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Security Sector Governance in Post-Cold War Era in Nigeria: Discourses, Policies and Foreign Policy Responses

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Abstract

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has come a long way since it first emerged on the international security and development policy scene in the late 1990s. This model of security assistance is now a mainstay in state-building policy and practice, widely perceived as a precondition for stability and sustainable development in countries recovering from conflict or making transitions from authoritarianism, fragility or collapse. The breakup of the bipolar world created space for issues such as governance, poverty reduction and conflict prevention to enter the development and security assistance agendas of many countries. This, in turn, enabled development donors to begin to discuss the linkages between security and development, and the appropriate role of development assistance in strengthening security in developing and transition countries. Specifically, the issue of national security is one that has been on the top list of the Nigerian government in recent years. It has become a matter of concern, not only domestically, but also internationally. This paper using documentary method of data collection examines an overall picture of the dynamic, complex, and multifaceted evolution of the security sector architecture in Nigeria. The objective is to help move an emerging discourse on security sector reform and democratic governance in Nigeria from the level of principles to effective implementation. The paper highlights the implications of security sector reform for the Nigerian foreign policy.

Keywords Security Sector Reform, Post -Cold War Era, Discourses, Policy options, Foreign Policy Responses.

Introduction

The issue of national security is one that has been on the top list of the Nigerian government in recent years. It has become a matter of concern, not only domestically, but also internationally. The essence of any state as well as government is to ensure and advance the security of lives and property of its citizens. As a result, providing security in all spheres ranging from safeguarding the territorial integrity, security of lives and property of the citizens as well as economic emancipation have constituted the core objectives cum national interest of virtually all nations' foreign policy in the world. In view of this imperative above, Nigerian 1999 Constitution unequivocally spelt out as a Fundamental Objective and Directive Principle of State Policy that "the security and welfare of the people (of Nigeria) shall be the primary purpose of government"

Specifically, Section 14(2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution states that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. This

is the basis for the social contract in which we as citizens of Nigeria surrender some of our freedoms in addition to submitting ourselves to the authority relating to governance in order for us to enjoy the full protection of our remaining rights. These rights which include those of life; dignity of human persons; personal liberty; fair hearing; private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; peaceful assembly and association; freedom of movement; and freedom from discrimination, are enshrined in sections 33 to 43 of our Constitution. According to Dambazau, (2013. p 4.) "these rights are fundamental to the social contract between government and the citizens, and failure to guarantee them by the former not only means a violation of the "agreement," but also a threat to the security of a nation"

> Security Sector Reform (SSR) has come a long way since it first emerged on the international security and development policy scene in the late 1990s. This model of security assistance is now a mainstay in state-building policy and practice, widely perceived as a precondition for stability and sustainable development in countries recovering from conflict or making transitions from authoritarianism, fragility or collapse. Generally speaking, security sector reform refers to planned improvements to existing structures and methods in a country's security sector, with the objective of improving security for the population. In many developing and conflict-affected countries, however, democracy and effective security forces are often lacking. A secure and stable environment is, however, vital for sustainable development. The point of the SSR concept is to provide external support for reorganising the security sector in line with democracy and rule of law to ensure the security of the population
> (Steffen, 2016, Abegunde, 2013).

Specifically, Nigeria began to reform its security sector as part of the transition from military to civilian rule at the start of the new millennium. The reforms began with an effort to convince the armed forces to return to their barracks and keep to their constitutional role as guardians of the state. The roots of defective security sector governance in Nigeria can be traced to the affairs of the immediate post-independence years. Barely half a decade after independence, the military intervened in its politics (1966) and, for the next three decades, with the brief exception of about four years (1979 to 1983), the country was administered by the military. Any discussion of security sector governance in Nigeria must be seen within this context of long-term military involvement in politics. The country experienced military coups in 1966 (January and July), 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985 and 1993; and a civil war from 1967 to 1970. This long period of military rule witnessed the near complete breakdown of security sector governance in the country, including massive human rights violations, destruction of *esprit de corps* in the military, corruption and truncation of democratic agendas *(Fayemi and Olonisaki , 2008)*.

The main reason for the SSR in Nigeria is to create a secure society through a security sector that will be alert to its responsibilities   such that it will be pro-active to nip perceived crisis on bud before it snowballs into a violent conflict; to create civil-military relation in a way that the civilian can confide in the security sector and to create a safe and conducive environment for both local and international investors. According to DAC Guideline and Reference Series (2012:p12) security system reform is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy. The deduction in this definition is that, it is only a conflict-free environment that can allow for economic development that will bring about poverty reduction and, by extension democratic growth and (Abegunde, 2013).

This chapter which is divided into five sections has the objective of examining the Sector Reforms under democratic governance and its implications for defence transformation in Nigeria since 1999.

Conceptual Framework

The following issues will be operationalised to shield more light on the topic under discussion.

(a)   **Security Sector Reform**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a concept that first emerged in the 1990s in Eastern Europe. Though there is no single globally accepted definition, SSR generally refers to a process to reform or rebuild a state's security sector. It responds to a situation in which a dysfunctional security sector is unable to provide security to the state and its people effectively and under democratic principles. In some cases, the security sector can itself be a source of widespread insecurity due to discriminatory and abusive policies or practices. SSR processes therefore, seek to enhance the delivery of effective and efficient security and justice services, by security sector institutions that are accountable to the state and its people, and operate within a framework of democratic governance, without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (Ball at el, 2007).

Throughout the Cold War period, the major powers of both East and West had no interest in using security and development assistance to promote democratic governance in the countries receiving their aids. Rather, their assistance was intended solely to foster strategic relationships with key allies, many of whom were ruled by military governments or had civilian-led governments with extremely close ties to the military and other security services.

The breakup of the bipolar world also created space for issues such as governance, poverty reduction and conflict prevention to enter the development and security assistance agendas of OECD countries. This, in turn, enabled development donors to begin to discuss the linkages between

security and development, and the appropriate role of development assistance in strengthening security in developing and transition countries. It also allowed for some modification in security assistance policies and saw the beginning of a dialogue between development and security donors. SSR was initially championed by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) following the election of the Labour Party in 1997. By early 1999, DFID had produced a policy note on poverty and the security sector that outlined the conditions under which development assistance could be used to engage in SSR and the specific criteria for DFID engagement (Ball, 2010)

Africa has remained a target of such reform agendas through recognition that of countries that have undergone civil war in the past 30 years – the majority on the African continent – nearly half have fallen back into political violence within a few years of peace being achieved. Many parts of the African continent, including Nigeria, face many challenges as the region moves from an era of conflict into a new era of democratisation and peace-building. Amongst these challenges is the challenge of transforming the defence establishments of the region to ensure appropriate, adequate, accountable and affordable defence for the people and nations of the region (Lalá, 2006).

(b) **Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy is defined by Goldstein and Pevehouse (2011, p 103) as the "strategies that government use to guide their actions in the international arena…they spell out the objectives which state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situation". Carlsnaes (2008:335) approached the definition of foreign policy in a more detailed form. He argued that it: …consists of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.

This implies that, for countries to relate effectively with one another, foreign policy must be well defined, well thought out, and must possess direction. Hence, Dougherty, et al (1981 : 34) infer that '' Foreign policy is essentially the instrumentality by which states influence or seek to influence the external world and to attain objectives that are in conformity with their perceived national interest. Foreign policy is conditioned by environmental or systemic characteristics, actions by others, which impinge on the interests or values of a state or groups of states, and domestic social and economic need.

(c) **Democratic Governance**

The conceptual use of the term 'governance' has been widespread, including too many undefined approaches by scholars of different areas and research traditions. Nonetheless, the term remains useful as an analytical concept, provided the boundaries of study are clearly defined. In the context of this paper, governance will be used as encompassing three different dimensions, namely those of the institutional properties (*polity),* actor constellations (*politics*) and policy instruments (*policy*) The interactions between these dimensions create bargainings, which ultimately give rise to (formal and informal) systems of rules, shaping the actions of the state and remaining societal groups((Treib, et al 2006, Lalá, 2006).

According to Nwabueze (2005), democratic governance refers broadly to the exercise of power through a country's economic, social, and political institutions in which institutions represent the organisational rules and routines, formal laws, and informal norms that together shape the incentives of public policy-makers, overseers, and providers of public services.

Governance in Nigeria dates back to the colonial period`. However, good governance is a much recent and novel idea of democratic governance that found expression in the detailed provisions of the 1979 Constitution that contained the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. Good governance became the reducible criteria for assessment of government under the 1999 Constitution, due to the negative effect of military rule, the activities of civil society and the pressures of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and UNDP.

Nigeria's Defence Policy and Prospects of Security Sector Governance
The Defence policy of any country is not only a reflection of its national security concerns, it is also a coherent and coordinated strategy of dealing with those concerns. A defence policy reflects a guideline of actions which the affected country would undertake to promote her national interests, protect her security and achieve her national policy objectives. Such a guideline will inevitably include the identification and evolution of threats, the necessity and justification for the use of force as a response to situations, the degree of force to employ and the availability of manpower and equipment within a country's financial resources (Wushishi, 1987).
Vogt (1986) and Imhobighe (1987) showed that defence is oriented towards protection from violation or subverting the territorial borders; land, sea, and air as well as to ensure adequate protection to national economic assets, military installations, symbolic locations, the civilian population, and cities. All nations in the modern world require a National Defence Policy to guide the core functions of their sovereignty and nationhood. Nigeria has operated a National Defence Policy since 2006 to guide her national direction in defence, economic and military affairs both locally and internationally. Since 2006, when the first National Defence Policy was produced, a lot of changes have taken place in the security architecture both locally

and globally. There has been an increase in terrorism, illegal oil bunkering/oil theft, armed robbery, kidnappings, banditry and piracy off the coast of Nigeria. These developments have necessitated the increased deployment of the Armed Forces to deal with the security challenges with a corresponding need to update the National Defence Policy to accommodate these challenges. The nature and character of threats have thus fundamentally changed.

In Nigeria, the Ministry of Defence is saddled with the responsibility of formulating and executing the national defence policy and the planning of military expenditure, as well as providing administrative and support services for training, equipping and combat readiness of the armed forces in accordance to standards and optimum performance. The Nigeria's Defence policy objectives as highlighted in the 2006 National Defence Policy are:

a)   Protection of Nigeria's sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and   territory against external attacks;
b)   Provision of defence as well as strategic advice and information to government;
c)   Promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians;
d)   Response to requests for aid to civil authority;
e)   Participation in disaster management and humanitarian relief operations both at   home and abroad;
f)   Assistance to government agencies and levels of government in achieving national   goals;
g)   Protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside
h)   Ensuring security and stability in the west African sub-region through collective   security;
i)   Participation in bilateral and multilateral operations; and
j)   Contributing to international peace and security (NNDP, 2006   p 4) .

The foregoing clearly explains that defence planners were mindful of the complex global environment that the agencies operate in, and the transnational web of threats that compete to attack the country's sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory.

The National Defence Policy further provides that, since neither defence nor the environment in which it is conducted is static, the policies outlined herein will be subject to periodic review as the situation warrants. For this purpose, the stakeholders are enjoined to subject the political analysis…to bequeath to the present and future generations of Nigeria a credible defence system that would be a vehicle for peace and stability both at home and abroad (Akpuru-Aja, 2011).

The global environmental factors were taking into consideration also in the drafting of the Nigerian National Defence Policy (NNDP). The draft document submitted to the Federal Government earlier on advocates a total strategy that ensures strong professional and citizens' participation while mobilising all relevant resources

for national defence. The emerging threats to defence and sovereignty of nations required the NNDP to be reviewed periodically to address new developments and challenges. The Federal Government was committed to restructuring and building the capacity of the armed forces to meet emerging and contemporary security challenges. The Ministry of Defence was also undertaking the reforms of the armed forces to reflect the current security challenges.

The *White Paper on International Security and Defence* approved in April 2015, represents a key step for the Nigerian Armed Forces as well as for the country's role in the international arena. Indeed, there are at least four reasons that make it an important document: Firstly, it is a full-fledged strategy for the country's defence policy; secondly, it fills a gap in terms of government's strategic documents which lasted since 1985; thirdly it fosters dialogue among the different components of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and with the most relevant stakeholders; and fourthly, it triggers a better relationship between the Armed Forces, the political authorities and the public opinion. The White Paper is important because it is not just an analysis of the international security environment, nor a mere list of the assets the MoD already has at its disposal but rather a coherent attempt to define priorities for the Nigerian defence policy as well as guidelines to reform the MoD, on the basis of the national interests at stake and the resources that will realistically be at the disposal of the Armed Forces in the next years (Aiyede , 2017, CGAR, 2016).

The 1999 constitution, having authorised the creation and existence of Armed Force for the federation under section 217 (1) by an Act of the National Assembly, designated the president as Commander-in-Chief in section 218 (1), but provides that the powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in-Chief are to be regulated by the National Assembly. In effect, both the President and the National Assembly have different but arguably complementary role to play in the task of preparing for war. The second issue-area is the power to declare war. On this, the constitutional prescription in section 5(4a) is that, "the President shall not declare a state of war between the Federation and another country except with the sanction of a resolution of both Houses of the National Assembly sitting in a joint session". Here again, responsibility has been shared between the executive and the legislative arms of government.

The provisions as embodied in the constitution stipulate the use of the armed forces for extension of national policies both at home and abroad, as well as to prevent the imposition of other people's will on Nigerians against her wish. As far as the third issue-area- the waging of war-is concerned, the 1999 Constitution stipulates that "except with the prior approval of the senate, no member of the Armed Forces of the federation shall be deployed on combat duty outside Nigeria. But if the President is satisfied that the national security is under a threat of imminent attack, he could under section 5 (5), following consultation with the National Defence Council, deploy the Armed forces on a limited combat duty outside Nigeria, provided that he seeks senate consent within fourteen days of combat engagement.

The fourth and last issue-area is termination of war and conclusion of treaties. All that needs to be said on this is that negotiation of treaties is the exclusive

responsibility of the President. But a wise President will include members of the senate in the team that negotiates important treaties, especially as treaties so negotiated require ratification by the National Assembly, given the provision of Section 12 (1) which states that "{no treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent of which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly (Akindele, 2000).

The President as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is the chairman of the National Defence Council (NDC), which includes the Vice president, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, Army, Naval and Air Staffs, and other members the president may appoint. The NDC is mandated to "advise the President on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria". According to the Third Schedule, Part 1, Section 16, 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, the Defence Minister, directly subordinate to the President, superintends the defence policymaking process and provides policy direction to the Armed Forces. The Defence Ministry has a civilian component headed by a permanent secretary (responsible for policy initiation, managerial support and accounting) and a military component headed by the Chief of Defence Staff, who manages the headquarters and coordinates the army, navy and air force heads. The National Assembly has responsibility to make laws for defence sector governance, appropriate funds for the military and other security agencies and oversee military service management and administration (Udeala, 2018a).

In reality, the defence policy is subject to review and reappraisals from time to time with a view to updating or realigning national objectives with changes in the country's foreign policy or such other political, economic or social order as may affect the nation's security. Accordingly, a review of the existing 2006 National Defence Policy is long overdue, considering that the roles of the Armed Forces in national development had changed with current socio-political trends. The adoption of a new National Defence Policy is strategic in view of the dynamic nature of national security and current security threats such as terrorism and militancy. A new Defence Policy should provide a detailed roadmap for the modernisation of the Nigerian Forces, building on the Government's investments in the military since the present democratic dispensation in 1999.

The objective is to produce a first-class, modern military that is well -trained, well-equipped and ready to take on the challenges of the 21st century. These policy reforms should be based on the Federal Government's vision for defence as well as an extensive and rigorous analysis of the risks and threats facing Nigeria and Nigerians in the years to come. This Strategy also takes into account valuable lessons drawn from recent experience at home and around the globe. Through stable and predictable defence funding, the Nigeria Defence Transformation Strategy provides the planning certainty required to allow the Federal Government to continue rebuilding the Nigerian Forces into the state-of-the-art military that Nigeria needs and deserves. It also presents unprecedented opportunities for Nigerian defence industry in its reach for global excellence.

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo on assumption of the office as the President on 29th of May 1999 identified defence transformation as a top priority and stated in his Inaugural speech that a great deal of reorientation has to be undertaken and a redefinition of roles, retraining and re-education will have to be done to ensure that the military submits to civil authority and regains its pride, professionalism and tradition. In his speech at the National War College (now the National Defence College) in 1999, he outlined the key elements of the proposed   defence transformation programme to include:

1. An elected Civilian President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the supremacy of elected state officials over appointed officers at all levels;
2. Civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defence and other strategic establishments;
3. Decisions regarding the goals and conduct of military operations must serve the political and strategic goals established by the civil authority;
4. Application of civil principles to all military investigations and trials;
     a. Right of Civil (Supreme Court) authority to review any actions or decision taken by   the   military   judicial   officers (Aiyede, 2015).

The measures implemented by the Obasanjo administration to reform the military included the following:

1. The exercise of the power to appoint and remove Service Chiefs; Making the Ministry of Defence a primarily civil body;
2. The institution of a Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission known as the "Oputa Panel" and a Human Rights Commission;
3. Reform of the military justice system by making all military court decisions subject to review of the Supreme Court;
4. Reform of Civil-Military Relations
5. Legislative oversight of the defence budget by requiring the National Assembly to scrutinise and pass the defence budget with oversight powers throughout the process;
6. The formulation of a National Defence Policy in 2006.

The Obasonjo administration immediately undertook several measures, particularly to restore effective civilian control and oversight and re-professionalise the services. He replaced all service chiefs with younger officers who had held no public office and retired about 100 other officers who had held appointments as federal ministers, state governors, directors of public corporations and task force chairmen during military regimes. This strategic move purged the military of politicians in uniform and created space for a comprehensive reform process to commence.

The new President further promised "comprehensive transformation of the armed forces", to include: (1) continuation of rationalisation, downsizing and right-sizing to allow shedding of "dead wood" and obsolete equipment; (2) re-equipping the services and upgrading soldiers' welfare; (3) reversing harm to military-civilian relations by subordinating the military to democratically-constituted authority; and (4) building, rehabilitating and strengthening the relationship between the military and the world after years of isolation and sanctions (CGAR, 2016).

In pursuit of its reforms, the government restored bilateral military aid programmes frozen during the Abacha dictatorship. In particular, it entered into agreement with the U.S., which offered $10 million for two programmes: short-term capacity building for some army units (Operation Restore Hope) and longer-term reform of the armed forces, to be implemented by a private U.S. consultancy company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI).

Seeking to address human rights violations and impunity under military rule, the government established a Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC), chaired by Justice Chukwudifu Oputa. Its objective was, among other things, to recommend measures for redressing past injustice and preventing their recurrence. It submitted its report to Obasanjo in May 2002. Obasanjo's initiatives faltered because they lacked a comprehensive guiding framework and were driven solely by the executive, without buy-in from parliament, other political elites and civil society.

These deficits impaired implementation and follow-up. Efforts to address and redress military-era abuses were thwarted by some ex military leaders, notably Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Muhammadu Buhari, who refused to appear before the HRVIC and filed suits challenging its legality. The Supreme Court declared the commission had no legal basis; its report was never published, no one was indicted or sanctioned on the basis of its hearings or submissions, and its recommendations on ending the military's impunity were never implemented.

Several incidents under Obasanjo's watch further entrenched a military culture of abuse and impunity. For example, the refusal to investigate abuses by military units during internal security operations, particularly retaliatory violence in Odi, Bayelsa State (November 1999) and Zaki Biam, Benue State (October 2001), also raised serious doubts about Obasanjo's reform commitment (CGAR, 2016)

However, towards the end of the Obasanjo's regime the pursuit of reform lost impetus due to the constant troubles between the President and the legislature, including controversy over President Obasanjo's effort to change the 1999 Constitution to provide for a third presidential term. The president's pre-occupation with these political challenges distracted him from the reform effort, weakening the prospects for the National Assembly to enact both new legislation concerning the military and constitutional amendments to support military reform. The prospect of military reform was further undermined by failure of the Obasanjo administration to incorporate some of the recommendations of arising from the Political Reform Conference of 2005.

The Conference recommended a constitutional provision against coups amending Section 1(2) of the 1999 Constitution, in addition to establishing the National Security Intelligence Council and the National Security Service Commission. Other recommendations included the political re-orientation of the military; retraining of the armed forces to encourage greater professionalism; the reorganisation of the defence industries corporation of Nigeria; investment in research and development focused on military applications, supported by committing at least five per cent of the defence budget to this work; the establishment of a Faculty of Technology at the National Defence Academy to support graduate/postgraduate studies in maritime/aeronautical engineering, armament technology and computer science; the establishment of a joint warfare school; improving welfare services for military personnel; and making the most of the military's engagement in peace-keeping operations (Aiyede, 2015).

As early as 2004, the then Army Chief, Lt. General Martin Agwai, had introduced a change management programme for the army with the responsibility to determine the structure, equipment and training needs of the Nigerian Army to meet the threats and challenges for the next decade and beyond. *A Framework for the Transformation of the Nigerian Army in the Next Decade (Volumes 1& 2)* was subsequently developed. The Office of Nigerian Army Transformation was established in 2006 to monitor and evaluate the transformation process, and to conceptualise, develop and ensure implementation of short, medium and long-term plans regarding the army's future.

Elevated to overall Chief of Defence Staff in June 2006, Agwai began to expand it to encompass the entire Armed Forces. He set up a committee, headed by Major General Suraj Alao Abdurrahman, to develop a comprehensive blueprint for defence transformation. He set up the Armed Forces Transformation Committee within the Ministry of Defence to provide a guide for transforming the military as a whole. In 2008 the Committee produced a national military strategy document, two volumes of joint doctrine for the armed forces and a proposed structure for the higher management of defence. These documents show that the Committee envisaged that military strategy would be revised every five years and the joint doctrine reviewed every two years. However, no revisions have occurred to date, nor was the planned management structure achieved (Aiyede, 2015).

In January 2008, Agwai's successor, General Andrew Owoye Azazi, started a new all-services reform initiative, constituting a committee, headed by Air Vice Marshal Olufemi Faloyin, to formulate proposals for "repositioning" the Armed Forces. The terms of reference of the committee include (1) check the threats and challenges facing the Armed Forces and how these could be addressed jointly; (2) look into the military strategy and operational doctrine; (3) analyse and recommend on the new combat system and force structure by 2025; (4) recommend on the military's human resource development agenda by 2025 and other manpower planning imperatives; (5) recommend on higher management of national defence, joint logistic procurement, preparation and conduct of peace-support operations, civil-military relations, crises response and management, defence space command,

information and communication technology, research and development, medicare, and (6) work out a detailed plan for Transformation of the Armed Forces (*The Guardian* January 31, 2008).

The Umaru Yar'Adua administration which succeeded the Obasanjo administration enunciated a seven-point agenda to tackle the country's problems. His primary security focus was on the Niger Delta, and military reform was not a priority. The Committee headed by Vice Marshal Olufemi Faloyin, submitted its report titled "Armed Forces Transformation" document which the military leadership and Defence Ministry adopted in June 2008. Six months later, President Yar'Adua established the Office of Defence Transformation at both the Defence Ministry and Defence Headquarters, as the document recommended. This office was supposed to fast-track implementation of the "transformation" blueprint. However, before the military chiefs began application, the terminally-ill president was in no position to provide the necessary leadership before his death in May 2010. Furthermore, the Boko Haram insurgency escalated, and focus shifted entirely to countering it.

President Goodluck Jonathan who succeeded Yar'Adua, initially raised hopes of transformation. In May 2012, Defence Minister Bello Haliru Mohammed announced a new effort, to involve the military's strategic expansion; effective and seamless coordination of resources, intelligence and equipment sharing between the armed forces, security services and other relevant agencies in the aviation, maritime and border sectors; increased military deployment to complement police operations, particularly in flash-point areas; and development of in-country capacity to produce light arms, ammunition and military kits.

Admittedly, some progress was recorded under the transformation programme, notably the development of a National Counter- Terrorism Strategy (NCTS). In July 2012, the army commissioned its first locally-produced armoured personnel carrier, the *Igirigi*, a joint venture between the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) and Israel's Marom Dolphin Nigeria Limited. In mid-2002, the navy took delivery of a home- built patrol boat, the 31-metre *NNS Andoni*, built by the naval dockyard in Lagos. The Air Force Institute of Technology built its first drone. These developments may have been significant, but they did not amount to real transformation. Instead, due to the lack of clear strategic leadership and strong parliamentary oversight during the Jonathan years, the military sank to unprecedented depths (CGAR, 2016).

The security sectors of authoritarian regimes have often been characterised by lack of legislation opening space for arbitrary and unaccountable decisions by its superior members. Legislation in the security sector in democratic governance is also helpful as a step towards transparency and the build up of trust on the part of the overall society and the political community in the security forces. From the point of view of democratic governance of the security forces, though shortcomings have been identified, it is arguable that Nigeria has made progress in the last decade.

The governance of the security sector is becoming more consistent with the rule of law, although severe institutional deficiencies constitute a stumbling block. In fact, currently, the main discouraging factor in the governance of the security sector

in Nigeria is that democratic rule of law itself seems to be increasingly threatened due to its permeability to the maladies of petty and high- level corruption as well as of organised crime. Hence, the key lesson concerns the need for closer attention to the coherence and sequencing in planning and effecting reforms within the security sector, i.e., beyond defence to include intelligence, police and even the justice sector, and encompassing the penal area as well. It is important that the connections between these areas be identified and adequately addressed within security sector reforms in this period of security challenges (Udeala, 2018).

The culture of democratic governance in Nigeria has moved beyond the mere procedures of democracy and the establishment of democratic institutions. It involves promoting the sustainability of democracy which includes an enduring capacity for: the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government; the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, the transparency and accountability of a responsible civil service, functioning at both the national and local levels.

Security Challenge and its Implications For Nigeria's External   Relations

The country's security challenge particularly the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria owing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria has greatly undermined the country's foreign policy drive. Boko Haram activities in Nigeria have led to negative reactions from groups and nations that have been affected by its activities in the country thereby leading to deterioration of foreign relations of these countries with Nigeria. The domestic policies and actions of sovereign governments, routine exercise of power on matters which border on day- to- day governance can snowball in to foreign policy controversies that can attract global attention.

When this situation arises, the issues or matters upon which governments have acted within the domestic jurisdiction of states or governments become objects of international concern. The shaping of foreign policy is a dynamic process involving the interaction between a country's internal and external environments. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy cannot be considered in isolation from the country's domestic political context since foreign policy is externalisation of domestic priorities and aspirations of the citizens.

Terrorist acts in Nigeria by Boko Haram and other groups have generated so much interest from the international community raising questions as to the potency of government's strategy to deal with the menace. Ojukwu (2011.p13) "This is because the audacity of the group has continued unabated amidst government claims of winning the war, every day casualty's increase at alarming rates after each attack making the general public to lose confidence in the system".

The current state of insecurity and bombings especially in the Northern part of Nigeria has posed serious challenges and threat to the peace and stability of Nigeria macroeconomic environment. The nation has not only suffered colossal loss in terms of infrastructure, properties, and human lives but also economic disruption leading to crowding out effect of foreign investment. Generally, no business can thrive in tensed and unsecure environment. This has serious implication on foreign

direct investment and economic growth. Osemwengie (2012. p 23) argues "domestic terrorism and social unrest do not only breed uncertainty in the investment and financial climate but also increase security cost, reduction in output and productive capacity, reduces tourism, damaged to infrastructure and displacement of foreign direct investment which has severe implication for economic growth and development of emerging economies"

The operation of the *Boko Haram* has moved from the sphere of domestic or internal politics to international domain. Nigeria security predicament has elicited several reactions from the United Nations, United States, Britain and several other western countries as they warned their nationals travelling to Nigeria to be more cautious especially about non-predictability of local civil unrest and violence, armed banditry, domestic and international terrorism. The World Bank and other international financial institutions classified Nigeria as weak state because of porous security situation in the country.

As a positive response to the call for concerted international action against terrorism, the French President Francois Hollande organised first Regional Security Summit in Paris on May 17, 2014 which brought together neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Niger and Republic of Benin, to overcome the challenge of insurgency through the joint action of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). During the summit, President Hollande promised to assist MJTF with intelligence gathering and provision of equipment to check the activities of insurgents in Nigeria (Udeala, 2016).

According to Ashiru, (2013: p12). "before the First Regional Security Summit held in France, the Jonathan administration came with policy measures to enhance national and sub-regional security. These policy measures included the strengthening of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) between Nigeria/Chad/Niger as well as Nigeria signing a bilateral agreement with the Republic of Cameroun to establish Joint Trans-Border Security in February, 2012. Nigeria within the same period revived and strengthened Nigeria/Benin Joint Border Security patrol. Also at the 14th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission held in N'djamena, Chad offered the country the opportunity to energise the Joint Task Force Border Security to assist Nigeria in tackling the growing menace of Boko Haram. Nigeria resolved to continue working with the UN and other partners in this global fight. To this end, the Jonathan administration worked closely with the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), as well as relevant international bodies and friendly countries to sharpen its response mechanisms.

As part of Nigeria's efforts to fight terrorism, the Jonathan administration signed into law the Terrorism (Prevention) Bill 2011 and the Anti-Money Laundering (Prohibition) Amendment Act on the 3rd of June 2012. The new laws not only outlined measures for the prevention and combating of acts of terrorism, but also prohibit the financing of terrorism and laundering of the proceeds of crime.

Conscious of the wholesome damage that terrorist acts can cause on the people and economy of a target nation, the Buhari administration on coming to power decided to nip the threat in the bud. The administration hit the ground running in tackling the insurgency by first relocating the military's command and control centre to the theatre of war in Maiduguri, raising the morale of the troops through enhanced welfare and the provision of the necessary fighting tools and then rallying sub-regional, regional and global support for the war. In the first two months of his presidency, President Buhari visited seven countries: Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin – the four other regional countries fighting Boko Haram – as well as the trip to the United States, attended a G7 meeting in Germany and the African Union summit in South Africa and stressed during these visits on the need for global action against terrorism. In addition to these trips to Nigeria neighbouring countries, President Buhari hosted the Cameroonian Defence Minister and the Presidents of the other three countries in Abuja to discuss Boko Haram operations (Udeala, 2016).

This regional focus should not come as a surprise. Before the election, Buhari and his team outlined a foreign policy vision of concentric rings. This means that Nigeria's primary focus is its neighbours, then the West African sub-region, then the African continent, then the rest of the world. How President Buhari has used his time in his first two months was to follow this policy to the letter.

The seriousness with which President Buhari has taken the threat of terrorism in Nigeria was underscored in his statement at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on 22 July 2015 and at the UN General Assembly on September 25, 2015 during which he criticised the US for not providing Nigeria with sufficient weaponry. He said the US policy has the unintended effect of "aiding and abetting" Boko Haram. In his speech at the European Union parliament's plenary session in Strasbourg, France on February 3, 2016, President Buhari called for the international community to provide more support to people in the Lake Chad region, affected by a six-year-long insurgency by Boko Haram terror group.

In furtherance of the efforts by the Federal Government to enhance the security of lives, property and investments in Nigeria and the neighbouring countries, President Buhari hosted the second Regional Security Summit in Abuja on May 14, 2016. The second security summit was attended by the Presidents of Cameroon, Niger Republic, Chad and Benin Republic. The representatives of "The United States, Britain, Equatorial Guinea, the European Union, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Gulf of Guinea Commission also attended the summit where it was resolved that more concerted effort was needed to tackle Nigeria's security challenges.

The fallout of raising lawlessness and anomie groups was that Nigeria's external image was battered reminiscent of the Abacha years. The rising crime wave which was the order of the day at a time when the country was desperately repackaging and marketing itself as an investment-friendly destination posed a formidable challenge to the image -building project. Investors became discouraged

by the gripping stories of mysterious murder of important personalities which carried the undertone that no one was safe in the country.

Though the major concern of the image project was how the nation was perceived abroad, much was not done to show similar concern how Nigeria was perceived by her citizens internally. Udeala, (2008: p260) maintains "the positive perception of any country's image is an important gauge for judging her standing in the international political system. A good image translates to respect, influence and prestige. On the other hand a bad or negative perception of a country's image indicates that such a country lacks respect, influence and prestige in the international system". As a consequence, all countries endeavour to build, maintain and enhance their image in relation to other countries. In fact, the expression of dismay by 0suntokun (1998) on the present reputation of Nigeria as a dynamically chaotic country is not a good augury for the future. Our reputation as fraudsters, drug peddlers and pushers, asylum seekers, racketeers and document and passport forgers have done irreparable damage to our country.

The emergence of terrorism and piracy as major issues in the contemporary world pose a major challenge to Nigeria's foreign policy. As Nigeria increasingly comes to terms with these additional concerns in its foreign policy pursuits, there is need for a carefully defined framework to guide decisions and actions. Studies on Nigeria's foreign policy have pointed to the incapacity of the structure and processes of conceptualising and implementing foreign policy decisions to meet the challenges of the rapidly changing reality of the contemporary international system. This inadequacy will only worsen unless reforms are introduced and institutionalised to address it.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the Security Sector Reforms under democratic governance and its implications for Nigeria's foreign policy since 1999. In the last decade, new and emerging threats to security have altered the way security is conceived and the global security landscape. Recently, terrorism has also become a growing concern. Globalisation has heightened interdependence between states, including in the area of security, and threats to the security of one country can easily spill over and destabilise a region or even world peace. This new reality, together with a broadening of the security agenda, has given further impetus to the reform of the security sector and international security cooperation.

The paper also has examined the new National Security Architecture for Nigeria and argued that it is a necessary document for all stakeholders in the security sector. The content   is not a document drawn for security operatives alone but for all the citizens of the country. The chapter has argued equally   that it is the sole responsibility of a government to guarantee the security of its citizens, and also as a matter of fact it is this responsibility that gives any government its legitimacy. In the case of Nigeria, the responsibility to protect and guarantee security is clearly spelt out in Section 14(2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution which states that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.' This is the basis

for the social contract in which we as citizens of Nigeria surrender some of our freedoms in addition to submitting ourselves to the authority relating to governance in order for us to enjoy the full protection of our remaining rights.

The country's security dynamics are inextricably linked with its national politics. From the foregoing, it is obvious that security problems of the country in all its ramifications are serious threat to any country's national interest and foreign policy. Foreign policy is a reflection and an extension of domestic policy. For Nigeria to have an effective and successful foreign policy, the country needs a stable domestic policy. No foreign policy can be effective if the domestic arena from which it takes its inspiration and operational essence is dysfunctional. Consequently, fundamental measures need to be taken to address domestic social, economic and political challenges that engender internal instability and negative publicity or perception in the international arena. The design and effective implementation of foreign policy, as in the effective pursuit and implementation of other facets of a country's national objectives, is absolutely dependent on the calibre of leadership.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the challenge lies in the resolve to strengthen the democratic process that allows for emergence of focused and determined personalities that can transform national psyche from the mindset of ethnic jingoism and religious fanaticism to mindset of patriotism. Nigeria's security challenges are multi-dimensional. No doubt, however, overcoming them requires a multi-dimensional strategy. There is no doubt however that whatever strategy is adopted would be dependent on good governance, because the majority of these challenges are the consequence of lack of transparency and accountability in governance; poorly observed rule of law; violations of fundamental human rights; high incidence of corruption; and general indiscipline.

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