungai, 2017). This theory sees all elections as a kind of transaction between the politicians and the voters, and this transaction is based on mutual agreement, which assumes that one of the parties (patron) has privileged access to a set of resources that he can grant or deny to the client at his discretion. This implies that citizens trade their votes. In this context, this theory portends that a "vote is literally 'bought' or 'sold' depending on whether one adopts the perspective of the candidate or the voter (Schaffer, 2005). The theory also proposes that clientelist exchanges ties the client to the patron not by encouraging a norm of reciprocity but by encouraging a fear that the flow of benefits will be cut off. Clientelistic political exchange scholars also acknowledge the use of positive and negative inducements to motivate voters. According to Mares and Young (2016) positive inducements refer to a category that includes vote buying; involve offers of rewards such as money, goods, or favours. On the other hand, negative inducements include the threat of economic or physical sanctions for an individual's voting behaviour.

The proponents of the theory drawn from different parts of the world generally argue that, politicians offer voters concrete benefits in the lead-up to elections, rather than promises of programmatic benefits that will materialize after the elections (Wantchekon, 2002). This implies, giving money and other material gratifications to secure votes from the vulnerable voters, In addition, politicians distribute goods/money to individual voters, instead of distributing public goods.

The basic assumptions of the theory include, but not limited to the following:

- xxxiii. A political monopoly over some specific resources, a monopoly whose continuity is contingent on electoral victory,
- xxxiv. A gap between the monitoring capabilities of the candidates, the patron being the one who has an advantage in gathering information about the voters and control their political behavior,
- xxxv. A vast attitude in the candidates' ability to make proposals, so that the effects of the clientelistic monopoly are not confused with possible effects of some arbitrary ideological differences between the candidates.

The above assumptions also imply that the theory belongs to the category of "divide-the money" electoral games, where two or more candidates compete for elective office(s) by offering each voter a share of some resources, in order to bend the voters' choices at the polls, even when such choices are antithetical to the general good of the people.

However, the major limitation of this theory is that it fails to pinpoint the basic factors that propel the electorates/voters to sell their votes in exchange for cheap and monetary gratification without a critical consideration on the grave consequences of such careless political behaviour may have on their post electoral political existence. Furthermore, the theory spend so much intellectual energy projecting vote trading as a mere less consequential game between the political barons and the voters, thereby making the act of vote racketeering to appear as an acceptable norm in a democratic society.

Application of this theory as it relates to vote trading and credibility of election in Nigeria, is that the theory draws scholars attention to a common observable practice in the ordinary market situation/environment where every trader strives to make a tangible gain/profit in their transactions/exchanges, so do the politicians and the voters in the contemporary chequered political parlance of most developing democracies like Nigeria. The politicians who

want to win elections by all means do everything within their powers, including vote buying, in order to secure political positions through the polls, and the voters who are willing to mortgage their future political benefits become susceptible to the monetary and material inducements from the political barons in exchange for their votes. Under the purview of the political clientelist exchange theory, the political heavy weights see the voters as clients whom they only settle and secure their votes with peanuts.

Social Assistance Programs and its Dimensions

There are so many distinguishing features of social assistance programmes, which aimed at poverty alleviation. It is useful to highlight two important dimensions of the social assistance programmes, which include the one characterized by the degree to which programme benefits are targeted to reach the poor. The more specifically a programme is designed to meet the needs of the poor, the more targeted, or progressive, it is on comparison, many universal-type of social programmes, such as food, subsidies, and price supports, experience, significant leakages of benefits to income groups other than the poor. The other dimension of social assistance programme is the leeway politicians have in deciding who receives benefits, when benefits are given and when they are withdrawn. Social assistance programme that allow a high degree of government discretion are vulnerable to political and electoral manipulation and poverty-reduction efforts suffer as a result. Discretionary programmes give politicians the ability to withdraw benefits on the basis of electoral criteria or for political motivation, such as when a beneficiary fails to vote for the incumbent or an election cycle is over. Programmes providing benefits according to an established eligibility formula, and which cannot be withdrawn unless the beneficiary fails to meet criteria, are more effective at reducing poverty. Effective poverty reduction calls for social assistance programmes that demonstrate both features simultaneously. They are targeted to the poor and they are not discretionary.

Similarly, such programmes are not immune to political biases. Political parties will invariably seek to benefit their supporters in the design of their social programmes. For instance, a left-wing party with a strong base of support among workers, farmers, women, and the unemployed will tend to implement social policies that disproportionately, favour those voter groups. Yet, when politicians and their brokers on the ground can neither disregard a social programme's eligibility criteria, redirect benefits to ineligible supporters

nor exclude eligible beneficiaries who support an opposing political candidate, opportunistic manipulation of programmes for short-term electoral gain is more difficult to achieve. Based on these features of social policy, welfare-state programmes are traditionally non-discretionary, so every formal worker is eligible.

Universal subsidies for food, medicine, transportation, and other financial assistance programmes tend to be ineffective at reaching the poor on the other hand, and discretionary on the other, since politicians are often free to start, stop or change benefits for such programmes by decree. It is not uncommon to observe that food, medical, and transportation subsidies rise during electioneering campaigns and fall once the voting is over. This is more or less seen in the form of clientelism, a strategy of vote buying; hence, subject of discussion.

Clientelism and Strategies of Vote Trading

In very basic terms, political clientelism describes the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support. With rare exceptions, academic researchers have perceived clientelism in almost entirely negative form. On the other hand, it appears to be associated with pre-modern social contexts, therefore connotes a cultural and economic backwardness. On the other hand, clientelistic dynamics are also found in advanced socio-economic contexts. By clientelism, we mean a type of political bond based essentially on face-to-face relationship, and involving mutually satisfying transactions between unequal individuals in terms of wealth, status, and influence (Okoli & Okoli, 1990). Clientelism is a form of personal, dyadic exchange usually characterized by a sense of obligation, and often also by an unequal balance of power between those involved, which manifest as a descriptor of hierarchical patron-client relationship in traditional rural societies (Piattoni, 2004). These relationships involve the patron providing clients with access to the basic means of subsistence and the clients reciprocating with a combination of economic goods and services, as well as social acts of deference and loyalty. Concisely, clientelism is a way of describing the pattern of unequal, hierarchical exchange characteristic of feudal society, in which patrons and clients were tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty (Piattoni, 2001).

Clientelism is essentially a variant of special interest politics – a mechanism through which political parties and their representatives can obtain political support in exchange for selectively allocating benefits through state institutions. In many ways, it gives less cause for concern than the opaque money-raising practices of many contemporary parties, which are willing to tailor public policies to corporate interests and various other lobbies in exchange for money. Corrupt party financing subverts citizens' inequality by allowing the wealthy to buy political favours, which redistribute further advantage to them. The demerits of clientelism, as a form of linkage in party democracy therefore remain strong because clientelism is generally an unwelcomed phenomenon from the point of view of mainstream normative democratic theory.

In democratic settings, social programs that help the poor do not emerge from benevolent rulers, but from competitive pressures that lead politicians to choose to design programmes targeted at the poor. The temptation of clientelism, corruption, and political manipulation of social programmes is tempered by incentives provided by the electoral returns of well-designed social policies that truly reach the less privileged. While we believe that political actors and governments are motivated by selfish calculations, we view the political process with relative optimism. The relationship is instrumental, and the benefits provided to clients are still largely private and excludable. The main reason here is that the use of vote as a currency to buy material benefits subverts the ostensible purpose of the electoral process in a representative democracy.

Party Loyalty and Voting Behaviour

In Nigeria, political parties seem to move some steps beyond their legislative jurisdiction for the provision of economic welfare to bribery, orchestrated in the form of vote buying and selling (Onanka, 2009). Clientelism has been a prominent feature of political interaction from the time of independence till the present age. Party patronage, graft, and sinecure offices serve as a means of securing loyalty of individuals.

Similarly, party loyalty is not only bought and sold, but more. It has made political activism more and more a lucrative enterprise. Many unemployed individuals look up to the periods of political party activities during election and electioneering campaign. This is to enable them serve as

party agents, party delegates, or as party thugs; thereby, Nigerian political parties are equally agents of political socialization.

Additionally, voting is the most overt form and the commonest measure of political participation in democratic and pseudo-democratic nations. Its variation at the individual level in the form of voting behaviour (who votes) in the form of voter turnout is an issue of great concern to political and policy analysts. Furthermore, in a democratic setting, voting is the key electoral device applied in the political process, through which the people participate in the creation, choice, and control of their government. Yet, voting is not a natural right, and definitely not a biologically determined human activity as erroneously perceived by many individuals, but a constitutional right. Hence, we examine the types of voting, which could be open-ballot system, secret-ballot system, direct voting, indirect voting, voting by proxy, and among others.

Voting behaviour in Clientelist exchange appears to fail as a personalized and instrumental view of political participation. Voters simply use their votes to sustain their patrons, thus earning the patrons protection and help. This virtue-inducing quality of democratic participation is dulled by clientelist exchange. Voters therefore, neglect the broader political consequences of their electoral choices, and representatives elected through clientelistic mechanism cannot credibly claim a mandate to pursue a broad programme of public policies. Moreover, if votes are cast purely in terms of the benefits received, then this leaves with governing parties the freedom to disregard popular opinion in all policy decisions, which do not relate to the direct allocation of resources in exchange of votes.

Factors Responsible for Vote Trading in Nigeria

The ugly trend of vote trading in Nigeria's political setting did not start in a vacuum, but attached to some predisposing factors. Davies (2006) infers that the inability of the political parties and the contestants to put in place a comprehensive and comprehensible manifesto for scrutiny by the voters is promoting vote trading in Nigeria. Instead of a clear-cut manifesto that would enable the electorate to make a rational political choice, meaningless slogans, demagogic and rabble rousing speeches are made. Similarly, Ayoade, (2008) affirms that candidates' ignorance of their own political parties' programme is embarrassing. As he rightly observed, candidates spin the issues they think can attract votes, which may sometimes negate party positions. The argument

here produces representatives but not participatory democracy, which consequently encourages money politics vis-à-vis vote trading.

Poverty and illiteracy are also contributing factors to the unfortunate trend of vote trading in the society. Poor people are vulnerable and due to the low level of political awareness in the country, intimidation and manipulation become easy tools to perpetuate this evil. Obviously, majority of the poor are ever ready to submit their mandate for monetary benefit. They become blindfolded with material/ financial incentives realized in selling their votes. In the same parameter, this menace of vote trading could equally be attributed to the harsh economic depression in the country. Education is the best mechanism of political consciousness and rational political behaviour.

Additionally, political cynicisms among the electorate also fuel the spread of vote trading in Nigeria. The impression that political office holders are incurably corrupt, self-centred, and lack administrative competency has made people to perceive politics as dishonourable venture or enterprise. This simply states that politics is synonymous to fraud, stealing, and betrayal of public trust (Ojo, 2008). The general perception of voters that political office holders are corrupt has become an excuse for accepting money as voting criteria and those funds realized before election is what they can benefit from the politicians. This buttresses the fact that politicians hardly fulfill their campaign promises. Meanwhile, this notion derails Nigeria's democracy.

Drawing from another perspective, the nature of Nigerian politics also encourages vote trading. The principle of winner-takes-it-all syndrome negates moral principle. Nigeria's politicking gives room for mediocrity and discourages morality. This ultimately poses threat to democratic sustainability in Nigeria. Politics is viewed as a dirty game and allows a do-or-die electoral contest between rivalries. This tells on the level of political culture in the country. In as much as the leaders could not lead by example, the led cannot be easily cautioned.

Cases of Vote Trading: Implications for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria

The relationship between money and politics is very powerful, but modern democracy has exposed its implication on democratic virtues. The role of money in any political arrangement cannot be over-emphasized. The abuse of money in Nigerian polity is indeed amazing too. Starting with the 1999 to 2003 civilian administration in Nigeria, money played prominent role in

canvassing for votes. Apart from the presidential election that witnessed high level of vote trading, the National Assembly became arena of trading.

In 2007 general elections, there were cases of buying and selling (vote trading) in the 'do or die' contest. In most states of the federation, including Imo, money was given in exchange for voters' card in polling units. Vote trading was equally reported in Rivers and Cross-River states. In Edo and Ogun states, party agents bribed officials of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) with the sum of N2000 naira each. In Osun and Oyo states, INEC allowed multiple votes, thereby witnessed bribing INEC officials, party agents, and members of Civil Liberty Organization (CLO) observers in most of the polling units (Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007).

Similarly, according to a reliable report, there was sharing of money in Benue, Nasarawa, Lagos, Borno, and Sokoto states during gubernatorial election in the case reported as vote trading (Jide, 2007). These instances buttress the view of Chief OlusegunObasanjo in a forum organized by INEC on 27th November, 2003 when he examined the cost of conducting elections thus:

Even more worrisome, however, is the total absence of any control on spending by candidates and parties towards election. I have said that we prepare for elections as if we are going to war, and I can state without hesitation, drawing from my previous life, that the parties and candidates together spent during election, more that could have been needed to fight a successful war. The will of the people cannot find expression and flourish in the face of so much money directed solely to achieving victory. Elective offices become mere commodities to be purchased by the highest bidder, and those who literally invest merely see it as an avenue to recoup and make profit. Politics become business, and the business of politics become merely to divert funds from the crying needs of our people for real development in their lives (Obasanjo, 2003, p.5).

In Nigeria, voters are usually offered money (65 % of all reported attempts in 2007), commodities such as food and clothing (25 %), and jobs (8%); ranging from median price of vote payment rise between 500 naira to 1000 naira, 2000 naira, 5000 naira, and 10, 000 naira between 2003-2011 because of the proportion of large payments increased over time (Michael,

2008). However, the 2011 general election was applauded by both local and international observers on the basis of being free and fair when compared to the previous elections, the interplay of money used in canvassing for electorates by parties and aspirants remain worrisome. For instance, over 1800 groups emerged on the course of supporting Goodluck Jonathan's presidential aspiration with so much money worth billions of naira disbursed in financing their campaign strategies (Olusola, 2011). Individual financial donors were very active, giving the resources redeployed in canvassing for votes by some of the wealthy candidates during elections. There is no gain saying the fact that the contestants exhibited scant regards for the provision of Section 91 sub-sections 2-5 of the Electoral Act 2010, which placed a cap amount they are to spend on their electioneering campaigns. During the party primaries, campaigns, and elections, humongous sum of money was deployed by the contestants to out-do each other. Apart from the legitimate spending on hiring of campaign offices and staff, procuring office equipment and vehicles, running jingles and adverts, printing bill boards and posters; there were illegal expenses such as bribery of electoral officers to manipulate election figures, hiring of political thugs, as well as outright vote buying (Jide, 2011).

According to Onuoha and Ojo (2018) the vote buying practice, which is completely antithetical to the ethos and norms of democracy, has become a common feature of party primaries and general elections conducted in recent years in Nigeria. For example, during the All Progressive Congress (APC) presidential primary in Lagos State before the 2015 elections, it was reported that "over 8 000 delegates who participated allegedly made US\$5 000 each from the candidates. Delegates were supposed to have received US\$2 000 each from the Atiku Abubakar group and also US\$3 000 each from the Buhari group. Given that more than 8 000 delegates were reported to have attended the primaries, the competing camps could have spent more than US\$16 million and US\$24 million respectively on vote buying at the primary stage" (Matenga,2016).

There were widespread allegations of vote buying in the off-cycle governorship elections in Edo and Ondo states in 2016. In the 28 September 2016 gubernatorial election in Edo, observers reported massive vote buying by the two main political parties, the APC and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The parties were accused of giving N3 000 to N4 000 for votes in several polling units (The Whistler cited in Onuoha & Ojo, 2018). Similarly, in the 26 November 2016 governorship election in Ondo State, it was

observed that members of the APC, the PDP and the Alliance for Democracy were giving money to voters at most polling centres across the state. Some polling stations in Odigbo, Okitipupa and Ilaje local government areas were given N450 000 while each voter got between N3 000 and N5 000” (Dada, 2016).

In the 18 November 2017 gubernatorial election in Anambra State, many observers condemned the brazen incidences of vote buying during the poll, stating that the level of commercialisation of the vote was an eyesore to democracy (Vanguard, November19). In particular, the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room noted that “even more lamentable was the fact that the buying and selling of votes took place in the full glare of security men and election officials. It was simply a bazaar in which the election officials and security agencies were undoubtedly complicit” (Vanguard, November19, p.11).

In the same manner, widespread acts of vote-buying were also reported during the recently held governorship election in Ekiti State on 14 July 2018. For example, the *Punch* newspaper documented the case of a retiree who claimed that an APC agent offered him money to vote for the party. According to the septuagenarian:

I was offered N5,000 to vote for the party but I rejected it. I am 73 years old retired teacher. I cannot allow the future of my children to be bought by moneybags. I don't know how we descended to this level when people brazenly offer money to people to secure their votes. It was not like this in the past. Will our votes count with this problem? (Atoyebi, Ajaja & Aworinde, 2018, p. 9).

As such, this trend has continued with rapid increase as reported above in the 2018 gubernatorial elections of Ekiti state, even in the Osun state, as well as the 2019 General Election of Nigeria.

It is an established fact that vote trading involves two or more persons – the buyer(s), the seller(s) and among other active players in the scene. The activities involved and its concomitant effect is detrimental to the political development, and so questions the country's readiness to embrace ideal democracy. One of the cardinal effects of this is the promotion of money over merit, ideology, creativity and people's well-being. However, a level playing ground would be sacrificed for imposition and intimidation, which definitely tells on the legitimacy of government.

Furthermore, vote trading denies a society the actual democratic principle of transparency and accountability. This is because vote buyers are under no obligation to serve the interest of the masses. Buying and selling votes (vote trading) is only a form of political entrepreneurship where investment comes from the right source. As argued by Danjibo, and Oladeji, (2007), vote trading compels politicians to see themselves as investing in a greater political harvest, thereby encouraging the entrenchment of corruption in the polity, which erodes the very basis of democratic governance. In this sense, candidates have invested much before being elected to the office; simple economic rationality will impel it on them to make the money they have invested in as many folds as possible. Where such exist, accountability and transparency, which is known to be hallmark of good governance and democracy, become jettisoned to the detriment of the political system (Ojo, 2008).

Finally, the recent gruesome commercialization of vote and/or political exchange of money and other material things (foodstuffs, clothes, etc.) for votes undoubtedly compromises the credibility, legitimacy and integrity of elections in Nigeria. This unwholesome practice of vote trading has far-reaching unintended consequences both to the people and the Nigerian State. As a result, the tendency to perpetuate bad governance and total crucifixion of democratic ideals will become the collective woes of people in Nigeria.

Findings

The study made the following findings:

- x. The study discovered that vote trading depicts a practical example of electoral fraud, which erodes or undermines the integrity and credibility of elections in Nigeria.
- xi. With the evil practice of vote trading, the will of the people cannot find expression and flourish in a government that came to power on “a purchased mandate” as they used so much money to secure votes for their victory at the polls.
- xii. Elective offices become mere commodities to be purchased by the highest bidder, and politicians who literally invest in it merely see it as an avenue to recoup and make profit. Thus, instead of service delivery to the people, politics becomes a mere business enterprise.
- xiii. Vote trading promotes elitist politics and weakens popular participation. This will only place persons with the resources to get

access to political office, and will ultimately discourage the masses from political leadership due to their financial handicap (Dung Pam, 2008). In essence, political affairs become monetized, and to a large extent, institutionalize the monopoly of power of the financially strong political party(s).

- xiv. More so, vote trading has dented the image of Nigeria political system in the international community. For instance, within the international system; it is believed that Nigerian politicians lack integrity and our country's political institutions lack democratic virtues. Consequently, this situation has created a devastating impression on the legitimacy of our democratic/electoral institutions.
- xv. The study also implicated poverty and illiteracy as contributory factors to the unfortunate trend of vote trading in the society. Poor people are vulnerable and due to the low level of political awareness in the country, intimidation and manipulation become easy tools to perpetuate this evil. Obviously, majority of the poor are ever ready to submit their mandate for monetary benefit.
- xvi. Vote-trading politics and the socio-political insecurity it engenders are likely to engineer military intervention (coup d'etat) due to legitimacy crisis. In a situation whereby dividends of democracy are not feasible; the military can seize such opportunity to hijack the political system.
- xvii. Lastly, the general perception of voters that political office holders are corrupt has become an excuse for accepting money as voting criteria and those funds realized before election is what they can benefit from the politicians. To them, politicians hardly fulfill their campaign promises and derails democratic dividends with impunity.

Recommendations

In view of the dangers vote buying poses to democracy in Nigeria, the following recommendations are proffered:

- xx. The study recommends among others, that the electoral officials should be proactive to implement rules for their engagement during election, and should further seek the cooperation of respective security agencies to ensure strict compliance to electoral norms.
- xxi. To curb electoral fraud and vote trading, there must be strict monitoring of financial activities of political parties by The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the Economic

and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), especially during their party campaigns and at the polling stations.

- xxii. Actions that reveal the vote cast by voters should be criminalized. To this effect, the INEC should device a strategy that will guarantee the secrecy of the ballot and make it very difficult for party agents to see a voter thumbprint on the ballot paper.
- xxiii. The Nigerian media needs to intensify voter education and enlightenment campaigns on the negative implications of vote trading, especially, on how it undermines good governance, promotes political corruption and raises the costs of elections.
- xxiv. As a strategy to control vote trading and exposure of a candidate voted for in an election, the Electoral Act should be amended so as to entrench the act of photographing of ballot papers (either for pre or post-elections payments) by a voter or any person as criminal offence with a capital punishment.
- xxv. Hence, poverty is implicated as what makes the electorate susceptible to criminal, financial and material inducements in Nigeria, the Federal government should pursue a policy of aggressive diversification of the economy in order to create more employment opportunities and reduce the poverty level.
- xxvi. Finally, the Nigerian electorate should, as a matter of necessity, develop the culture of political morality, integrity and value reorientation for proper conduct during and after elections in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The study has been able to interrogate the effects of vote trading on the credibility of elections in Nigeria from 1999-2019. The study observed that people only interact politically if there is something in it for them in exchange. When an electorate has little or nothing to contribute and/or receive in exchange in an electoral process, the consequence is tactical withdrawal from political activities or a display of sense of political inactiveness (apathy). Obviously, in a typical Nigerian situation, the level of one's political activism is as a result of what the person anticipates to have in exchange. This psychological attitude finds expression in the assertion that people interact and participate in politics if there is something in it for them to get in returns, simply because politics is a game of interest. The pursuit of this economic interest in politics is what makes the voter susceptible to vote trading.

Vote trading is an evil wind that has not blown any good to our country's democracy. Objectively speaking, the negative effects of the purchase of votes' syndrome demand that citizens should effectively change their behaviors in response to, and in accordance with the particularistic material offers, they receive.

Actually, people tend to vote in elections because they expect to have the dividends of democracy in exchange for their voting activity. Such dividends of democracy include good leadership, infrastructure, security, qualitative education, employment, and among others. However, if such dividends are not forthcoming, the electorates simply develop the culture of not expecting these public goods from the political leadership, but they rather resort to the option of vote trading or performance of criminal activities in exchange for monetary gratification and other forms of settlement without any recourse to its consequences on our democracy.

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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT FOR WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Britain's exit from the rest of European Union by referendum got the world thinking. It has stimulated thought provoking issues on the analysis of politics and economics. The social media got passionate about it. The Voters themselves who were utterly shocked by the results started to brainstorm on mechanisms to cope. Some of them celebrated the outcome, while others regretted their action, the rest who were neither here nor there, contemplated on the indeterminate nature of the future with much disparagement. The study therefore explored the political and economic implications of BREXIT to West Africa especially those countries that were formerly colonized by Britain. Qualitative and descriptive method of inquiry was used to achieve the objectives of the study. The paper argued that BREXIT has political, economic, and psychological implications for the Britain's allies in West Africa who had various economic and strategic partnerships with EU. Immigration issues for some of them had been complicated with challenges of securing employment in their new countries of residence. The paper recommends therefore that state leaders and citizens need adequate consultation, deliberation, and time to think through implications of such action, before execution.

Keywords: BREXIT, Political Implications, Economic Implications, West Africa

Introduction.

The referendum for Britain to exit from the rest of European Union has raised a lot of concern for the rest of the world, especially in the area of its implications politically. The media has carried the news concurrently internationally and locally. This has raised great subjects of discussion. David Cameron the Former Prime Minister of Britain had to resign because he didn't see reasons how this was going to work out without serious implications, he

did not believe in it. Majority of the older Britons bought the idea and are really excited about it. The younger citizens are not buying into the idea. Presently the new Prime Minister seems not to see her way through. The Parliament has been having deliberations on its implications, which has shown that they were not adequately prepared for the BREXIT.

This paper will look at the political implications of BREXIT to neighbouring countries accessing its benefits and drawbacks. The method of data collection will be qualitative and descriptive methods in its analysis. This work will x-ray the backgrounds to BREXIT, and seek to know its implications on the American elections, European Union and the rest of the world.

BREXIT is an acronym derived from the word Britain Exit, meaning Britain's exit from the rest of European Union. The British always had self-government as the ultimate objectives of their rule anywhere they colonized. In Nigeria and other countries she colonized, they regarded it as their responsibility to guide and prepare the natives for eventual self-government. The British recognized the peculiar differences of the different people, which made them adopt varying policies like the indirect rule for nationalist movements (Abia 2006)

Britain which is seen as a policy nation and a strong member of the EU adopted their national interest objectives in the international sphere. Nations like Britain pursue varied and many objectives to benefit their state in the international political system. In consideration of the conflicting interests at the world stage among nations, each nation adopts a particular strategy or a combination of strategies to achieve a given set of goals and objectives.

Nations employ various strategies to influence the external environment, using diplomacy, propaganda economic instrument militarism, clandestine-espionage, militarism, alliance (Abia 2006) and presently referendum like Brexit.

Public Choice Theory

The referendum to leave the EU by Britain and stand-alone without other nations as part has to do with the power of choice. The choice made by them to exit or succeed can be analyzed with the use of public choice theory. The major proponents of this theory were James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962). They are regarded as the leading proponents of public choice

theory. Other prominent contributors were Libecap (1989), Mueller (1989), Rowley (1995) and Wills (1997).

Buchanan (1973) sees public choice theory as the application of analytical methods of economics to political science challenges. The analysis of forces of self-interest which works out in the political process did not commence with the proponents of public choice. It can rather be traced back to the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes who were among the early contributors of the approach to political economy. Duncan Black also clearly reflected in his writing generally seen as the beginning of the modern public choice theory era.

Hill (1999) also writes that the public choice theory is founded upon the economic model of rational choice, having the explicit goal of facilitating exchange of work and ideas at the intersection of economics, political science and sociology (Nwogwugwu 2015).

Assumptions of Public Choice Theory

This theory analyzes political or governmental decision making. In terms of models obtained from the behavioural choices of individuals or actors in the political arena, public choice theory analyzes various choices which confronts individuals as public actors, such as voters and non-voters, participants, and non-participants in pressure groups, bureaucrats, politicians who are in and outside government. (Buchanan 1973)

In public choice theory individuals, bureaucrats, interest groups and politicians are assumed to seek their own self-interest. The decisions made is dependent on the costs and benefits of the action taken where each group attempts to maximize their own net benefits. Benefits can either be monetary or non-monetary, it can be ideologies, goals, and cultural values. This theory sees political decisions far from being made efficient and dispassionately in pursuit of the public interest.

Public choice therefore, voting and legislating are processes in which individuals can pursue their own, often conflicting interests. Different decisions making systems will produce very different policy choices (Butler 2012)

Nations, bureaucrats, politicians including interest groups in turn result in the adoption of a particular stance in the specification of institutions and property rights. It is regarded as exchange relationship in which one group

concedes to the order in as much as their self-interests are met not withstanding that all the decisions are taken in the public interest.

Criticisms of Public Choice Theory

Criticism has been raised on the theory of public choice. Kelman (1987) argues that the science of public choice is destructive to the social good, because it creates a cynicism about the political process and becomes a self-fulfilling philosophy. Kelman further suggests that crucial to any ability to maintain public spirit is the presence of continuing existence of a social norm that declares it appropriate for people to try to do the right thing in public behaviour and inappropriate for them to simply seek advance in their personal interest. Public choice theory provides cynical descriptive conclusions about behavior and even government that threaten to undermine the norm prescribing public spirit which could later on discourage community service in its entirety. Another scholar Rowley (1987) has also argued that though public choice provides powerful insights to human behavior in regard to political interests, they are propelled by the most pessimistic vision of mankind. The emphasis of public choice literature is so pervasive on the utility and wealth destruction imposed by self-seeking agents, that few scholars of public choice escape completely untainted by cynicism.

The criticism put forward by Kelman (1987) was addressed by Brennan and Buchanan (1988) stating that notwithstanding the fact that they did not believe that narrow self-interest is the sole motive of political agents or that it is necessarily as relevant a motive in political as compared to a market setting, certainly, they believe it is a significant motive for political agents and public officials.

Brennan and Buchanan 1988 posit that it would be immoral to base analysis upon the false assumption that all political behaviour is motivated by a concern for the public interest. And in both scholars agreeing with Kelman's public choice can be immoral to the extent that it destroys the public spirit. Brennan and Buchanan also argue that their constitutional perspective means that public choice gives some hope for public spirited action through constitutional reform.

In applying this theory to Brexit, it simply draws a clearer view that the decision made by Britain on its exit is played out in public choice theory understanding that it was the choice of the individuals, citizens of Britain to

take a stand and make their choice, by voting either to stay or exit from the rest of the European states.

Background to Brexit

Brexit can be looked at from various perspectives, but glaringly it is a practice of succession from the rest of the European union and states. Reason drawn from the relatively high levels of net migration into the UK in the last decade (BBC news. Retrieval 2016-7-5). The decision not to impose restrictions on European migrants after the addition of the A8 (eastern European) countries to the EU at a time when other European countries imposed such restrictions contributed to a spike in migration levels which propelled contemporary voter attitude in the referendum. (www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk2016).

The media on their part also played a role in the Brexit. Many of the UK's suggest seeking newspapers as noted by Janemartison a guardian journalist posits that the sun and the daily mail most especially including the daily telegraph and daily express, have been arguing for Britain to leave the EU for many years (Martison 2016).

The referendum result for the UK to exit the EU of 2016 was a victory for the leave campaign, amassing a total of 51.9% of the vote (Erlanger 2016).

The results of the referendum provoked considerable debate as to the factors that contributed to the victory (the economist 2016). The major reasons states was based on issues relating to sovereignty and migration (BBC 2016). Then the rest of the campaign for Brexit focused on the economic impacts of leaving the EU. This choice on issues which Britons felt to be important issues facing Britain today shows that immediately prior to the vote more people cited both the EU (32%) and migration (48%) as important issues than cited the economy (27%). (www.ipsos-mori.com 2016)

The sovereignty of the UK was a major challenge to Britons. Lord Ashcroft's polling team on the day of the referendum questioned 12,369 people who had voted. This poll produced data that showed that nearly half (49%) of those who wanted the 'leave' said the biggest single reason for wanting to leave the European union was the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK. The ipsos MORI data showed that Europe was the third most highly ranked problem by the Britons who were asked to name the most important issues facing the country with 32% respondents naming it

as a challenge (Lord Ashcroft polls 2016 & IPSOS MORI polls 2016) migration.

The leave voters who constituted one third (33%) said that the major reason was that leaving the EU offered the best opportunity for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders. It was clearly shown prior to the referendum data from ipsos-mori that immigration or even migration was the commonly cited issue when the UK citizens were asked what they see as the most important issue facing Britain, 48% of the respondents mentioned it (Ipsos-Mori 2016).

Ten years before the BREXIT referendum, there was a remarkable increase in migration from European countries. The inflow of European nationals migrating to the United Kingdom was about 268,000 in 2014 an increase fro201,000 as at 2013. Europe inflows were majorly flat for the 1991-2003 period, the average close to 61,000 yearly (www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk)

The age of voters was also a reason for the differential voting patterns. Recorded was 64% of eligible individuals, over 65 voted. The leave voters ranked highest with the other older citizens than the younger ones (guardian 2016). Where Mathew Goodwin and Rob Ford came up with ‘The left behind’ referring to the older white socially conservative voters in a more marginal neighbourhood (Ford, 2016).

This age group of the left behind had turned against a political class seen by them to have dominated by socially liberal university graduates with value that were fundamentally opposed to theirs on identity and especially immigration. And it was described as if you have got money, you vote to remain and if you have not got money you vote to exit (Harris 2016).

This struggle of voting either in or out is seen to be conflict, where there is conflict in ideology and identity.

Results of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 2016

United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 2016		
Choice	Votes	%
Leave	17,410,742	51.89

Remain	16,141,241	48.11
Valid votes	33,551,983	99.92
Invalid or blank votes	25,359	0.08
Total votes	33,577,342	100
Registered voters and turnout	46,500,001	72.21
Leave:	Remain:	
17,410,742 (51.9%)	16,141,241 (48.1%)	

Source: Electoral Commission "EU referendum results". Electoral Commission. Retrieved 9 October 2016.

Efforts by a province or region to succeed from an existing state are a special type of conflict over borders. Its not just the borders of two existing states but the effort to draw international borders around a new or even old state (Goldstein & Penelope 2011). There has been consistent moves and dozens of secession movements which exist around the world, of varying sizes and political effectiveness, but in most cases they rarely succeed in seceding.

Examples of secession: in the 1990's the predominantly Albanian population to secede from Serbia by the UN and NATO intervention, led to the withdrawal of Serbia's army from Kosovo and replaced with European and American peace keeping troops. Majority of the Kosovo population wants to secede and also feels that the international system should give them self-determination.

The Serbians themselves argue that Kosovo is historically and presently under Serbian sovereignty. All through 2007, the United Nations and great powers negotiated over the future of Kosovo, with Russia insisting that there be no promise of independence. However, the Kosovars took matters into their hands in 2008, declaring their independence without the UN approval. Several countries which include the largest EU states and United Nations recognized Kosovo's independence which angered Serbia, Russia, and China (Goldstein & Penelope 2011) The Brexit now is playing out in Trump's campaign speeches in the American presidential race, where he intends to deport and send back immigrants into US and even build a wall of

demarcation and boundary against neighbouring countries of the USA. (CNN August 2016).

There are cases where secessionists want to merge their territories with the neighbouring state, which amounts to redrawing the international borders, but in other cases they cut out entirely from an existing state or set limits just like the UK. There has been the challenge of the strong international norm of sovereignty and integrity treat on secession movements as domestic problems with little concern to other states. But that of Brexit affects the world generally due to its economic and security strength and even lots more.

The general principle playing out even in the UK seems to be this ‘we existing states all have our own domestic problems and disaffected groups or regions, so we must stick together behind sovereignty and international integrity (Goldstein & Penelope 2011). Due to the negative effect of the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and its implications for Chechnya and Taiwan respectively, Russia and China opposed the secession.

Furthermore in 2008 Russia was quick to recognize the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and south Ossetia, both are part of the republic of Georgia. In 2008 August, Russia intervened militarily on behalf of south Ossetia and Abkhazia after fighting broke out between Georgian military and South Ossetia. It brought about a brief war between Russia and Georgia. Russia then recognized both Georgian provinces as independent, a move denounced by the United States and the EU and not accepted by the United Nations. Conflicts on secession can be large or small and can equally be catastrophic. They can easily spill over international borders or draw in other countries.

Political Implications.

The political scene in the UK went through significant change and astonishment after the referendum. After the result was declared, Cameron declared that he would resign by October. In the occurrence, he stood down on 13 July, with Theresa May becoming Prime Minister. George Osborne was replaced as Chancellor of the Exchequer by Philip Hammond, Boris Johnson was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and David became Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn lost a vote of confidence among his parliamentary party

and a leadership challenge was launched, while on 4 July, Farage pronounced his resignation as head of UKIP.(BBC. 2016). Outside the UK many Eurosceptic leaders celebrated and expected others to follow the UK example. However, opinion polls a week after the Brexit vote showed strongly increased support for the EU in most of Europe. The right-wing Dutch populist Geert Wilders said that the Netherlands should follow Britain's example and hold a referendum on whether the Netherlands should stay in the European Union. (BBC News. 2016).

However, opinion polls in the fortnight following the British referendum show that the immediate reaction in the Netherlands and other European countries was a decline in support for Eurosceptic movements. In the current US Elections Donald Trump one of the Presidential aspirants for the Republican Party, is indirectly towing the same line on immigration laws, to the extent of promising to build border walls against other countries (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2016).

Political system of the European Union

As the UK electorate has voted to leave the EU, its subsequent relationship with the remaining EU members could take several forms. A research paper presented to the UK Parliament proposed a number of alternatives to membership which would continue to allow access to the EU internal market. These include remaining in the European Economic Area (EEA) as a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member (alongside Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), or seeking to negotiate bilateral terms more along the Swiss model with a series of interdependent sectoral agreements (Mason, Rowena (20 September 2016). "Angela Merkel . The Guardian. London, 2016.)

Britain has not negotiated a trade agreement since before 1973, and the government is looking to the private sector for assistance (Laura Hughes 2016. Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 13 September 2016.) Were the UK to join the EEA as an EFTA member, it would have to sign up to EU internal market legislation without being able to participate in its development or vote on its content. However, the EU is required to conduct extensive consultations with non-EU members beforehand via its many committees and cooperative bodies (Parker, George, et, al 2016Financial Retrieved 5 September 2016). (European Free Trade Association. 2009. Retrieved 19 September 2016).

Some EU law originates from various international bodies on which non-EU EEA countries have a seat. The EEA Agreement (EU and EFTA members except Switzerland) does not cover Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies, Customs Union, Common Trade Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, direct and indirect taxation, and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, leaving EFTA members free to set their own policies in these areas however, EFTA countries are required to contribute to the EU Budget in exchange for access to the internal market ("The Basic Features of the EEA Agreement". March 2015). The EEA Agreement and the agreement with Switzerland cover free movement of goods, and people. Many supporters of Brexit want to restrict freedom of movement; however, an EEA Agreement would include free movement for EU and EEA citizens, as passport systems allow EEA institutions to access markets in EU Member States, for the most part, without having to establish subsidiaries in each EU Member State and incur the costs of full authorisation in those jurisdictions. Others present ideas of a Swiss solution, that is tailor-made agreements between the UK and the EU, but EU representatives have claimed they would not support such a solution. The Swiss agreements contain free movement for EU citizens. The Swiss immigration referendum, February 2014 voted narrowly in favour of an end to the 'free movement' agreement, by February 2017. However, the bilateral treaties between Switzerland and the European Union are all co-dependent, if one is terminated then all are terminated. Consequently, should Switzerland choose unilaterally to cancel the 'free movement' agreement then all its agreements with the EU will lapse unless a compromise is found - as of July 2016, no such compromise was in sight (Brennan, Jackson, Lalone, Robson, Sugden, 2016). KattenMuchinRosenman LLP. Retrieved 28 September 2016. European Commission. Retrieved 14 September 2016).

Economic Implications

Before the referendum, the UK treasury estimated that being in the EU has a strong positive effect on trade and as a result the UK's trade would be worse off if it left the EU. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts reduced world economic growth by 0.1% following the referendum, and greater reductions in UK economic growth. (Hughes, Laura 2016. Treasury analysis:2016). bbc.co.uk.

Supporters of withdrawal from the EU have argued that the cessation of net contributions to the EU would allow for some cuts to taxes and/or increases in government spending. However, Britain would still be required to make contributions to the EU budget if it opted to remain in the European Free Trade Area. The Institute for Fiscal Studies notes that the majority of forecasts of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy indicate that the government would be left with less money to spend even if it no longer had to pay into the EU. (Redwood, *The Guardian*, 14 April 2016. IFS Report 116 2016). On 15 June 2016, Vote Leave, the official Leave campaign, presented its roadmap to lay out what would happen if Britain left the EU. The blueprint suggested that Parliament would pass laws: Finance Bill to scrap VAT on tampons and household energy bills; Asylum and Immigration Control Bill to end the automatic right of EU citizens to enter Britain; National Health Service (Funding Target) Bill to get an extra 100 million pounds a week; European Union Law (Emergency Provisions) Bill; Free Trade Bill to start to negotiate its own deals with non-EU countries; and European Communities Act 1972 (Repeal) Bill to end the European Court of Justice's jurisdiction over Britain and stop making contribution to the EU budget. IFS Report 116 2016). On 24 June 2016, the bond and credit rating agency of Moody's, on the basis of the result of the referendum, downgraded the UK's standing as a long-term debt issuer and the country's debt rating outlook from "stable" to "negative," while retaining the overall rating of Aa1. Fitch Ratings degraded the credit rating from AA+ to AA because "uncertainty following the referendum outcome will induce an abrupt slowdown in short-term GDP growth. (Rosenfeld, Everett 2016). Standard & Poor's cut the UK's rating to AA, with the following comment: "In our opinion, this outcome is a seminal event, and will lead to a less predictable, stable, and effective policy framework in the U.K. The negative outlook reflects the risk to economic prospects, fiscal and external performance, and the role of sterling as a reserve currency." On the other hand, economic analysts have pointed out that the UK, as a fiscally and monetarily sovereign nation, retains the ability to service or retire, at any time, any part or all of the state debt that is denominated in the national currency, and, hence, there is no risk whatsoever of defaulting on that part of its debt. (Bill Mitchell, 2016).

On 27 June 2016, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne attempted to reassure financial markets that the UK economy was not in serious trouble. This came after media reports that a survey by the Institute of

Directors suggested that two-thirds of businesses believed that the outcome of the referendum would produce negative results as well as the dropping value of the sterling and the FTSE 100, which began on 24 June 2016. British businesses had also predicted that investment cuts, hiring freezes and redundancies would be necessary to cope with the results of the referendum. (Wood, Zoe 2016) Osborne indicated that Britain was facing the future "from a position of strength" and there was no current need for an emergency Budget.^[109] "No one should doubt our resolve to maintain the fiscal stability we have delivered for this country And to companies, large and small, I would say this: the British economy is fundamentally strong, highly competitive and we are open for business.(BBC News – Business. BBC. 27 June 2016)

On 15 July 2016, Reuters reported that the value of UK funds' assets under management has dropped by more than \$40 billion or 8.2 percent "in the three weeks since Britain's vote to leave the EU", primarily due to the devaluation of the pound according to the EPFR (Emerging Portfolio Fund Research). While the stock market had rebounded, analysts at Société Générale bank in France were not confident: "The conditions and consequences of Brexit remain unclear" and spoke of a "strong negative bias on the UK domestic economy". In its summary, one month after Brexit, the Guardian noted that the initial effects had been less severe than predicted and there had been some sort of recovery but that initially \$2tn had been wiped off world stock markets. (Dewan, Angela; McKirdy, Euan 2016). CNN. June 2016. McGeever, Richard 2016). On 22 July 2016, a "flash" estimate for July from the Markit Purchasing Managers' Index (a survey of business activity) indicated the worst economic performance since the recession of 2009, with the important service sector being badly affected. The pound fell by one cent against the dollar on the news. Sky News. 22 July 2012. Retrieved September 2016.)

On 29 July 2016, The Guardian reported consumer confidence and confidence of manufacturers had both fallen sharply since the Brexit referendum. The City of Berlin, Germany, started to actively encourage UK-based start-ups to re-locate to Berlin by sending invitation letters.

Relationship between remaining EU members

Tim Oliver of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs expanded analysis of what a British withdrawal could mean for the

EU: the report argues a UK withdrawal "has the potential to fundamentally change the EU and European integration. On the one hand, a withdrawal could tip the EU towards protectionism, exacerbate existing divisions, or unleash centrifugal forces leading to the EU's unravelling. Alternatively, the EU could free itself of its most awkward member, making the EU easier to lead and more effective." Some authors also highlight the qualitative change in the nature of the EU membership after Brexit: "What the UK case has clearly shown in our view is that for the Union to be sustainable, membership needs to entail constant caretaking as far as individual members' contributions to the common good are concerned, with both rights and obligations."

Immigration

A Conservative MEP representing South East England, Daniel Hannan, predicted on BBC Newsnight that immigration from the European Union would not end after Brexit: "Frankly, if people watching think that they have voted and there is now going to be zero immigration from the EU, they are going to be disappointed. ... you will look in vain for anything that the Leave campaign said at any point that ever suggested there would ever be any kind of border closure or drawing up of the drawbridge." The EU had offered David Cameron a so-called "emergency brake" which would have allowed the UK to withhold social benefits to new immigrants for the first four years after they arrived; this brake could have been applied for a period of seven years.^[97] That offer was still on the table at the time of the Brexit referendum but expired when the vote determined that the UK would leave the EU.

In late July 2016, discussions were underway that might provide the UK with an exemption from the EU rules on refugees' freedom of movement for up to seven years. Senior UK government sources confirmed to The Observer that this was "certainly one of the ideas now on the table".^[98] If the discussions led to an agreement, the UK – though not an EU member – would also retain access to the single market but would be required to pay a significant annual contribution to the EU. According to The Daily Telegraph the news of this possibility caused a rift in the Conservative Party: "Tory MPs have reacted with fury [accusing European leaders of] ... failing to accept the public's decision to sever ties with the 28-member bloc last month."

Petitions for a new referendum

Shortly after the result's were announced, a petition calling for a second referendum to be held in the event that a result was secured with less than 60% of the vote and on a turnout of less than 75% attracted tens of thousands of signatures. The petition had actually been started before the referendum by someone supporting an exit from the EU.^[48] It attracted more than four million signatures, meaning it was considered for debate in Parliament. (Hooton, Christopher 2016. *The Independent*. Independent Print Limited. Retrieved 2 2016. Boulton, Adam 2016).

David Cameron's spokesperson stated on 27 June 2016, that holding another vote on Britain's membership to the European Union was "not in the least on the cards. Theresa May Home Secretary remarked when announcing her candidacy to replace Cameron as Conservative leader on 30 June "The campaign was fought ... and the public gave their verdict. There must be no attempts to remain inside the EU ... and no second referendum. Brexit means Brexit. The petition was rejected by the government on 9 July. Its response said that the referendum vote "must be respected" and that the government "must now prepare for the process to exit the EU". (Cooper, Charlie 2016). *The Independent*. London, UK. 30 June 2016.. *BBC News*. 9 July 2016

"Article 50" and the process for leaving the EU

Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union provides an invocation procedure whereby a member can notify the European Council and there is a two-year negotiation period after which the treaties cease to apply - although a leaving agreement may be agreed by Qualified majority voting.

As was the case with the Scottish independence referendum two years earlier, the 2016 referendum did not directly require the government to do anything in particular. It does not require the government to initiate, or even schedule, the Article 50 procedure.^[56] Although Cameron stated during the campaign that he would invoke Article 50 straight away in the event of a leave victory,^[57] he refused to allow the Civil Service to make any contingency plans, something the Foreign Affairs Select Committee later described as "an act of gross negligence."^[58] Following the referendum result Cameron announced that he would resign before the Conservative party conference in October, and that it would be for the incoming Prime Minister to invoke Article 50. Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union (Renwick, Alan 2016 *The Constitution Unit Blog*. 2016. Staunton, Denis (23 February 2016). *The Irish Times*. 2016. Patrick Wintour 2016).. *The Guardian*. Retrieved 21 July 2016. *BBC*. Retrieved 24 September 2016.)

A negotiation with the European Union will need to begin under a new Prime Minister, and I think it is right that this new Prime Minister takes the decision about when to trigger Article 50.

There is no established, formal process for holding a second referendum to "confirm" the decision to leave following negotiations. Alan Renwick of the Constitution Unit of University College London argues that Article 50 negotiations cannot be used to renegotiate the conditions of future membership and that Article 50 does not provide the legal basis of withdrawing a decision to leave. The UK government has stated that they would expect a leave vote to be followed by withdrawal, not by a second vote.

As long as the UK Government has not invoked Article 50, the UK stays a member of the EU; must continue to fulfil all EU-related treaties, including possible future agreements; and should legally be treated as a member. The EU has no framework to exclude the UK—or any member as long as Article 50 is not invoked, and the UK does not violate EU laws. However, if the UK were to breach EU law significantly, there are legal provisions to discharge the UK from the EU via Article 7, the so-called "nuclear option", which allows the EU to cancel membership of a state that breaches fundamental EU principles, a test that will be hard to pass. Article 7 does not allow forced cancellation of membership, only denial of rights such as free trade, free movement and voting rights.

Various EU leaders have said that they will not start any negotiation before the UK formally invokes Article 50. Jean-Claude Juncker even ordered all members of the EU Commission not to engage in any kind of contact with UK parties regarding Brexit. Media statements of various kinds still occur. For example, on 29 June, European Council president Donald Tusk told the UK that they would not be allowed access to the European Single Market unless they accept its four freedoms of goods, capital, services, and people. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said "We'll ensure that negotiations don't take place according to the principle of cherry-picking ... It must and will make a noticeable difference whether a country wants to be a member of the family of the European Union or not.

Immediately afterwards, Cameron declared his belief that the next Prime Minister should activate Article 50 and begin negotiations with the EU. During a 27 June 2016 meeting, the Cabinet decided to establish a unit of civil servants, headed by senior Conservative Oliver Letwin, who would proceed with "intensive work on the issues that will need to be worked through in

order to present options and advice to a new Prime Minister and a new Cabinet". After a debate about the planned UK exit on 28 June 2016, the EU Parliament passed a motion calling for the "immediate" triggering of Article 50, although there is no mechanism allowing the EU to invoke the article. Cooper, Charlie (27 June 2016). *The Independent*. London, UK. Retrieved 27 June 2016. Proctor, Kate (27 June 2016). *Yorkshire Post*. West Yorkshire, UK. Retrieved 27 June 2016. Stone, Jon (28 June 2016). *Independent*. London, UK. Retrieved 28 June 2016. Brooks, Libby (2016). Newly appointed PM Theresa May made it clear that negotiations with the EU required a "UK-wide approach". Speaking in Scotland on 15 July 2016, May offered the following comment. "I have already said that I won't be triggering article 50 until I think that we have a UK approach and objectives for negotiations – I think it is important that we establish that before we trigger article 50."

Possible need for parliamentary approval before invoking Article 50

Lawyers disagree on whether the prime minister can invoke Article 50 by royal prerogative, or whether there needs to be an explicit Act of Parliament to invoke it.

Three distinct groups of lawyers – one crowd funded – are suing the government or planning to sue it to make sure Article 50 is not invoked without a parliamentary act. (Jack of Kent blog. 11 July 2016 Elliott; Mark. J Stewart, Heather 2016). *The Guardian*. London, UK. Retrieved 15 July 2016.

Two days after her appointment as PM, Theresa May travelled to Edinburgh to meet with Sturgeon, to reinforce the bond between Scotland and the rest of the UK. After the meeting at Bute House, May offered the following comment about Scotland's role in the negotiations about the UK's exit from the EU: "I'm willing to listen to options and I've been very clear with the first minister today that I want the Scottish government to be fully engaged in our discussion." *BBC News – Scotland Politics*. BBC. 15 July 2016. Retrieved 15 July 2016.)

Delay in invoking Article 50

On 19 July 2016, at a preliminary High Court hearing of a challenge to the government's claim that it could issue the Article 50 notification without Parliamentary approval, lawyers for the government confirmed that the prime minister would not issue any such notification before the end of 2016. (*London Evening Standard*. 19 July 2016)

Nicolas J. Firzli of the World Pensions Council (WPC) has argued that it could be in Britain's national interest to proceed slowly in the coming months; the British Government may want to push Brussels to accept the principles of a free trade deal before invoking Article 50, hopefully gaining support from some other member states whose economy is strongly tied to the UK, thus "allowing a more nimble union to focus on the free trade of goods and services without undue bureaucratic burdens, modern antitrust law and stronger external borders, leaving the rest to member states". (Pensions Age. July 2016)

Prime Minister Theresa May made it clear that discussions with the EU would not start in 2016. "I want to work with ... the European council in a constructive spirit to make this a sensible and orderly departure." she said. "All of us will need time to prepare for these negotiations and the United Kingdom will not invoke article 50 until our objectives are clear." In a joint press conference with May on 20 July, Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel supported the UK's position in this respect: "We all have an interest in this matter being carefully prepared, positions being clearly defined and delineated. I think it is absolutely necessary to have a certain time to prepare for that." (Mason, Rowena 20 July 2016). According to the Daily Telegraph, the Department for Exiting the European Union spent over £250k on legal advice from top Government lawyers in two months and has plans to recruit more people. Nick Clegg said the figures showed the Civil Service was unprepared for the very complex negotiations ahead. (Laura Hughes 9 September 2016).

Summary and Recommendation

The study on BREXIT has political, economic, and psychological implications for the Britain's allies in West Africa who had various economic and strategic partnerships with EU. And considering the current debates and talks on the current referendum which seems to put a Immigration concerns for some of them had been thorny with challenges. The paper recommends therefore that state leaders and citizens need adequate consultation, deliberation, and time to think through implications of such action, before execution.

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**MONETIZED ELECTORAL VALUE CHAIN AND THE
CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN NIGERIA: A
REFLECTION ON NOT-TOO-YOUNG-TO-RUN ACT 2018**

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Abstract

Although the signing of the Not-Too-Young-To-Run Bill into Law by President Muhammadu Buhari regime was intended to decentralized electoral process and thus encourage political participation on the side of the youth. However, an increase of the monetized electoral value chain had possessed a slumbering block in achieving, democratic consolidation and encourage political participation in Nigeria. Thus, the increase in monetized electoral value chain had attracted the attention of various public analysts, researchers, and the masses concern. This study interrogates the effects of an increase in the monetized electoral value chain on the political participation of Nigerian youth in the 2019 election. The data for this study was collected using documentary sources. The study adopts the investment theory of politics to x-ray the attitude of the elite and politician in hacking the electoral process so that the highest bidder takes it all. The study advocates that to achieve democratic consolidation in Nigeria and increase popular participation of citizens in the electoral process, there should be a reduction in the monetized election value chain and enforcement of the rule of law in the country.

Keywords: Election, value chain, political participation, investment, monetization.

Introduction

In Nigeria, electoral value chain is connected to groups, political parties, electoral bodies, electoral observers, party dispute resolving committee, among others who plays a significant role together to see that election is conducted under a free and fair manner in order to satisfy the will of the masses and encourage democratic consolidation in the country. It emphasizes more on cash flow from the various flag bearers of political parties, party nomination papers from National electoral commission down to the electorate. The electoral value chain considers the masses first because the National electoral commission is there to harness and propel their interest. So bring out the desired leaders who will encourage development in the country. In Nigeria, the electoral value chain is still characterized by corruption, injustice, which had lead to high monetization of the electoral process. The monetization of the electoral value chain had been a phenomenon associated with the Nigeria political system. It increases to a greater height with the Fourth Republic Political Structure and disposition. Moreover, alienate most candidates from political participation. Tokunbo (2018) analyzed that the social stratum disposition on Nigeria has polarized into a vibrant and inadequate dichotomy, and this lead to undue political manipulation against the majority of masses.

However, political participation in Nigeria had been a significant issue of concern to the shaping of Nigeria democracy. The challenges of political participation have also been overwhelming in Nigeria, especially with associated electoral ills, such as thuggery, stuffing of ballot boxes, party indiscipline, vote-buying, electoral violence, rigging, killings among others. In other to consolidate democratic dispensation, the masses are supposed to be given a free hand to contest the election and remove every hinge that will

hinder political participation. According to the words of Samila and Othma (2015), Election Facilitates and shapes democracy, while democracy is considered the best form of government due to its ideology of promoting people's will in society. Electoral value chain should be democratic and incorporate other rules and regulation for effective consolidation of democracy in the country. Moreover, the increase in monetized electoral value chain had made a landmark in Nigeria politics. The National electoral commission and most politicians see the electoral process as an avenue for bidding, and the highest bidder takes it all. It had also hindered active political participation in Nigeria.

On the other hand, President Muhammadu Buhari Administration had shown his will to encourage the youth participation in politics by enacting the Not-Too-Young-To-Run Act in 2018. It necessitated the fact that most leaders in Nigeria are within the age bracket of 60-75years. Also, the youths were alienated from the voting process. The politicians use them as weapons to encourage electoral malpractices in Nigeria. They are involved in the killing, electoral violence, snatching of ballot boxes among others, rather than participating in the political process. Also, the inadequate and deminimal nature of Nigeria electoral value chain creates room for money to be the major determinant for party primaries, getting a nomination form, and also money attached to security vote and logistic support, money during general elections in Nigeria is not left out. It evidenced that the entire value chain of the electoral process are monetized in Nigeria. Moreover, this gives less hope for Nigeria youths who are yet to be gainfully employed talk more about going for party candidacy for the nomination. Thus, this research paper will focus on the increased monetized electoral value chain and the challenges of political participation on the part of the youth reflecting on the Not-Too-Young – To Run Act 2018. The following research question will guide the study:

- a. Does the increase in the monetization of electoral value chain alienate the youths in Nigeria from political participation?

- b. Does the enactment of Not-Too-Young-To-Run law encourage the youths participation in the electoral process in Nigeria?

Theoretical Analysis

In this study, we adopted the investment theory of politics as developed by Thomas Ferguson (1995), in this book title “the Golden rule theory” which analyzed how elites play the leading role in a political system. The investment theory of party competition recognizes that voters cannot bear the cost of becoming informed about public affairs. Therefore, the real market of political parties defined in terms of investors who invest in controlling the State. The investors define the core of political parties and are responsible for the signals of the party sends to the electorate. Therefore, political parties are seen as blocks of investors who present their candidates representing their interest.

Ferguson Golden Rule analyzed who rule following the gold. They invest in candidates and political parties and expecting a return on investment. Poire' (2006) argued that the market for federal funds comprises all those resources that politicians might want to use in a way that could conceivably be relevant to their career sustenance. Ferguson principal analysis was that the competing but wealthy investors block rooted in labour and capital-intensive industries invest in politics to maximize their material interest. Also, from Ferguson analysis of politics means gold is determining it, that is money politics.

The investment theory throws open the role of money politics in deterring the electoral process as well money breaks the value chain at the expenses of the electorate. The electoral process in Nigeria had been highly determined by money, especially on the part of the elite and politicians. It is a bidding process, and the highest bidder in the process takes its all. Increased in monetized electoral value chain had hindered the active youth participation in

the political process, primarily registering in Nigeria prominent political parties which had hijack their nomination fees beyond the reach of the youth. Money politics had been at the root of Nigeria politics, and it increases every time of the election in Nigeria. The youths in Nigeria are battling with unemployment and underemployment. The implication is that unless the government enforces the implementation of the rule of law in the country, otherwise the youth will remain alienated from the political process.

Electoral Value Chain in Nigeria

The electoral value chain is a set of activities carried out by independent electoral commissions in order to see that service to which they are invested to do are accurately carried out to the optimum satisfaction of the citizens. Michael Porter first used the value chain as a concept in his book titled “Competitive Advantage in, creating and sustaining superior performances” in 1985. In his analyses, the value chain is the process view of organizations. Organizations that carried out services are made up of subsystems with each having an input, transformation process, and then output. He also analyzed that inputs, transformation process, and output involve the acquisition and consumption of resources such as money, labour, material, equipment, buildings, among others.

The Nigeria electoral value chain forms a stream of activities and chains of activities of the electoral process which supposed to add value; otherwise, it may not be valuable to the society. In order to sustain and achieve a desirable electoral process, there must be coordinating activities within the chain. The primary activities within the electoral value chain include coordinating the logistics required for the electoral process which involves the movement of materials, registration of voters, party registrations, party primaries, buying of nomination forms by candidates among others. The support activities include, public enlighten programs on voters education on the nature of voting, the activities of the military in the consolidation of the

electoral process and then the human resources activities which involves recruiting ad hoc staff and training them and the need to acquire more materials, for the upkeeps during the election period. The activities of the external electoral observers within and outside the country are relevant sources of the value chain. The most sensitive aspect, of the electoral process, is buying of nomination and expression of interest forms are highly monetized down to vote-buying beyond the reach of the youths.

Furthermore, what creates a problem to the value chain is the activities of economic actors within the country. The electoral value chain is the integrating force that bids the ethnic groups in Nigeria towards the emergency of the ruler in the country. Therefore, the elite and politicians who are economic actors tend to jump the chain, reducing the value of chain and creating problem in political participation.

Youth inclusiveness in the electoral process in Nigeria

One of the significant challenges to Nigeria development process is inequality in the participatory leadership role in Nigeria. Moreover, this shows discrepancies in the opportunities granted to a different segment of the population in the electoral process. In light with this, the Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030 stressed on the need to involve the youth and women in the electoral process in order to encourage inclusive growth in the country thereby eradicating poverty, inequality and exclusion principles. It necessitated the fact that the youth can contribute a lot in the development of the economy, and for a long time, their resources had remained untapped mostly by the developing countries. The participatory youth role in decision-making, planning, and creating an effective political structure will enhance the democratic process and create civic engagement among people in the country. According to the handbook of electoral management (2017), the United

Nation Security Council Resolutions 2250 on youth, peace, and security strongly support the youth initiative in being represented in the political system.

Also, in line with youth participation in the electoral process, civil society organizations stressed the need to empower the youth. According to the words of Muhammadu (2015), The Not-Too-Young-To Run Act started in 2016 by the Youth Initiative for Advancement and Growth in Africa (YIAGA). They advocate for the inclusion of young people in democratic governance. The election conducted in Nigeria over the years, starting from 1999 till date had shown a low turn up of youths in elections. They also advocate for age reduction in the various political post in Nigeria. The Not- Too-Young-To-Run Bill passed in July 2017 about 25 States representing the country in attendance. So it was later passed into law on 31st May 2018 defining the youth age bracket between 18-30years. The passing of the bill into law alter most sections of the Nigeria 1999 constitution. More importantly section 65, 106, 131, and section 177. The age qualification into the various post reduced.

The table 1 below shows the reductions of ages for electoral posts in Nigeria

Post	Previous age	Current age reduced
Presidency	40 years	30 years
Governorship	35 years	30 years
Senate	35 years	30 years
House of Reps.	30 years	25 years
The state house of Reps.	30 years	25 years

Source: Authors compilation

Adenyi (2018) argued that the act seeks to prevent the youth from political hooliganism, gangsterism, racketeering, violence, and thuggery,


prevent corruption, Godfathers' imposition of candidates for election and promote internal party democracy. The Act also maintains the independent candidacy into Nigeria electoral system. In analyzing youth candidacy, Warami (2019) stressed that the youth participation increase from 10-13% in 2015 to 13.5 and 27.4% in 2019 and 253 young candidates run for senate and 1.262 for the house of representative. This evaluate that the youths participated in the election based on the Act that was passed into law. However, the question is how many of the youths won the various post during the 2019 general election in Nigeria? The primary purpose of the Act was to increase youth participation in politics and for them to rise for a leadership role in the country. Moreover, contribute their quota in the development process and also contribute better in the war against corruption in the country and further rescue Nigerians from Gerontocracy.

It is necessary to empower the youth on their leadership responsibility so that they can handle the affairs of the country and take the initiative at the grassroots level using the resources available to develop their communities. The development at the local level had been elusive for many decades. This development will encourage inclusive growth and diversification of the economy. The legal frameworks encouraging the youth to participate in the electoral process should be the one that will total encourage them to live up to their goals.

Onwughalu and Obiorah (2018) argued that the youth could boost their political participation during election through forming political parties designating youth interest, but this does not help issues, especially in the 2019 election. The youth alienated from political participation due to high monetization of the electoral process. The youth should be encouraged to join prominent parties in the country, and they should be involved in party primaries and other stages in the electoral value chain. It will go a long way in improving the ineffective political structure that characterized Nigeria political system.

Challenges to youth participatory role in 2019 General Election

In the 2019 general election youths that participated in electoral process constitute 26.57% of the 84, 004.084 registered voters age of 18 to 35 years and they are highest population of voters as they constitute 51.11% of the total age group registered (Toronado, 2019). The graph below shows the representation of the ages.



Adopted from
INEC analysis
2019 election

From the graphical representation, 29.92% constitutes the middle-aged, and 15.22% are the ages between 51-20 and 3.6% displayed those in the seventies. Despite youth increase participation in the 2019 election, the question remains what percentage of the youth won the electoral posts in the 2019 election.

The high monetization of electoral process is a hindrance to youth participation in the 2019 election. Candidacy is a welcome development in Nigeria politics. To what extent will the youth involve in it. Funding is a significant challenge for aspiring candidates. Resources will enable them to contest under the prominent parties in Nigeria. Kazeem (2019) argued that young people running for office in Nigeria is not a problem with the law on their side, but the issue is the culture of vote-buying on campaign process and Election Day for which politician offer money and food for incentives for votes.

However, the shift in leadership recruitment pattern demonstrates unique capabilities on the side of the youth, yet a lot can be done to motivate their participation in the electoral process. Nigerian youth had been known as unresponsive, unemployed, and lack knowledge about the political structure and how they function. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, youth unemployment recorded at 23.63% in 2014, but in 2018 it rose to 33.1%. The high level of youth unemployment will affect the ability to participate in the electoral process actively. It is because of the nature of Nigeria electoral value chain that involves spending much money to reach the top of the chain. Also, the issue of godfatherism in Nigeria had played a detrimental role in youth leadership emancipation. They determine who gets nominated during the election and also who won the election. According to the words of Olawale:

The political godfathers in Nigeria build an array of loyalists around them and use their influences, which are often tied to monetary considerations, to manipulate society. They use their influence to block others from participating in Nigeria politics. (2006:p80).

In Nigeria, godfathers are given higher power, and they can break the electoral value chain so that it will not usually flow the way it supposes to be, in order to satisfy the system of a free and fair election in Nigeria. Nuesiri (2018) argued that godfathers have the ability of exclusion tendencies alienating the electorate from their actual voting pattern, thereby discouraging their ability to respond to civil responsibility in the country. The 2019 election shows the sign that the youth are ultimately moving away from godfatherism issue in politics. More importantly, the need to move away from godfather sponsored elections is a more critical deal for emancipation on the part of the youth. Moreover, the need for Nigeria to have a different face of leadership, that will encourage the consolidation of democratic rule in the country which had eluded Nigerians for decades.

Monetized electoral value chains and youth alienation in the electoral process

The youth and other citizens in the country are the drivers of change in any democratic dispensation. The constitution in Nigeria stipulates the nature of the electoral process and political participation. The electoral management body manages Nigerian electoral processes (INEC). They managed the Nigeria electoral value chain and saw that elections are conducted to deliver a free and fair election to the maximum satisfaction of the electorate. The available resources are managed to see a follow of services within the value chain. The electoral process, with its dynamics and complex nature, require an effective and efficient utilization of the resources towards ensuring the maximum outcome of the process. Electoral value chain requires schedule and deadlines. Also, hence, any delay in the chain will undermine Service delivery. There is complete public involvement at each aspect of the chain, right from voters' registration, registration of political parties, and flag bearers' registration, among others. A breakage in any aspect of the value chain can

lead to violence, political instability, or even post-election violence. It is to the interest of the country's democratic consolidation that the electoral value chain and its associated risks be managed. Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2015) analyzed that the electoral bodies have a role to play in participatory youth role and it includes: determining and checking voters eligibility, receiving and validation of electoral register, constant conducting actual election vote's education, tabulating of voters' names, votes management among others. It is to ensure a steady electoral process in the country.

Bariledum, Abang, and Nwigbo (2016) analyzed that Nigeria elections had characterized by unpopular representation, corruption, lack of accountability by the leaders. The primary reason for most military intervention in Nigeria politics was attributed with irregularities in Nigeria elections. The youth had been alienated from the political process for a long time and also included in the process. In the presents, the cumbersome and complexities of Nigeria electoral process involves a complete alienation process. Also, Nigeria electoral process is further characterized by electoral fraud, which involves vote-rigging increasing the vote of the favored candidates and decreased the vote of those they did not want to win. So most importantly, vote-buying which take place with money exchanges, voters are paid and persuade to come out and vote.

Increased in monetized electoral value had been hurting Nigeria politics. In light with the youth engagement in politics, they have to battle with imposition and substitution of candidates by political parties leaders. The political parties leaders make sure that impose candidates successfully win the primary election and exclude aspirants from contesting. It is undemocratic, and young people denied the nomination form, and in some cases, their names omitted. The commercialization of political parties forms, with a high amount, shut out young Nigerians in the 2019 elections (Abdullah, 2019). It had been attributed by the inability of the party to raise fund from the party members and found Election Day as an opportunity for them to make money. However,

the 2017 electoral amendment bill Act, 6, of 2010 prohibits arbitrary fee for nomination paper. The bill passed according to Inyang (2019) the constitute limits each elective office should pay for nomination paper as table 2 below shows.

Table 2 Constitutional fees for Nomination papers

Elective Post	Cost Of Nomination Papers/ (₦)
Councillorship	₦150, 000
Chairmanship	₦250, 000
House of Assembly	₦500, 000
House of representatives	₦1, 000, 000
Senatorial post	₦2, 000.00
Governorship	₦5, 000, 000
Presidential	₦10, 000.000

Source: Author's compilation from daily post 3 April 2017.

The nature of the Nigeria rule of law does not reflect strict adherence to the country's constitutional provision. The ability of the various parties to stick to constitutional provision should be taken with a grip because most leaders in Nigeria are not interested with the constitutional provision rather, they cherish their interest especially in the area of corruption. Despite the provisions in the Electoral Acts, politicians spend much money on nomination forms; bridling big political parties' wigs, printing flyers and posters, advert on media among others.

On the part of general elections conducted by INEC the cost of voter registration and compilation of voter's keep increasing, as well as recruitment and training of electoral officials keep escalating so that the provision of electoral logistics, election security, civic and voter's education, procurement

of sensitive and non-sensitive materials becomes a problem (Baje, 2019). He further analyzed that INEC spends ₦112.9 billion for the election exercise in 2011 for 73.5 million voters. In 2015 INEC spent ₦108.8 billion for 68.8 million voters.

Table 3 below shows the cost of parties’ expression of interest and candidate nominations forms for the 2015 and 2019 elections.

Political parties	Post/office	Year	Nomination/Expression interest fees
APC	Presidency	2015	₦27,000, 000
	Governorship	2015	₦5, 000, 000
	Senate	2015	₦3, 000, 000
	House of Representatives	2015	₦2, 000, 000
PDP	Presidency	2015	₦20, 000, 000
	Governorship	2015	₦10, 000, 000
	Senate	2015	₦4, 000, 000
	House of Representatives	2015	₦2, 000,000
APGA	Presidency	2015	₦12,000, 000
	Governor	2015	₦10,000, 000
	Senator	2015	₦3, 000, 000
	House of Representatives	2015	₦2, 000, 000
PDP	Presidency	2019	₦12, 000, 000
	Governorship	2019	₦6, 000.000
	Senator	2019	₦3.5, 000, 000
	House of Representatives	2019	₦600.000

APC	Presidency	2019	₦45, 000.000
	Governorship	2019	₦22.5,000,000
	Senator	2019	₦7, 000,000.00
	House of Representatives	2019	₦3.85,000,000

Source: Olurumola 2015, West Minister Foundation for Democracy, Vanguard September 17th, 2018.

The table above shows an increase in nomination and express of interest forms for the years for the most prominent political parties in Nigeria. After, buying nomination and expression of interest forms, one needs to buy territorial holders, party delegates, and the teeming electorate. It is the root of corruption in Nigeria. Adeonye (2018) argued that given the situation the youths are faced with the problem of how to raise funds for the increased monetized electoral value chain, and this will affect their participation in politics.

Conclusion/Recommendation

The impact of comprehensive electoral system is quite explored, but little attention has been given on the link between a monetized electoral value chain and youth participation in the political process and how Not-Too-Young to Run Act has increased youth inclusiveness in the 2019 electoral process. However, the study found out that the increased in the monetized electoral process, corruption, the influence of godfatherism, inadequacy of the rule of law and party clientelism impacted negatively on youth participation in the electoral process. To examine the impact of the increased monetized electoral process, we collected data on nomination and expression of interest fees of the two prominent political parties in Nigeria. Moreover, the result shows that

APC as the ruling party had the highest money for nomination and expression of interest fees, which is 45 million naira on the last election while PDP had 12 million. The data collected from the previous election period also shows an increase in the monetized electoral process. There is also an increase in the general logistics of the election. It harmed Nigeria democratic process.

Hence, the monetized electoral process affects the democratic process as well as democratic institutions in Nigeria. These institutions will likely exhibit the same character. The findings of this study have contributed to the knowledge that increased in monetized electoral value chain had prevented the development of the democratic process, and it highly limits the youth inclusive in the electoral process. Therefore, the study recommends the following

- c) There should be effective strict adherence to the rule of law in the society.
- d) For Not Too Young to Run Act to function effectively there should be decreased in the electoral value chain in the country.
- e) Those who are involved in vote trading should face the sanctions of the law.
- f) Youths should be encouraged to join Nigeria prominent political parties.

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