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## Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy Against the Boko Haram in the North-East: Examining the Challenges of a Disjointed State Response

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**Abstract**
*The Nigerian state has adopted diverse strategies to combat the threats of attacks that emanate from the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency. Prominent of these strategies include attempt at pooling resources, sharing of intelligence information, coordination of military efforts that culminated in the formation and deployment of the Multi-National Joint Task Force, MNJTF with headquarters in Ndjamena, Chad. Nigeria has also utilized assets provided by civilian militia, notably the Civilian Joint Task Force, CJTF mainly for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and mopped up operations. However, central to Nigeria's national strategies to combat the menace of Boko Haram is the deployment of the nation's full military assets. To this end, the Nigerian state had committed enormous personnel drawn from all the sectors of the Nigerian Armed Forces and other military resources to prosecute the nation's counter-insurgency war in the North-East. Nigeria's military onslaught against the group was reinvigorated following the inauguration of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015. While there have been recorded successes in the counter-terror war the most notable been the recapture of Nigeria's territory previously held by the group, yet there remain challenges. Notable among these challenges are; poor interagency cooperation and coordination, poor culture of interagency intelligence information management, poor civil-military relations and lack of respect for human rights, funding constraints and corruption in defence budgeting and arms procurement, lack of elite consensus and poor intergovernmental relations among others. It is the manner that these issues constraints military efforts and undermining the successes of Nigeria's counter-terror campaign against the Boko Haram that this article addresses.*

## Introduction

The unrelenting attacks that the Boko Haram terrorist group have continued to carry out against soft targets notably, communities, schools, embassies, markets, amongst others, speak to the existential threats that terrorist groups constitute to the states in West Africa. States have adopted diverse national strategies to combat the threats of attacks that emanate from the activities of insurgent and terror groups in the sub-region. In the same wise, there have been numerous attempts at pooling of resources, sharing of intelligence information, coordination of military efforts and settling up of wholesale regional military outfit to combat the activities of terror groups by Sahel states in particular and states in West Africa in general. The formation and deployment of the Multi-National Joint Task Force, MNJTF with headquarters in Ndjamena, Chad is the culmination of joint efforts at combating Islamist terror insurgency in West Africa's Sahel. At the heart of states' national

strategies to combat the menace of terror insurgency notably that of the Boko Haram of which Nigeria is more impacted is the full deployment of the military asset. To this end, the Nigerian state had committed enormous personnel drawn from all the arms of the Nigerian Armed Forces, military assets and other resources to prosecute the counter-insurgency war in the North-East, the epi-centre of the Boko Haram terror group's activities.

Given the dynamism that has characterized the evolution of the Boko Haram, the Nigerian state's strategy to combat the militant and later full blown insurgent activities of the group have also taken an evolutionary path. In the period between 2003 and 2009 when the group was in the phase of militant mobilization, state response took the form of deployment of combined Police, Mobile Police and Army personnel to control and suppress the militant activities of the group. This phase witnessed the formation of Operation Flush II and its deployment in Borno and Yobe states in Northeast Nigeria. Rather than curtailed the activities of the group, the high-handedness of men of the Operation Flush generated sympathy from the population for the group. This phase witnessed the emergence of incidences of rights abuse committed by security forces personnel against Boko Haram members, sympathizers and local population. The height of the rights abuse was the extra-judicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf, the charismatic spiritual leader of the group in police custody in 2009.

Following the death of Yusuf, Boko Haram went underground and later re-emerged energized under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. The group transformed its operation into a clandestine activities and adopted the insurgency strategy of striking at police outposts and other security establishment targets. In response, the Nigerian state deployed a 3,600 men strong Special Military Joint Task Force (JTF) code-named Operation Restore Order. The mandate of the Joint Task Force was that of neutralizing the group and restoring order to the states where the group operates (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015). By 2013, the group had started to occupy villages and communities in remote parts of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states especially along the nation's expansive and porous borders with Cameroon, Republic of Chad and Niger Republic. In response, the regime of former President Goodluck Jonathan increased military deployment in the region sending additional 2,000 security personnel to the region to compliment the strength of the Joint Task Force. The Nigerian state also declared a 'State of Emergency' and commenced a full scale military operation in the region (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015).

With the electoral victory of President Muhammadu Buhari's All Progressive Congress in the 2015 general elections, Nigerians and keen watchers of Nigeria's affairs expected a robust strategy that would energize the military campaign against the group in the Northeast. This is in view of the party's campaign commitment on security on the one hand and the military background of the President on the other. Not to disappoint his supporters and Nigerians, President Buhari upon his regime's inauguration directed that the operational headquarters of the military operation against Boko Haram be moved immediately to Maiduguri. He also announced the formation of the 7th Brigade of the Nigeria Army with headquarters in Maiduguri, the

appointment of a Chief of Defence Intelligence and hallmarked the Nigerian state's military efforts against the group. The military operations against the Boko Haram had witnessed improved operational synergy and recorded tremendous field successes the height of which was the routing of the group from the Sambisa Forest and liberation of all territories hitherto under its control. These successes notwithstanding, there continue to be enormous challenges militating against the full realization of the objectives of the Nigerian state counter-insurgency operation against the Boko Haram group. It is within this context that one can understand the seemingly resurgence of the group and its successes at conducting successful strikes targeting military bases, outposts, communities and markets in the region in the months leading to the conduct of the 2019 general elections and after. It is the analysis of the challenges militating against the state military operation in Northeast Nigeria that this article address.

**Boko Haram: Emergence and theoretical Postulations**

An attempt at explaining the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism and subsequent growth of radical Islamism especially in Northern Nigeria needs to take into cognizance the historical antecedents of radical Islamism and utilization of violence in the country. The history dates back to the Second Republic and can be located in three epochs. According to Alao (2009, pp.15-23) the first epoch was marked by the incidence of Maitatsine and the group's violent rebellion against state institutions in Northern Nigeria. Second epoch of Islamic revivalism was marked by the formation of the Islamic Society of Nigeria, ISN popularly referred as the Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood by Ibraheem El-Zackzacky. Other notable organizations that sprang up in this epoch include; Izalat al Bidi'ah wa Iqamat al-Sunnah founded by the late Abubakar Gumi and the Ja'ammatu Tahidmul Islamia founded by Abubakar Mujahid who broke away from Zackzacky over doctrinal difference. The third epoch was marked by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States and the launching of the US 'war on terror'. The most prominent group that emerged in this epoch was the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatil wal Jihad* (also known as the Boko Haram) that emerged in 2001. Following series of events of which the extra-judicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf was the most prominent, the group re-invented itself under Abubakar Shekau and became popularly referred to as the Boko Haram. With the group's adoption of violence, it reincarnated from being a militant organization to a terror group and now represents the virulent face of radical Islamist movement in Nigeria (Animasawun and Saka, 2013; Adesoji, 2010; Isa, 2010, pp. 325-331).

Thus, it can be safely argued that the emergence of Boko Haram can be seen in the broader context of the radical Islamic reform movement inspired by Wahhabism and Salafism that flourished in northern Nigeria in the 1980s. These movements of which the Izala was the most organized was ably funded by Dawah Fund from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015, p.18; Onuoha, 2012; Adesoji, 2010, pp. 96-98). The historical evolution of the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatil wal Jihad referred as the Boko Haram in academic, policy and media circles and among ordinary Nigerians can be situated and presented in

phases. According to Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech (2015), the phases in the group's evolution can be divided into three/four. The first phase was characterized as the period of militant mobilization beginning from 2003 when the group came into public reckoning up till 2009.

The second phase was the period of clandestine/Islamic insurgency period spanning 2009 immediately after Muhammed Yusuf death up till 2013. The third phase was the period of full confrontation with the Nigerian state starting from 2013 to 2015. This period was marked by the occupation of Nigeria's territory by the group across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. It was also marked by the full mobilization of Nigeria's military assets in the prosecution of the country's version of 'war on terror' against the Boko Haram insurgency (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015, pp.21-24). The last phase was marked by the regionalization and internationalization of the Boko Haram insurgency and Nigeria's counter-insurgency strategies starting from 2015 till present. This period is characterized by Boko Haram networking with jihadist groups and networks in the Sahel and offshore outside of Africa. It is also characterized by the regionalization of military efforts at combating and defeating the menace of Boko Haram by the Nigerian state through security partnership with neighbouring states and the international community. The most significant institutional arrangement for effecting this partnership was the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force, based in Ndjamena, the Republic of Chad.

While it might be difficult to give the precise time that the progenitor of the current Boko Haram was formed, reports had it that it emerged in 1995 under the leadership of Abubakar Lawan (Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011; Onuoha, 2012). At inception, the group was known with the Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ah Hijrah. However, nothing serious was held about the group until 2003 when it claimed responsibility for series of attacks against personnel of the Nigeria Police Force in Borno and Yobe states. Bearing the brunt of the group's attacks was the towns of Geiam and Kanamma. Members of the group occupied buildings and hoisted the flag of the Taliban movement and this singular act earned the group the nickname 'the Nigerian Taliban' at this stage (Onuoha, 2010). A joint Military and Police operation, code-name 'Operation Flush' was sent in to dislodge the group from Kanamma and other communities it had occupied. The ensuing face-off with security operatives led to the death of 18 group members, arrest of others and the dispersal of remnants of the militants into Niger Republic, and towns in Northern Nigeria but more importantly, Borno and Yobe states (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, 2015; Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011; Onuoha, 2010).

The death of Muhammed Yusuf and the violent repressive campaign against the group by the Nigerian security forces meant that its members were forced to go underground. It later re-emerged around 2011 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, seen to be highly radical and professed extreme violent orientation (Comoli, 2015). Under Shekau leadership and control, the group transformed into a clandestine network that is well equipped to wage asymmetric warfare against the Nigeria security forces. From a mobilizational group engaged in preaching and dawah, Boko Haram under Shekau became a violent insurgent organization that carried out

successful targeted attacks at security outposts, schools, places of worship, markets and ransacked whole communities at will and with ease. It also engaged in ambush of security patrols, engaged in targeted assassinations and the kidnappings the most notable being Chibok and Dapchi cases (Agbiboa, 2013a, 2013b; Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012). At the height of its campaign of terror against the Nigerian state, its people and institutions, the group was able to capture and hold territories within Nigeria and in neighbouring countries. Although its capacity has been largely degraded, the group remains lethal and it continues to carry out successful surgical strikes against military and civilian targets (Smith, 2015; ICG, 2014).

As to the explanation of what informed the revolt of the lumpen of which the Boko Haram insurgency was the manifestation, there are divergent opinions and perspectives that had been expressed. Top on this list of the theoretical explanations for the rise of the Boko Haram is the position that is anchored on economic deprivation, poverty and governance crisis that is pervasive in Northern Nigeria. Like the Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s, the radical preaching of the Boko Haram finds ready audience with the millions of unemployed youth of Northern Nigeria that live in the margin of society. The problem of unemployment and underemployment of this important segment of the population makes them to be prone to being highly impressionist and open them to easy indoctrination by individuals that preach, espouse and hold radical religious views and positions. This theoretical position had earlier been used to explain the Maitatsine revolts by scholars such as Kastfelt (1989), Hiskett (1987), Isichei (1987), Lubeck (1985), and Hickey (1984). It is within the context of the similarities of precipitating factors that has made analysts to relate it to economic marginalization, poverty and governance crisis as an explanation for the emergence of radical religious groups that has made Adesoji (2010) to situate the emergence of Boko Haram as a form of Islamic revivalism that is linked to the Maitatsine revolt of the 1980s.

Advancing the poverty and governance crisis as an explanation for the rise of Boko Haram, Agbiboa (2015, p.10) notes that the relative poverty and inequality that is pervasive in Northern Nigeria has created a fertile ground for the growth of Boko Haram. This is because the group has been successful in capitalizing on the poverty of the lumpen youth at the margin of society and the poor governance of the political class to incite some segments of the youth population in the region against secular authority. Isa (2010, p.329) gives credence to economic deprivation explanation when he argues that the chronic poverty, deteriorating social services, educational backwardness, rising youth unemployment, dwindling fortunes of the agricultural sector and the dwindling productive base of Northern Nigeria's economy provides the fertile grounds for Boko Haram mobilization and incitement to violence. Mustapha (2014, p.168) advances the argument further when he argued that the emergence of Boko Haram signifies the misguided cry of a disgruntled segment of the youth population crushed by deteriorating economic situation and rising poverty on the one hand and state repression on the other. Thus, the rise of Boko Haram was a symptom of the failure of state to enhance democratic governance, promote accountability,

probity and enhance economic development in the context of civil rule (Mustapha, 2012).

Within this context, the emergence of Boko Haram is a manifestation of the extent of the state of alienation of the youth in Northern Nigeria from the secular state. This aptly explains the rise of 'God's warriors' that are dedicated to cleansing society through the implementation of Sharia law as a divine cure for pervasive corruption by secular authority and the mean of enhancing justice and equity (Mustapha, 2014). Abeeb (2012, p.150-151) also lend his voice to the poverty-governance crisis explanation when he notes that despite huge wealth potential that can aid the improvement of standard of living, Nigeria continues to be plagued by high rate of poverty, economic disparity, inaccessible education and limited educational opportunities and mass unemployment. While poverty, dwindling economic fortunes and governance crisis are a general problem, it is more acute in Northern Nigeria (Harrington, 2012; Onuoha, 2012b). Within this context, one can explain the turning into religious institutions and groups as modalities for coping with acute economic crisis. This in turn make segment of the youth population in Northern Nigeria more susceptible to recruitment, mobilization and indoctrination by radical religious groups operating at the fringe of society such as the Boko Haram (Abeeb, 2012, p.151; Alao, 2012). Thus, the needs and grievances explanation remains prominent in the analysis of and explanation about the rise of Boko Haram and the group's campaign of violence in Northern Nigeria (Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012, pp.31-32). Dowd (2015, p.506) has pushed this theoretical position forward when he notes that explanations for political violence which focuses on political marginalization and grievances can be used to explain violent Islamist activity in a range of contexts.

In the Nigeria context, like in other countries experiencing Islamist violence in sub-Sahara Africa, there has been the explanation that such violence is unique, remain pervasive and more implicitly a feature of and instrument of Islamist groups. To this end, it has been argued that ideational factors such as the concept of 'Jihad' in Islam is an important contributory factor in 'Islam's disproportionate role in religious inspired violence' (Toft, 2007, p.110). In essence, the argument has been advanced that religion provides not only the basis for mobilization, or a justification for the use force, but also that religion, (in this case '*Islam*') is the very motivation to engage in violence (Dowd, 2015, p.509). Applied to Nigeria, it has been averred that Islamist violence that the Boko Haram terrorist activities represent its stark manifestation was but a ploy to de-populate Northern Nigeria of Christian population and thus advance the agenda of Islamization of the whole of the region. The Islamization thesis also find resonance in the push for the enactment of Sharia law that swept through Northern Nigeria in the context of democratic rule starting from 2000. The push for the application of a stricter version of Sharia law was championed by former Governor of Zamfara, Ahmed Sani Yerima. However, events have clearly highlighted the instrumental use of Sharia law as means to advance political objectives by the political establishment in Northern Nigeria (Harnischfeger, 2014, pp. 34-35).

There is also the argument that bordered on conspiracy theory as explanation for the emergence of Boko Haram especially the group's instrumental use of indiscriminate violence after it re-emergence following the extra-judicial killing of Muhammed Yusuf in 2009. While the Boko Haram insurgency came out with the instrumental use of violence starting from 2009, however, the group's violent activities spiked in intensity in the immediate period before the 2011 general elections and afterward. For instance, Dowd (2015, p.525) notes that Boko Haram activity averaged around 1.6 events per month between January 2009 and November 2010. This increased to an average of 10 events per month in the six-month period surrounding the 2011 general elections and just under 30 events per month from December 2011 onward. This statistic shows that the group's violent actions witnessed increased intensity during the elections and afterward when then President Jonathan was declared winner of the Presidential poll. The rise in the violent activities of the group easily feed into the allegation that the group and its violent terror activities were meant to make Nigeria ungovernable for former President Goodluck Jonathan.

**The Nigeria State and its Management of the Boko Haram Insurgency**
The Nigeria state has adopted numerous strategies in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. At the heart of the state counter-terrorism strategy is the full deployment of Nigeria's military assets and the waging of an all-out military assault against the group. This state-centric approach to combating the scourge of Boko Haram terror attacks falls squarely within the prism of the 'Orthodox' approach at combating threats posed by terrorist groups and counter-terrorism. This approach gained prominence in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States. The approach that leans more towards the 'war model' sees terrorism as a military problem that justifies the use of military force against terrorist groups, their financiers and supporters. This counter-terrorism approach promotes targeted killings and arrest of key terror group figures and their sponsors (Richard and Vogt, 2003). It also advocates the direct invasion of terrorist group's enclave by state armed forces and multinational forces set up to fight terrorist insurgency. Within the context of orthodox counter-terrorism strategy, military deployments are often a reactive measure, yet military asset can be utilized for a pre-emptive strike at terror group's enclave and to disrupt its operational networks (Onapajo, 2017, pp. 62-63).

For most states fighting the scourge of terrorism, the orthodox military approach is often adopted because it is believed to be faster in the delivery of the objectives of degrading terror group's capacity and defeating terrorist group. It is also the preferred counter-terrorism strategy because it makes it easier to demonstrate to the citizenry state's efforts and convince the international community of state's capacity to combat terrorism within its territory. Thus, it is a veritable approach for convincing the public and the media, the seriousness that a state attaches to fighting terrorism (Wilkinson, 2011). It is within this context that one can situate the attention that the Nigerian state had devoted to the utilization of the military assets of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Mobile Arm of the Nigeria Police Force and other

security/intelligence apparatus in the nation's war on terror and its counter-terrorism drive against the Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria.

At the onset of its fight against the Boko Haram, the Nigeria state deployed a joint security team comprising military and police personnel. For instance, military and police personnel belonging to the Operation Flush was sent to dislodge what was then known as the 'Nigerian Taliban' from the town of Kanama in Yobe state in 2003. In July, 2009, a joint security team launched a security raid on the compound of late Muhammed Yusuf. In the ensuing confrontation, the security operatives seized bomb making equipment, arms, ammunition and made scores of arrest of which Muhammed Yusuf was among those arrested. On July 31st 2009, Muhammed Yusuf was reported to have died in the custody of the Nigeria Police Force. In the same vein, the main financier of the group, Alhaji Buji Foi was also reported dead also in police custody (Serano and Pieri, 2014, p. 201). This violent response was to set the tone for what has characterized the Nigerian state counter-terrorism strategy against the Boko Haram afterwards (Solomon, 2012).

Following continued violent attacks by the Boko Haram, the Federal Government of Nigeria under President Goodluck Jonathan on 12th June, 2011 established the Joint Military Task Force, JTF code-name 'Operation Restore Order' with headquarters in Maiduguri. The JTF personnel were drawn from the Nigeria Army, Navy, Air Force, Department of State Security and the Nigerian Police Force and its mandate was to counter the violent threats that the group poses to Nigerians and Nigeria's national security in the affected areas. It was expected that the JTF would be able to pooled resources, prevent duplication of efforts and enhance free flow of strategic information between the different segments of the security forces represented in the mission (Onapajo, 2017; Onuoha, 2014; Solomon, 2012). To give legislative effects to the war on terror, the Jonathan government on 22nd February, 2011 signed an anti-terror bill into law. Ramping up Nigeria's counter-terror campaign, the Federal Government on 15th May, 2013 declared a 'State of Emergency' in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States, the three that have been the epi-centre of Boko Haram violent terror attacks and sent more military personnel and equipment to reinforce the JTF (Onuoha, 2014, p.175; Solomon, 2012, p.6). At present, the military deployment in the Northeast was the largest military deployment in Nigeria since the end of the 1967-1970 Nigerian Civil War (Agbiboa, 2015, p.12).

Since coming to power in 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari has further ramped up state military onslaught against the Boko Haram. Given the centrality of defeating the insurgency and improve security in President Buhari's 2015 campaign for the presidency, efforts have been directed at enhancing Nigeria's counter-terrorism drive in the Northeast. After its inauguration in 2015, the President announced the relocation of military headquarters coordinating the counter-terrorism fight from Abuja to Maiduguri. The President also changed the security chiefs and saw to improvement in the welfare of personnel on the war front. The regime of President Muhammadu Buhari also announced the formation of a Seventh Battalion of the Nigeria Army with headquarters in Maiduguri and the appointment of a Chief of Security Intelligence equivalent to other service chiefs to coordinate intelligence

gathering for the operation against the group. At the bilateral and multilateral levels, President Buhari has been able to shore up Western Powers confidence on Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts and the country was granted access/concession on weapons and weaponry purchase and on intelligence sharing, notably with the United States and the European Union. The Nigerian government has also strengthened its cooperation with neighbouring countries and revitalize the operation of the Multinational Joint Task Force headquartered in Ndjamena, Chad.

In all, Nigeria's state-centric and military inclined counter-terrorism efforts have been undertaken by a Joint Task Force (JTF) (consisting of the main components of the Nigerian armed forces), the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (a multilateral military arrangement constituted by countries in the Lake Chad Basin Commission that included Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin) and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (a local vigilante group which undertook grassroots military operations against the Boko Haram). For some experts and analysts, the expectation was that given Nigeria's widely acclaimed military capacity and its noted history of successful peacekeeping missions in Africa, the military operation against the Boko Haram was largely expected to be a huge success. Unfortunately, the reverse proved to be the case as realities of fighting a nebulous insurgency has shown. Increasingly, the Nigerian military displayed gross incompetence in confronting the terrorists. It has lost a huge number of its fighters in the war. The ineffectiveness of the military approach is attributable to a number of factors (Onapajo, 2017, p. 67). These factors constitute the impediments to the success of Nigeria's counter-terrorism operation against the Boko Haram in Nigeria's Northeast.

**Challenges Undermining Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Northeast**

Following the declaration of a 'state of emergency' in 2013 and the full mobilization of military assets to combat the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency in the Northeast, the Nigerian state has committed enormous human and material resources to the cause of its 'war on terror'. Notwithstanding these commitments, there has not been commensurate success that can be directly attributed to the level of resources committed to the counter-terrorism efforts. The faltering nature of Nigeria's counter-terrorism war against the Boko Haram and the inability of the nation's security agencies to effectively curtail the violent activities of the group have serious implications for internal politics, governance and economic development. On the international level, it has impacted on the country's international image and dents Nigeria's leadership status in West Africa in particular and the continent at large (Saliu, 2016). As it relates to the Nigeria military, the lack of definitive success has undermined the nation's military much touted successes in international peacekeeping assignments, questioned the professional capacity and competence of the Nigerian armed forces and constitute a blight on the intelligence gathering potential of the nation's security agencies (Ogunnubi, Onapajo and Isike, 2016, pp.12-14; Hill, 2009).

Worthy of note, however, is the fact that since the inauguration of President Muhammadu Buhari's administration in 2015 and the taking of some important policy steps, there have been some level of progress and recorded successes in the

war on terror. The most significant of the successes was the liberation of previously held territories and the dislodging of Boko Haram fighters from Sambisa national forest reserve in Borno state. Normalcy seems to be returning to the Northeast as some of the displaced populations in the region are returning back to their communities (Onapajo, 2017, pp.68-69). These notwithstanding, the war on terror continues to encounter challenges that are undermining the consolidation of progress that has been achieved. The manifestations of these challenges include the Boko Haram continuous demonstration of its capability to surgically conduct hit and run strikes against military formations, convoys and assets in the Northeast and as well as attacks on civilian targets. Significant on the list of the challenges confronting Nigeria's war on terror against the Boko Haram are: poor inter-agency collaboration and coordination; poor intelligence gathering and lack of inter-agency cooperation on intelligence information management; corruption and resource mismanagement; poor civil-military synergy on the conduct of the war on terror; fragmentation of Boko Haram; lack of appropriate de-radicalization programme; shortfall in funding for military operations; debilitating impact of external interest; overdrawn tenure of Service Chiefs, mismanagement and corruption and poor respect for human rights in the conduct of the military operations, among others.

### *Poor Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination*
One of the pressing challenges that has undermined Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts against the Boko Haram terror group is the lack of synergy and inter-agency rivalry that remains the hallmark of Nigeria's security architecture. While the incidence of rivalry between government ministries, departments and agencies whose functions and responsibilities overlap is inevitable, however, when acrimony defines the working relationship of security agencies, the task of securing the people and advancing security interest of the state will be jeopardized. This is particularly the case in Nigeria where inter-agency squabble is more prominent amongst security agencies (Odoma, 2014). Following decades of military dictatorship, and the Nigerian Army provisioning of most leading officers/administrators under military rule, the army as a branch of the security architecture has come to occupy a vantage position that conferred an all-inclusive privilege on the branch and it personnel over and above other branches of the armed forces. This has strengthened the position of the Nigerian army, enhance its ability for resource capture in the context of security budgeting and provisioning and thus spikes envy among other branches of the Armed Forces on the one hand. On the other hand, the Armed Forces taken together have also been privileged over other security agencies notably the Nigerian Police Force as a results of decades of neglect of the Police in the decades of military dictatorship.

This scenario helped to cultivate the environment of acrimonious relationships within the branches of the security establishment in Nigeria and thus prevents the synthetization of operational efforts and sharing of intelligence information. While the security agencies work to advance the objectives of protection of lives and property, public safety, protecting Nigeria's territorial integrity, the poor pooling of resources, synchronization of efforts and intelligence information sharing

has worked to undermine the collective realization of this important state's security objective. A stark manifestation of inter-agency rivalry and squabble in Nigeria is the perennial public fallout among security agencies and street fights between personnel of different security agencies (Odoma, 2011). Adeniyi (2012) expressed the peculiarity of inter-agency rivalry in Nigeria when he noted that senior management officials of critical security agencies constitutionally responsible for security provisioning routinely engage in open trading of blames and throws damaging accusations in the media directed at discrediting efforts of sister agencies in a bid to score cheap political advantage.

In clear terms, the core mandate of the Nigerian Police Force is that of maintenance of law and order and given that the Boko Haram terror insurgency at inception was confined within Nigeria, it was expected that addressing it would rest more on the police. However, given decades of neglect, the Nigerian Police Force has proved to be incapable of addressing most internal security challenge. This has necessitated the setting up of joint task forces comprising of personnel drawn from multiple security agencies, often with the Army leading the pack. This was the experience in the Niger Delta, the Middle Belt and the Northeast against Boko Haram. However, given the differential experience of the various security agencies in terms of institutional culture, operating procedures, budget, mission and rules, the state of personnel training and equipment and operational readiness it became inevitable that there would be problems at it relates to cooperation and coordination among the arms of the forces. This would arise from the tension emanating from cooptation of personnel from agencies that are coming from differential doctrinal and operational backgrounds and the exigency of the need to work together to achieve mission objective. Adeniyi (2012) put this in clear terms when he notes that the problem of coordination bedeviling the prosecution of Nigeria's war on terror stemmed from the challenge of inter-agency non-cooperation.

The squabble and trading of blames between the Nigerian Army and the Nigerian Police Force on which institution is culpable for the extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram leader, Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 was the first major recorded instance of inter-agency fighting in the war against Boko Haram. Subsequent incidences of blame game and needless squabble between authorities of the Nigerian Army and the Police and between the Police and Department of State Security, DSS have continued to define inter-agency relationship in the course of prosecuting Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts in the Northeast. An important consequence of inter-agency squabble that has characterized the operational relationship among the country's security agencies has been the deaths of thousands of Nigerians in the hands of Boko Haram terrorists. The security agencies especially the Nigerian Army has also lost hundreds of personnel on the battle front. To this extent, it then means that it is not only in the interest of the nation that an enhanced inter-agency cooperation is gingered, but also in the interest of each of these agencies and their operatives (Adeniyi, 2012).

### *Poor Culture of Inter-Agency Intelligence Information Management*

Closely related to the problem of inter-agency rivalry arising from differential operational backgrounds and experiences is the issue of overlapping responsibility, authority and attendant inter-agency squabble prevalent in the area of intelligence gathering, intelligence information management, security threats investigations and response. By statutory rule, Nigeria maintain three main security intelligence agencies: the Department of State Security, DSS (also known as the State Security Services, SSS), Nigeria Intelligence Agency, NIA, and Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA. In addition to these three statutory agencies, there is also in existence the Directorate of Military Intelligence, DMI that was tasked with both military and domestic intelligence under military rule. Within the Nigeria Police Force, there is also the existence of the Force Intelligence Bureau. This special branch of the Nigeria Police Force is historical charged with the mandate of internal intelligence gathering and intelligence information management. However, during the decades of military rule, the bureau lost out in the intelligence agencies' politics and power play and was subsequently relegated by the military leadership in the scheme of things. However, the special force branch still exist as a unit within the Nigerian Police Force and continues to perform the task of intelligence gathering and information management in support of Police's law and order maintenance duties. In terms of schedule and authority, the DSS primary function is domestic intelligence gathering, the NIA is charged with intelligence gathering outside the shore of Nigeria while the DIA is responsible for intra-military intelligence gathering and management. The DSS and NIA are often headed by civilian while and active duty military officer heads the DIA (Gray and Adeakin, 2015, p.198; Mwalimu, 2009, p.948; Taiwo, 2009).

With this number of intelligence management agencies and special branches, the problem of overlapping jurisdiction and areas of responsibilities becomes unavoidable possibly with the exception of the NIA. Given the culture of inter-agency non-cooperation that characterizes the working relationship between and among Nigeria security agencies and the problem of overlapping jurisdiction and authority especially among agencies charged with domestic intelligence gathering conflict of interests and protection of turf cannot but arise. This tends to complicate the problem of inter-agency rivalry especially as it relates to intelligence gathering and intelligence information management. In the context of inter-agency rivalry, the main security agencies that conduct intelligence gathering activities have tended to jealously guard their institutional independence and seem not to broach any attempt at significant oversight. Thus, three key problems can be discerned as contributing to the failure of intelligence gathering and security information management in the fight against Boko Haram and the curtailing of other security problems facing Nigeria.

These are; budgetary constraints and the issue of corruption in defense and security spending, the issue of overlapping of roles, authority and jurisdiction among security agencies and the culture of superiority especially as it relates to the military that tends to see itself as the ultimate guardian and guarantor of Nigeria's security and sovereignty. When taken together, these problems have largely contributed to the serious lack of cooperation, cohesion and oversight among the security intelligence

agencies in Nigeria and that undermines their capacity to effectively harmonize efforts to combat Boko Haram and other security threats. While the office of National Security Adviser, NSA is expected to coordinate the activities of the intelligence agencies and provide oversight, it seems the office has not been successful in its coordination and oversight responsibility given the increasing nature of security threats that Nigeria has had to contend with especially from 2010 upward (Gray and Adeakin, 2015, pp.199-201). Another dimension of this problem is the lack of adequate legal framework to empower the NSA to be an effective coordinator of all security matters. Thus, little regard is paid to the NSA by heads of security agencies.

The appointment of a substantive Chief of Defense Intelligence by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 was meant to aid the synchronization of intelligence gathering and information management but it has worked to compound the problem of intelligence information management rather than abate it. For once, the issue of which office between that of the NSA and the Chief of Defense Intelligence is responsible for providing oversight and coordinate the operational activities of the various intelligence agencies surely remains problematic. As it relates to the war against the Boko Haram, which office will the intelligence agencies report to and relay intelligence information gathered from the field for onward sharing and utilization in the counter-terror operations among the security agencies engage in the Northeast theatre is also going to be a challenge. This overlapping roles, responsibility and authority as it relates to oversight and management of intelligence information has undermined the anti-Boko Haram effort. For instance, in January 2017, the Nigerian Air Force mistakenly bombed a refugee camp sheltering thousands of internally displaced persons near the town of Rann that was heavily fortified by personnel of the Joint Task Force. The death that resulted from the friendly fire by the Air Force was reported to be more than 100 people while more than 250 were said to have sustained injuries from the incident. The death included humanitarian workers who had been helping the thousands displaced people in Rann (Amnesty International, 2018a, p. 282; Associated Press, 2017; Gaffey, 2017; Oduah, 2017; Sieff, 2017). This incident alone highlighted the poor inter-agency coordination, communication and intelligence information sharing and management in the theatre of war in the Northeast. As Gaffey (2017) noted, for a civilian population battered by years of protracted conflict, friendly fire incidents such as those at IDP's camp in Rann eroded whatever little trust that an 'untrusted' armed forces have earned in the course of prosecuting the counter-terror war against the Boko Haram. In the consideration of President Jonathan, the establishment of a coordination office would solve the problem but the realities afterwards indicated that the problem of lack of coordination in the war against terror outlived his administration.

### *Poor Civil-Military Relations and Lack of Respect for Human Rights*
Under decades of military rule, personnel of the Nigerian Armed Forces, notably those of the Nigerian Army cultivated the culture of treating civilian with disdain, routinely violated human rights of Nigerians and thus unable to court and

nurture civilian trust. Similar poor relationship and understanding exists between Nigerians and the Nigerian Police Force both at the institutional and personal level. The ingrained culture of lack of respect for Nigerians largely continued unabated since the return to civil rule in 1999 (ICG, 2016). In particular, the sense of superiority at both the institutional and personal levels that defines relationship between the personnel of the Nigerian Armed Forces seriously undermines the evolution of a robust and cordial civil-military relations in Nigeria post May 1999. Commenting on the culture of ill-treatment of civilians, Hill (2009) has argued that the charges of rights abuse leveled against men of the Nigerian Armed Forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone is an evidence of the culture of contempt prevalent within the Nigerian military. This is a manifestation of the Nigerian military poor treatment of the people it is meant to protect. Evidence abounds in the military's interventions in the political process and actions in parts of the country where the military has been deployed to contained insurgencies such as the Niger Delta and Northeast and in other areas where it has been on assignments for police duties. Worsening the decline in professionalism and ethics as it relates to civil-military relations is the crisis of failed reform of the military by civil authorities since 1999 (ICG, 2016).

Personnel of the Nigerian Armed Forces and Police had serially abuse civilian rights under military juntas, the situation has continued under civilian regimes in the fourth republic. The poor human rights records especially by the military has had a debilitating impact on effectiveness of the force when on important national assignments. Indeed, since the return to civil rule, serious abuse of civilian communities, from Odi (1999) and Zaki Biam (2001), Odioma (2005) and more recently the incidences of extrajudicial killings, especially in the context of countering militant and separatist groups from Boko Haram and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) to the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), have alienated citizens whose cooperation is crucial for successful internal security operations (ICG, 2016, p.ii). In the context of the Boko Haram counter-terror operation, the Nigerian Police Force was indicted in the extra-judicial murder of Muhammad Yusuf, the erstwhile leader of Boko Haram and was also blamed for the death of the group's early financier, Alhaji Buji Foi.

There has been numerous incidences of civilian abuse and avoidable civilian casualties/collateral damage in the prosecution of the counter-insurgency against the Boko Haram by the Nigerian security forces. For instance, the Amnesty International (2018a, p. 282) reported that the Nigerian military detention facility at Giwa Baracks located in Maiduguri held more than 4,900 people in highly overcrowded cells. At least 340 of the detainees were reported to have died as a result of disease, dehydration and starvation. It was also reported that at least 200 children as young as four years old were detained in overcrowded and unhygienic children cell (Amnesty International, 2018a; Sieff, 2017). In April 2013, as many as 183 people were killed and an estimated 2,000 homes razed in a military offensive against the town of Baga, following a Boko Haram attack on a military patrol that killed one soldier (Allison, 2017). The Amnesty International (2018b, pp.8-12) also reported the instrumental use of starvation as modality for sexual exploitation of women and young ladies in the

Northeast. Indeed, it was reported that thousands of women and girls who survived Boko Haram brutality were subjected to further abuse by the Nigerian security forces and civilian joint task force members who claimed to be rescuing them.

Rights groups have therefore criticized the conduct of Nigeria's military during the insurgency. Amnesty International has accused the military of executing hundreds of detainees suspected of being part of Boko Haram without trial and allowing other suspects to die in squalid custody an allegation that the military has denied. The Amnesty International (2018c, p.4) alleged that Nigerian security forces have committed extrajudicial killings, engaged in mass arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and other ill-treatment, leading to thousands of deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and other crimes including rape and sexual violence. In Giwa barracks and elsewhere in north-eastern Nigeria, theatres of operation against Boko Haram, the military has often detained civilians who were once held by Boko Haram, accusing them of being sympathizers or "sleeper agents" for their former abductors and accused women and girls as being 'wives of Boko Haram' (Amnesty International, 2018b, p.12). The catalogue of abuses that the military has been alleged to have committed against civilians in the Northeast contributes to the eroding of civilian trust and confidence in the security agencies. Given that local populations have played a key role in countering Boko Haram as members of armed vigilante groups, while others have provided valuable intelligence information, losing their support at a critical stage of the insurgency no doubt undermines the state counter-terror operations in the region (Gaffey, 2017).

***Funding Constraints and Corruption in Defence Budgeting and Arms Procurement***
Decline in professionalism, ethics, value and code of conduct within the Nigerian Armed Forces dated back to the era of military rule. Leaders of series of coups that the nation had witnessed often deployed state authority for rent seeking and exploited their offices for private enrichment. In the decades under military rulers, the military as an institution was also a victim of misrule. Either as a result of suspicion or other factors military heads of state sometimes engaged in deliberate emasculation of specific units or services of the armed forces. The manifestation of such emasculation include; slashing funds, prohibiting training exercises, deterioration of equipment due to non-repair, intentional starving of the armed forces of state of the art equipment needed for maintaining military operational readiness (ICG, 2016, p.3). Attempts at reforming the Nigerian Armed Forces under the current democratic dispensation have been feeble, largely uncoordinated and not holistic in nature and thus have failed to achieve the needed turn around in the fortune of the Nigerian military. The same can be said of the Nigerian Police Force and other security institutions. In the same vein, plans to re-equip the military for effective performance of its constitutional duties have failed to materialize until the Boko Haram insurgency created the necessity for funding for equipment procurement for the military. Indeed, there was no significant budget increase for the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Police from 2000 to 2009. Military spending only witnessed appreciable increase starting from 2011 averaging USD1.7 billion up till 2014 (ICG,

2016). Nigeria's military expenditure increase from USD1.62 billion in 2017 to USD1.90 billion in 2018 (Trading Economics, 2019). More importantly, a larger share of defence appropriation and what is eventually released goes to service recurrent expenditures (payrolls and overheads) leaving less for equipment, kits, combat training and leadership capability building programmes (ICG, 2016, pp. 10-11).

Compounding the woes of the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Police as it relates to funding and equipping for operational readiness is the pervasive nature of corruption that has characterized defence expenditure and arms procurement in Nigeria. This is by far one of the most important factors that aided military decline, operational ineffectiveness and loss of standing in society by the security agencies. While defence expenditure and procurement information are often times secretive, the secrecy that has characterized the process in Nigeria is appalling (ICG, 2016, p.11). Rather than follow government-to-government arrangements, arms procurement in Nigeria are often channelled through middlemen. By this method, equipment are often procured at highly inflated prices, supplies are often substandard and sometimes what are supplied useless. The proceeds of this notoriously dubious and opaque procurement process are often diverted to private pockets of senior politicians, high ranking military officers and their accomplices within Nigeria and offshore. Indeed, there is hardly any forms of procurement irregularities that is not represented in Nigeria's defence spending. Duruji, Idowu, Dibia and Duruji-Moses (2018, pp. 439-443) have catalogued instances of corruption in military budget and spending that include; repeated expenses, inappropriate expenditure items, duplication of expenditures using different headings, and expenditure heads with unduly large funds among other forms of corruption practice.

There are numerous reports of corruptions in military procurement and defence expenditure that have been uncovered by the Presidential Committee set up by President Buhari in 2015 to audit weapons and equipment procurement for the security agencies in Nigeria since 2007 (*Premium Times*, 2015). The interim report of the committee headed by Rtd Air Vice Marshal John Ode was reported to have detailed irregularities in procurement and management of defence related funds traceable to the Office of National Security Adviser (NSA) headed by Rtd Colonel Sambo Dasuki under President Jonathan regime. The committee was reported to have reviewed 513 contracts awarded mostly by Colonel Dasuki while serving as NSA. Of the total awarded, the committee found out that 53 contracts with the sum totalling USD 2.1 billion were not delivered by the contractors. The contract items included; the purchase of four Alpha jets, twelve military helicopters, bombs and ammunition (Kazeem, 2015; Premium Times, 2015; Punch, 2017; Vanguard, 2015). Sequel on the report of the committee the Federal Government has placed Colonel Dasuki (rtd) in custody. Further investigation and questioning has been and continue to be conducted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC and judicial proceedings have been initiated against Colonel Dasuki and other senior military officers alleged to have committed graft and fraud in military procurement in the period covered by the committee terms of reference.

High ranking military officers implicated in what has come to be referred to as 'Nigeria's Arms-gate scandal' in media parlance include; Colonel Sambo Dasuki (rtd) former National Security Adviser; former Chief of Army Staff, Rtd. Major General Azubuika Ihejerika; Major General E.R. Chioba (rtd.), former Director General, Defence Industry Corporation; Air Chief Marshall Alex Badeh (rtd) former Chief of Defence Staff; former Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall (rtd.) Adesola Amosu; Air Vice Marshal J.B. Adigun, Chief of Account and Budget of the Nigerian Air Force and scores of other high ranking military officers. Notable civilian implicated in the scandal includes; Waripamowei Dufada, former Special Adviser to President Jonathan; Patrick Akpobolokemi, former Director General, Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA; Alhaji Aminu Babakusa, former Executive Director at the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; Alhaji Attahiru Bafarawa, former Governor of Sokoto State, Shuaibu Salisu, former Director of Finance and Administration in the office of the NSA; Bashir Yuguda, former Finance Minister, Chief Olisah Metuh and Chief Raymond Dokpesi among other notable civilian. Aside these individuals, 11 companies and 10 company officers were also implicated in the arms gate scandal (Sahara Reporters, 2018; World Peace Foundation, 2019).

Aside the Dasuki's Arms Gate scandal, Nigeria under President Jonathan was also caught up in a messy money laundering scandal when South Africa authority seized two private planes carrying millions of dollars in cash in Johannesburg. The cash was allegedly for an arms deal between the Nigerian government and private arms dealers (Kazeem, 2015). It is in the context of this arms scandals revelation that one can better understand the constraint being faced by the men of the Joint Task Force (Operation Dafiya Dole) drafted to the Northeast to confront the seemingly well-equipped Boko Haram fighters. At the height of the rage of Boko Haram, soldiers were reportedly without ammunition and their allowances went unpaid for months. With tension at fever pitch and frustration against the military as an institution and senior officers, there were reported instances where soldiers refused order to fight and engage in mutinous activities against constituted authorities (Kazeem, 2015). The problem of corruption and fraud in defence budgeting and expenditure and the fraudulence that has characterized arms and ammunition purchase and general procurement within the Nigerian Defence establishment and other security agencies largely undermines the capability of the security agencies to curtail the menace of Boko Haram. While the situation has improved, yet Nigeria security agencies especially those deployed in active duties mission notable in the Northeast against Boko Haram have continued to face challenges of shortage of equipment, munitions and other essential gadgets needed to successfully prosecute the counter-insurgency operation. These factors constitute serious impediments to Nigeria's counter-terrorism operation against Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria.

### *Lack of Elite Consensus and Poor Intergovernmental Relations on Boko Haram*

Aside the aforementioned operational, intelligence and governance challenges relating to the military handling of the war on terror, the lack of consensus among

critical sectors of Nigeria's power elite is also an important issue militating against the state efforts on the Boko Haram crisis. Elite consensus on an important national security crisis like the Boko Haram terror insurgency is highly important as a political foundation that would in-turn drive successful state efforts. The lack of elite consensus on what constitutes the Boko Haram, their philosophical/ideological position, the reasons behind the group's mindless violence and what should constitute the manner of response by the State largely mirrored the contrasting perspectives with which ordinary Nigerians also approach Boko Haram and its terror activities. For instance, some Nigerians held the believe that the Boko Haram terrorist activities is a war by Muslims against the Christians; to some it is a sponsored conspiracy against the Muslim North while other sees it as a war against the presidency of former President Goodluck Jonathan (Olaniyan and Asuelime, 2014, p. 93).

While it might not have been adopted as an official position, important leaders from the Christian Association of Nigeria CAN, have aired and maintained the position that Boko Haram was a deliberate creation of the Nigerian Muslims for the inquisition of Christians' minorities in Northern Nigeria and by extension, the total Islamization of Nigeria. For instance, in the estimation of Archbishop Peter Akinola of the Anglican Church and Pastor Ayo Oristejafor, then President of CAN, the objective behind the creation of Boko Haram is that of seeking an end to Western influence and the elimination of Christian presence in Nigeria. Thus, from their position, Boko Haram was a planned Islamic holy war (Jihad) against Nigerian Christians, the institution of the Church and the Christian faith (Akinola, 2013; Oristejafor, 2012; Sahara Reporters, 2012; Thurston, 2012). For adherents of the Islamic faith and notable Muslim power elite, Boko Haram is viewed as a ploy to discredit Islam and destabilize the North (African Herald Express, 2012; Bunza, 2012; Information Nigeria, 2012). The political implication of the ethno-regional and religious interpretations of the Boko Haram crisis by critical segment of the power elite especially from the South is the held view that the terror insurgency was an attempt to discredit the administration of former President Jonathan, a non-Muslim and a Southern minority and by so doing, made the country ungovernable for his regime (Olaniyan and Asuelime, 2014, p.97; Onoyume, 2011).

The Islamization/Fulanization narrative was recently given vent to by former President Obasanjo while reacting to the rising spate of kidnapping, farmers/herders conflicts and general insecurity in the country. Speaking at the second session of the Synod held at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul's Anglican Church in Oleh, Delta State,  Obasanjo was quoted to have asserted that, "Boko Haram is no longer an issue of lack of education and lack of employment for our youths in Nigeria which it began as, it is now West African fulanization, African Islamization and global organized crimes of human trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking, gun trafficking, illegal mining and regime change" (Ogundele, 2019; Sahara Reporters, 2019). Making a strong statement of this nature on an important national security crisis using the platform of the Church gathering and the pulpit shows the extent of divisiveness that characterizes the positions of Nigeria's power elite on the issue of Boko Haram terror insurgency. Position like this makes it extremely difficult to have a consensus

on military and political modalities for addressing the insurgency. There is also the problem of intergovernmental relations especially as it relates to the root causes of the crisis and cooperation and coordination on addressing the crisis. This problem of poor communication and lack of coordination and cooperation was more apparent between the Federal Government under former Jonathan and Borno State under Governor Kashim Shettima. The lack of cooperation and poor intergovernmental relations largely delayed the taking of concrete actions in the immediate period following the abduction of the Chibok girls in Borno state during the reign of President Jonathan. The mistrust occasioned by poor communication and lack of cooperation between the federal and state governments was an important hallmark of Nigeria's intergovernmental relations on the management of the Boko Haram insurgency under President Jonathan.

### *Ransom Payment, Prisoners Swap and Rise of Islamic State West Africa Province*

The payment of ransom to Boko Haram to effect the release of people kidnapped by the group, the arrangement for prisoners swap and the emergence of the Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP have also combined to undermine Nigeria's counter-terrorism war against the Boko Haram. To start with, there have been reports that the Nigerian government has engaged in the negotiation of ransom payment to effect the release of people kidnapped by the Boko Haram group. Across the world, the payment of ransom by national governments battling insurgencies remains a contested issue (Jenkins, 2018: iv). Informed by this, and given the contested nature of government policies in Nigeria, one would not have expected that ransom payment will not but be a hotly divisive policy direction. This is particularly the case given that the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency had further widened the gulf between power elite in Nigeria as it relates to the formation of consensus on origin and policy direction in tackling the problem. Thus, like every other issue on the Boko Haram terrorism, there are divergent opinions and positions on the appropriateness of ransom payment to terrorist group to effect release of kidnapped victims.

While the Nigerian government has denied that it engaged in the payment of ransom to Boko Haram to effect the release of kidnapped people, there are numerous reports to the contrary. For instance, the United Nations alleged that the Federal Government of Nigeria paid a huge ransom to Boko Haram for the release of the abducted Dapchi schoolgirls in March 2018. This position was contained in the 22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team, pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated individuals and entities (Adepegba, 2018). Although there was a swift denial by the Nigerian government, there are also reports that the Nigerian state through intermediaries (notably the Swiss Government) paid ransom for the release of 21 girls who were part of the 276 female students abducted from Chibok in 2014 (Burke, 2016). Reno Omokri, a former Media Aide to former President Goodluck Jonathan, commenting on the release of the Chibok girls also alleged that the Federal Government under President Buhari paid ransom to effect the release of the girls (Silas, 2019). In his recent outburst on Fulanization and Islamization agenda of

terrorist group in West Africa, former President Olusegun Obasanjo also alleged that, 'Nigerian government embarked on games of denials while paying ransoms which strengthened the insurgent and yet government denied payments of ransoms' (Ogundele, 2019).

The position of most commentators especially from the South of the country is that the Nigerian state under the present regime had engaged in the payment of ransoms to effect release of those kidnapped by Boko Haram especially the case of Dapchi schoolgirls. While it might serve the short-term objectives of facilitating the release of abductees, ransoms payments are problematic as modality for engaging insurgent especially terror group like the Boko Haram. One of the most serious negative implications of ransoms payment is that such payments often in foreign currencies like (the US Dollar and EU Euro) largely work to aid the strengthening of the capability and capacity of terrorist insurgencies to become more lethal in its violent attacks (Jenkins, 2018). Related to the issue of ransoms payment is the issue of prisoners' exchange/prisoners' swap that has also been utilized to secure release of hostages/abductees from terrorist and insurgent groups. Ransoms payment can also serve as motivation for terror groups to engage in more abduction and kidnapping as means to fuel their violence against the state (Adeniyi, 2018). In the Nigerian case, allegations have been made that the Federal Government had engaged in the release of captured Boko Haram commanders in state detention as exchange for the release of those abducted by the group (Burke, 2016). The fragmentation of Boko Haram which resulted in the emergence of ISWAP has also been held as a factor that has compounded and undermined state's counter-terror operation. Fragmentation makes the task of confronting terrorist insurgency complex as a result of the introduction of new players often with differing strategies, tactics, operational capacity to conduct violent attacks, open paths for terrorist new sources of funding, among other issues. To this end, the seeming fragmentation of Boko Haram added to the issues compounding Nigeria's operational challenges and undermining state efforts at combating the Boko Haram group.

**Conclusion**

The paper has examined the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria with emphasis on the level of response to it by the Nigerian state. After examining the background issues to the emergence of the militant group, it evaluated some of the theoretical explanations for the rise in the activities of the group. In its view, no one single cause can explain the blight of the Nigerian nation. As all the issues that have brought it about are interrelated. On the issue relating to why the efforts of the state in addressing the crisis have not been successful, the paper analysed the most critical issues including; poor funding, corruption, low level of civil-military relations, poor intelligence gathering, inter-agency rivalry, lack of coordination, among others.

The paper concludes that if the Boko Haram phenomenon is to be brought to a close, there is the need to rejuvenate national and international approaches especially the Multinational Joint Task Force. It holds the strong view that a total overhaul of the national military approach and the injection of human security

perspective to the war on terror are two issues that the nation cannot prevaricate on to reverse the damage that the militant group has done to national unity and the country's standing in global affairs.

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**Corruption and Nigeria's External Image**

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**Abstract**

*Over the years, Nigeria has grappled with endemic corruption which has had multiple consequences on different aspects of domestic national live. The phenomenon also had far reaching international consequences, one of the most disturbing being the negative international image the vice has on Nigeria. While many aspects of local effects of corruption have been addressed by existing literature, very few studies have interrogated how corruption has affected Nigeria's external image and what the consequences have been. This article therefore examines the impact of corruption on the international image of Nigeria over the years. Drawing mainly from secondary source of data, the study finds that two factors have been central to understanding when and how Nigeria's international image became heavily damaged by corruption. The first is the arrival of cross-national researches focusing on comparing levels of corruption among various countries of the world. The second is public perception of and publicity given to the phenomenon within Nigeria by Nigerians themselves. The study also noted several corruption-induced negative consequences, including low foreign investment, declining foreign aid and development assistance, and of course the negative profiling of and lack of respect for Nigerians abroad.*

**Keywords:** Nigeria, Corruption, External Image, Development, International Community

**Introduction**

Corruption is a negative phenomenon found in one form or the other in every country. In Nigeria, however, the vice is believed to have become a way of life. So pervasive has it become in Nigeria that many people now assume that it is the main, if not the only, explanation for most of Nigeria's present challenges. Recent governments have been criticized for not doing enough to curb the menace posed by corruption. However, the issue of corruption has been at the heart of policy and public discourse since the country emerged from British colonial rule in 1960. Successive governments, spurned by mounting public pressure, have come with one form of anti-corruption programme and initiative or the other. Many of these efforts have however failed to yield any meaningful result, leaving the problem to grow in leaps and bounds.

Giving its intractable and systemic nature in Nigeria, corruption has had multiple consequences on different aspects of public life. These range from political, social, environmental to economic. Its Political effects occur when corruption leads to crisis of legitimacy for government, violence and political instability. Socially, corruption also leads to erosion of social values, such as the culture of hard work,

social trust, respect for others, especially elders and the weak, among others. The effect of corruption for the environmental is often felt in the destruction of the environment (through criminal activities such as poaching, trade in endangered species, illegal exploitation of natural resources etc). Its economic effects can even be more damaging, such as when it results in poor economic performance or indicators, like high poverty rate, inequality, inflation, poor infrastructure, low investments, capital flights, brain-drain, and low economic growth, among others.

The impact of corruption has many domestic dimensions that Nigerians must worry about. However, the negative effect of the phenomenon go beyond the domestic scene. This phenomenon has also had far reaching international consequences. One of the most disturbing international dimensions of corruption in Nigeria is the negative international image the vice has fostered for the country. Today, it is not unusual to hear Nigeria's name being repeatedly mentioned as a very good example of a corrupt country in international conferences and meetings. Many world leaders have been overheard making undiplomatic comments about how corrupt Nigeria is. For instance, Colin Powell, onetime American Secretary of State was quoted to have said: *And what they could have done with their wealth over the last 20 years they just pissed it away. They just tend not to be honest, Nigerians, as a group frankly, are marvelous scammers. I mean, it is their national character* (cited in Zimako, 2009:239). More recently, in 2016, the then British Prime Minister, David Cameroon was reported to have declared that Nigeria is 'fantastically corrupt' (cited in Ogundipe and Ibekwe, 2016). Many Nigerians who have traveled abroad have also told stories of how they have been profiled and given degrading treatment on arrival in those countries simply because of their nationality. Indeed, part of the reason why the Nigerian government launched a war against corruption in 1999, following return to civil rule, was to restore national image that had been battered by many years of corrupt military rule (Enweremadu, 2012:5).

Despite its potential to frustrate development at home, undermine its international standing and encourage negative treatment of its citizens abroad, this aspect of the effect of corruption has not received adequate policy or scholarly attention. How did the international community come to associate the name Nigeria with endemic corruption? What effect has this had on Nigeria and Nigerians? What actions are necessary to ensure that Nigeria's external image is restored? The objective of this article is to examine the nature and extent of corruption in Nigeria and the challenge it has posed to the international image of Nigeria over the years. The methodology of research employed for the study was essentially descriptive in nature, involving an in-depth analysis of secondary materials sourced from academic journals, books, internet materials and newspaper articles, among others.

**Conceptual Clarification**

As the title of this article suggests, two concepts are central in the analysis presented in this study. They are corruption and external image. This section attempts to clarify their meaning, in order to facilitate their usage in this article.

*Corruption*

Corruption as a social problem has attracted considerable attention from all manner of people in recent times. These include scholars, international institutions and policymakers. Despite these heightened attention, the search for a clear and universally acceptable definition of the phenomenon has remained elusive. A careful review of existing scholarly literature however shows that there are three basic types or model of defining corruption (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2008: 7).

The first model of definition concerns the notion of public service and behaviours that regulate its operations. It is referred to as the *Public Office Centred Definitions* and it is credited to such scholars as Bayley (1966), Myrdal (1968; 2018), Nye (1967, 2008), and Macmullan (1961). Generally, these scholars place emphasis on the abuse of trust and power with respect to the exercise of public office, in a manner that is aimed at attracting illegal personal benefits which may not necessarily be material in nature.

The second category has to do with the *Market Centred Definitions*. These definitions are traceable to the works of scholars like Kluveren (2008). In brief, they emphasise the conversion of public office or positions into an enterprise for the maximization of income, almost similar to the way in which an entrepreneur will seek to maximise profits from his investments. According to Kluveren (2008, cited in Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2008), 'a corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will...seek to maximize. The office then becomes a – maximizing unit. The size of his income depends...upon the market situation and his talents for finding the points of maximal gain on the public's demand curve'.

The third and last category deals with the *Public-Interest Centred Definitions*. This set of definition is stressed in the works of Friedrich (2008), Etzioni (1984), Kempe (2000), and many others and links corruption to the concept of public interest. Within this framework, Friedrich (2018:15) defines corruption as: '*a kind of behaviour which deviates from the norm actually prevalent or believed to be prevalent in a given context, such as the political.* Similarly, Kempe (2000:18) views corruption as: 'the utilization of official positions or titles for personal or private gain, either on an individual or collective basis, at the expense of the public good, in violation of established rules and ethical considerations, and through the direct or indirect participation of one or more public officials, whether they be politicians or bureaucrats'.

These three classes or models of definitions contain each within them their own shortcomings or limitations. For instance, the public office and the public interest centred definitions consider corruption as more or less a public sector based phenomenon, whereas, corruption does also occur in the private sector. Similarly, some of them, at least the second set of definitions, that is the Market Centred Definitions, creates the wrong impression that corruption involves purely economic or financial gain. In reality however, corruption may involve other benefits that are non-material. One can therefore combine and integrate them in order to arrive at a more inclusive, exhaustive and useful definitional framework which gives a clearer

picture of the concept we are seeking to define. One of such comprehensive or inclusive definitions which comes to mind is the one offered by Khan (1996: 1) which sees corruption as: *'any act which deviates from the rules of conduct, including normative values, governing the actions of someone in a position of authority or trust, whether in the private or public domain, because of private-regarding motives (that is non-public or general), such as wealth, power, status, etc.'*

According to this definition, an act or behaviour can be termed corrupt if it meets all of the following conditions:

    i.   It involves an individual holding a position of authority or trust irrespective of the domain (public or private)

    ii.  The act or behaviour in question violets laws, regulations, including norms and values

    iii. The act or behaviour is committed intentionally with the aim of advancing some goals which may or may not be material in nature

Some examples of behaviours that could be termed corruption, based on the definition above, are bribery (Klitgaard, 1998); extortion (Forgues-Puccio, 2013); embezzlement, fraud, electoral manipulations and nepotism (Taylor, 2010); judicial manipulations (Omotola, 2008; Shumba, 2007) and academic/examination malpractices or fraud (Heyneman, *et al*. 2008; Graeff, 2014). These are also the most common forms of corruption in Nigeria.

### *External Image*

The concept of image may be applied to an individual, institution or even country or nation. For the purpose of this article, however, we are more interested on the later. In that context, a country's external image will also be taken to mean national image. That is, the image of a nation or country. The image of a nation may itself be domestically or internally determined, referring to the perceptions or impressions which citizens and residents of that country have about their own country. It may well also be external image, where the external image of a country refers to the sum total of the impression which foreign nationals, institutions and governments have of a given country. Where do these impressions or perceptions come from? Do they change from time to time or remain static?

Generally, the perceptions of a country or national image is believed to spring from three principal sources. These are (i) observed behavior (ii) information received about exhibited behavior and (iii) what is considered conventional (Zimako, 2009:144). Like those who share them national image, whether domestic or external is dynamic, meaning that it could change from time to time depending on several factors. For instance, changes in any of the three above listed sources will likely lead to a change in national image. Changes in national image can also be as a result of deliberate action. It is a common knowledge that every country, institution and even individual, deliberately seek to cultivate a positive domestic and international image, while avoiding any tag that can damage their reputation, such as being associated with or accused of corruption. This is because such negative perception can influence

how others relate and interact with them. Similarly, a positive international image can enhance the standing of a nation or its citizens at international fora and facilitate their efforts to attract the sympathy and support of other countries and nationals. However, a country that fails to deliberately cultivate a positive image for herself or allows domestic challenges to tannish its image ends up with a negative international image. It is for this reason that many countries engage in what is known as 'cultural diplomacy and communication' which has the potency of influencing public altitude and opinion about their countries positively.

**Theoretical Framework**

Several theories have been advanced to explain the reason for the widespread nature of corruption in some countries, such as Nigeria. These include the cultural, historical, functional, developmentalist/modernisation, institutional and neo-patrimonial theories of corruption. The analysis presented in this article however draw mainly from the cultural and institutional theories of corruption which, in my view, are the most relevant to understanding of the nature and causation of corruption in Nigeria.

*Cultural Theory*

Cultural theorists generally emphasize the central role of culture as a dominant determinant of behavioural patterns found among any set of people. Accordingly, several researchers have conducted studies showing that cultural legacies or existing cultural practices do to a large extent explain why corruption is very prevalent in Nigerian society and take the forms which they take. In Nigeria, for instance, we have in some cases more of corruption of the social exchange type, in form of nepotism, tribalism and clientelism etc, more than the economic type of corruption (for example illegal donation of campaign funds by private corparations) found in say the capitalist countries of the west. This is due to the place of primary group relations in Nigeria's cultural practices. However, these social types of corruption may also lead, in some instances, to corruption of the economic type, when for instance, social pressures on public officials to fulfill social obligations drive them to embezzle public funds (Smith,1964; 1979; Ekpo, 1979; Smith, 2007). The point we are making here, is that although corruption exist in all cultures and societies, however, the form it takes will usually be culturally determined. Thus, a given type or form of corruption may be more common in one society than in others.

*Institutional Theory*

The crux of the (neo)institutional theory of corruption is that the structure and character of a country's institutions are the major determinants of political behaviour. Thus, the prevailing forms of corruption in developing countries, such as Nigeria, are not only culturally determined, but also an institutional problem which can be contained, to a reasonable degree, by institutional restructuring (Akinseye-George, 2000; Enweremadu, 2012: xvii). This is why, for instance, some scholars have blamed its endemic corruption on governmental institutions, including its federalism

which has been characterized by two factors namely politically fragmental political order and regular creation of political sub-units. To begin from with the latter, regular resort to creation of new states and local councils, which was capped with a specific formula for the distribution of federal revenue among the federating states and local councils, and the institutionalisation of the 'federal character' principle, provided opportunities to spread development to previously inaccessible regions and for increased local political participation, but also for excessive corruption and rent-seeking on the part of the ruling elites and their cronies in the private sectors. This process has been termed the 'boomerang effects of Nigerian federalism (Bach, 1989; Suberu, 1998). The second factor is highly fragmented political system with multiple layers of antagonistic semi-autonomous political authorities. Frequent changes of government witnessed in the country as a result of intra-elite struggle for positions and resources encouraged the political leaders to be short-sighted in their calculations, and to place their individual survival above the exigencies of national development (Lewis, 2007). For instance, officials fearing that their stay in office could be cut-off at very short notice were encouraged to steal what they could as fast as they could. In other words, the nature of corruption and governance in Nigeria, is not only informed by the decentralized institutional arrangements in place, but also the country's notoriously volatile political atmosphere, punctuated by violent ethno-religious competition for power (Enweremadu, 2013).

Prevailing cultural values and weak and fragmented institutions therefore constitute the major explanations for the existing forms of corruption, and to some extent, the high incidence and magnitude of corruption in Nigeria.

**Effect of Corruption on Nigeria's External Image**
Studies suggest that several issues can damage the international image of a country (Zimako, 2009; Swift, 2017; Wike *et al*, 2015). These include culture, crime, violence, aggression, poverty, intolerance, extremism or fundamentalism and corruption. Of all these issues, however, corruption appears to be the most damaging. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is because corruption scandals or allegations by their nature often receive enormous attention from the public and media, resulting in severe reputational damage (UNODC, 2013). Secondly, corruption presents not only reputational risks for countries, institutions and individuals that are involved, both also significant legal and financial costs, especially when corporate scandals undermine investor confidence in those countries, businesses or individuals. In the former case, entities accused of corruption might be compelled to pay huge penalties or fines, especially when indicted by a competent judicial panel. Thus, beyond complying with the highest moral principles, "a well-executed anti-corruption programme also makes good business sense for everybody and will yield greater value over time" (UNODC, 2013:1).

The Nigeria case presents a conclusive evidence of how corruption can determine or shape the national image of a country. Although corruption is a major challenge for several other developing states, hardly any other country has been more closely associated with the vice (Enweremadu, 2012:1). Despite being aware of the

reputational risks and costs presented by corruption, especially its effects on its external image, Nigeria has not been able to pursue a coherent, effective and sustained struggle against corruption. Indeed, the question is no longer whether corruption has now more or less become a defining characteristics of Nigeria. But why and how did Nigeria come to be so closely associated with corruption? And what has been the consequences for Nigerians?

### Sources of Nigeria's Negative External Image

Nigeria has grappled with the challenges of a tainted national image for many years.  This worsened in 1990s when a combination of corrupt and repressive military regimes held sway. The criminal behaviours of some Nigerians, both at home and abroad, including those specializing in the well known Advance-Fee-Fraud (notoriously referred to as 419), drug and human trafficking, also helped to reshape this image crisis. A detailed assessment of the contributions of each of these factors, although desirable, is however beyond the scope of this article. Hence only the relative contribution of corruption to Nigeria's negative international image is to be addressed here. How has corruption influenced the perception of Nigerians abroad? At what point did this occur? Two factors are central to understanding when and how Nigeria's international image became heavily soiled by corruption.

The first factor is the arrival or development of cross-national researches focusing on the levels of corruption among various countries of the world. This became very noticeable in the early and mid-90s when cross-country studies on corruption started to surface. Many of these studies have sought to establish a correlation between the level of corruption and its relationship with under-development among states in world. In this wise, the position of Nigeria as far as corruption and development is concerned has been more aptly demonstrated by a combination of Transparency International's (TI) yearly survey, *Corruption Perception Index* (CPI), which measures the perceived levels of corruption in different countries of the world, and the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* (WDI) (TI, 1995-2000; World Bank Institute, 2003). These studies describe the level of human development among states of the world. In both surveys, the Nigeria has often appeared worse off. For instance, between 1996 and 2000, Nigeria was ranked either the first or the second most corrupt country in the world in the 90's (see table 1 below). The publications of these organizations which enjoy global acceptance, not only among policy makers, but also academics, the media and the general public, have gone a long way to foist a negative image on Nigeria.

*Table2: Nigeria's Corruption Perception Index 1996-2000*

| Year | Score | Position |
|------|-------|----------|
| 1996 | 0.6 | 54/54 |
| 1997 | 1.7 | 52/52 |
| 1998 | 1.9 | 81/85 |
| 1999 | 1.6 | 98/99 |
| 2000 | 1.2 | 90/90 |

Cited in Enweremadu, 2013b:206

The second factor explaining the close association of Nigeria with corruption is the public perception of and publicity given to the phenomenon within Nigeria by Nigerians themselves. In a 2011 article, Olowu observes that 'corruption has become a household word in Nigerian society from the highest levels of the political and business elites to the ordinary person in the village' (Olowu, 2011:111). Over the years, both the print and electronic (now including social media) have been inundated with stories of systemic corruption ranging from regular extortion of few naira notes by security agencies on Nigerian roads to large scale looting of state treasuries by highly placed government officials. The issue of corruption in Nigeria has also been popularized by politicians who regularly instrumentalize it as a weapon to delegitimize their opponents as a means of gaining political support. It is very common to hear Nigerian politicians accuse themselves of perpetrating corruption (those in opposition) or failing to steps to curb the practice, if not protecting those who engage in it (those in government) (Enweremadu, 2012). In an increasing globalized word these stories, many of them unconfirmed or at best exaggerated, have traveled at very high speed across the world, further reinforcing the global perception of Nigeria as a highly corrupt country. A renowned Public Relations practitioner and former president of the Nigerian Institute of Public Relations (NIPR) Mr Mike Okereke in a recent interview captured very well this phenomenon thus:

> No nation could develop, if its citizens continue to harp on its weaknesses rather its strengths… while the average Nigerian would always use every available opportunity to run down the country, utterances of the nations' leaders, in their fight against corruption had also not done the country's image any good, but rather continue to diminish the status of the country and its citizens before the outside world. The fact remains that we still have many Nigerians who make their living through honest means. It is only a negligible few that are corrupt. 90 per cent of Nigerians are very good. But when you give the world out there the impression that the average Nigerian is corrupt, how do you want them to respect us? Definitely no investor would want to come and risk plying his trade in an environment riddled with corruption… I think the average Nigerian, too, is rather critical about the country. They criticize everything. They don't see anything good in this country and they use every available space to vent their anger (Adewakun, 2017).

To a large extent, the public obsession with corruption in Nigeria has to do with the observable, or rather perceived socio-economic impact of corruption in Nigeria's daily life. This has been particularly severe in the economic sphere. For instance, despite a spike in economic growth rate in recent times, Nigeria still counts among the states with highest inequality rate, as well as the highest number of poor people (Enweremadu, 2013; NBS, 2005; Brookings Institution, 2018). The contradiction between massive oil windfalls and falling standard of living has led

many Nigerians to conclude that indeed corruption is endemic in their country. One Nigerian writer explains why this is so:

> The embezzlement, mismanagement, or misapplication of public funds often leads to a cessation of certain social services, or the non-completion of a road, school, or hospital project. The deterioration and scarcity of infrastructure and social services have worsened in direct proportion to the corruption problem. The loss of public funds to corruption translates inevitably to a lack of medicine in a rural hospital; a lack of access to education for millions of African children; a lack of potable drinking water and electricity for millions of Africans; and a lack of good transportation infrastructure (Ochonu, 2008).

Within this narrative, other observable national development challenges, such as colonial history, poor economic policies, ethno-religious fragmentation, political instability, or international politics, are easily ignored as potent explanation for underdevelopment.

### Consequences of Negative External Image

Whether the level of corruption in Nigeria is as serious as being portrayed or not, the perception of the country as a very corrupt society has brought huge negative consequences for its people. Drawing from the realist theory of International Relations, Zimako (2009) has argued that by carefully managing its national image (through cultural diplomacy for instance) a country can maximize its national power and prestige (p.140). Conversely, where a country proves unable to do so, a diminishing of national power and prestige will then be the logical consequence. This has been the experience of Nigeria in the last four decades.  In the case of Nigeria, several factors which serve as indicators of a corruption-induced diminishing national power readily come to mind. For the purpose of this article, however, we shall limit ourselves to only those that are political and economic in nature. These will include low foreign investment, inability to attract significant foreign aid and assistance, and profiling of and low respect accorded to Nigerian citizens abroad.

### Low foreign investment

Nigeria's huge population makes it an economy with great demand for goods and services. Ordinarily these characteristics should make the country attractive to foreign investments.  Despite the enormous human and natural resources, Nigeria receives very low proportions of global FDI inflows in comparative terms. This suggests that the economy was being perceived by investors as a high-risk market for investment (Jessen, 2012). According to Central Bank Statistics, the amount of FDI inflow into Nigeria stood at US$2.3 billion in 2003, before rising to US$5.31 billion in 2004 (138% increase) this figure rose again to US$9.92 billion (87% increase) in 2005. The sharp increase was explained by banking reform which engendered the interest of

foreign banks in the Nigerian market. During subsequent years the growth was slower as foreign direct investment (FDI) into the economy stood at US$9.6 billion in 2007(CBN 2006, cited in Olokoyo, 2012). By African standard, FDI to Nigeria can be considered significant. Over the last decade to 2014, Nigeria consistently ranked among the top three destinations for FDI in Africa – surpassing South Africa, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Danja, 2012). Out of a total US$36 billion of FDI that went into Africa in 2007, Nigeria received 26.66% of the inflow (Olokoyo, 2012:4).

The statistics presented above may look promising at a first glance. In reality, however, they do not offer Nigeria any serious comfort. First, although Nigeria might be the destination of a majority of FDI going to Africa, that does not necessary suggest that she receives any significant amount of FDI given that Africa as a whole accounts for a very small proportion of global FDI. For example, in 2001, Africa's share of global FDI amounted to only 2.3% (Olokoyo, 2012:16). Secondly, most of the FDI coming into Nigerian economy usually go to the oil and gas sector, to the detriment of the more labour intensive agriculture or manufacturing sectors. For instance, the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2006 shows that FDI inflow to West Africa is mainly dominated by inflow to Nigeria, who received 70% of the sub-regional total and 11% of Africa's total. Out of this Nigeria's oil sector alone receive 90% of the FDI inflow (Danja, 2012).

Further, apart from being biased towards the oil and gas sectors, foreign investments into Nigeria has been generally low in recent times, owing to the slump in oil prices in the past 24 months. As a general rule, FDI to commodity-exporting countries oscillates between the peak and the trough of commodity prices, depending on the prices of crude oil and metals. Therefore, when oil prices fell by over 60 percent from its peak of 2014 to about $45 per barrel in 2015, the UNCTAD reported that Nigeria's FDI fell 34 percent in 2015 (Oguh, 2016). In 2016, foreign investment inflow dipped by $4.52 billion to $5.12 billion, the lowest in nine years, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics, NBS. Specifically, the NBS stated that in the year 2016, capital importation into Nigeria fell by 46.86 per cent, from $9.64bn in 2015 to $5.12 bn, The NBS, in its Nigerian Capital Importation Report for the Fourth Quarter of 2016, disclosed that the amount recorded in 2016 was the lowest since 2007

What is then the role of corruption in all of these? It is common to hear Nigerians discuss the negative impact of the changes in oil price on foreign investment. That is however only a part, not all, of the explanations. The truth is that Nigeria is also being undermined by the presence of a highly decentralized and disorganized (unpredictable) form of corruption (Enweremadu, 2013). These forms of corruption usually create feelings of uncertainty on the part of investors and other key economic actors which can hurt a country's economy severely, especially in the area of FDI. The Nigerian experience, therefore, confirms the argument of some authors, notably Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Easterly (2001), and Lambsdorff (2005), that investors are more likely to be deterred by petty and unpredictable corruption, whereas grand and predictable corruption may not discourage them (GTZ, 2007;1). In

a situation of decentralized corruption, the number of officials demanding bribes, and other forms of pay-offs, will be limitless, resulting in a kind of free-for-all looting, or what is called "overgrazing the commons", where officials are unable to coordinate their bribe taking behaviours, thereby creating an environment of unpredictability for business (Kuncoro, 2006; 14). This largely explains the Nigerian predicament with respect to FDI.

*Inability to attract Significant Foreign Aid and Development Assistance*
        As is the case with FDI, the role of foreign aid in the development of poor economies is an area that has received some scholarly attention. While some scholars have even gone as far as emphasizing the corrosive effects of foreign aid on development (Wilson, 2001), other studies have pointed to substantial empirical evidence suggesting that foreign assistance does play a key role in the country's economic transformation (Posthumus, 1972; Akinyoade and Enweremadu, 2015). However, whether they be loan, debt forgiveness, grants, technical and humanitarian assistance, foreign aids are highly limited, and as such, recipient states must show themselves very worthy to be a receiver of such benevolence. Thus, only states which enjoy some measure of respect in the eyes of the donors are likely to attract significant aid. The ability to attract significant aid is in itself an indication of the confidence of external donors in the recipient countries. In general, foreign aid are in the direction of rich developed nations to poor developing countries, especially those perceived to be in need and prudent in the management of foreign aid. Donors generally shy away from countries perceived to be extravagant or corrupt, whether this perception corresponds with reality or not.

**Table 3: Top 10 ODA recipients in Africa (in million USD)**

| Country | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 3Year Av. | % of all Recipients |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1   Egypt | 1 807 | 5 508 | 3 532 | 3 616 | 7% |
| 2  Ethiopia | 3 221 | 3 885 | 3 585 | 3 564 | 7% |
| 3 Tanzania | 2 823 | 3 431 | 2 648 | 2 967 | 5% |
| 4 Kenya | 2 653 | 3 312 | 2 665 | 2 877 | 5% |
| 5 DRC | 2 847 | 2 583 | 2 398 | 2 610 | 5% |
| **6 Nigeria** | **1 912** | **2 515** | **2 476** | **2 301** | **4%** |
| 7Mozambique | 2 074 | 2 315 | 2 103 | 2 164 | 4% |
| 8 Morocco | 1 465 | 2 004 | 2 247 | 1 906 | 4% |
| 9 Uganda | 1 642 | 1 701 | 1 633 | 1 658 | 3% |
| 10Côted'Ivoire | 2 635 | 1 272 | 922 | 1 610 | 3% |
| Other recipients | 28 053 | 28 190 | 29 983 | 28 742 | 53% |
| Total ODA recipients | 51 132 | 56 715 | 54 193 | 54 014 | 100% |

**Note**: The figures presented above represent receipts from all donors, net ODA receipts.
**Source**: OECD (2016).

Although classified as one of the poorest developing countries, Nigeria has not been an ideal candidate for foreign aid relative to some other developing countries. As the statistics presented in table 2 above clearly show, Nigeria, relative to its population of about 200 million is among the lowest foreign aid receiving nations in Africa, receiving an average of 2.8 billion USD over a three-year period (2012-2014). On the other hand, Egypt and Ethiopia which have generally done better in global corruption perception indexes (see Transparency International, 1999-2019) received an average of over 3.5 billion USD during the same period. The disparity between Nigeria and these countries will become more clear when one considers that these two countries have population that are much smaller than that of Nigeria. According to CIA's World Factbook, Egypt's population stands at 99 in 2018, while Ethiopia was 108 million (2019).

Another study conducted by the author, a comparative study involving Nigeria and Indonesia, also showed that Indonesia benefited immensely since the mid-1960s. Records from 1967 show that Nigeria did not at any time receive up to half of what accrued to Indonesia in terms of assistance. Up to five-fold differential in amount received was recorded for many years (see figure 1) (Akinyoade and Enweremadu, 2015). It should be noted that some of the revenues Indonesia generated from economic activities were utilized for developmental purposes. The gaps in service delivery were being covered by official development assistance and aid. At some point, aid to Indonesia, or 'project aid', as it was then called, was requested mainly but not exclusively for direct financing of the external cost component of government projects. A large part of the counterpart-funds was used to help attains balance budget (Posthumus, 1972, p. 58).

**Figure 1: Official Development Assistance and Official Aid (current US Dollars)**



Source: ERS International macroeconomic data set, cited in Akinyoade and Enweremadu, 2015.

While Nigeria is not the only country where corruption is endemic, many of the leading recipients of aid are in fact as corrupt, if not more corrupt than Nigeria. The poor image of Nigeria abroad, however, has been a great obstacle. The way the donor countries view Nigeria was reflected in the comment of Michael Burleigh who writes for the Daily Mail, a very influential newspaper in Britain, 'given the appalling levels of corruption in that nation (Nigeria), this largesse (British aid) is utterly sickening — for the money will only be recycled into bank accounts in the Channel Islands or Switzerland. Frankly, we might as well flush our cash away or burn it for all the good it's doing for ordinary Nigerians' (Burleigh, 2013).

*Profiling of and lack of respect for Nigerian Citizens*

Nigerian nationals, including highly skilled professionals are found in large numbers around the world, especially Africa, Asia, Europe and the US (Mba and Ekeopara (2012:42). According to the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization, NIDO, an umbrella body of Nigerians resident abroad the number of Nigerians leaving abroad hovered around 17 million as at 2016 (Nwabughiogu, 2017). The fact that Nigerians are hardworking, dynamic and talented people have been globally acknowledged. Their presence and positive contributions in their host countries have been noted and felt in many areas of human endeavors including politics, public administration, international organizations, education, peace keeping operations, entertainment, health academics, business, sports among others. Nigerians in diaspora have also contributed strongly to the growth and development of the country through various financial remittances and services. For instance, the volume of remittances made into the Nigerian economy in 2016 amounted to a staggering $24 billion (Nwabughiogu, 2017). Beyond the financing transfers they regularly send to their country, diaspora Nigerians contribute to the provision of vital skill and services, even if on a temporary basis. For instance, Nigerian foreign based doctors, especially those based in the US, come home periodically to give free medical treatment and other noble services to Nigerians at no cost.

Yet, their achievements and vital contributions have tended to be overshadowed by the corrupt and fraudulent activities of a few unpatriotic Nigeria citizens whose activities are denting the country's image before the international community. As a consequence, the rest Nigerians have had to travel across the world carrying a stigma of corrupt and fraudulent people, on account of the stories of corruption carried by the Nigeria media and reinforced by official publications of influential international polling agencies. Many Nigerians, including prominent citizens, who have traveled abroad have also told stories of how that have been profiled and given degrading treatment on arrival in those countries simply because of their nationality. At major airports around the world, foreign governments and their law enforcement agencies single Nigerians out for special treatment. This challenge was aptly capture in a celebrated song by one of Nigeria's leading musician as follow:

> when Nigerians travelled oversea, once they are cited with Nigerian passport all the security forces will be put on red alert. You will be

subjected to rigorous searching and if nothing incriminating is discovered, there is no apology for wrongful search. It is not their fault; it is from Nigeria that the problems emanate. It is how we treat our nationals that other nations emulate in maltreating Nigerian citizens. Let us be factual why must we soil our name and Nigerians will not be able to walk freely in the midst of other nationals because our name and image is not good abroad. This embarrassment is becoming too much on our individual personality (Sikiru Ayinde Barrister- The Truth, cited in Memud, 2017).

In one of his first interviews with foreign media, Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari warned his fellow citizens to stop trying to make asylum claims in Britain, saying that their reputation for criminality has made it hard for them to be accepted abroad. According to him, "I don't think Nigerians have anybody to blame. They can remain at home, where their services are required to rebuild the country." (Freeman, 2017). While his views suggest he understand the sources of Nigeria's negative external image. Unfortunately, the Nigerian leader appears not to fully understand the implications of Nigeria's negative external image for the country. The issue of negative national image has severe economic implications for Nigerians abroad, and by extension the development of the motherland. This is perhaps why in 2016, Nigerians in Diaspora Organization, NIDO, an umbrella body of over 17 million Nigerians resident abroad came out openly to complain that the scourge of corruption back home is affecting their investments and image. Worried by the development, leaders of the organization decided in July 2017 to address a press conference in Abuja, as part of the activities marking the year's NIDO week. The group also said that they had decided to address the menace of corruption in line with anti-corruption stance of the federal government to give Nigerians abroad a good image, and because it was important to correct the growing impression that all Nigerians were corrupt (Nwabughiogu, 2017). According to the group, 'We can't paint white black just for some people to be happy. Is there corruption in Nigeria? Absolutely. One leader once said that we have corruption in Nigeria but Nigeria is not corruption and you cannot say that every Nigerian or Nigeria as a nation is corrupt. We have some people here. But I think we have different laws to deal with corrupt people in Nigeria. "Now, is it affecting the Diaspora investment? Absolutely. And it is one of the things we are trying to step into; we have a lot of scammers, a lot of issues, talking about in transparency in doing business. NIDO is stepping into that role. We want to begin to bridge those gaps, change those perceptions about Nigeria being a corrupt country. I can tell you that most of the reforms in Nigeria actually are from the Diaspora' (Nwabughiogu, 2017).

**Conclusion**

From the foregoing analysis, it is obvious that managing Nigeria's negative external image, which is largely induced by a long history of criminality and corruption perpetrated by her citizens, now constitute one of the most important

foreign policy challenges for the Nigerian government. This is because corruption clearly constitutes a roadblock to the realization of rapid and sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in Nigeria. Without doubt, it has been directly or indirectly responsible for the country's limited capacity to attract foreign investment into its economy, benefit significantly from foreign aid and assistance from rich countries and assure dignified treatment of her citizens abroad, in line with the country's foreign policy aspirations.

Since 1999, Nigeria has launched a high profile campaign against corruption in a bid to repair its tarnished image and attract foreign investments (Coker, Ugwu and Adams (2012). This suggests a realization of the fact that corruption has dented the image of Nigeria in the international community, undermined national development, and that concerted efforts are required to rid Nigeria off corruption (Anatusi and Nnabuko, 2014). Within this framework, several anti-corruption initiatives have been conceived and are being implemented. However, several challenges have also emerged which suggest that Nigeria's ongoing anti-corruption efforts need to be strengthened and sustained. Some of these challenges are the absence of a national coalition to support and sustain the anti-corruption war; delay in implementing legal and judicial reforms needed to expedite prosecution of corruption cases; limited capacities (human resources and equipment) within the anti-corruption agencies and constant political interference by government/officials of public institutions. Others are inadequate funding to enable continuous recruitment and (re)training and better remuneration of staff and increase productivity and morale, and of course difficulty in attracting sustained international support and collaboration in the midst of competing priorities (Enweremadu, 2012). How these challenges are managed will ultimately determine how far Nigeria can go in its efforts to eradicate corruption, deliver economic prosperity to its people and regain its lost international prestige.

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# Trade Liberalization and Nigeria-China Trade Relations, 1999-2018

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**Abstract**

*Trade liberalization became an issue of debate among scholars over its benefits or otherwise to developing economies, Nigeria inclusive. While some scholars argued that it is of mutual benefit to both strong and weak economies, others argued that trade liberalization favors stronger economies because of their strong economic structures. This paper is aimed at assessing the impact of trade liberalization on Nigeria with focus specifically on her trade relation with China. The paper utilized documentary research in collection of data. It also adopted globalization theory in order to analyze and understand the relations as well as assess its impact. The paper found that trade liberalization is antithetical to the development of Third World countries like Nigeria as it worsens the problem of unemployment, poverty and inequality and generally hinders economic growth. It reinforces her dependence on the industrialized nations for most of the manufactured goods it consumes. The paper recommends among others that Nigeria should make sound industrial policies, including the provision of infrastructure like good roads, steady electricity supply, pipe born water, tax holiday, interest free loan and protection, that would provide favorable environment for investment to both local and foreign investors. This would also give her competitive advantage in the global knowledge economy.*

*Keywords:* Globalization, trade liberalization, Nigeria, China, global economy.

**Introduction**

Globalization covers political, socio-cultural, and economic relations among countries of the world. This paper focuses on economic globalization and specifically liberalization of trade among the countries of the world in the global economy.

Globalization of the world economy is not a new phenomenon, for it could be dated back to the period of European activities of expansionism and domination of economy and politics of other states across the globe. The invention of maritime technology by Europeans gave them opportunity of expanding their power and authority overseas. By 13th century Europe had dominated world trade (Opellow and Rosow, 1999). By 15th century however, the African Coast, Asia and America had been discovered. Colonization of Africa in 19th century led to full integration and incorporation of Nigerian economy in particular into world capitalist economy. However, the present globalization could be dated back to late 20th century

Kwanashie (1998), Egwere (1998), Nemedia (1998), Ojo and Obasaki (1998). The collapse of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1980s where the world economy was dominated by capitalist firms' operation at global level especially from 1914 onward, Marrakesh Agreement of 1995 which led to liberalization of trade, and increased integration of international financial market, are among the factor that differentiated current and previous globalization. These developments however are facilitated by the rapid growth of information, communication, and industrial technology.

The liberalization of trade among the countries of the world gives them opportunity of exporting goods and services and generating surplus. Although this has become a matter of debate. While some scholars (Neoliberals) argued that the liberalization of trade is of mutual benefit to counties (both with strong and weak economy) for it made economies competitive, made transfer of technology easier. It also benefits parties in terms of division of labor and individual freedom. This will in turn lead to job opportunities, reduction in poverty and inequality, and bring about economic growth (Robertson 2000, Das 2002, Wolf 2004, and Friedman 2005). Others (Sceptics) argued that liberalization of trade is not mutually beneficial, for it gives stronger economies a chance of having access to weaker ones and making them weaker and dependent. According them the weaker economies have no capacity to compete in the global market which is characterized by struggle among the member countries to be at advantage (Spanu 2003, Dicken 2003, Onyeonoru 2003, and George 2010).

This paper is however, aimed at examining the impact of trade liberalization on Nigeria in her relation with China. The paper utilized the available data on the volume of trade between the two countries over the period of time (in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s) and balance of trade over these periods.

**Conceptualising Trade Liberalisation**

Trade liberalization means the reduction in the level of intervention by the states. It is an increase in openness with an increase in the importance of trade in an economy (Das, 2002). He argued that trade liberalization increases managerial, entrepreneurial skills and exposure to foreign competition. It also enables companies to access cheaper foreign technology and it allows for flows of global capital, which will make possible greater international exchange of information, which will lead to business practice, export competition, productivity gains and economic growth. Centre for International Economics (CIE) defines trade liberalization as economic reform which is characterized by lowering of tariffs, removal of quotas and the removal of restrictions on capital flows with a floating of a dollar. It argued that tariffs affect household welfare for it (tariff) leads to less consumption of some goods, which leads to loss of consumer and producer surplus. Firms according to CIE in protected industries are less likely to innovate or seek new market and countries that are more open to competition generate less unemployment and this according to it would lead to economic growth. On this however Thirlwall (2000) argued that trade liberalization led to massive expansion in the growth of world trade relative to world

output. He further argued that historically trade has acted as an important engine of growth for countries at different stages of development, not only by contributing to more efficient allocation of resources within countries but also by transmitting growth from one part of the world to another (Thirlwall, 2000, p.6).

The above definitions viewed trade liberalization as positive which will bring about economic growth and development in an economy. However, liberalization of an economy does not itself bring about economic growth, but it rather gives the already developed or the fast growing economies (with advanced industrial technology and much capital) access to economies with underdeveloped industries and less wealth which do not have the capacity to compete. Therefore, those stronger economies by having access to the weaker ones become stronger while the weaker ones become weaker. What is important is the preparedness internally (macroeconomic reform, example, setting up and protecting local industries at early stage until they are fit to compete) by the weaker economies to compete. This had been made by countries such as United States, Britain, China, India, Japan etcetera, and they succeeded. On allocation of resources as argued by Thirlwall a research conducted by Ogbeige and Agu (2015) titled "Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria: Any Causality" proved that there is a high level of poverty and inequality in Nigeria, and the relationship between the two is a direct one. However, even the spread of the growth to different parts of the world is not real because many African countries especially Sub Saharan African countries find it difficult to compete in the global market. Even Thirlwall (2000) admitted countries are not equal in their share of growth of trade or its benefit.

Spanu (2003) defined trade liberalization as "free movement of goods, capital and labour force across borders" Spanu (2003: 1). He argued that trade liberalization is to the advantage of countries with strong economic structures. He further argued that though the debate on trade policies shifted from the demand on developing countries to liberalize and now focus on the developed countries to remove obstacles (tariff and nontariff barriers) for the developing countries to improve and expand their export which will lead to their economic growth and development, the attempt had failed (example, Doha Round) because protectionist policies still remained in developed countries.

George (2010) sees trade liberalization as the integration of world economy through trade agreements (under WTO, regional and bilateral negotiation) which allows free movement of goods, resources across the globe. These trade agreements are aimed at reducing the remaining barriers and ultimately eliminating them in order to extend international trade. He stated that the reason for trade include economic efficiency and stability of the world trading system. He argued that liberalization of trade leads to loss of government revenue (by reducing tariff) which in turn may lead to cut of government expenditure which would affect health, education, social welfare support program and environmental protection, and this would in the end lead to poverty. Trade liberalization also has production effect, that is, uneven pattern of change in production, with its increase in some parts and decrease in other parts. Example is production of cloth which increased in India, Indonesia and China. It also

failed in EU states, USA, OECD countries, Mexico, Middle East and North Africa (George, 2010). He further argued that in Sub Saharan Africa excluding South Africa the effect was universally negative with production falling across nearly the whole manufacturing industry, and this change in production leads to increase in employment opportunities in places where production increase and vice versa. George (2010) argued that the efficiency gains which come from liberalization of trade in manufactured goods are much smaller than originally expected. He continued that, much larger gains come from economies of scale which is enjoyed only by those countries whose firms have the technologies and skills to compete in global market. Therefore, the restrictive trade rules that commit high-income countries to open up their borders and keep them open enable them to tap these gains while protecting them from trade wars with each other. However, these arguments by George presented the true picture of what is exactly happening in the global trade arena. Countries that are industrialized with much capital benefitted more from liberalization of trade compared to countries with little or absence of these factors, for the weaker economies have little to offer to their trading partners whose manufactured goods dominated the market. They also enjoy a favorable trade balance. Therefore, the liberalization of trade is an attempt by the stronger economies to have access and control over the weaker ones thereby making them more dependent on them while at same time improving their own (stronger economies. As Makwana (2006) argued that, through Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) poorer countries were forced to open up their markets to foreign products which largely destroyed the local industries and make them more dependent and underdeveloped.

**Theoretical Framework**

An analytical framework named rethinking globalization developed by David Held and Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (Held and McGrew, ed, 2000) found to be very relevant in analyzing the impact of trade liberalization on Nigeria. This theory has the following tenants:

That globalization can be located on a continuum with the local, national and regional. At the one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are organized on a local and/or national basis; at the other end lie social and economic relations networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global interaction. Globalization can be taken to refer to those spatiotemporal processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents. Without reference to such expensive special connections, there can be no clear or coherent formulation of this term, Held and McGrew (2000:54).

That globalization implies that connections across frontiers are not just occasional or random, but rather are regularized such that there is a detectable intensification, or growing magnitude, of interconnectedness, patterns of interaction and flows which transcend the constituent societies and states of the world order, Held and McGrew (2000:54).

That growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness may also imply a speeding up of global interactions and processes as the development of worldwide systems of transport and communications increases the potential velocity of global diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people, Held and McGrew (2000:54).

That the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions may also be associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global such that the impact of distant events is magnified while even the most local developments may come to have enormous global consequences. In this sense, the boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs may be blurred, Held and McGrew (2000:55).

Therefore according to them (Held et al, cited in Held and McGrew, 2000), a satisfactory definition of globalization must capture each of these elements; extensity (stretching), intensity, velocity and impact.

However, these four elements had been summarized (by Held et al, 2000) as follows:
1. The extensiveness of networks of relations and connections.
2. The intensity of flows and levels of activity within these networks.
3. The velocity or speed of interchanges.
4. The impacts of these phenomena on particular communities. These impacts however include:

Distributive Impact= Globalization may have considerable consequences for the distribution of power and wealth within and between countries. This impact refers to the way in which globalization shapes the configuration of social forces (groups, classes, collectivities) within societies and across them. They gave an example with trade where it (trade) undermines the prosperity of some workers, while enhancing that of others. This also includes uneven pattern of development across the globe.

Structural Impact= That globalization may condition pattern of domestic, social, economic and political organization and behavior. They gave an example with the spread of Western conceptions of the modern state and capitalist markets which has conditioned the development of the majority of societies and civilizations across the globe.

Interestingly, the above theory is very useful in understanding and analyzing impacts of trade liberalization on Nigeria. The connectedness has intensified due to multilateral trade agreements (especially with China's accession of WTO agreement as full member in 2001). The amount of manufactured goods exported to Nigeria is increasing in quantity and at faster rate as a result of globalization. This however has some negative impacts on the workers, local firms, and the entire economy.

## An Overview of Trade Relations between Nigerian and China

The global economy is characterized by flow of capital, movement of labor and free flow of goods and services across boundaries. This development serves as an opportunity for member countries to benefit from the world market and to have a share in the global economy.

However, China is one of the countries that benefits from the global economy especially after her decision to open up to foreign trade and investment with her accession of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement as full member in 2001. According to Morison (2012, p4) since her opening to foreign trade and investment, and implementation of free market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world's fastest growing economies, with annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging nearly 10% through 2014. China exports of goods and services across the globe have favorable trade balance when compared to her many trading partners (US inclusive). According to Sen (2010) While developing regions import nearly two third of China's exports in 1990, the share reduced to less than half by 1999, while exceeding half again by 2007. He further argued that the opposite was the case with industrial countries, with their current share dropping to less than half by 2007. He stated that United States continued to absorb nearly one-fifth (1/5) or a little less of Chinas export (Sen 2010, p 49).

Although the China's top three export markets were United States, the European Union twenty eight members (EU 28), and Hong Kong (Morrison (2015). The reasons that made China to extend and increase her influence in Africa include diplomatic, ideological, and commercial ones. Since the collapse of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1980s China's influence in Africa has been increasing, she remains the major competing partner of the Western World. China is currently exploiting opportunities in African markets where her exports are expanding. Her foreign direct investment, trade, and aid to Africa have been increasing. According to Renard (2011), China has emerged as a major trading partner for Africa, while European countries remain Africa's leading trade partners. Europe's share of Africa's exports has fallen, while China's import of African goods has risen, and the share of US continues to increase, Renard (2011, p.12). He continued that about 60% of Chinese exports are destined for only six counties: South Africa (21%), Egypt (12%), Nigeria (10%), Algeria (7%), Morocco (6%) and Benin (5%), while over 70% of Chinese imports originates from four counties- Angola (34%), South Africa (20%), Sudan (11%) and Republic of Congo (8%), others in the remaining 30 percent include, Equatorial Guinea (4.49%); Libya (4.10%), Algeria, (3.08%), Gabon (2.91%) and others 13.05%. However, most of the China's import from Africa are of raw materials especially oil and other solid minerals.

The collapse of communism, the rise of globalization – liberalization of trade and investment, and global economic recession made Nigeria to shift toward China.

Nigeria's contact with China could be traced back to 1960 when Chinese delegation attended Nigerians independent ceremony on the invitation of Nigeria government (Agubamah, 2014). However, the diplomatic relations between the two was established in 1971 (Agubamah, 2014, Ogunkola et al, 2008). The tie between the two countries is not unconnected to the need to complement each other. Chinese economy is among the fastest growing economies and second largest economy in the world (US is the first). This however necessitates the need for energy to feed the growing industries and market for the expanding production. However, Nigeria being among the African countries blessed with abundant oil and other mineral resources,

with market of over 150 million people has potentials that every growing economy would like to relate with.

The economic relation between Nigeria and China began with a six man delegation led by Nigerian Commissioner for Economic Re-construction and Development, Adebayo Adedeji, which visited Beijing in August 1972, where agreements on economic and technical cooperation including trade, was signed between the two countries (Ogunsanwo, 2008, cited in Rose, 2015).

In 1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria witnessed series of coups and counter coups while in same period China was busy reforming her economy. However, in early 1990s with the sanction imposed on Nigeria by US over suspicion of human abuse by the then administration, General Sani Abacha initiated contract with the Chinese government, which led to establishment of Nigeria-Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1994. The contract of rehabilitation of Nigeria's railway at a cost of US$ 529 million in 1995 was awarded. Through the Job was not complete due to failure of Nigerian contractors to supply material within the stipulated time (Rose, 2015). Agreement on oil between the two was signed in 1997, and this was not unconnected to Chinese demand for energy which was used for feeding industries (Chibuntu, 2000, cited in Rose).

President Olusegun Obasanjo who was elected as President of Nigeria under democratic rule, in 1999 strengthens the relationship between China and Nigeria throughout his two term tenure. For instance, President Hu Jinto paid a two-day official visit to Nigeria on the 28th April 2006 where he and his host signed a memorandum of understanding on petroleum cooperation, where Nigeria granted China four drilling licenses in exchange of investment & infrastructural projects worth US $4 million (Udeala, 20110:66 cited in Rose).

In February 2008, however, President Umar Musa Yar'adua visited China and an agreement was reached between the two on partnership in power and energy, transport, infrastructures among others, (Adeniyi, 2011, Okeke, 2008 cited in Pose).

The tie continues under President Goodluck Jonathan's administration. Contracts were awarded to Chinese in areas of power generation and rehabilitation of rail systems, example, construction of Papalanto power gas turbine plant in Ogun state, which was awarded to SEPCO (Ogunllola, 2008:16 cited in Rose, 2015).

However, since the assumption of President Muhammadu Buhari into office (May, 29th, 2015) as Nigeria's president who was democratically elected, Nigeria seem to skew her approach toward West, this could be justified by his foreign trips to some Western countries. However, the President Muhammadu Buhari's visit to China in April, 2016, proved that the bilateral relations between the two countries still remain. During that visit, China offered Nigeria US $6 billion loan to fund infrastructure projects. Also, the Industrial Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC), the world biggest lender, and Nigeria's government signed a deal on Yuan transaction. This means that Yuan would be traded among different banks in Nigeria, and the Renminbi has been included in the foreign exchange reserves of Nigeria (Reuters, in *ThisDay*, April 13, 2016).

**Assessment of the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Nigeria**

The following data would be analyzed and interpreted in an attempt to assess the impact of trade on Nigeria.

According to Mthebu-Salter (2009) the trade relation between Nigeria and China recoded 2.3 million pounds in 1960s. By 1971 it reached 10.3 million Pounds. By early 1980s, it reached 53 million US dollars where it fell to only 7 million US dollars in 1985 (Agubamah, 2014). However, it (the trade volume) recovered to 35 million US dollars in 1989, and rose to 97 million US dollars in 1993, and reached 327 million US dollars by 1997 (Ibid). It was estimated 13 billion US in 2013 (Richard, 2013 cited in Agubumah, 2004). According to European Commission (2015) total trade between Nigeria and China in 2014 reached over 14 billion Euro.

In 1977 and 1976, Nigeria's import from China totaled US$69.86 million and US$ 140.87 million respectively, while Nigeria export to China for these combined years was US$8.85 million (Ogunsanwo, 2008, cited in Rose 2015). However, China imported goods and services worth #39.360 million from Nigeria, while Nigeria imported goods and services working #5.388 billion from China in 1996 (Chibundu, 2000 cited in Rosen 2015). Also in 2012, Trade volume between Nigeria and China reach over #1 trillion with a deficit of 270 billion against Nigeria (business day Wed, 20th August 2014, cited in Rose). According to Global EDGE (2015) in 2013, China's export to Nigeria valued $8,038,724, 047, and China's import from Nigeria valued $7,715,630,743, still with trade imbalance by Nigeria. In 2014, China's export to Nigeria was 12.4 billion Euro aproximately, and her import from Nigeria was 1.8 million Euro approximately. Where Nigeria had trade deficit of over 10 billion Euro.

Considering the above data however, China have been enjoying favourable trade balance while Nigeria has been having unfavourable trade balance. Although the supporters of globalization (economic globalisation and trade liberalisation in particular) have been arguing that trade liberalization of mutual benefit to trading partners, what happened in reality is that economies that have more developed industries and have industrial technology and sound economic policies are always at the advantage side, while those that have little or absence of these factor remain at disadvantage side, for they have no capacity to compete. They depend heavily on the stronger economies for most of the manufactured products they consume. Mthemb-Selter, (2009) for instance argued that by 2008, bilateral trade between Nigeria and Chin reach 7.3 billion US dollar still with trade imbalance where Chinese export represented 93% of the trade total in that year, where around 90% of Nigeria export were crude oil. However, crude oil and other agricultural raw materials are the products mostly exchanges by Nigeria for the China's manufactured goods. In this sense however, China has two advantages. Firstly, it buys cheaper agricultural products (Cocoa, Cotton, etcetera), and oil. According to Owoeye and Kawonishe (2007, cited in Folarin et al, 2014) the trade imbalance suffered by Nigeria was due to the nature of China's export to and import from Nigeria. According to National Bureau of Statistics (cited in Trading Econmics, 30th November, 2015) export of commodities (oil and gas) is the main factor behind Nigeria's growth and account for more than 91% of total export. Therefore Nigeria depends heavily on China for

manufactured goods in exchange for her mineral and other agricultural products (such as cocoa, cotton, among others). China on the other hand exported manufactured and industrial items to Nigeria, and imported unprocessed agricultural and mineral items from it. Secondly, adding value and exporting them to Nigeria and other countries (which generate revenue and job opportunities). The China's export however gives her the following benefits:

Firstly, a lot of job opportunities were secured by the China citizens with the extension of the market for her products, which led to increase in production and high demand for labour. This reduced the number of jobless people in China's economy.

Second, poverty would be reduced with more people involved in the production process. This is a result of increase in the number of people in the work force, which led to more money in the hand of people, increase in purchasing power of people and finally improvement in their living standard. According to Daniel and Maiwada (2015) greatest reduction of poverty occurred in East Asia and Pacific, where poverty decline from 78% to 17% in 2005 and the number of people living on less than $ 1.25 a day decline by more than 750 million much of this decline was in China, where poverty fell from 84% to 16% (Sun, 2011:5, cited in Daniel and Maiwada, 2015:278).

Third, with more jobs and reduction in poverty, the gap between rich and poor narrows and this have spillover effect on the entire economy, and the wellbeing of the citizenry will also improve.

Finally, the China's economy by maintain trade surplus over Nigeria will become strong while the latter's will become weaker; this is a result of exporting the surplus capital to China in exchange for manufactured goods. This however has the following implication on Nigeria.

First; by depending on China for most manufactured goods, the jobless people in Nigeria will remain jobless and those that find jobs compete with those of China who worked in more specialized and more supported industries, these people (who secured job in Nigeria) have no certainty as a result of the competition in the global market (a good example is textile industries in Nigeria most of which shut down), and their failure to compete the lead to loss of jobs. Therefore, while Chinese people are securing more job opportunities, many Nigerians remain jobless and those with jobs at the few industries are at risk of losing their jobs.

Second, on poverty however, the higher the number of unemployed, the higher will be the number of people that live in poverty. However, if people are in poverty their living standard will also be power. Nigerian national bureau of statistics (NBS) released report that the percentage of Nigerians living in absolute poverty had increased nationwide from 55% to 61% between 2004 and 2010 (NNBS report, 2012, cited in Ugwu, 2015).

Third, the higher the number of unemployed, the wider the gap between rich and poor and lead to less purchasing poor, low productivity and low economic growth. Ugwu (2015) argued that unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, and wealth inequalities are the root cause of deep frustration across the country (Nigeria).

However, the trade relation between Nigeria and China has some impacts on the businesses in the country. Research conducted in textile market (Kantin Kwari Market) on the impact of Chinese participation on that market by Ibrahim (2012) found that the participation of China in the business led to the following:
1. Dumping of products worth millions of Naira.
2. Price instability.
3. Reduction of turnover of the traders.
4. Bankruptcy of many traders.
5. Uncertainty (trader were in rush to sell).
6. Exit of many traders.

This however, has negative effect on the economy, first, the Nigeria government would lose revenue from those industries affected, second, the manufacturers, traders and worker are also affected, therefore, the economy would remain dependent economy, ready to consume what is produced by China.

In his speech at a gathering during his visit to China President Muhammadu Buhari stated that trade between both countries must be mutually beneficial and conducted with respect and trust. That "although the Nigerian and Chinese business communities have recorded tremendous successes in bilateral trade, there is a large trade imbalance in favour of China, as Chinese exports represent 80 per cent of the total trade volume. This gap needs to be reduced" (Buhari, THIS DAY, April 13, 2016).

**Conclusion**

Trade liberalization is not good for countries that have weak economic structure. Economies that have strong internal structure are always at advantage side. Nigeria whose economy is weak compare to her major trading partners (like, China, India among others) has been recording deficit in her trade relations. However, sound economic policy that would strengthen the economy internally is needed before opening up the economy.

**Recommendations**
1. Nigeria should look inward, provide industrial policies that would help the local manufactures to produce commodities at cheaper rate and at the same time encourage the foreign investors to invest, example, provision of infrastructure, such as good roads, pipe born water, energy (power), tax holiday, interest-free loan, among others. This would encourage investors to set up industries and to be able to compete in the global market.
2. Restriction of importation of products that could be produced locally.
3. Government should make sound policy that would regulate the quantity of the products imported from china, as well as their supply to the markets. This would bring about certainty and price stability in the markets. It would also lead to improvement in the turnover made by the traders.

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# Political Sanctions and Nation Building: The Role of the United States in Nigeria's Democratic Consolidation

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**Abstract**

*Fundamentally, political sanctions represent behavioural conditions that signify approval or disapproval likely to be taken against a particular government; meant to either maintain or compel a change in the status quo in the nation-building and relations between countries. It should be noted that sanctions taken against Nigeria by other governments had been mostly on event of Nigeria's attitude toward democratic consolidation. Critically, the overthrow of Second Republic, on 31st December 1983, ushered for the re-entry of military into Nigerian body politic and this had brought about some issues and transformations in the efforts of nation-building that made United States of America's role instructive. In the light of this, the paper examines the role of the United States of America in Nigeria's efforts to democratic consolidation and nation-building. Equally, the paper highlights on the relevance of political sanctions in Nigeria's nation-building processes. The paper employs analysis of documentary sources to demonstrate the effectiveness of political sanctions employed by the United States (US) in maintaining and compelling Nigeria towards the trajectories and processes of nation-building. The paper asserts that the issue of democratic consolidation is derived out of the assumption that political pluralism, an important aspect of democratic culture remains a vital instrument for pursuance of nation-building by both military and civilian administrations in Nigeria. The paper recommends that political sanctions by the U.S.A. or international community should be considered within the support and effort of strengthening democracy in Nigeria and elsewhere; equally it could be located within the policies and priorities of nation-building.*

**Keywords:** Democratic Consolidation, Nation-building, Political Sanction, Relations.

**Introduction**

Over the years, Nigeria's democratic consolidation has been a matter of concern and an element of international linkages with other countries such as the United States (US), especially at a point when the focus of nation-building had been anchored on ensuring the exit of the military regime and installing democracy in Nigeria. The idea of democratic consolidation was derived from the assumption that political pluralism, an important aspect of democratic culture remains a vital instrument for invigorating nation-building agenda by both military and civilian administrations in Nigeria (Olagunjuetal, 1993:26). Equally, effort of the US in

supporting and strengthening Nigeria's democracy could be located within the US policy and priority of democratization globally. Thus, democratic transition in Nigeria matters to US government for the fact that Nigeria is the largest fledgling democracy in sub-Saharan Africa (Mikell & Lyman, 2001:28). A failure of Nigerian democracy could crop into the West African sub-region a round of political instability, economic uncertainty and security problems. Likewise, a strong and stable democracy in Nigeria could have a stabilizing effect in the West African sub-region and a significant impact on the African continent. Stable democracy could also facilitate closer positive partnership between Nigeria and other African countries. Therefore, the US sought to strengthen democratic structures, processes, and values in Nigeria at all cost. Accordingly, Nigeria had also been keen to acquire democratic credentials for nation-building.

Consequently, the question of political sanctions for democratic consolidation in Nigeria was central strategy by domestic and external groups in the efforts of making the root of democracy firm in the country particularly from 1983 to 1999, when finally, the military disengaged. Using documentary sources such as books, journals, newspapers, speeches and remarks of political actors, the paper analyzes content of data gathered by describing the context of foreign policy behaviour, actions, responses and the processes through which the actions and interactions are sustained and/or change. However, the attempt is not to view primarily all the events surrounding past political transition programme in Nigeria or delve into the theoretical issues that relate with political sanctions, nation-building and democratic consolidation, rather, the aim of this paper is to make some clarification of these concepts and examine the events that precipitated sanctions from the US. The paper, equally, highlights implications of these sanctions in the relations between Nigeria and US, democratic consolidation and nation-building in Nigeria.

**Sanctions, Democratic Consolidation and Nation-building**

International sanctions are actions taken by countries against others for political, economic or security reasons, either unilaterally or multilaterally. They are usually designed for three purposes. The purposes are meant to differentiate between the political contexts and the global nature of the events: first, to force cooperation with international law; second, to contain a threat to peace within a geographical boundary; and third, for condemnation of actions or a specific action or policy of a member/non-member nation (Chesterman & Pouligny, 2003:503).

Similarly, political sanctions represent behavioural conditions that usually signify approval or disapproval likely to be taken against a particular government; meant to either maintain or compel a change in the status quo in the nation-building or relations between countries. Sometimes, political sanctions are diplomatic in nature, which constitute political measures taken to express disapproval or displeasure at a certain action through diplomatic and political means, ratherthan affecting economic or military relations. Measures include limitations or cancellations of high-level government visits and withdrawal of diplomatic activities or staff (Haidar, 2015: 1).

Democratic consolidation signifies strengthening of the institutions of democracy to such that they can absorb shocks and grow unhindered. In addition, democratic consolidation entails the ability of a democracy to grow to the point that people's desires and preferences are reflected in the outcome of an election (Jega, 2005: 259).

Nation-building is a normative concept that informs both evolutionary and revolutionary meaning. In evolutionary terms, it involves long time and social and political processes that cannot be jump-started from outside. According to Stephenson (2005: 1), as a revolutionary concept, nation-building involves giving dysfunctional, unstable or even 'failed states' and economies, assistance in the development of governmental infrastructures, civil society groups, and dispute resolution mechanisms as well as economy in order to increase stability.  Fundamentally, nation-building can be viewed as equipping a polity with the institutional foundation necessary to increase capacity of effective self-governing power for economic, social and cultural objectives of the nation.

Consequently, nation-building has been usually used simultaneously with terms such as state-building, democratization, democratic consolidation, modernization, political development, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. This paper therefore considers nation-building as element of political development that relates with democratic consolidation. Pye (1966:9) identified mass mobilization and participation, building of democracy, stability and orderly change as part of political development. Thus, one of the nation-building desires of any country is to consolidate its democracy within political and economic environments of perpetual underdevelopment and retrogressive signs for economic, administrative, legal and overall developments. Therefore, consolidation of democracy and nation-building require a free electoral commission for better performance and an orderly transfer of power from one democratic government to another without crisis and conflict as well as respect for human right and citizen rights.

## Role of the United States in Nigeria's Democratic Consolidation under Military Rule (1983-1999)

A turning point in the political transition of Buhari military administration was ushered by the alleged report of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US in April 1983 prior to the taking over of power by the administration. The report predicted that the US government would consider the possibility of installing a friendly military regime in Nigeria to replace the corrupt civilian administration of Shehu Shagari in 1983 (*Daily Sketch*, 1983:1). Although, the US denied any attempted to dislocate Nigeria's democratic experiment, the perceived corruption charges pointed a relevant factor that could influence sanctions on democratic transition and relations between Nigeria and the US.

Position of fugitives came into fore in the chain of events that stimulated relations between Buhari administration and the US government. In 1984, Nigerian government requested that the foreign governments return all fugitives back to Nigeria to answer corrupt charges against them (Obong-Oshotse, 1984: 8). In

response to the Nigeria's request, US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Thomas William Smith expressed US government commitment to co-operate with Nigeria in her effort to get wanted politicians back to Nigeria. Indeed, the US government fulfilled this promise when it cancelled Umaru Dikko's American visa following a controversy surrounding this attempted kidnap (Obong-Oshotse 1984:8). This demonstrates that despite US objection to military rule; still, question of fighting corruption, an aspect of nation-building, brought about closer and warm relations her and Nigeria.

Human rights issues also factored significantly into Nigeria and US relations. The US Human Rights Report of 1984 described Nigeria's human rights records as healthy and also committed to the democratic principle of the open society (*Guardian*, 1985:12). Tribunal verdict of a black American housewife, Mrs. Marie McBroom testified Nigeria's positive record of human rights and placed the country into position of closer ties with the US (Olofintila, 1985:3).

In July 1987, a transition programme was inaugurated by Babangida's administrationthat recorded greater intensity of inter-agency collaboration between Nigeria and the US until the cooperation was scuttled by the events surrounding the nullification of June 12, 1993 presidential election (Oyovbaire & Olagunju, 1996: 174). Prior to the annulment, in January 1990 and in August 1992, Nigerian government arranged a state visit to US for the Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida; however, the US government decided to scuttle the visits due to some unresolved issues relating to the handling of transition programme by the military regime. Although, in 1991, Babangida visited US for a United Nations Meeting, the US government declined to accord his visit a status of state visit, maintaining that the Nigerian head of state was coming in his capacity as the OAU chairman, and not as Nigerian head of government (Ebok, 1992: 2). This illustrates instrumentality of state visits in compelling Nigerian military regime to implement reforms concerning the political transition.

Equally, in January 1993, when Nigerian military regime was perceived to extend its stay in power, the US government worked with civil society groups in Nigeria such as Civil Liberty Organization (CLO) and Campaign for Democracy (CD) in order to put pressure on the regime to quit power for a democratically elected government (Adewale, 1993: 28). It was the effort of the Nigerian civil society forces that shaped the decision of the United States' Information Services (USIS) in Lagos to frown at a shift of the presidential elections in Nigeria (Saliu, 2006: 24). The event opened up diplomatic face-off between the two countries. This demonstrates the instructive position of civil society groups in Nigeria and role of US in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria.

Similarly, in July 1993, when Nigerian government released a statement that suspended NEC and repealed two Decrees governing the transition to civil rule (Mbeke-Ekanem, 2000: 51), the US government through the Department of State, invited the then Nigerian Ambassador to US to inform him of the US decision on the matter. In addition, selective sanctions were also imposed on the military and members of their immediate families, and top government functionaries of Nigeria from entering the US. Several aid packages were suspended in the continued bid to

show US displeasure at the interruption of the transition programme to democratic civilian rule in Nigeria (Obi, 1997: 159). All these measures were applied against Nigeria because of the attitude of its leaders toward democratic consolidation, one of the elements of US interests in Nigeria.

It can be argued that the diplomatic pressure by the US had been one of the external factors that forced the Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida to quit power on 27 August 1993. Consequently, Babangida swiftly handed over power to the Interim National Government (ING) under the leadership of Chief Earnest Shonekan because of the perpetual domestic and external pressures. The US also called upon the ING in Nigeria to allow Abiola's full participation in the resolution of the political crisis that derived by the annulment of the June 12 elections (Kareem, 1993:1). However, The ING did not last long because of the weak political base that neither used military decrees nor civilian respected constitution. Hence, General Sani Abacha intervened and promised to respect the nation-building efforts of democratic consolidation.

Under General Sani Abacha, human rights violation emerged as a central issue to the US on democratization in Nigeria. It should be noted that the US government took the Nigeria's alleged human rights abuses as an issue which could determine the credibility of the transition programme in Nigeria (Nnanna, 1997:9). Between 1994 and 1996, special envoy, Ambassador McHenry travelled to Nigeria for eight times seeking moderation on the Abacha regime's decision concerning democratic commitment (Mikell &Lyman, 2001: 28). In general, members of the US Congress had been active concerning decisions on Nigeria's democratic transition programme. Debates in the Congress that discussed the Nigerian Democracy Act in a Senate Bill S. 1419 urged that "in the specific context of those goals (democracy and human rights) is served by engagement and dialogue calculated to build the institutional foundations of democracy and the culture of respect for rights of the individual," rather than outright sanctions (Ayam, 2006: 43).

Execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights advocates appeared top in the record of events that caused sanction and strained relations between Abacha regime and the USgovernment. On November 8, 1995, the Provisional Ruling Council, the highest decision-making body of the regime, met at Abuja and confirmed the death sentences (Mbeke-Ekanem, 2000: 164). Following the confirmation of the hang sentences, in November 1995, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department in Washington D.C., Nicolas Burns, condemned the trial as it was done outside the regular court system and had no regard to the rights of the accused. In spite of the calls and pleas from the international community, the military regime in Nigeria hanged Saro-Wiwa and eight others on November 10, 1995. The timing of the sentences coincided with the Commonwealth meeting in Auckland, New Zealand; therefore, the hanging stimulated the 52-Nations organization to suspend the membership of Nigeria in the group. Bilaterally, President Bill Clinton of the United States of America recalled US envoy from Lagos and imposed an arms embargo on Nigeria (Mbeke-Ekanem, 2000: 164).The decision on embargoes was successfully attained by the US, when in January 1996, Federation of International Football

Association (FIFA), which US has been a member, responded to the Nigeria's boycotts of the Nations' Cup because of the Visa problem that Nigeria experienced due to sanction by the European Union (Mbeke-Ekanem, 2000: 186). The bilateral tensions had reached the extent that in December 1997, the street corner by the side of the Embassy of Nigeria in Washington D.C. was renamed after Alhaja Kudirat Abiola contrary to the wishes of the Nigerian government. In this regard, Abacha administration decided to rename the Eleke Crescent, which hosted American Embassy in Victoria Island, Lagos, to Lowis Farakkan, an opposition element in the US (Akinterinwa, 2000: 15; Boer, 2000: 2). This demonstrates the extent of the irritating relationsbetween the two countries.

Following Abacha's death and subsequent death of Moshood Abiola (the acclaimed winner of June 12, 1993 presidential election), the military transitional regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar implemented decisions onnation-building and democratic consolidation that were welcomed by the US government (Oni, 2000: 33). Thus, in October 1998, the US State Department announced termination of a presidential proclamation that restricted entry into the US the high-ranking Nigerian officials and their family-members. Prior to the US State Department's announcement, General Abubakar, in September 1998, visited the US for a U.N. General Assembly meeting and met with President Clinton at the White House in his capacity as Nigerian Head of State, an opportunity that was denied to General Babangida in 1991. It should be noted that the transitory nature of the regime and its commitment to the activities of nation-building and democratic consolidation, notwithstanding its military inclinations, earned the government favourable understanding from the US government.

**Role of the US in Nigeria's Democratic Consolidation under Civilian Administrations (1999-2015)**

Nigeria returned to democratic civilian rule in May 1999 after 15 years of uninterrupted military rule. Prior to the transfer of power to the civilian administration, the penultimate military government of General Abubakar signed into law on May 5, 1999, a constitution (effective only on May 29) for the elected civilian administration. The constitution was based largely on the suspended 1979 constitution that prescribed on a presidential system of government to Nigeria, in furtherance of nation-building agenda (Anaba, 2000:12). The democratic and presidential characteristics of the government explain the justification for the US positive sanctions toward Nigerian administration because it was in accordance with the aspirations and yeaning of American decision makers.

Following the inauguration of democratically elected government in Nigeria, the Democrat government of President Clinton of the US gave Nigeria a waiver on narcotics, certified direct air link to US with the signing of Open Skies Agreement on December 20, 1999 by the two countries; on the account that Nigeria should make progress toward democratization (Oni, 2000:33). Bilateral assistance increased from $38 million in 1999 to $107 in 2000. The assistance was mostly handled by the USAID, an arm of American Department of State (Oni, 2000:33). Similarly, within

the first 20 months of Obasanjo administration, seven cabinet secretaries visited Nigeria along with numerous senior sub-cabinet officers (Mikell &Lyman, 2001:15). President Clinton had paid a three-day official visit to Nigeria in August, 2000, and met with President Obasanjo and Nigeria's National Assembly (Dagne, 2006:11). In fact, this was the first time in 22 years Nigeria hosted an American president, the last time when Nigeria received an American President was in 1978 when President Jimmy Carter, Democrat, Visited Nigeria. It should be noted that both Clinton and Carter were Democrat's presidents. This illustrates that African interests lay more in American politics in Democrat administrations than in Republican administrations.

However, frequent ethnic clashes had set in to challenge Nigeria's efforts of nation-building and democratic consolidation; particularly the experiences in Odi (Bayelsa State) in 1999 and Zaki-Biam (Benue State) in 2001 are good examples. The two experiences had witnessed the deployment of the military that amounted to clear cases of extrajudicial executions by the Obasanjo's government that threatened Nigeria's journey towards democratization (Human Rights Watch, 20002; Kalu, 2002). In addition, the actions contravened Nigeria's obligations toward international human rights law. In response to the events, the US government cut back the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Assistance to Nigeria (Mikell, 2008:286). According to Ambassador Jeter,

> The decision to suspend military aid was taken after we had expressed our views on the killings in Benue State for which we have called for thorough investigation...the U.S. was interested in seeing peace and prosperity in Nigeria and its transition from one civilian administration to another (Mikell, 2008:286).

It can be argued that the Nigerian government's failure to call for an official inquiry on the indiscriminate killings of civilians had been seen as detrimental to the priority of democratization in Nigeria by the US decision makers. In 2003, a bill was sponsored by the US Representative Henry Bonilla; it was introduced during the 2004 budget appropriation debate. The appropriation on foreign assistance Act had enabled Nigeria to benefit from such money set aside for foreign government since Nigeria's restoration of democracy. However, the US Congress listed some limitations in the way of Nigeria benefiting from the 2004 appropriations because of evidence of human rights violation of the Obasanjo administration (Akande, 2004: 1).

In 2005, a number of events challenged Nigeria's democratic consolidation. One of these events was the speculated tenure elongation of President Obasanjo. The tenure elongation bid attracted the concern of both domestic and international community. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was clear concerning the term limit of political office holders. Thus, stating, "A person shall not be qualified for election to the office of president if…he has been elected to such office at any two previous elections" (FRN, 1999: 4(137). The amendments were allowed, however, if it is approved by the votes of not less than two-third majority of all the members of the two chambers of the National Assembly and endorsed by resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two thirds of all the states

(Paden, 2008:81). President Obasanjo sought for tenure elongation through amendment of the 1999 Constitution (Habib, 2006:11). The events have not only been attempts to frustrate the agendas for nation-building and democratic consolidation but also have serious consequence in the Nigeria's relations with foreign governments. In February 2006, US Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte when testifying before U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence warned that any attempt at tenure extension by President Obasanjo could lead to political strife and eventual breaking of the country (Ununaiju, 2006:1). In late April 2006, the US government in a statement issued by the US Embassy in Abuja insisted that a third term for Obasanjo and State Governors threatened Nigeria's democracy.

Multilaterally, in April 2006, the G-8 Nations (an organization to which UShas been a member) showed their concerned about the potentially negative example of violating the two-term limit in Nigeria. In this regard, the G-8 apparently declined to invite Nigerian President Obasanjo in its 2006 meeting because of his efforts to extend his administration beyond its two-term constitutional mandate (Paden, 2008:45). The US pressures to the constitutional amendment on tenure elongation in Nigeria were part of the factors that resulted in the Senate turning down of the proposed changes on May 16, 2006 and the issue of tenure elongation was put to rest. In response to Nigeria's decision to turn over the tenure elongation, President Bush of the US described the decision as victory for democracy in Nigeria (Akande, 2006, p.4).

Similarly, following the 2007 elections marred by serious irregularities and massive international and domestic criticism, the US government expressed concern and declared that the FGN and INEC should rectify the irregularities in the presidential polls (Okwara, 2007, p.2). In the final decision, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Jendayi Frazer expressed disappointment of the US in the manner elections were conducted and cautioned that outright cancellation of the elections could trigger political instability. In response to the US government's plea, Yar'Adua administration set up an ad hoc committee to look into the records of the INEC, formed a Government of National Unity and promised to respect rule of law and implement reforms in the INEC (Okwara, 2007: 2).

Consequently, in 2008, a US-based think-tank and an independent research organization, the Peace Fund released its 2008 failed state index report and ranked Nigeria as the 15th in nations of most failed states. The ranking moved Nigeria upward than previous year position; 18th in 2007. The index's ranks were usually based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability; four social, two economic and six political. The indicators were not designed to forecast when states may experience violence or collapse. Instead, they were meant to measure state's vulnerability to collapse or conflict (Akosile, 2009: 6). The improved record of Nigeria in the failed states index demonstrates that there has been progress concerning Nigeria's democratic consolidation.

More recent, from 2009-2018 (during the administrations of Presidents Jonathan and Buhari), frequent domestic crisis that relate to ethno-religious, political and economic dimensions challenged nation-building and democratic consolidation in

Nigeria. Some of these domestic security challenges included Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram insurgency, cattle rustling, farmer-herdsmen clashes, rampage kidnappings. The resurgence of crimes and others that relate with kidnap were some of the security problems that call for issuance of travel warning to Nigeria by the US. The most violent and worrisome of these conflicts has been the Boko Haram uprising in the north-east. The conflict has transformed the areas of operations into a highly militarized zone, with obvious consequences for the country's national integration and democratic consolidation. In 2012, the United States of America listed Shekau along with two other top leaders of Boko Haram, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi, in the list of international terrorists (Alozieuwa, 2012). In 2014, the sect abducted over 200 schoolgirls at Chibok, Borno State. This action precipitated international concern and calls for the release of the abducted school girls by the US and other countries.

**Implication of the Sanctions Employed by USA on Nigeria**

Analysis of the implication of sanctions employed by the US against the Nigerian policy makers brings into to light the role of the US government in the country's efforts towards democratic consolidation and nation-building. The sanctions employed from the side of US on Nigeria suggested two types: positive and negative. A positive sanction was synonymous with a permission or approval; while a negative sanction was a penalty or disapproval, which was taken to either maintain or compel a change in the status quo. It should be noted that sanctions taken against Nigeria by the US regarding the matter of Nigeria's anti-democratic attitude toward the transition programme were mostly negative. The sanctions taken against the Nigerian military and civilian administrations were aimed at consolidating democracy in Nigeria.

As a matter of evidence, throughout the period of military rule (1983-1998), the military regimes, especially those of General Babangida and General Abacha had committed some actions that were perceived by the US as anti-democratic. Prominent among these actions included nullification of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections results, the execution of the nine Ogoni human rights advocates in 1995 and Abacha's efforts of self succession in political power. These actions precipitated the US to place different sanctions against the Nigerian military regimes that included ban on military cooperation, sports boycott and air travel embargo to Nigeria. The ban on military cooperation affected the sale of new and repairs of old military equipment. Other sanctions included decertification of Nigeria from drug trafficking free countries, freezing of the country's assets, campaign for isolation of Nigeria among the international community and placing of visa restriction on the Nigerians who were directly involved in the scuttling of democratic process in the country. The sanctions stand to explain the level of negativism received by Nigeria from the US; the actions demonstrate a higher level of misunderstanding by US to the Nigerian authorities then.

It can be argued that formal state visits had been used as instrument of sanction in the relations between the two countries within the period. Indeed, General

Abacha had never visited the US in his capacity as the Head of State. While General Babangida had attempted and scheduled formal state visits to the US in January 1990 and August 1992, respectively, the U.S.A government declined approval of his visit because of the way his administration handled the democratic transition programme. Moreover, in 1991, when General Babangida visited Washington for a UN meeting, the US government declined to accord his visit the status of formal state visit (Ebok, 1992: 2). The foregoing demonstrates high level of Negativism in the continuum of sanctions that the U.S.A placed on Nigeria.

Contrastingly, in their efforts of nation-building, the civilian administrations in Nigeria had also committed political actions that were perceived by the US as anti-democratic. The most apparent of these actions included human rights violation with the killings of civilians in Odi and ZakiBiam by the Nigerian military, the election malfeasant in 2003, the 2006 third term bid of President Obasanjo and the April 2007 election flaw, which President Yar'Adua emerged as winner. These actions also called for sanctions from the US against the Nigerian government. Some of these sanctions included cutting back of the IMET assistance to Nigeria; the condemnation and rejection of the third term bid of President Obasanjo through remarks and press releases by policy makers and institutions of the US. Thekinds of sanctions taken against Nigeria by the US government illustrate application of lowest level of misunderstanding to Nigerian civilian administrations.

In some cases, US government uses provision of foreign aid as an instrument for sanction towards democratic consolidation and enhancing economic development and nation-building in some countries. In Nigeria,unlike other countries where the US was able to use the provision of foreign aid as a means of political sanction towards democracy, as was the case in Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi, the US was unable to effect the same in Nigeria.The US used drug trafficking, air flights link, human right affairs and maintenance of regional peace as well as security as instruments for sanctioning Nigerian government towards democratic progress because Nigeria was not too heavily dependent on foreign aid (Dagne, 2006, p. 9). Owing to the relevance of oil in Nigeria and the US nation-building processes, the application of unilateral oil sanction was ruled out by the US on the ground that it did not make economic sense (Abati, 1996, p.23).

Consequent upon the US sanctions, the Nigerian civilian administrations demonstrated positive behaviour towards the sanctions enforced by the US. For instance, external pressures have been one of factors that made the civilian administration of President Obasanjo declined its interest of tenure elongation. The same positive attitude was recorded from President Yar'Adua's government on matters relating to flaw of elections of April 2007. President Yar'Adua set up an ad hoc committee to investigate INEC performances and implemented reforms in the INEC. The nation-building efforts by the civilian governments with the National Assembly in operation demonstrated changes in the conduct of government towards processes of nation-building. This also demonstrates that nation-building agenda are perhaps attained more in democratic institutions than with the military dictatorship.

## Conclusion

It was highlighted in the paperthatnation-building requires equipping a polity with instruments, including political sanctions, which are necessary to increase capacity of effective self-governing power for economic, social and cultural developments of a nation. It has also been established that the concept of nation-building is synonymously used with terms such as democratization, democratic consolidation, and political development. In Nigeria, efforts of democratic consolidation and nation-buildinghad been conducted with actions and decisions by both military and civilian administration that precipitated different sanctions from the US against the Nigerian government. These actions and decisions included nullification of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections results, the execution of the nine Ogoni human rights advocates in 1995, Abacha's efforts of self succession in political power, human rights violation with the killings of civilians in Odi and Zaki-Biam by President Obasanjo; the election malfeasance in 2003; the 2006 third term bid of President Obasanjo and the April 2007 elections. Outcomes of the sanctions by the US were determined by both positive and negative responses of Nigerian government towards the various demands of the US. Negative actions and responses were part of the factors that caused Nigeria's negative image and strained relations with the US. While positive behaviours by Nigerian government towards the sanctions enforced by the US were part of actions that enhanced understanding and good image in the relations between the two countries. Therefore, the paper suggests that political sanctions by the US or international community should be considered as instrument for nation-building and as a means and effort of consolidating democracy in Nigeria and elsewhere. The positive or negative consequences and implications of the sanctions should always serve as a guide to policy makers in relations and in the evaluation of nation-building agenda.

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# BREXIT, Trumpian Doctrine, and the Future of Globalism

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## Abstract

*Contemporary globalization is largely traceable to the neoliberal cum neo-conservative economic doctrines of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in Britain and United States, respectively. The forces of globalization have since marched on inexorably with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Two largely unforeseen events, or so they seemed, the sudden exit of Britain from the European Union and the emergence of Donald Trump as the 46th President of the United States with his doctrine of 'ultra neo-nationalism', have combined to cast a shadow on the future of global intercourse within a neoliberal capitalist order. In the context of the emerging scenario, the questions that readily agitate the mind include: shall the 'global movement of history' be reversed by the same powers that unleashed them? How would the stability of the international system be maintained, and for how long, devoid of US hegemonic superintendence? These and similar concerns form the raison d'etre of this paper. Data for the study were collected mainly from documentary sources and interpreted through qualitative descriptive analysis. It argues that rather than reverse the trend towards globalism, the current rumblings in the neoliberal epicenters shall seek to fiercely transform the current global order to conform more strictly to its original intendment of 'beggar thy neigbour'.*

**Keywords:** Brexit, Trumpian Doctrine, neo-liberalism, globalism, hegemony.

## Introduction

Without doubt, the contemporary global economic and political order was fashioned by the neoliberal and ultra-conservative regimes of Margret Thatcher in Britain (1979 to 1990) and Ronald Regan in the United States of America (1981 to 1989). It fossilized out of the ashes of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which provided an ideological counterpoise to neo-liberalism and hoisted on the world a bipolar world order. Following the turn of events in 1989-1990, the forces of globalism have since marched on triumphantly in a 'last-man-standing' kind of way, with every nation on earth expected to ride the tide.

As with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was largely unforeseen, two recent tumultuous but equally unforeseen events; the vote by Britain in referendum on June 23, 2016 to exit the European Union (EU) and the emergence of Donald Trump as the 46th President of the United States, riding as he did, on the crest of his anti-globalism mantra, have combined to challenge as never before the inexorable match of the forces of globalization. This has begun to agitate the minds of analysts and practitioners alike concerning the future of globalism. In the context of the emerging scenario, questions are being asked as to whether the exit of Britain from the EU and the 'America First' doctrine of President Trump would mark a reversal of

globalism or whether they merely constitute bumps on the globalist highway. This paper argues that acting alone or conjointly, Brexit and the Trumpian doctrine would constitute neither a reversal of globalism nor even a bump on its road as is currently canvassed. On the contrary, both events smack of an attempt by the epicenters of contemporary globalization to reinforce the rules of the game and plug all channels that have enabled unintended growth and development in some countries of the global South.

## Unbundling Globalism

The global economic and political order that was created in the aftermath of World War II is under attack by President Trump (Stiglitz, 2017). To analyze what this "globalist" phenomenon is that Trump has made the centerpiece of his wrath, however, one must first define globalism as a phenomenon (Christoff-Kurapovna, 2017). According to Christoff-Kurapovna (2017, para. 4):

> globalism in general stands for the stateless state; for centralized power without a center — without a pivotal figure of responsibility or moral authority — made up of floating and interchangeable parts everywhere and nowhere at once. It is a network of central banks, international political and monetary institutions like the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank; of academic conformity, media conformity and cultural conformity spread thick and impenetrable.

Christoff-Kurapovna therefore describes Trump's stance as nothing short of revolutionary. Regardless of Trump's inconsistencies with regard to several of his policy positions as with NATO, Israel, or Russia, Christoff-Kurapovna identified three positions that are the most significant to his anti-global agenda but which have received the least attention in the media. The first, according to Christoff-Kurapovna, was his statement shortly after the election that the United States would no longer engage in "reckless interventionism." The second was his repeated skepticism of the Federal Reserve and his being one of the few political leaders to speak out against the dangers of a "bubble" economy. Third, and most importantly, from the point of view of Christoff-Kurapovna, is his remark that the nation-state must return as a force in world affairs (Christoff-Kurapovna, 2016).

Nye (2002) had however indicated that many people tended to confuse or conflate globalism with globalization. He however insists that there are important differences between the two. Globalism, at its core, Nye explained, seeks to describe and explain nothing more than a world which is characterized by networks of connections that span multi-continental distances. It attempts to understand all the inter-connections of the modern world — and to highlight patterns that underlie (and explain) them. In contrast, Nye noted, globalization refers to the increase or decline in the degree of globalism. It focuses on the forces, the dynamism or speed of these changes. In short, globalism should be seen as the underlying basic network, while globalization refers to the dynamic shrinking of distance on a large scale. Globalism is a phenomenon with ancient roots. Thus, the issue is not how old globalism is, but

rather how "thin" or "thick" it is at any given time. Nye cited as an example of "thin globalism," the Silk Road which provided an economic and cultural link between ancient Europe and Asia. Getting from thin to thick globalism is globalization — and how fast we get there is the rate of globalization. Thus, "globalization" is the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick/intense (Nye, 2002).

Nye then made the all important point that both globalism and globalization are all too often defined in strictly economic terms whereas the other forms are equally important. He identified four distinct dimensions of globalism namely: economic, military, environmental, and social. Economic globalism involves long-distance flows of goods, services and capital and the information and perceptions that accompany market exchange. These flows, in turn, organize other processes linked to them. One example of economic globalization is low-wage production in Asia for the United States and European markets. Economic flows, markets and organization — as in multinational firms — all go together.

Environmental globalism refers to the long-distance transport of materials in the atmosphere or oceans or of biological substances such as pathogens or genetic materials that affect human health and well-being. Nye cited examples of environmental globalization to include the accelerating depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer as a result of ozone-depleting chemicals — or the spread of the AIDS virus from central Africa around the world beginning at the end of the 1970s. Military globalism on the other hand refers to long-distance networks in which force, and the threat or promise of force, are deployed. A well-known example of military globalism is the "balance of terror" between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War — a strategic interdependence that was both acute and well-recognized. What made this interdependence distinctive was not that it was totally new — but that the scale and speed of the potential conflict arising from interdependence were so enormous. Military globalization manifested itself forcefully post-cold war in the tragic events of September 11, 2001 when geographical distances were shrunk as the lawless mountains of Afghanistan provided the launching pad for attacks on New York and Washington — some 4,000 miles away (Nye, 2002).

The fourth dimension is social and cultural globalism. It involves movements of ideas, information, images and of people, who of course carry ideas and information with them. Examples include the movement of religions — or the diffusion of scientific knowledge. In the past, social globalism has often followed military and economic globalism. However, in the current era, social and cultural globalization is driven by the Internet, which reduces costs and globalizes communications, making the flow of ideas increasingly independent of other forms of globalization.

Nye acknowledged that the division of globalism into separate dimensions, as presented above, is somewhat arbitrary but rightly insists that it is useful for analysis, given that changes in the various dimensions of globalism do not necessarily go together. For example, economic globalism rose between 1850 and 1914 — and fell between 1914 and 1945. However, at the same time as economic globalism was declining during the two World Wars, military globalism rose to new heights — as

did many aspects of social globalism. The question as to whether globalism declined or rose between 1914 and 1945, for instance, can only be answered in relation to the dimension, or sphere, of globalism that is in issue. Without a specifying adjective, therefore, general statements about globalism are often meaningless — or misleading. The same applies when talking about globalization or globalism today. Based on the historic evidence, we should expect that globalism will be accompanied by continuing uncertainty. That there would be a continual competition between increased complexity and uncertainty on the one hand — and efforts by governments, market participants and others to comprehend and manage these systems on the other.

An aspect of globalism that Nye curiously left untended in his typology is the political dimension. This entails the unbridled propagation of liberal democracy as the ideal form of political organization and its forceful universalization since the end of the cold war. It was in recognition of this dimension that Fukukawa (2016) described globalism as "an international regime that was attained with the fall of the Berlin Wall as a turning point, beyond the waves of nationalism that dominated the world from the 19th to the 20th century and the East-West ideological divide in the second half of the last century. According to him, it was widely hoped that under globalism:

> the world would maintain peace through cooperation among the major powers while respecting democracy, the rule of law and human rights, promoting economic growth through market mechanism, free trade and liberalized corporate activities, and enhancing human welfare through protection of the environment, improvement in living conditions, propagation of medical care, elimination of poverty and spread of education (Fukukawa 2016, para 13-14).

**State of the Art**

Writing on Brexit as a rejection of globalization, Elliot (2016) recalled that the age of globalisation began with the dismantling of the Berlin wall in 1989, and that it was from that moment that trends which were already evident in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s accelerated. These, according to him, included: free movement of capital, people and goods; trickle-down economics; a much diminished role for nation states; and a belief that market forces, now unleashed, were unstoppable. Eliot noted that there had been push back against globalisation over the years beginning with the violent protests in Seattle in December 1999 during the meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 also highlighted that not only trade and financial markets that had gone global but also instruments of resistance against the negative fallouts of unbridled globalization. According to him, the global financial crisis of 2008 finally put paid to the notion of the state's abstinence from economic processes, including its traditional regulatory roles.

Elliot therefore reckoned that Britain's rejection of the EU as expressed through a referendum in June 2016 was more than a protest against shrinking career opportunities and the lack of affordable homes, but was in fact a protest against the

economic model that has been in place for the past three decades. While acknowledging that not all of Britain's economic woes could be blamed on globalization, he nonetheless insists that the EU is culpable in the sense of failing to fulfill the role previously performed by the nation state as the guarantor of full employment and welfare. He further explained that in the age of globalisation, the idea was that a more integrated Europe would collectively serve as the bulwark that nation states could no longer provide but that this has clearly failed to happen. Following Charles Grant, the director of the Centre for European Reform think-tank, Elliot asserted that Brexit is a momentous event in the history of Europe, and that going forward the narrative would be one of disintegration rather than integration.

Lee (2016) stated that Britain's surprise vote to leave the European Union signals a new era for the post-World War II globalization drive, exposing deep populist anger and leaving open the question of how best to rein in an increasingly connected and interdependent world economy. He opined that going by the vote, Britain and other Western democracies are likely to face growing pressure to put the brakes on open trade and immigration policies that have been hallmarks of world growth. He stated that few are predicting a scenario in which major borders are closed and protectionism rules the day but however noted that the sentiments underlying the British public's rebellion are broadly shared by many others in the EU as well as the United States.

Lee (2016) informed that the backlash stems from a growing realization that the biggest winners of globalization have been international corporations, wealthy families, skilled and educated workers and those with easy access to capital while older, working-class families in many Western nations have instead struggled with stagnant wages, job losses and staggering debt. Income inequality has grown worse in many of the same countries that have embraced globalization. With the so-called Brexit vote, the European Union, itself arguably the most ambitious post-World War II experiment in globalization, appears at risk of unraveling. He further stated that at the core of the "Leave" campaign in Britain was the desire to curtail immigration and reclaim full sovereignty in Parliament, both of which are incompatible with a world that is increasingly globalized. Lee added that a U.K. departure is going to make the entire EU inward-looking, more defensive on globalization and less confident about making it on the back of the world.

Evaluating the implication of Brexit for the future of globalization, Sampson (2017) recalled that since World War II the global economy has become increasingly integrated. Brexit however runs counter to this trend and has ignited a debate about the future of the EU and the global economy. Sampson noted that Brexit may prove to be a minor diversion on the path to greater integration, a sign that globalisation has reached its limits, or the start of a new era of protectionism, pointing out that whichever one of these eventualities is realised would depend, in part, upon whether leave voters supported Brexit to reclaim sovereignty from the EU or as a protest against their economic and social struggles.

Unbundling the Brexit vote, Sampson observed that the referendum split the electorate on the basis of geography, age, education and ethnicity. He found that older

and less educated voters were more likely to vote leave, while large majorities of black and Asian voters supported remain. He further found that voting to leave the EU was also strongly associated with holding socially conservative political beliefs and thinking life in Britain is getting worse rather than better. A further disaggregation of the data established three main regularities thus: First, education and, to a lesser extent, age are the strongest demographic predictors of voting behaviour. Second, poor economic outcomes at the individual or area level are associated with voting to leave, but economic variables account for less of the variation in the leave vote share than educational differences. Third, support for leaving the EU is strongly associated with self-reported opposition to immigration, but a higher share of EU immigrants in the local population is actually associated with a reduction in the leave vote share. There is some evidence growth in immigration is associated with a higher leave vote share, but the effect is small and not always present. Overall, according to Sampson, the picture painted by the voting data is that the Brexit campaign succeeded because it received the support of a coalition of voters who felt left behind by modern Britain. People may have felt left-behind because of their education, age, economic situation or because of tensions between their values and the direction of social change, but, broadly speaking, a feeling of social and economic exclusion appears to have translated into support for Brexit.

**Figure 1**: Leave Vote Shares in Brexit Referendum.



**Source:** Regional data from the Electoral Commission. Demographic data from Lord Ashcroft Polls in Sampson (2017, p.1).

Hazarding some explanations as to the possible motivations for the voting outcome, Sampson quickly dismissed the popular notion that Brexit was the result of a rational assessment of the economic costs and benefits of Brexit on the ground that a consensus exists among economists that EU membership benefits the UK economy on aggregate and that there is no evidence that changes in either trade or immigration due to EU membership have had large enough distributional consequences to offset the aggregate benefits and leave left-behind voters worse off. Sampson therefore proffered two possible plausible hypotheses for why the UK voted to leave. The first, according to him, is the 'Primacy of the Nation State', and the second is the 'Scapegoating of the EU'. Sampson noted that both hypotheses likely played some role in the referendum outcome, but that each would have quite different implications for the future of European and global integration.

Also commenting on the future of globalism, Shinji Fukukawa, a former Vice Minister in Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and president of Dentsu Research Institute, stated that there were mounting developments in world affairs that threaten to disrupt the progress of globalism notably the decision by Britain to leave the European, which has long been considered the model for regional integration and also a major driving force to help establish globalism around the world. He predicted that a string of difficult negotiations would likely ensue over Britain's withdrawal, and that some of the other EU members might follow suit signaling a backward spin of the wheels of globalism.

Fukukawa further pointed at China's expansionary moves in the South China Sea and the East China Sea on the strength of its economic power and military buildup, Russia's gradual but steady expansion of its sphere of influence against the backdrop of the declining influence of the Western powers, as well as the rising risk of nuclear proliferation as exemplified by North Korea's activities and the intensification of global reach of terrorist activities as further dampers on the wheel of globalism. Also, the populist political tendencies among major powers are impeding the appropriate control of market activities, resulting in the creation of excess liquidity thus making the world economy more speculative and uncertain, while turning the economic policies of the major powers more inward-looking. Under these circumstances, globalism stands at a crossroads.

Offering a more sanguine view however, Jing Ulrich, Asia-Pacific managing director and vice-chairman of JPMorgan Chase, didn't believe international integration was under threat. He declared that "The path to globalization will continue, Brexit won't impact cross-national movements." Zhu Min, deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was slightly more worried about the implications of Brexit, warning that the parties involved [in Brexit] should be reminded to support globalization since any reversal in trade negotiations between the U.K. and EU would be have terrible consequences (Chandran, 2016).

With regard to the implication of the emergence of Donald Trump and his ultra-nationalist zeal for the future of globalism, fears have widely been expressed among scholars and practitioners alike that this could as well mark the end of

globalism. Li (2016) stated that as in the Great Recession, the Eurozone crisis stalled trade deals, increased conflict between Russia and the West, electoral revolts against European political elites, and finally Brexit followed the 2008 financial meltdown, the fact that globalization was running out of steam should have been obvious to all. Yet most of its converts were blind, and even the fiercest rebels against globalization never expected to claim the top prize—the White House—and so soon.

Li explained that in the West, the leading disciples of globalism became its greatest beneficiaries. Wealth and power concentrated at the top, among the owners and deployers of capital, who favored free trade, multiculturalism, multilateral institutions, and even regime change and nation building in foreign lands. But their vision harmed the vast majority that constituted the middle class. Just one generation after winning the Cold War, the United States saw its industrial base hollow out, its infrastructure falls into disrepair, its education system deteriorates, and its social contract rip apart. Beyond the economic damage, Li reckoned that changes in social values propagated by globalism threatened social cohesion. Quoting the political scientist Robert Putnam's book, *Bowling Alone*, in which he described in painful detail the collapse of American communities, Li stated that in the name of globalization American elites had been building an empire at the expense of a nation. He declared that "globalism has committed suicide", and that "a new world order has been born" (Li 2016, p. 13).

Chandy and Seidel (2016) identified three levels at which the effects of the Trumpian doctrine on globalization would play out. The first, according to them, is the direct effect of the U.S. turning inward. Being the world's largest economy, measured in market dollars, and its third most populated, a partial withdrawal from the global economy by the U.S. is likely to register in measures of globalized stocks and flows, simply by virtue of the country's size. The second level at which much larger effects are possible in terms of the impact Trump's policies could have on globalism is by changing the behavior of other countries. This may see countries retaliate against U.S. protectionist policies which could precipitate a trade war. The third and final way in which the effect of Trump's election will impact on the future of globalization, according to Chandy and Seidel (2016), is the injection of a huge amount of uncertainty. According to them, the breaking of globalization's first wave a century ago is proof that the forces of global economic integration are neither irresistible nor irreversible. And Trump's ascent to the White House is a testament to this, representing as it does, the biggest shift in the U.S.'s orientation vis-à-vis the global economic system in the post-cold war period. This policy discontinuity is a source of uncertainty in and of itself. Perhaps the most important risk therefore concerns how he will respond to unanticipated events over the period of his presidency, through the prism of his anti-globalist perspective (Chandy & Seidel, 2016).

Murray (2017) stated that both in his campaign speeches and in his initial actions after taking office, Donald Trump has made it clear that he aims in his foreign policy to follow the path of dismantling America's alliance system of turning away an economy that has emphasized globalization to one that is protected by tariffs, and of

pursuing what he called one of "America first." For many Americans, at least to those with some knowledge of the last seventy-five years, Trump's direction appears to be a massive break with the past but that this is actually not the case. According to Murray, for most of its history, the United States has followed a grand strategy that has largely involved a separation from much of the rest of the world. In the eighteenth century, George Washington pointed out that there was little reason for the nascent republic to engage in foreign entanglements, when a great ocean separated the United States from the European powers. All that however changed in the twentieth century with the emergence of a globalized world economy even before the disastrous arrival of the First World War. That conflict eventually pulled the United States into the slaughter on the Western Front. Interestingly, President Woodrow Wilson refused to declare the United States an ally of the Entente Powers, but instead announced that America was an associated power. Only in the war's last months did American forces engage in major fighting. Nevertheless, the United States emerged as the great victor. It was now the world's dominant economic and financial power. Yet, almost immediately upon the war's conclusion, the United States withdrew into semi-isolation, refusing to join the League of Nations.

Thompson (2017) also identified marked consistency in US grand strategy between 1992 and 2016. He explained that even though the foreign policy records of the post-Cold War presidents – Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama – differed, sometimes dramatically, they shared fundamental assumptions about international politics and the strategy the US should pursue to maximize the safety and prosperity of its citizens. This entailed the core objectives of military predominance – albeit paired with a network of security alliances and membership in international organizations – the lowering of trade barriers, and the spread of democracy. In addition, each administration viewed legal immigration as desirable economically and acceptable culturally. This agenda also served a wider objective – the maintenance and spread of the liberal world order. This policy of enlightened self-interest, with the US benefitting as much as its partners and allies, was consistent with mainstream thinking after 1945. When it came to grand strategy, at least, the truism about continuity in US foreign policy – that there is a lot more of it than change, regardless of which political party was in power – largely held true.

But the election of Donald Trump has thrown into doubt the future of this pattern. The president represents at least a partial break from the post-1945 consensus. In contrast to his predecessors, he espouses a zero-sum philosophy – foreign policy is about "winning" at the expense of other nations. Furthermore, his ambivalence about the liberal world order – and the level of enthusiasm that this has generated amongst his supporters – raises fundamental questions about the future of US grand strategy and the international system. According to Thompson, the ascent of Trumpism can only be understood against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving world order in the form of the emergence – or rather the return to – a genuinely multi-polar system, as manifested in the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia.

Thompson observed that though the conservative establishment embraced the foreign policy consensus after the late 1940s, many in the grassroots and on the

fringes of the Republican Party never reconciled themselves to internationalism. Trump's successful presidential campaign merely reintroduced populist nationalism to the conservative mainstream. He blamed free trade and immigration for the plight of working-class whites, called into question longstanding security alliances, flouted democratic norms, and accused political and economic elites of using globalization to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the country. In other words, he rejected the foundations of the liberal world order. As an alternative, he touted a path that maximized the national interest at the expense of other nations – an approach he called "America First".

Thompson therefore espoused that Trump's election has altered, for the foreseeable future, the nature of US grand strategy by imparting legitimacy to populist conservative nationalism, which had lurked on the fringes of the Republican Party all along. He predicted that populist nationalism is here to stay even though it may be still too early to conclude that the US has reached an inflection point where a majority of the country rejects internationalism.

**Brexit, Trumpian Doctrine and the Future of Globalism**

It has widely been hypothesized that with Brexit and Donald Trump's fiercely ultra-nationalist bent, that globalism stands imperiled. A closer reading of the scripts, however, tends to prove otherwise. With respect to the Brexit, the most important economic policy area regarding the UK and EU is free trade. While it is not in doubt that Britain has been a very important partner in the 28-member regional body, it is hardly its most important partner even by purely economic parameters. Currently, the UK has a trade surplus of £19.8 billion with the EU. 44% of all UK exports and 53% of all UK imports are with the EU. Seven of the top ten trading partners of the UK are EU member states. Most experts therefore believe that Brexit would hurt British trade. Because the UK's economy is deeply integrated with the rest of the EU, the effects of higher trade barriers could be substantial. According to one study, for every 1% reduction in UK exports to the EU, there would be a 0.5% loss in the British GDP. Another report by the Institute for Fiscal Studies claimed that reduced trade activity and the resulting economic stagnation would cost the UK around £70 billion, more than the £8 billion savings in EU membership fees. The UK agriculture industry would be impacted the most by Brexit because the largest portion of the EU budget is dedicated to subsidies for farmers. In recent years, 60–65% of the UK's agricultural exports and 70% of its agricultural imports were with the EU. These numbers indicate the UK's strong integration into the EU's agricultural markets. With Brexit, farmers would lose subsidies from the EU, increasing the cost of food production and price level in the UK. On top of that, average real wages are lower now than they were a decade ago.

The financial and professional services industry—banks, accountants, corporate lawyers, and investments—would also be greatly impacted by Brexit. London is the largest financial center in Europe. Roughly one-third of the industry's business involves handling transactions for clients in Europe. After Brexit, much of that business could be illegal unless banks satisfy the proclivities of regulators in the

27 EU member states. Banks are already planning to move jobs to cities elsewhere in the EU to ensure that they would be able to execute all trades. Goldman Sachs, for instance, recently confirmed that it planned to move hundreds of jobs out of London to offices in Frankfurt and Paris.

Also, the EU has negotiated 759 treaties and international agreements with 168 countries. These agreements range from customs procedures and agricultural quotas to the landing rights of planes to even trade on sheep meat and goat meat with Iceland. The UK would also need to set up new regulatory agencies and decide on which EU regulations, on issues such as environmental, health, and safety standards, it wants to keep. The UK could choose to renegotiate trade deals with all these countries once it leaves the EU, but this would be a very time-consuming and costly process. Past experience shows that free trade agreements take between five to ten years to negotiate and may need to be ratified by national, and even regional, parliaments. Some countries would be willing to replicate the EU's free trade agreements but some would not. As such, it is unlikely that a comprehensive new agreement would be in place on the day the UK officially leaves the EU, leaving Britain's exporters facing higher barriers to trade and uncertainty over future market access.

Moreover, since the UK's GDP is less than 20% of the EU's GDP, it would have substantially less bargaining power in trade negotiations than the EU does. This is especially true towards countries whose domestic policies favor protectionism, such as the US, China, and India. For many countries that currently do not have a free trade agreement with the EU or are in the process of negotiating one, a trade deal with the UK would not be as important as a free trade agreement with the EU, given the difference in market size. Following from the above, it would appear that predictions about the disintegration of the EU following the British exit are somewhat exaggerated. And so are its projected spiraling effects on the future on globalism.

With regard to the impact of the Trumpian doctrine on the future of globalism, there is a sense in which it could be argued that Trump's position is a function of both an over valuation of national power and a faulty appreciation of the complexities of contemporary globalism. This much is evident from some of the actions Trump has so far taken since assumption of office.
In just one year of his presidency, Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and the Paris climate treaty, launched cruise missiles at Syria for using chemical weapons, increased American arms sales abroad, refused to certify Iran's compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, increased the number of American forces operating in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and rattled sabers on the Korean peninsula (Cato Institute, 2018). He has also imposed a tariff of some 45% against China, a renegotiation of NAFTA, and a tariff against Mexico of some 20% (Stiglitz, 2017).

These actions stem from Trump's long maintained deeply held views about American foreign policy. His overarching worldview is that America is in economic decline because other nations are taking advantage of it. Consequently, three core beliefs dominate Donald Trump's views of the world: repeated criticisms of U.S.

security alliances and an insistence that America's allies pay vastly more for U.S. security protection; outright opposition to every trade deal signed by the U.S. across many decades (especially multilateral agreements); and "a soft spot for authoritarian strongmen, particularly of the Russian variety" (Pollack 2017, p. 9). However, this soft spot does not appear to extend to China, which he appears to view as the preeminent threat to American predominance. Instead he has repeatedly leveled allegations of predatory Chinese economic practices, including currency manipulation. With China in mind, President Trump argues that retaliatory penalties against U.S. firms investing abroad and punitive tariffs on nations for what he deems unfair trade practices would convince or compel U.S. manufacturers to return jobs to the United States. Tom Wright of the Brookings Institute argues that: "Trump's frustration is that [he believes] the United States gets little for protecting other countries or securing the global order, which he sees as a tradeable asset that America can use" (Pollack 2017, p. 9).

As Trump contemplates launching a global trade war, his calculus is like that of a general counting his tanks in comparison with the enemies. He looks at the trade deficit, and infers from that that China is more dependent on the US than the other way around. As has been explained however, matters are far more complicated than this simplistic analysis would suggest. There is therefore a near unanimity among economists even in the United States that his analysis of trade and globalization is wrong, and so too for his analysis of the consequences of a trade war. This is particularly true because China already is engaged in a transition from export led growth to domestically demand driven growth (Stiglitz, 2017). Trump's policies will therefore only hasten that inevitable shift. Moreover, as Trump has antagonized former friends of the US all over the world, there are new alliances to be forged, e.g. with Latin America and Europe. China is sitting on a large amount of reserves. Stiglitz therefore warned that any trade war would have very adverse effects on particular sectors and regions in the US economy, and the fiscally constrained US government would be hard pressed to provide the assistance that they require. Worse still, Trump appears to be focusing so much attention on manufacturing, which employs but 8% of America's workforce. And the matter is further complicated by the fact that just same as the U.S. market share of world merchandise exports has declined sharply over the past decade, so also has her share of world services exports plummeted in the corresponding period. This suggests that the problem is much more complex than the simplistic assumptions Trump has continued to make.

In point of fact, while the direct effects of the U.S. turning inward on global economic integration are important, they are still likely to be relatively small. Much larger effects of the Trumpian doctrine on the future of globalism are therefore to be understood more in terms of the impact Trump's policies could have by changing the behavior of other countries. In the face of Trump's tirades against globalism and the clearly protectionist measures he has so far taken, therefore, Stiglitz enjoined countries, particularly China, to orientate their policies in anticipation of Trump's further protectionist policies. He assured that even though the United States was central to the creation of the international institutions that sustain globalism, these

institutions can "help the world maintain an open yet regulated trading and financial system, even if the US withdraws into its shell, or decides to take actions which violate its obligations" (Stiglitz, 2017, p. 2).

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, it would appear that neither Brexit nor the Trumpian doctrine constitutes a significant reversal of globalism. With respect to Brexit, the simple reason is that Britain, its orchestrator, lacks the economic leverage to decisively reverse or even derail the European integration project, let alone the future of globalism. And with regard to the Trumpian doctrine Donald Trump, its principal purveyor is limited in power and constrained by his class interest. For all his rabblerousing, Trump himself is a capitalist through and through and his economic interests would willy-nilly have him identifying with corporations and capital. Besides, economic globalism is not so much a creation of states as it is of big corporations. States are therefore limited in their power to reverse it. But even more importantly is that what appears to be under attack by both Brexit and the Trumpian doctrine is merely the economic plank of globalism. It is highly doubtful that either the United States or Great Britain would have the interest or the motivation to repudiate the universalization of liberal democracy as the ideal form of societal organization. With the resurgence of Russia and the rising stature of China, this might well spell an invitation to the dreadful prospects of a return to communism and perhaps military rule in fledgling democracies in Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America. All these are in addition to the fact that both powers, Britain and the US are powerless to roll back the massive technological architecture that has propelled and supported the other aspects of globalism. Nor can they wish away the 'illiberal' outgrowths of globalism in the form of ISIS, Boko Haram, and the like, all of which require collaborative global efforts as espoused under globalism to check their spread.

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## Corruption and Electoral Processes in Nigeria, 2015-2019

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## Abstract

*Corruption is endemic, systemic, institutionalised and has assumed the status of a culture in Nigeria. It has pervaded every facet of Nigeria's national life; having negative impact on education, health, and all facets of the nation's socio-economic and political existence. One of the ways through which corruption manifests in the electoral process is through vote buying. Evidences from the recently conducted gubernatorial elections in Ondo, Osun and Ekiti States indicate that vote buying could pose a real danger to the smooth conduct of the 2019 general elections. Thus, this study examined the impact of vote buying on the electoral process in Nigeria. It focuses specifically on Election Day activities. Data for the study was generated through documentary sources and the method of analysis was deductive. The study found that vote buying is fast becoming an economic exchange between the politicians (the buyers) and the electorates (the sellers), and that it introduces a 'market mentality' whereby the electorates see election period as the opportunity to translate their political value into economic utility. The paper recommends the expedited passage of and signing into law of the Bill for an Act for the Establishment of Electoral Offences Tribunal and the Nigerian Electoral Offences Commission currently pending before the National Assembly.*

**Keywords:** Corruption; electoral processes; vote buying; economic exchange; market mentality.

## Introduction

Corruption is endemic and systemic (Okolo & Raymond, 2014), institutionalised (Ogundiya, 2009) and seems to have become a culture (Nmah, 2017) in Nigeria. It is widely acknowledged that culture is the sum total of ways of life built up by a group of human beings transmitted from one generation to another (Australian Department of Education, 2015). Thus, corruption is assuming a way of life that has permeated every facet of national life in the country. It has pervaded the educational, health, social, economic and political spheres.

It is one of the banes of free, fair and credible electoral process, sustainable democracy and development in the country. This manifests in many ways, ranging from the familiar experience of small-scale bribery in daily encounters with public officials to clandestine grand corruption schemes, including the misappropriation of public funds (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, and National Bureau of Statistics, NBS, 2107) leading to the loss of up to 40% of its oil revenue (Ikpeze, 2013). It has also hindered mass participation and people-oriented leadership, turning the country's democracy into what could be termed *moneycracy*

or *Nairacracy.* This, therefore, makes only those who are rich or supported by moneybags able to successfully vie for public offices often through the instrumentality of vote buying.

Even though electoral contestation globally is often capital-intensive, unregulated use of money appears to have taken the centre stage in Nigeria's electoral process. Admittedly, from the pre-election to the Election Day (E-Day) and to the post-election period, money is expended in any electoral process. The government, through the election management body (EMB), the political parties and the candidates all spend money for the conduct of a successful election. Beyond the ideal use of money in the electoral processes, however, Nigeria's electoral democracy is bedevilled with the manipulation of the essence of money in election (Akintola, 2013). The unregulated use of money in the form of campaign financing, including its more clandestine usage in the form of vote buying appear to have contributed to the erosion of the credibility of elections in Nigeria since the Fourth Republic, especially in the build up to the 2019 general elections.

It is against this backdrop, that this paper examined the impact of corruption in electoral processes in Nigeria with particular focus on the manifestations of vote buying in the recently conducted elections and its implications on the current and future elections, sustainable democracy and development in Nigeria. The rest of the paper is divided into five sections namely. The first section is the Conceptual analysis where the basic concepts in the study are put in the perspectives of this paper, the second is the theoretical framework adopted for the study. The third section is on the historical evolution of corruption in electoral processes in Nigeria focusing majorly on the outcome of the E-Day, while the fourth examines the impacts of corruption on electoral processes, democracy and development in Nigeria and the last section is the conclusion and recommendations.

**Conceptual Analysis**

Central to this study are concepts of election, electoral process, corruption and vote buying. Each of the concept will be conceptually linked together to bring to the fore the nexus between and among them. This will be done in order to achieve the objective of the paper.

In a political system that operates democracy, election is very important. It is an avenue through which the government is instituted. It is the test of popularity of a political party, its candidate or a government (seeking for re-election). Consequently, electoral competition has progressively come to occupy a central place in the political life in all political systems that operate it (Akintola, 2013). It is a recognised process involving the selection of some individuals out of many contestants or nominees to occupy official positions of trust for the electorates (Abegunde, 2007). As a recognised means of involving people in governance process, election guarantees the possibility of winning the consent of the people, on whose behalf political power is then exercised.

Accordingly, Harrop and Miller (2003) stated that election, apart from being the procedure for choosing the leaders among the members of a particular group, also

performs two main functions. These are 'bottom-up' functions and 'top-bottom' functions. In performing the former function, election ensures political recruitment, representation; it makes government and helps to influence policy, among others. Election performs the latter functions by building legitimacy, shaping public opinion and strengthening elites.

Thus, election is not just for the benefit of political office holders, it benefits the electorates as it gives them the sense of belonging to the political system when they participate in the 'recruitment' into political offices. It is not just any procedure; it is a unique procedure or set of interrelated procedures. They are procedures that are consummated when public offices are given in trust by the electorate to their representatives (Akintola, 2013). These representatives are selected, chosen or elected out of so many contestants presented to the electorates through the electoral processes.

According to Akamere (2001) as cited in Nnamani (2014, p.80), electoral process refers to all the activities and procedures involved in the election of representatives by the electorates. It refers to all the pre, E-Day and post-election activities without which an election is meaningless. These include the registration of political parties, review of voters' register, delineation of constituencies, resolution of electoral disputes, return of elected representatives, swearing elected representatives. It is also argued that it includes the rules that guide the conduct of election, and important activities that make up an electoral process. Any conduct, therefore, that threatens the electoral process is a subversion of the peoples' sovereignty (Akamere, 2001 cited in Nnamani, 2014, p.80).

The arguments so far indicate that electoral processes can be broken into phases. To reiterate, the processes include the pre-election period, the E-Day and the post-election period. This can be located in the submission of INEC (2006) which indicates that electoral processes are as follows:

  i.     Delimitation of electoral constituencies
  ii.    Registration of voters
  iii.   Notice of elections
  iv.    Nomination of candidates
  v.     Election campaigns
  vi.    Elections, announcement of results and completing tribunal sittings
  vii.   Participation of other organizations
  viii.  Resolution of electoral conflicts from the participation and other organizations or groups.

The implication of the above is that the electoral process is a complex process that encompasses the good intentions and undesirable outcomes of election administration, particularly in emerging democracies where general elections are often marred by culturally hued electoral malpractices (Nnamani, 2014). Thus, Gberie (2011 cited in Samuel, Felix & Godwyns, 2013) argues that the twin problems of mass violence and fraud have become central elements of the history of elections and

of the electoral process in Nigeria. This is a form of political corruption that has pervaded the political space in the country.

Ogundiya (2009) argues that political corruption is connected to any behaviour that violates some formal standard or rule of behaviour set down by a political system for its public officials. However, it is to be noted that everyone, including the electorates, could be involved in it, which renders the definition by Ogundiya rather very narrow. Accordingly, Walecki (2008) argues that illegality is crucial to many definitions of political corruption. Thus, anything connected to illegality in electoral processes is rooted in political corruption. And as far as election and electoral process are concerned in Nigeria, it involves the illegal or unregulated use of money through the giving of cash and other valuable to pervert the sanctity of the electoral process.

Thus, Davies (n.d) submits that:

> Money seems to have taken the centre stage in the political process in most countries and in Nigerian politics; it is sadly, now playing an increasingly critical role. It even appears to be so dominant in the electoral process to such an extent that the word 'money politics' with a pejorative connotation, has crept into the country's political lexicon. It is now a critical variable when assessing the level of political corruption in the country (cited in Ojo, 2006, p.106).

Chief among electoral frauds and malpractices perpetrated through political corruption in the country is vote buying. Vote buying appears in various forms and dimensions. As a form of political corruption, Otite and Umukoro (2010, p.69) argue that it takes the form of:

i.   Sharing money or gift items with the electorates;
ii.  Giving money (bribes) to officers charged with the responsibility of conducting free and fair elections;
iii. Paying law enforcement agents either to intimidate anyone who fails to vote for the 'chosen candidate' or to remain aloof when they witness illegal electoral practices; and
iv.  Employing thugs to intimidate or coerce voters to vote for a particular candidate, preventing elections from taking place in certain areas or encouraging other acts that could prevent the conduct of free and fair elections.

Vote buying is viewed beyond monetary exchange and transaction (Sakariyau, Aliu & Adamu, 2015). It is said to include the distribution of items such as food stuffs, clothing items, etc. This practice is a norm in Nigeria's politicking and a situation where candidate fails to comply; withdrawal of support is usually the consequence (Sakariyau, Aliu & Adamu, 2015). Thus, vote buying is simply an economic exchange (Lucky, 2014). It is a contract or perhaps an auction in which voters sell their votes to the highest bidder (Lucky, 2014) and common to all political systems; it only differs in magnitude and manifestations from one polity to the other

(Sakariyau, Aliu & Adamu, 2015). There is no doubt that it has taken a worrisome trend and has negatively affected the conduct and outcomes of election in Nigeria.

**Theoretical Framework**

The paper adopted the economic theory of democracy propounded by Downs (1957) as its framework of analysis. The theory was originally propounded to make sense of several features of American political campaigns that previous sociological and social psychological approaches had missed almost entirely because they saw voters' choices as rooted in "party loyalty and group identity" (Grofman, 1995, p.379). The main assumptions of the economic theory of democracy are:

i.   Each political party is a team of men who seek office solely in order to enjoy the income, prestige, and power that go with running the governing apparatus.

ii.  The winning party (or coalition) has complete control over the government's actions until the next election. There are no votes of confidence between elections either by a legislature or by the electorate, so the governing party cannot be ousted before the next election. Nor are any of its orders resisted or sabotaged by an intransigent bureaucracy.

iii. Government's economic powers are unlimited. It can nationalise everything, hand everything over to private interests, or strike any balance between these extremes.

iv.  The only limit on government's powers is that the incumbent party cannot in any way restrict the political freedom of opposition parties or of individual citizens, unless they seek to overthrow it by force.

v.   Every agent in the model-whether an individual, a party or a private coalition-behaves rationally at all times; that is, it proceeds toward its goals with a minimal use of scarce resources and undertakes only those actions for which marginal return exceeds marginal cost (Downs, 1957, p.137).

From the foregoing, Downs developed the central thesis of his theory. He argued that political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes. They do not seek to gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any particular interest groups; rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain office (Downs, 1957, p.137). Therefore, he submitted with regard to the manifestos, government policies and all the actions of politicians that "in effect, it is an entrepreneur selling policies for votes instead of products for money" (Downs, 1957, p.137).

Downs argues that politicians and their parties are primarily concerned with winning elections; thus construct policy platforms that correspond to voters' preferences (Grofman, 1995, p.379). The theory states that a political party wants to maximise supports by defining its manifesto and programmes in order to gain support, while electorates or voters expect political utility which is satisfaction of their needs (Ibrahim, Liman & Mato, 2015). According to this theory, voters will

more likely vote for a political party or a candidate that would provide such utility for them.

In effect, it can be argued that in line with economic theory of democracy, giving of political utility (referred to as "stomach infrastructure" by Ayo Fayose, the former governor of Ekiti State and other inducements e.g. food stuffs, clothing materials, among others) and voting for a particular candidate in an election is a form of economic exchange. As perceived rational beings the electorates' acceptance of offer of money and other valuables made by the Nigerian politicians is an attempt to maximise political utility during election. On the other hand, the votes received during elections from the electorates are marginal return which exceeds marginal cost (of giving money and other valuables). Nigerian politicians, therefore, engage in this economic exchange rather than seek to gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any particular interest groups but solely in order to enjoy the income, prestige, and power that go with running the governing apparatus. This is at the expense of the electorates that sold their votes in exchange for immediate political utility.

**Historical Evolution of Corruption in Electoral Process in Nigeria**

Electoral process in Nigeria is rife with incidences of vote buying. This form of electoral malpractices is noticeable in almost all the general elections ever conducted in the country. In the First Republic, the three main political parties; the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) that later changed to National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG) (Dudley, 1982; Kehinde, 2007) contested the 1959 general elections "but the NPC won the highest (134) seats" (Dudley, 1982, p.61). Even though ethnicity played a major role in the election, politicians distributed T-Shirts, Caps and badges with party emblems, some food stuff and sundry items, to voters at political rallies, even though there was no huge spending by individual candidates to win elections as obtains currently in the political activities of candidates (Lucky, 2014).

Electoral frauds and malpractices became more popular in the Second Republic. In the 1979 General Elections, five political parties were registered and contested for elections at various levels; the Unity Part of Nigeria (UPN), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigerian People's Party (NPP), Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) (Olaniyan, 2007). At the time, vote-buying had become a national political malaise as both the electorates and officials of the national electoral body were daily inundated by offers of financial rewards to alter either their decisions about the party and candidate to vote for, or the outcomes of elections in their favour (Olugbenga, 2007). Even the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) members of staff were variously accused of aiding and abetting the perpetration of electoral fraud (Ofonagoro, 1981; Kurfi, 1983). Beginning from the Second Republic, election became a source of economic exchange. As Dudley (1982, p. 70) observed:

The elections did show that for the political elite, power was an end-in-itself and not a means to the realisation of some greater 'good' for the community, and whatever the instrumentalities employed in the pursuit of power, such instrumentalities were legitimate.

In the ill-fated Third Republic, even though the annulled presidential election conducted on June 12, 1993 was generally adjudged credible, free and fair (Osaghae, 2002; Kehinde, 2007; Abegunde, 2007), the elements of vote buying were still present. This was despite the fact that the two political parties that fielded candidates for the election; the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), were founded and funded by the Government (Akintola, 2013). One of the reasons given by General Ibrahim Babangida (rtd) for the annulment of the election was vote buying. The General disclosed that:

There were authenticated reports of election malpractice against party agents, officials of the NEC and voters…There were proofs of manipulations, offer and acceptance of money and other forms of inducements…Evidence available to the government put the total amount of money spent by the presidential candidates at over 2.1 billion naira (cited in Ojo, 2006, p.113).

One would have thought that Nigeria should have learnt from the role vote buying played in the annulment of the most-celebrated election conducted in the country. However, vote buying continues unabated in the Fourth Republic. It played a major role in deciding the winners and losers in the 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 (Lucky, 2014) and 2015 general elections. In 2007 general election for instance, Danjibo and Oladeji (2007 cited in Sakariyau, Aliu & Adamu, 2015, p.5) reported that:

There were cases of vote buying and selling in the 'do or die' contests. In Imo state, money was given in exchange for voters' card in polling units. Bribery of voters was equally reported in Calabar municipality. In Edo State, officials of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and party agents were bribed. In Ogun State, the home state of ex-president Obasanjo, voters were bribed with the sum of 200 naira each by party agents in Yewa South Local government. In Osun state, INEC allowed multiple votes and Oyo state witnessed bribing of INEC officials, party agents and observer member of Civil Liberty Organization (CLO) by stalwart of the ruling party in Ward 10, unit 11 of Egbeda Local Government Area.

Also in the 2011 electoral process, starting from pre-election period, especially during campaign period, vote buying reigned supreme. National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2012, p.38) notes that "violations of electoral laws on campaign alleged by representatives of media, parties and civil society across the country included vote-buying with cash or gifts". During the presidential election, votes were bought and sold. However, the pitiable aspect of it was that "while these

incidents were limited and most polling station officials attempted to mollify them, observers noted that the local communities in some areas encouraged these violations" (NDI, 2012, p.58). The local communities, and who might be the electorates, encouraged it because they have seen their votes as means of obtaining utility from the candidates and their parties.

Recently, on Channels Television on Monday, September 10, 2018, the All Progressives Congress (APC) Chairman, Adams Oshiomhole alleged that Former President, Dr Goodluck Jonathan engaged in massive vote buying where he churned out dollars in 2015 to secure the support of the electorates in order to win the presidential election (*The Pulse*, 11th September, 2018). Available evidences also show that in the recently conducted gubernatorial elections in Ondo, Ekiti and Osun States vote buying was phenomenal. In Ondo, some voters were bribed with between N3, 000 and N5, 000 in some polling units to vote for the candidate of the vote buyer (The Punch, 21 July, 2018). In Osun election, one of the contestants created a WhatsApp platform to woo voters and buy their votes as high as N10,000 (*The Punch*, 22nd September, 2018). When one of the correspondents of the Punch Newspaper disguised as a voter in the election and joined the WhatsApp group, the administrator of the group responded to him that:

> You'll receive bank alert 6am on the Election Day. Don't forget to pass this good news to all your friends and family. Make sure you add us to you(r) phone book and don't forget to send this to all your friends and family living in and around Osun State. Expect our call anytime from now (*The Punch*, 22nd September 2018, p.3).

In fact, the Police arrested two suspected vote buyers at Iwo Local Government of the State and the sum of N604, 000 was recovered from them (Daily Post, 22nd September, 2018). However, in Ekiti State, vote buying took a dangerous dimension.

Newspapers (*Daily Trust*, 26th August, 2018; *Sahara Reporters*, 22 July, 2018; The Punch, 21 July, 2018) were awash with ugly trends of vote buying which took place in 2018 Ekiti gubernatorial elections. Politicians kept vigil on the eve of the elections to knock on voters' doors to buy their votes ahead of the election on Saturday, 14th July, 2018 (*The Punch*, 21 July, 2018). Vote buying was nicknamed "as agreed" and "see and buy"; okada riders and bus drivers were allegedly given free vouchers to obtain five and ten litres of fuel respectively at a popular filling station in Ajilosun Area, along Ikere-Ado Road, Ado Ekiti (Sahara Reporters, 22 July, 2018). *Daily Trust* (26th August, 2018) reported that some acts of vote buying were performed in the full glare of security operatives who were supposed to arrest the 'merchants'.

In the just concluded 2019 general elections, especially during the February 23 Presidential and National Assembly elections, politicians did not desist from vote buying despite the alarm raised by President Muhammadu Buhari that many politicians were bent on undermining the credibility of the election through vote buying (*Vanguard*, 11th February, 2019). The President told Nigerians that the

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) had gathered reliable evidence that lots of dollar notes were in circulation which politicians planned to undermine the general elections (The Vanguard, 11th February, 2019; Leadership Newspaper, 6th March, 2019). During the election, the operatives of the EFCC arrested two people in Gombe with wards of naira in their hands (*Leadership*, 6th March, 2019). There were alleged reports of cases of apparent vote buying by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) members in Enugu in almost every polling unit and voting point in the State (*Vanguard*, 25th February, 2019). Also, it was reported that across the length and breadth of the country, vote buyers were scampering for safety at the sight of the operatives of the EFCC during the elections (*Leadership*, 6th March, 2019).

It is noteworthy to state that the incidences of vote buying were not rampant in the 2019 Presidential and National Assembly elections like in the gubernatorial elections preceding it because of various advocacies and campaigns against the act. Notwithstanding, to say the least is to state that the impacts of vote buying is a menace that is capable of reversing the gains ever recorded since the beginning of Fourth Republic in 1999. It is also a threat to sustainable democracy and a bane of development in Nigeria.

## Impacts of Vote Buying on Electoral Processes, Democracy and Development in Nigeria

The implications of vote buying on the electoral process, democracy and development cannot be overemphasised. It goes without saying, especially from the dangerous trend that vote buying has taken recently that it is antithetical to the conduct of free and fair election in Nigeria as it adversely affects the credibility of the process. It has constituted obstacles to organising credible, free and fair election. It seems to have introduced 'market mentality', especially on the E-Day. E-Day is practically turning into platform where candidates (and their political parties) meet the electorates to buy off their (electorates) mandates. Electorates are beginning to see E-Day as the only avenue through which they can 'force' Nigerian politicians to deliver political utility.

Meanwhile, it goes without saying that electorates that sell their votes are ignorant of the fact that they are losing on two fronts. First, they, mostly, do not decide what and how the politicians would buy their votes; politicians decide what their (electorates) vote worth. In an ideal market, this is cheating and unethical. Second, the electorates have practically exchanged the dividends of democracy that are supposed to be delivered to them in the next four years for whatever the politicians gave to them on the E-Day. Politicians practically invested (through vote buying) on E-Day and "where candidates have invested much before being elected or appointed into public office, simple economic rationality will impel them to want to recoup the money they have invested in as many folds as possible" (Sakariyau, Aliu and Adamu, 2015, p.7).

Thus, contesting for any political office is becoming more expensive in Nigeria. For the political parties and their candidates, it is becoming an exercise which the inducement of voters with money and other valuables must be included in

the preparation. This was why in 2018 Ekiti gubernatorial election, according to Sahara Reporters (22nd July, 2018) some governors, from both the PDP and the All Progressives Congress (APC) had allegedly arrived the state a day to the election, with large sums of money in chartered helicopters, allegedly to influence the processes of the poll in favour of their respective political parties participating in the election. It was also reported by the online newspaper thus:

> The spokesman of the campaign organisation of the PDP candidate, Lere Olayinka, alleged that N18b was illegally moved from the Abuja branch of the United Bank for Africa (UBA) to Ekiti State to fund Fayemi's election. Olayinka further alleged that the federal government moved part of the $321m recovered from the late Gen Sani Abacha family to the state for the election. Specifically, he alleged that $50m of the recovered loot was moved from Abuja in a chartered flight through Akure Airport to Ekiti in two bullion vans (Sahara Reporters, 22nd July, 2018; p.4).

This transaction in votes, therefore, denies the credible but not financially buoyant candidates opportunity to win in a fairly contested poll. Instead of election being a platform to choose candidates that will truly represent the interests of the people in government, election just becomes a charade. It has also eroded the power of election as an avenue to demand accountability from political office holders by the voters.

Consequently, poor governance has become the order of the day. According to Sakariyau, Aliu & Adamu (2015, p.7), "as a result of political entrepreneurship that enables wrong people to man institutions of government, most of these institutions in the country lack democratic virtues". The authors submit that this situation has ultimately been creating a devastating impact on the legitimacy of such institutions. And it can be argued that since the institutions lack the legitimacy of the people, it becomes difficult to initiate and implement people-centred programmes. Naturally, the initiated and implemented programmes would be to satisfy the political entrepreneurs that invested in the emergence of the political office holders.

With this, "vote buying undermines citizen's access to the political process, affording the rich and powerful individuals, corporations and big business (that financed the elections of those overseeing public institutions) the opportunity to hijack political influence out of the hands of the great majority" (Chul, Ismail & Samsu, 2017, p.62). This impedes on the citizens' political participation. It has also posed serious developmental challenge being responsible for the poverty of the populace and reducing the citizenry into willing tools in the hands of the political class (Okolo & Raymond, 2014).

Noteworthy also is the fact that the perennial problem of lack of credible and democratic electoral process has been linked with the phenomenon of "failed, uncaring and unresponsive governance in Nigeria" (Durotoye, 2015, p.176). Citing Inokoba and Kumokor (2011), Durotoye further stated thus:

> No wonder, years of civil rule since 1999 has failed to deliver on good roads, functioning health amenities, quality education, uninterrupted power supply, living wages for workers, effective petroleum sector, genuine electoral reform, equitable distribution of wealth and so on. Hence, Nigeria's democracy has been described as merely formalistic and devoid of substance (Durotoye, 2015, pp.176-177).

According to Lucky (2014, p.104), poor governance becomes unavoidable in Nigeria because performance of candidates (in government seeking re-election and for the newcomers, in their previous fields of human endeavours) is not a critical factor in electoral outcome, the incentive to perform is very weak. It is also argued that because vote-buying is very effective in achieving electoral victory the incentive to resort to it is very high (Lucky, 2014). Consequently, elected public office holders who spent huge sums of money to secure victory at the polls, through the mechanism of vote buying, would usually want to repeat the same and divert substantial portion of public funds to make it easier for them to buy vote in the next election.

This is why vote buying is antithetical to democratic sustainability and development. It is directly and indirectly responsible for the myriads of challenges encountered in the polity. It is the foundation upon which most of the challenges in the polity are built. If the foundation of democracy, which is electoral processes, is wrong and faulty, everything built upon it cannot be ideal and sustainable. In such situation, attaining development becomes a herculean task and elusive.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Electoral processes in Nigeria are bedevilled with many challenges. Each of the phases of election in the country is riddled with its unique challenges. In the pre-election period for instance, especially as is currently being experienced, passing of all relevant laws such as the amendment of the Electoral Act to meet the current reality in the country becomes difficult. This period is also saddled with challenges associated with party primaries and issues related to the funding of the EMB, the INEC. Even though this paper focused on vote buying on the E-Day, the menace is by no means limited to this period. Vote buying is also known to have been heavily deployed during party primaries. For instance, the 2019 presidential election flag bearer of the PDP, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar was widely accused of buying the ticket of the party from the delegates rather than win it democratically (Leadership Newspaper, 9th October, 2018). It is also imperative to note that corruption equally takes place in the post-election period. This takes place, for instance, during collation of election results and in the tribunals and subsequent levels of litigation.

Having examined the manifestations of vote buying in Nigeria's political history, the paper concludes that vote buying is currently taking a dangerous dimension and poses real danger for the conduct of credible, free and fair election in Nigeria. It argues that the 'innovation' brought into this electoral malpractice in 2018 Ekiti State gubernatorial election indicates that it is inimical to sustainable democracy

in the country. This is also antithetical to good governance and development in Nigeria.

Noteworthy, however, is to state that vote buying has been criminalized in the country. According to the 2010 Electoral Act (as amended) in Article 130:

> A person who – (a) corruptly by himself or by any other person at any time after the date of an election has been announced, directly or indirectly gives or provides or pays money to or for any person for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person or any other person to vote or refrain from voting at such election, or on account of such person or any other person having voted or refrained from voting at such election; or (b) being a voter, corruptly accepts or takes money or any other inducement during any of the period stated in paragraph (a) of this section, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of N100,000 or 12 months imprisonment or both (cited in *The Punch*, 21st July, 2018).

The question is if vote buying is a criminal offence, why has nobody been prosecuted and sentenced for the act? Those that have been arrested, as in the example cited earlier, what has become of them? Even when they are charged to court, the debate over the question of court jurisdiction and other technicalities usually predominate. Following from this, the paper recommends that:

i.  The National Assembly should expedite the process of passing the Bill for an Act for the establishment of Electoral Offences Tribunal and the Nigerian Electoral Offences Commission into law. If the Electoral Offence Tribunal, for instance, is not established, the issue of lack of jurisdiction might arise while trying election offences in the regular courts.

ii.  When passed by the National Assembly, the President should quickly assent to the bill. The back-and-forth that the Electoral Amendment Bill is currently experiencing between the National Assembly and the Presidency should not be repeated in the Bill.

iii.  The INEC and CSOs should not stop the campaign against stomach infrastructure just because the 2019 general election is over. Campaign against vote buying seems not to be effective because it is mostly done during election period. Therefore, the voter/civil education should continue to emphasise the implications of vote buying on free and fair election, sustainable democracy and development in Nigeria. This would help to make the consequences of stomach infrastructure part of the subconscious of Nigerians.

iv.  The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should not just promise to continue mobilising Nigerians and carry out orientation programmes against vote buying across the federation (The Cable, 5th March, 2019), the agency should actually begin the orientation programme in earnest. The initiative for continuous campaign against vote buying by the agency, even when general election is over is good but it will amount to nothing if just remains as a promise but not carried out.

v.  Those that were arrested recently (during the just concluded 2019 general elections) for various electoral offences related to and amounting to voting buying should be charged and prosecuted according to the law by the various anti-graft agencies in Nigeria. Until people are made scapegoats and are punished accordingly, Nigerians (especially politicians) may not desist from vote buying.

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# Regional Integration and the Challenge of Development in Africa

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## Abstract
*Regional integration has been projected as an inevitable strategy for development in contemporary Africa. As nation-states try to grapple with their development challenges through regional integration, regionalism and globalisation continue to reinforce each other within a global structure, which is reshaping national and global politics. This global structural transformation throws up the challenge of how to align regional integration in Africa with the need to secure more functional roles for the African continent in the mainstream of the global economy. This paper, therefore, interrogates the relationship between regional integration and the challenge of development in Africa within the framework of "new regionalism", an offshoot of international political economy school of thought. The paper argues that the relationship between regional integration and development in Africa is apparently weak and that Africa is still peripherally situated in the global economy due largely to bad governance, corruption, debt burden, intra-state conflicts and individual states foreign client-patron ties. Development in Africa depends largely on the behaviour of governments and leaders with respect to good governance and prudent management of national economies even as they cooperate at the regional level. The paper concludes that regional integration would make more meaning if African leaders pursue good governance and prudent economic management in the domestic affairs of African states.*

**Keywords:** Regional Integration, Development, Globalisation, Political economy, Governance.

## Introduction
The post-Second World War international system has witnessed a global trend of regional integration, which has been further intensified with the end of the Cold War. A school of thought maintains that the contemporary global environment has become too dynamic and complex for individual African States, which are considered too weak to cope with their developmental challenges in such an environment. The urgent need for African states to pursue integration was argued by a former Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim thus:

> integration is no longer a simple question of propriety; it is an inevitable strategy of survival and development. The rhythm of globalization … (has) made it as emergency for African countries to hold each other's hands if they wish to expand, strengthen and integrate their economic areas (Olubomehin and Kawonishe, 2004, p.1).

According to a report released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2009 titled "Economic Development in Africa", African countries need to deepen their regional integration in order to build stronger and more resilient economies. The report, subtitled "strengthening regional economic integration for Africa's development", also noted that regional integration, when designed and implemented within a broader development strategy to promote economic diversification could enhance Africa's productive capacity and improve its competitiveness and serve as a launching pad for an effective participation in the global economy (UNCTAD, 2009). The imperative for a strong and united Africa is based on the view that economic development is enhanced by integration, because the economic advantage of a whole regional community is greater than the sum of the economic advantages of its separate constituent states. It is assumed that the demands of economic development in the contemporary international system have become too enormous and too complex for African states to shoulder individually. Thus, for there to be sustainable development in Africa, there is need for states in Africa to achieve regional integration. Implicit in this opinion is the assumption that there is a positive correlation between regional integration and development. Thus, for there to be sustainable development in Africa, there is need for states in Africa to achieve regional integration.

In this direction, African leaders at various official conferences and summits have long promoted the idea of regional integration, however, with little results to show for it. African Heads of States have over the years tried to either set up new regional structures or strengthen already existing ones in pursuit of deeper regional integration, and this has led to the emergence of a plethora of integrative mechanisms in the region. Thus, regional integration has consistently been part of the postcolonial development strategy in Africa. However, regionalism in Africa appears more to be a form of escapism from daunting challenges of governance and development at the domestic level, as well as a strategy to consolidate alliances that would reinforce political sovereignty of the integrating countries. African leaders appear to be hoping to achieve, at the continental level, economic development which they failed to actualize at the domestic level. The futility of attempting continental integration on the basis of weak national foundations has continued to show on the paucity of the results achieved so far. Consequently, all the efforts so far at regional integration in Africa have left a lot to be desired as the continent continues to struggle with myriad of development challenges, especially in the face of globalisation. Paradoxically and in sharp contrast to inter-state relations in Africa, which largely has been relatively cordial, internal politics of states in Africa have been volatile and unstable. Thus, inter-state relations and intra-state politics in Africa are inversely related to traditional theories of international relations, which assume that domestic politics is more orderly and stable than international politics (Laursen, 2008). The African economy is still internally disarticulated, and externally marginalised in the global economy. The high incidence of poverty and underdevelopment that accompanied this state of affair has created an urgent need for not only integrating the economies of African countries but also for greater integration of Africa into the global political economy, as a

precondition for overcoming the perennial development crises in the continent. However, as Hoekman, Schiff and Winters (1998) pointed out, the development outcome of regional integration depends heavily on the specific models used, and is very sensitive to the internal characteristics of the member countries and the policies and strategies for integration and the political will to implement them. This paper, therefore, examines the prospects of regional integration in addressing the challenge of development in Africa.

**Conceptual and theoretical issues**
**Integration**
There is no one generally accepted scheme of conceptualizing integration. One area of controversy among early scholars is whether integration refers to a process or to an end product. For instance, Karl Deutsch defined integration as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long time', dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population" (Deutsch, 1957, p.5). Deutsch used "amalgamation" to refer to "the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government". Ernst Haas defined integration as the "process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectation and political activities to a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958, p.16). Haas developed the concept of spill-over from economic to political integration. He talked about "the expansive logic of sector integration" and predicted that trade liberalization within the customs union would lead to harmonization of general economic policies and eventually spill-over into political areas, leading to the creation of some kind of political community.

Among scholars that conceive integration more as a process than an end product is Leon Lindberg. In his study of the early EEC, the Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Lindberg noted that integration is

> … (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre (Lindberg, 1963, p.5).

Central to Lindberg's concept of integration is the development of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous action by national governments.

In his study of the fate of nation-states in Western European integration, Stanley Hoffman noted that every international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations and outside aims among its units (Hoffmann, 1966). Hoffman made a contrast between

the logic of integration and the logic of diversity. The logic of diversity, according him, sets the limits to the degree to which the spill-over process can operate, restructuring the domain in which the logic of functional integration operates to the area of welfare. "In areas of key importance to the national interest", according to Hoffman, "nations prefer the certainty, or self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty" of integration. Thus, he focused more on the mechanics of integration processes, which is shaped by preferences of nation-states as they rationalize the logic of integration on the basis of their national interests.

Other scholars have, however, observed that the early notion of integration portrayed it as being too automatic. Acknowledging the need for revision, Lindberg and Scheingold began to conceive integration as a process in a political system where inputs in the form of demand, support and leadership are transformed into output in the form of policies and decisions (Lindberg & Sheingold, 1970.) Laffan (1992) and Lodge (1994) in their separate books see regional integration as a process of peacefully creating a larger coherent political system out of previously separate units, each of which voluntarily ceding some part of its sovereignty to a supranational authority and renounces the use of force for resolving conflict among members.

Mathews (2003) differentiated between regional integration and regional co-operation. According to him, regional cooperation takes place on an *ad hoc* basis around specific projects or thematic issues based on the fact that some regional public goods must be delivered by a number of governments acting in concert. On the other hand, regional integration is basically a supranational process. The prospect of overall welfare gains from regional co-operation does not make the negotiation of agreements easy. Countries may be unwilling to co-operate because of national pride, political tensions, lack of trust, high coordination costs among a large number of countries, or an asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits.

Mattli (1999) provides a conceptual model of conditions under which implementation of integration scheme is likely to succeed or fail. Mattli (1999) argues that two types of conditions need to be satisfied if integration is to succeed. First, there must be a demand by the integrating actors for greater integration. The actors must perceive a significant potential for economic gains from extending market exchange within the region. Second, there must be the fulfilment of supply conditions, which he defines as the conditions under which political leaders are willing and able to accommodate demands for regional institutions at each step of the integration process. Political leaders anxious to improve their chances of retaining power will support integration if it helps to improve domestic economic conditions. The implication is that interest in promoting integration increases during periods of economic difficulty, and wanes during periods of economic success. But he notes that political will alone is not sufficient, given the problem of collective action which arises, notably coordination, in the integration process. This leads to a key supply condition: "the presence of a benevolent leading country (regional hegemon) within the region seeking integration". Such a country serves as a focal point for the coordination of rules, regulations and policies. It also has the capacity and incentive to ease the distributional tensions that may arise in the integration process.

However, the presence of a regional hegemon may undermine the stability of the grouping because of fears among the remaining members about the distribution of benefits and their concerns that the grouping is simply a mechanism for the hegemon to extend its economic and political influence over the region. This has been an issue in the role of Nigeria in the peace and security of the West African sub-region under ECOMOG in particular and ECOWAS in general. Problem may also arise where there are wide income disparities among integrating countries. Where the larger country is also more industrialised, this will accentuate the fears of smaller members that it is the larger country which will benefit most from the arrangement. However, the role "benevolent leading country" does not necessarily have to be that of a regional hegemon but may be that of a regional leader, which will not necessarily dictate to other states but provide visionary leadership around which the rest members will rally. The role of France and Germany in the European integration is more of leadership than hegemonism (Mattli, 1999).

Generally, the controversy over the concept of integration is not only on whether it is a process or an end product, but also whether it an economic phenomenon or a political one. While some see it as an economic phenomenon which involves the interconnection of separate economies into a larger economic community, others see it essentially in terms of transnational political cooperation towards interconnecting national structures to form a larger political community for the general good. While regional integration arrangements are often evaluated in purely economic terms, integration may be pursued for explicitly political motives. Although it is now almost taken for granted that trade integration is one of the main benefits sought by countries entering regional integration arrangements, all successful regions have objectives other than free trade. "Trade may well be secondary to political or security objectives or a tool rather than an objective: it is difficult to find any groups which have only a strictly trade agenda" (Page, 2000:12). Even if political motives are not uppermost, political will is a crucial ingredient in the integration process and, in its absence, little progress will be made. At the same time, economic integration can have political consequences, as when it contributes to stabilising a political regime or enhancing regional peace and security.

However, to the extent that political and economic forces are inextricably intertwined in a rather complex and dynamic way, it will be more analytically useful, though less convenient, to see integration in the light of the dynamic interaction between economic and political variables. As Deutsch (1971) rightly noted, authentic regional integration encompasses the whole system. Actors in regional integration seek to enjoy the advantages of economies of scale, increased commercial activities, and uninhibited factor mobility, through "institutional integration" and "policy integration," making room for collective decision-making and the sharing of responsibility for policies. Sovereign states participate in regional integration for various reasons and because they expect tangible benefits, which may be political or economic. Politically, a country may participate in a regional scheme in order to bolster its military prowess, augment its political stature, deter aggression from hostile neighbours, and enhance or fortify regional peace and security. Similarly,

countries may integrate so as to achieve economies of scale, optimally allocate scarce resources, and to increase trade and accelerate economic growth. In any case, participating in regional integration enhances the fortunes of the domestic political economy. Since the economy is the base of the state, it does not make much meaning to try to divorce economic integration from the political process through which such integration is negotiated and contrived. Thus, a more analytically useful approach to integration should capture the political economy of the integration process.

## Development

Development studies gained prominence after the Second World War out of conscious efforts to guide newly independent states in Africa, Asia and Latin America towards post-independence economic stability (Gauba, 2003). These scholarly efforts were, however, entrapped in the cold war ideological struggles between the Western and the Eastern blocs. Scholars of the Western persuasion presented the path to development as a movement from the traditional to the modern society based on the modernisation theory, and explained the problem of development in terms of tension between forces of tradition and the drive towards modernisation (Offiong, 2001). According to this perspective, the history of social evolution has ended for Western societies, which, therefore, became the standard measure of development. On the other hand, scholars of the Eastern persuasion used orthodox Marxism to explain development as a movement of modes of production from pre-capitalist to capitalist social formations, ultimately leading to a socialist revolutionary overthrow of the capitalism. Apart from the ideological colouration of these narratives, both the modernisation theory and orthodox Marxism presented forms of unilinear evolutionary process and a universal science applicable to the study of all societies irrespective of their specific historical experiences and peculiar socio-cultural contexts (Mamdani, 2002). In reaction to these unilinear conception of development, dependency theory emerged with an argument that underdevelopment is a creation of modern imperialism and that both development and underdevelopment are products of a process of "accumulation on a world scale" (Ihonvbere, 2012). A common feature of all these approaches, however, is an epistemology of binary of opposites. Modernisation theorists conceptualised society as traditional (pre-modern or pre-industrial) and modern (or industrial), orthodox Marxism conceived modes of production as pre-capitalist and capitalist, while the dependency theorists juxtaposed development with underdevelopment (Mamdani, 2002). Thus, the dependency theory also failed at decentring and breaking down the binaries of discourses resulting from the cultural hegemony of Western influences on knowledge production. The implication of this form of "ahistorical structuralism" is that the new states generally and Africa in particular were denied both historical specificity and independent conceptual validity, and were to that extent rendered analytically useless.

However, development refers to an encompassing process involving steady and systematic changes in the cultural, economic and political spheres of society in a way that increases production, empowers the people and their communities, protects

the environment, strengthens institutions, grows quality of life and promotes good governance (Ekundayo, 2015). This implies that it is possible to speak of social, economic and political development. Development is about people and how their lives and institutions can get better (Igbafen, 2012). Development is also seen as the increasing capacity of society to make rational use of natural and human resources for social ends. It is in this sense that Gauba (2003) defined development as a process in which a system or institution is transformed into stronger, more organised, more efficient and more effective forms and moves to be more satisfying in terms of human wants and aspirations.

**Theoretical framework**

New regionalism is an offshoot of the international political economy school of thought. The international political economy represents an attempt to incorporate the study of international relations within the field of political economy. Political economy focuses on the dynamic interaction between the state and economy, between governance and market and between control of political power and distribution of wealth. The international political economy rejoins national political economy with the global environment. It sees the domestic and international spheres as being engaged in a continuous process of interaction, exchange and mutual influence. Thus, this school of thought views the regional sphere as equilibrium between the national and global levels. Regional integration is thus understood as a process and institutional framework that allows states and non-state actors to participate in the world economy while at the same time being protected from excesses of the global structural transformation (Fanta, 2008).

New regionalism is a framework that is built on the premise that there is a dialectical relationship between regionalization and globalization, and that the two processes are articulated within the same larger process of global structural transformation. Processes of regional integration affect and are affected by many levels of the world system: the global system, the level of inter-regional relations, the internal structure of the region, and domestic forces operating across national boundaries within the region. The outcome of this process is a dialectical, not a linear, development, depending on the relative strengths of contending social, political and economic forces involved (Hettne, 1996). According to Bjorn Hettne, one of the proponents of this approach, the new wave of regionalism can be seen as a response to the process of globalisation (Hettne, 1996). As the forces of globalization crash across territorial boundaries, encumbering on the traditional powers and sovereignty of nation-states, these states regroup under regional levels to have a consolidated political and economic capabilities to face the challenges of the globalizing world. Regional integration is thus one way of coping with global transformations since most states lack the ability and the means to manage such tasks at national levels. Integration in any region of the world is, thus, not rationalized based entirely on the point of view of that particular region because every integration process in any part of the world has systematic repercussions on and produces reactions from other regions, thereby reshaping the global power structure.

This framework acknowledges the importance of state behaviour in the process of regional integration. Integration in a region does not come about unless the states in that region want it and conduct their domestic and foreign affairs in ways that promote it. Although the region slowly becomes an actor in its own terms, the nation-states typically still conceive it as an arena where "national interests" could be promoted and these interests are, of course, differently conceived by different social classes in society. Thus, the concordance of state behaviours with the demands of the integration is central to the success of the integration process.

## States and Development in Africa

The capacity of the state to engineer economic development is encapsulated in the concept of the "developmental state". Two basic strands of characteristics can be distilled from the literature on the developmental state. One strand of the literature emphasizes the developmental goals and objectives of the state; in other words, the ideological character of the developmental state. According to Castells (1992), a state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy, the ability to promote and sustain development, which is a combination of steady and high rate of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship with the international system. In the same vein, Pronk (1997) defines developmental state as one which is able and willing to create and sustain a policy climate that promotes development by fostering productive investment, export, growth and human welfare. Useful as the above conception of the developmental state might be, it ignores the institutional characteristics that enable a state to achieve growth and development where others fail in the same venture. Attention also has to be paid to the institutional/structural configuration of the state because what sets a developmental state apart from others is not only that it is able to clearly set its development objectives, but also that it establishes institutional structures in order to achieve the objectives (Edigheji, 2005). Hence, the developmental state also has to be defined by its institutional or structural attributes. This approach is located within the second strand of the literature on the developmental state. Thus, Mkandawire (2001) defined developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and which seriously attempts to construct and deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development. It is defined by both its objectives and its institutional characteristics.

Earlier conception of developmental state paid no attention to the nature of the political regime – the democratic aspect of the developmental state. This is partly because some scholars regarded the repressive and undemocratic nature of the state as one of the factors that enhanced its developmental capability. But, as Adigheji (20005) observed, if there were a positive correlation between undemocratic regimes and development, then African states would have been among the most developed in the world. In recognition of the limitations of this earlier conception, Robinson & White (1998) came up with the concept of the "democratic developmental state", with an inclusive approach to public policy-making, a broader social basis of accountability and channels of political participation. This becomes the basis of state

infrastructural capability to penetrate society in order to elicit cooperation and consensus for its developmental endeavours.

As Mkandawire (2001) has noted, one remarkable feature of the discourse on the state and development in Africa is the disjuncture between an analytical tradition that insists on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa and a prescriptive literature that presupposes their existence. The literature on the development of states in Africa is torn between pessimistic diagnosis, which insist on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa, and optimistic prescription, which exhorts the states in Africa to assume roles probably beyond their capacity or political will. States whose capacity to pursue any national project is denied at the theoretical level are exhorted, at the prescriptive level, to assume roles that are beyond their capacity or political will. Such states are often urged to "delink" from the unfavourable international system, to reduce the size of the public sector, to stabilize and privatize the economy, to promote "good governance", to democratize, etc; in other words, to do what they, perhaps, cannot do. This is a result of an invidious comparison of states in Africa with states elsewhere, without taking into account the historical and structural differences between them (Mkandawire (2001).

The most obvious feature of modern African history has been the continent's poor economic performance and developmental challenges. The continent still contains some of the poorest countries in the world, with an average per capita income of just $600 per annum (Word Bank Group, 2018). According to the World Bank, African economies since the beginning of the 1990s have recorded a low average growth rate of 4.5 percent per annum and a crushing debt burden, which ballooned from $80 billion in 1982 to $275 billion in 2004; the amount annually repaid by African governments more than double their spending on health and primary education combined. According to the World Bank, real income per head in the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2005 rose on average by 25%, while it leapt 34 times faster in East Asia (*The Economist*, 2016). A large part of surplus and returns from investments in Africa leaves the continent through debt repayment, expatriation of profit, capital flight etc. 340 million people in Africa, or half of the population, live on less than US$1 per day; the risk of a child dying before completing five years of age is still highest in Africa (76.5 per 1000 live births) (WHO, 2018) and life expectancy at birth is only 61 years (Statistica, 2018); only 58 per cent of the population have access to safe water; and the rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 per cent. Youth unemployment rate in sub-Saharan Africa is 12% while the region has the world's highest rate of working poverty – people who are employed but earn less than US$2 a day (ACET, 2016).  Disease infection and epidemic, mainly of malaria and HIV/AIDS, has been a major problem in Africa. All these are pointers to the fact that states in Africa have not performed well in the development of the economy in particular and the society at large.

**Dialectics of Integration and development in Africa**

Much of the history and reality of modern Africa is accounted for by twists in events outside of Africa. The vast majority of African states are direct creations of

external forces of colonialism. All of the boundaries and structure of states in Africa, and structure of the economy are products of European political and economic escapade in the continent. The dynamics within which states in Africa emerged produced a set of unique historical political entities: weak institutions that can hardly maintain order within its territory yet recognised as sovereigns by the international community, which helps in quelling internal uprisings against the states; and weak economies that can hardly maintain the civil service yet being kept afloat by the international community through various kinds of foreign aid (Ihonvbere, 2012). Perhaps, one may be right to say that states in Africa have enjoyed relatively "friendly" international environment. The world community has allowed any country, no matter how underdeveloped its political and economic institutions, to enjoy the full privileges of sovereignty (Page, 2000).  Looking at this situation in comparative perspective, the contrast between the evolutionary development of European states and the case of Africa, where states that are largely dependent on foreign aid continue to thrive on protections afforded by the international system that structured them, is dramatic. Continuous aggressive competition for survival among the then evolving European states had made war a driving force in European history, unlike states in Africa that have enjoyed relatively peaceful neighbourhood, albeit teething internal violent conflicts. Perhaps, if European states had finances as problematic as many African countries now face, they may not have been able to survive in an era which "punished" fiscal failures.

In the contemporary era, the international community has more or less continued to keep many weak states afloat. Due to the fact that it is relatively "easy" for states in Africa to get funds from the international community (though at the cost of mounting debt burden and depleting natural resources and mortgaged future of generations unborn), the leaders get lackadaisical about national economic development. Also, because they are directly in charge of funds from foreign aid to their various countries, national leaders are hesitant about regional integration, fearing that it may render them economically debased. As such, Africa has been described as being "littered with the carcasses of failed economic unions" and a legion of volumes of plans under continental organizations that were never realized (Adeyemi & Ayodele, 2007). According to Mathews (2003), virtually all regional integration efforts in Africa to date have failed to produce the desired result. None of the regional integration efforts worked because the architects and planners of the regional groupings could not offer national leaders enough incentives to abdicate their areas of power and control. Hence, the regional organizations failed, despite the fact that many donors were sympathetic to them (especially during the Cold War), because Africa's political fragmentation made aid to individual countries problematic. Thus, African leaders preferred playing the "politics of poor nations" over the development prospects of regional integration.

The Cold War provided Africa with patrons who were competitively ready to give states in Africa various aid packages, as well as protection when their sovereignty were challenged either internally or externally. The great powers were concerned with cultivating clients in all parts of the world and therefore were willing

to help states in Africa financially, as well as in crushing ethnic rebellions or threats from neighbours. States in Africa became "beautiful brides" courted by the rivalling great powers and welcomed development aids, cheap loans, technical assistance and other benefits granted by international patrons (Ihonvbere, 2012). Between 1967 and 1978 alone, for example, the USSR supplied US$2.7 billion worth of weapons to Africa, while the United States contributed US$1.6 billion (Thompson, 2000). Rival political camps in Africa came to be supported by the competing Cold War patrons: example is in Angola where the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government was favoured by the USSR while the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel movement was backed by the US. External interests in Africa, thus, were at the same time undermining the sovereign powers of states in the continent.

The end of the Cold War, however, dramatically affected the flow of external resources to African governments, as external powers became more reluctant to provide material, diplomatic and military aid to states in Africa. A number of former US clients in Africa, including Samuel Doe in Liberia, Hissene Habre in Chad, Siad Barre in Somalia, and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, were deposed in the 1990s. Given that African governments were, and still are, heavily dependent on external assistance, a humanitarian disaster, perhaps, would have broken out if aid had been severed completely after the Cold War. Aid, however, lost its geopolitical strategic importance and then became tied to political and economic conditions coated as development policies and strategies. States in Africa were, thus, required to democratise and maintain good governance, as well as to implement economic reforms towards liberalisation and privatisation (Mkwezalamba & Chinyama, 2007). France, for example, suspended development aid to Zaire in 1991 and to Togo in 1993 because the leaders of these countries resisted pressures for democratic reforms. This spurred African countries into embarking on a number of political and economic reforms, and at the regional level informed the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Ekundayo, 2015).

Regional integration in Africa has been largely driven by strong political motives (Mathews, 2003). As McCarthy (1995) noted, pan-Africanism, as an expression of continental identity and coherence, distinguishes regional integration in Africa from (what obtains in) other regions in the developing world. Part of the driving force of regional integration in Africa has been the philosophy of black solidarity and the efforts towards uniting all people of African descent. However, as a result of the poor record of regional economic integration, African countries may have to rethink the philosophical framework of the pan-Africanism and embrace a more concrete and pragmatic model of integration based on the development of the region. This would mean a deviation from the traditional model of top-down regional integration, espoused by a gathering of African Heads of State with a rather rhetorical base and heavy political content.

As a result of their weak authority bases, one core element of national interests of states in Africa as enunciated by the ruling class is the survival and preservation of the postcolonial state at all cost and even against the wishes of the

citizens. The very weak authority and legitimacy bases of states in Africa compel national leaders into adopting various strategies aimed at preserving their hold on state power and resources. The preservation and strengthening of the state became the overriding priority of governments, not only within domestic politics but equally in foreign relations (Yaqub, 2003). The centrality of political survival of African leaders has also provided driving motive force for regional integration in Africa as the leaders come together at the regional level to protect their positions in their various national politics. Through the formal conduct of states' foreign policies, African leaders find common understanding among themselves so as to reduce the threat they face in their internal environments and mutually pose to each other in the external environment. Thus, the process of regional integration in Africa has taken the character of an "elite agenda", in which the civil society and the private sector are sidelined (Fanta, 2008). As a result, the process of regional integration in Africa is not driven by bottom-up pressures seeking economic advantage and development, but rather follows a top-down pursuit of political goals. With low level political accountability in their domestic politics, African leaders did not also border to democratise the regional integration process. Indeed, the Constitutive Act of the African Union begins as follows; "We the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)", while the Charter of the United Nations starts with "We the Peoples of the United Nations". This underscores how elitist the regional integration agenda is in Africa. An observable trend in regional integration in Africa is more of a regional coalition of "Africa of Heads of State" rather a regional integration of states in Africa. To African rulers, regional organizations serve as forums for political legitimisation, a resource that is much sought after in African politics. An example of how regional organisations can be used to legitimise the position of a national leader is seen in the case of Somalia, where President Abdullahi Yusuf was appointed president of that country through the agreement managed by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), rather than a national legitimisation process, to resolve the conflict in that country (Adogamhe, 2008).

Neo-patrimonial structures at the national levels are replicated at the regional level to maintain a system of power consolidation through regional patronage. The main interests pursued at regional forums in Africa are more of the political survival of the leaders than the interest of nation-states. There then arises a contradiction in the interests of leaders: conflict between their need for regional political-legitimacy-base and their desire to remain effectively in charge of their national sectors (Fanta, 2008). Despite its acknowledged gains, national governments tend to be sceptical, fearing that integrating at the regional level would make them lose their sovereignty to a collective power. As such, integration in Africa, like most of the developing regions, is largely intergovernmental with little evidence that countries are prepared to cede authority to supranational bodies. As a result, the "commitment institutions" which is supposed to underpin the sustainability of these arrangements have been weak. This is the basis of the observation made by President Barack Obama of the United States of America in his speech in Accra Ghana on his first official visit to Africa in 2009, that Africa needs strong institutions and not strong men.

Apart from consolidating their hold on the political power of their various nation-states, African leaders also use regional platforms as strategies for foreign relations with the outside world. They present relatively ordered regional forums to the international community to cover or make up for the sordid state of domestic affairs. As such, governments which by all practical purposes have suspended their national constitutions and bastardised their electoral systems still summon the moral courage to actively participate in the drafting and promulgation of regional instruments on good governance and people's rights.

Regional integration in Africa has become part and parcel of the game of political survival of African leaders. This made it expedient for these leaders to, as much as possible, foster peaceful interstate relations in Africa, overlooking some ordinarily "legitimate" grounds for disputation. For example, the boundaries of African states have remained unchanged despite the fact that the original colonial demarcations were hurriedly done in a manner that did not account for Africa's political, sociological, economic and ethnic factors. As argued by Thompson (2000), the boundaries of many African countries were arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers and were not encouraging frameworks for unified, legitimate and capable states. These arbitrary boundaries did not only divide social and ethnic groups into separate political territories, numerous variegated groups were lumped together, occasioning series of internal conflicts. Also, about 14 African countries are landlocked, with all the attendant economic and strategic implications (Adogamhe, 2008). Yet, African leaders at the OAU's resolution on border problems pledged member states to respect the national frontiers they inherited at the eve of their independence. Thus, the international community embraced the principle of boundary stability established by the OAU to effectively prevent the application of the norm of self-determinism to a group of people once their country has become independent. In the case of border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso, for instance, the International Court of Justice maintained that because African states had decided to retain the colonial boundaries, the practices of the region must be respected despite the apparent conflict with the principle of the right to self-determination.

**Conclusion**

The ability of regional integration and to engender development is neither automatic nor invariable. The outcome of an integration scheme is a social construct generated from a dialectical interaction of political, economic and social actors and factors, operating and cooperating across territorial boundaries of nation-states under a common institutional framework to pool their strengths and resources towards achieving goals of common interests. There is a weak relationship between regional integration and development in Africa. While African leaders build regional structures and policy frameworks meant for collective development, their conducts in the domestic affairs of African states practically undermine the goals of regional integration and development in Africa. Low commitment to national development, ambivalent political will to integrate, and bad governance, among the others, impede

developmental regionalism in Africa. Efforts made so far by states in Africa towards regional integration have not significantly improved Africa's position in the global political economy. Africa is still participating in the global economy as a periphery region, and has, since the end of the Cold War, been in steep decline in global strategic importance except in the growing global concern on how to contend with its numerous political and economic problems (against the background of possible globalisation of threats and problems). Africa's economic fortune would have been better, even without regional integration, if African leaders embraced good governance and prudent economic management in the domestic affairs of African states. There is need to open up both the political and economic spaces in Africa for active participation of the civil society and private sector. This will not only democratize Africa's integration process but also help to release development potentials of various sectors of society.

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# Internal Party Democracy and Candidate Selection in Nigeria: A Review of the 2018 All Progressives Congress's Primary Elections

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**Abstract**
*Since the commencement of the Fourth Republic, the process of selecting candidates has always been a source of conflict for political parties. This cannot be unconnected with the fact that their primary elections are in most cases devoid of democratic ethos. This has adverse effects on stability of political parties and democratization process. It is on this basis, that, this paper derived its twin objectives. Firstly, the paper undertakes a conceptual and theoretical exposition of internal party democracy cum candidate selection. Second, it reviewed some primary elections held by the All Progressives Congress so as to determine the extent of its adherence to principles of internal democracy. Adopting the qualitative research method in which data were largely derived from secondary sources particularly through relevant journal articles, textbooks, government publications, newspapers and magazines, it was discovered that the process of candidate selection within the APC was largely tainted by conflicts and intrigues largely due to perceived disregard for laid down rules guiding the conduct of primary elections. The paper however concluded with recommendations on how to foster internal party democracy as it relates to candidate selection so as to boost stability of political party and democracy in Nigeria.*

**Keywords:** Political Party, Internal Party Democracy, Candidate Selection, Democracy, All Progressives Congress

## Introduction

Political parties all over the world are the cornerstone of representative democracy and electoral process. By virtue of their functions, they remain one of the prominent and critical political institutions of representative governments. Parties help to articulate group aim, foster quality political leadership, formulate and promote policy alternatives and present voters with coherent electoral choices by recruiting political leaders through selection of candidates to represent them at elections (Scarrow, 2005). With their significant functions, political parties no doubt are the heart beat of democracy. Thus, electoral democracy without political parties is a mere fallacy. The existence of vibrant political parties is no doubt a precondition for democratic governance. However, much as political parties are of crucial importance to modern representative governments, the success or otherwise of such governments to a large extent depend on the nature of the quality of Internal Party Democracy (IPD) of political parties most essentially as it relates to the selection of candidates to contest elective posts during general elections.

Presenting candidates for elective posts in the general election is a question of how parties arrive at the choice they present to voters and specifically, whether and to what extent parties need to be internally democratic in order to promote democracy within the larger society. One of the ways by which a party can exhibit the attributes of internal democracy is through the conduct of transparent, inclusive and credible party primary elections (Scarrow, 2005). As noted by Okhaide (2012) there is the need for political parties to take to the ideals and practice of IPD because the quality of internal democracy within political parties to a reasonable extent can be used to determine a country's level of democratic growth. In essence, the process of selecting candidates for general elections within a party is an important task because the stability of a party largely depends on well established and institutionalised internal party democratic structures.

A party's stability can be accessed through the manner in which it conducts the process of selecting candidates for a general election. Therefore, the obligation of political parties to abide by the principles of IPD cannot be underestimated. When candidate emerge through transparent primary elections, it translates to the fact that party structures and organization are participatory and inclusive which thus, results in the harmonious co-existence of members within the party. In this regard, party discipline and cohesion are enhanced. Party discipline based on due process is the substance of party cohesion both of which are crucial to the sustainability of any democratic system. Party discipline as the foundation for party cohesion however, requires complete adherence to the letter and spirit of party constitution (Jinadu, 2011).

Since the commencement of Nigeria's Fourth Republic, there has been an unending quest and outcry for the institutionalisation of IPD and adherence to its ideals and principles specifically as it relates to the selection of candidates to fly party's flag during elections. The period of selecting candidates for general elections has always been a source of tension and sometimes violence. Such tensions at times threaten the existence of political parties. These in most cases emanate from perceived deliberate imposition of candidates at the expense of other candidates who might have contested and probably emerged winner in primaries. The deliberate imposition of candidates during party primary elections undermine the very essence of democracy and generate post-election disputes which culminate into litigation through which aggrieved candidates seek redress while others resort to self-help by institutionalizing violence. These have serious implication for party stability and the democratic process. It is on this premise, that, this paper examines internal party democracy and candidates' selection using the 2018 All Progressives Congress's (APC) primary elections as points of reference. Following this introduction is the section on conceptual and theoretical exposition of internal party democracy and candidates' selection. This is followed by an overview of the emergence, structure and objectives of APC. Following this is a review of the 2018 APC primary elections. The last part concludes the paper.

### Internal Party Democracy and Candidate Selection: A conceptual and Theoretical Exposition

The idea of IPD which emerged in the epoch of mass parties (Duverger, 1961) has become prominent in literature on political parties owing to its ability to connect ordinary citizens to government and the governance process and to contribute to the stability and legitimacy of the democratic systems in which the political parties engage in electoral competition for political power (Scarrow, 2005). IPD is a comprehensive concept which encompasses an extensive variety of procedures for carrying party members along in intra-party deliberation on issues and decisions affecting the party. It is democracy within the party and the extent to which a party ascribe to and adhere to the basic and universal norms and ideals of democracy (Scarrow, 2005). To Cular (2004) "Internal party democracy means that the party's should be formed "bottom-up" and that the internal distribution of power should be marked by dispersion at different levels, bodies and individuals rather than by the concentration in one organ" (p. 34). In a similar vein, Wolkenstein (2016) located the definition of IPD within the context of the traditional conception of the role of political parties in a democracy that is, connecting citizens to the government. He claimed that IPD is the instrument used in establishing and sustaining the connection between the people and government. He further argued that political parties which internally stick to democratic ethos empower its members and afford them access to demands of the constituents and provide them with opportunities to channel these demands into policy decisions.

The above definitions share certain commonalities. For instance, they emphasise the fact that IPD is a viable medium through which citizens or better still members of a political party are given voice in the governance process. Second, they depict the notion that party structure, organisation and activities are not and should not be the exclusive reserve of a select few within the party. Third, they see IPD as a micro democratic project within the larger democratic society. The third point may have suggested why Cular (2004) observed that unlike most definitions of democracy at the level of political system, the definition of IPD does not mean a state can be distinguished from other forms of internal party order. It is rather about the extent by which a party can be rated in terms of internal democratic tenets. Thus, unlike the overall democratic project, internal party democracy should be taken as a neutral term and valued only if it contributes to the quality of the overall democratic process.

Candidate selection as a concept is underscored by one of the main definitions of political party given by Sartori (1976) that is, ''a political party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office'' (pp. 63-64). This assertion has been buttressed by Cross and Katz (2013) when they posited that: "choosing candidates and leaders is a strategic process with important implication on the nature of the party itself as it might reflect its democratic ethos" (p. 115). As a concept, candidate selection is the procedure through which political parties take the crucial decision of who will be on the ballot paper as their recommended candidate(s). It involves the decisions of political parties regarding who to put forward as candidates under their label for

general elections. Simply put ''It is the primary screening method in the process through which the party in public office is reproduced'' (Kartz, 2001, p. 277). The process through which candidates are selected by political parties is party primaries. A primary election is the preliminary step in the process of electing a candidate to fly a party's flag at the general elections. It is an election which narrows the field of candidates before the general elections are held. Primary election can be categorized into two: these are the closed primary and the open primary. In the closed primary, only party members can vote, in the later all voters can take part and may cast votes on a ballot of any party. Party primaries are mechanisms for managing diversity, accountability and inclusion in the governance of political parties including relevant electoral process for party and public offices. Above all they remain one of the most crucial elements of IPD.

Theoretically, IPD can be enhanced through various party activities. Mimpen (2007) opined that there exist two important instruments of fostering internal democracy. These are: free, fair, credible and regular elections to occupy positions within parties and to select candidates to represent parties in major elections. The second involves equal opportunities for all members such that all interests are equally represented and attended to. This instruments according to him foresters the internal democratic setting of parties in which the political party is open to all members in terms of inclusiveness in party activities. In a similar contribution, Sindre (2016) observed that IPD can be determined by party leadership election institutionalisation which can be measured by the extent of adherence to formal rules and regulation governing the election of party leaders. According to him, attention should in this regard, be paid to the existence or non-existence of formal rules most especially as codified in official party documents such as party statutes and constitutions.

The centrality and importance of the procedure of candidates' selection to IDP has also been stressed by Wolkenstein (2016) when he offered two models of IPD. These are the candidate selection model and the direct participation model. He stressed that the candidate selection model has remained the prevalent model of IPD. The basic tenet underlying this model is that the process of selecting party representatives should be an all inclusive affair and should provide opportunities for members to air their preferences. In addition, it has been stressed that candidate selection procedures should be reasonable competitive. The direct participation model however, emphasise that rather than indirectly influencing party's decision through voting at primary elections to select candidates, party members should be able to air their views so as to directly influence party decisions. The most common form of this model is voting by members of political parties not only for candidate selection but for determining policy alternatives. This model compared to with candidate selection model give more sense of belonging to party members than the candidate selection model (Wolkenstein, 2016).

Wolkenstein (2016) however, argued that the two models of IDP above are not adequate for fostering IPD. He argued that the two models limits members ability to play active part in party affairs because they ''bracket out processes of preference-formation'' (p. 304) which has detrimental effects on the capacity of political parties

to connect citizens to crucial political and government decisions. More so it weakens the democratic potentials of IDP. He however, suggested that to address the shortcomings of these models, there is the need to be deliberative in internal party activities. He thus, recommended the deliberative model of IPD. The underlying notion of this model is to coordinate party activities in a manner that members play active part in party policy decisions. Deliberation, according to him, 'is a practice that involves jointly engaging in discursive exchanges about specific issues. It is about finding agreements on, or getting clear about the nature and depth of disagreement over these issues in conversation with others'' (Wolkenstein, 2016, pp. 304-305). It is important to note that the deliberative model in itself cannot function in isolation of the candidate selection model and the direct participation model. What is obtainable is that the candidate selection method and the direct participation model perform certain indispensable functions within the party which the deliberative model cannot perform. For instance, it is considered unavoidable for political parties to present candidates for elections. This, which can only be actualised through the conduct of party primaries, is considered one of the major ways of enhancing IPD.

Much as the procedure for selecting party candidates enhances IPD, the danger of candidate selection process leading to violence has been underscored. In a study on Candidate Nomination, Intra-Party Democracy, and Election Violence in Africa (2018) Seeberg, Wahman and Skaaning observed that, although there is burgeoning literature on African democratisation and electoral violence, little attention has been focused on violence during party primary elections. They stressed that violence during selection of party candidates, though having different causes from those of general elections, is a variety of intra-party feud which jeopardises the quality of IPD and general elections and also undermines the overall quality of democracy. Thus, they posit that the dangers that the candidates' selection violence portend goes beyond the candidates' selection period. Such violence according to them, endanger the democratisation process and consolidation of the democracy. Aside these, the dangers can also be seen in the fact that party unity and cohesion is threatened. Thus, there is a high possibility of intra-party conflict arising.

In another study, Party Primaries, Candidate Selection and Intra-Party Conflict in Nigeria: Peoples Democratic Party in Perspective, Adekeye (2017) emphasised the interplay of party primaries, candidate selection and intra-party conflicts in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The focus of the study was on how the inter play of process of candidate selection and party primaries within the PDP generated internal crisis and feud among party members. Findings from the study revealed that the non-adherence to the ideals and principles of party rules, regulations, legal framework as well as institutional design was the major driver of intra-party conflicts within the PDP. Rather than follow due process in conducting primaries through which candidates emerges, party constitution, rules and regulations and institutional design were subverted thereby giving prominence to imposition of candidates (Adekeye, 2017).

IPD has indeed been constrained within political parties in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. Several factors have been held responsible for this.

Matlos (2004) outlined the challenges facing IPD in Africa to include the following: ''leadership, primary elections, party funding, gender equity, and management of the internal affairs of the party'' (pp. 9-10). He argued that: leadership of political parties remain a contentious issue and is capable of generating intra-party feud if not well managed. It was further stressed that the ability of a political party to foster democracy to a large extent depends on the quality of its leadership. In this regard, a party's performance during general elections and primary elections is a function of how effective and visionary its leadership structure is. The idea however, is that most political parties in Africa lack the pre-requisite quality leadership required for the conduct of party primaries through which candidates are selected (Matlos, 2004).

Primary election as a challenge facing IDP revolves around the fact that the process through which candidates are selected to fly parties flag during general elections have been largely devoid of democratic ideals, principles and ethos. This in turn generates controversies and conflict arising from the way and manner in which such primaries are conducted by the parties' leadership. Under these conditions IPD cannot thrive because the selection process is not open and inclusive. Again, party funding within political parties constitute another challenge facing IDP. The extent of transparency in the utilisation of party funds is another criterion used to measure the level of internal democratic norms among political parties. In Africa, the disbursements of party funds are in most cases not a party issue but that of a select few within the top echelon of the party. This breeds disgruntlement among party members thus having adverse effects on party activities. In addition, the extent to which gender equality is entrenched in political parties determines and fosters IPD. The perception is that the experience of women empowerment within political parties is not an encouraging one both in qualitative and quantitative terms (Matlos, 2004). The management of internal party affairs and activities constitute another yardstick for determining the extent of IPD. The management of internal party affairs entails the management of day-to-day party activities. When the process of management is not open and inclusive party members nurture grudges which in most cases manifests during selection of candidates.

### The All Progressives Congress: Emergence and Ideology

The All Progressives Congress (APC) as a political party in Nigeria was formed on the 6th of February, 2013. The party emerged as a result of a merger of three prominent opposition political parties. These were: Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA). The resolution of the merger was accented to by representatives of the four parties which formed the new APC. These included: Tom Ikimi, who represented the ACN; Senator Annie Okonkwo on behalf of the APGA; Ibrahim Shekarau, the Chairman of ANPP's Merger Committee; and Garba Shehu, the Chairman of CPC's Merger Committee (Agomuo, 2013). However, on the 31st of July, 2013 the party was formally approved by the nation's Election Management Body, the Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC) t be recognised as a political party. Following this, the licenses of the three former parties were revoked (Owete, 2013).

In terms of it ideology, the APC is renowned for its centre-left political ideology. The party tends to foster market economic policies and a strong incentive towards government regulation. The APC is in support of state's rights. Its social policy also entails a combination of social nationalism. The party believes in mass participation in the control of the major means of production, distribution and exchange. In this regard, the APC believe in the African ideology of public ownership of the means of production without necessarily discouraging private entrepreneurship (Shilgba, 2014). The party believes staunchly in the notion that workers productivity is in consonance with the wages and salaries they are rewarded with. Thus, the party believes in better working condition for the average Nigerian worker. The APC upholds the provision of the 2$^{nd}$ Chapter of the Nigerian Constitution captioned: Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, with the dictate: "the weak must be cared for by a strong society; but a weak and failed society is weak in affection towards her disabled, women and children" (APC Manifesto, 2013).

The manifesto of the APC is geared towards the following key issue areas: the constitution, national security, conflict resolution, national unity, social harmony, job creation and the economy, agriculture and food security, industrialization, infrastructure, oil and gas industry, education, healthcare, senior citizens, youth sports and culture, women empowerment, environment, foreign policy (APC Manifesto, 2013). As fallouts of the above, the APC has strong support for freedom of speech for nation's citizens. The party is of the opinion that guarantee of freedom of speech and expression makes better citizens. As such it places emphasis on affordable and quality education because of the intent that it produces intelligent and well informed citizens who can positively engage in informed discussions aimed at promoting the society. The party also approves of friendly foreign relations with other countries and that both internal and external strength and respect emanate from internal respect for citizens. It also supports devolution of power to the federating states without weakening the centre (Shilgba, 2014).

As part of its belief in democracy and its resolve to foster it, the APC promotes and upholds the practice of internal democracy where there is no imposition of candidates or overwhelming influence of the godfathers. This is however, directed at eliminating all forms exclusion and godfatherism within the party which may be situated between elected public officials, who are at the very top end and the masses at the wide base. In view of this, the party in its constitution clearly stated as one of its objectives ''promoting and upholding the practice of internal democracy at all levels of the party's organisation'' (APC Constitution, Article 7: viii). This is however, embodied in the following provisions of the Constitution:

> All Party posts prescribed or implied by this Constitution shall be filled by democratically conducted elections at the respective National Convention or Congress subject, where possible, to consensus, Provided that where a Candidate has emerged by consensus for an elective position, a vote of "yes" or "no" by ballot

or voice shall be called, to ensure that it was not an imposition which could breed discontent and crisis (APC Constitution, Article 20, p. i).

Taking into consideration the provisions of the party's Constitution as regards nomination and selection of candidates and conduct of primary elections one can deduce that the party's intent to foster internal democracy cannot be in doubt. The party's strong affirmation that no party member shall impose any leader or group of leaders on the people is a strong indication of its resolve to stick to the letters of the guiding rules and principles of the party. No doubt the party has an elaborate and encompassing blue print which does not accord any member or group undue respect or advantage. By the provisions of the Constitution, the party's national leadership exhibits a character which can guarantee members and citizens voice in the actual operations of the political party. This, when put into practice can go a long way in enhancing internal democracy within the party and can consolidate the overall national democratic project and effort.

**The All Progressives Congress, Candidate Selection and its 2018 Primary Elections**

The legal framework for enforcing adherence to democratic norms and principles relating to activities and operations of political parties in Nigeria are contained according to Ikechukwu (2015) in five distinct legal documents. These include: the 1999 Constitution, the Constitution of political parties, the Electoral Act, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) statutory rules and other informal rules. These documents also spells out the rules that governs internal party activities most essentially as it relates to the conduct of primary elections for selection of party representatives. For instance, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria stipulates that:

> Political parties must provide for the conduct of a periodic election on a democratic basis for the election of its principal officers, executive members and members of its governing body, at regular intervals not exceeding four years; members of its executive committee and other principal officers must reflect the federal character of Nigeria, and these officers must belong to different states not being less than 2/3 of the 36 states and FCT (Section 223, Sub-sections 1-2).

In a similar vein, pursuant to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) particularly Paragraph 15, Part 1 of the Third Schedule and the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) the INEC stipulates the following provision governing the conduct of party primary elections for the selection of candidates:

> A political party seeking to participate in any election organized by the Commission must conduct primaries, wherein all eligible members of the party must be given equal opportunity to participate

in the primaries of the party for the purpose of selecting candidates for elective positions (Act no. 64 (as amended).

Based on the provisions of the legal framework for selection of candidates by political parties, the primary elections of the APC were scheduled to hold as follows: 25th September, 2018 – Presidential primary election; 29th September, 2018 – Governorship primary elections; 2nd October, 2018 – Senate primary elections; 3rd October, 2018 – House of Representatives primary elections; 4th October, 2018 – State House of Assembly primary elections (Alechenu, 2018). However, prior to the commencement of the primary elections there were series of deliberation as regards the mode by which the primary elections shall be conducted. This had to do whether it would be direct or indirect. On the one hand, the direct method involves registered members of the party getting an equal opportunity to vote for the party's candidate. In this regard, all registered members of a party are allowed to vote in the primary election to elect the party's representative in the general elections. While this method is perceived as tedious and time-consuming, it is also considered as the most transparent and credible method that represents the wishes of majority of party members. The indirect method on the other hand has to do with vesting a group of people known as delegates to vote for the selection of candidates on behalf of the party members. Such delegates are usually elected by party members at the Ward congresses (Toromade, 2018). The party on the long run decided that the state chapters of the party have the freedom to adopt any of the two methods (Busari, 2018).

In the Presidential primary election, the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari was the sole candidate. Despite being the sole candidate, it was required that his candidature be confirmed by registered party members through direct voting. The results of the primary election however, indicated that Muhammadu Buhari secured overwhelming victory in most of the states (*Daily Trust*, 2018). Much as the conduct of the Presidential primaries was successful, the declaration of the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari did not go down well with some members of the party. This led to the rejection of the primary by a coalition of presidential aspirants of the party spearheaded by Alhaji Mumakhhai Unagha and Dr S.K Ogbonnia (Onoyume, 2018). The coalition claimed that the declaration of Buhari as the sole candidate of the party did not comply with the dictates of the Constitutions of the country and that of the party.

It was further claimed that no candidate stepped down for the incumbent President. Thus, the unanimous decision to declare Buhari as the sole candidate of the party was seen as denying citizens their right to seek public office. They however, concluded that there was no level playing ground in the screening exercise of the party. Thus, they perceived the screening process as biased. They complained that while other members of the party who signified interest in the selection process were subjected to rigorous screening exercise, no effort was made to re-evaluate the appropriateness of Muhammadu Buhari for the ticket most essentially as it relates to his educational qualification, state of health and the circumstances surrounding the

nation's ethnic composition (Onoyume, 2018). It is however, important to note that Article 20(1) of the APC Constitution provides for the emergence of a consensus candidate(s), but such candidate(s) shall be subjected to an acceptability test in which a vote of "yes" or "no" by ballot or voice shall be called (APC Constitution, 2013).

However, starting from the 29th of September 2018 the party's gubernatorial primaries commenced in most states of the Federation. In Ogun state, the tussle for the governorship was between Adekunle Akinlade and Dapo Abiodun. It was alleged that Adekunle Akinlade was the proffered candidate of the incumbent Governor Ibikunle Amosun while Dapo Abiodun was favoured by the party's leadership (Omilana, 2018). Prior to the primary election, the state chapter of the party was engulfed in series of controversies. First, the party was polarised as a result of the adoption of Adekunle Akinlade as the consensus and anointed candidate of the incumbent governor-led faction of the party. Second, was the inability of the state leadership of the party to reach a consensus as regards the mode by which the primary elections shall be conducted (Omilana, 2018). While the Amosun-led faction favoured an indirect mode of primary election the other faction and the National Working Committee (NWC) of the party frowned at it.

Two primary elections were held in the state. One was conducted by the state Chairman of the party, Chief Derin Adebiyi on 2nd October, 2018. In that primary election, Adekunle Akinlade who contested against five other candidates was reported to have polled 190,987 votes out of 201,620 valid votes cast across the 236 wards in the state. There was however a twist in the election when the Chairman of the Electoral Committee and the agents of the other five contestants refused to sign the results. The other election which was held on 3rd October, 2018 was overseen by the NWC of the party. In the election, it was reported that Dapo Abiodun won with 102, 305 votes. Akinlade scored 23.443 votes, Jimi Lawal scored 51,153 votes while Abimbola Ashiru polled 29,764 votes. Other contestants Senator Gbenga Kaka got 17,771 votes and Abayomi Hunye 9,110 votes (Omilana, 2018). The election which produced Dapo Abiodun has been ratified by the NWC of the party which thus, nullified the parallel primary conducted by the State Chapter of the party (Ugbede, 2018). This development did not go down well with the Amosun-led faction of the party in the state.

The faction saw the process by which Dapo Abiodun emerged as the party's gubernatorial candidate as being largely compromised and not transparent. The Amosun-led faction described Abiodun's emergence as an imposition and accused the Chairman of the party Adams Oshiomole of complicity and desperation (Moses, 2018). To register their grievances against the emergence of Abiodun, some female members of the party led by Chairman of Ilugun Local Council Development Authority, Mofoluke Soremekun, and other women leaders from the three senatorial districts staged a protest at the governor's office carrying placards which indicated agitation for a stolen mandate. They said that they had supported the emergence of Akinlade who hails from Ogun West Senatorial District and who happens to be the anointed candidate of the governor (Adedeji, 2018). The governor who threatened to dump the party for another solicited the intervention of the President in the imbroglio.

In Zamfara state controversies surrounded the conduct of primary elections. While the INEC claimed that it is not expecting the state chapter of APC to submit list of candidates for various elective posts owing to the fact that the party did not meet the October 8 deadline for the conduct of primary elections, the governor of the state, Abdulaziz Yari claimed that the state primary elections were held before the due date and that they were supervised by officials of INEC (Tukur, 2018). It is important to note that the national leadership of the APC had earlier dissolved the state's party executives and barred the Governor from taking part in the primaries. The governor however, claimed that the elections were held on the advice of INEC. He further claimed that it became imperative for him to conduct the primary elections when it became evident that the two committees sent from the national headquarters were not willing to conduct the primaries. This according to him was because the result primaries which he supervised did not go in tandem with the expectations of the committee. It was on this basis, that the results of the primaries were cancelled (Tukur, 2018).

One of the candidates for the primaries, Kabiru Marafa who showed interest in contesting the state's gubernatorial party ticket asserted that no primary election was held in the state, thus, supporting INEC's stand. In an affirmative statement that was contrary to the one above, the governor insisted that primary elections were held. He reiterated this when he asserted that: ''the most important thing is that we conducted election on the 3rd and 4th of October and all agencies INEC, Civil Defence, Police, and DSS were there and they signed for us and the report was written by the REC that elections were conducted.'' In his response, Adams Oshiomhole, the party Chairman claimed that primary elections were held in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution as spelt out by INEC regulation on the conduct of party primary elections. Based on this the governor said the party shall produce candidates for elective posts in the forthcoming 2019 general elections. The case has however, turned to a legal battle (Tukur and Ayitogo, 2018).

In Adamawa state, three gubernatorial aspirants slugged it out for the party's ticket. These were the incumbent Governor Muhammed Jibrilla, former Chairman of the EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu and Mahmud Ahmed, an inlaw to President Muhammadu Buhari. However, the two aspirants challenging the governor alleged that the committee sent by the National Headquarters to oversee the primary election collaborated with the governor to declare him the candidate of the party when no primary elections were conducted (Tukur and Ayitogo, 2018). The same scenario was the case in the senatorial primaries. Candidates vying for the Senatorial ticket also alleged that the incumbent Senator Binta Garba representing Adamawa North was unduly favoured by being declared the senatorial candidate when primary elections were not held. One of the Senatorial aspirants Idris Ahmed alleged that the APC was not fair to them by not conducting a transparent primary election for an authentic winner to emerge (Tukur and Ayitogo, 2018). Nuhu Ribadu on his own part condemned the process from which the governor emerged as the party's governorship candidate. He expressed shock when he heard that result of non-existent primary elections was being announced. To further describe the extent of impunity in the

primary election, one of the aspirants Mahmud Ahmed said he would reject the results of the primaries even if he was declared winner (Alao, 2018).

In Kaduna state, the controversies which surrounded the conduct of primary elections centred on the process of candidate selection for the Kaduna Central Senatorial District ticket. While the APC leadership insisted that the incumbent Senator, Shehu Sani is the party's candidate, the Kaduna state chapter of the party conducted a senatorial primary on the 6th of October and declared Uba Sani, one of the aides to incumbent governor Nasir El Rufai as the winner of the election (Mohammed, 2018). The primary election was alleged to have been contested for by the following candidates:  Sani Saleh, Uba Sani, Shehu Sani, Usman Ibrahim and Shamsudeen Giwa. It is important to note that while other candidates may have been present at the election venue, the incumbent Senator, Shehu Sani was conspicuously missing from the venue of the election. The serving Senator dissociated himself from the primaries claiming that as far as he was concerned he remains the anointed candidate of the party's leadership. Thus, he described the primary election organised by the state chapter of the party as a charade. Following controversies that trailed the Senatorial primaries in the state and his subsequent inability to secure the party's ticket, Senator Shehu Sani dumped the party (Inyang, 2018).

In Kwara state, the scenario was that of parallel gubernatorial elections. Shortly before the primary election, two factions of the party had emerged. One is the Ishola Balogun-Fulani-led faction and the other is the Bashir Bolarinwa-led faction. It is important to note however, that the Ishola Balogun-Fulani-led faction has earlier been dissolved by the National Working Committee of the party but was being recognized by court. Despite being dissolved by the NWC of the party, the faction under the guise of its recognition by the court went ahead and conducted its primary election. In the contest, thirteen aspirants contested for the factional ticket. At the end of the election, Abdulwahab Omotoshe was declared as the winner. Following this, the Bashir Bolarinwa-led faction postponed its primary election (Olowolagba, 2018). The faction on 5th October conducted its primary election with eight candidates vying for the sole ticket. At the end of the polls, Abdulrahman Abdulrasaq emerged winner with 29,098 votes. Other results showed that his closest contestant Prof. Oba Abu scored 23,298. Alhaji Lukman Mustapha recorded 14,233 while Alhaji Yammah Abdullahi scored 22,116 votes. Other results include the following: Alhaji Hakeem Lawal – 18,758; Alhaji Mooshood Murtala – 9,511; Isaq Modibbo Kawu – 5,060; Alhaji Yakubu Gobar – 2,420; and Tajudeen Makama Audu – 3,127 (Ezeigbo, 2018).

The NWC of the APC having recognised the election conducted by the Bashir Bolarinwa-led faction as the authentic election has submitted the name of the winner Abdulrahman Abdulrasaq to INEC despite the court recognition of the Ishola Balogun-Fulani-led faction of the party. Following the perceived injustice and non transparent manner in which the election was conducted, supporters of various candidates protested what they see as deliberate imposition of candidate on the party members. Supporters of Alhaji Shuaibu Yaman Abdullahi, one of the governorship aspirants of the party in the state protested in Ilorin the state capital to register their dissatisfaction with the process through which Abdulrazaq had emerged. They

perceived the outcome of the primary election as a product of injustice. A candidate alleged that his agents and collation officers were threatened and treated with disdain and were denied copies of the results sheets (Mikail, 2018).

In Oyo state, the gubernatorial primary election which produced Adebayo Adelabu, former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and the grandson of the notable Oyo state politician, Adegoke Adelabu was decried particularly by Adebayo Shittu, a serving minister in President Muhammadu Buhari's Cabinet. Worthy of note however, is that Shittu was allegedly refused clearance to participate in the gubernatorial primaries by the NWC based on his non-possession of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) certificate (Bada, 2018). Before the primary election, Shittu was reported to have rejected the indirect method of primary election which was the method chosen by the Committee which conducted the election in the state. Part of the reasons for rejecting the indirect method was that the delegates selected to vote constituted the bulk of those purposively selected for the party' state congresses which were still under contest in the court and that circumstances which surrounded the emergence of the leadership of the state chapter of the APC were still subjected to court litigation (Bada, 2018). He complained that the adoption of the indirect method of primary election at the expense of the direct method was aimed at reducing his chances at the primaries and that it would not create a level playing ground for the contestants (Bada, 2018).

In Ebonyi state, the APC primary election to select candidates for the Senate and House of Representatives took a bloody dimension. The crisis, which occurred in Onueke, headquarters of Ezza South Local Government Area, venue of the Ebonyi Central Senatorial District and Ezza South/Ikwo Federal Constituency primaries, resulted in sporadic shootings between supporters of two different factions of the party. As a result, one person was killed while several others including a policeman were injured (Agwu, 2018). The imbroglio was alleged to have occurred when a faction of loyal to a House of Representatives aspirant from Ikwo clashed with supporters of a gubernatorial aspirant who lost in his bid to secure the party's ticket who hails from Ezza North, over who controls the authentic delegates (Agwu, 2018). In Imo state the aftermath of the primary election which produced Senator Hope Uzodinma as the APC flag bearer has been that of a bitter rivalry between the incumbent Governor, Rochas Okorocha and the serving Senator characterised by hate speech. The governor alleged that Senator Uzodinma has criminal cases to answer and that his source of wealth is not clean (Nwachukwu, 2018). The Senator however, alleged that Okorocha and his cronies are cooking up stories because they never thought he could emerge as the party's gubernatorial candidate (Nwachukwu, 2018).

The occurrences which trailed the primaries examined above indicated that the selection processes for choosing aspirants of the party were tainted by intrigues, controversies, allegations of bias and deliberate imposition of candidates. This arises as a result of blatant disregard for the rule and constitutional provisions guiding the conduct of IPD most especially the aspect having to do with selection of candidates within the party for general elections. While one should not have expected the ruling party to have crisis free primary elections across the country, the magnitude of

allegations of bias, imposition of candidates and the use of unconstitutional means of candidate selection was unprecedented. The use of unconstitutional means of selecting candidates produces non-transparent candidate selection processes which have devastating effects not only on party stability but also on the lager democratic project.

The undemocratic conduct of party primary elections can spell doom for political parties at polls. This may result in legal battles which some may not be resolved until a day to the election. Also, the influence of political "godfathers" in the imposition of candidates affects the performance of a political party at the polls. The political "godfathers" play the role of political gate keepers who dictate who gets "what and when". They monetize elective positions to the extent that the highest bidder gets the nod. The internal crisis which rock political parties due to irregularities surrounding the procedure for nomination flag bearers hinders the conduct of free and fair elections which may affect the stability of the party. Most of the conflicts which arise after general elections usually come as a result of the synthesis of the actions and inactions of political parties during the conduct of primary elections. There is a very high tendency that the traits and character which a political party exhibit during the conduct of its primary election are also exhibited during the general election. These largely determine the success or failure of such political party at the polls

**Conclusion**

Allegations of candidate imposition, parallel congresses, and undemocratic conduct of primary elections, mass protest, and gruesome murder of candidates have been discovered as features of primary elections in the APC. The party primary elections within the APC are instruments in the hands of the party leaders in the name of "godfather" to impose their preferred candidate on other party members. This hinders the development of norms of internal democracy. The APC has almost been destabilized by internal wrangling which comes as a result of undemocratic conduct of candidate selection process and leadership tussle. There is no doubt that political parties in Nigeria need total re-orientation as regards aggregating members' interest and conducting transparent and credible party primaries. However, the conduct of credible free and fair primary elections will entail fostering party discipline which serves as the basis for the harmonious co-existence of members of the party.

Also, members of political parties should see politics as a call to serve and not as an opportunity to amass wealth. Members should accept defeat at elections in good faith. Lastly, the electoral act 2010 (as amended) part V section 87 and sections 227 and 228 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) which gives political parties relative autonomy to control and decide their internal activities should be amended is such a way that INEC will have the power to oversee party primary elections so as to ensure that due process is followed. The electoral body should also be given the power to sanction any political party which fails to abide by the rules and regulation governing the conduct of party primaries. By

doing this INEC will be empowered to monitor and enforce the practice of internal democracy within all registered political parties in Nigeria.

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# Voter Turnout and the 2017 Gubernatorial Election in Anambra State, Nigeria

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## Abstract

*The history of democratic struggle for votes makes it clear that in the absence of a referendum a low turnout is a vote against the politics of the time in question. There has been a continued downward decline in the turnout of voters in successive elections in Nigeria since the dawn of civilian administration in 1999. From national through state and local government polls, the rate of exercise of franchise has continued to dwindle. Factors not unconnected with lack of trust in government and political processes coupled with over bloated presence of security personnel in troubled sectional and conflictual inter-ethnic relations have remained defining and remarkable. This study thus interrogates the import of democratically elected public officials wherein registered voters refused to cast their votes. It observes that 22% electorate participation in the 2017 Anambra State Gubernatorial elections ordinarily was not democratic in a state with over 2 million registered voters. It further examines possibilities of legal definition of acceptable voter turnout for a legitimate election in Nigeria while exploring a clearer clarification of what constitutes genuine mandate for the election of political leaders. Based mainly on secondary sources of data, the study is a descriptive and analytical clarification of the efficacy of democratic struggle for votes within the context of alienated government and politics.*

**Keywords:** Voters Turnout, Electoral Victory, Legitimate Mandate, Gubernatorial Elections, Democratic Struggle for Votes

## Introduction

Periodic, competitive and participatory (free and fair) elections constitute the cardinal pillar of democratic political systems (Omotola & Aiyedogbon, 2012, pp: 54-73). Elections that fall short of these ingredients of democratic standards undermine the processes of democratic consolidation. Hence, the nature and rate of electorate turnout and participation in electoral processes define, in significant terms, the credibility of electoral democracy. The continuous decline in voter turnout during elections in Nigeria is fast becoming phenomenal. As it continues in manners that bespeak failing democratic ethos, concerns continue to rage as it relates to conferred electoral mandates when compared with principle of mass participation (majority rule) as a hallmark of democracy. To further flesh the argument on the nexus between elections and democracy, Fagunwa (2018) contends that scholars like Powell (1986), Wattenburg (2002) have explicitly argued that low voter turnout decreases the legitimacy of democracy. It is an undisputable fact that if the masses of a particular country refuse to fulfill their electorate obligation, then there is disconnect between

the masses and the government, thus bringing to question the democratic right, acceptability of the government. It is then clear that decline in voter turnout is nothing but a reflection of the failing authenticity of democracy in our context.

What is more, the rate of voter turnout in elections, whether high or low will forever be a fundamental component of representative democracy because this encapsulates the evaluation of public influence on the management of their affairs by politicians. The 2017 gubernatorial election in Anambra State has been interpreted as a resounding victory for Governor Willie Obiano and, his political party the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). It has earned the governor some interesting political dexterous names such as 21/21. Yet, less than a quarter of the total number of registered voters actually participated in the election (Owoseye, 2017) that determined his re-election.

In fact, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance once put it that voters' turnout has always been below 40% of the general registered voters (IDEA, 2006). Yet, despite the generality of decline in voters' turnout throughout the globe, if a country records a major low turnout of voters in an election, it brings forth the question of the legitimacy of the government that emerges from such an election.

Hence, despite the electrifying effect of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, it was discovered that less than half of the registered voters, 42.76%, officially cast their votes (INEC, 2015). In fact, as it would be argued in the course of this paper, since 1999, the country witnessed its lowest voters' turnout during the 2015 general elections. This was pegged at 43.65% compared to the 54% in 2011 or the 57% in 2007 and lastly the 69% and 52% in the 2003 and 1999 elections respectively. In the same light, the attendant scattered state and local government polls have continued to witness general dismal voter turnout that tend to generate more questions than answers as it concerns meaning of popular mandate and majority rule in our context. Does a system with voluntary turnout select the right candidate? How do policy positions of competing candidates influence their turnout rates and, their electoral prospects?

Consequently, this paper seeks to interrogate the continued existence of democratic standards of participatory and competitive polls wherein the masses abstain from elections. It further seeks to determine the import of poor electorate turnout and legitimacy of mandates in electoral democracies. Does percentage votes cast in elections in anyway relate to legitimate mandate and vice versa? The paper therefore attempts to contribute to the debates on political participation in evolving democracies by examining the amount of support an incoming regime would wield in order to enjoy popular mandate in dwindling electorates involvement in elections using data from the 2017 gubernatorial elections in Anambra State. The premise of the paper is that the concepts of voter turnout should form the cardinal pillar for determining popularity of regimes and government policies. It would thus advance arguments for increased popular participation for more enduring legitimacy and regimes.

**Conceptual Clarifications**

The concepts of political participation, election and voting behaviour are closely interrelated as they are mutually reinforcing because they all revolve around the concept of democracy which upholds citizens' engagement in public affairs (Genyi, 2015). In this section, we shall reflect on the concepts of political participation while paying particular attention to voter turnout as a specific indicator in democratic systems to enable us situate the study properly for apt analysis of the issues canvassed.

**What then is Political Participation**

Like most other concepts in the realm of the social sciences, political participation is well rehearsed in literature. Virtually every study of political participation starts with the allegation that political participation and democracy are inseparable (Van Deth, 2001).

However, the perspectives and positions of scholars reflect their orientations and backgrounds but some certain features are found defining in all. In specific terms, most scholars share the viewpoint that political participation deals with voluntary action of citizens aimed at influencing the course of governance. Such action(s) and sometimes inaction of the electorates define(s) the relationships between the government and the people wherein the latter demonstrate their perception of the former.

Hence, Verba and Nie (1972, pp.2-3) define political participation as behaviour designed to affect the choice of governmental personnel and/or policies. Similarly, Kaase and Marsh (1979, p.42), perceive political participation as 'all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system'.

In a rather comprehensive approach, Nelson (1976, p. 8) sees it as an 'action of private citizens intended to influence the actions or the composition of national or local government'. The level and pattern of political participation of the citizens determine, to some extent, the success of the political system (Falade, 2014). The confidence of the citizens in the electoral system and their participation in the electoral process are requisites for the enthronement of responsible and democratic leaders.

Consequently, political participation, particularly in the electoral process, is a fundamental requirement of representative democracy. This is the reason why Appadorai (2004) argued that where, on account of an atmosphere of fear and coercion, people do not feel free to discuss or vote, democracy cannot be said to exist, even though the other political rights are enjoyed by the people. Representative democracy rests on the assumptions that the citizens possess and demonstrate some civic capacities. These civic capacities involve three qualities: intelligence, self-control and conscience. The citizens must be able to understand the interest of the community, to subordinate his own will to the general will and must feel his responsibility to the community and be prepared to serve it by voting (Appadorai, 2004).

Political participation therefore describes the involvement of the citizens in the political system. It entails a process through which the individual plays a role in the political life of his society and has the opportunity to take part in deciding what common goals of the society are and the best way of achieving these goals. These activities culminate in the exercise of franchise by qualified citizens.

In the light of the foregoing postulations, Conge (1988) identified broad categories about the meaning of political participation and amplified the debate on limit of the concept. Such questions as whether political participation should be defined only in terms of action of voting, campaigning for a political party or should it include passive forms as in a feeling of patriotism, an awareness of political issues, civil (dis)obedience became trendy (Omotola and Aiyedogun, 2012). Arising from the contentions, Conge (1988, p.147) aptly submits that political participation deals with individual or collective action at the national or local level that supports or opposes state structures, authorities, and/or decisions regarding allocation of public goods … the action can be verbal or written … violent or non-violent … can be of any intensity.

This again raises a lot of concerns as per the extent of possible deviant behavoural dispositions that could emanate in political participation. Obviously, election forms the basic standing for citizens to demonstrate their preferences for and against government policies and programmes including choice of personnel, thus offering the electorates the greatest platform for involvement in governance in democratic systems. The poser here is how well do citizens take advantage of elections in getting involved in governance? What is the rate of citizens participations in elections? These questions lead us to dissenting the concept of Voter Turnout in elections which for all intents and purposes is the basic indicator of political participation in democratic governance.

**Voter Turnout as a Parameter for Democratic Quality**

Democratization project concerns primarily the guaranteeing and enjoyment of civil and political rights by citizens. Democracies make these rights possible through citizen participation in elections and governance (Mahmud, 2015). According to Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) cited in Omotola and Aiyedogun (2012), voter turnout has been in literature as one of the core ways of measuring the level of participation in elections. Voter turnout is one of the crucial indicators of how citizens participate in the governance of their country. Higher voter turnout is in most cases a sign of the vitality of democracy, while lower turnout is usually associated with voter apathy and mistrust of the political process (IDEA, 2016).

It is often measured as a percentage of registered voters who vote and it defines peoples' choices in electoral democracies. In a related manner, Mahmud (2015) submits that voter turnout simply means the percentage of voting age population (or the percentage of registered voters) who actually came out to vote in an election. It is thus a measure of how many electorates that cast their votes in elections and not how many citizens that registered to vote or participated in other

forms of the electoral process like joining campaign rallies or membership of political parties. Voter turnout is the extent to which eligible voters use their vote on election day. It is measured as the percentage of votes cast at an election, including invalid votes (IDEA, 2016).

The higher the level of voter turnout, the higher the level of participation and by implication the greater the democratic quality (Lindberg, 2004). Hence, voter turnout describes the rate at which registered voters exercise their right to vote in elections thereby making the concept the fulcrum for understanding the real import of the concept of political participation vis-à-vis regime legitimacy.

Literature expounding theories, determinants and modalities for promoting voter turnout at individual, local and national levels abound (Lijphart 1997; Blais, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Hence, evaluating the views expressed by Schedler (2001) while reflecting on attempts to account for political participation as a crucial factor for democratic consolidation, it is crucial for perspective observers to measure political participation with voter turnout as a cardinal indicator.

Mass support indicate popular mandate which is a prerequisite for democratic governance and can only be measured through rate/percentage of electorate involvement in elections. This position is further corroborated by the realization that elections in liberal democracies are 'bottom up' which enables the ruled to control the rulers. It provides for voters to exert some influence over government for obedience to decisions they only partly shaped. This position again maybe dependent upon the importance of sovereignty which grants real powers to the electorates.

To that end, Mahmud (2015, p.6) argues that "of the various forms of political participation, none is more important than the act of voting in a democratic political system as a fundamental right". He avers that voting in elections serves as a measure of popular support for regimes and state legitimacy. This obviously explains why landslide victories are celebrated, while attempts to boycott elections are often discouraged. It also according to Mahmud (p.7) is responsible for classical theorists equating citizenship to participation in politics. Thence, it could be surmised that a regime with a solid base of support from high voter turnout, enjoys popular support of the electorate. A high voter turnout ushering/reelecting a regime is therefore an indication of high quality democracy embedded in popular democratic governance defined in majority rule.

## Gubernatorial Elections in Anambra State since the Current Democratic Dispensation

Elections lie at the heart of representative governance thereby giving meaning to the modern conception of democracy (Joseph, 1987). Hence, Omotola (2010, pp. 535–553) submits that "elections guarantee political participation and competition which are pivotal to democratic transition and consolidation". Election is the most superior method of selecting/recruiting leadership in democratic political systems.

Going into specifics, Ojo (2007, p.5) contends that "election is the process of choosing people for particular jobs by voting". Elections are also central to the institutionalization of orderly succession in a democratic setting, creating a legal-

administrative framework for handling inter-elite rivalries. Elections also provide a modicum of popular backing for new rulers.

In Nigeria, elections represent procedures for choosing representatives to the Nigerian federal government composed of the President (as the executive arm) and the National Assembly (as the legislative arm), the 36 State Governors, Federal Capital Territory and 774 local government Councils. Thus elections are categorized to include Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial, House of Assembly and Local Government Elections. Nigeria elects on the federal level - the President and a legislature (referred to as the National Assembly composed of the Senate and the Federal House of Representatives), the Governors of the 36 states in gubernatorial elections conducted in general and scattered polls as occasioned by the situation in Anambra state following Mr Peter Obi's success in the Courts in 2006. Gubernatorial elections are therefore elections conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to select personae for the office of the governor of a state in Nigeria. It comes every four years for the various states of the federation.

The electoral history of Anambra state since the dawn of the fourth republic in 1999 is full of political intrigues and notoriety: from 1999-2013, the state created a new record in godfatherism. First was the Emeka Offor-Chinwoke Mbadinuju saga (1999-2003), Chris Uba-Chris Ngige comedy (2002-2006) and later the farcical impeachment of Mr. Peter Obi as the governor of Anambra State (CDD, 2017). The intrigues include the unprecedented abduction of a serving governor (Dr. Chris Ngige) who was allegedly forced to resign; an election petition for a governorship election which lasted for nearly three years in a four-year tenure; the impeachment of a governor, which was later found to be without merit but took months to get the governor reinstated, the brazen attack and burning of government house, among others.

The seeming defeat of cabals and godfathers by the "never existed" Dr. Chris Nwabueze Ngige regime and Mr. Peter Obi led government invariably marked the demise of shylock political godfathers in Anambra state politics. By 2007, Mr Obi cruised to landslide victory that occasioned a new dawn in Anambra gubernatorial politics which invariably introduced the Chief Willie Obiano administration in 2014.

The 2017 gubernatorial election ordinarily represents a huge opportunity for state building and democratic consolidation that was predicated on several variables. It was to test the impact and how the IPOB/Biafra separatist agenda would subsist as well as a re-test of the efficacy of election boycott in Nigeria. The boycott declaration by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) through the instrumentalities of MASSOB posed an unimaginable threat to the conduct of the election. Again, the declaration of MASOB as a terrorist organization by the Federal Government was very defining for Ndi-Igbo and electorates in Anambra State against the latency of imports of operation *Python Dance,* a military operation that was recently concluded in the region.

**Theoretical Exposition**

Voting could be referred to as that critical aspect of political participation in a democracy that is civic but voluntary. It is the basic indicator for measuring

participation that determines to a large extent the degree of support a government wields upon its personnel and policies.

Why and how do people vote? The customary political science answer to that question is that people vote if they have a preference about the candidates or parties that they want to express. They abstain if they do not care. This expressive motivation has long been recognized. According to Merriam and Gosnell (1924, p. 159) "indifference is undoubtedly the greatest cause of non-voting".

To the present day, political scientists and journalists commonly point to high or low turnout rates as measures of voters' preference strength which invariably describe the quality of democracy in political systems. There are prevailing theoretical perspectives on voter turnout and political participation especially as it relates to choice and why voters get involved in electoral processes but this study evaluates the impact of security threat to voter turnout along the postulations of the rational choice theory of voting.

The rational choice theory of voting is not new. Gary Becker was an early proponent of applying rational actor models more widely. Rational decision making entails choosing an action given one's preferences, the actions one could take, and expectations about the outcomes of those actions. Downs (1957) while explaining the theory posits that, where voting is costly, individuals will consider both how much they care about the outcome and the likelihood that their vote will influence the outcome (be pivotal). In large elections, the likelihood that an individual's vote will be pivotal is so small as to make it unlikely that the expected benefit of voting will outweigh the costs. This, of course, leads to the difficulty that if elections are large, no one will have the incentive to vote, but, if no one votes, any one vote can determine the outcome so that the incentive to vote will be high.

Without developing the foregoing position fully, Downs suggested a solution based on the idea that there are important private and social benefits to the act of voting that might accrue to individuals and give them the incentive to vote. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) extended Downs' idea in a useful model of the decision to vote that starts with the rational assumption that individuals will vote if their expected utility from voting is higher than their expected utility from not voting. Frerejohn and Fiorina (1974) present an alternative framework for understanding the voting decision based not on expected utility maximization but on the minimal regret decision criterion. Rather than probability weight outcomes, as in expected utility maximization, the minimal regret criterion has the individual calculate the difference between the utility from voting and the utility from not voting (regret for not voting) for each combination of election outcome and whether or not the individual would have been pivotal. The individual then chooses the option that yields the smallest value for regret.

Our analyses of the position is largely dependent upon the cost implication which read beyond economic dimensions to include security of lives and property. The cost of voting or otherwise in the gubernatorial election was a function of (in)apt dissection and appraisal of the call by IPOB for Anambrarians to boycott the elections which ignited massive deployment of red alert security personnel to the state during

the period of the election. Majority of the electorates weighed their gains from the elections and possible threat of manhandling by security personnel whose mindset was that of deal and get the people to conform to the forced indivisibility of Nigeria nation. Most electorates stayed at home owing largely to the dastardly experiences and fate suffered in the region on the implementation of *Operation Python Dance.* People wanted to live beyond the election which many considered to be less important when compared with their lives and the likely benefits to them in the long run.

**Voter Turnout and Electoral Victory in the 2017 Gubernatorial Election in Anambra State: A Critical Analysis**

The history of voter turnout in Nigerian elections over the years reflect significant dwindling of electorates' participation. At the inception of the fourth republic, it appeared as if the pendulum would change but with efforts at consolidation of democracy, turnout which is the basic indicator of political participation has continued to go down. Overall, the electioneering processes of Nigeria over the years have been characterized by several untoward tendencies ranging from massive frauds, rigging, intimidation of both opponents and potential voters, state interference, lack of ideological conviction of the ruling class, lack of continuity, violence, to mention a few, hence apathy naturally sets in (Fagunwa, 2018).

Low voter turnout especially in governorship polls has become a recurring decimal in Anambra State. This had been on since 2003 when Mr. Peter Obi presumably won with 235,000 popular votes (the highest in the history of Anambra State except Emmanuel Andy Ubah's allocated over one million votes (in the April 2007 court annulled poll) out of total registered population of 1.9 million. To that result, Umeagbalasi (2017) observed that Obi's popular votes were rigged and replaced with intimidating figures of fake votes.

In February 2010, another governorship poll was conducted and out of a total registered voting population of 1.84 million, only 301,232 representing 16.3% of the electorates cast their votes; from which Peter Obi of the APGA won his second term with only 97,833 valid votes, followed by Chris Ngige of ACN with 60,240 and Prof Charles Soludo of PDP with 59,355 votes (Owoseye, 2017). In November 2013, a new governorship election was conducted in Anambra State and out of a total registered voting population of 1,776,167; 442,242 electorates representing (25%) cast their votes and 16,988 were invalid while 425,254 were declared valid; out of which Willie Obiano of APGA, won with 180,173 valid votes; followed by Anthony Nwoye of PDP with 97,700 and Chris Ngige of APC with 95,963 valid votes.

**Figure 1: 2013 Anambra Gubernatorial Election Turnout (26.3%)**



**4,055,048**
Population of Anambra
(2006 Census)

**1,758,220**
Anambra Registered Voters
(2011 INEC Figure)

**462,412**
Anambra Voter Turnout
(2013 INEC Figure)

**Source:** Transition Monitoring Group from
http://www.tmgtowards2015.org/turnout.html

In the 18th November 2017 Governorship Poll, out of a total registered votes of 2,158,171; only 448,771 votes representing (21.74%) voted; 26,457 were declared invalid and 422,314 were declared valid votes cast; out of which incumbent Governor Willie Obiano of APGA scored 234,071 valid votes, followed by Anthony Nwoye of APC with 98,752 and Henry Oseloka Obaze with 70,293 votes. Incidentally, not all the 457,511 accredited people actually cast their vote. The INEC figure shows that only 21.74 per cent of the registered voters (448,771) actually cast their votes.

**Table 1: Voter Turnout in Anambra State Gubernatorial Elections from 2010 - 2017**

| Year | No of Registered Votes | Vote Cast | % Voter Turnout |
|------|------------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| 2010 | 1,844,815 | 301,232 | 16.4% |
| 2013 | 1,770,127 | 465,891 | 26.3% |
| 2017 | 2,064,134 | 457, 511 | 22.2% |

**Source:** Compiled by the authors from existing literature

From the above table, it is obvious that governorship elections in the state never witnessed up to 50% of voter turnout, except in the 2007 election which was marred by allegations of massive rigging (Owoseye, 2017). A review of the voters' turnout figures shows a progressive decline. Whereas the total registered votes in the state has fluctuated in an irregular manner indicative of malpractice, turnout has not been impressive. All elected governors from 2010 did not go through very competitive democratic struggle for votes in very keenly contested elections. Most citizens have abstained from the gubernatorial elections in the state for reasons ranging from lack of trust in the political system or the electoral system coupled with clear alienation of the government from the citizens.

Thence, the poser is how do we calculate popular mandate in elections that did not witness two-third majority participation (turnout) in the process? Governor

Obiano claims 21/21 electoral victory in an election that does not have polling result that is more than total registered votes of 14 out of 21 local governments in the state. Whose mandate is the governor wielding in this scenario? What happens to the concept of democratic struggle for votes?

Accepted that the history of electoral boycott in Nigeria shows negative gradient for the electorates who observe the boycott, the unusual deployment of over 26,000 security personnel to Anambra for the election (Moshood, 2017) was an unprecedented scare and threat to the electorates already beclouded in deep rooted inter-ethnic and regional conflictual struggles with the national government and its agencies. This factor was amplified by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) issuance of threats of 'vote and die' against Anambra voting population as well as poor handling of same by way of militarization of voting arenas by security agencies (Umeagbalasi, 2017). The feeling of insecurity by many electorates who perhaps weighed their gains from the elections coupled with lack of confidence in the electoral system among other factors maybe accountable for the poor turnout of voters across the state.

Hence, total accredited votes of 457,511 out of 2,064,134 irrespective of the invalid votes conveys electoral victory upon the candidate that secured a meager 11.34% of the total registered votes. Whose mandate was earned in that election? Is the mandate popular and legitimate? This situation describes the potency and strength of Nigerian democracy and places significant question mark upon the kind of legitimacy that political leaders who emerged from such elections enjoy. Any electoral turnout that is below 40% speaks volume of forces against the government and its policies and programmes. The situation in Anambra was a necessary evil but baseline is critical for subsequent elections in Nigeria.

Those results are acceptable on several grounds which include the proposition that the total registered votes is greater than genuine electorates in the state. Perhaps, persons who are either under age or not in existence and those who have relocated from the state have their names in the register. This argument is made manifest in the spiral downward degeneration of voter turnout in the state overtime in successive elections. Take a look at Table 1 above and balance your thoughts with general apathy from 2010 till date. If the 2007 voters' register was bloated, could it not be said that the 2017 register is yet to be completely cleaned from fraud? If the register has been cleared of all manipulations, then the electoral process is to be screened to get trusted. Voting is a civic responsibility that should not be allowed to fritter with reckless abandonment.

**Recommendations**

In line with the key observations and findings of the study, the following strategies are recommended to improve upon the situation:

I.    A systematic update and clean-up of the Anambra State voters register should be carried out immediately to guarantee that the register is actually updated before the conduct of any more elections in the state;

II.     The governments at all levels are advised to allow and grant level playing field to all parties in election regardless of their relationship with state apparatuses of force and security;

III.    There should be a baseline turnout rate of about 40% for every election to ensure popular mandate;

IV.     Polls that did not secure 40% turnout rate should go into second ballot;

V.      The deployment of security personnel during elections should be guided by a code that would regulate their conduct and involvement in the process to avoid militarization of polls.

**Conclusion**

The paper examined the issues of voter turnout as a cardinal pillar of political participation and democratic governance in Anambra state with particular reference to the 2017 gubernatorial elections. From statistical breakdown of gubernatorial elections in Anambra state which shows that more voters cast their vote in 2017 than 2013. Whereas 448,771 or 21% of registered voting population voted in 2017, lesser number of 442,254 or 25% of registered voting population voted in 2013. In the same order, Governor Obiano secured 180,173 valid votes in 2013 and 234,071 in 2017. It is observed that voter turnout in elections in the state has continually been below 30% which invariably indicates the existence of sustaining factors that have affected democratic governance. The study identified such factors for the 2017 elections to include the activities of IPOB, unusual deployment of security personnel in a manner that resulted in the militarization of the polling centres across the state, lack of trust in the government by the people.

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# European Union and Britain Exit:
## Policy Implication for Economic Community of West African States

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**Abstract**

*The mid-20th century, specifically after the end of World War II, witnessed large numbers of integrative economic organizations all over the world. For instance, the 1950s saw the formation of the European Economic Community which later translated into the European Union (EU) while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) emerged in the 1970s with policies aimed at ensuring economic gains among members such as single market, free movement of people, goods and services across borders, common tariff, common currency and peace and stability etc. The study examines the EU and the planned British exit (BREXIT) with regard to policy implications for ECOWAS. This is important because the EU and ECOWAS shared a common goal of promoting political and economic interests among member states. It therefore becomes necessary for ECOWAS to learn from policy loopholes and complacency of the EU especially as it affects member state(s) economic and internal security problems which is common today among EU and ECOWAS member states. This problem and others could have been promptly addressed by EU, but failed to do so which prompted the BREXIT plan to enable it face its internal problems squarely. The study adopted historical and descriptive method in collecting data. The findings revealed that member states within EU and ECOWAS have benefited for many years in the areas of free trade of goods and services, freedom for its citizens to live and work anywhere and maintaining of peace among member states etc. The study also revealed that the recent happening in the world scene such as global economic recession, religious extremism, insurgency, terrorism, trans-border crime, refugee crisis and most importantly, immigration problem have greatly affected individual member's internal economy and security. On this, the study recommended that ECOWAS should not allow it members to be at a disadvantaged position. Also, complaints that affect economic and internal security of its members within the community should be handled promptly to avoid European Union experience with Britain otherwise known as Brexit.*

**Keywords:** European Union, Britain, Exit, Implication, ECOWAS.

## Introduction

The catastrophes that engulfed Europe following the first and the Second World War, greatly inspired the founding of what was later to become the European

Union to increased their determination to rebuild Europe and to eliminate the possibility of another war. This sentiment eventually led to the formation of the European coal and steel community by West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux Countries. The first full customs union was originally known as the European Economic Community (informally called the common market in the United Kingdom) established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and implemented on 1st January, 1958. This later changes to the European Community which is now the "first pillar" of the European Union created by the Maastricht. The outcome of Maastricht was an agreement to create European Union, consisting of three European communities. The New European Union like the Old European Communities from which it is emerging offer a beacon of attraction to the rest of Europe (Pinder, 1991, Booker and North, 2003).

From a wider context, it is obvious that the mid-20th century, specifically after the close of the Second World War has witnessed large numbers of integrative economic organizations all over the world. In other words, every region of the world has embarked on economic integration, which as many scholars have argued, is an important response to globalization by nation-states. Among these integrative economic organizations include the European Economic Community (EEC) which later in 1993 translated into European Union (EU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of 28 member states that are located primarily in Europe. The EU policies aim is to ensure free movement of people, goods, services, and capital within the internal market, enact legislation in justice and home affairs, and maintain common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries, regional development, abolition of passport control, a monetary union, health, education, urbanization and infrastructure, military, security, humanitarian, energy and sport etc (Joseph and Corcell, 1989, McComick, 2007, Yesilada and Wood, 2009).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional body created on 25th May, 1975 during its first conference in Lagos, where its treaty was signed. The idea of having a United West African body was first proposed by the then Nigerian head of state, Yakubu Gowon. His idea was to collectively achieve a self-sufficiency through integration of the sixteen West African Countries into an economic block with a single market controlled around an economic and monetary union. The community started with 5 members. Laters on Cape Verde joined in 1976, but Mauritania withdrew it membership in December 2000. At the moment, the commission has 15 members namely: Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Gambia, Cape Verde and Burkina Faso. Niger and Guinea have both been suspended due to coup d'etat incidences.

The main objective of ECOWAS is to promote cooperation and integration in order to create an economic and monetary union for encouraging economic growth and development in West Africa through: the suppressions of custom duties and equivalent taxes; the establishment of a common external tariff; the harmonization of economic and financial policies; and the creation of a monetary zone and to serve as a

peace keeping force for the region. Technically, the initiative to create ECOWAS grew from the assumption that because of the growing unfavourable world economic trends toward the developing countries and the declined in the economics of the countries within the sub-region, the projected economic community would bring benefits to the individual members by promoting their long-term development needs. However, due to the slow pace encountered in implementing this treaties, the treaty was revised in Cotonou in Benin on July 23, 1993. The new treaty adopted a less rigid collaboration. It subdivided ECOWAS into The Commission, The Community Parliament, The Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). These institutions are intended to be the tools used to implement their policies (Abubakar, 2001, Ibok, 2015; UK Essay, 2018).

A closer examination of European Union from its inception till 2016 reveals that member states have benefited greatly in various areas of cooperation such as; single market, climate, environment, health, education, research, agriculture, culture etc. However, despite these gains recorded, certain issues have developed as a result of global economic crisis and its effect on members' internal economy and security such as insurgency, terrorism, immigrant and refugee crisis. These problems have not been given prompt attention, hence Britain decision to leave the Union. This study therefore aims at finding out policy implication of Britain exit on ECOWAS.

**Theoretical Framework**

Observers and theorists have associated phases of European Communities now European Union in their evolution with particular approaches to the study of European integration. Loosely, a linear development has been identified with decades marking the transition from the low politics to the high politics of integration. Under this scheme, the 1950s are characterized as a period when functionalism reign; the 1960s as the time of neo-functionalism; the 1970s as the phase of confederalism and inter-governmentalism and the 1980 and 1990s as a time of resurgent federalism or neo-federalism (Hass, 1964, Lodge, 1994).

However, this work is predicated on "Neo-Federalist" view of European Integration as advanced by John Pinder who tries to deal with the intermediary steps between inter-state relations and a fully-fledged federation. It was believed that European Union and federation would solve the problem facing Europe. This therefore entails that the European Union would require a single market, economic and monetary union, a common external policy with cooperation on security; while federation also needs control of armed forces. Both would involve federal institutions, with majority in the council, co-legislation by the council and the European Parliament aid "full executive competence". For the commission, member state would keep control over domestic policies (Pinder, 1991).

**European Union and Britain Exit**

The attainment of European Union nevertheless remains a goal of all EC now EU states. EU members are bound together through a web of relationship in a range of different policy areas and through participation in a range of different

organizations. The distinguishing features of their participation in the EU is that whereas participation in other European and international organizations is the product of co-operations, in the EU they are committed to common endeavours sustained and entrenched by a unique supranational system under which national sovereignty is voluntarily constrained. Power and authority no longer rest only with the members themselves. Instead, it is shared with independent supranational actors (Lodge, 1994).

A closer look at EC now EU performance for the past 66 years before planned Britain exit revealed that the Union has recorded tremendous success in various key areas eventhough there were some grey areas that needed prompt attention. Some of the benefiting areas are:

- The European Union is built on the rule of law; everything it does is founded on treaties, voluntarily and democratically agreed by its member countries.
- Abolition of border controls; people can travel freely throughout most of the continent which has made it much easier to live, work and travel abroad.
- Common agricultural policy (CAP): This came as a result of Rome Treaty of 1957 which aims were to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, to stabilize markets, to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices and to modernize farming infrastructure. These have largely been achieved. Although these subsidies paid for by EU tax payers secures the standard of living for farmers in EU countries, but most importantly endangers Third World jobs, potentially causing increased poverty and malnutrition.
- Single Market: Many policies of the EU relate to the development and maintenance of an effective single market. Significant efforts have been made to create harmonized standards designed to bring economic benefits through creating larger and more efficient markets. The single market has both internal and external aspects thus:
  - Internal policies: Free trades of goods and services among member states; A common EU competition law controlling anti-competitive activities of companies through antitrust law and merger control and member states through the state aids regime; the Schengen treaty which allowed removal of internal border controls and harmonization of external controls between its member state. This excludes the UK and Ireland, which have derogations; freedom for citizens of its member states to live and work anywhere within the EU with their spouses and children, provided they can support themselves; free movement of capital between member state; harmonization of government regulations, corporations law and trademark registrations etc.
  - External policies: A common external customs tariff, and a common position in international trade negotiations; funding for programmes in candidate countries and other Eastern European counties, as well as aid to many developing countries; the establishment of a single market energy community by means of the Energy Community South East Europe Treaty; the establishment of a Single Market Aviation area; the establishment of a European Defence Agency; and the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force etc.

Cooperation and harmonization in other areas include; freedom of citizens of the EU to vote in local government and European parliament elections in any member state; cooperation in criminal matters, including sharing of intelligence through EUROPOL and the information system, agreement on common definition of criminal offences and expedited extradition procedures; a common security policy as an objective, including the creation of a 60,000 member European Rapid Reaction Force for peacekeeping purposes, an EU military staff and an EU satellite center for intelligence purposes, common policy on asylum and immigration; common funding of research and technological development; European social fund used to finance vocational training and to help people find work; cohesion fund used in financing transport infrastructure and environmental projects in EU countries whose GDP per capita is lower than 90% of EU average (Bennett, 1986, Lodge, 1998, Pascal, 2014).

However, despite these gains recorded, certain happenings seem to threatened the continued existence of EU especially as it bothers on why of BREXIT. Reasons range from global economic crisis, religious extremism, terrorism, insurgency, refugee as well as immigration problem. These developments needed concrete policies to tackled them. No wonder the supporters of BREXIT argued that:

- UK was being held back by the EU which imposed too many rules on business and charged billions of pounds a year in membership fee for little in return;
- They wanted Britain to take back full control of its boarders and reduce the number of people entering Britain to live and or work.
- High levels of immigration – this remains one of the serious issues which the union could not resolve, so Britain is committed to getting net immigration. That is, the differences between the number entering and learning UK to a sustainable level, which in reality should be below 100,000 a year. But currently running at 330,000 a year of which 184,000 are EU citizens, and 188,000 are from outside the EU.
- UK wants to limit outward flow of Britain national which is against the EU main principles binding EU membership which is "free movement" meaning that you don't need a visa to go and live in another EU country. This may lead to brain drain which Britain is not favourable dispose to.
- The recent mass movement or migration from poorer and war ravaging countries like Syria to peaceful richer countries has also raised question about the free movement route (www.bbc.com 28/1/2017, www.bookshop.eur.opa. eu 17/4/2017).

In view of the above, coupled with recent reality that bothers on economy, internal security, immigration etc. BREXIT therefore entails that;

   i.    an independent Britain will be better able to cope with those strains.
   ii.   As member of EU, it costs the UK over £350 m each week – nearly £20 bn a year. Such amount as argued could be used to enhance domestic economy and security etc.

iii.  BREXIT will create hundreds of thousands more jobs in the UK by negotiating trade deals with countries individually.

iv.   Britain can never control immigration until it leaves the EU, because freedom of movement gives other EU citizens an automatic right to live in the UK. Most important, EU does not have the legal structures needed to cope with the current migrant crisis. So if leave, Britain will take back control.

v.    Britain is the World 5th largest economy and also a member of UN Security Council and possessor of a nuclear arsenal, hence, does not need EU to be a key player on the international stage.

vi.   Freedom to rescind EU laws and regulations and:

vii.  To save the lion share of Britain contribution to EU which stood at £9 bn a year eventhough it represents a palsy sum of 0.5 PC of the UK GDP (www.telegraph.co.uk17/4/2017).

The above points started as a problem which could have been swiftly addressed by EU but failed to realize the dynamic and changing nature of the world that what was acceptable 20-50 year ago may not be acceptable today. Hence, the need to response to such issues by amending the existing laws or making new ones to address the problems. Since EU was complacent and satisfy with the status-quo, Britain therefore decided to quit to enable her address those problems and save her economy as well as its internal security.

**European Union and Britain Exit Policy Implication for ECOWAS**

As earlier observed, ECOWAS was established based on an implicit political premise that by pooling the resources of the member-states together and providing services, they would benefit, and such benefits would also promote popular acceptance of the principle of regional rather than national services. The logic of economic integration of the West African Sub-region was built on the idea of functionalism. The idea of functionalism on the goal of integration revolves around the creation of a network of independent transnational functional organizations for the provision of socio-economic demand which according to the functionalists, is for sheer community interests.

The establishment of ECOWAS was to solve common economic problems. ECOWAS important areas of cooperation are: custom union and trade, industrial cooperation, common financial institution, conflict resolution, transport and communication, social and cultural exchange programme and scholarship and student exchange programme etc. But it is obvious that inspite of the initial surge of enthusiasm that catapulted the formation of ECOWAS, it has not been very successful in achieving some of its chartered objectives. The problems confronting ECOWAS are: traditional economic dependence on their formal colonial powers, unequal distribution of gain as Nigeria dominated the community in terms of population and land mass; non-adherence to the provision of ECOWAS protocols especially as occasioned by government of ECOWAS states restricting the movement

of people, and thus embarking on series of repatriation of such resident and boarders closure, (Bunting, 1981, West Africa, 1982, Ibok, 2015).

Recently, the most pressing issues confronting ECOWAS just as it EU counterparts are present economic situation and internal security especially the activities of armed or insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, the Taurug rebels etc. Also, lack of firm political will on the part of ECOWAS leaders occasioned by clashes of interest, boarder check and harassment and the spread of deadly disease such as Ebola across national borders etc. The most glaring issues that sent fears into some members spine is the suspicion that ECOMOG was primarily set up to serve Nigeria's political and economic interest as against ECOWAS primary goal of solving members socio-economic problems. Just like UK financial commitment to EU, it is equally observed that Nigeria spent over $10,000,000,000 during the ECOMOG Peace Support Operation (PSO). This huge amount spent by Nigeria alone in Liberia as argued would have been used in establishing industries or other welfare projects in the country which could have gone a long way to meet the welfare needs of the citizens. Besides, Nigeria is the prime contributor to the ECOWAS (Okojie, 2009).

The policy implication of these problems experienced by ECOWAS revealed that all is not well with this sub-regional body. This therefore calls for a proactive action by the ECOWAS to address these problems by going back to the drawing board to come up with realistic policies to address some of the grey areas that need urgent attention for the continued existence of the sub West African body (ECOWAS). Most importantly, with the current happening in the world scene and the dynamic nature of our society should informed ECOWAS members to be committed to ECOWAS goals and objectives. More so, any serious complaint by a member state should not be relegated to the background to avoid Nigeria or Liberia exit.

**Conclusion**

The interest in economic integration is reflected in a resolution adopted at the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held in New Delhi, India on February to March 1968. At the conference it was reaffirm that trade expansion, economic cooperation and integration among developing countries is an important element of an international development strategy, and would make an essential contribution toward their economic development (UNCTAD, 1968).

ECOWAS just like EU, primary goal was to foster the socio-economic opportunities for the population of West Africa thereby accelerating the process of economic development collectively and individually and diffusing suspicion and border conflicts among others. Despite the initial surge and enthusiasm among member states, certain factors continued to threatened the corporate existence of ECOWAS such as globalization, environmental factor, economic dependence, economic downturn in ECOWAS states, internal security threat, international market price fluctuation, terrorism and trans-border crime etc. To forestall break-up, a well

clear policies are needed to tackle these problems to save ECOWAS from EU experience otherwise known as BREXIT.

**Recommendations**

In order to reposition ECOWAS to enhance effective and efficient cooperation among member-states and to avoid BREXIT, the following recommendations are made:

- That ECOWAS should come up with policy that will protect and strengthened members' internal economy as a way out of the current recession.
- That a well-founded policy should be aim at guaranteeing members internal security against terrorism, insurgency and religious extremism.
- That no member states should be allow to be at the disadvantaged position.
- That any compliant received should be promptly and properly handled to avoid European Union experience with Britain.
- That from time to time agreement, protocol, etc should be reviewed in line with the current realities.
- That there should be a policy to eliminate dependency relations that reinforce the conditions of peripheral capitalism within the member's state.

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# Social Contract Theory and the Nigerian State in the Fourth Republic

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## Abstract
*This work examines the social contract theory with respect to Nigeria's democracy of the Fourth Republic. Thomas Hobbes propositions as encapsulated in the social contract discuss established the platform upon which the state craft was built; a contract in which the citizens willingly submit their allegiance to the state and in return expects a better bargain summed up in good governance as reflected in safety of lives and properties as well as provision of basic necessities of life. However, the growing inadequacies of the Nigerian state in fulfilling this contract through the provision of basic necessities to the citizens has orchestrated dwindling trust in governance on one hand and the democracy of the fourth republic on the other thereby brewing discontent, mistrust and democratic apathy both of which are antithetical to the country's political development and national integration. Adopting therefore the descriptive methodology and the social contract theory as framework of analysis, the work uncovered amongst others that on the basis of social contract discuss, the Nigerian state has related marginally with the citizens whereas the citizens have always kept their own part of the bargain. Secondly, Democratic governance in Nigeria especially in the Fourth Republic has not done much to engender adequate protection of lives and properties of the citizens. Based on the foregoing, the work recommends that for the government to live up to the social contract which she entered with the citizens, she must begin to embrace good governance culture in all its ramifications.*

**Keywords:** Democracy, Social Contract, Good Governance, Political Development, National Integration

## Introduction
The spate of killings and other political unrests that now characterize the Nigerian state have compelled scholars to liken the country to the Lockean state of war. The trajectory of violent events in Nigeria only serves as a stark reminder that the country is slowly regressing into the hypothetical state of war created by the social contract theorist; John Locke. The dynamics and the emergence of violent groups in the country such as the Boko Haram sect, the Niger Delta Avengers and the Fulani herdsmen is a reflection of the general state of insecurity ravaging the country and thus painting a gloomy picture of "three nights falls in a day" (Rufus, 2017, p.21). Bearing the above in mind, it can thus be argued that objective vulnerabilities and insecurities shape the nature and outcome of individuals' actions and responsibility towards surviving and coping with insecurities (Adugo, 2004, p.116). Locke no doubt considered the above in his 'state of war' when framing his social contract theory.

The social contract theory implies that people's political obligations and moral stance is product of a collective agreement among individuals to form the society in which they live. The social contract theory was developed to explain how society came into being. A hypothetical state of nature was used to explain the conditions that necessitated the social contract. The major argument of the social contract theory is that in the state of nature (the state that existed before the social contract came into being), the life of man was not guaranteed since there was no established system to regulate human behavior and as such, it was all man for himself. While there are many variations of the social contract theory and the state of nature, the three main social contract theorists are; Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Nigeria, a country that was unified by the British colonial government clearly lacks this social contract that purports to unify the people. Her existence is the product of the forceful amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 by former colonial governor; Lord Fredrick Lugard (Ayeni, 1988:76). Looking at the above, it is safe for one to posit that the eruption of conflict was almost certain with over 250 ethnic groups forming the country. Thus, it did not come as a surprise that shortly after independence, attempts by her founding fathers to use their political positions at every slightest opportunity to favor their own region at the expense of other regions threw the country into a fierce civil war that almost added her to the list of countries that once was. The events that led to the civil war revolved around; marginalization, oppression, injustice and a feeling of rejection (Etekpe, 2004:67).

However, more than fifty years after the civil war, the country is still confronted with the same set of problems that then threw her into a ferocious enclave. Presently, there are lots of clamor by different sections of the country for a restructuring of the present federal system while also, there are calls by various other groups with hard stance such as IPOB, OPC and the Niger Delta Avengers clamoring for secession (Rufus, 2017:34). The present challenges' confronting the country is even made worse by the existence of such other violent sects as the Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen, Niger Delta Avengers and the Baddo group both of which have identified the disequilibrium in social distribution as their bone of contention.

The Nigerian situation is clearly a reflection of a failure in governance (Ayeni, 1988; Ake, 1995; and Sklar et al., 2006). The leadership model in Nigeria has been criticized for lacking the necessary focus capable of instilling national development and promoting political stability (Ayeni, 1988; Ake, 1995; and Sklar et al., 2006). Thus, the focus of this work is to apply the social contract theory especially John Locke's variant of the theory to identify the gap in state formation, leadership and governance lacuna that has created the ominous conditions for instability in the country.

**Theoretical perspective**

This study which focuses on the Nigerian state, Social contract theory and democracy of the Fourth republic is predicated on the social contract theory of John Lock as its analytical tool. Generally, social contract theorists advanced the view that

the state or more precisely, civil society is the product of a contract, a covenant, an agreement or a compact.

In western political history, some of the earliest exponents of the social contract idea were the Sophists, who pursued a social doctrine that harped on the limit of state authority and the individual's obligation. In the Socratic period, Plato was a notable representative of this idea. In his dialogue, *Crito*, Plato presents Socrates as observing his covenant with the state by not escaping from prison to exile. In another dialogue, *the Republic*, Glaucon (1780) advances contractual idea of tacit agreement between individuals as a principle of justice.

As a theory about the institution of political society through a covenant among individuals, the Social contract theory originated in the 16th to 17th century. In his distinction between social contract as a governmental pact and social contract proper, Appadorai (1999:57) ascribes the first proper mention of the Social contract theory to Hooker and others who later developed the idea as a theory for constructing their political doctrine. However, the most famous exponents of the social contract theory were Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The starting point of their treatise rests on a hypothetical state of nature against which background the agreement between the ruler and the ruled was said to have taken place.

In his *Leviathan* (1651), Hobbes pictures man's state of nature as basically a selfish one, in which man is motivated to act by his appetites, desires and passions. Owing to this selfishness and the absence of a reasoned out guide for the amorphous community of people, everyone was against the other in a perpetual cycle of struggle, competition, diffidence and strife leading to a state of war. There was no modicum of morality or iota of legality, for it was a senseless, unimaginable situation of *homo lupus hominem* (man the wolf of man). Hobbes describes the life of man in this state of nature as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". Friend (2004: 56) notes that in spite of this situation, Hobbes conceded that this primitive state was governed by some laws of nature, which endowed man with the natural rights of self-preservation. Man was at liberty to preserve his life by whatever means, for in such anti-social state, there was the ubiquitous fear of violent death. To avoid the unfortunate condition which the Hobbesian state of nature bred, there was need for everyman to give up some of his natural rights and repose them in some supreme coercive power, (a man or an assembly of men) that would ensure peace and security necessary for an organized society. The logic of Hobbes' social contract theory, despite its perceived anomalies, is as Sogolo (2014:34) pointed out; "If the state of nature is as intolerable as Hobbes painted, it makes perfect sense for men to cede their rights in exchange for security and protection from one powerful man or group of men." What this implies is that for society to have peace and security, some sort of absolutism is necessary to maintain law and order.

John Locke's social contract theory, as postulated in his work, *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) portrays a state of nature, though similar to Hobbes' in terms of the condition of the state of nature, differed from his with regard to the dictates of the law of nature. Whilst Locke's state of nature was a natural and perfect condition for mankind, where men were free and equal and each living according to his desires,

the laws of nature curbed the exercise of this freedom, for it stipulated that no man should infringe on the freedom, life, health and possession of another. Thus unlike Hobbes' conception of the law of nature, which stressed self preservation, Locke is concerned with the preservation of all men. Again like Hobbes', Locke's state of nature had no enforcer of these laws, for each man was left to interpret them according to his liking. The consequence of this condition is that, whilst the Lockean state of nature was not one of war, it was a precarious condition that harbored fear, danger and insecurity of life and property. Thus the civil society was brought to being when individual men, representing their families, come together and form society; they make one body politic under one government and submit themselves to the will of that body (Appadorai 2010:78). Friend (2005:67) posits that "Having created a political society and government through their consent, men then gain three things which they lacked in the State of Nature: laws, judges to adjudicate laws and the executive power necessary to enforce these laws. Each man therefore gives over the power to protect himself and punish transgressors of the Law of Nature to the government that he has created through the compact."

According to Backer (1998:118) in his book, *Social Contract*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's social contract theory is a "gospel of return to nature and the rights of man". The truism in this assertion is captured in Rousseau's *Social Contract*, which begins with the often quoted lines: "Man was born free and he is everywhere in chains". The import of this profound quote is the paradox of freedom which Rousseau seeks to unveil. In the state of nature, Rousseau explains, man lived a life of idyllic happiness, where he was free and equal. Unlike the Hobbesian and Lockean versions, which described man's state as one of fear and danger, Rousseau depicts man's life in the state of nature as essentially good. However, the development of society characterized by the introduction of private property, the rise in population, amongst others, strife and rancor arose to compel man to give up his freedom. Upon giving up his freedom, he surrendered all his rights to the community rather than to one man or group of persons. This community, "an aggregation of individual surrendered wills", becomes a general will imbued with the status of sovereignty and with a power to force the individual to be free. What Rousseau seeks to address by this postulation is the problem of how people can live together without succumbing to the dictates of individuals' force and compulsion. He claims this can be done "by submitting our individual, particular wills to the collective or general will, created through agreement with other free and equal persons." By this agreement, law becomes a dictate of the general will just as it protects the individual's freedom.

In the contemporary revision of the social contract theory, two versions are notable: one is the social contract theory developed by American philosopher John Rawls. Drawing insight from Immanuel Kant's political philosophy, Rawls, in his work; *A Theory of Justice* (1971), proposed a **contract-centered** principle of justice to address issues of fairness in socio-economic and political situations. The abstract philosophical nature of his theory lies on the fundamental question his theory seeks to address; namely, what could be said to be a just social contract theory in addressing socio-political issues. Rawls position is that a just social contract theory is one

whereby rational individuals in a hypothetical original position, that is a condition in which they would have no foreknowledge of their place and fortune in the society they are agreeing to, reach an agreement on certain general principles of justice and legal organization in society. Rawls maintains that any rational person in the original position and placing him or herself behind the veil of ignorance would reject utilitarian, egoistic, perfectionist alternatives for justice as fairness. This principle of justice is captured by this sentence "All primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored" (Ibaba, 2004:54).

The other version is the neo-Hobbesian theory, which attempts to emphasize the value of rationality to agreements. In his 1986 work, *Morals by Agreement* he criticizes Hobbes position which privileges man's passions and appetites over reason as a determinant of moral action, thereby requiring some external sovereign to enforce the agreement between two conflicting parties. Gauthier (1986:67) proposes that "if both parties were to stick by the original agreed-upon arrangement and morals outlined by the contract that they both would experience an optimal result". Rather than the enforcement from an external sovereign outside of the agreement, rationality, augmented by trust, self interest, Gauthier (1986:67) contends, are sufficient factors in creating the cooperation necessary for understanding in the moral and political spheres.

The social contract theory is the most veritable theoretical perspective that can be applied in examining the contract between the Nigerian state and her subjects. Nigeria as a state has continued to display backwardness in the provision of basic amenities to the people such as security of lives and properties, thus, the current insecurity challenges that have persisted in the country. The ethnic disparity and tribalism have taken a great toll on the country that is meant to be united for development and prosperity. The recent wave of attacks and ongoing protests in the country is a clear signal that social contract have failed to thrive in the country as postulated by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

## Democracy: Towards Conceptual Explication

The concept "Democracy" originated from the ancient Athens in Greece as early as 600 BC. It is a derivative of Greek word "Democrakia" meaning "The rule of the people" or "The rule by the people. Ifechukwu (2009:126) observes that great Athenian states man; Pericles speaking in 431 BC defined it in the following clear terms:

> Our constitution is named a democracy because; it is in the hands not of the few, but of the many. But our laws secure equal justice for all in their private disputes and our public opinion welcomes and honors talent in every branch of achievement... on grounds of excellence alone... our citizens attend both to public and private duties and do not allow absorption in their various affairs to interfere with their knowledge of the city's ... we decide or debate, carefully, and in

person all matters of policy, holding ... that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken un-discussed.

According to Aristotle (1710:178) "Democracy is the rule of many for the good of poor as opposed to oligarchy which is the rule of the few for the good of wealthy. This distinction was made by him in order to indicate the intrinsic characteristics of the two politics (Democracy and oligarchy). According to him, in Oligarchy Government, the rulers are few because there are only few people who are wealthy whereas in Democratic government, the rulers are many because liberty is enjoyed by all. In his work titled "The State man" Plato maintained that the end of democracy is liberty, equality and variety. But he criticized democracy precisely on the grounds of "Liberty" in the sense that liberty entails doing whatever one desires to be attractive, which he further explained that it is more or less desirable than doing the right, even though most people, who are ignorant enough to know and choose for themselves what is right, Plato as quoted by Adugo (1998:342) observed that:

> Democracy, I suppose comes into being when the poor, wins the victory, put to death some of the other party, drives out others and grant the rest of the citizens equal share in both the citizenship and office and for the most part, these offices are assigned by lot.

Mill (1850) an advocate of utilitarian principle of "the greatest good is the happiness of the greatest number of the people" opined that: Democracy is the government of the whole people, by the whole people in which the majority... will, out-vote and prevail. Also in his "Representative Government" Mill (1850) argued democracy as the best form of government in his ideal state theory. This means a state in which the sovereignty or supreme controlling power is in the last resort, rested on the aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of the ultimate sovereignty, but being at least occasionally called upon to take an actual part in the government.

As a result of the fluid nature of any social concept, democracy is now mostly defined by modern scholars in two forms, namely "Direct Democracy" in the case of the ancient Greece which is a direct active participation of all adult citizens (Men) excluding the (Women, Children and the Slaves) in the decision making and "Indirect Democracy" (Representative form) of a democratic system where the active participation of all Adult citizens (Men and Women) in decision making is done, on behalf of them through the few whom they have duly elected by a means of voting to be their mouth piece in decision making (Ifechukwu, 2009, p. 82).

The principal feature that differentiates Ancient democracy from modern one is that, while the modern form is based on representation, the Ancient was on direct form. The reason being that the modern representatives is styled for large cities, states, provinces or countries, communities etcetera and it is impossible for all members of such country or states to meet as a group in certain necessities. As a result of that, they elect certain members of their people to represent them in decision making, promulgation of laws and other matters that affect the masses.

Going by the second definition of democracy characterized by liberty and equality, the former U.S president Abraham Lincoln on 19th November, 1863 at the union commentary in Gettysburg, Philadelphia conceptualizes it: *as the government of the people by the people and for the people.* In "The second Treatise of civil Government" Locke stated that the best form of government is democracy. He elucidated that men are endowed with certain inalienable rights by nature, and that on men uniting into society, the whole power to make and execute laws is naturally in their hands, with this, he elucidated that when they willingly come together to appoint officers whom they will entrust the political power to make and execute laws for them, that form of government is perfect democracy.

From the Revolutionary point of view, Karl Marx argued that democracy can be conceived in social and economic terms as well as political. He stated that the battle for democracy will not be won for the first step taken forwards, until the working class raises the proletariat to the position of the ruling. He also insisted that what is called democracy will permit and may even try to condone social inequalities and economic injustices which initiate political liberty.

It is unmistakable for one to conclude with all these theoretical matrix, that democracy is the best or better form of politics (government) if not for anything else, but on the claim of its touch-stone, equality and respect for dignity of mankind. But the devastating issue here becomes how can this dividend be realized in any democratic setting most especially in Nigeria? This is because the yearning for a true democratic culture in Nigeria since early independence-to-date seems to be nothing but a fruit-less effort or journey. The evidence of this claim can be said to be feasible in her economic, social, religious and political instabilities and bankrupt of peace in the country.

**The Nigerian Democracy and the Social Contract Spirit**

The inherent democratic tenet in the indigenous political systems operated in different parts of Nigeria, accounted for their existence as entities and for centuries before the advent of colonial rule. For instance, the Yoruba political system under the Obaship (Kingship) guarantees good governance and people's representation through established institutions. The Alaafin (King) of Oyo, who was often praised as having the powers of life and death, is in practice, not so absolute in exercising his powers (Aderibigbe, 2004:115). The Basorun, who is the head of the Oyomesi, the committee responsible for the selection of the new Alaafin, is by Oyo constitution, empowered to order an Alaafin to abdicate the throne, when the Alaafin is considered to have violated the Empire's constitution (Aderibigbe, 2004:115). This principle of checks and balances inherent in African political system prevents absolutism and misuse of power by the leader.

In the emirate system of the northern Nigeria, the decision of the Emir is directly subject to the agreement of his Council (Hunwick, 1997:237). The Emirate Council consists of the Emir himself, the Waziri, the Khadi, the Chief Imam and other prominent chiefs that vary from one place to another (Hunwick, 1997:237). The importance and powers of the Balogun (War Commander) in Ilorin emirate remain

unparallel to the other emirate under the caliphate system (Balogun, 1977:256). By 1900 when the British government formally established colonial rule on the colony of Lagos, protectorates of the south and the north, it was actually bringing together and for the first time, diverse peoples with distinct identity. By 1906, the British colonial administration formally amalgamated the colony of Lagos and the protectorate of the South (Ikime&Obaro, 1977). Perhaps, the success recorded by the amalgamation of the colony and protectorates of the south, accounted for the 1914 amalgamation of the colonies and protectorates of the south and north which was named Nigeria. The justification for the colonial policy on amalgamation can be located in its desire to minimize the cost of administering the vast land mass and diverse cultural groups. Nigerians were neither consulted nor involved. For these facts, the problems associated with the democratic system initiated by the British can be located as the bane of its administration.

The introduction of electoral system and its impact on Nigerian politics, the mobilization of elites in West Africa to launch the National Congress of British West Africa must have been brought about by both internal and external factors. The congress was considered to be a viable body by which Africans in Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast (Ghana) and Nigeria would press home their demands including to participate in the affairs of their environment (Ikime & Obaro, 1977). In 1920, the Congress sent a delegation to London to hand over to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a petition which demanded the establishment in each territory in British West Africa, a Legislative Council, half of which would be elected while the other half would be nominated, the establishment of a House of Assembly composed of the members of the Legislative Council and six other "financial" representatives elected by the people to control revenue and expenditure, the appointment of Africans to judicial offices and the establishment of a West African University (Adigwe, 1979:24).

Even though the request of the Congress were formally turned down by the Secretary of State, Lord Milner, the British Colonial Governor in Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford, censored the demands of the Congress (Adigwe 1979:30). He accused the Nigerian members of the delegation not only of being unrepresentative of the Nigerian people but also being ignorant of the Nigerian conditions. He further asserted that the claims and pretensions of the delegation were at variance with the natural development of real national independence which, in his opinion, should be the goal of all true patriots in Nigeria (Adigwe, 1979:35). Certainly, for Sir Hugh Clifford's increased apprehension of the influence of the Congress on the people, by 1922 he abolished the Nigerian Council together with the old Legislative Council to constitute new Legislative and Executive Councils (Adigwe, 1979:35). The new Legislative Council was made up of forty-six members, twenty-seven of whom were official, while the remaining nineteen were un-official (Adigwe, 1979:36). Three of the elected seats were allocated to Lagos while the remaining one was allocated to Calabar. In total, thirteen Africans were in the new Council (Adigwe, 1979:36). The electorate for the elected members from Lagos and Calabar were to be male adults who were British subject or British protected persons having ordinarily resided in the

particular area for a period of twelve months and having a gross income of £100 per annum (Adigwe, 1979:36). For both the Northern and Southern protectorates, they were represented in the newly constituted council by the Lieutenant-Governor, Senior Residents of the provinces and the European representatives of Kano Chamber of Commerce, Mining and Industry (Adigwe, 1979:36). The introduction of the elective principle naturally brought about increased political activities to Lagos Island and this in turn, led to the emergence of political parties. The role of Sir Herbert Samuel Healas Macaulay in the formation of the Nigerian National Democratic Party which operated between 1864 and 1946 deserves a mention. In 1925, Herbert Macaulay established "The Lagos Daily News (Adigwe, 1979:40). The "Nigerian National Pioneer" was established by Mr. Kitoye Adisa, while in 1926, Richard Barrow in collaboration with Sir Adeyemo Alakija launch the "Nigerian Daily Times" (Adigwe, 1979:40). The increased political activities in Lagos and Calabar, eventually led to the emergence of other political parties such as the Nigeria Youth Movement and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (Adigwe, 1979:42). The provisions in the constitution of 1946 by Sir Arthur Richard which came to effect on the 1st of January 1947 extended the electoral principle to the Northern region. By the gradual implementation of the colonial policies, especially on the electoral process, the seed of discord have been sowed in the Nigerian democratic experience. The fears of Southern domination by the North was actually palpable and it thus explained why many meetings had to be mid-wifed by the British administration, both in Nigeria and in Britain before an agreeable date, 1st October 1960, was picked for formal independence of the Nigerian State from the British.

**The Nigerian State, Governance and Question of Legitimacy**

For analytical purposes, the prevailing narrative here will focus on giving answers to two arguments: (a) the legitimacy of the Nigerian state, and (b) the legitimacy of the Nigerian government. This section is thus, structured to critically peruse into how the Nigerian state came into existence in order to indentify if there was any form of a social contract binding the people to be part of the state. Also, the section will examine if the Nigerian government has the right to exert authority over the Nigerian citizens in the event of no definitive social contract and finally, to see if both parties have kept their part of the bargain in the event of a social contract.

It is known that prior to the advent of the British Colonial Government in 1900, there was no territory known as Nigeria (Ike, 2007:45). The various ethnic nationalities that form what we now know as Nigeria existed independently but not oblivious of the other. What they were not aware of however, was the fact that their peaceful cohabitation as independent nation was about to change due to key economic events happening in the West far away from their lands. Capitalism, the economic cum political system that emphasizes on a free market economy has just transformed the West with the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution which ensured that machines replaced hands in the chain of production opened the West to a world unimagined before. Prior to the industrial revolution, labor was an essential

part of the production line, but with the industrial revolution, machines started replacing men in production (Hunwick, 2004:332).

With the machines in, production level soared to new heights. The machines ensured that the production/consumption ratio was not at par with the former outweighing the latter. Consequently, two problems were created with the first being Europe's inability to supply her industries with much needed raw materials and secondly, the industrial revolution created too much competition for a small market thus creating the need to search for new markets. It was thus this search for new frontiers that brought the Royal Niger Company to the shores of what is now known as Nigeria.

The first motive for searching for new territories was purely imperialistic (economic control). But with the need to secure captured territories from other European powers, the British government officially came into the country in the year 1900, which marked the official commencement of colonialism (political control) (Aderibigbe, 1997:211). Despite the territory now referred to as Nigeria being under the British Government, the different ethnic groups were still independent of the other until 1914 when the Northern and Southern protectorates were amalgamated. In January, 1914, the British government unilaterally created Nigeria by uniting the southern and northern protectorate through the process of amalgamation. This was a defining moment in the history of the country, as it was the first time that the once independent regions assumed a common name; Nigeria. Although the British had colonized Nigeria since 1900, it treated the different regions as separate entities. The decision of the then Colonial governor, Lugard to unify the Southern and Northern protectorate was largely for administrative convenience. The vast land mass and the shortage of colonial officers ensured that unification became the only convenient way to administer Nigeria. As noted by the British Broadcasting Corporation, "Britain wanted empire on a cheap." Nigeria remained under British rule from 1914 up to the 1st day of October, 1960 when she was finally granted independence from her colonial master. Ever since then, the country has fought a nefarious civil war, but has remained as one to this day.

It is clear from the above that the unification of Nigeria was not done in consultation of the people. The British government did not consider the huge ethnic and political diversity of the regions. The Southern Protectorate was largely dominated by Christians and the Northern protectorate was heavily populated by the Muslims (Aderibigbe, 1997:213). The result of the amalgamation was the marrying of over 250 ethnic groups together. It is important to state that the sole purpose the Northern and Southern regions were merged, was for the maximization of profit for the colonial government and as such, the people were not consulted whatsoever to know if they had any interest to come/stay together, neither was there any honest attempt to unify them as the British used different approach in administering the two regions (Aderibigbe, 1997:213).

The negative result of the British decision to amalgamate the country without consultation started manifesting soon after independence, as Nigeria's founding fathers that took over from the Colonial government, failed to realize that the country

was now one and that, they no longer represent their various regions, but Nigeria. One major red flag that showed that the people did not see themselves as Nigerians was the formation of ethnic affiliated political parties. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) was affiliated to the North, the Action Group (AG) was affiliated to the West, and the National Council of the Nigeria and Cameroon was affiliated to the East. The rhetoric of our founding fathers also affirmed the above. The people that fought for the country's independence did not see any future in the country's unity as this is revealed by their utterances. For example, Awolowo (1947) while commenting on the unity of Nigeria emphatically stated that Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. For him, the word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation used to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not…He went further to note that West and Eastern Nigeria are as different as Ireland from Germany. The North is as different from either as China. In the same vein, Belewa (1948) declared that:

> Since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country".

Similarly, Azikiwe was not left out in these unguided but truthful statements as he was quoted as saying:

> It is better for us and many admirers abroad that we should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces. Should the politicians fail to heed the warning, then I will venture the prediction that the experience of the Democratic Republic of Congo will be a child's play if it ever comes to our turn to play such a tragic role (http://www.abaisgood.com/2015/12/3-powerful-quotes-from-3-founding.html).

The statements above as shocking as they are, were only a reflection of the fact that the people never saw themselves as one. Each region has attempted to secede at one time in history. Sadly, after several years together, the country still does not feel as one as in recent times; the NDA, the OPC, the Arewa and IPOB have all called for secession or a restructuring of the federation.

## Social Contract and the Failure of Governance in Nigeria

Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999. Prior to that, the country had experienced two to three failed republics. The collapse of the first republic was largely due to the ethnic styled politics played by the first republic politicians since the entire first republic political parties that stood for elections, had ethnic affiliations. As a result of this, it became difficult for democracy to thrive in the country. The style of politics played was detrimental to the growth of the country's nascent

democracy as the desire to win by all means pushed desperate politicians to indulge in undemocratic behaviors such as tribal politics and the rigging of election results.

There was constant pressure to win as the stakes were high: this was basically due to the fact that the consequence of losing in a winner takes it all politics, was always going to be fatal. Thus, there was constant attempt (sometimes undemocratic) by each party to reduce the influence of opposition parties in their strong hold. The unhealthy political competition/maneuvers by opposing political parties led to the Western region crisis. This crisis marked a turning point in the country's democracy, as it culminated in the bloody coup of 1966 that brought the first republic to an abrupt end. The young military officers that carried out the coup cited ethnic politics, corruption, election rigging etc. as factors that motivated their actions.

After the collapse of the first republic, the country endured a long military rule that saw coups and counter coups including the nefarious civil war that almost brought the union to an end. In 1976, the country returned to democratic rule under the leadership of Alhaji Shehu Shagari with a new system of government; the presidential democracy. The presidential system was adopted to avoid a repeat of the loop holes in the parliamentary system that led to the collapse of the first republic. Sadly, despite all the cautions applied, the second republic still met the same fate as its predecessor. It is significant to note that the same factors that were cited in the collapse of the 1st Republic were also mentioned in the collapse of the 2nd Republic.

The third republic did not materialize as the military government that was in power, refused to hand over power hence 'aborted the third republic'. The country once again endured a long/brutal military rule under the dictator General SaniAbacha until his death in 1998. After the death of Abacha in 1998, the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Ever since then, the country has been under democracy for an unprecedented 18 years uninterrupted. After 17 years of democracy however, the question that we beg to ask is: Why is there still so much instability in the polity?

The answer to the above question is quite straight forward and simple. Nigerians had just seen the end of a brutal military regime. Thus, the return to democracy was greeted with much hope and expectations from the people and rightly so. However, after 17 years of democracy what the people have is dashed hopes, stolen mandates and abuse of power by the ruling class who are domineering. As a matter of fact, the only difference between the democratic government and the military regime they took over from was the fact that whilst the former came in through a military coup, the latter came in through an electoral rape. One can confidently make a case against the Nigerian state that in reality exist for a few powerful individuals but in theory, exist for all. This corroborates the Marxian view of the state that it did not emerge through consent or any social contract. It is thus seen as an instrument of class or ethnic domination and exploitation (Ake, in Alapiki, 2001:47). It follows therefore that the interest of those (class, ethnic or religious group) that control the state are promoted over and above those who do not exercise political power. This is done through the obnoxious laws (Land Use Act 1978, Petroleum Act, 1969) of the state which reflects the interest of those who exercise political power.

Considering the method in which power was acquired, it was obvious that the people were not going to get much from the democratic government that replaced the one of the military because, the people did not choose the government, but rather, it was imposed on them. Nevertheless, the people were still optimistic. The first significant event that stunned the people and brought them back to reality was the Odi massacre. The Odi massacre made the people realize that they were still under a military regime masquerading as a democratic one. Shortly after assuming office as president of the federal republic, the Obasanjo's administration ordered a military clear out of Odi (a small town in Bayelsa) due to the death of some police officers at the hands of some rebel youths from the community. At the end of the operation, the town became a ghost town (Etekpe, 2007:53).

The event at Odi was a clear message of intent from the government that it was not going to tolerate any challenge and that it was going to crush any form of opposition without due regard for the rule of law (a fundamental principle of democracy). Sadly, the brute force, highhandedness, and disregard for the law shown by the Obasanjo's administration set the standard as to what democracy in the Fourth republic represents. The ease at which the Obasanjo's administration maneuvered the national assembly' up to the extent the senate produced three senate presidents in his first tenure, only showed they were nothing but puppets in the hands of the executive and that checks and balances was all but an illusion.

The level at which the executive arm disregarded judicial pronouncements and engaged only in selective judgments that was in its favor, made the people realize that the only way they were assured of justice was to take the laws into their hands. The above is particularly true in the case of the Niger Delta and its clamor for resource control. The government had refused to listen to the peaceful agitations of the people who bore the brunt of oil production for a more favorable share of the national cake that can reflect their input. The refusal of the government to listen to the plight of the people led to the militarization of the region. This ugly scenario was already pointed out by John Locke when he opined that the state of nature will degenerate into a state of war when people try to oppress others. When the activities of militant groups started destabilizing the financial purse of the government, once again, instead of looking for a diplomatic way to settle their differences, the state decided to apply its coercive apparatus. It was when military confrontation failed, that the Yar' Adua's administration that took over from Obasanjo decided to offer the rebel youths amnesty (a social contract).

The decision to grant amnesty to the rebel youths coupled with the failure of fixing the fundamental issues made the people to realize that the government only understood violence. The decision to apply violence whenever a section of the country is aggrieved is informed by the belief that justice cannot be gotten through the court. Another case to buttress this point (that the people have lost confidence in the judicial process) is the radicalization of the Boko Haram sect. It is on record that the Boko Haram sect had existed peacefully before her leader; the late Mohamed Yusuf was brutally killed while in police custody. Today, the Boko Haram sect is the deadliest terrorist group in West Africa. Since 2009, the sect has been ravaging the

North. Similarly, the failure of the government to checkmate the Fulani herdsmen and their incessant killings, but their swiftness to crack down heavily on unarmed IPOB protesters might create another violent sect in the country in the nearest future.

Apart from the anomalies mentioned above, more worrisome is the issue of monumental corruption that has continued to plague the country. Shortly after the return to democratic rule in 1999, the state of affairs made it almost impossible for well meaning/credible development oriented candidates from breaking into the elite or leadership circle. This has made our political environment to be infested with 95% of old men who can hardly perform making it resemble what we call Gerontocracy (a democracy ruled and controlled by the oldest people who supposed to have retired but are rather vehemently against giving young people important elective positions other than to vote) (Ake, 2001:172). It's very important to note that many of these young people have great legacies in the Nigerian history. The likes of Awolowo, Melford Okilo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Tafawa Balewa, Odumegwu Ojukwu, Sir Amadu Bello only to mention a few are in their twenties when they made debut in the leadership circle (Ike, 2007:156). As a matter of fact, the present ruling class has remained the same set of people right from independence who has kept recycling themselves in an endless manner to ensure they remain in power. The above has made the youths to realize that the future does not belong to them, and that the only way by which they can break into the ruling class, is to apply violence (Etekpe, 2007:223).

The present spate of political instability is only a reflection of a failure in governance. This is in line with the assertion made by Locke that the state of nature will degenerate into a state of war because of (a) the absence or lack of an established law known to all; (b) the absence or lack of an independent/impartial judiciary to adjudicate the law; and (c) the absence or lack of an executive to enforce the law (Wayper, 1974 in Ibaba, 2004:101). The manner at which the executive arm manipulates the constitution to its favor has left every one with the feeling that there is a lack of an established law known and acceptable to all. The above argument becomes even more plausible when we put into consideration the fact that the present constitution was drafted by the military without due consultation of the masses whom the constitution is supposed to be binding on. Secondly, the dependence of the judiciary on the executive has meant that there is an absence or lack of an independent/impartial judiciary to adjudicate the law. Also is the fact that the Nigerian judicial system is weak and can be easily manipulated by the elite/ruling class thereby making the common man to resort to jungle justice at every slightest opportunity. Finally, the failure of the executive to keep to their part of the contract by ensuring that the lives and property of the populace is secured has meant that the people have resorted to self actions and responsibilities towards surviving and coping with insecurities.

**Managing the Nigerian State: Towards Renegotiating the Contract Terms and Restructuring the State**

In every social phenomenon, the easy part has always been identifying the problem whilst the difficulty lies in proffering the solution. Thus, this section seeks to

look at possible solutions to the Nigerian problem by reinventing the contract terms and restructuring the State.

There is no doubt that the Nigerian State was built on a shaky foundation by her founding fathers through the 'ethnicization' of politics. The decision to exploit the huge ethnic differences of the people by her founding fathers to gain political power has sown a seed of discord/hatred among the different ethnic nationalities especially amongst the South/East and West/North. The South-South and South East now see the South West and North as common enemies. The above is true when one puts the 2015 presidential election result into perspective. Firstly, it is important to state that a country that is not united cannot progress as there will always be an internal contradiction to impede progress. The United States of America is regarded as the most developed nation in the world today because she is truly united. Thus, it is obvious that the most challenging phenomenon confronting Nigeria today is her unity. Thus, the question to answer is; how do we fix our differences, stay united, and progressive?

To answer the question above, we must first of all identify the major challenges to the country's unity. When the Northern protectorate and Southern protectorate were amalgamated in 1914, the British government failed to take cognizance of the fact that the huge size of the North was always going to ensure that she remains a permanent majority consequently, that single action by the British colonial government created a permanent minority; a people who felt that no matter how hard they work, they were not going to get the best out of the union. This is seen in the decision of Igbo's to pull out of the union just after three years of independence. Up to this day, there is a feeling of discontent amongst the various ethnic groups especially amongst the minorities (Nnoli, 1978; and Etekpe, 2007). The above is not helped by the fact that whilst one group has remained dominant in terms of control of political powers, the bulk of the resources that has kept the country going is found in the minority region. The general believe amongst the minorities is that the major ethnic groups have used their power to manipulate the distribution of resources in the union in their favor despite contributing little to the economy. Their fears (the minority groups) is made plausible by the fact that Karl Marx stated in his material dialectics that those who control "the super structure (politics), controls the sub structure (economy)".

The lopsidedness of Nigeria in terms of land mass and resources has ensured that each ethnic group (both majority and minority) have lived in fear. The Hausa/ Fulani ethnic groups which are the majority are afraid that if political power is lost, survival will be a matter of life and death to them. On the other hand, the South-South and South East are afraid of the domineering nature of the North, and have been crying of not being treated fairly in the union. Suffice it to say that, the fears of both regions are not out of place.  And as such, if nothing is done to allay these fears, the country will find it difficult, if not impossible to progress.

It is obvious from the above as the facts speaks for itself that the country is in dire need of Restructuring. Thus, there is no disputing the fact that the country is in dire need of a conference that would midwife a constitution that can reflect the will of

the people and at best truly represent the wishes of the people not as an imposed one, like the present constitution. A National Conference of this sort was held in the recent past, but sadly, up to this day, the recommendations of that conference have not been implemented due to some selfish interests. Once again, suffice it to say that if the country is to progress, she must be ready to make some difficult sacrifices, set her differences aside, and be ready to implement policies that will represent the interest of all and not a segment of the union.

**Conclusion**

The problems of Nigeria have metamorphosed beyond leadership into institutional problems. Nigeria is living in falsehood, as the constitution does not reflect the will of the people. Thus, if the country has to progress from this 'state of war' in which she has found herself, she must be ready to reinvent/renegotiate the contract terms of her union which will ensure that the government exists for the good of the people and as, such should depend on their consent for governance. Thus, restructuring remains a viable option for the Nigerian State to renegotiate its Social Contract and Launch herself into developmental strides of acceptable magnitude.

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# Vote Buying: A Major Cog to Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria

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## Abstract

*The conduct of free, fair and credible elections provides a yardstick to measure the quality of democracy in any given country. It is a known fact that vote buying in Nigeria's electoral system is becoming worrisome. Buying and selling of votes have become an accepted norm in Nigeria's political system and threaten her readiness to consolidate her nascent democracy. The basic thrust of this paper, therefore is to ascertain the threats posed by vote buying in consolidating Nigeria's democracy. The paper is anchored on prebendalism theory. Data for the study were collected from documented sources. The study revealed that there is a link between institutional failure, poverty, illiteracy and vote buying in Nigeria. This paper identified that vote buying played significant role in obstructing the conduct of free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria. The paper recommended among others that there is an urgent need for an electoral offences tribunal or commission to focus partly on ensuring that all forms of electoral violence are adjudicated upon and effectively treated.*

**Keywords:** Democratic Consolidation, Elections, Political Parties, Prebendalism Theory, Vote-Buying.

## Introduction

One of the pillars that support every democracy is the conduct of free, fair and credible elections within a specified period as the case may be. Elections seem to have become the only channel for selecting democratic political decision makers. Nigeria's democracy is truly at a crossroads. However, there is no doubt that since the 1999 political transition, Nigeria has successfully conducted five general elections and is going for her sixth general elections in the fourth republic keenly scheduled for February and March, 2019. According to Nnoli (2006) election is the backbone of democracy and there is no democracy in the absent of election.

Nigeria is a country with a prolonged history of military regime while democracy is seen as the most desirable and expensive system of government. Election in Nigeria is characterized by multi-party system of politics and systematic institutional arrangement. For example, as at the time of carrying out this study, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) reported that 56 political parties out of the 91 registered parties in the country are set to participate in the 2019 general election. Among some of the registered political parties for the 2019 elections are: All Blending Party (ABP), Green Party of Nigeria (GPN), Social Democratic Party

(SDP), United Patriots (UP), Mega Party of Nigeria (MPN), National Unity Party (NUP), Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACD), Africa People Alliance (APA), People Democratic Party (PDP), Young Progressive Party (YPP), Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN), All Progressives Congress (APC), Labour Party (LB), Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN), etc (INEC, 2018). However, it is pertinent to note that Nigeria is now enjoying the longest period of uninterrupted civilian rule after the collapse of her first civilian republic with a military coup in 1966, ushering in a devastating civil war and several more military governments.

Egbefo (2015) stated that thirty-three years from 1966 until the inception of the Fourth Republic from 1999, civilians only governed for four short years. Historically, therefore, the dearth of democratic experience has created enormous challenges to institutionalizing democracy and the conduct of a credible election in Nigeria. Elections therefore allow citizens to genuinely take part in governance. Electorates use elections to appraise how the elected public officials of governments have succeeded in providing public goods to the citizens and stabilization of the economy among others. It is therefore a cardinal process through which power is allocated, and representative democracy is accomplished. However, in Africa and Nigeria inclusive, the quality of election administration still varies widely as elections have been plagued with problems such as ballot fraud, intimidation, multiple voting, low voter education, snatching of ballot boxes, violence, giving out of electoral incentives or buying of votes and others (Stokes, 2005; Schaffer, 2007; Vincente, 2008; Kramon, 2009).

In Nigeria, vote buying has been part of the country's electoral politics for a while; its dimension is what is changing. There is no doubt that one of the major challenges of our electoral politics has been the role money and other incentives play in the choice of candidates at both the party nomination phase and voting in elections. In the recent past, party leaders have been compensated to see to the emergence of certain candidates while community leaders, gate keepers and in some instances influential religious and thought leaders have been at the fore of negotiating electoral choices for communities based on the incentives offered by candidates. Vote-buying in Nigeria has gotten to a point where politicians have spread their tentacles of inducements to the electorate, election officials, security agencies, election observers and even the media. This trend has taken a worrisome dimension and constitutes subject of discussion in recent time in Nigeria. This ugly scenario has astronomically increased the cost of elections; created an uneven playing field for electoral contestants; and gives victory to the highest bidder. It is against this backdrop that the paper focuses on the challenges of vote-buying to democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The study examines how vote-buying undermines democratic consolidation in Nigeria, taking into consideration how this phenomenon seems to obstruct democratic processes and the quality of free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria.

**Understanding Vote Buying**

Generally, vote buying entails the exchange of money, gifts, goods or services for a vote. Nichter (2014) noted that there is conceptual ambiguity in how

scholars define and study vote-buying as a social science phenomenon. Lahoucq (2007) argued that vote-buying involves trading valuable goods for votes on the day of elections. Owen (2013) stated that vote-buying is "a process consisting of an offer made to purchase the vote of an individual of voting age, who accepts the offer, receives compensation, shows up at the polling station, and then votes as paid". However, Schaffer (2002) asserts that vote is literally 'bought' or 'sold' depending on whether one adopts the perspective of the candidate or the voter. The concept of vote buying refers to two related strategies for winning elections. The first strategy is to offer a monetary payment as a direct exchange of cash for votes (Hicken, 2011). Another strategy is to buy turnout, that is, to offer cash payments to induce core supporters to cast their vote (Nichter, 2014) or to induce opposition voters to stay at home during vote. In addition to cash, political parties and their agents or representatives often distribute a wide range of other material goods such as food, clothing, bags of rice, as well as services such as free transportation to the polling units/centres etc, on the day of the election. Lucky (2013) described vote-buying as the use of cash as an inducement on behalf of candidates to persuade voters to vote by the terms of the vote-buyer.

Apart from definitional diversity, on whether vote-buying is condemnable as fraud or excusable as election promises, Lippert-Rasmussen (2011) stated that there is intense controversy concerning whether certain actions should be seen as vote-buying or as election promises. From the literature reviewed, it stated that vote-buying involves influencing voters' preferences which is likely to obstruct the choice of the right candidate in the election.

**Over View of Vote-Buying in Selected Election in Nigeria's Fourth Republic**
The centrality of money in modern day democracy cannot be over emphasized. According to Ohman (2013) money in politics has a significant nexus with key aspect of any modern state and the management of political finance determines the credibility of elections and electoral campaigns of any nation or state. In Nigeria political aspirants/candidates deploy money to run electoral campaigns, consult interest group, as well as foot advertising and legal costs, policy research and political education, lobby services, among others. Besides, Nigerian extant electoral statutes recognize spending by political office seekers. This is even supported by Sections 88 & 91 of the electoral (amendment) Act 2010, which has provided for election finance by presidential candidates, governors, national and state assemblies and chairmen of local government councils. Also, in the handbook of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (2005) it recognized election finance as an accepted principle, accepting that as the sophistication and complexity of communications and other technologies needed to effectively compete for votes increases for the vast resources by political parties to finance their electoral campaigns.

Unfortunately, unlike in the electoral and political process of developed nations where financial spending is strictly within stipulated recognized limits, Nigerian politics become excessively monetized, with widespread, often illegal and

undetected use of money by politicians in elections taking the front burner, under guises such as 'dividends of democracy; 'votes buying' 'food or stomach politics' 'money bags' 'godfather' etc. Vote buying seems to be an integral feature of electoral politics in Nigerian's nascent democracy. In Nigeria, vote-buying, vote-trading or vote selling as may be called is an offence publishable by law. According to the Electoral Act, 2010, Article 130, as stated thus:

> A person who – (a) corruptly by himself or by any other person at any time after the date of an election has been announced, directly or indirectly gives or provides or pays money to or for any person for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person or any other person to vote or refrain from voting at such election, or on account of such person or any other person having voted or refrained from voting at such election; or (b) being a voter, corruptly accepts or takes money or any other inducement during any of the period stated in paragraph (a) of this section, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of N100,000 or 12 months imprisonment or both (EA, article, 130).

But in spite of the commission's stance on vote-buying, the act has gradually been turning into a regular phenomenon, as observed and reported by election observers of recent. Money politics has first found acceptance in the fourth republic from parties sanctioning cost of buying forms for the expression of interest, as well as to actually contest in the primary election in respect to all posts. Vote buying/selling in Nigeria obtains at two important levels of the electioneering process, namely the party nominations (primaries) and the general elections. At the primary elections, votes are usually purchased by candidates or their godfathers through cash transfers to the participating delegates. The monetary prices ranges from hundreds of thousands to millions Naira, depending on the competitive nature of the electoral struggle as well as the financial powers of the candidates or their financiers.

In preparation of 2019 elections, the All Progressives Congress (APC) began the sale of nomination and expression of interest forms for all elective offices ahead of the 2019 general elections on Wednesday 5th September. Consequently, it fixed the presidential nomination form at N40 million and expression of interest form at N5 million, totaling N45m. For governorship, the nomination form is N22.5 million while expression of interest is N2.5 million. As for the Senate, the nomination form costs N7 million while the expression of interests costs N1 million. Nomination for the House of Representatives cost N3.5 million and the expression of interest form, N350, 000. As for the state House of Assembly, the nomination form costs N750,000 while the expression of interest is fixed at N100, 000. In the document signed by its National Organizing Secretary, it was stated that "there shall be no separate charge for deputy" while "female aspirants and physically challenged aspirants are to pay 50 percent of the prescribed fees for each position" (Ajayi, 2018).

While the Nigeria's main opposition party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), announced the commencement of sale of expression of interests and nominations forms for all elective offices ahead of the 2019 general elections. In a statement by its

National Organising Secretary, the party's decision was in accordance with its guidelines for the conduct of primaries for the 2019 general elections, as approved by National Executive Committee (NEC). The party pegged its presidential nomination and expression of interest form at N2 million and N10 million respectively making a total of N12 million while that of governorship is N1 million and N5 million, making a total of N6 million. Others are Senate, N500,000 and N3.5 million respectively, House of Representatives N500,000 and N1 million respectively, and House of Assembly N100,000 and N500,000 respectively. National delegates and ad-hoc delegates are to pay N20,000 and N5,000 respectively (Ayitogo,2018). According to party guideline, all female aspirants were exempted from payment for purchase of nomination forms for all offices except national and ad-hoc delegate categories. Similarly, there was reduction in cost of nomination forms for the House of Representatives due to demands by several youth groups to enable younger Nigerians participate in the contest. In line with the constitution of the party, the NWC, acting on behalf of NEC, reviewed downwards the cost of nomination forms for House of Representatives from N2,000,000 to N1,000,000 (Ayitogo, 2018).

However, many Nigerians and party stalwart regard this high cost of form as a design to pave way for money bags and political god-fathers to hijack the electoral and political processes in order to install their favourite candidates. The fees announced by the parties are seen to be scandalous, highly prohibitive and unacceptable to many Nigerians. It is not in the best interest of our nascent democracy. There is no justification for high cost of nomination fees. With high cost of nomination fees, our democracy may likely be hijacked by the rich and political offices sold to the highest bidders. This is most unfortunate and could undermine our democracy if not checked. This form of political clientelism, raises questions about the character of Nigeria democracy. It keeps the poor from not having their interests accurately expressed in the electoral process and pave the way for vote buying as the only means of benefitting from the nations resources. For example, almost all the conducted five elections that included the 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections were roundly condemned as not meeting the required global standard and therefore, not credible. According to Ovwasa, (2013:3) the idea of money politics and vote-buying is the major factor inhibiting credible elections in contemporary Nigeria.

Alagbe (2018) reported that during elections, it was alleged that some voters were bribed with money ranging from, N3,000 to N5,000 in some polling units to vote for the candidate of the vote buyer. It was the same scenario in the November 2017 Anambra governorship election when politicians were alleged to have bought the electorate's votes for an average of N5,000 each, depending on the location. It was reported that in the rural communities, votes were sold for N5,000 each while in the urban areas, they were sold for between N7,000 and N10,000 each. Similarly, when the Edo State governorship election was conducted in September 2016, the Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, described the exercise as marred by incidents of "inducement and vote-buying." A policy analyst in Abuja, with name withheld, said vote-buying was a corrupt election practice which could hamper the growth of democracy in the country. Vote-buying in Nigeria is becoming a  threat to the

conduct of free and fair elections. The manner in which it is being done these days is alarming and could jeopardized the future our democracy (Alagbe,2018).

**Vote Buying in Nigeria: Selected Influential Factors**
▪ **Institutional Failures**
In Nigeria, the key institutions that administer and support electoral process, most notably is the INEC and the Nigerian police. In every election cycle since independence, the problem has been how to deal with issues relating to election management in Nigeria, especially the activities of the electoral umpire. The government attention has always been on how to address institutional failures, such as ineffective resource management, poor preparations, collusion among politicians and election officials to cheat as well as electoral violence (Ekezie, 2018). Others are acts of intimidation by contending groups, especially political parties, and the use of security agents for election duties. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and its activities have been mired in controversies.

Consequently, the government has always deployed energy and resources in efforts to deal with the challenges of election management, including electoral violence. This is the reason that in addition to addressing logistic challenges of INEC, the government also mobilises the security agencies to secure the election environment. Furthermore, government restricts the movement of persons on election days, but the measures have not guaranteed the sanctity and integrity of the process as the election outcomes are often declared inconclusive and contested in either in re-run elections or courts. However, the Electoral Act stipulate, some form of punishments for vote marketers which INEC should strictly adhere to.

▪ **Poverty**
Poverty, according to Mukhtar et al. (2016), is a multidimensional state of deprivation involving lack of basic requirements, social and political exclusion and lack of education. Poverty is a condition of having insufficient resources or income. In a recent report by Ahiuma-Young (2018), for every minute in Nigeria six persons slip into poverty and six out of ten Nigeria are also estimated to be living in poverty. Poverty is characterized by hunger, malnutrition, ill-health, unsanitary housing and living conditions and often without required education and resources to overcome these afflictions. The manner in which vote-buying is carried out these days is alarming. It is being practically carried out openly without fear simply because of the level of hunger in the society. Vote-buying is a function of a mix of socio-economic, cultural and institutional factors (Hicken, 2007, p. 58). Vote-buyers largely target voters based on their poor status in the society.

Fundamentally, the vote-buying strategy focuses on the socio-economic factors by targeting vulnerable persons (Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2015). In Nigeria, poor voters placed more value on immediate benefits such as monetary benefits as opposed to the provisions of public goods such as standard health services, portable water, good roads, good education, etc. Owen (2013) asserted that poverty had a significant impact on the decision of the poor to sell their votes. It is not unusual for poorer

voters, therefore, to perceive vote buying as part and parcel of politics or electoral strategy (Gonzalez Ocantos, De Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio & Nickerson, 2012). Most importantly, poverty had led to the perception that vote-buying is a legitimate electoral strategy by political parties during elections (Jensen & Justesen, 2014). The people are not ready to think about tomorrow because of what they will eat today. So as long as the electoral management bodies remain porous, vote buying will continue because candidates who are not sure they will win election resort to vote buying as the only option to emerge winners. It is not a secret that millions of Nigerians are poor. Poverty, low salaries, unemployment – constitutes campaign issues for politicians. Poverty and corruption are real 'friends' and are extremely loved by politicians. People who cannot afford food are willing to trade their vote for bread, fruit, and cereals or even money. This is what has led to poor governance in the country.

- **Illiteracy**

The minister of education recently stated that the country had about 65 million to 75 million illiterates, describing the figure as unbecoming and high, considering the country's population. Education he said is the bedrock of any country's development and any country that does not educate its populace is bound to fail. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, we have a very large population of illiterates; in relation to the overall population of the country (https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/09/illiteracy-rate-nigeria-alarming-fg/ ).

Illiteracy is the major cause of poverty in the land, and the poorer one is, the more likely he/she will be used by the rich to get what they want. They (the rich) know this and keep using it. The urge to acquire education is defeated by poverty which leads to vote-buying. Khemani (2015) stated that uneducated voters prefer immediate monetary benefits because they do not know how good governance can translate to good public services. As opposed to uneducated voters, educated voters recognize the value of the abstract societal costs attributed to vote-buying (Borang, Cornell, Grimes, & Schuster, 2014). It is, however, right to say that education influences the vote-sellers' perception of vote transactions (Hicken, 2007). In any event, illiteracy is one of the socio-economic factors that fueled vote-buying (Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007; Onapajo et al., 2015).

**Theoretical Framework**

For the purpose of this study, the Richard Joseph's (1991) prebendalism theory is adopted. This theory is predicated on the need to recognize and fully understand the interdependence between vote buying and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Prebendalism was a term used to describe patron-clientelism or neo-pratimonialism in Nigeria. According to the core proponent of the theory, "state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups…" (www,en.m.wikipedia.org). These material benefits were equally held to be of a patron-client nature and thus converted where possible into hereditary

entitlements. The theory characterized the pattern of politics whereof "state power is sought by all and sundry as a means of personal material aggrandizement (Okoli & Orinya, 2014). This obtains in a context where the state has usurped the role of the economy as the major wealth creator, employer of labour, and guarantor of socio-economic security (Okoli, 2009; Okoli & Otegwu, 2010; Okoli & Orinya, 2014). The prebendal character of politics in Nigeria has significantly influenced how state power is sought and utilized. In this respect, politicking attracts inestimable premium and high stakes. As observed by Bratton: Elections are struggle over the access to the resources controlled by the state, which are the biggest prize in society. Given these high stakes, politicians resort to a variety of means –whether fair or foul –to attain public office (Bratton,2008). The expediency of power struggles in the arena of electioneering necessitates and compels the adoption of extra-legal incentives to ensure electoral success and victory (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014). In this regard, politicians and party loyalist often resort to material inducement or intimidation in their desperate bid to gain electoral advantage. In this circumstance, vote buying, vote-selling, vote trading among others becomes a competitive electoral strategic tactic.

The theory gives an understanding on how prebendal politics in Nigeria has led to the privatization, commercialization and materialization of electioneering and partisan politics in Nigeria. The exchange of votes for money as exemplified in the phenomenon of vote buying/selling is, therefore, a necessary consequence of the prebendal character of politics in Nigeria. The character of the Nigeria state makes the capture of state power irresistibly attractive. In Nigeria, power is sougth by every means, legal or otherwise and those who already control state power try to keep it by every means. What emerges from this is a politics which does not know legitimacy or legality, only expediency. However, this state power resistance constitutes forces within that influence the direction and the success of any election in Nigeria. This is why the core mandates of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other key election management bodies in the conduct of free, fair and credible elections seem unattainable. This prebendal orientation to a reasonable extent is, indeed, a diametrical opposite of an effective representative democracy as the central concern of the representatives has come to border more on how to share for themselves the national cake rather than effectively represent the electorates and extend democracy dividends to the citizens. In this context, election exercises are turned into power struggle among contending political candidates and often time a nightmare for election officials and the electorate. All these are few justifications for the relevance of the prebendalism theory in understanding the place of "vote-buying" in consolidating Nigeria democracy.

**Vote-Buying: A Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria**

The meaning that we ascribe to the notion of democratic consolidation depends on where we stand (our empirical viewpoints) and where we aim to reach (our normative horizons). It varies according to the contexts and the goals we have in mind. Democratic consolidation is regarded as a stage in a country's democratic

process where democracy acquires some features of stability. According to Diamond, (1999 cited in Aluaigha, 2016), consolidation cannot take place unless certain political features are present in a country operating a democratic government. Some of these features have been identified as 'routinized, recurrent and predictable patterns of political behaviour; defining clear workable rules of the game, establishing more authoritative, proficient, and dependable structures for mediating political conflicts (Diamond, 1999).

As a result, the pre-conditions of democratic consolidation should include such divergent items as popular legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of antisystem actors, civilian supremacy over the military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the organization of functional interests, the stabilization of electoral rules, the routinization of politics, the decentralization of state power, the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial reform, the alleviation of poverty, and economic stabilization. According to Im (2000), the importance of democratic consolidation is to become overt in a society when the rights of citizens are guaranteed, and the ruling elite is accountable and responsive to the populace. A further hallmark of democratic consolidation is that the masses are well acquainted with political procedures and norms – that is, the masses 'routinize, internalize, habituate, and legitimate. On the other hand, it implies that there is a need to consolidate the base of the existing democracy. This implies making firmer, more solid and more resilient the base of the existing democracy (Obah-Akpowoghaha, 2013).

There exists a nexus between vote buying and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Vote-buying in Nigeria had become a culture, especially by political parties with access to public funds, whether at the state, or federal level. Scenarios where elections are sold to the highest bidder are akin to a death knell on our democracy. Nigerian democracy is now for sale – a democracy that perpetuates ignorance, poverty, violence and underdevelopment. This ugly political atmosphere is entrenching the practice of corrupting the system to earn illicit money in order to buy votes from an impoverished and psychologically-damaged populace (Akume, 2018). To Meya, Ande and Egbejule (2018), vote-buying can give birth to election violence, which is a threat to the growth of democracy in Nigeria. Vote-buying had constituted a huge threat to free, fair and credible election, which is the main target of the of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Vote buying unduly raises the cost of elections thereby shutting out contestants with little finances and promoting political corruption. When victory is purchased rather than won fairly, it obviously leads to state capture. Vote trading equally compromises the credibility, legitimacy and integrity of elections.

According to Adamu, Ocheni and Ibrahim (2016) vote buying discourages conscientious people from participating in electoral politics and causes citizens to lose faith in state institutions. Vote buying equally has the tendency to perpetuate bad governance. It not only compromises the wellbeing of those who sold their vote for instant gratification, but also the future of those who did not sell their votes but are inevitably exposed to bad governance that results from such a fraudulent process.

**Policy Recommendations**

In view of the dangers vote buying poses to democracy in Nigeria, the following recommendations are proffered:

- The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and various stakeholders- electorate, government officials, civil society organizations and the media should develop a strategic collaborative framework for effective monitory of political parties' campaign funds in order to effectively curb electoral fraud, including vote trading.
- The National Assembly should fast-track deliberation and passage of the Bill establishing the National Electoral Offences Commission (NEOC). The NEOC, when established should arrest, investigate and prosecute electoral offenders.
- The media and civil society organizations need to intensify voter education and enlightenment campaigns on the negative implications of vote trading particularly on how it promotes political corruption and undermines good governance.
- The Nigerian government should pursue a policy of aggressive diversification of the economy to create more employment opportunities and reduce the level of poverty that makes people susceptible to criminal, financial and material inducements.

**Conclusion**

This study has tried to examine the emerging issue of vote buying as it poses a threat to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.  From the literature reviewed "vote-buying" is a process consisting of an offer made to purchase the vote of an individual of voting age, who accepts the offer, receives compensation, shows up at the polling station, and then votes as paid. There is no doubt that the key institutions that administer and support Nigeria's electoral process, most notably the INEC and the Nigerian police and their activities have been mired in controversies. The study further revealed that the micro-economic conditions under which people live have large effects on the extent to which eligible voters are targets of vote buying, an effect that seems to increase when elections are closely contested. In the context of Nigerian democracy, it is perhaps not surprising that poverty is the predominant socio-economic motivating factor of vote buying. Besides, poverty also makes vote buying a more common political strategy during elections. Therefore, saving Nigeria's budding democracy from collapsing into a sale in an open market under the weight of vote buying is a task that must be urgently undertaken by INEC and other key institutions.

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# Prebendal Survivalism and the Challenges of Political Restructuring in Nigeria: A Diachronic Synthesis[1]

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**Abstract**

*Even before independence in 1960, Nigeria had been opportunistically skewed and structured to the advantage of a section of the country and to the misery of the other. The advantaged section has historically fed fat on the resources and energies of the latter, and as such has remained adamant, if not antagonistic, to any move or policy that appears to question the status quo. With the mindset that a change in status quo is dialectically proportional to power and wealth redistribution, the popular clarion call for political restructuring from many zones of the country becomes, on the part of the disadvantaged, a summum bonum that must be vigorously pursued, and on the part of the advantaged, a murderous threat that must be stoutly rejected and quashed. This paper, therefore, chronicled the historical foundation upon which the agitations for restructuring are laid, and the consequential dynamics that have transformed the restructuring question into survival warfare. The theory of prebendalism was adopted to unravel how the Nigerian state has been deployed to serve the interest of a section instead of standing aloof as an objective force. Data for the study are predominantly secondary and were collected using the documentary method, which eventually made itself amenable to content analysis. The study found that orchestrated political marginalization is at the heart of the agitation for restructuring, and that as such, agitations for restructuring may continue even in the face of suppression until equity, fairness and inclusion unseat marginalization in Nigeria.*

**Keywords:** Prebendal survivalism, Restructuring, Diachronic synthesis, Marginalization, Agitations.

**Introduction**

Hitherto, political restructuring has never been so serious an issue in Nigerian political lexicon and politics. This is however not to say that it was never occasionally mentioned or some of its principles implied in the discussions of Nigerian federalism and politics. Rather, it is a way of emphasizing the relative importance the concept or

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[1]Part of the thoughts shared in this article had been published by the lead author and others under the title "*Predatory state-ethno regional relations, parasitic oligarchic class and the restructuring question in Nigeria: How ethical?"*

phraseology has garnered in recent times. At a time, mentioning or demanding for restructuring was viewed as being analogous to a felony, as it implicitly coheres with tampering with the corporate existence of Nigeria as an indivisible entity which the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria had sanctioned against. However, with a little spark ignited in 2014 and 2015 by the National Conference (Confab) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) respectively, which the Federal Government has tried without success to extinguish, the demand for political restructuring has since graduated to an unquenchable inferno. It still remains a credit to the 2015 spark that few months into the 2019 General Elections, all the presidential aspirants of various political parties had keyed in to the necessity of restructuring the Nigerian federation, especially its power structure. Whether these were sincere concerns borne out of altruistic feeling to execute an idea whose time has come or just an insincere and opportunistic gesture to court the political support of certain sections of the country, the truth is that political restructuring for the very first time in the history of Nigeria has attracted the greatest level of political attention since 1954 when Nigeria became a federation. The clamour for political restructuring centers on Nigeria's badly skewed federalism which almost every section of the country, except the direct beneficiary (the north), have come to acknowledge is a far cry from ideal true federalism. No less a figure than the former Secretary General of the Common Wealth Organisation, Chief Emeka Anyaoku frowned at Nigeria's federalism which, according to him, allows too much power and resources at the centre to the detriment of the country's ethnic nationalities. He regretted that the founding fathers of Nigeria would be "disappointed to find that instead of a few viable federating units in which effective economic development can be planned and pursued with security, better policed and maintained, Nigeria now has what would be describe as a plethora of nonviable federating units with an all-powerful central government (Ogefere, 2017).

It should be noted however that before now, some sections of the Nigerian federation had stoutly stood and fought against the necessity of political restructuring in Nigeria. This is not against the dominant thinking and view in the south, especially South-East and South-South parts of the country that those who are opposed to restructuring are direct beneficiaries of the status quo lopsided Nigerian federal structure. The prevailing view among the proponents of restructuring is that those opposing it are afraid of losing their strategic and juicy position within the Nigerian polity as presently constituted or structured. In this regard, political cum economic survival becomes the focal point upon which their opposition is couched. At the heart of the debate or contentions on political restructuring lies the all important issue of politico-economic resource apportionment behaviour of the Nigerian state. It is at this point, that is, in connection with resources (economic and political) appropriation that the very concept of prebendalism comes into play. Differentiating prebendalism from patronage, Van de Walle (2013) describes the former (prebendalism) as "the handing out of prebends, in which an individual is given a public office in order for him/her to gain personal access over state resources". He went further to contend that in postcolonial Africa, "certain structural factors" led political leaders "to rely more on prebends than patronage", and that one of these factors was the need for "intra-elite

accommodation in young, multi-ethnic and poorly integrated political systems". Meanwhile, Joseph (1987) conceives of prebendalism as the pattern of political behaviour which reflects, as its justifying principle, that the offices of the state may be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of the office holders as well as that of their reference or support groups. Accordingly, he notes that in Nigeria, state political offices are primarily regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by the office holders to generate material benefits for themselves and for other ethnic, cultural or community groups (Ugwuani and Nwokedi, 2015).

Joseph (1987) and Van de Walle (2013) may have done the social sciences an unquantifiable noble in their works on prebendalism in Nigeria and Africa at large. However, the unhealthy interface and conflictual nexus between prebendalism and survivalism was not given (adequate) attention. Rather, the two scholars in their respective works spent worthwhile effort and time in exploring the relationship between prebendalism and patronage in African/Nigeria. Part of the objective of this current paper therefore is to demonstrate that a dialectical nexus exists between the appropriation and parcelling out of collective resources or common wealth by those who have historically captured the Nigerian state and have clung tenaciously to it for covert and overt socio-economic and political survival (prebendal survivalism) on the one hand, and the difficulties of achieving an objective political restructuring, with the inherent danger of upturning the sensitive status quo in Nigeria.

To achieve this objective, the paper diachronizes the dynamics of the prebendal origin of survivalism in Nigerian politics and how this poses as an albatross that is very difficult to be overcome through the mechanism of restructuring as being clamoured for. The paper is divided into four sections. While section one introduces the issues with which the paper is saddled section two locates the paper within an appropriate theoretical framework of analysis. In section three, attention was turned to the historical manifestations of prebendal survivalism in Nigeria. Whereas the next section examines the push and pull of political restructuring in Nigeria as well as the challenges, the last section concludes the paper and offers some recommendations.

**Theorization of the Paper**

The Theory of Prebendalism which seeks to describe another level and modality of political clientelism in Nigeria is adopted in this paper. Its adoption here is not because it is fundamentally superior to other theories, but because it combines elements of other theories that attempted to unravel Nigeria's political development quagmire, and transcends their (other theories) limitations through adjustments and refinement thereby providing a more relevant framework for analyzing the Nigerian society and politics. The theory was developed and expanded by Richard Anthony Joseph, a Political Scientist and Professor at Northwestern University, in his thought-provoking book: *Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic* published in 1987. Joseph first used this term to describe Nigeria's political and office holders' culture. He had argued that the country's political culture was strongly influenced by the fact that holding public offices provided officials with access to resources, and that the theft of such resources went

largely unpunished.  He called this "prebendalism", likening it to European feudal practices.  According to him, this theory, states that offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by public officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups.

Prebendal has also been used to describe the nature of state-derived rights over capital held by state officials in parts of India in the early 18th century. Disbursing of public offices or state rents to one's ethnic group or ethnic-based clients. It is an established pattern of political behavior that justifies the pursuit of and the use of public office for the personal use of the office-holder and his clients. The official public purpose of the office becomes a secondary concern.

Prebendalism, therefore, is an extreme form of clientelism in which corrupt public officeholders appropriate state resources to personal and/or ethnic and sectional advantage. Prebendalism thus deepens sectional cleavages and erodes the resources of the state. It discourages genuine productive activities and expands the class of individuals who live off state patronage. Joseph (2013) wrote:

> In my adaptation of this concept to Nigeria politics as well as many capitalist nations, the term prebendal refers to patterns of political behavior which reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing state may be competed for and then utilized for the benefit of office holders as well as that of their reference or support group.  To a significant extent, the 'state' in such a context is perceived as congeries of offices susceptible to individual cum communal appropriation.  The statutory purposes of such offices become a matter of secondary concern, however much that purpose might have been codified in law or other regulations or even periodically cited during competitions to fill them (Joseph, 2013, pp.30-31).

In essence, prebendalism breeds and deepens patron-clientelism as there are two sides to prebendalism: the office holder and the clients. A prebendalized system is inherently unstable.  Aspirations to build a capable state, a democratic system and a coherent nation are ultimately foiled by prebendal practices. The theory of prebendalism thus captures the practice that re-enforces 'authority stealing', and it is of course the authority entrusted to state offices that is stolen by those appointed or elected to fill them (Joseph, 2013).

In applying the theory of prebendalism to this study, we first saw how the colonial masters took Nigeria and its resources as a prebend that must be exploited and appropriated, not for the interest of the colony, but for the overwhelming interest and advantage of the Britain and her citizens in the United Kingdom. For unbroken continuity in this institutionalized prebendal bent, the colonial masters rigged the 1959 general election in favour of the pliant north (Mason, 2007). By so doing, the Nigerian state since independence has become and remained, in the hands of those who captured it from birth, both an object of prebendal reinforcement as well as an instrument for further prebendalization of the economic and political resources of the

Nigerian polity, especially those which could be said to be regional in location and ownership. As brilliantly captured by Abada, Okafor and Udeogu (2018, p.)

> The Nigerian state, due to its colonial descent and mission, sowed the seed of disorder by taking side with a section of the society. Determined to leverage one region against another, the state became partisan, exploitative and predatory in character and principle. From the favoured region has emerged a parasitic class, feeding fat on the resources and pains of other regions.

It is to the origin and multifarious manifestations of this prebendalization of the Nigerian state for the opportunistic survival of a region/section of the country that we now turn our investigatory and analytic attention. The dynamic operation and analytic relevance of Theory of Prebendalism will become clearer and evident as we examine the next subheading.

### History and Manifestations of Prebendal Survivalism in Nigeria

The scramble for Africa which eventually culminated in the partitioning of the whole continent among the super-powers of Europe led to British occupation of Nigeria and some other African societies. Thenceforth, the consciousness of exploitation, of tapping the colonies' rich resources, of taking without replacement or replenishing, of carting away fortunes from the region of much abundance but less developed to the region of least abundance but relatively better-of; in a word, of prebending on the locals and real owners of the resources and fortunes had been alive, well and kicking. As a rule, prebending never occurs, as it is inconceivable, in an environment with no resources or people to be subtly or forcefully exploited and subjugated. To facilitate more exploitation and overcome some inevitable incidental challenges associated with the rather complex processes involved in extraction, assemblage and shipment of values to Europe, the colonial masters used the money from the central fund accruing from custom duties levied at the port, etc, to create infrastructure, as a means of further exploitation of what was later to be Nigeria so as to achieve their economic and commercial ends. The colonial regime begrudgingly embarked upon what Egerton (the then High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria) had called 'developmental expenditure. As a result of the Egertonian development expenditure initiative, there was a general rise in the money spent on public work extraordinary from 1906 to 1909. According to Mohammed (2013, p.431), public works extraordinary expenditure peaked during the year of the great deficit, 1909. After that, the percentage of such expenditure went down sharply and rapidly from a high of almost 22% to under 12% by 1912. More than anything else, this drop shows the declining willingness of the colonial office to give priority to the Egertonian developmental expenditure.

**Table 1: Southern Nigeria: Revenue and Expenditure, 1900-1913**

| Year | Revenue | Expenditure | Surplus deficit |
|------|---------|-------------|-----------------|
| 1900 | £535,902 | £ 424,257 | £ +111,645 |
| 1901 | 606,431 | 564,818 | + 41,613 |
| 1902 | 801,737 | 619,687 | + 186,050 |
| 1903 | 760,230 | 759,953 | + 22,777 |
| 1904 | 888,123 | 863,917 | + 24,219 |
| 1905 | 954,748 | 998,564 | -46,816 |
| 1906 | 1,088,717 | 1,056,290 | + 32,427 |
| 1907 | 1,459,554 | 1,217,336 | +242,218 |
| 1908 | 1,387,975 | 1,357,763 | + 30,218 |
| 1909 | 1,361,891 | 1,648,684 | -286,793 |
| 1910 | 1,933,235 | 1,592,282 | +340,953 |
| 1911 | 1,956,170 | 1,717,259 | + 238,917 |
| 1912 | 2,235,214 | 2,410,498 | + 124,914 |
| 1913 | 2,668,198 | 2,096,311 | + 571,887 |

**Source:** Colonial Reports-Annual: Southern Nigeria, 1907-1912.

Of all remarkable developments, the departure of Egerton in 1912 and his subsequent replacement by Sir Frederick Lugard as the Governor-general of both Northern and Southern Nigeria remains most outstanding. Through the amalgamation of the Colony and Protectorate Southern Nigeria with the Protectorate of Northern Nigerian into what has come to be formally known as and called Nigeria brought under one administration, the staggering deficit that the colonial government had since struggle to manage for the administration of the Northern protectorate was eventually opportunistically addressed.

No less a figure than Lord Lugard himself acknowledged the financial predicament of the North and the anticipated prosperity that would follow the projected amalgamation of the Northern protectorate with the Southern protectorate, when he reported that "the prosperity of the Southern protectorate as evidenced by the liquor trade, had risen by 57 per cent. In fact, the liquor trade alone yielded revenue of One Million, One Hundred and Thirty-Eight Thousand pounds (£1,138,000) in 1913" (Ijomah, 2017). The true position is that the Northern administration could not have survived without the imperial grant-in-aid which in the year before the amalgamation stood at One Hundred and Thirty-Six thousand Pounds, (£136,000) and had averaged Three Hundred and Fourteen Thousand, Five Hundred Pounds (£314,500) for the eleven years ending in March, 1912.

**Table 2: Combined figures for Southern Nigeria and Lagos the Year they were Amalgamated**

| Year | Total Public Work Extraordinary Expenditure | Percentage (%) | Total Public Work Extraordinary Revenue | Total |
|------|---------------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------------|-------|
| 1906 | £532,902 | 16.2 | £1,056,290 | £1,088,717 |
| 1907 | 242,065 | 19.9 | 1,217,336 | 1,459,554 |
| 1908 | 238,016 | 17.5 | 1648,684 | 1,361,891 |
| 1910 | 211,087 | 13.3 | 1,592,282 | 1,933,235 |
| 1911 | 216,375 | 12.6 | 1,717,259 | 1,956,176 |
| 1912 | 246,355 | 11.7 | 2,110,498 | 2,235,412 |

**Source:** Colonial Report-Annual: southern Nigeria, 1906-1912

The goal of the 1914 amalgamation, therefore, was to plunder the South for the expedient need of developing the North and the ultimate goal of enriching imperial United Kingdom. How pathetic it is that before leaving in 1912, Egerton had made the unrepentant boast that "one of the things I am proudest of in West Africa is that I found southern Nigeria with hardly any debt and I left it with a debt of five million pounds" (Mohammed, 2014, p.431). The immediate concern of the British colonial regime was to develop the North commercially while preserving the administration's interest...such that in 1907, and with financial support from the colony and protectorate of southern Nigeria, northern Nigeria began building a railway line to link Baro and Kano (Mohammed, 2013, 441).

The point being made here is that even before independence in 1960, the north has always survived through the appropriation of the resources of the south via the instrumentality of state power. Like in most other African countries, the state and access to its power has remained the most lucrative business venture such that those who have once bestridden it always associates lack of access it to death (Onuoha, 2008). It is this survival tendency that has continued till this day to pit the north against any move that suggests the diminution of federal government power (to which it has remained the major beneficiary), including restructuring.

**The Push and Pull of Political Restructuring in Nigeria**

The clamour for restructuring is the admission that the existing structure as Ijomah (2017) puts it is 'unworkable.' As has been stated before, serious concerns have been expressed by individuals, groups and sections to revisit this largely perceived odious system and arrangement that has historically put certain sections or regions of the federation at the mercy of the other and allowing certain unproductive class of people to feed fat on the labour and pains of others. At the heart of the clamour for restructuring is resource allocation—economic and political. Economically, the issues that have consistently fanned the flames of the clamour for restructuring include natural resource control and resources allocation formula, which tilts unjustifiably in favour of the centre, breeding wastes, corruption, ineptitude and underdevelopment of the constituent states. In this connection, the people of Niger

Delta under different umbrellas, including the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) have had to agitate for 100 percent control of the oil and its proceeds.

Added to the above is that restructuring the political and economic system of the country which tangentially coheres with unbundling the federation arguably has the inherent tendency of positioning the components units or the regions to tap into their local talents and endowments for multifaceted grow and development. If therefore the status quo remains, the fear and apprehension is that Nigeria may never again witness the glorious days of Nigeria development of the First Republic era. No less a figure than the former Vice President of Nigeria and current Presidential candidate of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Alhaji Atiku Abubakar has consistently aired his dissatisfaction with the current political structure of Nigeria. He decries that it does not encourage development as experienced in the First Republic. According to him, under regional political structure, Western Nigeria was able to build a television station ahead of France. He added that even the Royal family of Saudi Arabia used to attend medical checkups at the University College of Ibadan's Teaching Hospital. During the period, different leaders made efforts to restructure Nigeria for effective management. In response to this effort, Nigeria subsequently grew from four regions in 1963 to thirty-six states as at today.

Since the recommendation of the 2014 National Conference for the country to be further restructured into fifty-four states with the addition of eighteen more states in order to address the question of imbalance inherent in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, the call for the restructuring has become deafening. Before the 2014 effort, Nigeria got a constitution in 1999 with which the country was returned to civil rule. Shortcomings of that constitution have fuelled allegations of marginalization and estrangement which resulted in the agitation for restructuring. Those who have championed this call insist that Nigeria has come to the point where there is need for a review of the systems and foundation upon which the present structure was built. Many have described our federal system in various terms including "feeding bottle federalism". According to Okonkwo (2018), many have wondered why we gather in Abuja every month to share money for the ineffective running of the states. There are also those who have asked why certain realities, like policing have to be dependent on the federal government. There are more questions as to why we have to go to the federal government to obtain something as little as a license to drive a car. Many wonder why we have discriminatory unity schools and university admission policies. Some still ask why states cannot build and maintain their own railway lines. Many Nigerians are still asking to know why the federal government has to decide for state how much they must pay their workers as minimum wage even where the states lack the resources to do so. So many other people are raising questions as to why communities where natural minerals are found still do not have rights to participate in the mining of same. Many have argued that the revenue sharing formula which gives more to the federal government is reason for lack of development in the states and also, for high level corruption at the center. There are those who believe that our structured quota system

which makes it mandatory for every section of the country to be involved in the leadership ladder is reason our country has been held back. Former Military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, in his 2017 Eid-el-Fitr message to Nigerians said: "the talk to have the country restructured means that Nigerians are agreed on our unity in diversity; but that we should strengthen our structures to make the union more functional based on our comparative advantages". He went further to advocate for devolution of powers to the extent that more responsibilities are given to the states while the federal government is vested with the responsibility to oversee our foreign policy, defence, and economy. That means we need to tinker with our constitution to accommodate new thoughts that will strengthen our nationality.

As the 2019 general elections draw closer, the clamour for restructuring continues to gather more momentum as well as apologists. People of the South-East region of Nigeria, where the agitation for restructuring seems to be at its peak, wish to know why they have only five states while the North-west has seven and all others have six each. Their quandary is informed by their understanding of the socio-economic and political implications of this numero-structural nosedive. Nigeria being a representative democracy, at least in principles, this means a lot. Five states for the South-East translate to fifteen Senators. On the other hand, seven states for the Northwest means twenty-one senators while other geopolitical zones have eighteen each. The implication of this is further made prominent with the recognition of the fact that states are the basic units for sharing national revenue. Taking the quandary further down, the South-Easterners are at loss as to why out of the seven hundred and seventy-four (774) constitutionally approved local government areas in Nigeria, the South-East has a total of Ninety-five while the Northwest has One hundred and Eight-six, North-East One hundred and thirteen, North-Central One hundred and twelve, South-West One hundred thirty-seven and south-south One hundred twenty-five. Thus far, no one has explained to the southeast people why this sort of structure exists. The pains of this situation and many more have all been weaved into the push to restructure the system for equality, equity and fairness.

In the South-West, *Afenifere*, the pan-Yoruba socio-cultural group has recently joined its South-East and South-south counterparts-*Oha Na Eze Ndigbo* and the Indigenous People of Niger Delta, respectively—in agitating for the restructuring of Nigeria. They had to vent their dissatisfaction and anger over the issue following the Ife clash between Hausas and Yoruba. As noted by Ogefere (2017), they were particularly bitter that the government of the federation controlled by the Hausa/Fulani exhibited bias and discriminatory attitude towards the Yoruba in the handling of the crisis.

As it now stands, four geopolitical zones of the country favour restructuring to free the zones to function within their different spheres of capacity, while two zones are vehemently opposed to it. A breakdown of this shows that the entire South (South-West, South-South, South-East) including one northern zone (North-Central) are in support, while North-West and North-East are against it. As such, conscious efforts at restructuring Nigeria have been thwarted by the Northern prebendal oligarchic class. They instigated the Northern delegates at the National Political

Reform Conference convened by former President, Olusegun Obasanjo in 2005 when the Federal Government conceded to slightly review the derivate principle upwards as a way of accommodating the demand of the Niger Delta delegates on restructuring, calling it a blackmail. In the same vein, the implementation of the 2014 National Conference which recommended the restructuring of the country in specific lines has remained a herculean task because the same elements have been up against it. In the final analysis, the northern emirate aristocracy has consistently opposed any move to restructure the political status quo. The only dissenting voice from the northern oligarchy, perhaps, is former Vice President, Atiku Abubakar who has seized every available opportunity to harp on the matter, contending that Nigeria as presently structured is economically unproductive and politically weak. He was quoted to have said that the restructuring that "I have been calling for involves changes to the allocation of powers, responsibilities and resources among the states or zones and between them and the federal government" (Ogefere, 2017). The reasons for the northern opposition to restructuring are well understood. No less a northern academic, political and Islamic figure than the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi II acknowledged that the North will be worse off in a restructured Nigeria (Ogefere, 2017). What sustains the North currently is in the South, and with restructuring, the draining pipe of the northern prebendal class will be disconnected from its source of flow. This is in line with William Shakespeare's truism that: "You take my life when you take the means whereby I live"[2] It is this consciousness to survive via political prebendalism that has galvanised the northern interests against every move in the direction of restructuring the country politically.

**Concluding Remarks**

    To restructure is to make adjustments on an existing structure. The concept has become a national appeal. So long as the current political structure and odious arrangement that has historically put certain sections or regions of the federation at the mercy of the other and allowing certain unproductive class of people to feed fat on the labour and pains of others remains, agitations and clamour for its restructuring will never cease. The current wide support for political restructuring in Nigeria is an indication that restructuring is an idea whose time has come. As John F. Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States of America rightly remarked: "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable".

    The liberalization and restructuring of Nigeria to free it to become more functional will have to begin with the dismantling of the exclusive legislative list to grant more powers to the state. Such powers will give the states more autonomy and responsibilities which will enable them pursue development. But for prebendal survivalism and its antithetical disposition to restructuring, the Nigerian state possesses all the possibilities of becoming a polity where component states/regions will mine and harness resources with which it is endowed by nature and then pay loyalties and taxes to the center. Then shall we appreciate the opportunities that

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[2] *The Merchant of Venice*: Act 4, Scene 1.

nature has given us to develop. It will no more be the business of the center to build roads and bridges in the states and call them federal roads. When restructuring shall have unbundled the federation, the federal government will busy itself more with things as defence, immigration, foreign policy, customs service, monetary and fiscal policies.

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# Political Culture of Violence in Developing Democracies

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## Abstract

*Violence inhibits growth, development and democratic sustenance of any country in the world. Violence has its culture with definite structures through which it operates in different climes. This structure enables it to continually manifest in such community. The political structure of violence is referred to as a 'virus genome' in this paper. The genome is a compound complex structure. This genome in all communities allows violence to strive amidst of all political, social, economic and institutional measures. How can the political culture and structure of violence be broken? Qualitative research method is used to obtain data. Relative deprivation theory is applied in explaining the root cause of violence in the society. This paper revealed that political culture of violence in developing democracies and developed alike has its origin which is traceable to bad governance and the deprivation of the people of their common good. In order to break the political culture and structure of violence, good governance and prompt policy actions are inevitable.*

**Keywords:** Democracies, Good Governance, Insecurity, Relative Deprivation, Violence, Virus Genome.

## Introduction

Violence of all forms and kinds is an anomaly to governments all over the world. It is often seen as both ancient and modern challenges with multivariate dimensions. The extent of violence in various countries may vary due to various peculiarities prevailing in such political environment. The depth of violent occurrence is related to the level of political and economic developments in such country. A developed country has its peculiar level of violence so also the developing countries. The paradox of violence in most polities is that the more developed the polity is, the complex the extent of violence therein. Also, the level of undeveloped a country is, the more dynamic and reoccurring its level of violence might be.

The dimensions to which violence inclined in both ancient and modern times can be simply categorised into three - political, economic and social. However, there is no clear consensus among scholars as regarding the manifestations of violence in different dimensions among states. Some claim a variation while others claim a typology (Goldsmith 2015; Rolandsen and Anderson 2015). In the view of Moser and Mcilwaine (2004 and 2006) they categorized violence into four main types; political, institutional, economic and social violence which are present in both developed and developing countries and or democracies.

Developing democracies are the class of states in the world which have the potential of growing from their present redundant states of institutional status to a more robust political economic structure. In such countries, the executive, legislature, judiciary and the mass media institutions are all present as in all other democracies but the level of their operations and functionalities are weak, poor, solitary and most times rudimental (Aluko, 2017). The extent of violence in developing democracies is most potent and revolves in chain streaks. This does not mean that violence is not present in other countries especially in developed democracies. Violence is a political genetic crisis predominantly found in any form of political system or governmental arrangements adopted by any country of the world. That is to say, the reason for ubiquity of violence in all countries of the world is that there are political genetics in all system that clones, provoke and instigate violence.

Violence genome is therefore a classified socio-political and economic trait present in every human relations and societies. The community gene that coat for violence is a virus that is so potent and it thrives in all forms of political and socio-economic circumstances in the country. The virus genome that coat for violence in the community has a complex compound structure which makes it fairly impossible to eradicate. It consists of six (6) elements and at the centre is the nucleus which has four electrons. The elements revolving around the nucleus are connected to the nucleus by a connective fibre which is held in shape by double bond chains. The elements are also connected together to one another by connective fibres which are held in shape by either the double bond chains or the single bond chains.

Can violence be eradicated in human communities? If no, how can it be reduced and to what extent? This paper argues that the occurrence of violence in a country has a political culture backing it manifestations. The political culture of violence may be strong or weak depending on the extent of good governance in such country. The political culture of violence breeds a structure called the 'violence virus gene' or simply put, virus genome in every community especially the developing democracies. Violence is referred to as virus because of its multiple operational complexities. This therefore makes very it difficult to eradicate but rather managed or minimised. In other to analyse the political culture and structure of violence, the paper thematically considers the conceptual clarification of violence, the theoretical framework of relative deprivation as a root course of violence, the complexity and manifestations of violence in developing countries, the political structure (virus genome) of violence in developing democracies, dimension of urban violence in developing democracies and the conclusion.

**Conceptual Clarification**
Violence is a ubiquitous concept in social sciences. It has various connotations. Harroff-Tavel (2010) posited that violence is purely a criminal activity perpetuated to achieve an end. He mentioned different forms of violence including social and political uprising, hunger, riots, identity-based violence among ethnic or religious groups and clashes between territorial gangs, terrorism and acts of

xenophobic violence directed against migrants. This is usually done in an organized and calculated manner.

Gurr (1970) opined that violence is a complex phenomenon which has other forms and they are categorised as; Turmoil— low scale violence such as relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions. Conspiracy—a medium scale violence such as highly organized political violence with limited participation, including organized political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coup d'états and mutinies. Internal war—a higher scale violence such as highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolution

In the opinion of Kunkeler and Peters (2011), violence is generally interpreted and classified as criminal activities. Within a context of state failure or the inability of state representatives to provide security, it can be inferred that fear is a psychological dimension of violence. Akinwale and Aderinto (2013) agreed that all forms of violence in any areas constitute a serious social problem irrespective of their nomenclatures. Therefore, any form of violence that constitutes a threat to security of lives and property of a large number of people in an area is considered as violence.

In another study, Aliyu, Kasim and Martin (2011) and Aluko (2018) expressed violence in terms of ethnic and religious conflicts. Also, Penglase (2011) argued that representations of violence are often centred upon concerns with transgression to the societal social structure, organization, norms and conducts. This might be socio-political or economical in nature. Krause, Muggah and Gilgen (2011) distinguished direct and indirect forms of violence. A direct form results in physical and psychological harm including intentional fatalities, assault and sexual violence. The indirect manifestations negatively affect other aspects of livelihoods, social relations and wellbeing. The trends of violence in general have its origin from relative deprivation of a group of people in either the urban area or the rural area who in turn foment trouble in the country. This implies that when people's right had been deprived for a period of time, it gets to an unbearable threshold or limit of proportionality which will provoke violent reactions against the subject and of the deprivation

**Theoretical Framework**

Relative deprivation theory guided this study. It is the underlining factor that endangers peace and instigates violence. Relative deprivation is a theory that was born out of feelings and perceptions of individuals and groups' unjust treatment when compared with other groups. These unjust treatments lead to agitations. If the agitations are not properly addressed by the relevant authorities, it will lead to protest which could be violent protest (destruction or 'vandalisation' of properties) and some other societal melee such as kidnapping among others. The theory was first articulated by Stouffer and his group (Stouffer et al 1949) to explain feelings of

satisfaction among various personnel in different cadre in the army. The main premise of relative deprivation theory is that people generally experience dissatisfaction and resentment when their own outcomes do not match the outcomes of other people with whom they compare (Gurr, 1970; Cook, Crosby & Hennigan, 1977; Martin, 1981). For Walker and Smith (2002), the emergence of deprivation feelings is the result of comparative judgments, rather than being determined by objective outcome. Once the comparativeness is unfavourable, there is a tendency of mild scuffling and later escalates into large scale violence if the object of deprivation is not resolved.

Gurr (1970) and Crosby (1976) refer to Relative Deprivation as the tension that develops from a discrepancy between what 'ought to be' and the 'what is' obtainable of collective value satisfaction which disposes men to violence. This implies that 'Relative Deprivation' is the discrepancies between what people want; their value expectations, what they actually gain and their value accruing capabilities. Therefore, the intensity of relative deprivation varies in terms of the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities. People will revolt and become violent when they lose hope of attaining their societal values amidst frustration with depression and inflation. This is true for most violent groups such as the Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, Fulani herdsmen, Shi'ite Muslim sects, political and ethnic militias found across the world.

Gurr asserts that ethnicity and religion are the obvious basis for mobilizing oppression and oppositions against the state. This implies that, the higher the degree of frustration, the greater the rate of violence fomented which results into political instability. Esman (1994) therefore supports the assertion that the gap between a group's prospects and current status and what appear to be reasonable and legitimate expectations leads to agitations and violence if it is unattainable. The violence becomes stronger if other similar comparable groups are believed to enjoy what is available in material, cultural, and political satisfactions at the expense of others.

When taking a closer look at the different ways in which the value of one's outcomes can be assessed, a basic distinction can be made between interpersonal comparisons and intergroup comparisons. Unfavourable interpersonal comparisons may result in feelings of individual deprivation, the violent symptom could be rage and rape among other assaults. While unfavourable intergroup comparisons may lead people to act of vandalism, kidnapping and other socio-political mishaps. This is an important distinction because egoistical (individual) and fraternal (group level) deprivation are predicted to have fundamentally different behavioural consequences (Tyler and Lind 2002). Fraternal deprivation is seen as an important precursor of political protest and intergroup social conflict, while the experience of egoistical deprivation has been associated with social isolation and individual maladjustment. A critique of this view of relative deprivation, however, is that it does not specify the circumstances under which people are likely to interpret their situation as individuals.

In the view of Tougas and Beaton (2002) relative deprivation as personal and group deprivation is the experience of the advantageous group acting against the interest of the disadvantaged group. This may be against the advantaged group's

personal interest or group interest. Relative Deprivation had also been used to address gender disparity and protests. Crosby, Ozawa and Crosby (2002) opined that countries that are essentially individualistic such as Americans will easily implement the affirmative action to remedy gender relative deprivation while countries that are collectivistic such as Japan will hardly implement the gender relative deprivation to remedy of affirmative action.

Relative deprivation theory also explains the reason behind the incessant violence in the developing democracies. Ethnic chauvinism, favouritism and nepotism of the dominant groups over other smaller groups are most causes of this continuous violence. This breeds a political culture of violence and suspicion among the country members. The political largesse and economic gains meant for all the groups in the country will be diverted by the strong fraternal groups at the expense of other groups. These will eventually result into rancour, acrimony and violence initiated by the non-benefiting groups. Also, the result of long-time relative deprivation against the common goods brings about coalition of smaller groups. This coalition gives them an edge to compete with the big ethnic groups and as a result the frequent reoccurring of violence or simply put, the culture of violence is inevitable. By interpolation, violence genome has its bases from relative deprivation of individuals or group of people in the society. Whenever relative deprivation is removed or reduced from the political system, violence will be drastically reduced because the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people will be satisfied.

## Complexities of Violence in Developing Democracies – Nigeria

The notion of violence in developing democracies has a changing complexity and manifestations. However, urban areas are the developed areas in the society where high and sophisticated technologies are deployed to curb unlawful acts easily and the reoccurrence are usually nipped in the bud. The complexity is that violence defiles the high standards technologies in such areas and in fact it occurs in a repeated manner with little solutions to curb it especially in developing democracies (Turshen 2015; Aluko, Isiaq and Aremu 2018). The complexity of violence manifests in the various hydra headed shapes it has in it occurrence and effects on the community. It is so complex that as a trend is submerged by the government another new style from the old stalk is been replicated. The policies adopted in the various regions in the country seem to be unique to each state as it is inadequate to curtail the same menace with the same strategy or policy in other areas of developing democracies (Aremu 2014). The enigma will be more prominent whenever various forms of urban violence are taking place at the same time in different part of the country. The following are some of the changing complexities of violence in developing democracies;

## Kidnapping

The kidnapping is a form of man-stealing phenomenon. This melee has gained ascendancy in developing democracies. This malaise previously unknown to the people has rapidly been domesticated. Davidson (2010) illustrates it as a group of criminals armed with guns and cell phones who apprehends unsuspecting victims and

drags their victim into a secluded spot and begins to make phone calls to whomever to demand for a ransom. Ngwama (2014), explains literarily the word kidnap as being derived from "kid" meaning; child and "nab" which means; to snatch. Adewale (2009) pointed out that kidnapping now appears to be an emerging concern in developing democracies though it is not a new phenomenon. It is as old as the word itself. But the motive may vary from country to country.

Not only does kidnapping inflict psychology violence on the direct victims and their families, it also spreads a fear that hinders direct economic investment in the area where such evils are perpetuated. This in the short and long term leads to decline economic productivity, increase in unemployment rate and a threat to the government's efforts in wooing investors into the country. Ngwama (2014) noted some socio-economic factors facilitating kidnapping in developing democracies (Nigeria) include the following; leadership failure, poor security system, work place insecurity, threat to industrial harmony, unemployment and destabilisation of labour market. The complexity in kidnapping is that it could take the form of political, economic or social-religious. It could be all in some other climes. Political kidnapping could be during electioneering period while the other forms could be at any point in time. However, the aim is to inflict hardship on perceived targets.

**Gang Violence**

The urban areas have been a site of constant struggles where various socio-political groups in the state and local communities converge to get a means for survival. The scale of violence witnessed in developing democracies in the 1990s till date is a source of worry to the international community (Badmus, 2009). This is because of the emergence of social movements that were at the forefront of resistance against exploitation and relative deprivations. Prominent among these movements in Nigeria and other African states are the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) (Atere, and Akinwale, 2006 and Badmus, 2009).

Aluko, (2018) opined that the activities of these groups have negative impacts on the state despite the fact that they have been able to place their demands on the country and became popular beyond their shores. The Ogoni resistance, championed by MOSOP, is interwoven around the struggles against environmental degradation and social marginalization. The Ijaw ethnic group struggles is centred on perceived state suppression and socioeconomic marginalization. The rise of Ijaw struggles was coincided with the seemingly decline of the Ogoni resistance following execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others in direct state repression of the Ogoni in Nigeria. Gang violence complexity is visible in the aim it tends to achieve. These could be to achieve political ends, economic motives and or social status.

**Terrorism**

This is the height of armed group violent activities. Armed groups have increased their use of violent tactics over the past year in the form of kidnappings,

battles with security forces, inter-group clashes with one another, car bombs and indiscriminate killing and general attacks on perceived soft target which is a more recent tactic. Such groups are mostly a product of relative deprivation which leads to separatist agitation and they have demonstrated increasingly the use of sophisticated tactics and weaponry, raising concerns about future violence. They are creating conditions conducive for escalation of violence (Hazen and Horner, 2007).

The terrorism levels in developing countries have incapacitated and render helpless the government, particularly with the bombing activities of the Boko Haram Sect and the Fulani militias in Nigeria and other countries in West Africa (Amnesty International, 2011 and Omilusi 2013). The raise of terrorist groups in the Middle East and Far East is a worrisome crisis in developing countries. The governments and the elite are unable to tackle the terrorist groups single-handedly. This had aid their transformation into a terrorist organization. Not only is the sect on rampage and the governments clueless, the problem has reached a point where the authorities are 'sadly and shamelessly' pleading for dialogue. Terrorism variability in complexity is visible in the aim it tends to achieve. These could be towards political ends, economic motives and or social status.

## Dimension of Violence in Developing Democracies

The dimensions to urban violence in both ancient and modern times can be simply categorised into three. These are: the political violence, the economic violence and the social violence. However, Bernault & Deutsch (2015) and de Bruijn, Bouju, Studiecentrum (2015) had different perspectives to the dimensions of violence but there is still some consensus in their various opinions. Moser and Mcilwaine (2004; 2006) have categorized violence into four main types; political, institutional, economic and social violence. Any new class of institutional violence can be seen as a derivation of any of the three fundamentals inclusion in any society; the political institution, economic and social institutions. However, it is unique to carefully segregate it from the parent genome so as to give a dimension of an organized violence which has the inclusion of the three parents almost at the same time.

Aluko, Isiaq and Aremu (2018) noted that political violence is seen as the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power in the society. These include the following manifestations; Guerrilla conflict, paramilitary conflict, political assassinations, armed conflict between political parties among others. Economic Violence is the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire which may be conscious or unconscious for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power in the society. It manifests in various ways as street crime, carjacking, robbery/theft, drug traficking, kidnapping, assaults including killing and rape made during economic crimes.

Social Violence may be seen as the violent acts motivated by a desire, which may be conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain and or maintain social power in the society. The manifestations vary but can be captured in the following ways; inter personal violence such as between spouses, child abuse, sexual assault of

women and children, arguments that get out of control such as traditional ownership of land, right to perform a traditional rite such as festivals which gets out of hand leading to community upheaval among others. Social (religious or and ethnic) cleansing by civil vigilante groups, lynching of suspected criminals by community members (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004).

Institutional violence is motivated by a desire to consciously or unconsciously exercise institutional power at individual or collective levels over other groups and individuals. Its manifestations include the following; violence perpetrated by state 'political institutions' such as the army and police as well as government ministries such as health and education among others. Examples include; Extra-judicial killings by police, physical or psychological abuse by health and educational institution workers, state or community vigilante-directed social cleansing of gangs and street children, lynching of suspected criminals by community police or Army members. The table two (2) below summarises the dimension of violence.

**Table 2:    Dimensions of violence in urban areas**

| Category Of Violence | Types Of Violence By Perpetrators and/or Victims | Manifestations |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Political** | • State and non-state violence | • Guerrilla conflict<br>• Paramilitary conflict<br>• Political assassinations<br>• Armed conflict between political parties |
| **Economic** | • Organized crime<br>• Business interests<br>• Delinquents<br>• Robbers | • Intimidation and violence as means of resolving economic disputes<br>• Street theft, robbery and crime<br>• Kidnapping<br>• Armed robbery<br>• Drug-trafficking<br>• Car theft & other contraband activities<br>• Small-arms dealing<br>• Assaults including killing and rape in the course of economic crimes<br>• Trafficking in prostitutes<br>• Conflict over scarce resources |
| **Economic/social** | • Gangs<br>• Street children (boys and girls)<br>• Ethnic violence | • Territorial or identity-based "turf" violence; robbery, theft • Petty theft<br>• Communal riots |
| **Social** | • Intimate partner violence inside the home<br>• Sexual violence (including rape) in the public arena<br>• Child abuse: boys and girls<br>• Inter-generational conflict between parent and children<br>• Gratuitous/routine daily violence | • Physical or psychological male–female abuse<br>• Physical and sexual abuse, particularly prevalent in the case of stepfathers but also uncles<br>• Physical and psychological abuse<br>• Incivility in areas such as traffic, road rage, bar fights and street confrontations<br>• Arguments that get out of control |
| **Institutional** | • Violence of state and other | • Extra-judicial killings by police • |

| | 'informal' institutions • Including the organised private sector | Physical or psychological abuse by health and education workers • State or community vigilante-directed social cleansing of gangs and street children • Lynching of suspected criminals by community members |
|---|---|---|

Source: Adapted from Moser and McIlwaine (2006); Researchers' update 2018

From the above complexities and dimensions of violence occurrence in the society, it is evident that violence has a political culture. The culture of violence however operates in specific structures. It is therefore imperative to understand the structure of violence and why it has the potential of reoccurring in any human societies. The inevitable occurrence is due to its active genome which is has high rate of replication like a virus at any time.

## THE STRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES (THE 'VIRUS GENOME' OF VIOLENCE)



Figure I. The 'Virus Genome' of Violence[3]
Source: Author

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[3] Also called; Aluko Democracy Crises Transport Chain (ADCTC)

The virus genome that coats violence in the community is a compound complex structure. It consists of six (6) elements and at the centre is the nucleus which has four electrons. The elements revolving around the nucleus and are connected to the nucleus by a connective fibre which is held in shape by double bond chains. The elements are also connected together to one another by connective cords which are held in shape by either the double bond chains or the single bond chains. The pillars of violence (cytoplasm material) present in the virus genome of any community and especially a developing democracy are the Insurgency (I) element, Neo-colonialism (NC) element, One Party Government (OPG) element, Military Rule (MR) element, kidnapping (K) elements and Failed States (FS) elements. The foundation material (nucleus) of the virus genome is the Crises Democracy. The component of the foundation materials (nuclei materials) are referred to as the crises electrons which are the Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual crises (PESS crises electrons).

The starting point is the centre, the crises democracy (Figure I). The Democracy in Crises Transport Chain (will be simply referred to as DC transport chain) is a multi facet input and output source with a bilateral directional movement that shows the output transport of societal abnormalities as a result of constant inward transport of fragmented crises electrons; the Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual crises (PESS crises electrons). All the outward elements (Insurgency, Neo-colonialism, One Party Government, Military rule, kidnapping and failed states) has the PESS crises electrons of which all may be present in one output. All the output electrons may be present in a single country (field).

DC is a field which has charged elements around it. Each element has it electrons around it. It has six double bonds with the surrounding elements in it field. Each element is bonded together with either single bound or double bond. The six bonds connecting the elements together are two double bonds and four single bonds. The double bonds are situated from K element to I element and from OPG element to MR element. The single bonds are from FS element to K element, I element to NC element, NC element to OPG element and MR element to FS element. Each element transmits the PESS electrons to the Compound DC. When DC field gets charged up, it transmits back in any of the elements directions depending on the elements that has the presence of highest concentration of electron charges in the compound DC field.

However, whenever compound DC transmits back the output abnormally which is also seen as political anomaly, it has the capability to transmit electrons to one another through their connecting bonds. With this clockwise transmission, there are tendencies of changing of form of occurrence of the anomaly to the new one which received the full charges from the previous elements PESS crises electrons. The only condition of anticlockwise transport of the PESS crises electron is the presence of double bonds. After the reverser transport, the electrons continue on either the clockwise or the anticlockwise transport chain so as to transform into the next element.

Whenever the anticlockwise transport occurs, the only factor that prevents a reverser transport is the level of saturation of the previous political anomaly element.

If the level of saturation of the clockwise is greater than the anticlockwise transport, due to sensitisation of it manifestation in the society, the anticlockwise transport is overcome and the clockwise onward transport continues. This may be altered by a new outward forceful transport of electrons charges when the DC compound field is fully saturated. The PESS crises electron transports are both towards the DC compound and at the same time across the field in a clockwise direction towards the other anomaly element.

**Analysing the Transport Chain of the Violence 'Virus Genome'**
The transport chain of violence in a political system operates with a genome. It is referred to as virus genome because it is difficult to get rid of it just like a virus and it has the potential of spreading rapidly. This genome is made up of certain six elements. Each six elements have four electrons that help in the transportation of the elements. The rate of saturation of any of the element in the political system results into its resultant violence typical to the saturated element.

**Starting point**
All the six elements which are the Failed State (FS) element, the Kidnapping (K) element, the Insurgency (I) element, the Neo-Colonialism (NC) element, One Party Government (OPG) element and Military Regime (MR) element are in active states in all countries. Their rate of transports depends on the environmental factors propelling it in such country. They therefore transport their Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual (PESS) crises electrons through the bonds in a linear order into the Democracy in Crises Compound field. The factor that kept the electrons to move in linear order is the force of the DC compound field. So far all the six elements transmit their PESS electrons into the DC compound, the factor that warrant the resultant output of the political anomaly is the rate of concentration and saturation of the individual electrons within the DC compound.

The rate of transport of the electrons into the DC compound is conditioned by environmental factors. For example, if the society is heated up using any of the PESS crises electrons by a group of actor (people), the nature of the group will determine the outcome of the transport effect. If the actor-group is militant in nature for instance the Boko Haram Islamist extremists in Nigeria, the Niger Delta Ethnic militia groups among others the Democracy in Crises can lead to Insurgency or Kidnapping. If the actor-groups are military personnel, just like the military coups that ended the first, second and third republics in Nigeria, the Democracy in Crises can lead to Military rule or One Party Government. If it is instigated by selfish capitalist groups the Democracy in Crises can lead to Neo- Colonialism or One party Rule. If the group instigating the electron transports is multi facet, the Democracy in Crises can lead to a failed state or any of the abnormal political elements.

**Stage two**
Immediately there is a saturation of the DC compound, there is an outward transport of the replica electrons that constitute the saturation point within the DC

compound through a forceful counter transport caused by the forceful random collision forces of the PESS crises electrons. This moves back along the double bonds that transport it inwardly into the DC compound. This implies that whenever the crises electron of any of the six elements for instance insurgence reaches a saturation point in the political system ahead of other elements, insurgent groups will spring up in the country.

Saturation point can be reached whenever the relevant government authority neglects the demands, needs or yarning of the people for a long time in a particular location. For instance, the neglect of the Niger Delta development in Nigeria led to various violent groups that kidnap and vandalise government and private multinational properties. Also the neglect of the educational and infrastructural needs of the 'almagiri's' in the northern Nigeria which in turn gave rise to Boko Haram terrorist insurgency.

**Stage three**

Depending on the environmental factor(s) that caused the rapid transport of PESS crises electrons that led to the over saturation point of the DC compound; if the outward forceful counter transport leads to kidnapping anomaly, the prevailing crises in the community will be kidnapping of any form or dimension. If it is not interrupted by another forceful reversal transport within the DC polity, there is a continuous flow of PESS crises electron to the other less saturated anomaly element.

This implies that whenever an element is in saturation be it Kidnapping or others, it remains prevalent until other element gets to its saturation and over shadows the manifestation and dominance of the initial one. For instance, kidnapping may be in prevalence for a while but when terrorism becomes saturated, it takes over the stage of dominance and prompts manifestations.

**Stage four**

In cases where there is a double bond, the transport from the clockwise direction also has the tendency of reversing back after it had gotten to the next anomaly element. However, due to the level of saturation of the previous anomaly element, the double bond reversal process is overcome and the new level becomes stabilised with the new anomaly element. Also, this transport can be altered by the forceful reversal transport within the DC polity so as to start from another anomaly element entirely.

This implies that the double bond is a two-way flow channel. If the saturated flows round the cytoplasm of the genome (round the country), it could be reversed when it gets to another region due to the presence of a prevailing element. However, if the initial element is more saturated it cannot be reversed. For instance, there were kidnapping in the Central and Northern states in Nigeria but this was submerged by the insurrection of Fulani Herdsmen militia and Boko Haram terrorist groups respectively. This is the double bond two-way flow channel of virus genome of violence in a society.

**Stage five**

In cases of multiple forceful reversal transport within the DC polity into the bonds of the anomaly elements, the result can be a failed state element. This means that if there are multiple saturations of the elements simultaneously, there will be multiple effects of violence in the different regions of the country and it could lead to state of emergency and subsequently a state failure. That is to say, in a country where there are uncontrollable and prevalence of Insurgency, Neo-colonialism, One Party Government, kidnapping and or Military rule, it can lead to a state of emergency declaration and subsequently failed state.

**Extra Transport factors:**

These are some of the prominent factors that affect and conditions the transport of elements and their constituent PESS electrons in the DC field–political system; a. *dependence on externalities*, b. *selective regimes* c. *suspension of the constitution* d. *porous security*

(a) There is an extra transport element in the transport of PESS crises electron from Insurgency (I) element to Neo-Colonialism (NC), which is the *dependence on externalities*. This might definitely help the country witnessing DC but it will be with some strings attached. The conditions attached will lead to reduction in sovereignty of the state and Neo- Colonialism will set in. A situation where by externalities becomes the controller of the polity directly by their physical presence or indirectly by using the indigenous rulers. For instance, a country that depends on the donor agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund among other or over reliance on the military capability of an allied country, such country will operate under their conditionality and this will reduce the sovereignty of such country.

(b) There is an extra transport element in the transport of PESS crises electron from Neo-Colonialism (NC) to One Party Government (OPG), which is the *selective regime*. The neo-colonialism will create a lopsided government which will only cater for the 'elite powers' who are controlling the administrative means of production and distribution of goods and services. The whole masses in the polity will be at the mercy of the group(s) controlling the government. This will eventually commutate into a one party government. Such is seen if a group of people are controlling the core economic life of the country and as well if a person is the sole financial of a political party.

(c) In the transport of PESS crises electron from Military Rule (MR) to Failed State (FS), there is an extra transport element which is the *suspension of the constitution*. As a result of military rule, the suspension of the constitution element becomes inevitable. This aids the free practice of lawlessness of state of nature practice, recklessness in handling the economic goods and services and worthlessness of human lives in the polity. The eventual result in the polity is the failed state element. This is a situation where by everyone is for himself but God is for all in the polity.

This was a replica in the civil war in Nigeria, genocide in Rwanda, war in Syria and other wars or civil war outbreak where the Constitution were suspended.

(d) In the transport of PESS crises electron from Failed State (FS) to Kidnapping (K), there is an extra transport element which is the *porous security (Free Attacks).* As a result of the failed state symptoms, the extra element of porous security encourages free attacks on perceived enemies in the polity. This will facilitate the kidnapping element in the polity. This is a situation where by people become missing in the community because some personalities had carried them away. This may be for any reasons from the PESS crises electron.  In essence, in a failed state, people got missing without trace and no one to be accused for the action due to bad security.

It is important to note that the environmental factors that may conditions the transport of the PESS crises electrons for rapid saturation of the Democratic Crises compound may be unpredictable in the community. However, the relative deprivations of the people of their basic rights make the elements more potent and influence its rapid saturation in the political system. A single external condition may also lead to more than one forceful counter transport of PESS crises electrons to the outcome of any of the elements. This implies that the country with DC syndrome will witness more than one element in operation. This is the situation in most developing countries and developed countries as well.

**Conclusion**
Violence indeed constitutes a serious social problem irrespective of their nomenclatures. Violence constitutes a threat to security of lives and property of a large number of people in any geographical location. Developing democratic countries have high rate of turnover of violence than the developed ones. Violence in both developed and developing democracies has a changing sinusoidal complexity. The complexity and dimensions vary and the following are prominent in their occurrence; kidnapping, Terrorism and Gang Violence. The relative deprivation theoretical frame work as used buttresses the fact that when people are deprived of their rights for a period of time they become tensed up and result into agitations, protest and violence may become endemic. Deprivation makes people to result into self willed survival strategy or activities in the society.

There is no country in the world that does not have a measure of violence occurrence. The political culture of violence is evident in various forms and structures. The magnitude or the level of its occurrence may differ from place to place. This means that the foundational content or the elements of violence with their corresponding electrons are present in the political system of any community and especially in both developing and developed democracy. There are presence of either one or more combination of threats such as the Insurgency (I) element, Neo-colonialism (NC) element, One Party Government (OPG) element, Military Rule (MR) element, kidnapping (K) elements and or Failed States (FS) elements with their

corresponding Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual crises (PESS crises electrons).

The various crises across Africa (Somalia, Nigeria), Asia (India, Pakistan), Middle East (Syria, Iran, Iraq), Europe (Ukraine, Russia) among others all have the iota of some or all of Political, Economical, Social and or Spiritual (PESS crises electron) malfunctioning. Political crises instigated bad leadership and public policies will in turn lead to bad governance, poor economic growth which will be favourable to just a group of people other than the entire country. It will also breed bad social melee such as ethno-religious crises, gang culture and other spiritually inclined vices. The summation of all these factors among others will result into typical crises as characterised or facilitate by the crises element.

Therefore, it is pertinent to break the connective fibres of the Aluko Democracy Crises Transport Chain (ADCTC)—'virus genome' of violence. A potent measure for this operation is good governance characterised with equality before the law, supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law and separation of power of the various arms of government. Periodic conduct of free, fair and credible election coupled with the equitable distribution of goods and services are also essential to neutralise the PESS electron causing violence. The root causes of violence must be tackled with the appropriate policy statements, actions and implementations so as to reduce the rate of saturation of crises elements in the political system and rate of spontaneous agitation. This will prompt sustained development, harmonious peace and continuous progress in the country. Eventually, this will result into the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people in the country.

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# Corruption and Development in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects

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## Abstract

*There are many unresolved problems in Nigeria, but the issue of the upsurge of corruption is troubling. And the damages it has done to the polity are astronomical. In fact, the major factor obstructing her path towards sustainable development is corruption. This study therefore made an attempt to situate the impact of corruption on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. Adopting the extractive corruption theory as a theoretical framework and relying on secondary sources of data, the study revealed the country's scandalous underdevelopment in spite of her huge revenue, promotion of kidnapping, decline in public morality, absence of basic amenities and infrastructures, unemployment, poverty, high mortality rate, lawlessness, ghost workers' syndrome, election irregularities, among others as a result of a failed system. The study recommended that the anti-corruption agencies will not be able to fight corruption alone unless effective institutionalization is embarked upon. Nigerians need empowerment, security and re-orientation through a responsible Press and exemplary leadership in all institutions in order to attain meaningful and sustainable development.*

**Keywords**: Corruption, Socio-Economic, Development, Nigeria.

## Introduction

One of the most dangerous social ills of any society is Corruption. This is because corruption like any deadly virus, attacks the vital structures that make for society's progressive functioning. This is particularly true for developing countries where limited but valuable funds and resources that are initially earmarked for industries, hospitals, schools and other infrastructures are either out rightly embezzled, misappropriated or otherwise severely depleted through kickbacks and over-invoicing by agents of government. At the individual level, allocation of job or responsibilities are not based on merit or potentials but rather on who has the resources and willingness to grease the palms of those in charge. Thus, there is a growing worldwide concern over corruption at the present time; several factors are responsible for this. First, a consensus has now been reached that corruption is universal. It exists in all countries, both developed and developing, in the public and private sectors, as well as in non-profit and charitable organizations.

Secondly, allegations and charges of corruption now play a more central role in politics than at any other time. Governments have fallen careers of world renowned public figures ruined, and reputations of well-respected organizations and business firms badly tarnished on account of it. The international mass media feeds on it and scandals and improper conduct, especially of those in high places, are looked upon as extremely newsworthy, and to be investigated with zeal and vigour. The rising trend

in the use of corruption as a tool to discredit political opponents, the media's preoccupation with it as a highly marketable commodity, and the general public's fascination with seeing prominent personalities in embarrassing situations have brought scandalous and corrupt behaviour, a common human frailty, into the limelight of international attention. Thirdly and most importantly, corruption can be a major obstacle in the process of development and in modernizing a country. Many now feel that it should receive priority attention in a country's development agenda. In a survey of 150 high level officials from 60 third world countries, the respondents ranked public sector corruption as the most severe obstacle confronting their development process (Gray and Kaufmann 1998).

**Conceptual Elucidation**
**Development**
    Development is a complex concept, with many different and sometimes contentious definitions. A basic perspective equates development with economic growth. At a particular point in history, development was seen as a process of increases over considerable periods, in an economy's real national income, instigated through active direct government intervention. The dissatisfaction in the sixties with economic growth without improvements in the living standards of the majority gave rise to a re-conceptualization of the concept, which now had poverty reduction, expansion of productive employment opportunities and the reduction of income inequalities as its core elements. Development does not only mean capital accumulation and economic growth but also the condition in which citizens have adequate food and job and income inequality among them is greatly reduced. It is the process of bringing fundamental and sustainable changes in the society. Development is now more applied to the improvement of the human condition constituted by the alleviation of unemployment, poverty, misery and social inequality. It is providing opportunities, empowerment and security. Opportunities mean employment, roads, electricity, markets, schools and health service. Empowerment on the other hand consists of strengthening participation in political processes and good governance. Security encompasses reducing vulnerability to economic shocks, natural disasters, ill-health and personal violence. Development is therefore a complex process. It implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being.
    Contextually, development is seen as a process that aims to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs as natural resources are not inexhaustible. It therefore, focuses on finding strategies to promote economic and social wellbeing; cultural and political empowerment with regulative, extractive, distributive and responsive capacities towards nation building.

**Corruption**
    It is very easy to talk about corruption, but like many other complex phenomena, it is difficult to define it in concise and concrete terms. Corruption is

coined from the Latin word; 'corruptus' which in essence means 'to destroy'. Corruption is the intentional mis-performance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal. Tanzi (1995) states that corruption is the intentional non-compliance with the arm's-length principle aimed at deriving some advantage for oneself or for related individuals from this behaviour.

Corruption the act which deviates from rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority of private-regarding-motive such as wealth, power or status. Gray and Kaufmann (1998) define acts of corruption to include bribery and extortion, which necessarily involve at least two parties and other malfeasances that a public official can carry out alone including fraud and embezzlement. For them, it manifests in governmental activities through the appropriation of public assets for private use and embezzlement of public funds by politicians and high level officials. Lipset and Lenz (2000), define corruption as an effort to secure wealth or power through illegal means-private gain at public expense. Corruption is "the abuse of public office for private gain." In other words, the use of this definition excludes the possibility of corruption in the private sector, and it focuses exclusively on corruption in the public sector. This definition is consistent with the beliefs of Nobel Prize laureate Gary Becker that "if we abolish the State, we abolish corruption."

Even though some of these definitions of corruption have been around for over decades, the recent development in Nigeria where discoveries of stolen public funds run into billions of US Dollars and Nigeria Naira, make these definitions very adequate and appropriate.

**Theoretical Framework**

To properly understand the issues of corruption and development in the Nigerian context, the concept of **extractive corruption theory** may be handy. This paper posits that the state is the stronger part in the state-society relationship. The state is symbolized by the ruling class/elite while the rule represents the society. Significantly, the ruling elites are the strongest force in society. This elite or class uses the state apparatus as its instrument to extract based on experience of the new-patrimonial states in particular. Put differently, the theory posits that the state is not only the strongest force in society, but also many centers of power (Okechukwu and Inya, 2011).

The theory also emphasized the well-being known expression that all power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. That is, the more political power is concentrated exclusively in the hands of few individuals, the greater the temptation for power abuse, selfish wealth-seeking and primitive accumulation (Okechukwu and Inya, 2011). Again, the theory posits that the ruling elites use and misuse the power of the state primarily to safeguard their own corporate interests, to the detriment of the majority. They use violence, force and persuasion to command respect. They may use sophisticated institutional arrangements like presidentialism,

dominant-multi-single party system (PDP in Nigeria), and the cooption of rivals in order to restrict participation and power sharing (Omenka, 2013).

The theory is also characterized by new-patrimonialism that is, a kind of political system where there is pervasive and patron-client structures, the non-distinction between public and private pursuit and strong political weakness exist. In truly patrimonial system there is no distinction between public and private, and the modern idea of corruption will make no sense because the ruler's personal income is the same as the government revenue. And there is no nepotism because there are no criteria for appointment to office other than the ruler's favour. In the words of Weber (1964), the classical or traditional patrimonialism is one in which the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office, and exercised more through the informal clientelist and nepotistic practices than strong formal routines of authority.

In Nigeria, the ruling elite's uses or misuses state powers to plunder resources which would have been used for the country's development for their personal gains. Most of the resources which are ear-marked for developmental projects develop wings and fly to people's pockets (elites). It is sad to note that elites in Nigeria have established hegemonic circle who siphoned the country's wealth for personal use. They are composed of rather small elites of politically and economically dominating families. Their corrupt acts are responsible for Nigeria's underdevelopment (Omenka, 2013).

**Typologies, Natures and Characteristics of Corruption**
There are different types of corruption. Two types relevant to this paper are political and institutional or bureaucratic corruption.

i) Political Corruption (ii) Bureaucratic Corruption
Political corruption takes place at the highest levels of political authority. It occurs when the politicians and political decision-makers, who are entitled to formulate, establish and implement the laws in the name of the people, are themselves corrupt. It also takes place when policy formulation and legislation is tailored to benefit politicians and legislators. Political corruption is sometimes seen as similar to corruption of greed as it affects the manner in which decisions are made, as it manipulates political institutions, rules of procedure, and distorts the institutions of government. Thus, government officials, political officials or employees seek illegitimate personal gain through actions such as bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. It also includes purchase of votes with money, promises of office or special favours, coercion, intimidation, and interference with freedom of election. Corruption in office involves sales of legislative votes, administrative, or judicial decision, or governmental appointment. Disguised payment in the form of gifts, legal fees, employment, favours to relatives, social influence, or any relationship that sacrifices the public interest and welfare, with or without the implied payment of money, is usually considered corrupt.

Bureaucratic corruption occurs in the public administration or the implementation end of politics. This kind of corruption has been branded low level

and street level. It is the kind of corruption the citizens encounter daily at places like the hospitals, schools, local licensing offices, police, taxing offices and on and on. Bureaucratic petty corruption, which is seen as similar to corruption of need, occurs when one obtains a business from the public sector through inappropriate procedure. Other forms of corruption include:

A) **Bribery:** The payment in money or kind that is taken or given in a corrupt relationship. These include kickbacks, gratuities, pay-off, sweeteners, greasing palms, etc.

B) **Fraud:** It involves some kind of trickery, swindle and deceit, counterfeiting, racketing, smuggling and forgery.

C) **Embezzlement:** This is theft of public resources by public officials. It is when a State official steals from the public institution in which he/she is employed. In Nigeria the embezzlement of public funds is one of the most common ways of economic accumulation, perhaps, due to lack of strict regulatory systems.

D) **Extortion:** This is money and other resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence or threats to use force. The police and custom officers are the main culprits in Nigeria.

E) **Favouritism:** This is a mechanism of power abuse implying a highly biased distribution of State resources. However, this is seen as a natural human proclivity to favour friends, family and anybody close and trusted.

F) **Nepotism:** This is a special form of favoritism in which an office holder prefers his/her kinfolk and family members. It occurs when one is exempted from the application of certain laws or regulations or given undue preference in the allocation of scarce resources.

**The Causes of Corruption**

Why is corruption a viable enterprise in Nigeria? The causes of corruption are myriad; and they have political and cultural variables. Some evidence points to a link between corruption and social diversity, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and the proportions of country's population adhering to different religious traditions (Lipset and Lenz, 2000).

Gray and Kaufmann (1998) identified seven factors that engender corruption. These are the value of wages and salaries, presence of strong opportunities and awareness of how to perpetrate corruption, weak measures against accountability, population, natural resources wealth, lack of political will and indecisive pressure and assistance from the global community. To identify the cause of corruption is as complex as defining the concept of corruption. There is no doubt that several authors have been able to explain the causes of corruption with regard the peculiarities of the environment they were analyzing as well as the incidents of corruption being referred to. Several causes of corruption have been proffered. Interestingly though, these causes might differ in nomenclature yet refer to the same thing in explanation.

Tanzi (1998) identified regulations and authorizations as a major cause of corruption. "In many countries, and especially in developing countries, the role of the state is often carried out through the use of numerous rules or regulations. In these

countries, licenses, permits, and authorizations of various sorts are required to engage in many activities". Shortly after independence, many African countries adopted statism as their development model. This approach to resource allocation emphasized state control and eventually turned many African governments into major economic units. The massive involvement of the government in almost every sector of the economy made the state the leading business organization. Thus, for any entity to be involved any form of economic activity, the authorization of the state was indispensable. The activities of the state cut across minor issues such as issuing permits for opening a shop, building a house, to other major ones such as the importation and sale of petroleum products as well as authorization to get involved in mining activities. The authorization as well as regulatory function of the state makes it easy for those involved in the issuance of such authorizations as well as regulations to manipulate the process. When the process becomes excessively manipulated, those seeking the authorization of the state might resort to paying bribes to get such permits, authorizations or approvals as may be deemed necessary.

Tanzi (1998) adds that the existence of regulations and authorizations gives a kind of monopoly power to the officials who must authorize or inspect the activities. These officials he opines may refuse the authorizations or may simply sit on a decision for months or even years. By this, they can use their public power to extract bribes from those who need the authorizations or permits.

Corruption could best be understood in the context of colonialism - its systematic use of material inducements to corrupt African chiefs/administrators to collaborate with them in the pursuit of their colonial project of dominating and exploiting their own peoples. The existing economies, therefore, lacked the financial and economic infrastructure necessary for engaging in corruption. Consequently, the new economies promoted by colonial governments had to nurture the conditions for the evolution of structures that were conducive to corrupt practices". Their economic infrastructure revolution was facilitated through the introduction of monetary tax. In essence, "it was not the introduction of taxation per se, but the manner in which the tax itself was collected, that encouraged corrupt behaviour … to motivate chiefs to generate as much tax revenue as possible and to do so with zeal, the colonial administrations allowed them to retain a part of it".

Agbo (2009) posits that there is the emergence of two broad social classes within the same state, with one directly involved in the production of primary goods, while the other group is engaged in the provision of secondary services. To this end, decision making authority is vested in the second group and they also become the rulers. "The authority itself becomes exploitative to the extent that members of this ruling class turn the coercive apparatus of state to individual and group advantage by allocating more of the available social wealth to its members.

Other factors are poor reward system and greed; Nigeria's reward system is, perhaps, the poorest in the world. Nigeria is a society where national priorities are turned upside down; hard work is not rewarded, but rogues are often glorified in Nigeria. More so, the influence of extended family system and pressure to meet family obligations causes people to be corrupt.

**X-Raying Corruption and it effect on Development in Nigeria**

In discussing the issue of corruption in Nigeria and its impact on development, one is at a loss as to where to begin. From the police officer on the road or the clerk in the office, top government functionaries to the common man on the streets, corruption abounds. It undermines economic progress, impedes policy changes required for development and diverts limited funds for private use. You can feel the effects in the political, social, moral and economic life of the people. Despite publicized commitment by the Obasanjo's administration to dislodge corruption, Nigeria still ranked amongst the most corrupt nation's in the world, and has remained a cesspool of corruption. Between 1970 and 2007, Nigeria lost estimated $400 billion oil revenue to official corruption (Agbo, 2009). Lack of transparent leadership at all levels of government has denied the people of social services and paralyzed all sectors of the economy. Between 1999 and 2007, governments at local, state and national levels went on a looting spree and siphoned away much of the windfall that accrued from galloping oil price at the international market. Out of the 36 governors that ruled the states from 1999 to 2007, at least 21 were investigated and indicted for looting their state treasuries.

A consequence of the inordinate looting of public treasury is that the money needed to put in place basic infrastructure for the overall growth of the country goes into private pockets. That is why, in-spite of the massive budget each year for social welfare, more than 60% of Nigeria's citizenry remained poor. Politically, economically and culturally, leaders are disconnected from the people, because they lack dignity and are only interested in stealing and embezzling public fund. While a Nigerian worker is under paid, the elite over remunerated themselves, thus preparing the nation for perpetual underdevelopment. They continued to hide under ethnicity, regional and religious politics to perpetuate these corrupt practices, thereby making politics in Nigeria a lucrative business.

The death of the General Sani Abacha revealed the global nature of graft. French investigations of bribes paid to government officials to ease the award of a gas plant construction in Nigeria revealed the global level of official graft in the country. The investigations led to the freezing of accounts containing about $100 million United States dollars. In 2000, two years after his death, a Swiss banking commission report indicted Swiss banks for failing to follow compliance process in allowing family and friends of Abacha access to accounts and depositing amounts totaling $600 million US dollars into the accounts. The same year, a total of more than $1 billion US dollars were found in various accounts throughout Europe. In fact, there are many examples too numerous to mention.

**Evaluating The Effects of Corruption on Development in Nigeria**

The National Planning Commission has identified systemic corruption which engenders low level of transparency and accountability as the major source of development failures (National Planning Commission, 2005). The effects of corruption on a nation's sociopolitical and economic development are myriad. The negative effects impede economic growth among other things. Lipset and Lenz

(2000) note that the effect on growth, is in part, a result of reduced level of investment, as it adds to investment risk. The effect of corruption on education comes from the fact that the government spends relatively more on items to make room for graft (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Lipset & Lenz, 2002). And corrupt government officials would shift government expenditures to areas in which they can collect bribes easily. Large and hard-to-manage projects, such as airports or highways, make fraud easy. In addition, poverty and income inequalities are tied to corruption. Development projects are often made unnecessarily complex in Nigeria to justify the corrupt and huge expense on it.

When there is corruption, society loses in several ways. First, productivity is not at optimal level because efficient people are the ones doing the job. Secondly, it creates a feeling of frustration, hopelessness, low morale in the country. When a sizeable portion of the citizenry perceives that it is not capable of producing positive and desirable outcomes through honest efforts, the result is either passive or excessive cynicism. There is the lost of revenue or funds diverted from their intended use, economic distortions, inefficiencies and wasted resources. It increases the cost of doing business and poor service delivery. If the profits from corrupt practices are re-invested in the economy, the negative effects of corruption will be mitigated. From the economy dimension, it gives the nation a poor image in the international scene, trade and commerce cannot thrive as investors are not willing to invest much, economic and social infrastructures are vandalized to create room for unnecessary replacement, unemployment and decline in output, deterioration in the standard of living of the people and lack of continuity in government projects. We have so many abandoned projects and some of those completed are done with substandard materials that will not stand the test of time (Agbo, 2008).

Corruption deepens poverty and makes it difficult for the ordinary man in the streets to survive. The poor man cannot survive on his income. The instinct for survival makes it difficult to resist the demands of corrupt officials. It engenders political instability, breakdown of law and other, brain drain, inefficiency of public service. And from the socio-cultural context, corruption part from engendering poverty, changes the social values. People no longer appreciate the virtues of good morale, conducts and practices. Many studies have been conducted that show the evils or consequences of corruption. And corruption has taught the Nigeria a dangerous and wrong lesson that it does not pay to be honest, hardworking and law-abiding.

Corruption causes a reduction in quality of goods and services available to the public, as some companies could cut corners to increase profit margins. Corruption effects investment, economic growth, and government expenditure choices; it also reduces private investment (Mauro 1998). Bribery and corruption, the culture of late payment, delays or refusal of payment for services already done, are according to the Lord Bishop of Guilford, David Peck, scaring away British investors from Nigeria. He notes that those who fail to pay companies for services done seem to forget that the life blood of any company is its cash flow. And rightly points out that the price of corruption is poverty (*Daily Trust*, July 9, 2002).

Because of the widespread of "petty" and "grand" the international business community regards the whole of Africa as a "sinkhole that swallows their money with little or no return" (Callaghy 1994). Becoming corrupt in Nigeria is almost unavoidable, as morality is relaxed, because to survive people have to make money. As this was not too bad enough, the 2008 Transparency International corruption perception index (CPI), Nigeria was 121 out of the 180 countries pooled (Lipset & Lenz 2000; p.113). And in the 2009 corruption perception index (CPI), the image of Nigeria slipped further down south (ranked 130, out of 180 countries pooled).

Corruption is also destructive of governmental structures and capacity. The NEWS, in its July 11, 1999 issue The Face of a Liar, broke the news of forgery and perjury committed by the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Alhaji Ibrahim Salisu Buhari. Through corrupt means, Alhaji Ibrahim Salisu Buhari amassed wealth (he made millions working for NEPA), and bribed his way to the fourth highest position in the land. This scandal dominated the political agenda of Nigeria for some time. It is a national shame that a crook was in charge of the House of Representatives, the body that makes the laws of the land. What type of laws could he have made for Nigeria? President Obasanjo disappointed the world by granting Alhaji Salisu Buhari a state pardon, despite his apparent campaign to transform Nigeria into a corruption-free society (Obasanjo's Inaugural Speech, May 29, 1999). The Buharigate, as the scandal was later called, nearly destroyed Nigeria's democracy-experiment. Also, recently corruption almost destroyed the banking sector in Nigeria. We see the battle between the Central Bank and the shareholders of the troubled banks under the reign of Soludo and lamido Sanusi respectively (Ekpo, 2010).

Despite the immoral aspect and pernicious effects of corruption, some scholars have argued that corruption can be beneficial to political development or "political modernization" scholars opined that scandals associated with corruption sometimes have the effect of strengthening a value system of a society as a whole This is probably true in relation to Nigeria. The scandals associated with the Abacha era (looting of the treasury and human rights violations) have given the nation some food for thought. Nigeria is still perplexed and reoccupied with the issues of how to strengthen the nation's essential governmental structures to avoid the reoccurrence of these kinds of looting and atrocities in future.

**Effective Control of Corruption**

Some human ailments could require many doses of medicines to be treated. Similarly, the menace of corruption, which has eaten deep into the fabric of Nigeria, would require all the necessary medicines to effectively control it. In other words, no single and simple remedies will do it; and the problem cannot be solved overnight, because, as we have noted, corruption has been ingrained into the fabric of the society. Nigeria has, in theory, the solutions in the book to tackle corruption; but like other issues (poverty, etc) bedeviling the nation, implementations of the laws are the Achilles heel (a vulnerable point) of the society (The Guardian, July 10, 2002).

Gray, Kaufmann (1996) noted that one of the reasons why the measures against corruption have not been fruitful in Nigeria is that they have operated at a

level of mere symbolism. Yes, corruption has defied all measures adopted to combat it in Nigeria, apparently, because those wagging the corruption-wars are themselves corrupt. In the name of turning Nigeria into a corruption free society, the nation has experimented with many policies. It has tried the judicial commissions of enquiry, the Code of Conduct Bureau. It had wrestled with thePublic Complaints Commission to no avail. Also it fiddled with the Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), and the National Open Apprenticeship (NOA), but corruption instead blossomed.

Then, General Buhari clobbered Nigerians with his horsewhip branded the War against Indiscipline Council (WAIC), without success. The most focused and far-reaching war against corruption in Nigeria could be said to have started during the regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo especially with the establishment of the two anti-graft bodies; The Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The establishment of the two bodies provided great impetus for the press to perform the constitutionally ordained role of effectively watching over the activities of the government so as to ensure efficient service delivery of its activities. A search through Nigerian Newspapers and Magazines in the last nine years of new democratic experiment show that corruption and corruption related matters are among issues that take up sizable percentage of spaces available in newspapers and news magazines.

Any society faced with the challenges of corruption will continue to find ways to break the circle. Nigeria cannot effectively control the menace of corruption in the nation by merely instituting probe panels. It was suggested that to tame the surge of corruption in Nigeria, the general population should be re-orientated to a better value system. This is because Nigerians have for long been living on the survival of the fittest and grab-whatever comes- your-way mentality (Dike, October 6, 1999; Dike, February 5, 2002). The re-orientation of the youth in Nigeria to a good value system could help in the war against corruption. Preaching the gospel and practice of virtue is the ultimate solution to behavioral change and reduction in corruption. Educational system and religious sector are the major pillars of re-orientation. Armed with ethics and virtue, the nation should then set out to reduce personal gains to corrupt behaviour with tough penalties on the culprits. Making tough rules with vigorous enforcement can deter corrupt behaviour.

Nigeria has to fortify the institutional checks and balances among the country's major social forces and the separation of powers within the government. The nation should not grant too much discretionary powers to officers who are in position to grant favour to others (businessmen in particular), such as officer who issue out licenses and passports (These officers often create artificial scarcity to attract bribes from the desperate public). There is the temptation to be corrupt when the officials who have a lot of power are themselves poor.

The Nigerian police should be upgraded in status, and be well trained, well equipped and well paid (and on time too). The police should become an elite profession, which would be open only to those with good moral character. If the police and other security agents (for instance, customs and the military), will learn

and understand their limits (not to harass and kill innocent citizens) and follow the rules, things might improve in Nigeria. In fact, if they bring more of our corrupt elite to book, the rate of criminal activities would reduce (Vanguard, 30th March, 2002).

The mass media has a crucial role to play in the campaign to educate the people of their rights as citizens, and in exposing the rogues. Nothing chills nonsense more than exposure to thin air. The nation should erect permanent structures in the society to constantly tackle corruption, instead of setting up ad-hoc corruption-panels here and there. The citizens have a role to play in the war against corruption: they should always try to resist the temptation to offer bribes to corrupt government officials, as it takes two to tango.

**Prospects of a corrupt-free developing Nigeria**

Corruption like a cankerworm is eating deeply into the developmental fabrics of Nigeria, but Anti-graft agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commision (EFFC) and the Institute of Corrupt Practices Commission(ICPC) have being making positive headways on the fight against corruption, in as much that corruption as the say will always fight back, but their progress in tackling it has been commendable.

Furthermore, the whistle blowing policy, the "change begins with me programme" and the recent executive order signed by President Muhhamudu Buhari on July 5, 2018, enabling the seizure of properties viewed to be purchased by / with corrupt funds, is a huge prospect for the war against corruption and a gain for futuristic Nigeria's development.

**Conclusion**

Above all, Nigeria cannot be seen as secure and free until the people's human rights are respected and protected by the government. As Mikhail Gorbachev points out, "the world cannot be considered secure if human rights are being violated." And more importantly, the world cannot be considered secure if a many people lack the elementary condition for life worthy of man.

Similarly, Nigeria cannot be considered secure if millions of people go hungry, do not have a roof over their heads and to be jobless and sick indefinitely, with the most basic human right, the right to life is disregarded" Gray, Kaufmann (1998). Through it all, to tame corruption, Nigeria has to use words as well as actions a multifaceted approach. However, has Nigeria been monitoring the effectiveness of her many (but not serious) anti-corruption strategies? Good governance, transparency, accountability and the rule of law are the keys to tackling corruption in the society, as corrupt leaders cannot wage an effective war against corruption.

In sum therefore, it is cogent to assert that corruption in Nigeria is the foundation of the varied and diverse problems being experienced in the nation and the continent. For more than fifty years after independence, Nigeria as a nation has not been able to rise above the shackles of underdevelopment because of corruption. Indeed, corruption has impeded development in our country. Thus we are been perceived in the world today as the poorest of the poor nations of the world despite

our vast human and natural resource. Therefore, there is no gainsaying the fact that unless we uproot corruption from every sphere of our life, we can never achieve development. This is the task that must be the preoccupation of all and sundry.

**Recommendations**
This paper makes the following recommendations below, in a bid to help tackle the menace caused by corruption and to curb its limitations to development in Nigeria;

- Require direct, clear and forceful support of the highest political authority: the president or prime minister;
- Introduce transparency and accountability in government functions, particularly in all financial transactions;
- Encourage a free press and electronic media to forcefully report to the public on corrupt practices in the society;
- Organize civil society to address the problems of corruption brought to light by the process of transparency and the activity of the media;
- Introduce into government watch-dog agencies – anticorruption bureaus; inspectors general and auditors general who will identify corruption practices and bring them to public attention;
- Minimize and simplify government regulations, particularly those involving the issuance of licenses, permits and preferential positions, thereby restricting opportunities for rent seeking by corrupt means.
- Insert anti-bribery clauses into all major procurement contracts and with the assistance of both international financial institutions and bilateral aid agencies insist that international corporations, bidding on African procurement contracts, accept such clauses and the penalties associated with their violation.
- Introduce similar anti-bribery clauses into contracts relating to privatization of government enterprises, and the development of natural resources.
- Ensure that enforcement is predictable and forceful;
- To criminalize the acts of bribery; prohibit the deduction of bribes for tax purposes; and erect barriers to transfer to western financial institutions of financial gains derived from corrupt practices.
- Declaration of Assets: The State should require that all high-level Nigerian officials (Presidents, Ministers, Legislative officers, Central bank governors, Police and Customs Chiefs, Military Generals), sign a statement granting permission to banks (both local and foreign), real estate or investment house to disclose any personal assets they may hold.
- Withholding of Aid: International donors (the IMF and World Bank) can be helpful by cutting off completely distribution of assistance to any country marked for high-level corruption.
- Scrutiny for sources of income: As was pointed out above, scrutinizing individual depositors of huge sum of money, by financial institutions for

sources, would go along way to curbing looting of national treasury by civil servants.

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# Counter Insurgency and Management of Internally Displaced Persons in the North East Nigeria, 2009-2016

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**Abstract**

*The paper examined counter-insurgency campaigns and the management of internally displaced persons in north-east Nigeria between 2009 and 2016. Specifically, the objective of the paper is to ascertain whether the counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State undermined the security of the Internally Displaced Persons in north-eastern Nigeria. Juxtaposing the counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State with the principles highlighted in Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency Theory (Coin-T), the paper argues that: Counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State have undermined the security of the Internally Displaced Persons in north-eastern Nigeria. Data were collected through documentary method, and subsequently analyzed using the rigorous method of content analysis of written records. In the end, it was found that basic strategies of the Nigerian State by means of which it has had to fight insurgency have not effectively succeeded in countering it. Instead, some operational oversights and tactical errors such as conceding some attacks in the IDPs camps and occasional reports of security agents abusing the women/girls amongst the IDPs have further aggravated the fear and plights of the IDPs. Informed by this, the Nigerian government should see counter-insurgency as a multi-pronged national assignment embodying to itself social, economic, humanitarian, psychological and of course military dimensions. Nigerian-style counter-insurgency campaigns have not yielded the desired and expected result because it is still seen as a solely military issue.*

**Keywords**: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Internally displaced persons, Insecurity, Boko Haram.

**Introduction**

Have the counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State undermined the security of the Internally Displaced Persons in North-East Nigeria? This question was necessitated by three fundamental reasons. First, the Boko Haram insurgency has no doubt, dominated security matters in Nigeria. This seemingly intractable problem started when, in July 2009, the Nigeria Police started investigated the activities of Boko Haram group and reported that the group was arming itself. During the investigation, several Boko Haram leaders were arrested in Bauchi, sparking off

deadly clashes with security forces which led to the breakdown of law. Since then, the result has been intermittent bouts of violence masterminded by the deadly sect. True to their threats, the group has been going about killing innocent citizens. The *modus operandi* for these killings include the use of motorcycles for drive-by-shootings; early morning raid of villages and the killing of unarmed citizens found there; car bombs, suicide bombings; targeting of luxury hotels, churches, and other places of public attraction such as United Nations buildings; attack of military personnel and military establishments, policemen, Police Headquarters, Police Stations and offices of the State Security Service, Schools, Markets, etc.

The second reason is the pathetic situation of internally displaced persons (refugees in their own country) arising from the Boko Haram attacks, in the affected states of Northeast Nigeria, particularly in Adamawa, Bauchi and Borno states. An overwhelming percentage of residents in the states in northeast and neighbouring states have fled their homes, residential areas, business establishments and comfort zones for their life to escape what could be likened to a Hobbesian state of nature where there is "constant fear of violent death...and where human life is poor, solitary, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes, 1651 cited in Mukherjee & Ramaswamy, 2007). Some of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) among whom were pregnant women and children whose appearance evoke both sympathy and empathy had run from different troubled spots in the war-ravaged northeast to Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, FCT, for safety and succour (Nwabughiogu, 2015). There are varying statistics about the number of Nigerians living in IDPs camps. According to the Displacement Tracking Index (DTI) published in February 2018, a total of 1,188,018 IDPs, consisting of 129,200 households were identified in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe States alone. In addition to this, another 25, 600 IDPs, comprising 42300 households were identified in Plateau, Nasarawa, Abuja, Kano and Kaduna States, according to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). This is a reduction in the number of IDP as compare to the figure in 2018. In total, 1,153788 IDPs were identified in Northern Nigeria, while the highest number of IDPs is in Borno State with 576,894, followed by Adamawa State with 353,199 and Yobe State, 223,695 (https://www.naij.com/66928.html).

The third reason is that the Nigerian state, is now faced with double tragedy of combating the deadly and faceless Boko Haram insurgents and the equally daunting task of managing the constantly increasing volume of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). As a responsible government, or better still, a government *struggling* to be responsible, the Federal Government of Nigeria, in conjunction with governments at lower levels and the international donors/donor agencies, has since begun establishing camps for the unfortunate fellows. "Scores of camps in different parts of the country have been provided to accommodate the growing number of IDPs, a large part of whom are from the northeastern part of the country" (hptt://www.channelstv.com/2015/01/26/internally-displaced-persons-idps).

In the light of this unprecedented rise in IDPs in Nigeria occasioned principally by the unmitigated Boko Haram insurgency/attacks, the objective of this paper is to ascertain whether the counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State

have undermined the security of the Internally Displaced Persons in north-eastern Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper is partitioned into six sections with this brief introduction as section one. Section two was devoted to the thrust and problematique of the paper. Section three mirrored the theoretical underpinnings of the paper. Section four conceptualised some concepts germane to the paper. Section five examined counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State vis-à-vis the Security of the Internally Displaced Persons in North-Eastern Nigeria while we concluded in section six.

**The Problem**

In response to growing violence by the militants, then operating under the rubric of *Jamā'at ahl al-sunnah li'l-da'wah wa'l-jihād* (JASDJ)—'The Association of the People of the Sunna for Proselytisation and Armed Struggle', on 14 May 2013 the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in three north-eastern states of the federation: Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (Higazi, 2013). This was after the Nigerian state had attempted to eliminate it through overwhelming force in July 2009. Since these clashes, attacks by Boko Haram and the Nigerian military's deployment against the group (counter-insurgency) have been rife. The nefarious activities of Boko Haram in tandem with counter-insurgency campaigns by the Nigerian Armed forces have continued to generate dire humanitarian crisis in the northeast region of Nigeria, with Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states being the worst hit. Outstanding among these humanitarian crises have been the development of Internally Displaced Persons, refugee debacles, food insecurity and the spread of various diseases (Imasuen, 2015). The northeast region has ceased to know civil normalcy as a result of orchestrated human casualties, human right abuses, population displacement, loss of means of livelihood, food crisis, limited medical facilities and other social amenities. Due to this growing level of violent attacks and siege laid by extremist in the zone, the number of displaced persons in northeast Nigeria has more than doubled. Imasuen (2015, pp. 288-289) vividly chronicled it thus:

> Over the years since 2009, the activities of the Boko Haram sect, has increased the displacement of people from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in the form of internally displaced persons(IDP's) fleeing to safer havens within the nation and refugees fleeing into neighbouring nations like Niger, Chad and Cameroun. It has been noted that majority of these persons constitute women and children (International Regional Information Networks, 14 March 2014). According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 2014 report, there have been steady rise in internally displaced persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. From 2009 to 2010 IDP's rose to 100,000 and from 2010 to 2011 it increased to 130,000. From 2011 to 2012, the number of IDP's rose to 200,000. From 2012 to 2013 IDP's grew to 290,000 and from May 2013 to March 2014 it decreased slightly to 250,000. From May-June 2014, it rose again to 436,608 and from

August to December IDP's drastically rose to over 600,000 persons (UN OCHA, 2014).

In total, 1,235,294 IDPs were identified in Northern Nigeria. While the highest number of IDPs is in Borno State with 672,714, followed by Adamawa State with 220,159, Yobe State with 135,810 IDPs ranked third. The increased activities of the Boko Haram sect have further increased the influx of Nigerian refugees into neighbouring nations over the years. It has been estimated that there are over 30,000 Nigerian refugees in Northern Cameroun, 1,000 Nigerian refugees in Chad (on Lake Chads Choua Island) and more than 50,000 Nigerian refugees in the Diffa region of South East Niger (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, March 2014).

By way of temporarily addressing the IDPs problem, the federal government of Nigeria in partnership with affected state and local governments, resorted to a contrivance of necessity in the form of setting up IDPs camps when and where they deem necessary. Today, there are over 2.2 million IDPs in the country living in IDP camps in their own country (www.channelstv.com/2016/04/24/nema-releases-idp-figures-in-northeast/ see also www.channelstv.com/2016/04/13/serap-organises-round-table-to-address-plight-of-idps).

However, few years after, government's preparedness to squarely manage and cater for the all round welfare of these unfortunate ones in the camps is being called to question as it has come under heavy criticism. Like its Malian and Somalian counterparts whose displaced population struggle with food insecurity (Collins,1993), the Nigerian government faces the challenge of adequately responding to the humanitarian crisis of increased food insecurity, limited access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), limited access to medical facilities, outbreaks of diseases and sexual violence among women at the IDP camps. Gender and sexual based violence is believed to be a widespread phenomenon among female Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) both at various camps and in host communities (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, May, 2014). This has made it rather very difficult for most humanitarian agencies to respond to the needs of Internally Displaced Persons within these rural areas, making thousands of IDP's with little access to food, clean water or healthcare in northeast Nigeria (IRIN 2014, p.14). The poor living conditions in the IDP camps has become of great concern. Report from both domestic and international agencies have shown that these camps since 2009 have lacked adequate facilities in addition to their poor sanitation and increase in the rise of diseases such as Malaria, acute watery diarrhoea, measles and pregnancy complication related issues (IRIN, 29 November, 2013). Despite all the frequently reported donations, a large number of these IDPs are still living in hunger, deplorable and unhygienic conditions. Overwhelmed by this situation, the Federal Government through the former Acting Inspector General of Police Ibrahim Idris, months after the President had announced the establishment of the Northeast Rehabilitation Committee, has indicated interest to relieve the military and enable displaced persons return home.

Meanwhile, continued counter-insurgency attacks on the terrorists have occasionally pushed the dreaded group to launch severe lethal mayhems on the traumatized residents of the war-wacked north-eastern Nigeria. The attack in Dikwa community, which is about 90 kilometres from the Borno state capital, Maiduguri, was believed to be a reprisal after the military raided Boko Haram strongholds in the area. This goes to unravel how vulnerable and inadequately protected the IDPs and their camps are to further attacks by the Boko Haram terrorists. The deadly and monstrous attacks have continued unabated, even in the IDPs camps which ought to be a safer haven compared to their war-torn communities in the northeast. The massacre of at least 58 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by two female suicide bombers in their camp in Dikwa, Borno state, on Tuesday, 9 February, 2016 fully brought home the high level of vulnerability of the IDPs (Ocheyenor, 2016), thereby provoking the question of whether the insurgency is intractable.

Equally very pathetic is the rising incidence of food scarcity among other health-related challenges in the camps. on Thursday 25th of August, 2016, hundreds of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), mostly women and children in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital mounted barricades of stones, sticks and tyres which caused massive traffic jam along the Kano-Maiduguri highway, protesting and demonstrating against poor feeding and related matters in their camps (Haruna, 2016).

From the above analysis, it is therefore pertinent to argue that the Counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State have undermined the security of the Internally Displaced Persons in north-east Nigeria. We shall proceed to investigate the hypothetical position of this paper for empirical validation.

**Theoretical Perspective**

The paper found explanatory relief in the Counterinsurgency Theory (Coin-T), which was variously propounded by scholars and practical strategists like Galula (1964), Thompson (1966), Hamilton (1998), Kilcullen (2006), Trinquier (1961), Zambernardi (2010), among others. According to the Counterinsurgency Theory (Coin-T), there are essentially two operational categories of insurgency. In the first category, the insurgents and rebel fighters work in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War. The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such a degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. The ultimate goal is to out-rightly defeat the military force of a state and take over the governance of the state in question. In the second category, the goal of the insurgent is not to defeat the occupying military force; that is almost always an impossible task given the disparity in resources. Rather, they seek through a constant campaign of sneak attacks to inflict continuous casualties upon their superior enemy forces and thereby over time demoralize the occupying forces and erode political support for the occupation in the homeland of the occupying forces. It is a simple strategy of repeated pin-pricks and bleedings that, though small in proportion to the total force strength, sap the will of the occupier to continue the fight.

Galula (1964) gained his practical experience in counter-insurgency as a French officer in the Algerian War. His theory of counterinsurgency is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. Galula (1964) proposes four laws for counterinsurgency:

1. The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
2. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.
3. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.
4. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.

He went further to contend that:

A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization...A victory is that, plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population....In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population (Galula, 1964 pp.54-56).

With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control: In a Selected Area;

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.

6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants (Galula, 1964 pp.54-56).

According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula (1964, p.95) as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward."

Similarly, while arguing that a successful counter-insurgency effort must be proactive in seizing the initiative from insurgents, Thompson (1966) outlines four basic principles for a successful counter-insurgency:

1. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable;
2. The government must function in accordance with the law;
3. The government must have an overall plan;
4. The government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas;

In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first *(*Hamilton 1998).

**Figure 1: Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency**

In his "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Kilcullen (2006) recognised and described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information:

> This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level—because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment (Kilcullen, 2006 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf).

Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance, because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest) (Kilcullen, 2006). The overall goal, according to this model, is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality, noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective and legitimate institutions (Kilcullen, 2006).

Kilcullen's Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency appears very comprehensive, as it embodies virtually every aspect of what others have emphasized in their own contributions. The fundamental essence and aim of counter-insurgency is to provide security using both political and economic means. Granted that effectiveness is of essence while deploying measures and strategies to combat insurgency, caution should be deployed too towards ensuring that the campaign is carried out legitimately so as to have the confidence and support of the population. The diagram of "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency" shows that information is at the very base or root of an effective counterinsurgency mission. This information should cut across global, regional and local boundaries so as to amass quantum of useful information about the insurgents and propagate/spread anti-information about the operations and activities of the guerrilla group. The ultimate end of counterinsurgency, according to the three pillars of counterinsurgency, is to douse insecurity tempo, arrest political violence and revamp economic stability obviously tempered with in the course of the insurgency.

Looking, however, at the indices that make up the three pillars, one would quickly conclude that the Nigerian state's effort at counter insurgency is still a far cry. Judged against the pillar of "security", the counterinsurgency campaign has not been able to effectively guarantee the security of the military and the police themselves, nor has it been able to ensure safety of the generality of the Nigerian public/population. In the second pillar, the "political" pillar, one cannot deny that the Nigerian State has not mobilized its forces. But then, "governance extension", "institutional capacity" and "social reintegration" of the displaced citizens (IDPs) still remain a collective mirage to many Nigerians. Looking at the roof of the pillar-"Control", the counterinsurgency campaigns of the Nigerian state have not reduced the "tempo" of Boko Haram insurgents, as they still attack with vivacious impunity. "Violence" on the citizens, including those in the IDP camps has not stopped nor has "stability" been restored to the political system. An exploration of the third pillar, the "Economic" pillar, reveals that in Nigerian situation, one would immediately observe that the last three items (Development assistance, Resource & infrastructural management and growth capacity) are evident in their absence.

**Conceptual Clarifications**

According to the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), counter-insurgency or counterinsurgency may be defined as "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes". On the other hand, "insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective" (U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009).

Counter-insurgency campaigns of duly-elected or politically recognized governments take place during war, occupation by a foreign military or police force, and when internal conflicts that involve subversion and armed rebellion occur. The best counterinsurgency campaigns "integrate and synchronize political, security, economic, and informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing insurgent influence over the population. COIN strategies should be designed to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence; strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically" (U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009). Supporting the above, Eizenstat, Porter & Weinstein (2005) in Ogbeide (2011) maintained that to understand counter-insurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Insurgents capitalize on societal problems, often called gaps; counter-insurgency addresses closing the gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate.

On the other hand, IDPs are people who through the nefarious activities of hoodlums or natural disaster have lost their abode, or whose abodes have been seriously threatened by any or a combination of the two. However, the United

Nation's *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (1998) define IDPs as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human- made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." As citizens in distress, they deserve and indeed do demand for serious attention, especially as it concerns their material, health and psychological security. Certainly, it is the sole responsibility of government to protect the lives and property of citizens. This is indeed, the primary purpose of government. The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) made this clear when it stated in section 14 (2b) that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government".

More disheartening is that Boko Haram insurgency, according to Raleigh (2011, p.32) has continued to lead to "increases in international migration and internally displaced persons". According to the information from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2015), unpredictable waves of IDPs and refugees across Nigeria and neighbouring countries have complicated how displacement is monitored and evaluated. This is further exacerbated by the fact that many people on the run do not have, or have lost, their identification documents, which makes it problematic to discern whether a person is internally displaced, a returning national or a stranded migrant. Despite these complexities, three trends have emerged that shine some light on the patterns of movement of those fleeing the violence. First, while available data indicates that IDPs tend to stay within their own state, anecdotal evidence suggests that as the conflict drags on, people are fleeing greater distances than before, and staying in these areas of refuge for longer periods of time. This should not only flag to humanitarian and development agencies the need to plan for alternatives to return, but could also signal a longer-term change in the region's demographics. Secondly, Boko Haram conducts surprise attacks on un-suspecting villages. This means that family members are often in different places – working in the fields or at school– when they have to drop what they are doing and flee for their lives, often leaving with nothing but the shirts on their backs. This has dispersed families and left many children separated from their parents or caregivers. The government recently registered 760 unaccompanied children in Adamawa alone, signalling the probability of significantly higher numbers across the region. Thirdly, the presence of Boko Haram along Nigeria's borders with Cameroon and Niger has prevented people from fleeing across these frontiers to safety. Others have been trapped in towns the militants controlled as part of their caliphate. Ongoing military interventions may continue to open up escape routes for people currently blocked from seeking safety elsewhere, but will also likely increase the amount of displacement in the region (IDMC, 2015).

**Counter-insurgency Campaigns of the Nigerian State and the Security of Internally Displaced Persons in North-Eastern Nigeria**

In response to the rising state of insecurity in northeast occasioned primarily by the Boko Haram insurgent groups, President Jonathan's announcement in early May 2013 of an extra-budgetary of $1 billion for emergency military procurement, which according to Reeve (2014 p.5) is said to be "an added incentive for international security cooperation." Daily Trust shows that the total security vote shot up to N1.055 trillion when figures from all the security agencies are added up. These are Defence, N349 billion; Police formations, N311.1 billion; Police Affairs, N8.5 billion; Interior, N156.1 billion; and Office of the National Security Adviser, N116.4 billion. Eme & Anyadike (2013, p.24) gave the following intriguing summary:

> The total represents an addition of N135 billion over the N920 billion budgeted for 2012.Billions for security gadgets A further breakdown of the security budget shows that the Defence Headquarters is to spend N150 million on travelling and training. Nigerian Army is allocated N128.1 billion, N5.1 billion of it is for overheads, N116.2 billion for personnel and N6.7 billion capital costs. Nigerian Navy has total allocation of N71.4 billion out of which N13 billion is for capital expenditure, N51.9 personnel, N6.8 billion for overheads and N58.4 billion for recurrent expenditure. The Airforce will spend N68.762 billion next year and N54.7 billion of it is for personnel cost, N6.9 billion for overheads, and N7.1 billion will go for capital expenditure. The Nigerian Army will spend N510 million on motor vehicle maintenance, N887.7 million office and residential quarters maintenance and a total of N2.1 billion on training and travels. N1 billion is allocated for procurement of various types of ammunition for the army while production of armoured personnel carriers will cost N350million.

Reeling out information on the navy and giving more clarification on some issues already raised, they continued with their elaborate detailing thus:

> The Navy is proposing N10 billion to purchase ships, N1.973 billion on defence equipment and another N1.3 billion on training and travels; N90million on generators. For the Air Force, N1.5 billion will be spent on travels and training, while rehabilitation and repairs of defence equipment got N3.7 billion. The Defence missions has a total of N10.3 billion out of which N539.6 million will go for purchase of secured communication equipment for the missions. The National Security Adviser's office has N1.034 billion as security votes, satellite communication in the FCT will cost N6.782 billion, data signal centre N9.8 billion, iridium/communication platform also in the FCT N2 billion, motorized direction finder 12 4X4 jeeps N178 million, cyber securityN142 million and presidential communication network got N1.3 million (p. 25)

　　　　The true position is that in recent years, the security sector has attracted huge funding. According to the President, security has to take the lion's share because of "the threat of Boko Haram, Niger Delta militants and increasing spate of insecurity and wanton destruction of lives and property by criminal which are on the rise". He noted that counter terrorism equipment would cost N3 billion while the Police was to spend N165 million on 3 armoured toyota landcruiser vehicles and armoured hilux for GSM tracking; N310 million is for patrol vehicles, special operational vehicles got N340 million, N455 million is for bullet vests and ballistic helmets. Also, explosive disposals will gulp N250 million, dogs and handling equipment N50 million, operational vehicles for mobile police N150 million, mounted troops accessories N50 million, automated finger print identification system N70 million, forensic equipment and provision of DNA test and crime scene laboratories. It is therefore not surprising that the latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), based in Sweden, shows that in 2012, Nigeria ranked 57 in the global rating on military expenditure and the 6th highest spender on the military in Africa. The report show that the country's military spending competed with the expenditures of countries like Libya ($2.9 billion), Morocco ($3.4 billion), Angola ($4.1 billion), South Africa ($4.4 billion) and Algeria ($9.3 billion). Countries with relatively lower expenditure among the top 10 spenders on military in Africa include Cote d'Ivoire ($407 million), Namibia ($407 million), Tunisia ($709 million), Kenya ($798 million) and South Sudan ($964 million) (*http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures*).

　　　　According to the SIPRI report, Nigeria's military spending, which may not include wages and salaries, but mainly military hardware purchases, "has been on the increase since 2006". For example, while government spent $1.067 billion in 2006, by 2009 the expenditure rose to $1.825 billion. In 2010, a huge sum of $2.143 billion was spent in procuring military hardware, and the figure rose to a staggering $2.386 billion in 2011. In 2012, the total budget for security was N921.91 billion, close to a record N 1 trillion, which attracted much criticism from various segments of the society, especially when compared to the sum of N348 billion allocated to defense in 2011. As at 2012, the budget for security was the biggest, bigger than the allocation to education. Even in 2013, the trend continued, as the allocation to Defence alone hit N668.54 billion, ahead of what was allocated to Education, Health, Works and other infrastructure-related sectors (http://news.naij.com/34638.html). Eme and Anyadike (2013) corroborated this report when they remarked that Nigeria ranks 57 in the global rating on military expenditure, occupying the seventh position in African while it is regarded as the largest spender in the West African sub-region. Making some clarifications on the budget allocations for security and defence, Mr. Bright Okogu, Director-General, Budget Office, a quasi-governmental agency under the presidency, noted that within ECOWAS, Nigeria's defence spending is the largest. Bright cited in Oladesu (2012, p.43) had noted that: "It is five times greater that the spending of Cote d'Ivoire and almost 15 times the size of Ghana's spending". The table below shows the Security Votes in Nigeria between 2008 and 2013:

**Table 1: Budget Allocations for Security/Defence from 2008-2012**

| Year | Amount | President |
|------|--------|-----------|
| 2008 | N 444.6 billion | Umar Yar'Adua |
| 2009 | N 233 billion | Umar Yar'Adua |
| 2010 | N 264 billion | Umar Yar'Adua |
| 2011 | N 348 billion | Goodluck Jonathan |
| 2012 | N 921.91 billion | Goodluck Jonathan |
| 2013 | N1.055 trillion | Goodluck Jonathan |

**Source:** adapted from Eme & Anyadike (2013)

Among others, this table goes to compare the budgetary differences in security expenditure between the administrations of Umar Yar'Adua and Goodluck Jonathan. From the table above, it is clear that the astronomical rise in security vote occurred under President Goodluck Jonathan under whose administration too the spate of insecurity also mounted.

Below is another table showcasing that defence has been witnessing steady increase in financial allocation from the year 2011, except in 2014 that the sector had a slight decrease in allocation. Compared to the health sector also captured in the table, the increase is clear. Though budgets of other security agencies of the state were not captured in the table, they equally witnessed increased funding during the years under review.

**Table 2: Total Budget for Defence Vis a Vis that of Health, 2011-2014**

| S/N | Year | Budgeted Amount for Defence (N) | % of the total Budget | Budgeted Amount for Health (N) | % of the total Budget |
|-----|------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | 2011 | 309,783,758,334 | 6.90% | 202,458,852,933 | 4.51% |
| 2 | 2012 | 359,735,485,992 | 7.66% | 284,967,358,038 | 6.07% |
| 3 | 2013 | 364,415,146,885 | 7.30% | 279,819,553,930 | 5.61% |
| 4 | 2014 | 340,332,339,871 | 7.33% | 262,742,351,874 | 5.65% |

**Sources:** *http:// www.budgetoffice.gov.ng*

However, whether this bogus allocation and increase in security budget has brought about corresponding increase in security of lives and property of Nigerians is another issue that must not be glossed over. Apart from widespread allegations that corruption in the defence and police affairs ministry including the Nigerian Police Service Commission over the years which has brought to fore the reason why operatives of the armed forces are not sufficiently kitted with the state- of- the- art combat weapons to be able to decisively crush the uprising threatening the territorial

integrity of Nigeria, it appears that the more government spends on defence, the more insecure Nigerians feel. The heavy spending on security would ordinarily not attract public attention if this jumbo expenditure has continued to translate to jumbo security of lives and property of Nigerians, especially in the Northeast.

In fact**,** nothing could be more ironic than when a supposedly safe haven turns into a theatre for massacre. Upon the obvious but unfortunate displacement of persons from their places of abode coupled with the clarity of the fact that certain towns and villages in some north-eastern states were no longer safe for the civilian citizens due to the frequency of attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents, the next laudable move by the governments (both states and federal) was the establishment of camps for the internally displaced persons, popularly known as IDPs Camps. Displacement Tracking Management (DTM) statistics shows that a total number of 2,093, 030 are displaced in thirteen states (Abuja, Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, Yobe, and Zamfara). The displaced persons are made up of 370, 389 households. 53 per cent (602, 374) of the IDPs population are female children while 47 per cent (536,867) of the IDPs population are make children. In total, 54 per cent (1,139,241) of the IDPs population are children, 53 per cent (1,108,353) of the IDPs population are females. However, only 7 per cent (147,577) of the IDP population are above sixty years (Olawale, 2016).

**Table 7: IDPs in Northeast Nigeria**

| State | IDPs | Main state of origin | Number of camps | IDPs living in camps |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Borno | 1,600,000 | Borno (99%) | 49 | 16% |
| Adamawa | 160,000 | Adamawa (71%) | 9 | 7% |
| Yobe | 113,000 | Borno (56%) | 7 | 12% |
| Gombe | 27,000 | Borno (48%) Yobe (47%) | 0 | - |
| Bauchi* | 48,000 | Borno (45%) | 0 | - |
| Taraba* | 13,000 | Borno (73%) | 12 | 4% |

* Number of BH conflict affected IDPs. Both states host IDPs resulting from community clashes

**Source:** IOM DTM X, OCHA cited in ACAPS Crisis Profile: Nigeria, July 2016

When compared with the alternative of having to remain in their battered places of abode, the IDPs Camps were in principle to be a safer place for the IDPs. However, this has not been completely true as the fear of the Hobbesian "sudden death" for why the 'refugees in their own country' had to leave their homes soon flickered right into the supposed 'safe forte' (the IDP Camps), challenging, as it were, the very essence of the establishment of Camps. Olawale (2016) noted most

regrettably that living in the camps has not made them immune to rape, shootings, suicide bombing and random attacks from Boko Haram. It is therefore not surprising that the plight of IDPs in Nigeria has been described as "from insecurity to insecurity"*(https://www.thecable.ng/idps-nigeria-insecurity-insecurity)*.

Very pathetic was the shout, cry and apprehension that gripped the IDPs on Friday 11th of September, 2015 when Boko Haram terrorists detonated a bomb at Maikohi Camp – Nigeria's largest Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs) – located in Yola, the capital of Adamawa State.  According to Dan Fulani (2015), the attack killed seven people and injured 20. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) further reported that "Among the injured seven (7) were treated and discharged while thirteen (13) persons including four (4) NEMA officials are still at FMC Yola" (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/189822-7-killed-in-yola-idp-camp-bomb-blast.html).Witnesses said the bomb was planted inside a tent near the major warehouse of the camp where 200 displaced persons who had just arrived from Madagali Local Government of Borno State, had been camped. The bomb exploded at about 10:30am, causing panic as some of the refugees fled the camp. Meanwhile, sources at the hospital however said the death toll rose to 10. While condemning the attack, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar said in a statement posted on his Facebook page that "Many people I know were working as volunteers in the camp, including staff and students of AUN, who sustained minor injuries in today's blast. "Today's attack is an attempt to break the spirits of the people who came to seek refuge. The perpetrators will know no peace. (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/189822-7-killed-in-yola-idp-camp-bomb-blast.html).

Four months later, February 10th 2016, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) again reported that 58 people had been killed and 78 victims others injured after suicide bombers detonated explosives at the Internally Displaced Persons camp in Dikwa, Borno State. Emergency workers said the incidents occurred when the IDPs queued up to collect their morning food ration in a camp that then accommodates over 50, 000 people displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. The Zonal Coordinator of NEMA in the North East, Mohammed Kanar, later revealed that some of those killed had been buried while the injured were moved to unnamed medical facilities.

In the evening of this unfortunate event, the Nigerian government circulated a statement condoling with families of victims of the Dikwa attack. An excerpt from a statement by the vice president's office is hereunder presented thus:

> On behalf of the federal government of Nigeria, Vice President, Prof. Yemi Osinbajo, SAN, expresses his profound condolences to the families of the victims of yesterday's suicide bombing of an IDP camp in Dikwa, Borno State, and also the entire people and government of the state (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/ news/headlines/198295-58-killed-78-injured-suicide-bombings-borno-idp-camp.html).

The Vice President stated that it is indeed regrettable that the heartless terrorists chose to unleash their wickedness on people who were taking refuge from previous acts of destruction in their homes. He further reassured the nation that the full weight of the federal government's force will be deployed to hunt down the perpetrators of this evil act and also to confront terrorists continuously in the protection of life, liberty and property of all Nigerians: there will be no hiding place for terrorists. The Vice President later gave directives that formidable security in and around the IDP Camps in the country be beefed up and renewed measures put in place to guard against future occurrences (http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/198295-58-killed-78-injured-suicide-bombings-borno-idp-camp.html).

However, what seems to worry many Nigerian much is that very often, the government has repeatedly claimed Boko Haram had been significantly degraded to such a level that it could no longer carry out coordinated attacks. But the group has continued to wreak havoc, attacking communities in Borno and carrying out suicide bombings, killing and maiming scores each time, even right inside the camps.

Life in the IDPs camps presents a checklist of existential anomalies and pathetic oddities. Displaced persons face tough problems in their various camps. Olawale (2016) remarked that these underlining problems make it difficult to rehabilitate and resettle them to their pre-conflict locations: mismanagement among government authorities in charge, lack of comprehensive data, hunger and malnutrition, poor healthcare to mention a few. The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund made it known that children are dying daily in Nigeria's IDPs camps due to acute malnutrition. In a similar trend, a report by Doctors without Borders revealed that six malnourished children die daily in IDP camp in Bama, Borno state. One eighty-eight of them died of diarrhoea and malnutrition in June 2016 alone, while 1,200 graves were counted of which above 500 were children. Reports of rape, prostitution and theft are predominant uprising from the camps; to tackle malnutrition, while Borno state switched from central feeding of IDPs to household feeding, the President has also ordered probe of corrupt officials at the IDP camps but nothing seem to have changed, except that the situation as gotten worse.

Displaced persons are finding it difficult to regain pre-conflict ways of living because of the poor living condition; poor sanitation which exposes members of the camps to infectious diseases; poor medical facilities which accommodate growth of infectious bacteria, fungi and virus in their bodies; poor feeding which exposes them to malnutrition; and poor condition of infrastructure such as of access to power, water, roads etc. Considering the population of nursing mothers and children, several appeals have been made to previous and incumbent governments to ameliorate the condition of IDPs, but these have achieved little or no results. Members of parliament representing affected regions have slammed the federal and state governments severally, but to no result. Members of the IDP camps need the attention of the Nigerian government to ameliorate their conditions (http://opinion.premiumtimesng. com/2015/12/28/idps-in-nigeria-and-a-call-for-urgent-intervention-by-olawale-rotimi/).

In August 2015, the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reported the occurrence of over 500 cases of diarrhoea and vomiting recorded in 22 IDPs camps in Maiduguri (http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/news/over-500-cases-of-diarrhoea-and-vomitting-recorded-in-maiduguri-idp-camps/108470.html). According to the Director Medical Response and Humanitarian Services, Dr Muhammad Guluze, about 320 of those affected are receiving treatment in about 18 health facilities within the state capital. After making it known that the Ministry had already dispatched a rapid response team of medical personnel to the affected centres to address the problem, Guluze attributed the outbreak of the diseases to poor personal hygiene on the part of the IDPs as well as lack of environmental sanitation in the camps. He lamented that challenges were being faced on a daily basis as a result of the increase in IDPs trooping into the camps from some of the towns liberated by the military. In his words:

> The camps are over-stretched but we are working with other partners, which include NEMA, WHO, UNICEF, BOSEPA and SEMA, to provide conducive, healthy and hygienic environment for the IDPs (http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/ news/news/over-500-cases-of-diarrhoea-and-vomitting-recorded-in-maiduguri-idp-camps/108470.html).

Challenges associated with poor hygiene, environmental insanitary and water scarcity are rife in the IDP camps. The situation is so dishearteningly alarming that an international organisation, OXFAM, in May 2016 observed that over 330,000 Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs, were in danger of epidemic in the North-East region of the country, because of lack of portable water and poor and sanitation. In an assessment report titled "Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Assessment 2016", presented by Humanitarian Manager, OXFAM Nigeria, Olayinka Fagbemi, the body called on the government and development partners to move fast and save the situation (Ewepu, 2016). The assessment report by OXFAM was done on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP. The report covered four states of Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe. Fagbemi gave the following pathetic account of the situation thus:

> The majority of households in the assessed LGAs are in dire need of improved sources of drinking water. Individuals with high chronic illnesses, such as asthma, diabetes, cancer, liver cirrhosis, HIV, tuberculosis, were present in 23 percent of the households assessed. In general, Nafada with 49 percent has the highest case of open defecation by children followed by Potiskum with 31 percent, and Fika 30 percent, while Konduga six percent and Maiha 21 percent have the lowest... key findings in the assessment shows that 61 percent of households are without water, while 55 percent of households do not have access to sanitation devices (http://allafrica.com/stories/201605270673.html).

Humanitarian crisis punctuates life in IDPs camp. The poor hygiene of the facilities and the environment they live in enhance growths and transmission of

infectious bacteria, fungi and virus on the internally displaced persons, IDPS. The poor feeding which they are equally subjected to, leaves mostly the children malnourished, dying and dead. There is also poor provision of social infrastructure such as power, water, and healthcare. This has made the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), an international medical charity, to describe the scarcity of food supply in the northeast as a humanitarian disaster. The MSF confirmed that severely malnourished children are dying in large numbers in northeast Nigeria as food supplies are almost running out, noting that 15 percent of children are suffering from life-threatening malnutrition. In its previous report, the MSF had noted that six malnourished children die daily in the IDP camp in Bama, where poor living conditions were prevalent. Just like in the other IDP camps in Yobe, Adamawa and Taraba states, women and children have no access to water, sanitation, dignity, basic shelter, and most of all, food. The situation has spawned a crisis, one in which 188 people died in the month of June due to diarrhoea and malnutrition. More than 1,200 graves near the camp were dug in the past year (and), almost 500 of which were for children (http://realnewsmagazine.net/featured/worsening-humanitarian-crisis-in-idp-camps-in-nigeria/).

**Table showing humanitarian needs overview in the IDPs in North-Eastern State on a scale of 10**

| State | Education | Food Security | Health | Nutrition | Protection | Shelter and NFI | WASH |
|-------|-----------|---------------|--------|-----------|------------|-----------------|------|
| Adamawa | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Borno | 1 | 3 | 7 | | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Yobe | | 3 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Bauchl | 1 | 2 | 4 | | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Gombe | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Taraba | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | 1 |
| Total | 2 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 6 |

**Source:** 2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria

The foregoing goes to reveal the pathetic living condition of the IDPs in north-east Nigeria. More worrisome is the fact that this gory tales of starvation and deaths flowing from the internally displaced persons, IDPs, camps in the North eastern part of Nigeria which has been on for weeks may worsen. This is because the United Nations Fund for Children, UNICEF, which has been one of the major organisations working to bring relief to the inhabitants of the camps who were displaced from their homes by the Boko Haram insurgency, has suspended its activities until security situation in the area improves (Ezugwu, 2016). He further stated that the decision of the UNICEF came in the wake of an attack by unknown

assailants on its humanitarian convoy which was traveling from Bama to Maiduguri in Borno State, Nigeria, after delivering desperately needed humanitarian assistance to the IDPs.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

The paper focused Counter-insurgency campaigns and the management of internally displaced persons in north-east Nigeria between 2009 and 2016. In specific terms, the objective of the paper was to ascertain whether the counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State undermined the security of the Internally Displaced Persons in north-eastern Nigeria. Juxtaposing the counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State with the principles highlighted in Kilcullen's theoretical model and other models within the Coin-T, the paper argues that: Counter-insurgency campaigns of the Nigerian State have undermined the security of the Internally Displaced Persons in north-eastern Nigeria.

In validating this hypothetical assertion, it was found that basic strategies of the Nigerian State by means of which it has had to fight insurgency have not effectively succeeded in countering it. Instead, some operational oversights and tactical errors such as conceding some attacks in the IDPs camps and occasional reports of security agents abusing the women/girls amongst the IDPs have further aggravated the fear and plights of the IDPs. In line with the findings of the paper, the following recommendations are hereby proffered:

First and foremost, the Nigerian government should see and approach counter-insurgency as a multi-pronged national assignment embodying to itself social, economic, humanitarian, psychological and of course military dimensions. Nigerian-style counter-insurgency campaigns have not yielded the desired and expected result because it is still seen as a solely military issue.

Secondly, since insurgency is not a conventional warfare on which Nigerian soldiers are trained, there is also the urgent need to retrain the Nigerian soldiers on the principles, arts and science of guerrilla warfare to which Boko Haram insurgency is a strand.

Thirdly, there is an alarming necessity to scale up the humanitarian response not only in the various IDPs camps in north-east Nigeria, but also in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Given the regional nature of the displacement crisis, the humanitarian response should be harmonised and coordinated across the four affected countries, by sharing expertise, lessons learned and standardising approaches. Such a regional plan needs to be coordinated on the basis of reliable information about the number of those affected and their needs.

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# Gender Politics in Africa: The Political Roles of Women in Sustainable Democratic Governance in Nigeria

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## Abstract
*Overtime, gender politics in Africa has witnessed some transformations. Although, issue of gender bias was not designed or willed, but arose from the symbiosis of culture and religiosity. The transformation in gender politics was impelled by the global agenda, among them was gender equality. This is as a result of accumulated unbearable inequalities in different stages of political advancement in the developing countries, especially in Africa. Among the ludicrous posed by men dominance is the abysmal decrease of women's political participation, and government appointments. To examine the possible roles by women to advance governance in Africa, especially in Nigeria, is what this study is set to achieve. To that effect, bridge the gap of the social injustice that exposes women to maltreatment, denial and segregation. The study suggested allowing few active women in politics to be appointed as political party chairpersons, given ticket as Presidential aspirants by the leading political parties and also increase their appointments in the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government, as ways to encourage more women active participation in politics. Especially, those with leadership potentials, this will help to improve on the socio-political and economic stress of underdevelopment of posed by gender equality in Nigeria and Africa*

**Keywords:** Gender politics, equality, women political participation, imbalance treatment, political instability

## Introduction

The issue of women contribution to political system has been contested over the years, there is this ideological view that consider them less important and as such underestimate their hierarchical relevance compared to men. This makes their roles neglected, not recognised, lack clarity and also has restrained their freedom in Africa. According to Guttentag and Secord as cited in Stark (1992), states that "when one gender group faces a substantial lack of dyadic power for an appreciable time, they will organize to seek ways to remedy their problem". The history of feminists can be traced to United States in 1848 when a group of women gathered in Seneca Falls village in the upstate of New York, to discuss the social, civil, and religious rights of women. This women movement was led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, this group issued what they called "Declaration of Independence, proclaiming

that "all men and women are created equal." Between 1960s and 1980s, emerged another wave of feminist who focused on the cultural inequalities, gender rules and role of women in the society. Thereafter, is the diverse strains of women activity aligned to the existing ones, response to envisaged challenges and how to rediscover and re-address this issue by reflecting on the achievements of women in governmental body. This is aimed at projecting women in the political system retrospectively, and conceptualising the way forward in government and society with a view to encouraging their efforts and also inspiring the next generation of women in making valuable contributions to politics. However, the issue of women cannot be over-emphasised or be complete without relating to feminism.

Feminism has placed gender on study in politics; this has generated a lot of arguments in this field of knowledge. Some scholars have argued on feminism ideology of women being neglected or marginalised, in effect resulted to exploitation and inequality with men (Conkey & Mgero, 1997) however, some scholars like Robyn Wiegman in his work titled, "Feminism Against Itself" has faulted this ideology, and generally consider it societal problem. The bias has been obvious, particularly in Africa where women opinions, roles and activities are ignored and considered derogatory from all perspectives in the community. Historically, Women are accorded very low status in the society, in spite of the indelible contributions made in the past and of course in the present, gender segregation is still prevalent in our society. In this case, women are seen as inferior to men in all aspects such as social, economic, political, religion and more. It is on this note that this study briefly examines the activities of women in democratic governance in Nigeria.

## Politics of Gender in Africa

According to Gidden (2004), gender refers to a social expectation about behaviour regarded as appropriate for the members of each sex. It is seen as social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female, the relationship between women and men. While, Conkey (2003), considered gender to be social differences that may vary according to the times and the society or group one belongs to and which are learners or attributed by women and men. Apparently, there is a common understanding among the scholars, and that is gender being a social attribute associated with male and female.

Whereas politics is defined as a system that involves any persistent pattern of human relationships, to a significant extent, the control, influence, power or authority (Dahl, 1984), it can also be described as "who gets what, where, when and how" or the authoritative allocation of value (Easton 1953). Notably, the traditional focus of politics and other formal institutions obscure both the role of women in spite of their fundamental importance and active contributions in the areas of education, religion, health, culture, politics, economy, agriculture etc. Intrinsically, the women participation in different developmental processes have been greatly influenced by religiosity and cultural belief in Africa society, especially in politics. Over times, women political ambition receives limited support and resources, that notwithstanding, some relentless efforts are still put in place. Examples still abound

of women who refused to be limited by prevalent gender inequality in Africa. Notably are Liberia's head of state Ellen Johnson Sir-leaf made history as Africa's first female president in 2006. In 1957, during the pre-independence era of Nigeria, women political activists like Mrs. Margaret Ekpo, Mrs. Janet Mokelu and Ms. Young were members of the Eastern House of Assembly.  The late Mrs. Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti had strong influence too in the Western Region politics. Hajia Gambo Sawaba fought for the political and cultural emancipation of women in the North. The General Babangida government, recorded a tremendous improvement in women political participation in Nigeria, Mrs. Maryam Babangida was the first to have an institutionalized office as the first lady in 1987. She launched and projected the "Better Life for Rural Women" programme. Others that impacted in the Nigeria politics include: Dr. Mrs. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala former Minister of Finance, Dr. Mrs. Oby Ezekwesili, late Prof. Dora Akunyili (Celis, Kantola, Waylen, Weldon, 2013). Nonetheless, women have also made immense contributions on informal activities to national development in the area of trade, technology, co-operative society etc. These contributions are given little or no attention. It has been widely noted that:

> Nigeria's 80.2 million women and girls have significantly worse life chances than men and also their sisters in comparable societies... women are Nigeria's hidden resource. Investing in women and girls now will increase productivity in this generation and will promote sustainable growth, peace and better health for the next generation" (Gender in Nigeria Report 2012 cited in United Nations System in Nigeria, 2013).

In traditional African society, women were seen to have definite social, political, and economic roles that enable them achieve a measure of independence and autonomy (Steady, 1981). These significant roles were exhibited in the political life of the people especially through the women union leadership, this extend to the community in legislation, execution and punishment of offenders among them. For example, as a union in the traditional South-Eastern Nigeria, they operate under the umbrella of *'Umuada'*. *'Umuada'* is a women traditional governmental body that is made up of the first-daughter of a village, town, or kindred in Igboland, their roles fall within the traditional leadership hierarchy. Oftentimes neglected, but still showcase immediately after the age grade institution, and also function as the power house of the other leadership institutions.

## Governance and Political Participation by Women in Nigeria

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1997:3), in its policy paper defined governance as "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels."  This includes the "mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their difference." This was endorsed by the Secretary-General's inter-agency sub-task force to promote integrated responses to United Nations conferences and summits. For over a decade, the number of country level programmes on governance supported by the United Nations system has dilated substantially (United Nations Economic and Social

Council, 2006). Importantly, for proper management of economic, political and administrative authority of a country's affairs, there must be the exercise of equal opportunities for both male and female. To ensure the effectiveness of this process, there must be democracy. According to UNDP Human Development Report, 2002, it states that "for politics and political institutions to promote human development and safeguard the freedom and dignity of all people, democracy must widen and deepen". Democracy was defined as the exercise of the control of the government in power by the people. When the fundamental rights of individuals in the minority are protected by law. Women are the minority in governance processes in Africa and Nigeria, the right of selection to national leadership and policies inclusiveness have been denied over the years, but recently, has gained a little breakthrough. This was evidenced by notable role played by a Liberia peace Activist Leymah Roberta Gbowee, who led a nonviolent peace movement known as Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace (WLMAP) that tremendously helped to bring to an end the Liberia civil war in 2003. The aftermath of that action ushered in peace in Liberia after 25 years of crisis and also enable a free election in 2005 which Mrs. Ellen Sirleaf became the first female President in Africa. Another breakthrough was in the appointment of Late Prof. Dora Akunyili as the first female Director General of National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) by President Obasanjo in 2001 to 2008. Prof. Akunyili's records were outstanding, as she helped to restructure NAFDAC.

In Nigeria, the 2015 statistical report on women and men in Nigeria, the disparity or inequality is very glaring in governance and political participation. Governance has witnessed a clear disparity or inequality between men and women in Nigeria and other African countries. Thus, an albatross, which often impact negatively on women's political, economic and social opportunities is the limited number of female participation in the structures of governance, especially, at the key policy decisions-making and resource allocation. Usually, despite women's right to vote and hold public office, they are under-represented in national parliament, even as they are believed to be about half of the electorate. Despite the importance of women's political empowerment and recognition within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals, which among them are gender equality promotion and women empowerment, the recognition is poor in political participation.

Nonetheless, the efforts to bridge gender inequality gap as propagated in MDGs framework is progressive but not proportionate to the number of seats held by women both in the lower- and upper-chambers of the National Assembly. For instance: the 2015 election in Nigeria - out of the 469 honourable members of both Senate and Representative, 92.5 percent are men, while only 7.5 percent are women. Importantly, of all the men in both houses of the parliament, 23.0 percent are in the Senate and 77.0 percent in the House of Representative. See table below:

**Table 10: Summary of Seats Held in National Assembly by Type, Sex and Year**

|  | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Senate |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 100 | 91.7 | 101 | 92.7 | 100 | 91.7 |
| Female | 9 | 8.3 | 8 | 7.3 | 9 | 8.3 |
| Total | 109 | 100 | 109 | 100 | 109 | 100 |
| House of Reps. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 334 | 92.8 | 338 | 93.9 | 337 | 92.8 |
| Female | 26 | 7.2 | 22 | 6.1 | 23 | 7.2 |
| Total | 360 | 100 | 360 | 100 | 360 | 100 |
| Both Houses |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 434 | 92.5 | 439 | 93.6 | 437 | 92.5 |
| Female | 35 | 7.5 | 30 | 6.4 | 32 | 7.5 |
| Total | 469 | 100 | 469 | 100 | 469 | 100 |
| *Source: INEC* |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Source:** National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2016).

Having analysed the above discrepancies in women political participation in national legislative assembly and comparing it with the role of the *Umuada* in traditional Igbo society. It is imperative to note that their functions are indispensable, when supported in the national political hemisphere, it would contribute immensely in the governing process to the advancement of democracy in Nigeria.

**The Imbalance between Men and Women Representation in Politics (Gender Inequality)**

The prevalent gender inequality, amid tremendous contributions of the female is still mind-bogging. The challenge in the society is quite enormous, such that the males record large percentage of participation in politics than females. There has been persistent discrimination in national and state status, customary and religious laws. In Nigeria, traditions, customs sexual stereotyping of social roles and cultural prejudice continue to militate against enjoyment of rights and full participation of women on an equal basis with men in national development (NGP, 2006). Various negligence on the part of women in getting political supports has deprived them of some potentials in the economic and political well-being of the society, though numerically strong. For instance: According to National Population Commission (2006), the percentage of the population in Nigeria males and females are almost at 50% each. With males and females thus recorded: males - 71,345,488, while the females - 69,086,302 showing equilibrium on the genders.

Against this backdrop, it is worthy of note that roles of male and female are socially constructed. In other words, it is dynamic or learned, change overtime or multifaceted and differed within and between cultures. Number of indicators can be used to buttress this point and the gender imbalance in Nigeria. These indicators could be social, economic, political etc. Measuring the situation from the education sector, imperatively, there has been obvious gender disparity at all levels of education, especially at the regional dimension. In spite of the increasing advocacy

for the education of the girl child by the government and some NGOs, the gap in enrolment in most schools, especially in the north is still negatively skewed to girls, while ironically; in the eastern part of the country there are more girls than boys enrolled in schools although, it was prompted on the aftermath of the civil war in 1970. Presently, there has been a decline in the indoctrination of the male in the Eastern part of Nigeria to undertake commercial activities as was commonly observed in the 1970s, 1980s and part of 1990s. This can be empirically certified by the number of male enrolled in the tertiary institutions each year from the Eastern region of the country.

Aside that, the geographical differences that play a significant role in Nigerian education. Obviously because of state autonomy and regional integration and drive, there are still fundamental gaps in education between females and males. See table below for the records of student enrolment and out-turn in tertiary institutions by year and sex.

**Students Enrolment and Out-turn in Tertiary Institutions by Year and Sex**

| | College of Education | | | | | | Polytechnics | | | | | | | University | | | | | |
| | Enrolment | | | Out-turn | | | Enrolment | | | Out-turn | | | | Enrolment | | | Out-turn | | |
| Year | Female | Male | %F | Female | Male | %F | Female | Male | %F | Female | Male | %F | | Male | Female | %F | Male | Female | %F |
| 010 | 45667 | 11495 | 7.4 | 9320 | 5547 | 6.6 | 2470 | 6761 | 1.2 | 9147 | 2625 | 3.7 | | 0792 | 9411 | 1.1 | 4345 | 2341 | 3.6 |
| 011 | 27592 | 17274 | 9.2 | 9006 | 8767 | 9.7 | 2596 | 8237 | 2.1 | 1685 | 1423 | 0.3 | | 5823 | 9107 | 2.7 | 9437 | 864 | 1.3 |
| 012 | 53072 | 53017 | 0.2 | 6164 | 5863 | 9.7 | 5994 | 4911 | 0.5 | 5412 | 2997 | 9.4 | | 3266 | 1684 | 2.6 | 1968 | 0418 | 2.2 |
| 013 | 82564 | 28642 | 2.5 | 8714 | 3860 | 2.5 | 0828 | 7711 | 0.4 | 1201 | 5697 | 2.5 | | 9143 | 6292 | 3.9 | 8864 | 068 | 5.7 |
| 014 | 41282 | 64321 | 3.6 | 3239 | 6553 | 1.6 | 9104 | 4018 | 2.7 | 2104 | 4018 | 2.8 | | 2416 | 9002 | 4.0 | 6149 | 8812 | 3.9 |
| 015 | 96017 | 90633 | 2.3 | 2017 | 8633 | 6.8 | 9759 | 5217 | 4.2 | 9759 | 9217 | 2.4 | | 5444 | 2825 | 4.7 | 5992 | 6973 | 5.9 |

**Source**: National Bureau of Statistical Report on Men and Women in Nigeria, 2015

In spite of all, funding of education remains a great challenge in Nigeria and has contributed to some extent the drop out of boys and girls in the school. It has been a recurring decimal in the national polity. However, allocation to the education sector falls abysmally below the United Nations' approved 26% of the total budget and with the total deregulation of the educational sector in Nigeria at all levels, funding remains a great challenge to both the sector, boy/girls and the society at large (Aremu, 2014 cited in IOM,2014). For instance, some of the strike embarked upon by Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) are oftentimes triggered by poor funding by government to Nigeria Universities, wages and other incentives. On the other hands, in the bid to meet up with the academic demand for conducive and effective learning environment, school fees become high for the average Nigerian parent(s) afford. The gender preference set-in for parents on who to deny and who to be educated, optionally female child is usually forced to early marriage for financial support to enable the male child access to education.

Based on this imbalance, gender study tends to handle both men and women at equal rate. It was also discovered that in most cases these equality is not exercised due to some religious and cultural beliefs which has conferred women as lesser entity in creation. This belief advocates the superiority of men over women, thereby

generally concise them to kitchen, home managers and limit the exercise franchise right as part of creation.

**Conclusion**

The Nigerian women constitute half of the workforce by implication, as a group, do as much work as men if not more. The difference has been their access to opportunities for advancement is not the same with men, even when the same work are done. Although, women are, most times, disadvantaged compared to men in access to political opportunities and conditions of the process; yet many women forgo or choose some type of employment because of family responsibilities. The removal of obstacles and inequalities that women face with respect to employment is a step towards realizing women's potential in the economy and enhancing their contributions to economic and social development (NBS, 2015).

It is brought under inference that women have vital potentials and contributions that have impacted the governance, especially if gender inequality of political positions in the society is revisited and women allowed at the centre of leadership. Traditionally, women were seen as pillars that held the society in their roles especially as Umuada who occupy the position, settle dispute, and engage in decision-making and settlement of debts in the South-Eastern part of Nigeria. The notable roles of some women in Nigeria were briefly identified and their positions that brought upliftment and attachment of high value to them and avail the opportunity to express their potentials. Gender through study has revealed the equal right of women in political system and the roles these women play in the society for transformation and values in the society.

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# Rethinking Poverty and Underdevelopment in Nigeria

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## Abstract
*Nigeria is a country endowed with both natural and human resources and the sixth largest oil producer in the world, yet the citizen wallow in abject poverty. Nigeria ranked 152nd out of 188 countries in terms of poverty as reported by the 2016 United Nations Development Programme, with abysmal Human Development Index low value of 0.514. The continued rating of Nigeria as one of the 20th poorest countries in the world despite the abundant resources, prompted various governments to embark on different developmental programmes aimed at improving the living standard of the people, yet, the situation continued to escalate. Recently, Nigeria was reported to have taken over from India as a country with the highest number of people living under abject poverty. This paper interrogates poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. The broad objective of this study is to find out the relationship between poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria and the challenges. The study adopted optimal constraint theory as its framework of analysis. The data for the study were collected from documentary sources, media commentaries, scholarly inputs and direct observation, while content analytical approach was adopted. The findings show that there is a significant relationship between poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. It equally shows that there are challenges confronting poverty reduction and socio-economic and infrastructural development in Nigeria. It again shows that Nigeria has enough natural and human resources that if effectively and efficiently managed could develop the country and lift the citizens out of poverty line. The study recommends among other things that the government should be committed to poverty reduction through the provision of socio-economic and infrastructural amenities shun corruption and ethnic sentiments and as well through constitutional amendments, allow each state to manage its resources to develop their areas.*

**Keywords:** Poverty, Underdevelopment, Socio-economic, Infrastructure, Nigeria.

## Introduction
The symbolic relationship between poverty and underdevelopment rest on the belief that underdevelopment is the basic foundation for poverty. Therefore, poverty and underdevelopment are regarded as mutually dependent to the extent that all efforts geared towards poverty eradication is the same for fighting underdevelopment. This has prompted the countries of the world to see development as the greatest challenge that should be tackled to a reasonable level if poverty could be eradicated.

The issue of poverty reduction through development of infrastructural facilities has been a serious challenge to various countries of the world including Nigeria. Nigeria's efforts at eradicating poverty and underdevelopment started before Independence, prompting Jega (2003) to reiterate that the successive government efforts at reducing poverty dates back to pre-Independence era through to the period

of Independence. Most of these efforts were developmental in nature geared towards improvement of infrastructure and other social amenities that would eradicate poverty. It is on this note that Eze (2007) states that the number of government programmes initiated in the past were aimed at improving basic services, infrastructure and housing facilities for the rural and urban population, extending access to credit farm-inputs, and creating employment.

These objectives were to be achieved through national development plans (NDPs) which were designed to indirectly alleviate poverty by achieving an improvement in real income of the average citizen, equitable distribution of income and in the creation of job opportunities. It is therefore, within different theoretical models for development that past policies aimed at bringing development to the rural areas of Nigeria were designed. Realizing that approximately 70 percent of the population then lived in the rural areas where they depended largely on agriculture, public policy on agriculture has been therefore expected to impact positively on the people (Edoh, 2007). Governments tried to provide basic infrastructures particularly roads to haul commodities from the rural areas as the population was largely rural, and the regions were largely supported by the wealth of the rural areas, educational facilities, potable water, as well as health facilities were put in place in the rural areas, adding that although these were inadequate, they marked a humble beginning and a conscious attempt to improve the lot of the people.

After independence, Nigeria like other developing countries, operated and based their development plans on the assumptions of perfect knowledge of the problems of the people. This prompted the government to initiate and implement various poverty reduction and developmental programmes some of which included; the farm settlement/school leaver's farms by the three regional governments, the tree crop plantation of the Eastern and Western governments and the small farmer credit scheme. The first National Development Plan: 1962-1968 allocated 13 percent of the gross capital outlay to agriculture and primary production. In the Second National Development Plan: 1970-1974, three areas were identified for federal assistance to agriculture which includes, grants for development of agriculture, forestry and livestock and fishery; Establishment of a national credit institution and special agricultural development scheme in which the federal government entered into both financial and management partnership with state governments in carrying out projects. At this period, Marketing Boards were established in the regions which generated much revenue, the surplus of which the government used to develop the basic infrastructure needed for long term development (Oyesanmi, 2006), in the long run, jobs were created and the rate of inflation, unemployment and productivity remained relatively acceptable as unemployment rate was around 15 percent and was only visible among primary and secondary school leavers. Other notable poverty reduction related programmes that were put in place in Nigeria then included; Operation Feed the National (OFN) set up in 1977, Free Compulsory Primary Education (FCPE) set up in 1977, Green Revolution established in 1980, and low cost Housing Scheme, Agriculture Guarantee Scheme (ACGS), Rural Electrification Scheme (RES), Rural Banking Programme, National Agricultural Land Development

Authority (NALDA) (Omotola, 2008). As a result of the oil boom in the 1970s, Nigeria neglected agricultural sector which was its main economic base and focused on oil. This period witnessed remarkable growth rates but the boom had no impact on the real sector as the industrial sector remained relatively weak. The windfall from oil was not utilized in establishing the industrial sectors, therefore, when the recession of the 1980s set in, the economy found itself unable to absorb shocks from declining oil prices (Eze, 2007).

At the time of economic recession, the Nigeria's economy remained such that real wages could not meet basic requirements, social services deteriorated at an alarming rate, whiles the gap between the rich and the poor though not visible, began to emerge. The government had to make determined efforts to check the crisis through the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programme. However, the implementation worsened the living conditions of many, and Nigeria became importer of basic food items. Gross Domestic Investment as a percentage of GDP which was 16.3 percent and 22.8 percent in the period 1965-1973 and 1973-1980 respectively, decreased to almost 14 percent in 1980-1988. This made the government to design and implement many poverty alleviation related programmes between 1986 and 1993 aimed at providing the people with socio-economic amenities required to enable the people have access to basic necessities of life such as food, drinking water, health care services, education, housing, employment etc. Also, under the guided deregulation that spanned the period 1993 to 1998, more poverty alleviation related programmes were put in place. Some of these programs include: Directorate for Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), National Directorate of Employment (NDE), Better Life Programme (BLP), People Bank of Nigeria, Community Bank, Family Support Programme, Family Economic, 2006).

In 1999 when Nigeria returned to democracy, World Bank Report indicated that Nigerian's Human Development Index (HDI) was only 0.416 and while about seventy percent (70%) of the population was still living under poverty line (World Bank,1999). These alarming rates of poverty and underdevelopment both in Nigeria and other countries of the world prompted the emergence of Millennium Development Goals (MDGS). The MDGs as stated by Socialist International (2005) cited in Elekwa (2008), is part of the social democratic approach to governance in a global society. It was a commitment at the 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit by 189 Heads of State and government on behalf of their people in the Millennium declaration to free their fellow citizens from the abject dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty. The declaration reaffirms universal values of equality, mutual respect and shared responsibilities for the conditions of all peoples and seeks to redress the lopsided benefits of globalization. This prompted the government of Nigeria to review the existing poverty alleviation schemes with a view to harmonizing them and improving on them. Three presidential panels were set up in this regard. The findings and recommendations of these presidential panels coalesced in the formation of the National Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP) in 2001. The target of the national poverty eradication programme was to completely wipe out

poverty from Nigeria by the year 2015 in line with the Millennium Development Goals target.

In 2004, Nigeria equally came up with National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) to further see to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The NEEDS as a national policy was intended to meet some of the MDGS, especially poverty reduction and underdevelopment.

With all this plethora of developmental programmes initiated and implemented, the various UNDP reports still indicate that the Nigerian poverty rate is still below average. Against this backdrop, the cardinal objective of this paper therefore, is to juxtapose poverty and underdevelopment, causes and effects on the Nigerian state with a view to proffering alternative perspectives for the nation.

**Delineation of Concepts**
**Poverty**

The disagreement on the precise definition of poverty has continued to engage the attention of scholars all over the world. This stems from the multifaceted nature of poverty and the relativity of the concept of poverty which prevents unanimity among scholars as regards its definition. This is evidenced by the intensive and extensive consultations and debates among scholars in determining a conceptual definition of poverty. Consequently, scholars and development economists admit that the concept of poverty is complex and multidimensional and as such a mere definition may not give a clear picture of its complexity.  Ugo and Ukpere (2009), confirmed this when they stated that no definition of poverty can be said to be adequate due to its complexity. They averred that there are various factors that shape the interpretation of poverty to different people in different places and at different circumstances, stating that what one sees as poverty can be an affluent to another person. Despite this difficulty in poverty definition, they agreed that poverty has one peculiar instrument which they explained to be involuntary deprivation; hence they see poverty as involuntary deprivation which a person as an individual, household, community or nation faces. At individual level, deprivation could manifest when one is unable to have access to basic needs of life such as food, housing, education and health care services, and at the household level, poverty manifest when a man is unable to take care of his immediate family members such as sending children to school and paying their school fees, take house hold members to hospital when need arises and access the health care services, as well as taking  care of family members' nutritional needs, while at the community or national level, deprivation can be seen when community or nation is unable to create access to social-economic and infrastructural services  and create jobs and income generating opportunities to the people. Since income is the means of creating access to other needs, income becomes an important issue when poverty is discussed. Lack or insufficient income to be able to create access to meet basic needs is the basis of poverty.

Nnamani (2003) sees poverty in different perspective, as he sees poverty as not just having sufficient income to take care of basic needs of life, but the account of how people were denied the opportunity to have access to the means of production to

better their lot. This indicates that people are in poverty as a result of their denial of access to means of production such as land, education, healthcare services, electricity which would have enhanced their standard of living. The denial of access to means of production has continued to throw people to hunger. This is supported by World Bank (1996) assertion that the alarming rate of poverty was basically due to the denial of people the access to means of production which have thrown the poor into helpless situation. Poverty is as well seen as a situation where people are subjected to hardship and lack resources that would have assisted them seek means of assuaging their condition. Poverty can as well be seen from social perspective which portends people who cannot measure up to certain standard in the society as being poor. Here, people are judged by the type of school they send their family members, the type of food they eat as well as their dressing and the type of accommodation they have. This creates economic and social distance. Gasu (2011) sees this situation as a situation where a population or a section of the population is not just unable to meet its essential needs of foods, clothing and shelter but inability to maintain what the society see as minimum standard of living. Dennis (2011) added credence to the issue of social distance when he states that it is the marginalization of the poor that has created the situation of helplessness as the poor see themselves as people that are condemned to be pathologically on the road to damnation.

Another aspect of poverty came up when it was argued that it was the poor himself that will be in a position to describe poverty in line with his situation. This assertion has given a different approach to the concept of poverty. The assertion is that it is the person that wears the shoe that knows where it pitches him, hence the core of this view of poverty is that poverty has to be defined by the poor themselves or by the communities that poor people live in. Oladipo (1999) agreed that poverty may look quite different when seen through the eyes of a poor man or a woman. This is seen in the differences in the various definitions, as poverty is weighed in relative term. As a result of this, Social and Management Scholars discern the need to widen the definition of poverty when they famed that poverty can be seen in the areas of history, intellect and ideology, hence, Shephered (2007) sees poverty as multifaceted.

The concept of poverty is multidimensional, encompassing both monetary and non-monetary aspects. This shows that poverty cannot be defined focusing on one aspect of this concept as doing that would mean not showing good underestimating of its complexity.

## Underdevelopment

Underdevelopment is seen as the inability of a nation, state or community to improve the socio-economic and infrastructural wellbeing of the people in the provision of education, road, electricity, pipe-borne water, hospital. Imhonopi & Urim (2010), see underdevelopment of a country as the inability of a country or countries to improve the social welfare of the people in the areas of social amenities such as education, healthcare services, power, housing, pipe-borne water, roads, access to means of production, participation in governance among others and others. The components of underdevelopment in any country include; economic

underdevelopment, socio-cultural underdevelopment and its impact on human development. Ogboru (2007) observed that economic development expressed in GNP can increase human development by expenditure from families, government and organizations such as NGOs. With the increase in economic growth, families and individuals will likely increase expenditures with the increase in income. This increase can lead to greater human development, showing that development must be measured in terms of jobs created, justice dispensed and poverty alleviated.

**Causes of Poverty and Underdevelopment in Nigeria**

The high rate of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria as indicated by various studies despite its abundant human and natural resources, the various poverty reduction and developmental programmes initiated and implemented by various governments in the country has continued to be of paramount concern to both scholars, economic experts, development agencies and other organization. This is made more difficult when compared with other countries that have similar resources with Nigeria. However, a search of the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria has revealed different factors. One of such factors as stated by Maiangwa (2009), is lack of political will and commitment by government. He noted that most of the poverty reduction and developmental programmes initiated and implemented by various governments in the past were not directed at the poverty. He explained that no poverty programme no matter how much is expended on it can successfully reduce poverty when the people whose poverty are being reduced are not identified and involved in the planning and implementation of such programme, stressing that Nigeria has been fighting poverty through top-bottom approach. This he states created opportunities for government to have continued to waste a lot of resources without achieving any result, and that rather than achieve the objectives of such programme, their implementation worsened the situation of the people. He went further to add that the failure of these programmes to achieve the desired objectives had prompted various governments to abandon any poverty related programmes instituted by other administration. This is line with the submission of Obadan (2002) when he revealed that the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme by government made the people poorer and widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Another reason for the continued persistence of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria is the postulation of Adeyeye (2000) that one of the major causes is the non-diversification of the economy. He argued that since Nigeria discovered oil, that the agricultural sector which was the main stay of the economy was neglected. He argued that as a result of over dependence on oil that Nigeria not only neglected agriculture but equally neglected all other sectors including the manufacturing sector and that this left Nigeria at the mercy of the world oil market which was never stable. He recounted that when the recession came in the early 1980s, that the Nigerian economy crashed and since then, Nigerian poverty profile has continued to grow while the few available infrastructure deteriorated. Contributing to the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria, the World Bank Report (2008) revealed that one of the major causes is corruption, which it explained as the abuse of

entrusted power to personal benefit. The report reiterated that this has become a common practice in Nigeria where government funds meant for developmental purposes were embezzled by public office holders, stressing that this has led to the failure of government programmes since funds meant for the execution of government projects were diverted to private accounts while the projects were abandoned. In some cases, unexecuted projects were paid for while the masses who would have benefitted from such projects were allowed to swallow in poverty. This is the case in Nigeria where the country is rich while the citizens are poor. Many have attributed bad governance as the cause of corruption in Nigeria as those who ought to stop this trend are those that perpetrate them. This is supported by several allegations by Transparency International that the federal government was not serious in her fight against corruption and has been severally rated as one of the 20th most corrupt nation in the world and ranked 152nd in 2016 Human Development Index out of the 188 countries as released by UNDP Report (2017) with HDI value of 0.514, showing that Nigeria is still placed on Low Human Development category outside High Human Development and Medium Human Development. Elumilade, Asaolu and Aderebi (2006) in their contribution to the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria explained that lack of employment or access to means of production and job creation were reasons for poverty in Nigeria. They argued that any nation that does not create job opportunities for its teeming youth will definitely continue to leave its citizen in poverty, explaining that creating job opportunities starts with the building of infrastructural base, good educational system, skills, market and availability of land and capital accessible to the people which Nigeria has ignored over the years.

**Theoretical Construct of the Study**

The theory used for the explanation of this work is the Optimal Constraint Theory by Yasmin Dawood (2012). The theory argues that it is the interaction of various factors; constitutional, political, institutional and civil that produces dysfunction in governance. The theory posits that some governmental systems are better positioned to function in the face of different environmental factors. It hinges on the democratic system of governance which involves trade-off between mechanisms that constrain government action on the other hand, and mechanisms that either allows for governmental action or that relieve constraints on action. Effective governance requires an optimal balance between these competing factors.

In applying this theory to this study, an examination of Nigerian political system no doubt, shows that various factors interact with one another to produce great constraint on governmental action especially as it concerns poverty reduction and the development of socio-economic and infrastructural development in Nigeria. These factors include; the constitutional structure, political factors, institutional factors and the civil factors. Although it is quite necessary that constitutional structure is in place as a guide to democratic governance, it is the interaction of this same constitution with political, institutional and civil factors that create functional or dysfunctional governance that will either mare of make development and poverty reduction in any state.

**Methodology**

Content analytical approach was utilized in the study. This analytical technique was adopted as a result of the need for a reliable scientific method for assessing, analyzing and interpreting a large variety of materials. For clarity of purpose, content Analysis is a research technique adopted primarily for the objective, systematic and qualitative analysis and interpretation of information.

Data were sourced from existing records like books, journals, United Nations documents, World Bank publications, government and other official publications, internet materials, other documents related to Poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria and direct observation.

**Dimensions of Poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria**

The magnitude of Poverty in Nigeria for many years now has not been encouraging. This is more disturbing judging from the fact that the country is endowed with both were capable of seeing Nigeria as one of the richest countries in the world. The present poverty situation in the country has necessitated the country that was rated among the first twenty richest countries in the early 1970s to be rated today as the first twenty poorest nations in the world as noted by Chigbo (2001). He revealed that the measurement of poverty in the country was first carried out by the federal office of statistics in 1980 where it was discovered that about 27.2% of the population were already below poverty line. He noted that by five years later in 1985, that the country was estimated to have moved about 46% of its population to poverty line, and by 1996 survey, the poverty trend was already at 66% of the population. This trend has aroused the curiosity of scholars, economic experts, development agencies, civil society organizations and other world bodies to raise questions as to what has gone wrong especially when compared with other countries that are endowed with similar natural resources. Nigeria is endowed with petroleum resources among other resources and the sixth largest oil producer in the world and a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) but the report of UNDHDI (2010) ranked her 156th out of the 187 countries surveyed and the poorest among the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Comparative analysis of members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries showed that Indonesia is ranked 124th with its life expectancy put at 69.4 years, education index at 0.584 and gross national income per capita of $3, 716. Qatar is ranked 37th with its life expectancy put at 78.4 years, education index of 0.623, and gross national income per capita of $107,721, while United Arab Emirate (UAE) is ranked 30th with its life expectancy put at 76.5 years, education index of 0.741 and gross national income per capita of $59,993. Others were Saudi Arabi at 56th position, Kuwait 63rd, Iran 88th Venezuela 73rd, Algeria 96th and Iraq is ranked 132nd (UNDHDI, 2010). Chimobi (2010) argued that judging from the rich natural resources in Nigeria that the level of poverty is very high, stating that the poor rating of various measures of poverty such as life expectancy at birth, level of education, gross national income per capita are all indication that the country's poverty level is bad. He added further that infant mortality in the country is as high as 99 per 1000

birth. The above position is supported by the Human Development Report on Human Poverty Index 1999 - 2007 in Nigeria.

**Data Presentation and Analysis**
**Table 1: Human Development Report, Human Poverty Index (1999-2007)**

| Human Development Report (HDR) | | Human Poverty Index | Population of People not expected to survive at age of 40 (Longevity) % | Population without Adult Literacy (Knowledge) | Population without access to water, health & sanitation % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Rank | Value | | | |
| 1999 | 63 | 38.2 | 33.4 | 40.5 | 51 |
| 2000 | 62 | 37.6 | 33.3 | 38.9 | 51 |
| 2001 | 59 | 36.1 | 33.7 | 37.4 | 43 |
| 2002 | 58 | 34.9 | 33.7 | 36.1 | 43 |
| 2003 | 54 | 34 | 34.9 | 34.6 | 38 |
| 2004 | 57 | 35.1 | 34.9 | 34.6 | 38 |
| 2005 | 75 | 38.8 | 46.6 | 33.2 | 40 |
| 2006 | 76 | 40.6 | 46 | 33.1 | 52 |
| 2007 | 80 | 37.3 | 39 | 30.9 | 52 |

**Source:** UNHD Reports (2007) on Human Poverty.

The table above shows that Nigeria's human poverty level, life expectancy, education, access to water, health care as well as sanitation have continued to remain low despite all the efforts of the various administration in reducing poverty in the country.

**Table Two: Trend in Human Development Indicator 2009-2013**

| | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HDI | | 0.462 | 0.467 | 0.50 | 0.504 |
| IHDI | | | | 0.276 | 0.300 |
| GNI per capita (2011 ppp$) | 4597 | 4716 | 4949 | 5176 | 5353 |
| GNI index | 0.578 | 0.582 | 0.589 | 0.596 | 0.601 |
| Life expectancy at birth (in years) | 50.8 | 51.3 | 51.7 | 52.1 | 52.5 |
| Life expectancy index | 0.474 | 0.481 | 0.488 | 0.494 | 0.5 |
| Mean years of schooling | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 |
| 5 mortality rate (per 1000 life births) | 132 | 128 | 12.4 | 124 | |
| Educational Index | | 0.8686 | | | 0.8139 |
| (Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 0.31* | | | | | 0.247 |
| *2008 value | | | | | |

**Sources**: Human Development Report (various years), 2015

The above table shows the development index (HDI), GNI per capita, GNI index, life expectancy at birth (in years), life expectancy Index, Under 5 Mortality rate over 1000 live births, educational index and multidimensional poverty Index. It also dwells on analysis of development and progress in components of human development

indices and factors influencing them. In this respect, focus is on life expectancy, the economy and the role of harmful social conditions, knowledge, learning and literacy as well as income and standard of living.

It is this continued drifting of Nigerian population to poverty line that prompted Ukwu (2002) to argue that the life of average Nigerian citizen has been progressively going down over the years and that since no solution seems to be available that the people have started seeing it as part of their existence. Since the measurement of poverty has gone beyond the per capita income, to include the level of illiteracy, access to health care services, life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, sanitation, gross domestic product of a nation as well as nutrition, it has become necessary that efforts geared toward reducing poverty should be all embracing. Although Nigeria's gross domestic product per capital has been increasing, Chimobi (2010) noted that despite this increase that many Nigerians are still living in poverty. He noted that the average income per capita does not give the real picture because of the gap between the rich and the poor in Nigeria, adding that about 71% of Nigerians live on less than $1 a day while about 92% live on less than $2 a day. He noted that the high rate of mortality in the country is caused by lack of money for parents to take care of their children while many mothers are ignorant of some preventive measures such as immunization and vaccines due to illiteracy.

The prevalence of poverty is higher in the rural area where over 70% of the population lives. The rural area is characterized by poor sanitation, lack of socio-economic facilities such as healthcare services, educational infrastructure, good roads, skill acquisition centers and other human resources that would have helped them improve their living condition. Shephered (2007) agreed to this position when he noted that rate of poverty is higher among the regions where we have more concentration of rural areas as there are differences between regions in the concentration of poor and the rich in the society as poverty varies from the North to the South with more concentration of the poor in the North. The North-East geopolitical zone he noted has the largest proportion of its population living in poverty compared to other geo-political zones, noting that while the average family expenditure per month was N4,058.00, the North East recorded the least figure of N2, 941. This he noted was associated with lack of formal education, unemployment, lack of skills, healthcare services among others. As if that was not enough, the country again was ranked the 152nd position in the poverty ranking out of 188 countries surveyed by UNDP Report in 2014, 2015 and 2016, showing no effort in improving its poverty and underdevelopment level.

## Effects of Poverty and Underdevelopment on the Nigerian State.

The efforts to reduce poverty and underdevelopment all over the world have been a global issue. This is mostly due to its associated effects. Since poverty and underdevelopment are both economic and social deprivation, those who find themselves in this situation will never be at ease with serious economic and social consequences as noted by Odion (2009). Apart from the material deprivation associated with poverty and underdevelopment, it is dehumanizing and socially

disruptive. It brings about social alienation, powerlessness and worthlessness. Other effects of poverty and underdevelopment are outlined to include; lack of respect for both the country and the citizens, unhappiness, lack of self-esteem, lack of confidence or courage (Ukwu, 2002). Deprivation associated to poverty and underdevelopment can lead to bad habit like armed robbery, causing of confusion in the community and apathy towards community development. Since being poor includes not having food to eat, shelter, clothing, low income etc., and underdevelopment to include lack of socioeconomic and infrastructural facilities, it therefore means that those born under such environment are likely to have high infant and maternal mortality, illiteracy, poor health condition, while those on low incomes are often nutritionally poor. UNECA (2005) noted other conditions to include; poor housing and homelessness as shown by the type of houses the people live. People on low income often experience debt which affects the prospective standard of living in future since they are denied access to education. As a result of poverty occasioned by lack of access to education and resultant unemployment especially the youths, more and more of them stand the risk of suffering from mental disorder or engaging in drug addiction with associated crime. Chimobi (2010) noted that apart from crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping for ransom, internet fraud and other forms of fraudulent activities, many turn to immorality out of sheer desperation, leading to high increase of people being infected with HIV/AIDS. Ibrahim (1999) noted that these were people who would have been contributing to the growth of the economy if they were gainfully employed but are rather thrown to destructive activities thereby creating unhealthy environment for the thriving of the economy. Soludo (2006) revealed that the North East is the poorest geopolitical zone in the country, and today the severe crisis that engulfed the Nigerian society especially in the North East has been attributed to poverty and underdevelopment.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we have examined the relationship between poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. With the initiation and implementation of various poverty reduction and developmental programmes in Nigeria which dated back to pre-independence, down to period of independence. The paper equally examined the period when democracy returned in the country in 1999 in the areas of poverty reduction and development, and it was discovered that the challenges of poverty reduction has been on how to develop our infrastructure and diversify the economy. We realized in the cause of the study that poverty reduction and development have come to assume a new aura of significance in the modern world affairs. This was based on the interest of the world to accelerate socio-economic development; given that it is perceived to enhance poverty reduction.

Though, poverty and underdevelopment are totally misinterpreted especially in the developing world, the provision of socio-economic infrastructure and access of the poor to these amenities are still viewed as a sure way for poverty reduction which will guarantee equal rights and participation of the poor in the formulation and implementation of developmental plans and as well guarantee security to the entire

populace, it is still assumed to be the bridge-builder. Most importantly, development has a better opportunity to facilitate the provision of and equal distribution of resources and basic needs of man. It is the embracement of development that can address the general problems that militate against poverty reduction. This measures entails the mobilization of the domestic resources which includes human resources to increase production and stimulate employment, raise the capital flow of the people, reduce poverty and alleviate their standard of living. It equally enhances agricultural development, rural industrialization development, education, health care facilities, rural housing, and transport, sanitation through provision of access to good water, roads and bridges.

Therefore, poverty and underdevelopment are inseparable and in eradicating poverty, the development of key sectors of the country plays a very significant role, especially in the areas of healthcare facilities, road, electricity, education, transport system, sanitation, and drinking water among others.

**Recommendations**

In view of the findings of this study, the following recommendations were made for poverty and underdevelopment to be addressed in Nigeria with the findings that the two issues go hand in hand and cannot be separated.

1. There is urgent need for more government commitment for revival of socio-economic and infrastructural facilities in Nigeria in the areas of electricity, healthcare facilities, good road network, education, skills acquisition, transport system, drinking water, and industrialization among others.
2. Poverty should be addressed using the people oriented approach where the poor should be key actors, devoid of ethnic sentiments and corruption.
3. Government should create agencies to be solely responsible for maintenance of existing infrastructure in the country.
4. There should be constitutional amendments to allow every state to have control of the resources in their areas to accelerate socio-economic and infrastructural development which is key to poverty reduction.

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# Power Devolution and Economic Diversification in Nigeria: History, Challenges and Prospects

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## Abstract
*The paper examined the nexus between power devolution and economic diversification in Nigeria. It delved into how the prevailing monocultural economy and monocratic polity were imposed on Nigeria during the colonial rule and how they were subsequently retained by Nigerian politicians who are largely abdullistic capitalists. The inherited reality served their rapacious intents for primitive accumulation and political power domination. The paper made use of secondary sources of data: books, journals, periodicals among others. Power Theory was use as its framework of analysis. It was established that Nigeria's current monocratic political posture has inevitably negated any attempt at diversification because it has made the country excessively centrist, statist and ipso facto totalistic. Also, the nation's centre has over-empowered the component states and local councils are simultaneously disempowered and encouraged to be lazy and beggarly thereby making political patronage rather than economic productivity the only recognizable access to the national cake which continues to get narrower and increasingly monocultural. The study also discovered that Nigeria of today is far more monocultural than it was in the colonial times. This is so because in the colonial era at least no fewer than four commodity exports were produced, namely cocoa, cotton, rubber, palm oil, groundnut, etc. But today, the only recognizable export commodity is oil at its crude state. The paper recommends among other things that: Government should make conscious and concerted effort at reviewing the country's Constitution in a way that transfers land management and resource control to the states and councils while the centre maintains defence and external relations; and that, at the state and council levels, Government should encourage diversification by making available credit facilities at minimal interest rates.*

## Introduction
There is no doubt that the phenomenon of diversification of Nigeria's economic mainstay has been a dominant, and *ipso facto* a contentious matter among Nigerians, both lay and learned or informed and un-informed. This is so because it is

rigorously contended that the constant loss of means of livelihood – especially through retrenchment, forced closure of businesses borne out of lack of micro credits or unfriendly tax regime, unfavourable forex benchmarks, inconsistency and sometimes clash in government fiscal and monetary policies, etc. – leading to a spike in the army of the unemployed, is tied to the narrow resource base inherited as the major economic heirloom from the ex-colonialists.

This resource or economic base, it is contended, was not only made to be narrow or monocultural but also disarticulated and dependent. Scholars like Ake (1981, 2001) Onimode (1983), Rodney (1972), Ibeanu (2004) and Jacob (2012) are among those who have written profusely on the monocultural and disarticulated character of both the colonial and post-colonial Nigerian state and economy.

All the above attest to one thing: the urgent and unremitting need, and indeed clarion call, for the reversal of this trend, hence the imperative of diversification. The paper is of the view that the over-concentration of political, economic, administrative and developmental powers at the centre is largely *responsible for the* unproductive or slow pace of development. Thus, it is naturally, inherently and ruthlessly anti-diversification. In light of the above, any attempt at diversification, a phenomenon which has wantonly assumed the status of a development paradigm, without first embarking on conscious political power devolution would amount to sheer hypocrisy, a banal travesty of reality or at worst, *ignorantio elenchi.*

## Operational Definitions and Theoretical Framework

Some concepts used in the study that require brief definitive clarification are:

**Power:** as used here means "a form of currency that allows its holders to satisfy important values and attain objectives (Deutsch, 1966)".

**Power Devolution:** this means the de-concentration of a central government of constitutional powers so as to strengthen the component states and local councils for purposes of economic diversification and development. It also means the process of political power dispersal so that formerly weak subsidiary governments in a federal setting become strong to serve their citizenry.

**Monocultural Economy:** as used here it means two related things. The first is the production of one export product. The second is the production of only raw or primary product which could either be two or more, but not necessarily one.

**Petroltocracy:** This means oil is the driving force to acquire political power in Nigeria and an end in itself.

**Diversification:** this means the process of translating a monocultural economy into a *multicultural* one.

**Monocracy:** this is a system of governance whereby virtually all powers – political, institutional, administrative, economic, etc – are vested in the center governmental authority.

**True Federalism:** as used here represents a form of federal system where the federating or component units constitutionally control socio-economic resources domiciled in their individual domains, and pay designated percentage of their *revenue*

to the coordinating or central authority for nation-wide defence, security, disaster management, etc.

## 2.1. Power Theory

This study employs the Power Theory. This theory has its roots in Nicolo Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau, who regarded power as a means to pre-calculated ends. They place primacy on state (or political) power over and above other forms of power – economic, technological, scientific, spiritual, biological, etc. – as they believe that it is by state power that everything that happens within the state is determined and sustained. It is in this light that Nnoli (1986) contended that "power exists in practically all institutions…but when we talk about power in politics we talk about state power…. All other forms of power yield to it and are, or can be controlled by it". He adds that "state power, therefore, is the basis of all security, all rights and privileges in a society, and the maintenance of any mode of livelihood".

Morgenthau (1948, pp 4-14), defined power as 'Man's control over the mind sand action of other men.' He Accordingly, gave the elements of national power as follows: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, state of military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, and quality of diplomacy. This is what makes a state all powerful and dreadful that sets the pace for competition within and without.

Depicting the import of state power in the colonial and post-colonial state of Africa, Ake (2001) asserted that "to become wealthy without the patronage of the state was likely to invite the unpleasant attention of those in control of state power. Political power was everything; it was not only the access to wealth but also the means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being". Ake further submits that "for anyone outside the hegemonic faction of the political elite, it was generally futile to harbor any illusions of becoming wealthy by entrepreneurial activity or even take personal safety for granted. For anyone who was part of the ruling faction, entrepreneurial activity was unnecessary for one could appropriate surplus with less risk and less trouble by means of state power".

In his recent theorizing, MacOgonor (2000) contended that geography, population, resources, etc., constitute instruments of state or national power. However, major proponents of the power theory like Machiavelli, Morgenthau, Deutsch, Kissinger, Kennan, Galbraith, and Niebuhr have agreed that "the quest for power is driven by human desire for domination". The power theory's applicability in this study stems from the fact that it is the quest to use state power as an instrument of domination, appropriation and primitive accumulation that has driven Nigeria's political elite to systematically and invidiously enthrone and entrench a culture of monocracy or over-concentration of powers in the centre. This has inevitably negated and made mockery of the call for, and vigorous campaign for the diversification and development of Nigeria's economic lifeline. This is because to domicile all powers in one *center* like the *Treasury Single Account (TSA)* gives the *crooked* politicians the licence to plunder *all* in one fell swoop.

**Nigeria's Colonial and Post-Colonial Legacies of Monocultural Economy**

One of the major realities of British colonialism in Nigeria was the creation and fostering of a mono-cultural, one-sided and subordinated economy in Nigeria while at the same time building an all-round material life in Britain. It suffices to state that a mono-cultural economy is an economy whose major material output sellable as export commodity occupies a categorical and often dependent position in the production process or chain; this could be primary, secondary or tertiary position.

So, when it is said that British colonialism created, in Nigeria, a mono-cultural economy, this thought could be understood from two intellectual positions. The first is that the colonialists made the country to produce just one product, that is, a *mono* product. The other intellectual orientation is that they made Nigeria to produce just raw materials – that is only primary product – which could be two or more products and not just *one*. It does not necessarily entail that it made Nigeria to produce just one commodity or item, but that it made Nigeria to produce commodities or goods which had one categorical nature in the production process. And this categorical nature was that which pertained to the production of raw materials or production of unrefined, unfinished goods or commodities.

The import of the above argument is that British colonialists are not to be reprimanded for making Nigerians to produce just one item because, in all reality, Nigerians produced more than one items among which were cocoa, cotton, coffee, groundnut, palm oil, etc, all of which were exportable and actually exported; but, that they engineered the engagement of Nigerians in the production of the above commodities only at a crude or primary level without creating the much needed inclination for industrialization or manufacturing. It is in this form that the mono-cultural economy created by British colonialism in Nigeria is to be understood and analyzed.

Having made the above clarification, it is now left for us to consider the core reasons why this status of a mono-cultural economy was created and foisted on Nigeria especially in relation to the overall material development of Britain, and its consequences on Nigeria.

To begin with, it should be reiterated that the core reason why the economy of Nigeria was modulated in the above fashion, was borne out of the major causes of British capitalist expansionism towards Nigeria in particular, and Africa, at large. It is important to state that the Europeans generally made progress towards non-industrialized and non-mechanized lands in order to be able to fulfill their core interests.

The above was made manifest in Sir, Lord Lugard's colonial order; the 'Dual Mandate' (1922, in mimeograph, 1991, UNN) thus:

> Let it admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made

reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfill this dual mandate.

The interests were mainly material or economic. The British imperialists migrated to the shores of Nigeria primarily to sell or ease off wares or over-produced and under-consumed commodities to Nigerians, or also referred to as the 'vent theory of surplus'. It was this state of industrial and commercial affairs of Europe that drove their inevitable search for markets in the so-called virgin lands or non-European, well-populated and non-industrialized territories which today constitute the third world.

Also of paramount consideration is the fact that the pervasive mechanization of the production lines specifically meant that the employment or use of manual labour or labourers became naturally obsolete. This was essentially because a job that was done by 100 manual labourers prior to European industrialization could now be done by one or two man-controlled tractors or other machines thereby rendering the remaining 98 manual labourers unemployed. The redundancy or retrenchment of these labourers meant that an army of unemployed was created, an army that squarely acted as a clog in the wheels of the peace and pleasures of the other one or two labourers employed and paid huge amount of money. From the army of the unemployed, criminals, assassins, prostitutes, drug addicts and drug peddlers and more, became the manifest folks in major European cities and urban centers. In other words, the mechanization of production did not only mean the retrenchment of many labourers, but this retrenchment also meant that nuisance situations had been systematically created, situations which only acted as great displeasures to the emergent European industrial bourgeoisie. Therefore, the army of the unemployed Europeans needed to be taken to other places where they could be engaged in other activities, especially expatriate activities – these activities were to be found in those already discovered virgin lands. This was because as much as possible these nuisance elements needed to be sent to places that were considerably removed from the pleasure-range of the industry and factory owners.

Meanwhile, in the face of European industrialization, agricultural and other agrarian activities were abandoned or relegated. This was because men and women then wanted white-collar and blue-collar jobs which were to be found only in the industries and factories. These jobs went with some forms of pays and respect which could no longer, by the said abandonment and relegation, be derived from the farms and plantations, or the forests and rural communities.

Agricultural activities became defaced and discarded. But, of critical consideration is the fact that the abandonment of agriculture also meant the emergence of the problem of lack of raw materials. It should therefore be noted that even though the initial motivating force that propelled the Europeans to expand beyond their borders was the quest to sell their wares, the motive changed after the sale of their first sets of already produced wares, because the issue of raw materials to continue production in their industries and factories systematically outstripped that of the marketisation of produced goods.

The point here is that it was the quest to secure raw materials for the continuation of industrial and factory production that led to the creation of a mono-cultural economy in Nigeria by Britain, the frontline industrial capitalist country as at then. So, Nigerians were compelled to produce raw materials or engage in primary production chiefly to serve and service the interests of Britain and by so doing helping to advance the frontiers of her industrialization. In this case, Nigeria was made to become the farms and plantations of Britain producing all the raw produces or materials she needed: Nigerians were only allowed to be planters and farmers of commanded crop items, and no less. The clear implication of this situation in which Nigeria became the farm and plantation of Britain was that Nigeria became the rural areas of Britain which had gradually taken upon herself the form of an urban, metropolitan or city center.

Moreover, by the instrumentality of the marketing boards which were created by the British, Nigerians were carefully held in a situation that could best be described as double squeeze, a situation which explains that the British colonial imperialists dictated what crops Nigerians were to produce and how much they (the Europeans) were to pay for these produced items. This was a complete state of the subordination of one people to another amounting to the dehumanization, exploitation and frustration of the totality of Nigerian farmers and planters.

The saddest conclusion that could be made here is that the compulsive gravitation of Nigerians into mono-cultural, raw material, production also meant that Nigerians were not allowed to industrialize. That is, there was a conscious ossification of all attempts at industrialization mainly because this would have meant that the aim of the advent of British colonial imperialism would have been defeated. This deliberate non-industrialization of Nigeria carefully created a situation of disarticulation which defined the non-complementarily or de-linkage of various sectors within the Nigerian political economy (Ake, 1981, p.43).

This disarticulation was pervasive in that it manifested in virtually all sectors of the Nigerian economy. It was this disarticulation that deepened the unwholesome dependence of the Nigerian economy to that of Britain, a situation which culminated in the underdevelopment of Nigeria, or what is better called a dependent development of the country. A dependent development or a situation of dependence, in the reasoning of Santos (1970, in Offong,1980, p.73) implies "a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others." It was this dependent relationship arising from the material phenomenon of disarticulation that created the paradoxical state of the development of underdevelopment.

In this light, the materiality of Nigeria's political economy was configured to be exocentric or outward-serving and it became relevant only to the extent that it produced the raw materials needed to feed and furnish British factories and industries. This narrow production of raw materials did not agitate the necessary impulses which could have brought about the urbanization and material development of Nigeria. To this end, even when urban signs were observed in certain areas, it was as a result of the fact that it had become compelling for them to be developed so as to create a

relatively more conducive, Europe-like environments in some selected areas to be inhabited by imperial or colonial supervisors who were in charge of monitoring the activities of Nigerian peasant farmers. The Nigerian farmers had naturally become peasantized because they had been converted or translated from processing necessary products to processing surplus products which were to be sold as cash crops only to the British imperial bourgeoisie.

It should be noted that the peasantization of the Nigerian farmers and planters was borne out of the monetization of the colonial Nigerian economy. The monetization of the colonial Nigerian economy meant the massive engagement or use of British pounds and sterling, the value of which was dictated externally to appropriately suffice the rapacious profiteering craves of British materialistic czars.

The bottom-line of the foregoing explanation is the fact that the materiality of Nigerian political economy was made to take a dependent, disarticulated and a heavily underdeveloped posture by virtue of the foisting of a monocultural label on it by the British colonialists. Today, even though this monocultural label has taken a new outlook yet its motive force remains unaltered. In this regard, even though Nigerian mono-cultural stature has largely shifted from the production of agricultural raw materials – not because the country has outgrown agricultural production or has done very well that she has become agriculturally buoyant – to the production of raw materials in the crude oil sector. It could even be argued that the crude oil production Nigeria does today whether at the primary level or otherwise, is done mainly with the support and pioneering efforts of external manufacturing and industrial elements/technology.

So, the mono-cultural economic development that was superimposed on Nigeria by Britain which has also created a dependent development has continued to subsist till date. This position is taken because the crude oil which accounts for more than 90% of the nation's annual total revenue is largely produced – from extraction to refinement – by foreigners and foreign corporations, with fragments handled by not-totally local companies. Even when Nigerians and Nigerian companies are involved, they mainly end at the level of extraction and contract out the other stages which would culminate in usable refined petroleum products. This final and main stage – that cost very high to do - is mostly done abroad making Nigerians to still reside on the plane of mono-cultural or primary production.

**Nigeria's History of Monocratic/Autocratic Governance**

It is relevant to note at this juncture that the colonization of Nigeria by Britain brought about the elevation of alien political autocracy and its entrenchment in the territory of Nigeria. This meant that Nigerians were politically subordinated to the overlordship of white rulers who acted as foot soldiers of the monarchy of England. This alien political autocracy was elevated and entrenched by reason of how political, administrative and constitutional powers were generated, distributed and operationalised.

It should be noted that from the time  the colonial state in Nigeria was formally established as a single, concerted political entity – being  an amalgam of the

Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria – in 1914 under the political and administrative  pleasures of Lord Fredrick Lugard who himself was the chief representative of the monarchy of England then, the politico-administrative head of the country who was also called the Governor-General, and at some other points as Governor, was vested with what was called the veto power. The veto power of the Governor-General who was a non-Nigerian, defined a form of political power that was immensely totalistic as it was unchallengeable, uncontestable and unquestionable especially by Nigerians.

The Governor-General to this end, possessed the licence to kill and to make alive; he had the totalitarian discretion to hire and fire without been responsible or responsive to the Nigerian people or at any rate to any statutory establishment. He was only responsible to the Queen of England and responsive to the mercantile interests of British traders, manufacturers and financiers for whose sake the colonial state was originally contrived.

This situation made the Nigerian political elite to be marginalized to the extent that when Nigerians were constitutionally permitted to vote and be voted for from 1922 – during the Governorship of Sir Hugh Clifford thereby making Nigerians to form an active voice in the legislative council, they were still rendered politically impotent because the Governor-General who had the said all-consuming or overriding power was not answerable to the legislative council. He ruled mainly by proclamations, which were political or legal instruments equivalent to military decrees and fiats. Armed with Instruments of Proclamations, the Governor-General was unchallengeable in his political power possession. He needed totalistic powers for the economic and socio-cultural expropriation of Nigeria for the Queen's Majesty.

It was necessarily conceived to be totalistic because it was expected to make – and at other times, unmake – and implement laws which were to favour one class against another. These laws and legal instruments were construed and constructed to favourably serve and secure the interests of the British commercial and industrial bourgeoisie over and against the Nigerian peasants and proletariat. In this case (Ake, 1995, p 105), argued that the colonial state was considered as:

> a specific modality of class domination, one in which class domination is mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society… appears as an objective force standing alongside society.

This position readily implies that the colonial state in Nigeria was conceived and erected to serve as "the totality of the materiality of political class domination" in society (Ibeanu, 2004, p.7-8). In essence, it was ordained from the very onset to have the overriding powers to issue out instructions for the expropriation of lands, the legislation of taxes, the commodification of production, the construction of roads, railways, bridges, ports and dams; the facilitation, collection and distribution of produces, and the introduction, consolidation and regulation of chains of marketing

boards for the purpose of benefiting the British colonial imperialists to the detriment of Nigerians.

It is in the above light that the overriding powers of the Governor-General squarely conformed to the royal configuration of the colonial state in Nigeria: they were in a necessary politico-economic symmetry. This was the driving force behind the reigns of Sir Lord Lugard, Sir Hugh Clifford, Sir Arthur Richard, Sir John MacPherson, Oliver Littleton, and others not-too-popular Governors-General.

In the same vein, the above explanation also implies that the personality of the Governor-General could not have been democratic because the state structure he had been summoned by imperial necessity to superintend over was non-democratic. The state structure was such that does not consider necessary, or places any value on the need to consult with Nigerians on issues that had to do with their exploitation and dehumanization, or at any rate, their peasantization and despoliation.

Since the colonial state structure was not configured to consult with the Nigerian people, it was therefore irrelevant for the Governor-General to dialogue, at any time, with the colonized subjects. So, political negotiation, bargaining and diplomacy were not significant virtues of the colonial heads of state. Even when some forms of consultation were done like the ones that preceded the 1951 McPherson's constitution, they were mostly cosmetic as they were not fundamental enough to pave the way for the emancipation of the Nigerian people.

It is on this count that the colonial state became wayward and worthless. But, the waywardness and worthlessness of the colonial state was so seen only by Nigerians and not by the British colonial imperialists or the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of Britain; to them, the state was seen as only living up to its necessitating establishment requirements and expectations. In this light, Ake (2001, p.2) observed that:

> Since the colonial state was called upon by the peculiar circumstances of the colonial situation to carry out so many functions – indeed to do everything – it was all-powerful. It needed to be all powerful not only to carry out its mission but also to survive along with the colonial order in the face of the resentment and the hostility of the colonized.

The waywardness and worthlessness, or what Ake called the absolutism and arbitrariness, of the colonial state easily made colonialism to become "a negation of freedom from the viewpoint of the colonized" (Rodney, 1972, p.244). This freedom that was negated by the waywardness and worthlessness of British colonialism in Nigeria was freedom to possess political power to control economic matter and other commanding heights of material life; freedom to have a history, a culture and a community devoid of the tenets and precepts of the culture of political autocracy. The basic knowledge to be drawn from the foregoing is that the colonial state, and of course the colonial situation in Nigeria as devised by the over-lordship of the Elizabethan powers, based in Britain, was oppressive having no signs of utilitarianism nor the clemency of democracy.

However, the most fundamental consideration that should be noted about the colonial state in Nigeria is the fact that it was easily inherited and sustained after the formal attainment of political independence in 1960. But what is urgent to state here is the fact that the inheritance and sustenance of such dimension of over-powered and over-charged Central Government, especially the position of the head of state, logically meant that the political activities which should naturally lead to the capture of the Central Government by a political party or electoral cabal became increasingly ferocious and daring. This was compounded by the long-years of military invasion into the vestry of power.

**Devolution of Power**

There is a strong relationship between the concepts of devolution, deconcentration and delegation when it comes to political or administrative power distribution in a federation. This is because three of them are different degrees or forms of decentralization. To Sayer and others (2005, p.8), devolution entails "the transfer of rights and assets from the centre to local governments or communities. All of these processes occur within the context of national laws that set the limits within which any decentralised or devolved…management occurs". Devolution is thus a constitutional matter, and not just a privilege being shown to the lower body to which the said power is being devolved. In the same vein, devolution is conceived as the "The transfer of 'natural resource management to local individuals and institutions located within and outside of government" (Edmunds *et al* 2003, p.15). These two definitions clearly agree that devolution cannot be said to have taken place if power over natural resource management and ownership has not been transferred from a hitherto central authority to the subsidiary or component governments having semi-autonomous paraphernalia. In support of the above concepts, Gregersen and others (2004, p.8) contend that devolution is:

> One form of administrative decentralization which transfers specific decision-making powers from one level of government to another (which could be from lower level to higher level of government, in the case of federations, or government transfers decision-making powers to entities of the civil society. Regional or provincial governments, for example, become semi autonomous and administer forest resources according to their own priorities and within clear geographical boundaries under their control. Most political decentralization is associated with devolution.

This definition falls short as it mainly looks at devolution from the administrative rather than constitutional perspective. The problem with viewing devolution administratively is that it will make it inevitable for the central authority to arrogantly feel that it is doing the component governmental authority a 'favour'. It is in the considered opinion of this researcher that this view is deficient. This is where the view of Kincaid (1998) becomes relevant. To him devolution connotes:

> a transfer of specific powers or functions from a superior government to a subordinate government. The transfer is of constitutional magnitude…it is

ordinarily intended to be permanent; it surrenders all the powers associated with the devolved functions (namely, political, legislative, administrative, and fiscal); and it leaves the functional field vacant for occupancy by subordinate governments.

He adds that:

Devolution occurs in the context of vertical intergovernmental relations. Hence, devolution can occur within the British parliamentary system and can also be said to occur within the fifty American states where, constitutionally, local governments are creatures of their state, but it cannot occur between the federal government and the states without constitutional change.

In his paper "The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare," Kincaid specifies six objectives of devolution to include more efficient provision and production of public services; better alignment of the costs and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry; better fits between public goods and their spatial characteristics; increased competition, experimentation, and innovation in the public sector; greater responsiveness to citizen preferences; and, more transparent accountability in policymaking. This means that devolution leads to a reality where all arms and tiers of government will become more responsible and more responsive.

## Economic Diversification

Gill and others (2014), IMF (2014), To them economic diversification is defined as the shift toward a more varied structure of trade and of domestic production so as to increase productivity, create jobs and provide the base for sustained poverty-reducing growth (in domestic production and trade). Specifically, The World Bank (2017) posits the following as hallmarks of diversification:

1. Domestic production diversification results from the shift of domestic output across sectors, industries, and firms. It captures the dynamics of structural transformation, because successful diversification of domestic production entails resource reallocation across and/or within industries from low productivity activities to those with higher productivity, and that

2. Trade diversification occurs in three ways: (a) the export (or import) of new products (good or services); (b) the export (or import) of existing products to new markets, and (c) quality upgrading of exported (or imported) products.

    In the 21st Century however, there are many more routes towards diversified economies:

    I. Firstly, there has been an increasing focus on firms and the process of reallocation of resources between low productivity firms and high productivity firms, including within existing industries. For example, there is now a considerable body of evidence to suggest that within sectors, firms that export have higher productivity, and pay higher wages, than those that do not;

II.     technological change and the reduction of transport costs has led to the splitting up of production and the emergence of regional and global value chains where distinct activities or tasks are undertaken in different countries according to where it is most efficient to locate activities and manage the value chain.

III.    Regulatory reform and the decline of communication costs has enabled developing countries to participate in the expansion of trade in services (beyond tourism) many of which provide relatively high productivity activities compared to traditional agricultural activity.

Economic Diversification is a key element of economic development in which a country moves to a less concentrated production and trade structure. Lack of economic diversification is associated with increased economic vulnerability such that external shocks can undermine the development process. Low income countries have the least varied economic structures usually with a heavy reliance on farming or minerals, such as fuel oils, gas, copper and other metals. This creates challenges in terms of exposure to sector specific shocks, such as weather related shocks in agriculture (droughts, floods, pest infestation, disease outbreaks) and sudden price shocks for minerals, as is happening now with the slowdown of growth in emerging markets. Growth also tends to be unbalanced in the case of mineral dependent countries or slow and difficult to sustain in agrarian economies. Poverty-reducing trade-driven growth has been particularly difficult to achieve in countries whose economies are concentrated upon commodities and natural resources. Diversification helps manage volatility and provide a more stable path for equitable growth and development.

Economic diversification and structural transformation, the reallocation of resources, within and across different sectors to higher productivity activities, are closely linked. Highlighted by Simon Kuznets, in his Nobel Prize address, as one of six characteristics that accompany modern economic growth, structural transformation refers to the shift from agricultural to nonagricultural sectors, and from industry to services. A broad and well documented trend has been the gradual decline of agriculture and increase in services, accompanied by an initial increase followed by decline in manufactures that consistently shows across countries as a part of the process of economic development. A useful way of understanding the relationship between economic growth and structural transformation is by decomposing the causes of increases in productivity into that due to factor reallocation across sectors (structural change component) and that due to changes in productivity within sectors (within component).

There are indications that Nigeria and indeed a number of developing countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America, structural transformation was slowing down and that these countries were showing signs of 'premature deindustrialization' (the rate at which economies were diversifying and transforming their economies was not proceeding as fast as observed in today's advanced economies) are losing steam. Recent data shows that the structural transformation

component is positive. Nevertheless, the challenge prevails for many countries to transform and diversify their economies. This task will likely be made more difficult as new technologies may encourage are shoring of manufacturing production to advanced economies.

Again, diversification of the economy and broad-based economic development are critical for the long-term sustainable development in resource-rich developing countries for two reasons. First, the high level of export concentration makes these economies vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations that can result in abrupt contraction of public resources and/or create a negative spillover effect in the rest of the economy. Second, extractive sectors are generally capital intensive, have weak links to the rest of the economy, and, as a rule, do not generate much employment. Therefore, investments in these sectors and their expansion have a low impact on the growth and productivity of other industries leading to a high concentration of gross domestic product (GDP) and a low impact on job creation. Resource-dependent countries, however, face a number of challenges in achieving economic diversification. Fast growth in export revenues from resource extraction is invariably accompanied by exchange rate appreciation pressures, or the so-called Dutch Disease, that reduces competitiveness of other traded sectors of the economy.

A study carried out by Meller and Simpasa (2011) on diversification of Chile and Zambia, both abundant in copper deposits, shows strikingly different results. Their different economic trajectories illustrate that diversification can be achieved even in resource rich countries. Chile and Zambia have abundant deposits of copper and copper is their main export product. They also share similar population size. But they differ significantly in their income levels. Chile's per capita income is over US$21,000 while Zambia's is just over US$3,800. Fifty years ago, both countries produced similar amounts of copper. Zambia even showed higher levels of production than Chile during 1960-1970. Both countries have also had similar patterns of copper deposit ownership (with their state-owned companies playing a major role). But their economic performance has been very different. Chile has steadily increased copper production while Zambia has remained stagnant, although there has been a recovery since 2000. Whereas Chile became less resource dependent, Zambia became more resource dependent. While copper currently represents 50% of Chilean exports, it is about 80% of Zambian exports.

Chile followed a two-track diversification strategy: (i) diversification "within" industry (increasing value added in the copper industry by improving the quality of copper extraction and exporting process and complementing it with the development of domestic ancillary/logistics services; and (ii) diversification "across" industries (development of fisheries: high quality salmon exports, increasing exports of high value-added agricultural goods such as fruit and vegetables). In addition, Chile set up mechanisms that allowed it to save the rents from mineral extraction and invest in critical growth expenditures during the commodity busts.

Specifically: (i) a structural fiscal surplus rule that sterilizes the country's spending levels against copper fluctuations. This ensures macroeconomic stability and it also generates accumulation of wealth when copper prices are high; and (ii)

sovereign funds to administer the rents saved during the commodity bonanza. Chile invested a significant amount of the boom savings on training in advanced skills (ie. scholarships to enroll Chileans into top global universities) and financing and mentoring to high growth start-up firms.

Unlike Chile, which enjoys a coastal location, Zambia is a landlocked country with high trade and transportation costs. Growth has not been inclusive and poverty in Zambia is widespread, with 61.2 percent of the population estimated to be living below the national poverty line. Rural poverty at 74 percent is more than double the urban poverty rate of 35 percent. Sustained growth and continued political stability have produced only modest improvements in livelihoods. The effect of economic growth on overall poverty reduction has been small, as much of the benefits of growth have accrued to those already above the poverty line. Growth has been primarily driven by mining, construction, and financial services and did too little to create jobs and expand opportunities beyond the relatively small labour force already employed in these industries. In fact, the income shares of the bottom 40% fell from 2003 to 2010. Thus, for Zambia, economic diversification remains an essential objective to deliver more inclusive growth in the face of declining prices for copper, and to create employment for its fast growing, urban and youthful population.

**Economic Diversification before Power Devolution: An Interrrogation**

It is a fact that, Nigeria economy is currently in 'recession' but now politically out of recession, urgently needs to diversify its economic base to fast track development. This is because the inherited and consolidated monocultural economic mainstay tacitly hinders comprehensive development. This will in turn broaden the country's opportunity as well as revenue base thereby facilitating the creation of a multicultural economy which naturally results in massive job creation, enhanced standard of living, reduced cost of survival, infrastructural re-activation and mitigation. This would lead to total elimination, of vices of terrorism, militancy, kidnapping, prostitution, trafficking, armed robbery and corruption, to mention a few.

The argument here is that as important as the paradigm of diversification is, embarking on it without first correcting the anomalous political posture of the Nigerian federal imperative will amount to placing the cart before the horse. This political posture which inevitably negates any attempt at diversification is the monocratic character of the country's federalism. This reality of monocracy makes the federal system of the country excessively centrist, statist and *ipso facto* totalistic (Ostrom, 1990; Wunsch & Olowu, 1990; Olowu, 1995; Ake, 2001).

This is because, as contended by Ostrom (1990), monocracy does not only negate true federalism but also negates true democracy and polycentricism, and invokes a "political order in which all powers emanate from and gravitate to one central point". In a bit to pose the discourse further, Olowu (1995, p.11) posited that "for a variety of reasons, most of …independent African countries adopted a monocratic political order…either through the adoption of a one-party state or military coup d etat". In the case of Nigeria, the major post-colonial factor which entrenched this culture of monocracy or Unitarian federalism is military imposition of

its command, centrist and absolutist emblems on the nation's political economy. Glaringly, this devious imposition suited Nigerian politicians who are largely abdullistic capitalists with uncontrollable rapacity to amass and arrogate to themselves public good and according to Okowa (1996, 2005), easily retained this model through making 'appropriate' legislations which helped in completing the process of centralization of powers.

As the center is over empowered the component states and local councils are disempowered and so encouraged to be lazy and beggarly to look to the center for economic fortification. Political patronage rather than economic productivity became the only recognizable access to the *national cake* which continues to get slimmer in Marxian primitive accumulation and increasingly monocultural with its attendant crisis that over burdens the state. In short, it is the considered view of this paper that Nigeria of today is far more monocultural than it was in the colonial times and indeed immediately post independence. This is so because in the colonial era at least no fewer than four commodity exports were produced, namely cocoa, cotton, rubber, palm oil, groundnut, etc. But today, the only recognizable export commodity is oil at its crude state. The country survives on oil rents and royalties which are often looted by the *custodians of power*, a situation which automatically makes power at the center the only means to wealth, and wealth in turn means more power at primitive accumulation.

It is in this light that the devolution of power at the center must necessarily precede the diversification of *national* economy. This implies the *re-federalization* of Nigeria leading to the adequate dispersal of power from the center to the component states and councils to engender diversification and development of economic and national life. This dispersal will mean that the states and councils will then be in a position to control and manage their resources – lands, minerals, etc – and liabilities thereby making them more responsible and responsive to the yearnings of their peoples – while also acting as a check to their leadership. In this light, diversification becomes a natural offshoot or product of power devolution as more and more states will strive to out-develop one another so as to attract more and more development partners at home and abroad. This means devolution of power will lead to healthy economic competition and increased productivity among the federating states and sub-national units (councils) – leading to the ultimate advancement of the entire federation.

## Prospects, Conclusions and Recommendations

This study has been able to establish that the present monocratic or over-centralized political system being practiced in Nigeria is anti-diversification because it hijacks developmental dispositions and commitments from the federating states and local governments, and concentrate them in the centre that is more concerned about collecting rents and royalties rather than broadening the revenue base of the country. This has worsened the monocultural status of the nation.

To be sure, and in today's reality, it is already trite to note that Nigeria is a monocultural nation with its economy heavily dependent on petroleum revenue which

accounts for about 80% of government revenue and 90% of foreign exchange earnings. Before the prominence of petroleum industry, Nigerian economy was dependent on agriculture. The growth of petroleum industry in Nigeria brought about dramatic change in the nature of Nigerian economy leading to its suffocation. The high economic gains of the oil industry made the nation to abandon other sectors of the economy and depend solely on oil industry. The situation has led to non-development of other sectors of the economy like exploration and exploitation of abundant solid minerals, agriculture, manufacturing industries and service industries. This has exposed the nation to economic instability occasioned by the vagaries of international oil markets, gross unemployment, poverty in the face of plenty, and a passive political leadership that is lukewarm in articulating and embarking on viable economic policies (Anyaehie &Areji, 2015, Ochim, 2015).

The presidency of Nigeria has always harped on the need to diversify the nation's economy. The current administration led by President Muhammadu Buahri has not been any different. The president seems to be very determined in this resolve as there has not been   any official statement or comment on the economy without a mention of the need to diversify. Of course the amplification of this need has, but slided Nigeria into economic recession. This is a state of zero or weak purchasing power, spikes in inflation, unemployment, under-employment, poverty, hunger and disease, high cost of living and depletion of general economic fortunes of majority of the citizens in at least two consecutive quarters. The only escaping route from this quagmire now appears to be a resurgence of the call to diversify the economy so as to rescue the nation.

It is the position of this paper that this call, like previous ones, is largely hypocritical or hypothetical and misplaced. This is so because the same government that is resolutely calling for economic diversification is forcefully condemning devolution of powers to the states and local councils, hiding behind the *excuse* that Nigeria's *unity* is not *negotiable*. How can there be sustainable diversification without first devolving powers through conscious and systematic restructuring, enthronement of a regime of resource control or fiscal or true federalism? It is instructive to posit that this form of federalism does not amount to a dismemberment of the country as *wrongly speculated* but would rather strengthen it as it would make all the states to sit up and work, looking inwards, developing what it has - whether coal, crude, bitumen, gold or farming, - and without having to wait for, or go cap-in-hand to the federal government to share oil wealth derived from just few states and or region. If the Nigeria's government continues to harp on diversification without the corresponding recognition of the need to devolve political powers *first*, it would amount to mere rhetoric, hypocrisy and any diversification attained in this manner would not be sustained.

Specifically, the following recommendations are put forward for the advancement of further research in this areas as well as aiding policy makers:

- Government should make conscious and concerted effort at reviewing the country's constitution in a way that transfers land management and resource

- control to the states and councils while the center maintains defence and external relations.
- In the above light Government should repeal all anti-federalism laws like Land Use Act of 1979, the Petroleum Decrees of 1969 and 1991, the Lands (Title Vesting, etc.) Decree No 52 of 1993 (Osborne Land Decree), the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree No. 13 of 1997, etc
- At the federating states and councils' levels Government should encourage diversification by making available credit facilities at minimal interest rates.
- Urgent consideration should be given to the recommendations of the National Conference Report given under President Goodluck Jonathan's administration.

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# Modern Technology and Election Administration in Nigeria:
## An Appraisal of the 2015 General Elections

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**Abstract**

*Owing to the various forms of malpractices associated with elections in Nigeria, the country's electoral management body other pertinent stakeholders have been making efforts to inject credibility into the electoral process through a series of pronouncements, changes in electoral laws, and other innovative practices. One of such moves undertaken in this regard includes the introduction of electronic technology, notably the smart card reader (SCR). The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of this innovation in terms of strengthening and injecting credibility into the electoral process. This research is qualitative in nature and documentary evidence was the key instrument used in generating data, which were analysed by relying on qualitative descriptive method. The Modernization theory served as the framework for analysis. The basic finding is that though the electronic technology adopted for the 2015 general elections had the capacity to reduce electoral malpractice and enhance the credibility of the process, its application was grossly compromised and the basic objectives defeated. The main recommendation is that efforts should be made to eliminate or mitigate the existing negative factors that had contributed to poor election administration so as to create conducive environment for efficient operation of the adopted technology.*

**Introduction**

The popular "Linconian" definition of democracy, which captures it as "government of the people by the people for the people" (Omelle, 2005:1) underscores the relevance of the electorate in a democratic dispensation. The implication of this is that electoral malpractice negates the essence of democracy and the centrality of the people within a democratic equation. The basic difference between the democratic and the other forms of government is that the former demands, as a prerequisite, that those aspiring to occupy (elective) political offices should seek and obtain the mandate of the electorate before getting into such offices. A government cannot be tagged *government by the people* if the mandate did not originate from them. In the absence of free, fair, and credible elections, a regime claiming to be democratic would lose its value and operate with only the democratic shell devoid of content.

In spite of the indispensability of free and fair elections under a democratic system, the Nigerian electoral process has thrown up practices that, over the years,

have led to the devaluation of the electoral mandate whereupon the actual votes generated during elections play very little or no significant role in determining those that eventually occupy elective positions. The political environment manifests ugly practices such as what Ibeanu (2003) referred to as primitive accumulation of votes, which tend to deemphasise the relevance of the people's mandate in a purported democratic dispensation. Indeed, the situation falls in line with what Egwu (2014) referred to as electoral authoritarianism. Instead of seeking the electoral opinions of the people, political leaders appear to be seizing the mandate in an authoritarian manner. There is no better way to depict the danger posed by this trend than recalling that electoral malpractice stands out as one of the main reasons the military seized power from civilians in 1966 and 1983 respectively. But despite the danger posed by such malpractices, politicians have persisted in acts that debase the electoral process.

When we talk of election administration, the immediate culprit that readily comes to mind is the Election Management Body (EMB) and how well or badly it conducts elections. However, it is necessary to understand that factors leading to poor election administration may not necessarily be internal to the EMB. It also includes those external factors such as influences from the political environment. This is true in view of the fact that no matter how qualified, principled, and organised the personnel of the election management body appear, they can be overwhelmed by negative events while operating in a very rough political terrain. It is a known fact that the Nigerian environment is one in which public officers have been exposed to influences of corruption. In this type of environment, it is possible for 'workable' administrative patterns that operate efficiently in other parts of the world to witness hitches and appear unworkable based on reasons relating to peculiar human factors.

The modern world is abandoning the manual and even the analogue system in their administrative processes. Issues relating to census, identification of citizens, eligibility of voters, voting, etc, are no longer subjected to the manual order. Outdated technologies are giving way to modern ones and, undoubtedly, tasks are made easier by this development. In line with this transformation in the nature of administration, Nigeria's electoral management body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) introduced the use of the Smart Card Reader (SCR) in the 2015 general elections. Following allegations of uneven deployment of the device across zones in that elections, and the eventual defeat of the then ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) by the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC). The essence of this paper is to assess the extent to which the adoption of electronic technology in Nigeria's 2015 general elections has promoted the credibility of the electoral process.

**Conceptual Explications**

Election can be seen as a clearly spelt-out democratic procedure through which citizens determine their political leaders. It became a very essential and indispensable democratic tool ever since democracy shifted from its original form of direct political participation and metamorphosed into the stage of 'indirect participation' through political representatives. In the age of electoral democracy, election stands out as the means through which the electorate determine those to

occupy political positions in a representative capacity. By implication, the outcome of elections is supposed to be a reflection of the mood, choices, and preferences of the electorate. This is the extent to which elections are expected to be free and fair so as to reflect these choices. In view of the fact that it is a periodic exercise, it accords the electorate the power to demand for political accountability from the elected representatives and as such empowers them to remove from office those that performed below expectations.

Election is a process, which involves a series of specific activities that include the delimitation of constituencies, mobilization of the electorate to participate in the electoral process, recognition and registration of political parties, registration of voters, release of election time table, emergence of aspirants/candidates under the umbrella of the different political parties (or as independent candidates – where the constitution permits), political campaigns and competition by the different candidates, accreditation of voters, voting, counting of votes, collation of results, announcement of results, and declaration of winners. The process equally includes the window made available for those dissatisfied with the outcome of elections to seek redress through the judicial process, as stipulated by the constitution or Acts of Parliament relating to elections. There is usually a body or institution saddled with the responsibility of organizing or supervising these activities to ensure that they are in line with the stipulations of the law.

**Election Administration**

We see election administration, therefore, as methods of organizing, prosecuting, supervising, and delivering all the aspects of the electoral process in order to produce public officers that would occupy elective positions. Since the individuals elected as such are supposed to reflect the choices and preferences of the electorate, it stands to reason that election can only be meaningful when its outcome is a true reflection of the choices made by the voters. Anything short of this defeats not only the essence of elections but also that of democracy. In this regard, it is quite agreeable that the credibility of elections is to a large extent dependent upon the credibility of the institution organizing the election.

**Technology**

The term, technology, can be seen as practical manifestation of knowledge of science. Science, as we know, deals with the understanding of natural laws. But the knowledge generated by understanding the laws of nature cannot make any meaningful contribution to human existence unless it is deployed to practical purposes. It is therefore within the realms of technology to devise tools and means of contending with the forces of nature, which science has helped us understand (Odum, 2012).

Though many people view it from the angle of complicated machines/equipments or sophisticated products of engineering, technology covers all the physical objects converted from natural resources that are employed in performing specific functions. As such, it includes the simplest tools that predated the

age of modern engineering as well as the most complicated ones. It is a fact that tools such as bow and arrow, axe, hoe, etc, which we see as being very simple today, were indeed great 'inventions' as at the period they were devised. In line with the postulations of the modernization theorists, the developed societies once passed through the stage of using very simple tools before getting to the stage of devising and applying more complicated ones. As the society gets more sophisticated and poses fresh challenges, individuals devise more complicated tools to tackle the challenges. It is the ability to move with the changing times that determines the pace of societal development. In the modern age of engineering, therefore, technology has gone far beyond simple tools to stand for complicated ones, hence, *modern technology*.

Technology is applied in different spheres of life. Equally, technological improvement is not limited to one area but cuts across all spheres of human endeavour. The modern era has witnessed tremendous technological advancements geared towards improving the gadgets and appliances being used at homes and offices, in recreation facilities, academic, religious, political, and other sundry activities. When we talk of modern technology, therefore, we mean those technological improvements or advancements that characterize the modern era as distinguished from the older technological gadgets that existed in the past. For example, computers and printers are modern technologies compared to typewriters. Same goes with the technology used for e-mails compared to the ones used for telegrams.

In this study, our main focus is on the aspects of electoral process that deal with registration of voters, accreditation of voters, and the actual voting. Equally, the 'modern technology' that falls within the purview of this study is the aspect that relates to the adoption of electronic, rather than manual means, in the electoral process. They include the Direct Data Capture (DDC) machine and the Smart Card Reader (SCR). The aim is to find out how the adoption of the electronic means of registration and accreditation of voters had led to improvement in the credibility (or otherwise) of the voting process and elections in the country. Also, there has been several elections in the country but the focus here is Nigeria's 2015 Presidential elections. References made to elections outside it are only for historical or comparative purposes. The main abbreviations used in this study include: DDC–Direct Data Capture (machine); SCR–Smart Card Reader; EMB–Election Management Body; PVC–Permanent Voters' Card; EVR–Electronic Voters Register; INEC–Independent National Electoral Commission.

## Methodology and Theoretical Framework

This study relied mainly on secondary sources for data collection, especially, in dealing with historical developments and comparative issues. Added to this, the researcher equally gathered information, as an unbiased participant, through direct observation and interaction with relevant players in the electoral process as well as documentary evidence they provided with regard to the elections under study. The focus is primarily on the application of electronic technology (Direct Data Capture

machine and Smart Card Reader) in the 2015 general elections. Insights were equally drawn from events trailing other elections that followed up immediately afterwards at the state levels such as the Kogi, Rivers, and Bayelsa states gubernatorial elections.

The study adopted Modernization theory as its analytical framework. The basic thrust of the modernization theory is its stages of development thesis, as can be captured from the works of scholars such as Rostow (1960) and Organski (1965). It is this thinking, which guides the belief that all societies progress through similar stages of development and, that the developed societies once passed through the same stage the underdeveloped societies are, currently. The implication of this is that the developing societies can actually fast-track their development if they move along the same path undertaken by the developed ones.

Indeed, most Western scholars see modernization as Westernization. This, perhaps, is what Eisenstadt (1966:1) had in mind by describing modernization as a "process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in the Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth", which subsequently spread to other parts of the world. By breaking it down to specific characteristics, Nash's (1966) submissions capture a modernized society as one that has developed a social, cultural and psychological framework, which facilitates the application of science to the processes of production. Extending it to the political realm, Huntington (1965) sees political modernization as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures, which manifest when the political system is experiencing greater adaptability, autonomy, coherence and, complexity. By implication, these organizations and procedures are expected to be such that fall in line with political framework of the West.

It can be said that modern democracy had been alien to the Nigerian State. History shows that, prior to the imposition of colonialism, various forms of political systems had existed within the vast areas that eventually became Nigeria. However, none had the trapping of modern democracy. Though Nigeria went through a colonial phase, it is a known fact that colonialism was never founded on democratic spirit and neither did it operate on democratic principles. It was an imposition that was crafted, introduced, nurtured, and sustained on the whims and caprices of the colonialists. As such, there was no conscious effort made by the colonial masters to instil a democratic spirit into the minds of the indigenous peoples.

Nigeria inherited Britain's Parliamentary form of government in 1960 when independence was granted and equally retained it in her Republican Constitution of 1963. That system served the country within the First Republic that collapsed in 1966. With the constitutional amendments that heralded the Second Republic after many years of military rule, the country switched over to the American-type Presidential system of government. In the light of these, it stands to reason that modern democracy was introduced into the country as a 'foreign product'. Though direct form of democracy originated from the Greek city-state of Athens in ancient times, the Nigerian state only started responding to the wave of democratization at a time that system of government had been modified from its original direct form to the representative brand in line with the realities and prescriptions of the countries in

Western Europe and North America. As such, the country is actually being guided by the experiences of the developed countries with established democracies, notably, Great Britain and America.

Nigeria's democratic experience suggests that the country is still groping its way politically in a bid to institutionalize its political organizations and procedures. There are various indicators, which suggest that the country is still occupying a low status in the rungs of the democratic ladder and these include, among others, the conduct of political office holders that suggest the privatization of political offices; the dictatorial tendencies that characterize the supposed democratic dispensations; the preponderant parochial and subject political culture that manifest through poor political participation; the lack of persuasive demand for political accountability by the majority of the citizens; the lack of clear political ideology by political parties; as well as high level of political intolerance. The electoral process, which has remained problematic, portends even greater danger for democracy. It is perhaps in a bid to strengthen democracy through free and fair elections that different measures had been undertaken to 'modernize' the electoral process through such means as adopting modern technology in registration of voters and accreditation during elections. Though there were positive results when option A4 was adopted in the country's electoral process, it was dropped, perhaps, because it was not 'modern'. Hence, the modernization theoretical perspective can be helpful in making detailed analysis that would reveal the extent to which this move towards 'modernity' had yielded results.

**Notes on Past Elections and Election Administration in Nigeria**

The history of elections in Nigeria parades a not-so-fantastic picture when it comes to election administration and the general outcome of elections, especially, under the independence era. It is, perhaps, in this vein that Egwu (2014:7) talks of "impunity and fraud that have characterised the country's post independence electoral history". Apart from the accusations of political manoeuvrings and gerrymandering by the British, which were said to be tailored towards favouring the north politically (Gana, 2003; Nwabueze, 2013; Bretton, 1962), there are no explicit reports of election administration characterised by outright malpractices within the colonial era. Brazen electoral malpractices that gave cause for the interrogation of election administration started featuring prominently after independence was granted, and this assumed a worsening dimension with the passage of time, especially, under civilian administrations.

We can categorize elections conducted in Nigeria into two – based on their peculiar characteristics and outcomes. While the elections conducted under military regimes come under the first category, those conducted under civilian regimes fall under the second. Under the first category, we have the 1979, 1993 and, 1999 general elections. The 1964/65, 1983, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015 general elections belong to the second category. One of the distinguishing features between the two is that while the former were conducted under military regimes whereupon no contestant enjoyed the power of incumbency, the latter were conducted under situations whereby the

incumbents (President/Governors) either contested for re-election or demonstrated the desire to influence the electoral process in the interest of their party's candidate.

Just like the 1959 independence elections conducted by the departing colonial masters, the 1979, 1993, and 1999 elections were not characterized by flagrant abuse of the political and electoral process often exhibited by politicians under civilian regimes. For the 1979 elections, Kurfi (1983) observes that measures were taken to help the election management body achieve a dual objective of reducing the number of political parties as well as ensuring that the emergent political parties had a nationwide geographical spread in order to eliminate the identification of any party with a particular ethnic group. Equally, the lack of excitement and general voters' apathy, as noted by Kirk-Greene and Rimmer (1981), which was made possible by the long years of military rule contributed in reducing tension during the election. Though ethnicity still manifested in the voting pattern; and there were still accusations and counter-accusations revolving around printing of ballot papers, stuffing of ballot boxes, and rigging by political opponents, the election was generally acclaimed to have been managed better than the 1964/5 polls.

The next round of elections conducted under a military regime, which terminated with the 1993 presidential polls, showed signs of better election administration. Considering the peculiarities of the Nigerian political environment, the EMB introduced what came to be known generally as Option A4 system. This system required voters to queue behind the candidate of their choice (or their pictorial representations). After queuing up, the presiding officer in charge of each polling booth would count the voters loudly and thereafter declare the results on the spot. To a large extent, this system succeeded in eliminating most of the ills it was set to correct. Though the elections were adjudged to be highly transparent, free, fair, and indeed, well administered, the military government eventually annulled the June 12 1993 presidential elections and suspended its nearly-completed transition programme. The reasons given for the annulment were, however, not in any way blamed on poor election administration. In fact, it was the general view that the junta was taken unawares by the level of transparency that characterized the elections, which created room for people to know that the annulment was unwarranted.

The election that finally completed the transition from the military to a civilian regime was conducted in 1999.It is worth pointing out that, in spite of its success, the Option A4 'died' with the aborted Third Republic. The use of ballot papers resurfaced under the 1999 elections. However, the pattern of voting deviated slightly from the secret ballot system that had been the practice prior to the introduction of Option A4. The new arrangement – known as the Open-Secret ballot system – required a voter to do the thumb-printing of the ballot paper(s) inside a slightly secluded area, after which the person would drop the thumb-printed ballot paper(s) into ballot boxes positioned in an open place. Among others, this was aimed at eliminating the form of rigging perpetrated through the stuffing of ballot boxes with multiple ballot papers by one individual. Though there were patches of accusations and counter accusations of rigging from the different political camps, such incidents were not glaring as to disrupt the process.

The above picture differed significantly from the elections conducted under the incumbency of civilians. The 1964/5 federal election violated the ideals of due diligence in electoral process and efficient election administration. From the accounts of Kurfi (1983) and Nnadozie (2007), there were reports of abuse of power of incumbency that manifested in the form of denial of permission to hold public meetings or processions, abuse of right to free assembly, as well as arrest and detention of political opponents, especially in the North and West and these led to protests that culminated into total boycott of elections in the East and partially in the West. According to Ujo (2012), the election itself was characterized by malpractices such as rigging, thuggery and violence. In the final analysis, the election triggered off political instability that eventually led to the collapse of the First Republic and the concomitant military interregnum.

The 1983 elections shared almost similar characteristics with the 1964/5 general elections. Firstly, it was the first election to be conducted by the civilian government under the Second Republic. Again, there were several incidents pointing in the direction of politics of intolerance, name calling, political violence, and abuse of power of incumbency, especially by the ruling party at the centre, which manifested in such means as directing the instruments of state power against the opponents. Describing it as a sham, Tijani (1986) observed that the election was massively rigged in a manner that depicted collusion involving the ruling party at the centre, the election management body, security agents, and even the judiciary.

The events surrounding the 2003 general elections did not deviate from what transpired during the 1964/65 and 1983 polls. It was the first election to be conducted by the civilian government under the Fourth Republic[4]. And just like the other two, it was characterized by what could be described as the 'second-term-fever' whereupon incumbents tried everything within their means to retain power and, along the line, engaged in actions that compromised due diligence in the electoral process. Nnadozie (2007:70) rightly captured the situation, as he posited that the ruling party at the centre "exploited the power of incumbency to the fullest by mobilizing and deploying every available instrument of the state including the police and the military personnel before, during and after the elections to ensure the retention of power". Ibrahim and Egwu (2005:8) equally observed that there were "plethora of electoral malpractices such as ballot box stuffing, snatching of electoral materials and smashing of ballot boxes, inflation of votes and other dimensions of electoral fraud". One of the events that bore testimony to the fact that there were high levels of electoral fraud during the polls was the revelation that trailed the series of events, which Ibeanu (2018:151) described as "the Ngige-Uba comedy", specifically, the attempted removal of a serving governor of Anambra State from office by his political godfather, who claimed that he was the one that installed the governor (Adebanjo, 2003). In trying to justify the attempts made to forcefully and unconstitutionally remove Governor Chris

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[4]It has become a common practice for people to assume that the country actually went through a Third Republic. However, no one could state the exact period it existed, that is, when it took off and when it came to an end.

Ngige from office, Chris Uba boasted that he single-handedly installed the governor as well as the other 'elected' political office holders in the state. By talking about installation, he (Chris Uba) was undoubtedly referring to the manner the elections that produced those office holders was manipulated in such a manner as to represent his personal his personal choice rather than the choice of the electorate. In fact, the European Union Election Observation Mission (2003) summarized everything about the elections by stating that the minimum standards for democratic elections were not met.

The next general election that took place in 2007 was unique in many ways. It was the first time the country witnessed the third election in an unbroken succession within the same Republic. Again, it was the first election in the country that created opportunity for a civilian-to-civilian transition (since the incumbent president had served out the maximum of two terms as stipulated by the constitution). Preparatory to the elections, however, the country was engulfed in controversies arising from speculations of a third-term bid of the incumbent president. Though the president did not confirm this officially, certain moves made by him and his staunch supporters, as captured by Ibeanu (2007), indicated that he actually planned to remain in office beyond the stipulated eight years. Notwithstanding that the unconstitutional plans were eventually foiled, the fact that it was ever contemplated by the incumbent sent warning signals that the 2007 election might lose democratic flavour. In fact, the incumbent president further ruffled democratic feathers when he made a declaration that the election would be taken as a 'do-or-die' affair by the ruling party.

Though the incumbent president did not eventually contest in the election, the power of incumbency still played out during the polls, as the ruling party manipulated the electoral processes – relying heavily on state security agents. Rigging assumed a new dimension during the elections, as there were several places where electoral officials did not show up at the polling stations yet the final results captured that elections were conducted in such areas. There were equally several cases where election results were declared at INEC headquarters even while voting was still going on at the polling stations. Some other absurdities that occurred include situations where the number of recorded votes surpassed the number of registered voters with big margins. It was clear that there was no close correlation between the election results and votes cast at the polling stations. Generally, the situation made a mockery of the electoral process and the president that emerged through the elections was sincere enough to admit during his inauguration that the process that brought him to power was greatly flawed. This admission of guilt was against the backdrop of the verdict of Domestic Election Observation Group (cited in Ujo, 2012: 436), which held that "the election was a charade and did not meet the minimum standards required for democratic elections".

The 2011 general elections witnessed a significant improvement compared to the gross abuse of the electoral process and impunity that characterized the 2007 polls. Close political watchers credited this improvement partly to the personal attitude of the president under whose incumbency the election was conducted, and partly on the measures adopted by the election management body, which included the

adoption of electronic means of registration of voters. There were however accusations of malpractices, this time, in terms of inflation of votes and participation of under-aged voters in the electoral process. In spite of the few hitches recorded, the election was adjudged by both international and local observers as being free and fair. The post-election violence that occurred in the north (Odum, 2016) merely manifested signs of political intolerance and inability of some political actors to accept defeat easily.

After taking a cursory glance at the elections that had taken place in the country prior to 2015, one's summary cannot deviate from existing scholarly submissions, which point in the direction that the electoral process in the country had been very defective and the results of elections questionable (Kurfi, 1983; Eya, 2003; Oddih, 2007; Ujo, 2012). Indeed, there had been attempts (whether pretentious or genuine) to reposition the EMB towards correcting the mistakes of the past and improving on its activities. Such measures, as captured by Nnadozie (2007:80) include "joggling with the name of the Commission – from FEDECO to NEC to NECON to INEC". But as he rightly observed, the status of the commission cannot change by mere wishful thinking or by altering its name. As observed earlier, there was a time the EMB adopted the open ballot system otherwise known as Option A4 and this yielded positive results, though it was later abolished. In recent times, the EMB has been showing the inclination towards adopting electronic system in the electoral process and, so far, has adopted the DDC machine for voters' registration and SCR for accreditation.

**Electronic Technology and Election Administration in Nigeria**

For some reasons, attempts to adopt modern technology in activities that involve determining the correct number of people have always proven problematic in Nigeria. A clear example can be drawn from the issue of census-taking, which Nnoli (2008) contends, had not been credible and reliable in the country owing to political reasons. In their bid to manipulate elections and take advantage of the distributive character of the Nigerian State, politicians, especially those who believe that they might lose under free and fair conditions, not only prefer generating 'false' population figures but also display the penchant to resist attempts geared towards conducting credible census. The 'politics' surrounding the controversy and eventual removal of Chief Festus Odimegwu as the Chairman of the National Population Commission is a clear pointer to this fact (Thisdaylive, 2013). It is not surprising, therefore, that the country is yet to have a biometric data of its human population.

Within Nigeria's political arena, it has equally become an age long practice to live with methods that had created rooms for manipulating the political process. For so long, the country had relied on the manual method for voters' registration, accreditation and voting, which usually gives politicians the latitude to manipulate the results of elections. The EMB in Nigeria adopted the electronic method in the electoral process for the first time preparatory to the 2007 general elections. This involved employing the Direct Data Capture machines in voter registration so as to develop Electronic Voters Register (EVR) "with comprehensive information on every

eligible voter such as name, age, gender, address, photograph, and thumbprint" (INEC, 2007:24). The nationwide electronic voters' registration exercise, which commenced on October 25, 2006, lasted till February 2, 2007. This came after the initial registration exercise that took place in special areas affected by the Nigeria/Cameroon boundary adjustment as well as those areas with a history of communal conflicts. The general exercise was successful to the extent that it produced temporary voters' cards before the elections. Its impact on the election was however insignificant in that the 2007 general elections, as observed earlier, were marred by serious irregularities. The 2010 gubernatorial election in Anambra State further threw up controversies that created doubts over the credibility of the voters' register produced by INEC. It was observed that the EMB produced voters register with ghost-names and that the names of many eligible voters that took part in the registration exercise did not appear on the list.

From 2007 onwards, the EMB had employed electronic registration in the conduct of elections. Preparatory to the 2011 general elections, INEC opened a window for further registration exercise using the DDC machine. The registration exercise was completed eventually, though few hitches were witnessed such as the seeming incompetence of some of the registration officers and their inability to adhere to instructions. The register generated thereof was used during the 2011 elections and it was clear that the register reflected what transpired during the registration exercise. Those who participated in the registration exercise, but could not find their names on the voters' register, were mainly people whose registration requirements were not fully completed- owing partly to the incompetence of the registration officials and partly to the inability of the affected individuals to cross-check the records during the period slated for the display of voters' register and correction of noticed mistakes/omissions.

Again, another round of electronic registration was conducted in view of the 2015 general elections. This was done mainly for those that were yet to have their names in the existing register, as well as those that relocated from where they were residing during the previous registration exercise. Though there were hitches such as inadequacy or non availability of registration machines in some areas, the exercise was completed as scheduled and the updated register used for the elections. Equally, the EMB issued permanent voters' cards (PVCs) preparatory to the 2015 elections. It is worthy to note that the EMB expanded the scope of the electronic technology during the 2015 elections to cover not only voters' registration but also voters' accreditation. This was done through the introduction of the Smart Card Reader.

**Electronic Technology and the 2015 General Elections: Matters Arising**
Controversies relating to the adoption of electronic technology in the 2015 electoral process actually started with the voters' registration and distribution of PVCs. The nationwide registration exercise that preceded the elections generated serious complaints concerning the inadequacy as well as non-functionality of some of the DDC machines deployed for the exercise. This alarm manifested glaringly in the southern part of the country. In the face of rumoured or actual threats from

governments in the south east that non-possession of voters' cards would attract sanctions such as non-payment of salaries (for civil servants), non admission of one's wards into schools, or denial of access to certain public facilities, many people that encountered serious hitches in the registration units within their residential area had to go to other areas with functional machines to register - at least, for the purpose of possessing the voters' card. It was on this ground that some politicians from the zone began to accuse the EMB of 'tactical disenfranchisement' of Southerners in the impending election. This was especially so in view of the fact that inadequacy/non-functionality of registration machines amounted to shutting out many eligible voters from the registration exercise, and that those who eventually registered in polling units far away from their residential homes would not have the opportunity of casting their votes on the day of the elections owing to the restriction of movements usually imposed on such occasions.

Similar incidents that led to the accusation of the EMB by politicians from the southern part of the country equally played out during the distribution of the PVCs. Issues were raised concerning how some geo-political zones appeared to be lagging behind during the distribution of the PVCs. The report from Pointblanknews.com (2015) that was released on 5th Jan, 2015 shows the following distribution list: South-East – 59.22% collection; South-South – 66.66%; South-West – 43.15%; North-Central – 69.89%; North-East – 81.09% and; North-West – 80.18%. From the breakdown, while Eastern states like Enugu and Anambra were trailing behind with 45.0% and 48.6% respectively, northern states like Jigawa and Bauchi were already on 94.0% and 96.97% respectively. Equally, there were allegations of sharp contrast in the adherence of the set rules between the north and south. For instance, it was pointed out that district heads in most northern states were preferentially allowed to collect the PVCs for their owners while this was not allowed by INEC in the southern states. Also, it was alleged that INEC, at some point, embarked on house-to-house registration in some areas of the north.

Subsequent update on the issue of the PVCs still showed that the EMB was facing challenges that were throwing up crisis of confidence among the people, especially from the southern part of the country. It should be recalled that INEC announced the postponement of the 2015 elections a week ahead of the scheduled date, citing reasons of insecurity.  As at the time of the postponement of the election, the EMB confirmed that over two million voter cards were either not yet delivered to INEC by its contractors or lost/stolen (The Eagle Online, 2015). Also, the issue of lopsidedness in the distribution of PVCs continued to rage in a manner that gave certain sections of the country cause to accuse INEC of taking steps to manipulate the electoral process in favour of the presidential candidate of the main opposition party. Timothy's (2015) account reveals that as at March, 2015 (more than a month after the initial date of the election), states in the north – including the areas under the threat of insurgency – were still recording higher distribution rate of the PVCs compared to the south.It was equally reported that, few days to the election, INEC acknowledged its inability to provide about 200,000 PVCs in Lagos (Ezeamalu, 2015).In view of all these, and recalling the highly controversial lopsided allocation of polling units

whereupon about 21,000 units were allocated to the north while only a little above 8000 units were allocated to the south, there were sustained accusations from a great number of southerners that INEC, under the incumbency of a northerner, was deliberately taking steps to weaken the south, which was the main political base of the presidential candidate of the ruling party at the time.

INEC's decision to adopt the Smart Card Reader (SCR) for voters' verification in the 2015 general elections generated fresh waves of controversies. One of the salient reasons raised by those opposed to this decision hinged on the timing. Going by the experience witnessed during the electronic registration exercise vis-à-vis the hitches relating to the (non)functionality of some of the machines, as well as the exhibition of inadequate knowledge of the technology by many of the registration officials, the argument was raised that INEC ought to have conducted an extensive test of the new technology in a mock exercise or during a less-sensitive election such as by-elections instead of experimenting with a very sensitive nationwide election.

It is worthy to note that the EMB did not conduct any field test before insisting that the machines would be deployed for the polls. The decision to run a test only came after the elections had been shifted from its original dates. Meanwhile, the reason for the postponement was not in any way attributed to INEC's unpreparedness, as the EMB had already declared that it was fully prepared to conduct the polls. The elections were rather shifted on the grounds of state of insecurity in the North East zone and the resolve of the government to boost security in the area before conducting the polls. As a matter of fact, it was the postponement that created a window for the testing of the SCR. This exercise was undertaken in select wards comprising 225 polling units and 358 voting centres drawn from twelve states of the federation. From Adebayo's (2015) reports, INEC acknowledged (after the field test) that they witnessed such challenges as 41% failure of fingerprint validation during the exercise. The magnitude of failure, for instance, led to a repeat exercise in Ebonyi State. At the end of the day, the EMB insisted on deploying the SCR for the verification of voters' cards during the elections, promising to take care of the hitches witnessed during the trial exercise.

The EMB eventually adopted the SCRs during the elections, insisting that it must be strictly used in the accreditation exercise. However, problems started quite early on the day of the presidential election concerning the non functionality of the SCRs in most areas in the south. For instance, the case of the PDP presidential candidate hit the airwaves when he was unable to be accredited due to SCR malfunction. In many other cases where the machines appeared to be working, it was observed that the accreditation was very slow. With all these experiences, some of the voters had to leave the polling stations in frustration after waiting for long hours with the hope of getting back when the situation must have improved. Some never went back. This state of affairs had already stretched beyond the six hours allowed for accreditation before INEC amended its guidelines and relaxed the rules about strict compliance with SCR, thereby permitting the adoption of manual verification of voters and the use of Incident Forms in the event of malfunctioning of the SCR (Alozie, 2015).

In contrast, the problems associated with the SCR malfunction, non identification of fingerprints, or delay in accreditation did not seem to manifest glaringly in the northern parts of the country. The events that took place led many political analysts into believing that northerners either bypassed the card reader, or that machines deployed to the zone were special ones (different from the type used in the south). Going by the high number of votes released by INEC at the end of the elections, as well as video clips that went viral depicting incidents of multiple thumb-printing and stuffing of ballot boxes in the area, it became clear that the rules concerning the electronic technologies were not strictly adhered to in the northern part of the country. Once again, the pattern of events rekindled the accusations about selective standards adopted by INEC in the electoral process in the application of the electronic technology. Clearer pictures of what transpired emerged from the information generated from INEC's (2018) Smart Card Reader Accreditation Backend Transmission System, which shows that out of 23,643,479 accredited voters only 10,266,139 (43%) went through full biometric authentication. The accreditation statistics on state basis show that while core northern states like Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto recorded only 17.5%, 27.6%, and 22.9% respectively in terms of full accreditation, southern states like Abia, Delta, and Lagos recorded 68.1%, 60.2%, and 75.4% respectively. The implication of this is that more than one million people voted without full biometric accreditation in states like Kano and Katsina while the enforcement of full accreditation was being enforced in the southern states.

In the final analysis, it could be said that the electronic technology adopted during the elections was compromised due to such factors as inadequate preparation made by the EMB as well as the seeming collusion between politicians and some INEC officials to manipulate the electoral process. Though uncritical observers may hold the view that the election was highly successful, it could be said that this was true to the extent that the incumbent president conceded defeat as soon as the results were announced and did not bother to challenge whatever irregularities that took place during the polls. This 'success', however, cannot be attributed to the adoption of the electronic technology for the elections but rather, the democratic attitude exhibited by the incumbent president who took everything that happened with equanimity. Events that trailed the election were to prove that the electronic technology did not in actual fact forestall electoral fraud. For instance, the several tribunal/court judgements that nullified some of the elections conducted within the period showed that there were indeed several irregularities. As at January 2016, there were already more than eighty court-ordered re-run polls. Equally, the manner in which the INEC conducted isolated gubernatorial elections in Kogi and Bayelsa States as well as the rerun exercise in Rivers State threw up serious questions as to whether the EMB was actually in charge during the 2015 general elections. These isolated elections that were conducted at different times in just one (out of the thirty six) state of the federation ended up on an 'inconclusive' note and had to be concluded on later dates. In view of the fact that INEC mobilized all the necessary resources and still made a poor outing under those isolated elections, it stands to reason that the EMB must have been grossly overwhelmed during the general

elections and as such could not have recorded high success as was being claimed. Electoral violence and other forms of electoral chicanery still played out and diminished the relevance of the new technology.

**Concluding Remarks**

The basic things to note include that the pattern of election administration in the country has always raised serious concerns and as a matter of fact casts doubts over the credibility of the electoral process; politicians always display the propensity to subvert the electoral process through what Ibrahim and Egwu (2005:10) termed "competitive rigging", and as can be seen from what Ibeanu (2007) referred to as machine politics or, according to Okolie (2006), godfatherism; the Election Management Body in the country has not been able to devise a foolproof means of conducting elections so as to generate highly credible results; the political environment under which the EMB is operating has a serious influence over its officials and this contributes to the problem of poor election administration. This was buttressed by Jinadu's (2007) account where he pointed out that the National Electoral Commission under Awa was rent and fractionalised by mutual distrust, which almost paralysed its activities. It needs be reiterated that the manipulation of election results usually involves collusion between the politicians and officials of the EMB, and that the introduction of electronic technology, per se, cannot eliminate negative human factors that contribute to poor election administration.

In line with the thinking of modernization theorists, one can rightly say that the Nigerian State has been in a continuous process of change towards those types of political systems and processes that have developed in the Western countries and older democracies. The adoption of electronic technology in the electoral process can be seen as part of the tendency towards modernization. However, the discourse of the Prismatic model by Riggs (1964) exposes us to the possibility of importing 'structures' without having commensurate political and socio-cultural practices to support the adopted 'structures'.

One can rightly aver that the essence of 'modernizing' and introducing electronic technology is to inject credibility into the electoral process. But this appeared not to have played out during the 2015 general elections and subsequent elections that came afterwards. To a large extent, it can be submitted that the electronic technology did not succeed in injecting the much needed credibility in the election owing to avoidable manipulations and distortions caused by those that managed the elections. This position can be substantiated by the subterfuges and series of incidents that took place before, during, and immediately after the elections.

It is recommended therefore that, in order to achieve efficient election administration through electronic technology, there is need to create the right environment for its smooth operation and also ensure that the machines are functional. It is a fact that those planning to rig elections actually begin with pre-election manipulations. To this extent, INEC must ensure that its activities such as registration exercise, allocation of PVCs and delimitation of constituencies are done properly. Furthermore, INEC should desist from experimenting with new

technologies during general elections. Any technology being adopted should be tested in order to guarantee its functionality. Equally, there is need to train capable hands to operate machines meant for electoral functions.

Again, there is need to ensure that INEC officials, both permanent and ad hoc, are committed to their duties. As a means of injecting credibility into the system, electoral officials found guilty of committing electoral fraud must be sanctioned. Same goes with political contestants and their agents. Unless those found guilty of electoral malpractice are punished, the temptation to subvert the system will continue to be high. More importantly, there is every need to reorder the people's political/electoral orientations, which promote issues like tribalism and do-or-die politics that usually orchestrate violence. So long as the culture of electoral malpractice persists in the system, the country will continue to witness situations where stakeholders conspire to undermine whatever technology deployed for electoral purposes.

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# Management of Nigeria's Foreign Policy Post-2019 Elections: Perspectives, Prospects and Projections

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## Abstract

*Nigeria's foreign policy projections were quite vibrant in the 1960s and 1970s, it maintained that momentum as it contributed toward anti colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in Africa. It acquired the status of a leader. But Nigeria's Afrocentric policy lost its relevance with South Africa's emergence from apartheid, and liberation of most of Africa. Nigeria's leadership position came under threat not only in Africa but also globally. Nigeria, hence, adopted several foreign policy objectives which include economic diplomacy, and later citizen diplomacy. Still it has continued to lose its pivotal position to South Africa, Ghana, or even Kenya. However, the forthcoming 2019 general elections, presents opportunities for Nigeria to rediscover and consolidate its leadership position in Africa. This study seeks to examine prospects of renewed post-2019 elections foreign policy, and projections for achievement of enviable position in Africa. The study is anchored on Snyder's (internal-external) model of Decision-making approach. Documentary method of data collection was employed relying on secondary data from books, journals, and official documents. Data were analyzed using content analysis. It was found that; Nigeria assisted African countries, some of which were unsolicited, therefore unappreciated; Nigeria is gradually losing its position to more economically stronger South Africa; and Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy was not appreciated by its immediate neighbours. It recommends that: Nigeria could reclaim its lost position by taking care of domestic inadequacies before focusing externally; the incoming administration should revamp Nigeria's foreign missions; INEC should ensure free, fair, and credible 2019 elections to send positive signals globally.*

**Keywords:** *Citizen Diplomacy, Election, Foreign policy, National interest, State.*

## Introduction:

Nigeria's foreign policy has always been focused toward the social, political, and economic liberation of African states. By this it meant that Africa had been the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy right from the time of its independence in 1960 to early 1990s. as a result, there have been both positive and negative consequences of the part it had chosen to play. Most significant among its achievements were its cardinal influence on the political outcomes in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola, South Africa and others. In the case of South Africa, its roles

on anti-apartheid struggles earned it the position of a frontline state, though it actually does not have close contiguity with South Africa. Then in the 1990s, when Nigeria was still under the firm grip of military dictatorship by erstwhile Head of state Gen. Sani Abacha, it orchestrated and spearheaded the much heralded quest by the ECOMOG to restore and consolidate civilian democracies in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the two Guineas (Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau). Though, afrocentricism lifted Nigeria to certain level in its foreign policy projections, but after the liberation of much of Africa from the claws of colonialism and apartheid rule with the return of South Africa to popular democracy in 1994, the policy became out of fashion especially with stiff opposition and even outright challenge to Nigeria's leadership position by the same South Africa and others. Hence, scholars and foreign policy technocrats began to clamour foe a re-appraisal of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives. That gave birth to the adoption of economic diplomacy which sought to build in aspects of economic development of the country in its foreign policy objectives. However, it became clear that a momo-cultural economy which is almost totally dependent on the vagaries of the international oil market, and the dollar could not favourably compete globally with comparatively stronger diversified economies. Moving forward the administration of Yar'adua whose foreign minister was Ojo Maduekwe adopted the citizen diplomacy at a time when Nigeria was treated as a pariah state, and its citizens seen as just fraudsters and drug peddlers. The advent of Muhammadu Buhari administration threw up a different challenge which is insurgency across the country, this has made the government to concentrate on domestic challenges than external ones. Yet citizen diplomacy cannot be said to have achieved much as Nigerians are still being maltreated in states like South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and elsewhere. But Nigeria and its citizens have been presented with a new opportunity to salvage their image and develop like other developmenta states of the world by the forthcoming 2019 general elections in the country.

But earlier, in the 1960s and 1970s to be precise, Nigeria stood in the gap for most African countries in relation to the fight against colonialism, apartheid regime in South Africa, equality for all nations of the world, and other forms of oppression against Africans in the continent. That role was not only for the fact that its population was and is still larger than that of any other country in Africa so it saw itself as a natural defender for Africans, but also because its foreign policy objectives had Africa as its centre piece. Leaders in Nigeria's first republic maintained that focus as well as the military regimes headed by Major General J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi and General Yakubu Gowon. However, when General Murtala Mohammed came to power in 1973 his regime took Nigeria's foreign policy projection to its highest point ever. Osuagwu (2014:65) notes that;

> The Murtala administration took one of the most important foreign policy actions when it recognized the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in Angola against the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). And Nigeria's move caused the OAU to do the same, hence these twin actions doused any form of support that UNITA had.

Efforts of military leaders in Nigeria helped in pressurizing leaders in the then apartheid South Africa to make some concessions that heralded its eventual dismantling. Also in the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria under the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari played commendable roles in Chad, Niger, and other states within the West African sub region. According to Gambari (2008) as cited in Osuagwu (2014:69) "under Nigeria's Presidency of the UN Security Council in May 1994, the policy of apartheid in South Africa was formally led to rest; the mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria was lifted; and that country resumed its seat in the UN General Assembly." Furthermore, it was quite ironical that under the military regimes of Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani Abacha, Nigeria spearheaded efforts to restore and consolidate civilian administrations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau when it was itself governed by the military.

On the face value of it all, some of these foreign policy actions seemed brave and worthwhile but considering their enormous costs and serious infrastructural deficit in Nigeria itself, they became heavy burdens which Nigeria should not have undertaken. Confirming this Sanda (2012) notes that Nigeria spent about "$10 to $14 billion dollars" in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in Liberia at a time when majority of its citizens lived below the poverty line. In the light of the above stated, many scholars began to question the rationale for Nigeria's "Africa first" foreign policy when it is faced with enormous internal challenges which continues to dwarf its efforts to consolidate its leadership position in Africa. Unfortunately for Nigeria's foreign policy, the momentum began to wane when it became difficult for her to sustain the enviable heights it achieved in Africa and the world due to a combination of daunting internal and external challenges that confronted it in the 1990s.

The emergence of South Africa from apartheid as a civilian democracy in 1994 manifested as the fiercest challenge to Nigeria's leadership position in Africa. This was because whereas Nigeria as a state then still under military leadership fought for the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, South Africa eventually emerged as a unified, and formidable democracy that is economically, socially, and politically strong, conversely at a time Nigeria still wallowed in the doldrums between 1993 and 1999- a period which could be described as the darkest years of its foreign relations. As a result, Nigeria lost a lot of grounds in its leadership position in Africa to the same South Africa which became most glaring when South Africa under Nelson Mandela pioneered Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations as a result of Sani Abacha's execution of environmental activist Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni eight. Ever since, Nigeria's fate as to its foreign policy in Africa and West Africa has never been the same, though it later transited from military rule to civilian democratic administration on the 29th of May, 1999.

Consequently, many scholars have called for a re-appraisal of Nigeria's foreign policy of "Africa first" to objectives that reflect its current circumstance, and developments in Africa at the moment. Hence, there had been recourse to economic diplomacy under Olusegun Obasanjo, and Ojo Maduekwe's citizen diplomacy under Yar'Adua/Goodluck Jonathan administrations but none have succeeded in charting a

new course for Nigeria to reclaim its erstwhile enviable position in Africa. In the midst of the situation on the ground, the 2019 general elections in Nigeria which is slated to commence with the Presidential polls on 16th February presents Nigeria with veritable opportunity to get its acts right domestically before trying to project a renewed foreign policy objective externally. However, first and foremost, a free, fair and credible election is paramount in determining the path or direction to which the incoming administration would tread. Therefore, this study seeks to examine the perspectives, prospects, and projections that would possibly return Nigeria to that exalted position it once occupied in Africa. The study adopted the qualitative research design which relies on literature information from studies and research carried out earlier on the subject of Nigeria's foreign policy up till the period 2018. Books, journals, newspapers and other periodicals were consulted for data on the subject area.

**Conceptual issues: Foreign policy**

Nigeria like other nations of the world relate with States outside its borders based on the dictates of its foreign policy which is a reflection of its national interests. What does it mean when one refers to a nations foreign policy? Briggs (1994:193) contends that foreign policy *"is an instrument designed to serve long-term national objectives in world politics."* Every objective is aimed at achieving particular goals which may not be short term; most times they may be long term goals, however, they are goals after all and it does not matter much how long it takes to achieve them. For instance, in the case of Nigeria, it has the following as the main thrust of its foreign policy according to Agbu (2008:6);

i.     The sovereign equality of all African states;
ii.    The respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all African states;
iii.   Non-interference in internal affairs of other African states;
iv.    Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity; and
v.     Total eradication of racism and colonialism from Africa.

Policy number (v) above influenced Nigeria's actions during the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, economic imperialism, and anti apartheid struggles from the 1960s and early 1990s. However, most of Africa has been liberated, machineries for regional economic integration have sprang up in Africa, hence the driving force in its erstwhile proactive foreign policies have waned down, and it has in turn adversely affected its standing in the international system. Chibundu (2003:1) stress that foreign policy is "a country's response to the world outside or beyond its own frontiers or boundaries…." This assertion is possibly based on the fact that States in the international system project their foreign policies with the motive of achieving their national interests in an environment where there are no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests. Therefore, country A could react to situation Z in a different way from how country B reacts to it, and vice

versa. On the part of Okolie (2009:5), foreign policy refers to "specific decision-making aimed at protecting, maximizing and promoting the prescribed national interest of the given state." This is straight to the point, a state's national interests could be said to be the main essence of its existence, and if such goals or objectives are not pursued with vigour, the state may lose its standing or worth in the international arena. At some point if states' national interests are continually unattained, its own citizens may begin to drop their citizenship advertently or inadvertently and apply to be citizens of other states.

Bringing in most attributes of foreign policy, Wittkopt (2003:14) states that "foreign policy embraces the goals that the nation's officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments used to pursue them." For instance, Nigeria's 'Africa first' foreign policy has gulped an appreciable amount of resources from Nigeria even at the expense of infrastructural development of Nigeria itself, yet its leaders from the 1960s to the 1990s have pursued policies that conform with the achievement of that objective. Nigeria spent about $10 to $14 billion in the ECOMOG operations to restore and consolidate democracy in Liberia (Sanda, 2012), when ironically itself was still under military rule, and most towns and villages in the country were and are still in dire need of basic amenities necessary for good living and infrastructure for economic development. It was consequent on the fact that at that moment Nigeria was believed to be pursuing its foreign policy which by implication could mean that it intended to avoid regional refugee and humanitarian crisis by its actions. Finally, Akinboye and Ottoh (2007:115) see foreign policy as "a type of policy that transcends the boundary of a given state." The view of Akinboye and Ottoh differ slightly from that of other scholars in that it is possible that other forms of policies could exist, but the one they refer as foreign policy is that which is projected beyond the borders of a given state. Therefore, this definition reckons with both the domestic and foreign policy of a state.

Extant literature reviewed in this study includes studies on Nigeria's foreign policy from independence in 1960 to 2018 majority of which hinges on its acclaimed 'Africa first' policy, the in roads that Nigeria has made with it, the challenges faced by it, and some scholarly projections for future foreign policy engagements. In fact, over the years, the main plank of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives, which emanates from its national interest is the constitutionally provided 'Africa first' policy. Its foreign policy from inception in the 1960s has always seen Africa as its main concern. This line of thought has persisted and has influenced most foreign policy actions of Nigeria over the years as Alkali (2003:183) notes that the main objective of Nigeria's foreign policy consists of;

> The critical questions of independence, national self-determination, national unity, national security, territorial integrity, economic prosperity and the advancement of freedom and justice for the black race in Africa and in the Diaspora.

It is the burden felt by Nigeria to fight for all people of black race especially on the continent of Africa that spurred her to embark on several struggles aimed at ending

colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, economic imperialism, inter-state conflicts, and slavery, among others. However, in the light of her efforts at helping other African countries to surmount some of their political, economic and social challenges, Nigeria seem to have focused more on the external responsibilities it felt it had than on the realities of its external and domestic challenges. For instance, Nigeria orchestrated the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mainly for economic integration of the sub region, even when some states in the region initially could not see the need for such body to be constituted. Alkali (2003:180) corroborates that by observing that;

> Despite the opposition by Ivory Coast and challenges from other African countries, in 1975 Nigeria along with Togo and in consultation with other West African countries played decisive role in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States.

Few years after its formation, the sub-regional body may not have achieved all that were expected of It at inception, but from indications, it has helped in economic integration and development in the sub-region appreciably judging by inter-state trade in the sub-region as noted by Alkali (2003:182) thus;

> Nigeria's exports to the ECOWAS countries rose significantly from only N7.2 million in 1970 to as much as N1, 736.0 million in 1988. Nigeria's imports from ECOWAS countries also increased from N3.3 million to N147.5 million within the same period.

ECOWAS has also increased the rate of movement of people and goods across borders in the sub region, so it is not only Nigeria that has benefited but all the States in the region have benefited in one way or the other through the integration of their economies.

In the area of maintenance of international peace and security, Nigeria has made its financial, material and human resources available to the course of achieving that cardinal objective of the United Nations Organization. This is not only in the West African sub region, and Africa, but also globally. Musa (2010:294) notes that *"Nigeria has participated in more than fifty percent of the total UN peacekeeping missions around the world."* Nigeria has also used the ECOWAS forum to not only galvanize support and assistance for needy states, but also to singlehandedly finance the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in restoring peace to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote'd Ivoire, and Equatorial Guinea. At the height of the Liberia crisis, Musa (2010:298) observes that "ECOMOG continued to serve as (*the*) primary keeper of the peace with Nigeria providing the bulk of the troops and 80% of the resources and virtually all the commanders" *(Emphasis mine)*. For example, in contributing troops and materials for the task of restoring peace to Liberia, Nigeria made very significant efforts at making sure that the multinational force achieved its set objective at the expense of huge financial, material, and human resources. Table 1.0 below shows the GDP of member

States of ECOWAS, the configuration of the ECOMOG force, and the contributions of each State in the sub region to its build up.

**Table 1.0 GDPs & Military Strength of ECOWAS Member States (1991-1992)**

| Serial | Country | Gdp ($87.90) | Military Strength (Total Armed Forces/ Army Strength) | Expected Contribution (Based On Average For Ghana, Nigeria & Sierra Leone) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) |
| 1 | Benin | 1.76bn | 4,300/3,800 | 430 |
| 2 | Burkina Faso | 2.69bn | 8,700/7,000 | 870 |
| 3 | Cape Verde | 213m | 1,300/1,000 | 130 |
| 4 | Cote d'Ivoire | 10.63bn | 7,100/5,500 | 710 |
| 5 | Equatorial Guinea | 139.75m | 1,300/1,100 | 130 |
| 6 | The Gambia | 212m | 900/- | 90 |
| 7 | Ghana | 5.67bn | 11,900/10,000 | 1,190(1,050/7.8%) |
| 8 | Guinea (Conakry) | 2.44bn | 9,700/8,500 | 970 |
| 9 | Guinea Bissau | 141.11m | 9,200/6,800 | 920 |
| 10 | Mali | 2.14bn | 7,300/6,900 | 730 |
| 11 | Niger | 1.93bn | 3,800/3,200 | 380 |
| 12 | Senegal | 5.81bn | 9,700/8,500 | 970 |
| 13 | Sierra Leone | 789.02m | 3,150/3,000 | 315(500/15.9%) |
| 14 | Togo | 1.57bn | 5,100/4,800 | 510 |
| 15 | TOTAL | 36.13bn | 83,450/70,100 | 8,345 |
| 16 | Nigeria | 27.33bn | 94,000/80,000 | 9,400(7,000/7.4%) |
| 17 | Grand Total (Sub region + Nigeria) | | 177,450/150,100 | 17,745(8,345 + 9,400) |
| 18 | Liberia | 990m | | |

*__Source:__ Aboagye (1999) ECOMOG: A sub-regional experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia, pp. 146-47.

The table shows that all other 15 States in the West African sub region put together could not measure up to Nigeria's military strength as at the time ECOMOG was constituted and deployed to Liberia. The 15 States including Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Senegal had a total of 83,450 strong army, while Nigeria alone had a 94,000 strong army which made it possible for her to muster a large part of the total force. In the area of the economy, the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the West African States excepting Nigeria was $36.13bn, while that of Nigeria was $27.33bn. Though these figures show overwhelming advantage for Nigeria militarily and economically over other States in the region put together, but the motivating factors for her contributions to the success of ECOMOG and other developmental projects were borne out of her perceived 'manifest destiny' to fight for Africa as a leader, and her constitutionally provided - Africa as the centerpiece of her foreign policy, and not merely to become a regional hegemon. This is because her sheer size,

economy, and population relative to those of other States in the region have already made her a potential hegemon. Many other States, even in the sub region, could have these advantages but would choose to look the other way whenever there are situations that may warrant their assistance or support. This becomes clearer when one considers that Nigeria never factored in on any economic interests before, during, and after the interventions or operations. Such developments have contributed substantially to the calls by scholars for leaders in Nigeria to reappraise and refocus her foreign policy objectives to align with current situations and present day realities.

In an effort to identify the motivating factors for Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa, Akindele (2013:25) notes that *"Nigeria's multilateral diplomacy in West Africa has always been informed by three considerations which flow from the dictates of the country's national interest."* The study went ahead to capture these considerations thus;

> The belief in its *(Nigeria's)* leadership role allegedly inspired by the quasi-religious doctrine of 'manifest destiny' and sanctified by the conspicuous reality of the comparative advantage of the components of national power decisively in its favour…..the understanding that, if war, like peace, has indeed become indivisible, the country must, in its national interest, be prepared to invest resources on the maintenance of peace and security under the auspices of ECOWAS…..(*and finally*) the very recent concern in Nigeria, particularly since 1999, for the strengthening of the value and culture of democracy and good governance (*Emphases mine).*

Quite intriguing to many scholars in Nigeria, is the fact that there have been many contributions that Nigeria have made to the economic, social and political development of States in West Africa and Africa which ordinarily should have uplifted her to the status of a leader in Africa with less opposition from other States, but the contrary is always the case for Nigeria.

In order to better grasp the determinant factors for Nigeria's foreign policy direction, the six principles of its foreign policy is enumerated, and they are as Saliu (2013:171) list them thus;

a. Non-interference in the affairs of other states: Every State should be allowed to administer itself.
b. Legal equality of all States: Irrespective of size, population and wealth, all States should be equal; one country, one vote.
c. Multilateralism: In conducting Nigeria's foreign policy, Nigeria shall rely on the use of multilateral channels.
d. Peaceful means in resolving global conflicts: All international conflicts must be resolved using peaceful means.
e. Non-alignment: Nigeria would be free to relate with the two power blocs on the basis of merit, not as a matter of routine.
f. Africa centerpiece policy: International issues would be weighed on the basis of their impact on African nations. Africa would be the cornerstone of her *(Nigeria's)* foreign policy *(Emphasis mine).*

Based on the dictates of the above stated principles, and strengthened by huge foreign exchange earned from its oil exports during the oil boom, Nigeria projected robust foreign policy across the African continent from the 1970s to the 1990s. These emanate from its foreign policy objectives as captured by section 16 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) thus;

1. Promotion and protection of the national interest.
2. Promotion of African integration and support for African unity;
3. Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations;
4. Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as seeking the settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, and
5. Promotion of a just world order.

These have been part of the driving force behind foreign policy actions and pronouncements by leaders in Nigeria since independence. Overall, in Africa as well as in the world, Nigeria has consistently tried its best to project a robust but peaceful foreign policy since it achieved nationhood. From the formation of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU), to the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the formation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Her exploits during the Congo crisis, the Chad crisis, the three Guineas, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the the Cote d'ivoire crisis, and later when South Africa had begun its challenge-the Libyan debacle. Summing up Nigeria's accomplishments in its foreign policy in Africa, Fawole (2012:160) states that;

> Nigeria played a prominent role in the transformation of the Organization of African Unity; it was instrumental to the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), it championed the campaign of debt relief for indebted African countries including Nigeria; it was in the vanguard of the establishment of the African Peace and Security Council.

This shows that Nigeria is not new to charting courses meant for African development as well as policies aimed at promoting inter-African peace and stability. Aside from Nigeria's strides through its diplomacy of peacekeeping in Africa and around the world, it has lent financial and technical aids to less endowed African states from the 1960 to the new millennium, its economic woes notwithstanding (see Sani, 2012; Owoeye, 2002). Most of these are manifestations of its national interest which outwardly express the decision-makers' preferences at a given time. Sani (2012:78) as cited in Osuagwu (2014:57) shows some of the financial aids to other African countries in table 2.0 below

**Table 2.0**

| Contributions of Nigeria to some African States | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Date | Country | Amount ( in naira) | Reason (s) |
| 1973 | Egypt | 1 million | Assistance |
| At independence | Angola | 13.5 million | " |
| " | Zimbabwe | 10 million | " |
| 1980s | Mali | 431,579 | " |
| " | Senegal | 333,333 | " |
| " | Burkina Faso | 407,895 | " |
| " | Chad | 320,179 | " |
| " | Mauritania | 214,912 | " |
| " | Niger | 342,105 | " |
| " | Ethiopia | 200,000 | " |
| " | Sierra Leone | 20,000 | " |
| " | Somalia | 1,007,893 | " |
| " | Guinea Bissau | 644,000 | " |
| " | Cape Verde | 500,000 | " |
| " | Mozambique | 675,890 | " |
| " | Sao Tome and Principe | 60.775 | " |
| " | Niger | 644,000 | " |
| " | Zambia | 500,000 | " |
| " | Sudan | 400,000 | " |
| " | Sao Tome and Principe | 124,000 | " |

Source: Osuagwu (2014:57).

The financial contributions notwithstanding, Nigeria has not earned the respect and support of African countries. According to Alli (2013:112) certain factors have made it difficult for her to achieve the set objectives, these include *"Failure of the Nigerian state in the critical areas of national governance."* The study went further stating that;

> This poor governance is reflected in poor social and physical infrastructure exemplified by chronic power shortages, the deplorable state of the road network…. poor healthcare and educational facilities which has resulted in frequent industrial actions by labour unions and a general poor service delivery in all spheres of national life.

While we align with Alli's view on the consequences of failure of governance in Nigeria because it is true that industrial actions which are frequent in the country have negative impact on the country's GDP. It resulted in the loss of billions of foreign exchange that could have accrued the country. We also point out that with such weak leadership structure, widespread insecurity and fragile investment atmosphere, no country could successfully project positive foreign policy abroad

sustainably. This was to be the bane of Nigeria's foreign policy achievements, especially soon after the emergence of South Africa from apartheid rule which had kept it isolated from the rest of the world from the 1940s to the 1990s. Since the emergence of South Africa from apartheid rule to a multi party democracy, certain inherent attribute of state failure in Nigeria which hitherto had been hidden has come to the fore. Consequently, Nigeria has been seen as a failing or failed state due to some parameters as Alli (2013:118) notes that;

> Nigeria is listed among the 20 states that are increasingly facing critical internal distress or state failure. Nigeria occupies the 14th position out of 20 on the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Journal 2010 Failed States List.

Another factor that makes achievement of lofty heights through Nigeria's foreign policy difficult is that it has remained unfocussed in projecting its foreign policy for many years now. There have been policy 'summersaults' in this regard. Olawale (2011:101) in order to expose the inconsistencies of Nigeria's foreign policy stresses that;

> Shagari continued to give aid to Angola even when the nation experienced the second oil glut in 1981, Babangida established the Techinical Aid Corps (TAC) in 1987 and also introduced Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) same year.... ECOMOG was formed in 1991 while Abacha restored democracy in Sierra Leone in 1998.

Of what need are all these measures and programmes when Nigeria had even more daunting internal challenges to grapple with? Also confirming this Alli (2013:122) observes that;

> Over the years, it has become fashionable for every minister of foreign affairs to generate a perspective, or a paradigm for the decision of the nation's foreign policy. Concentric Circle Model was introduced by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Concert of Medium Powers by Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, Economic Diplomacy by General Ike Nwachukwu, Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism by Ambassador Olu Adeniji, and Citizen Diplomacy by Ojo Maduekwe.

Though he concludes that *"they all lack vision",* but it is imperative to also note that these perspectives or paradigms were adopted in order to fill in some perceived gaps between theorizing in Nigeria's foreign policy and realities of the time identified when they were introduced. As noted earlier, Nigeria faced some challenges to her foreign policy in many areas as a result of her dwindling economy after the global oil glut of the 1990s, but there is no area it faced such challenge more than in Africa after the emergence of South Africa from apartheid. Nigeria felt the challenge from South Africa more because the main plank of its foreign policy is 'Africa first', and naturally due to its earlier contributions to African countries it sees itself as the ultimate leader in the continent. However, the challenges from South Africa were not by design, rather they were manifestations of inadequacies

identifiable, first, in Nigeria's internal or domestic environment, and second, in the area of her inability to fulfill some necessary obligations in the international system. To highlight some the potentials of Nigeria, and its problems also, Briggs (1994:192) notes that;

> Within Africa, the country's population is certainly a qualification for primacy, as one out of every four Africans is a Nigerian. But following the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986, the per capita income in Nigeria tumbled to a very low level, which led to the country being classified as the thirteenth poorest country in the world.

Nigeria depended and still depends on oil as the mainstay of its economy and this does not speak well of the country and would not prepare the grounds for any sound economic growth. Briggs concludes that *"The fact is that in comparative evaluation, Nigeria is still relatively underdeveloped."* Of course, no other country in the continent of Africa would have constituted itself as such a formidable challenge to Nigeria's leadership posture in Africa if not South Africa, as Briggs (1994:192) brings out South Africa's strengths by observing that;

> South Africa has a vibrant economy with over 4,000 dollars per capita income. The country is a major exporter of steel, textile, tyres, motors, plastics, and is the world largest producer of gold and a leading exporter of chromium, iron, coal, manganese, nickel, phosphate, uranium, diamond and copper.

All these positive credentials of South Africa notwithstanding, Briggs (1994:193) contends that *"The most urgent challenge confronting Nigeria's foreign policy is how it can take full advantage of the prominent role it played during the anti apartheid struggle, in post-apartheid South Africa".* However, it is imperative to note that challenge from South Africa as a country is not all there is to Nigeria's dwindling foreign policy, first, besides South Africa, Nigeria has its own domestic challenge as earlier stated which it has not been able to surmount, or even address. Again, a country which suffers from unstable and fragile economic atmosphere would never be able to solve its own challenges regardless of whether there are external ones or not. Meanwhile many States in Africa believed that Nigeria could stand for Africa in all situations particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, however this believe was erroneous and misplaced as Olawale (2011:104) notes that due to the fact that;

> Nigeria committed her resources to liberation struggle in Africa is capable of making one slip into the illusion that Nigeria's economy is ever buoyant. The truth however is that Nigerian problem in the international scene is that she has no resources enough to embark on vibrant foreign policy.

The challenges discussed here are not all that bedevils Nigeria's foreign policy, there is also the issue of putting square pegs in round holes as long as appointments into Nigeria's foreign missions is concerned. Olawale (2011:107) succinctly captures this as it states that;

Nigeria's foreign policy is also facing the problem of over politicalization of the Foreign Service or appointment remains a veritable compensation for failed politicians who lost out during elections. Thus the Nigerian Foreign Service *(have)* witnessed invasion of non-diplomats. (*Emphasis mine*).

All in all, these foreign policy actions of Nigeria, the challenges she faces internally as well as from South Africa and other countries externally, have indicated that Nigeria cannot afford to continue to do the same thing all the time and expect to achieve different results. The situation and reality at hand calls for concerted, deliberate, and well thought out plan of action that would ultimately lead Nigeria out of the woods in its foreign policy actions in West Africa, Africa, and the world. Fawole (2012:167) hints on Nigeria's current situation as regards its international relations and foreign policy thus: "Nigeria cannot shy away from certain realities in its geopolitical neighbourhood of West Africa and Africa, as well as other contemporary issues in world politics to which it must respond."

Actually, it is quite difficult for any state in the international system to try to exist in isolation, that would ultimately be an effort in futility. Hence, owing to the fact that most foreign affairs Ministers in Nigeria have at one time or the other introduced new frameworks or paradigms through which they hoped to achieve Nigeria's foreign policy objectives (see Alli, 2013), but it has been the same old story of a new Minister dumping the earlier framework only to introduce another of which the result has been inconsistencies and unfocussed foreign policies. It has also been the same narrative of ill articulated frameworks which are more of 'personal worldview' than a well planned and articulated paradigm backed by necessary state machinery for its actualization. However, if Nigeria hopes to reclaim its leadership position in Africa, it would have to address some contemporary issues in world affairs and also redirect its national interest objectives to include how to react to some of these as enumerated by Fawole (2012:167) thus;

Terrorism and other trans-border crimes such as human and narcotics trafficking; the changing regional dynamics in North Africa and the Middle East, democratization across the continent, the emergence and increasing influence of global economic and technological power centres such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Nigeria's reaction to these may not necessarily involve competing with another state for recognition or position, but just to apply its apparatuses to contemporary ways of handling these issues with the ultimate goal of remaining relevant in global affairs.

Many scholars have focused their studies on Nigeria's foreign policy, some of these are; Asobie (2010) which dwelt on issues, challenges and prospects of Nigeria's foreign policy, it held that aside from older politicians, younger well educated leaders are capable of turning Africa's fortune around by strengthening institutions like civil society groups, legislatures and political parties. It is a holistic view of Nigeria's foreign policy distinct from streamlining on ways in which its

foreign policy should be managed in the future especially post 2019 elections. Fawole (2012) examined Nigeria's foreign policy from the perspective of different paradigms which have been adopted over the years including pitfalls of the paradigms. It did not approve of adoption of a new paradigm but agrees that a review is ultimately required for Nigeria to come to terms with new challenges in the area of security, narcotics and human trafficking, and so on. Dallaji (2012) focused on Nigeria-South Africa relations in the face of South Africa's palpable challenge of Nigeria's premier position in Africa, but advances that Nigeria should endeavour to *"brace up and meet up to the challenges"* posed by South Africa instead of backing out totally. Ogunsanwo (2012) traced the beginnings of Nigeria's foreign policy from the 1970s and efforts of different leaders to review it. It highlighted Nigeria's efforts towards the formation of ECOWAS, also the challenges that Nigeria faces and identifies most of Nigeria's efforts at becoming a major player globally. It locates Nigeria's hope of success on what it termed *"the extent to which the country's (Nigeria's) internal fundamental problems and questions have been successfully addressed." (Emphasis mine).*

This study holds that it is not necessary that Nigeria abandon any part or section of its already existing national interest from which emanates its foreign policy, because as the extant literature has revealed, changing the paradigms or charting a new course does not necessarily result to achievement of set objectives. Rather Nigeria ought to enter into wide-ranging multilateral international relations with a view to playing roles that would place her on a pedestal to return to position of relevance both continentally and globally. From the extant literature reviewed, it is clear that most studies in the area of Nigeria's foreign policy have dwelt on its perspectives, challenges, and prospects without necessarily considering why many such options have failed to make impact in the past. Most of the new options including the new paradigms and frameworks have been hinged on Nigeria's national interest and foreign policy objectives, and yet they failed.

This study is meant to fill in the gap in the literature concerning the urgent need for Nigeria to put its acts together at home especially leveraging on the post 2019 elections foreign policy before projecting abroad, this is because honour and respect are virtues that can only be earned and not otherwise. Again, the main plank of Nigeria's foreign policy has been its 'Africa first' policy (Adeniji, 2012), but according to Osuagwu (2014:43);

> Nigeria's foreign policy over the years has been characterized by acts of giving and supporting other African states without expecting anything in return, or even planning to build upon and maximize opportunities that present themselves, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sao Tome & Principe are good examples.

But when States in Africa have on several occasions distanced themselves from or consciously failed to support Nigeria in courses pursued by her for Africa's interest, then it becomes apparent that Nigeria should reconsider her objectives, or it could be fighting a lost battle.

**Theoretical Framework**

The study is anchored on Snyder's (internal-external settings) model of Decision-making approach. Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin in 1954 while working for the Foreign Policy Analysis Project of Princeton University, developed the internal-external settings mdel of foreign policy analysis. The model was basically a reaction to the inadequacies inherent in the realist paradigm. According to Rosenau (1971) the internal-external settings model came up to address the realists' ambiguous concepts and theories which have not been tested, and which also the behaviouralists saw as abstract. Asobie (1990:24) holds that proponents of the internal-external settings model of foreign policy analysis *"stressed the necessity for devising precise operational concepts and formulating explicit theories to enhance the measurement and quantification of the regularities and patterns which…human behavior exhibits."* Paramount among the objectives that Snyder and his colleagues wished to accomplish was the issue of state behavior and perceptions of those that make the decisions. Foreign policy of the state is not to be seen as some far off abstract, or ambiguous venture which pops up from the blues, rather these could be arrived at by embarking on what Rosenau (1971:256) refers to as "process analysis." Though, Snyder and his colleagues did not disagree with the realists' assumption that the 'nation state' is a central actor in international politics, but in order to drive home their argument they defined the state thus; "…those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action of those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers" (Rosenau, 1969).

Snyder and colleagues reasoned that, after all, state actions or political actions are taken by human beings. To make the understanding of this model's arguments simpler, Asobie (1990:26) stresses that; "With respect to foreign policy decision-making, Snyder and his team subdivided the variables *(of the model)* into three main sets of stimuli; 'internal setting', 'external setting' and 'decision-making process'" *(Emphasis mine).*

He also went further to state that "the way any state behaves towards the world must be sought in the way its society is organized and functions (i.e the basic social structure and behavior), in the character and behavior of its people and in its physical habitat." While the external setting refers to the factors and conditions beyond the territorial boundaries of the state. It includes the actions and reactions of other states (i.e their decision-makers) and the societies for which they act, as well as the physical world (Asobie, 1990:27). Another important hallmark of the internal-external settings model is that outcomes in states' foreign policy, and by extension, the international system depends on the attitudes, perceptions, judgments and purposes of a state's decision-makers. This is stressed because different individuals react to same stimuli differently; hence it all depends on how one perceives the situation at a particular time. The external setting is seen as ever-changing and dynamic, and so it is left for the decision-makers to factor in on what they may view as important.

It is pertinent to note that the domestic social forces have important impacts on the formulation and execution of foreign policy; in turn, a state's external actions may have serious consequences for the domestic society itself; and, then again, the external and internal settings are related to each other in the sense that inter-societal, inter-cultural non-governmental interaction condition the state's official action (Asobie, 1990:27). Connecting this model to the study which is Nigeria's foreign policy, it is clear that Nigeria exerted immense power and influence within the comity of nations especially in Africa in the 1960s, 1970s and the early part of the 1980s. This was because then her economy was healthy and strong enough to support vibrant foreign policy. The military regime headed by Murtala Mohammed paraded a man who was very proactive and whose decisions and worldview had profound influence on the country's image abroad. It helped the regime to project vibrant foreign policy, and equally awakened positive reactions from Nigerians. However, when the military handed over power to the civilian administration headed by Shehu Shagari, the momentum died down, the fate of the country's foreign policy projection was worsened by the global oil glut which affected the country's economy adversely causing decision-makers to look inward to try to solve its domestic problems. One of the policies of the administration which touched off negatively on Nigeria and Nigerians was the expulsion of illegal aliens from the country. Hence, Snyder's comprehensive (internal-external setting) model of Decision-making approach could be applied in order to explain the reasons for decisions and actions of the Nigerian state in its foreign policy, and by extension, the decision-makers who the model see as the state itself. More so in order to arrive at the motivating factors that are responsible for Nigeria's adherence to its 'Africa first' policy from independence to the 1990s, and later in the new millennium, struggled to assert its authority in the scheme of things in West Africa and Africa, which informed the different paradigms and frameworks; a systematic study of the internal-external environments with which it is faced is very expedient.

## Data presentation and analysis

Some foreign policy actions of Nigeria over the years and their outcomes have indicated that it requires a reappraisal, if not discarding altogether its 'Africa first' policy. For instance, Nigeria spent about "$10 to $14 billion dollars" according to Sanda (2012), in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in Liberia at a time when majority of its citizens lived below the poverty line. In the light of the above stated, and especially in the face of uncooperative disposition of some African states to Nigeria's leadership aspiration, many scholars began to question the rationale for Nigeria's "Africa first" foreign policy when it is faced with enormous internal challenges which continues to dwarf its efforts to consolidate on leadership position in Africa. For us to adequately appreciate the huge disparity between Nigeria and South Africa's level of economic development, let us consider figures in Table 3.0 which shows the level of development even when South Africa just became a multiparty democracy in 1994. From table 3.0 below, South Africa had a population of 42 million which is about half

of that of Nigeria, but its GDP was $160.0 billion while Nigeria's GDP was $28.0 billion. Nigeria's GDP was far more less than South Africa's. Also, South africa exported goods more than it imports while the reverse was the case in Nigeria. South africa's 42 million people had per capita income of $2,600 per head, while Nigeria's 88.5 million people had per capita income of $230 per head. These indices show that Nigeria's Africa first policy cannot be sustainable.

**Table 3.0 Macro-Economic Indicators for Nigeria and South Africa as at 1994**.

| Economic Indicators | South Africa | Nigeria |
|---|---|---|
| Population | 42 million | 88.5 million |
| GDP | $160.0 billion | $28.0 billion |
| National Budget | $35.0 billion | $10.0 billion |
| Exports | $23.8 billion | $13.0 billion |
| Imports | $21.2 billion | $9.5 billion |
| Per Capita Income | $2,600 per head | $230 per head |
| International Reserve | $1.5 billion | $960 million |
| Gold Reserve | 5.6 billion | 689 million |

**Source:** Culled from Alkali, R.A. (2003). Issues in international relations & Nigeria's foreign policy (2nd ed.). Kaduna: Northpoint Publishers, p. 246.

Going further, indications are that if Nigeria does not re-strategize its foreign policy objectives, South Africa may actually eclipse her and take full leadership position in Africa, and thereby representing Africa in matters that concern the continent globally. Zabadi and Onuoha (2012:408) note that *"South Africa is not only being invited to the G8, she also has become a member of the G20, and the BRICS."* Behold, South Africa is not joining these platforms without any interests, they note that it does so to *"show that she can speak for Africa."* In the midst of these Nigeria could do nothing, it could not be a member of the G20, nor the G8, and of course not a member of BRICS group of countries.

Osuagwu (2014:9) opine that "there has not been a justification for Nigeria's huge expenditure on the continent even when it had about $36 billion dollars debt owed to Western donor agencies." It would, therefore, be more beneficial to Nigerians and more economically sensible for Nigeria to leverage on a peaceful, fair, free, and credible election in 2019 to handle its internal and external challenges in order to take policy actions that earns support and respect abroad and not piling up debts for an already impoverished populace.

**Research Findings**

Policies pursued by Nigeria sometimes make it difficult for it to instantly reciprocate acts of provocation from neighbouring states. For example, if not for Nigeria's policy of good neighbourliness and the desire to observe international treaties especially in West Africa and Africa, Imhanlahimhin (1998) state that "… Nigeria had overwhelming resources to trade tackles with Cameroun in 1981when some Camerounian troops killed some Nigerian border guards….." But Nigeria did

not make Cameroun pay for that in order to serve as deterrence to other states. Instead Nigeria's quiet reaction emboldened the Camerounians who went further to take the Bakassi matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). At such instance these policies seem to incapacitate Nigeria even in occasions where it could have called the shots.

**Conclusion**

Nigeria's economic development indices at the moment will not support competition with South Africa for leadership in Africa. Leadership should be about ability to measure up with demands of sub regional and global roles. Hence, it is not right for Nigeria to engage in competition with South Africa

**Recommendations**

Nigeria should according to Briggs (1994:194) formulate policies that would "resolve its domestic situation" after the 2019 elections before projecting abroad. Nigeria should, first, reconsider its objectives; second, it should enter into diverse multilateral relations traversing different critical sectors of its economy with major global power players with the interests of Nigerians the main consideration; third, earlier paradigms such as economic diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy should be articulated into a broad framework that seeks to reposition Nigeria globally. The principles of Nigeria's foreign policy which includes that Africa would be the cornerstone of her (Nigeria's) foreign policy, should be amended to state thus 'Nigeria would be the cornerstone of its foreign policy.'

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# Internal Party Democracy and Conduct of 2015 Gubernatorial Election in Enugu State: Appraisal of Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)

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## Abstract

*Democratic rule which failed in Nigeria during the First and Second republic political experience was re-adopted in 1999 as a measure to embrace democracy vis-à-vis majority-constituted system of government contrary to what autocracy, dictatorship, theocracy or fascism would offer. Election is the major instrument to decide who controls power and government in almost all the democratic dispensations. The outcomes of primary and general elections remain paramount for the sustenance of political parties and their attendant variables ranging from ideology to loyalty of members. In a federal democratic system, a political party's constitution is out-rightly not inferior to the state's constitution even when these could be subjectively interpreted for known or unknown exigency. In 1999 general election, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) swept the polls and almost entrenched one-party system. The party allegedly sponsored by the retired army generals, material-opportunists and past governments' beneficiaries left no one in doubt and regards to its determination to actualise absolute control of power and machineries of government. Enugu State gubernatorial primary election generated tremendous controversy in the party and was found to be inconsistent with the party's constitution considering the manner which the candidate that ran for the party emerged. We have attempted here-in a scholarly investigation why the internal party democracy has failed to yield desired benefits in the PDP. Method of research data was mainly secondary source cum descriptive qualitative analytical instrument. For the purpose of deep understanding of the phenomenon, we employ the Marxist theory of post-colonial states which dwells on the activities of the ruling class in collaboration with their foreign counterparts. We arrived that the subsisting anti-democratic tendency and activities of the elites and party chieftains promote internal party crises. In addition, personalisation of political power and offices had been located as the major source of electoral fraud visa-a-vis; INEC misconduct of election and results. However, we proffered in the study antidotes for proper democratic disposition which party members should imbibe for an enduring democracy in Nigeria.*

**Keywords:** Democracy, Gubernatorial, Election, Internal party democracy, Autocracy.

## Introduction

Democracy or democratic rule requires vibrant political parties with the capacity and precepts to represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate their ability to govern for the public good. With an increasing disconnect

between citizens and their elected leaders, a decline in political activism, a growing sophistication of anti-democratic forces, democratic norms and principles are continually suppressed by the privileged selected few (Rebirth Democratic Initiative, 2005). World public opinion polls conducted in nineteenth century reveal that in every country's poll, the public supported the principles of democracy.  At the same time, in nearly every nation, majorities are the masses.  The survey went further to state that in all the nineteenth-century polls that the majorities agreed with democratic principles; that the will of the people should be the basis for the authority of government. Likewise, for democracy to prevail in political parties, the party leaderships/chieftains should derive their authority from the party's constitution and disallow one-man rule (Baldin and Stevenson, 2005).

Nigerian party politics began during the twilight of British colonial rule. Due to the ethnic and religious composition of the country, political parties were formed on the basis of the aforementioned variables. The three major political parties were functional namely; NCNC, NPC and AG. These represented the dominant political blocs in Nigeria considering the politics of 'Divide and Rule' that was deliberately imposed by the colonists. As stated in Asobie (2007), the political parties that took the mantle of political activities from British authorities inherited a legacy which would not encourage socio-economic and political cooperation amongst various tribes in Nigeria that had hitherto failed to pursue agenda for Nigerian people other than ethnic agenda. This specific problematic is mostly referred to as seed of disunity and was perceived as the major factor which caused the collapse of the country's First republic; in other words, the first democratic experience.

Politics of imposition and high-handedness featured prominently within the Nigeria's earliest political parties and this provoked fierce rivalry, resentment, inter/intra-ethnic subterfuge, hate and of course the 1962 political conflict in the western region between factions of AG remains fresh in the mind. The northern political establishment that equally controlled the politics of Nigeria due to the colonial support allegedly instigated and orchestrated the crises in western Nigeria in an attempt to determine among Awolowo and Akintola who leads. The re-emergence of democratic rule in 1979 after Shehu Shagari was declared winner of the widely acknowledged controversial election result further deepened electoral crisis in Nigeria. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) that secured victory through the misinterpretation of two-thirds majority had a political alliance NPP opposed to the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) that stood as the opposition. The politicians during this democratic experience failed to learn from the past consequences of imposition of candidates and/or rules on the party rather, behaved as if there was never a past to learn unto.  This was cited by the military as its main reason for truncating the Nigerian democratic dispensation of that era (Chukwumah, 2007).

Nigeria was under the military dictatorship for a period of fifteen years after which another phase of democratic system re-emerged when Olusegun Obasanjo was declared winner of the 1998 presidential election. The PDP under which Obasanjo contested and won, was formed by Alex Ekwueme and others while the former was serving prison term having been implicated on a *coup d'etat*. However, a good

number of retired military generals during the early stage of PDP formation ensured that Obasanjo was released unconditionally from prison and lobbied to hijack the party and Ekwueme's influence that was hitherto decisively impacting due to his democratic credentials and pedigree. He enjoyed majority support of the party membership, as a tested/trusted democrat cum the supposed presidential candidate of PDP in the 1999 democratic election mostly seen as an opportunity to send the military back to barracks through democracy (Nwankwo, 2007).

The PDP once again began the experimentation of civil rule after the long period of abeyance having been infected with the military mentality could neither encourage nor lay a solid foundation for internal party democracy which should nourish/nurture the entire democratic institution or structure Between 1998 and 2015, the party did not organise free and fair national/state convention but resorted to appointment of about nine national executive chairmen even in outright transgression of the party's constitution. PDP constitution states that the office of the national chairman should be duly contested, thus the enthronement of unpopular candidate based on certain ulterior consideration would be unrealistic. Unfortunately, the national conventions which brought into power the party's stewards from the time of inception were adjudged undemocratic and at variance with the party's constitution. There had been two main blocs in the party namely; governors and presidency that were constantly at logger-head to produce the party officers, ruling governors and president (Gauja, 2006).

Constitutionally, the sitting president is recognised as the leader of the party in the country. But the cooperation among the PDP governors had reduced the influence of the president on party matters resulting to countless confrontation arising from clash of interests between the blocs. However, this situation was not different at various states where PDP was in control of government. In Enugu State, the alleged selection or appointment of the chairmanship position by the sitting governor was the principal factor that provoked resentment within the party which eventually metamorphosed into factions during the party primaries. The division within the party played negatively against the party in the general election. There was public out-cries when it became known nationally/internationally that the president was a crowned emperor who cannot be answerable to the party's constitution formulated in recognition of the principles of "rule of law" instead of respect to man's autocratic disposition. PDP primaries in Enugu State never ended without factions and declaration of two or more candidates parading as authentic flag-bearers of the party.

This explains why Agbakoba (2008) criticized the approaches and measures adopted by PDP both at the national and state's level as incongruent to a democratic government. Berating the party's primaries as open fraud and unthinkable of taking Nigeria to an enviable standard. Obviously, Nigerians have expressed doubt that the political office occupants actually understand the sacrifice requires of leadership and the responsibility that must be attached to public offices.

The extant literature nevertheless is analytical on matters relating to internal party democracy with PDP as a major focus. Scholars are concerned with out-right disregard to the party's constitution by the chieftains and political office holders that

rose to power through its platform, yet failed to recognise the supremacy of the party constitution/ideology on members. Scholars cum analysts have criticised what they described as tap-rooted culture of impunity imbedded within the serving and retired soldiers that hijacked the party's leadership from inception. Onah (2010) captured succinctly the mood of conspiracy in PDP which was planted by certain individuals with anti-democratic background. To him, these elements oppose any form of democratic norms or rule that would endanger their group's interests; ranging from usurpation of state power to primitive accumulation of public wealth. In a similar development, Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2008), Egbo (2001) and Akpuna (2010) underline the fact that PDP has been suffering from autocratic disposition/mentality of its chieftains in the habit of sacrificing the rules of democracy on the altar of private and/or group's objectives.

Indeed, the above interrogations are germane, yet failed in revealing the unwritten policy which hitherto induces political office holders in Nigeria into the privatization agenda of public affairs in order to promote group's interests hiding on the banner of leadership. It is needful however to address this lacuna for posterity and enriching the extant literature. Against this background, this paper attempts to problematize the consequences of anti-democratic stances by certain chieftains of PDP that gave in for stultification of internal party democracy in her Enugu State chapter.

The paper employed qualitative and analytical dimension. Secondary data was adopted as a source for generating materials necessary in the interrogating the subject-matter. The data generated were verified using content analysis perspective.

## Conceptual Clarifications
### Democracy

The term 'democracy' cannot be over-emphasized in today's administration of men and the states. It has speeded across the globe like wide fire registering its indispensability on nations and countries as well. Democracy has not faltered or relented in dwarfing the achievements of government systems that existed before now; fascism, autocracy, monarchy, military-dictatorship to mention a few. This originally conceived Greek word; 'rule of the people' considering the unanimous nature of man is ever stressing the crucial importance of the majority rule. During the Greeks' ancient life, most political thinkers were opposed to the notion of democracy which defiled absolutism usually found in or within an individual or few persons (Oxford, 2003). Democracy connotes an overwhelming size or portion, invariably more than a half size of a population. It stresses the general acceptability of the people over a certain situation or position even when a minor percentage of unacceptability of the overwhelming general interest or position is recorded. Contest between two candidates for a particular position requires voting and the candidate with the majority or highest number of votes is often declared winner. The process of lobbing or asking for votes in democracy is tagged as campaign which is equally a period when the candidates standing for election are expected to say to the people their intention. Democratic instruments are voting, lobbing, proselytisation, and

persuasion, debate, convincing, and sometimes scheming. Democracy is not without treachery as in the case of African politics. The fundamental debate for democracy was from Thucydides to Pericles one of the political leaders of Athens in 430 BC whence it was argued that democracy is associated to tolerance, yet made no mention about majority. Plato and Aristotle did deplore democracy on the basis of deprivation of the experts and encouragement of populism. To Aristotle, government of the people amount to government of the poor who would likely appropriate common wealth for private interest.

**Election**

The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences cited in Okolie (2004) states that: "election is a process of selecting the officers or representatives of an organisation or group by the vote of its qualified members." In a more encompassing approach, Bain; (1964:162) states that: "election is the formal process by which the electorate selects officials and determines the issues submitted to it." It is thus, a procedure for choosing officers and making binding decisions concerning policy by the vote of those formally qualified to participate".

Another view-point was expressed in Igwe (2005:132) as the "institutionalised process of determining popular choice in direct and popular representation in indirect or representative democracies, the latter being dictated by the size and complexity of modern state system". In all, election in democratic system ensures adequate measure through which candidates are formally selected to perform duties assigned statutorily on various position/offices. However, it's necessary to indicate that the above arguments are obtainable in western-developed countries unlike Africa where democratic-dictatorship and minority autocracy still persists.

**Political Party**

An organised group of like minds with an intention to participate in election through fielding candidates for various offices and anticipating to win in order to control the state together with other attending variables. Political party has been variously defined hence most scholars believe that it is the largest mass organisation of voters in contemporary governments, predicating the notion that it is an organised and registered group of individuals based on shared philosophical and/or ideological interest as manifested in their manifesto for the aim of controlling state resources (Okolie, 2004). Political party shares different ideological conviction ranging from liberalism, conservatism, populism, elitism, egalitarianism, communism to individualism.

**Theoretical Perspective**

We employed the Marxist theory of the post-colonial states as our analytical framework. Marx (1964) cited in Okolie, (2004) asserts that the state remains a potent instrument of domination, deprivation, suppression and alienation of the people by the few that control the state power/resources. This argument is further strengthened by Marxist scholars that the state is a creature and manifestation of the

irreconcilability of class struggle. Hence, Lenin (1984:10) and Engels (1942:155) argue that: "the state is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it's the admission the society has become entangled in an insoluble contraction with itself that it has split into irreconcilable antagonism, these classes with conflicting economic interest might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle. It becomes necessary to have power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the conflicts and keep within the bounds of order and this power arisen out of society but placing itself more and more from it, is the state".

Reasons: Marx formally expressed these attributes;
That the state is an instrument of class domination.

That the centrality of the state and its apparatuses are the main instrument for private accumulation especially by dominant class and their foreign collaborators. (Engels, 1942; Alavi, 1973; Lenin, 1984).
That the state is equally extractive and capitalist oriented.
In non-socialist societies, the function of the state is to serve and protect the interests of the powerful; hence the capitalist state cannot be reformed for two reasons: it is inherently exploitative and true reforms are not in the interest of the ruling class which, therefore, will not permit them. Because such a state cannot be reformed, it must be replaced; that the redistribution of goods and services through welfare, taxation and similar means is mere tokenism serving only to pacify the exploited class from uprising and revolt; and human essence is defined historically and economic factors are largely determined by history.

Thus, Moor (1958) posits that there is hardly any area of socio-economic, political or cultural investigation which has not been scrutinised by the techniques of Marxist analysis. In particular, this has involved historical materialist methodology rooted in the belief that the structure of society and human relations in all their forms are product of material conditions and circumstances rather than ideas, thought, or consciousness. Consequently, the state and its institutions including political parties and electoral bodies in charge of elections have been hijacked by powerful men who turned these apparatuses into instruments for perpetuation of class interest, willful alienation and self-reproduction.

Ake (1985) buttressed this view on the character of the state and local bourgeoisie in Nigeria and other developing countries as follows: "due to lack of autonomy, the states in Africa, nay in Nigeria is bogged down in contradiction. In actual fact, it is also involved in class struggle. Indeed, the states in peripheral social formation are basically inchoate and thrive on low autonomy". The state appears over-developed as economic centralism remains its hallmark. To Hassan and Ifejika (2007), the state here is the source of economic power as well as the instrument to appropriate socio-political prestige; the state is a major means of production".

It is from this perspective that the recurrent problem of internal party democracy in the states of Africa that had embraced democracy could be further explained. In other words, the crises or absence of internal party democracy in political parties in Africa with emphasis on Nigeria is largely a product of external

creation of the post-colonial ruling class and this makes the local bourgeoisie prone to external manipulation. The consequence is that the post-colonial ruling class devotes considerable energy and resources in defending the external interests; foreign capital at the expense of national interest and democracy. The attempt by the masses to resist this subversion/sabotage in the form of electoral malpractice and personalization of political power by party leaders often cause them severe systemic repression through the state's sponsored coercion/terrorism. This, of course, is at the root of the lingering anti-democratic stance of the party leaders in the post-colonial states. In order to hold on to power, the emergent post-colonial leaders undermined the principles of democracy and became manifestly corrupt and brutal as they hunt down people seeking greater freedom and all those perceived as threatening their position. So long these party leaders advance the western interest through policies like; neo-liberalism, privatisation, removal of oil subsidy, protection of multinationals and non-strict import policy, it's assumed that they have been given clean bill of health to crude democracy. Hence Hassan and Ifejika (2016) remark that: "disguised one-party dictatorship such as Uganda's no-party democracy and Nigerian autocratic democracy were endorsed not only by World Bank but equally by other donor agencies in pretence of regional security and African solutions to African problem. This can also explain why liberal democracy is not being enforced in some states of the Middle East; allies to the West.

However, low autonomisation and high quest for material accumulation propel the party leaders to influence the democratic institutions of the state such as INEC, Political Parties, Courts, Legislature, etc., to a dangerous degree in committing electoral fraud and imposition or undue recognition of a particular candidate (Okakpu, 2008). This accounts for lack of internal party democracy and unwholesome attitude of the political leaders in Nigeria, basically self-centered, unproductive and relying mainly on the acquisition and control of the state power. Seemingly, the prevailing situation; the use of political power for personal interest, is responsible for high incidence of electoral malpractice that is linked to lack of internal party democracy of the PDP in Enugu State.

**Democratic Reconciliation and Persistent Autocracy**
Though democracy has its origin in the ancient Greece yet other cultures have significantly contributed to the evolution of democracy such as ancient Rome, Igbo, and India, etc. Democracy has been called the last form of government and has spread considerably across the globe. Suffrage has been expanded in many jurisdictions over time from relatively narrow groups such as wealthy men of a particular ethnic group but still remains a controversial issue regarding to disputed areas with significant immigration and countries that exclude certain demographic groups. But Harkinsho, (1999) opines that: "there are varieties of democracies; some of which provide better representation and more freedoms for their citizens than others. However, if any democracy is not carefully legislated to avoid an uneven distribution of political power with balances, such as separation of power and become harmful to the democracy itself. The majority rule is often described as a characteristic of the rights

of the minority to be abused by the tyranny of the majority or vice-versa. An essential process in representative democracies is competitive elections that are fair both substantively and procedurally. Furthermore, freedoms of political expression, freedom of speech and of the press are essential so that citizens are informed and able to vote in their personal interest".

In collaboration with the above, Alexander (1957) sees democracy as a system where freedom is paramount value that ensures actual sovereignty of the people and government by the people through political pluralism leading to transfer of power. Democracy is based on respect of all the people, including freedom of thought and expression and right to organise under the effective political institutions with an elected legislature, an independent judiciary, a government that is subject to constitutional and public accountability and political parties of different intellectual and ideological orientations. This type of democracy requires guaranteed freedom of expression in forms, topmost among which is freedom of press, audio-visual and electronic media. It calls for adopting free, regular, centralize and decentralised elections to guarantee transfer of power and the rule of the people.

In the ancient Greek democracy, for example Athens, public officials were occasionally elected but more often were chosen (Harkinsho, 1999). To this source, in Rome the popular assemblies elected the tribunes. In the Middle Age elections were abandoned, except for such processes as elections to the papacy and in a more limited sense of the Holy Roman emperor by a small and hereditary body of electors. Lewis (2003), in the same vein, argues that in modern period, elections have been separable from the growth of democratic forms of government. Elections were associated with the parliamentary process in England from 13th century and were gradually regularised by acts prescribing the frequency of elections; the Triennial Act of 1694 and the Septennial Act of 1716; by the successive reform bills widening the franchise in the 19th century and by the adoption of the secret ballot in 1872.

In a liberal democratic theory, an election is a viable mechanism for consummating representative government. Apart from facilitating leadership succession, it promotes political accountability, citizens' participation and gives voice and power to the people. In other words, elections are expression of the people's sovereignty and will. Mill (1948) in his treatise on representative government noted that: "the meaning of representative government is that the whole people or some numerous portions of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by them the ultimate controlling power which in every constitution must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness.

The reality, however, is that the nostalgia of direct democracy which Ake, (1985) recounts is problematic in a complex and complicated post-modern society. In any case, liberal democracy is in crisis in many countries; developed and developing (Ezeilo, 2007). In developed countries the level of citizen participation in the electoral process is dwindling largely because real choice is limited and the people have a sense of powerlessness rather than satisfaction. In developing countries, especially in Africa, elections are riddled with tension, crises and fraud such that it is difficult to use barometer of people's choice.

Nevertheless, the state is seen as a central agency in regulating political parties, setting rules and procedures and ensuring fairness in social interactions and bargaining amongst the people. As far as the state may be embedded in the social structure, it has the capacity not only to influence but also transform the social structure despite individual political inclination. It is the locus of power and the determinant of social values. As such, strong interfaces exist between the nature and character of the state, political leaders and democratic values. Thus, Akintoye (1989) notes that: "African states have been the object of much social theorising. The African states have earned various epithets ranging from dependent, neo-patrimonial, prebendal, entrepot, rentier, rogue, criminal, peripheral, etc. An analysis of two theories on the African state may give some insights into the strengths and biases of those frameworks".

Bayart *et al* (1999) in his theory of the criminal state in Africa instigated by abuse of political power of the political cabal draws a parallel between Africa's history and traditional political values and criminal conduct in the political system which has implications for the crisis of personalisation of power and legitimacy in Africa. Africa's history of state formation, which is located in the mercantilist era is one predicted on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and rents, conduct transferred to the post-colonial era. As mercantilist trade declined in importance, its global networks were adapted to criminal activities such personalistion of political offices, favoritism and god-fatherism. Thus, this source remarked that the relationship between accumulation and power is henceforth situated in a context of internationalisation and growth of organised political crime on a probably unprecedented scale. Criminal gangs seize control of political power and the state becomes machinery for organised crime, especially; electoral fraud, privatisation of power/offices and sabotage against democracy. The criminalisation of politics and of the state may be regarded as routinisation at the very heart of the political and governmental institutions and circuits, of practices whose criminal nature is patent, whether as defined by law of the country in question, or as defined by the norms of international community (Bayart, 1999).

Achebe (1985) argues that the rise in Africa of activities officially classified as criminal is aided by existence of moral and political codes of behaviour especially those of ethnicity, kinship, religion, cultural representations, notably the social values invisibility, and of certain prestigious styles of life, even of an aesthetic, whose capacity to legitimins certain types of behaviour is considerable. In essence, elections/partism becomes a criminal activity in which bandits and criminal gangs hold sway because such modes of political practice are reified by popular culture and social values. Ezeilo (2007) explains the same problem from s materialist perspective. He argues that the personalisation of political power which causes other monumental damage; underdevelopment of the productive forces in a developing country like Nigeria, creates limited autonomy for the state and hampers its capacity to mediate class and political struggle. He further noted as follows: "what needs to be kept in view is that limited autonomisation means that the African states are extremely weak to perform adequately the essential functions of state. The African state as

constituted hampers the realisation of the law value and development of the productive forces. The state in post-colonial Africa is unable to mediate the struggle between classes and even within class vis-a-vis political parties and hegemonic establishment. The net effect of this is that politics essentially is the struggle to control and employing the state power for private objectives. Power is overvalued and security lies only in getting more and more power. There is hardly any restraint on the means of acquiring power, holding it or using it. Might co-exist with right.

**The Electoral Institution, Elites and Election Management**

We examine personalisation of political power by party leaders in Nigeria as a conspiracy by forces of wealth, tribalism, oligarchy and capitalism for aims and objectives that are entirely predatory and subversive to democracy, from a theoretical prism of the latter. Personalization of political power refers to the set attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which violate the principles of internal party democracy and the political process and further provide the underlying assumptions and rules that appear monopolistic when applied in the political system (Yaqub, 2001). It is the aggregated experience of a people over a period of time, particularly in its recent history which shapes their psychological and subjective disposition in politics. It is both cumulative and contemporaneous engagement of the people especially the elites with the political process their values, orientations, perceptions, understanding and meaning of political power and process in the country. Personalisation of political power, as Okolie (2007) argues, comprises elite and political cloning preoccupation the relationship between both is crucial in determining the performance of the political system.

The nature of Nigeria's federal system and the legacy of military rule are enduring factors that influence the extent political parties and electoral practices, especially as constructed by the political class. The state being a centralised federal system in which power and resources are concentrated at the center; there is a disconnect of power from responsibility and between citizens' material obligation to the state and state responsibility for ideal institutional conduct and ethical behavior. The base of national accumulation which is oil rather than taxation imposes little restraint on state conduct, performance and accountability. Within the context of political centralism vis-à-vis; personalisation of political power, the tendency is for the struggle over state power especially at the center to be fierce, lawless and extremely consuming.

Years of military rule have accelerated this drift towards hegemonic politics at the expense of democracy. Ekwueme (2005) notes that Nigeria has experienced decades of military and authoritarian rule which has left deep imprints in country's party democracy and electoral process. Consequently, the political elites have become accustomed to centralization, concentration and personalisation of political power, the central defining elements of modern despotism. The consolidation of democracy, however, requires the institutionalisation of political power in which the process, rules and regulations replace the exercise of individual power /interests.

Meanwhile, electoral fraud is not limited to political polls and can occur in any election where the potential gain is worth the risk for the cheater; as in elections

for labour union officials, students' council, sports judges and awarding merit to books, films or music. Despite many instances of electoral fraud, Lukeman (1970) and Rosebolm (1970) took a common position that it remains a difficult phenomenon to study.

Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006) in conjunction with Nwankwo (2004) observe that the primary responsibility for election management in Nigeria resides in an electoral body. This body to the scholars has the responsibility to constituency delimitation, registration of voters, registration of political parties, monitoring the parties' primaries, organisation of elections and declaration of election results. Hence, Ezeilo (2007) held that the problem of legitimacy and credibility are embedded in this institutional history. Like its past leaderships, INEC has not been able to engender public confidence in the electoral process or organise transparent and credible election (Odey, 2003, Anifowose and Babawale (2003). As Nwankwo (2007) remarked on the conduct of 2007 elections: "one thing was unique in the 2003/2007 elections the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was genuinely not in control of activities on election days. Extra-INEC, forces working in tandem with INEC officials adopted unconstitutional methods to determine the outcome of most of the elections conducted by INEC".

There are several issues which impinge on the autonomy of the electoral commission and its efficacy. According to Jinadu (1997) composition and mode of appointment of the body should be of paramount concern; the process of choosing the INEC officials, numerical strength, tenure and under what circumstance would they be removed from office, how and by who? Second is the legal framework of its powers. Nevertheless, its constitutional provision should account the basis of operation or conduct. In other words, what institutional autonomy does it have from the executive and legislature? How is the electoral commission funded? To whom is the commission answerable? And with what freedom does it conduct its activities like the voter's registration and the actual voting process? Ezeilo (2007) states that the composition of Nigeria's electoral body is at the behest of the President. The commission is one of the executive organs of the state albeit recognised by the constitution as independent. INEC is composed of a chairman, twelve national commissioners and thirty-seven resident electoral commissioners, all whom are appointed by the federal government, thereby rendered vulnerable to the manipulation of the President and Federal Authorities.

Although officials of the commission are usually screened by the legislature, it has become a mere formality as the ruling political party with overwhelming majority in the national assembly would influence the screening exercise. Hence, the recent practice by the president has been to appoint people without credible professional or intellectual competence in electoral matters to head the commission (Kurfi, 2005).

Nwankwo (2007) observed that the federal electoral commissioners have tenure of office, but do not have security of tenure. They can be removed by the president without any *prima facie* case of misconduct made against them; for example, Eme Awa and Humphrey Nwosu were removed from office in 1989 and

1993 respectively in questionable circumstances. The former was removed due to uncompromising stance in the management of the electoral commission and the latter following the military regime's decision to annul the 12th June 1993 presidential election contrary to the position of the commission. The funding of the electoral commission is the prerogative of the executive which determines the amount provided for in the national budget. Finance is a major means through which the autonomy of the electoral commission is compromised (Nwankwo, 2007).

Essentially, the nature of the four main political parties is captured by Lewis (2003). The nebulous party system has little to do with any distinct ideologies, strategies or sectional appeals. The major parties are relatively diverse in their leadership and constituencies, but remain focused on the elite contention and patronage. Ethnicity is still a crucial vehicle for political mobilization. Personalities and clientelist networks predominate internal discipline is weak and internecine battles are common. Indeed, Abubakar (2012) observed that: "an essential element of promoting free and fair elections in the country is the free and fair conduct of party nominations. Most elections are rigged before they occur because candidates are eliminated through various methods. These include subverting party constitution and rules, the use of thugs, corruptible party officials to disqualify or annul the nomination of some candidates and other illegal methods of distorting the wishes of the electorate".

## Party's Supremacy and Personalities

Political parties are obviously riddled with internal strife and multiple crises. Nwabueze (2007); Agbaje (2006) and Obi (2005) all share the view that the situation in PDP exemplifies a general tendency. A manifestation of the crisis within the PDP is the high turnover of the party chairmanship. In six years, the party produced four chairmen. The President was apparently the sole power in the party and was referred to as the party leader, a position not provided for in the party constitution. The president could remove party chairmen at will. The October 2005 congress of the PDP amply demonstrated the perfidy that characterises the internal democracy of the party. In an unprecedented but questionable manner, a non-elective national executive committee of the party dissolved the membership of the party and directed all members to re-apply.

Strengthening the aforementioned view, Agbakoba (2008) maintains that the re-registration exercise was a power game by the president and the national executive committee to seize control of the party. Hence, *Daily Sun* (2006), in a similar reaction, maintains that their registration method adopted by PDP was to de-register some members perceived as radicals. However, with dubious party membership list, the party proceeded to organise a party congress which was characterised by rancor and violence in virtually all the states of the federation (Nwankwo, 2007). Obi (2005) summerises the picture that emerges in the PDP from its national congress as follows: "in the PDP of today, all known rules of democracy have been thwarted. The party does not care a hoot about the process of election or selection. It violates them at will. In the party, it is not the people that make choice; rather few people who seized the

instruments of power that impose their will on the people. If democracy is thrown open the polity for mass participation in official matters, the PDP has shrunk the political space thus making democracy look like a closed-shop. The sins of PDP against democracy and internal party democracy are legion. The Jacob (2007) summed it up in an editorial by arguing that: "if PDP cannot conduct itself to the rule of law and due process, entrusting the country's constitution and election matters is like digging a pit against socio-political development of Nigeria".

The scenario above is definitely unimaginable in Nigeria. According to Okakpu (2008) due to absence of internal party democracy in the political parties of this era, with emphasis of PDP, the president is the leader of the party and in actuality, decides what happens in the party; prior to the emergence of President Yar'Adua, his predecessor; President Obasanjo built personality cult around himself that the party at all levels was suffocated due to his dictatorial expressions in terms of words and actions. He embodies the party leadership and the party leadership toed his dictations. This situation did not change during Yar'Adua's administration. Whoever the president does not like becomes an enemy to PDP and the party rises in support of the president on any issue. These turnout events did not wear a different color in various states' chapters of the party where the governors hold sway as the leaders of the party in the states.

In Enugu State, during 2007/2015 PDP primaries, there were various factions that organised the party primary election separately. Okakpu (2017) notes that the paralleled primaries held at different time and venue indicates lack of cohesion and discipline among the party members and leaders. This source states that the irreconcilable differences within the leaders of the party in the state, manifested into two/three paralleled primary results which produced two or more governorship candidates of PDP in the state. The sitting governor organised a primary election, the federal law makers from the state organised a different one, while the state party chairman had another organized. With this formation, needless to expect the party in-question to emerge victorious in the general election if fair, free and credible election is guaranteed by INEC. But the unexpected eventually happened. PDP with this kind of divided house, indiscipline of members and lack of mutual cooperation of the leaders, won the duo governorship elections in the state. In his view, Agbakoba (2008) referred to PDP's victory on 2007 governorship election in Enugu State as "victory gotten through the barrel of gun and not by vote casting". This line of argument was generally expressed nationally hence Nwabueze (2013), Uchegbue (2016) and Omemma (2016) held politicians without the democratic character and commitment to rule of law accountable for ugly outcomes during the period under investigation.

However, in South Africa, the earlier scenario narrated above is a similar situation that former President Thabo Mbeki found himself. He was on trial by the leadership of his party; the African National Congress (ANC) for allegedly influencing the decision of the National Directorate of Public Prosecution (NDPP) to file charges of corruption against his former deputy; Jacob Zuma Uchegbue (2017).

Thus, scholars have demonstrated seemingly unanimous consensuses in the context of a weak electoral body, perversion in electoral process, imposition of candidates, quest for personalisation of political power and undemocratic political parties which create the stage for flawed elections. Hence, election 1999 to 2015, appear like virtually all the elections in Nigeria's post-colonial history were classic examples of electoral malpractice. Arguing further on this direction, Onuoha (2003) identified two broad terms while analysing post-colonial electoral history in Nigeria as 'transition and consolidation'. He notes that transition elections were organised by departing colonial authorities in 1959, 1993; aborted and 1999. On the other hand, consolidated elections of the civil rule include the 1964/65, 1983, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections. While virtually all these elections have been contested, the elections of the former category stand out as the most corrupt and fraudulent. The common characteristics of elections in Nigeria as stated by Chukwumerije (2007) include massive electoral fraud, politics as a warfare, anti-continuity syndrome, high level of opportunism, low level commitment to different variants of right-wing political ideologies that characterise the political office holders, objectification of politics and the mobilisation of ethnic identities/appeal as the basis of defining legitimacy of claims to political power. Consolidation elections are more complex to manage in Nigeria (Emekwata, 2006). In his words, Emekwata (2006:23) presumes that: "interests and forces with a stake in the consolidation process are largely multifarious, with most of them controlling the electoral programs. Consequently, the process reproduces some of the tendencies associated with transition elections, including a deliberate attempt by the ruling party to contrive and monopolise the electoral space, engineer grand electoral fraud, as well as hatch a calculated plot to move the process towards a one party dominant democratic order in favor of the ruling party".

Akintoye (1998) asserts that electoral fraud has been as old as civil rule experience in Nigeria. In his words, Akintoye (1998:77) states that: "the Nigerian People's Congress (NPC) demonstrated gangsterism in politics by the desperate manipulation of the electoral process to monopolise political power in western Nigeria during the first republican/civilian administration in 1964/65, using the NNDP as its proxy, of which this act and other factors culminated the collapse of the first republic. In the same vein, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) attempted to expand its political power by controlling twelve states from seven through electoral fraud in 1983 elections. Three was out right resistance from coup of that year. The 1998, 2003 and 2007 election in Nigeria is still acid test when we are reflecting on the incidences of election in Nigeria".

Similarly, Ojeleye (2014) notes that unlike South Africa where party supremacy is actually supreme, it is the supremacy of the president that supersedes hence any strong person; a president that knows how to wield power would place himself above the party and even the entire country. It is a case of weak democratic/political process versus strong personality cults. Indeed, the preceding discussion points to absence of internal party democracy in most political parties in Nigeria with PDP a major culprit. The prevalent personalization of political power by

party leaders, the imposition of candidates on party members by the elites, political instability and disorderliness in developing African states, appear as product of influence due to western intervention of African politics and economy.

## Conclusion

Considering the out-right attempts to suppress internal party democracy in PDP which was cleverly orchestrated by the party chieftains in Enugu state during the primaries in 2015, this study reviewed the links connecting dictatorial propensity and quest for political unilateralism that eventually gave rise to party-factions and multiple primaries/results. The study however discovered that the ideological substance of PDP has been sacrificed on the altar of quest for political power which supposedly creates unlimited access to economic resources. With such mental disposition of the few elites in control of the party's administrative machinery, it becomes extremely difficult to nurture and/or encourage the practice of internal party democracy.

The study having interrogated occupational background/training of the retired soldiers who invaded PDP during the formation stage, argues that, until most of them embark on another form of democratic training, they would never relent in disdaining democratization process which nevertheless would guarantee democratic consolidation if the party's rules are observed. The study equally notes that inclination and/or resolves to disobey the prescription of the party's constitution by the chieftains and political office holders on the platform of PDP, predisposes other members to lack of faith/trust on the leadership accounting to the absence of internal democracy in PDP.

## Recommendation

To ensure that internal party democracy is safeguarded in political parties, the party leadership/chieftains must be accountable to the party's constitution and subjected to the general opinion of the entire members. With this formula, someone cannot lord it over others in attempt to promote individual interests oppose to general objectives.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should as a matter of urgency carved out from the executive branch, thus, reduce or possibly stop the political and economic control of the body by any of the three organs of government there-by making it difficult for INEC to monitor the party primaries. INEC's autonomy is crucial to democracy and the state of political development in Nigeria, hence should be re-structured in such manner that no politician, no matter how highly placed can influence the institution.

Political parties' constitutions should be deposited with the Supreme Court to ensure that overzealous politicians cannot at will change the stipulation in order to accommodate their personal interests. And if such constitution should be reviewed, the three organs of government shall equally be notified.

Electoral cases before the courts should receive accelerated hearing to guarantee justice and fairness to the actual winners. In other words, an authentic party

candidate must be ascertained prior to the commencement of the election which was not the case in Enugu State, hence certain personality felt shortchanged, took his case to court and eventually, verdict/judgment given by the supreme court in favour of the sitting Governor.

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# The Nigerian State and Political Restructuring:
## A Prognosis for Peaceful Co-existence

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## Abstract

*The search for peace in the Nigerian federation has almost remained a recurrent phenomenon in the agenda of past and present governments. While a number of analysts have pointed to diverse causative factors, this paper set out to interrogate the role that the call for political restructuring of the country has played in the crisis of nationhood among these seemingly disagreeable units that make up the Nigerian state. Available literature on the Nigerian state is replete with chronicled analysis of how the country has not attained the expected position due it among the comity of nations. One major area where the country seems not to have performed well is in the management of its political affairs, largely characterized by a lopsided federal structure. The method of research adopted for this paper was largely qualitative, with data derived from secondary sources, while the social exclusion theory was adopted as the preferred theoretical framework. The work concluded on the note that the structures upon which Nigeria's democracy rest are not only faulty but not firm and deep rooted enough. The paper recommended among others, the need for the federating units to agree on a common modality to meet and discuss the future of the country; through dialogue and negotiation.*

**Keywords:** Political restructuring, Federalism, Crisis, Dialogue, Constitution.

## Introduction

The geographical area known as Nigeria came into existence following the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates by Sir Lord Frederick Lugard in 1914. Literature on the historical evolution of the country is replete with the fact that before the advent of colonialism, nations, empires, states and city-states which existed operated independently, with forms of government peculiar to their territories (Udokang, 2006). These reflected the different ethnic groups found in the area, all organized either as centralized or non-centralized political systems.

The above narrative goes a long way to demonstrate the fact that pre-colonial Nigeria and its people to a large extent engaged actively in a process of state formation, dissolution and reformation. In modern democratic terms, it would imply that accountability and representation were features of governance. Thus, rulers were judged in one way or the other based on how they were seen to have discharged their duties. In those days, decisions were arrived at based on deliberation, consultations and consensus (Uya, 1989 in Udeh, 2007).

Accordingly, the three major ethnic groups that will later dominate the Nigerian State in near perpetuity, had their distinct forms of government. While

Northern Nigeria (dominated by the Hausa-Fulani) operated the Emirate system of governance which was peculiarly centralized and unitary in nature  with the Emir at the peak of the structure, the Yoruba (Western Nigeria) ran a political system that was quasi-democratic and segmentary; a form of loose federation or confederal monarchy (with each major town/village having an Oba as the leader), the East (dominated by Igbo speaking people) was described as highly decentralized, republican or acephalous in nature; they had no recognized leadership structure like the north and west (Dode, 2015). All the above would change, following the invasion of Africa by the European powers in the 19th Century and subsequent change of administrative style of once self-accounting political systems and people. The advent of colonialism was thus more of a disruptive force in the evolution of democracy in Nigeria. Built on exclusive imperial control of politics and the economy (political and economic imperialism), colonialism restricted indigenous participation in governance affairs. The structure remained the same (1922-1940s) until the twilight of colonial rule, when things began to change. There is no gain saying that the advent of British colonialism in the Nigerian territory brought about unpatriotic alliance of entirely distinct bed fellows; hence the core reason for the diverse problems the country has had to contend with over the years. Inter-ethnic intolerance seems to get worse on daily basis, especially since the return to civil democratic rule in 1999.

The political calculus was slightly different during the First Republic (1960-1966) when the type of federal form of government practiced enabled each region to enjoy full autonomy; independent and coordinate at some point. Each region could then develop at its pace, while managing its own affairs with little or no interference from the centre. All that however changed for the worst when the military interfered severally with the democratic course of the country (1966, 1975, 1983, and 1985, 1993-1998). The Federal Government through decrees arrogated to itself overriding powers over the states resources and land, thus destroying the democratic and federal structure that was in the process of consolidation. It must be noted that only a section of Nigeria (North) dominated the military governments for well over 80% of the periods they lasted. This reality came to enhance inter-ethnic suspicion and intolerance in a country characterized by deep rooted ethnic, religious and cultural diversities.

Consequently, Lawan (2014), while adapting the postulations of Huntington, opined that Nigeria is divided along a fault line where two distinct and debatably reconcilable civilizations clash-the Northern part is predominantly Muslim with Islamic orientation and culture, while the Southern part is predominantly Christian, inclined to the western culture. The crux of the matter currently is that citizen alienation holds way nationwide to the extent that virtually all the ethnic components of Nigeria feel sufficiently aggrieved, marginalized and thus seek equity through one form of restructuring or another. Paradoxically, for a while, before 1999, the call for restructuring seemed to be one sided. Not any more, the call for restructuring now runs from East, West, and South to the North of Nigeria. An attempt to shove this call aside or under the carpet as insignificant may amount to greater danger, given the caliber of eminent Nigerians who in recent times have learnt their voices to this call.

Examples of Nigerians who have voiced their position in this direction include: Ben Nwabueze, Atiku Abubakar, Balarabe Musa, Wole Soyinka, Alani Akinrinade, Edwin Clark, Emeka Anyaoku, Ishola Williams, Tanko Yakassai and Pan-Socio-cultural groups like Ohaneze Ndiigbo, Afenifere, Movement for National Reformation and the Patriots. A dangerous addition to these is the slew of agitations and emergent armed groups that have held different parts of the country hostage at several occasions, like, Boko Haram, Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The discontent caused by perceived imbalance in the shape the Nigerian federal practice has taken will thus constitute the focal point (hub) of this paper.

By restructuring in this paper, we mean a restructuring and renewal of the federation to make it less centralized, less suffocating and less dictatorial in the way the federating units relate.

**Theoretical framework**

This work shall benefit from the postulations of scholars associated with the "social exclusion theory". Scholars who have advanced the social exclusion theory observed severally that not too long ago, it was a common practice in existing literature to describe social divisions and inequality in terms of concepts like poverty, deprivation and disadvantage. These terms have been used in relation to the perception that poor or disadvantaged members of society lacked adequate resources with which to achieve acceptable standards of wellbeing and with which to participate in customary activities of society (Townsend, 1979).

Whilst theorists argue about the causes and precise nature of such poverty, there was widespread agreement that, in its extreme manifestations at least, it was socially unacceptable and morally indefensible. Such reasoning helped to tilt most public policy initiatives of states to the provisions of various kinds of relief to the less privileged. However, from the 1990s, a relatively new concept – social exclusion (together with its relatives; social inclusion and social cohesion) took over as the most fashionable term for describing social division.

Theorists of social exclusion stress its multidimensional nature. Social exclusion, they argue, relates not simply to a lack of material resources, but also to matters like inadequate social participation, lack of cultural and educational capital, inadequate access to services and lack of power. It is a theory that tries to capture the powerlessness in modern society rather than simply focusing on one of its outcomes.

Theoretically speaking, the Council of Europe sees social exclusion as a broader concept than poverty, encompassing not only low material means but the inability to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life and in some characterizations alienation and distance from mainstream society (Duffy, 1995). Consequently, this is a term that has been most generally used to refer to persistent and systematic multiple deprivations, as opposed to poverty or disadvantage experienced for short periods of time (Walker, 1997).

The theory captures the concept of exclusion and the process of disempowerment and alienation, whereas other descriptions focus largely on the outcomes of such processes. It highlights the fact that due to certain state actions, some social groups and neighbourhoods have become more detached and alienated from mainstream society. They argue among others that if social rights of citizenship are to be widely achieved, it follows that some reconsideration of equality of opportunity will need to follow.

This theory is deemed fit for our present study because among others, it tends to explain how the feelings of disempowerment and alienation from the center of authority in Nigeria by some groups have led to different types of agitations and thus heightened the call for restructuring in the country.

**Problems associated with the brand of federalism practiced in Nigeria**

Scholars on the Nigerian state and specifically its federal structure have developed a concept to capture the problems that have bedeviled the country's federal practice from beginning to date. That catch-phrase is known as the national question. To a large extent such scholars like Nwabueze (2016) and Dode (2015) agree that there is in general, a national consensus that the type of federalism intended by Nigeria's founding fathers has not been worked out in the country; apart from the brief period that the First Republic lasted (1960-1966). The long years of military rule reinforced centralizing tendencies at the expense of regional/ethnic autonomy. There is no arguing the fact that in the way and manner the military ran the affairs of the country in close to forty years, federalism got the hardest knock. Federalism was virtually annihilated, with the military running the political affairs of the state like a unitary government (absence of devolution of power). This truism has been reflected in the kind of constitutions handed over to and operated by subsequent civilian administrations.

As alluded to above, this was Nigeria which once operated a federal system (1960-1966) that allowed the regions/federating units to retain some measure of autonomy, raise and retain revenues, promote development, and conduct their affairs as they deemed fit; while engaging in healthy competition with one another. Decades after such healthy federal practices, many right-thinking Nigerians are calling for a restructuring and renewal of the federation to make it less centralized, less suffocating and less dictatorial in the way the federating units relate. Many have observed that the current federal structure and practice have been major impediments to the economic and political development of the country. It is noteworthy though that the trend towards centralism in federally constituted nations has been universal for the past three decades. Studies have shown that because of the need for a rational integrated national economic planning,  the need for national economic and social goals to be adequately articulated in each component state of a federation and above all, the need to equip the central government with sufficient powers and resources to enable it reflect and project the image of the nation, most central governments, all over the world confirmed to have encroached increasingly on the domains originally recognized as the spheres of power of the component units (Adebayo, 2001). The

latter however contended that in developed democracies where centralized federalism is operational; such countries have to a large extent succeeded in containing the strains and stresses arising out of this trend as a result of their political culture and centuries of political interaction and experiences. Unfortunately, the reverse has been the case with many developing countries like Nigeria.

Nigeria is currently governed like a unitary state, with the federal government known for the act of issuing instructions to states and having an upper hand over the resources that ought to be domiciled in the federating units. It is a common practice to see the president of the country summon state governors to Abuja for meetings at the shortest notice. The states and local governments, as currently managed are at the mercy of the federal government; hence constantly go cap in hand each month to the federal government for monthly allocation and in the days of President Buhari (2015-2017), bail-out-funds. There exist a lot of deficiencies in the federal constitution which showcases unitary elements. This over centralization of powers constitute one of the major reasons for the clamour/call for Nigeria's political restructuring (Adebayo, 2001). In the current 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the legislative list gives the central government not only exclusive powers on more than 67 items, but also concurrent powers over the rest. The central government has an overriding power to legislate for any part of the federation for peace, order and good governance. The police force is centrally controlled in such a way that the governors are chief security officers in name only. Elections both at the federal and state levels are conducted by a federally controlled and funded electoral umpire (currently INEC). It is in line with such arguments that Chief Joseph Oke (immediate past chairman of Leventis Groups) observed in *The Nation* newspaper (April 20, 2017:30) that:

> The Local Government Council, which is the third tier and closest to the grassroots, is a marginalized government. The interest of all minority groups and the issue of derivation must be addressed. The federation must be restructured to devolve more powers to the states, which must include policing, education, health, road network and security.

These are sentiments and facts that have been shared by a number of analysts to justify their clamour for the restructuring of Nigeria, especially in the area of its federal practice. The general argument therefore is that if a central government has under its control an over concentration of powers (as is the current practice in Nigeria), there is a greater likelihood of abuse and misuse. It is the abuse of the dominant role of the federal government that has led to intensified calls for political restructuring, coupled with suppressed frustrations and resentments during the long years of military rule, resulting in inter-communal violence now threatening national peace and security.

Appropriate compensation for the oil producing states (generally referred to as resource control) has remained a major source of hitting the polity and even threatening the unity of Nigeria, thus making the call for political restructuring imperative. It is worthy of note that one of the paramount causes of the cataclysmic

nature of most African states, especially Nigeria is the fact that the federating units or ethnic blocs never had pre-amalgamation discussions; they were mostly colonial creations intended to satisfy the whims and caprices of the colonialists. It is such reasoning that made authors like McGarry (2004) to insist that federations that get established on voluntary basis are likely to last longer and operate more smoothly than those that were decreed by fiat into existence.

**Calls for political restructuring of Nigeria**

The call for political restructuring in Nigeria is not a new/recent development as there have been demands for it long before 1999. Prior to the fourth republic and persistent calls for political restructuring, there have been demands for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference, promoted by the defunct National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), led by late Chief Anthony Enahoro. The argument of NADECO, among others was that the political dispensation then under the late Head of State, General Sani Abacha and the 1999 constitution were foisted on the country by past military regimes and that made it imperative for the country to start a dialogue on some fundamental flaws that threaten the unity of the state.

It can be recalled that President Olusegun Obasanjo canvassed the above described position when the country faced some challenges with regard to the enforcement of Sharia law by some state governors in the North. Not long after the political crisis which erupted over the Sharia law implementation, Obasanjo gave a tacit backing to the convocation of a national conference to examine pertinent issues confronting the country when it was obvious that the agitation for a confederation was gaining momentum in the South. Obasanjo, though like David-West was averse to the convocation of a sovereign national conference. His argument was that the convocation of a sovereign national conference could portend danger for the country and lead to the dissolution of elected governments as well as the legislature across the country; if that conference is given supreme powers.

In recent times (2015-2017) notable Nigerians have asked President Buhari to commence the implementation of the National Conference Report conducted by the Jonathan administration. Such personalities include: Second Republic Vice President (late); Alex Ekweme, Pan-Yoruba Leader, Ayo Adebanjo, Former Minister of Information, Jerry Gana and former Governors of Anambra State, Chukwuemeka Ezeife and Peter Obi. They argue among others that the implementation of some of the recommendations of that conference will address the myriads of problems confronting Nigeria, noting that the current protests and demands for separation by various groups in the country and other socio-economic crisis could be reduced if the report is considered and implemented. To Ekweme, the six zones structure he recommended was the result of a deep reflection on how to solve Nigeria's problems; especially those of the minorities in the south and north.

To Adebanjo (2016), the origin of true federalism experienced in Nigeria between 1960 and 1966 was traceable to the pre and post-colonial constitutional conferences, which unfortunately was adulterated by the military's incursion into the nation's body politics, hence, destroying the existing constitution. He argued further

that the various incidents of violence in different parts of the country like Niger Delta militancy, religious sectarianism in the north and insurgency in the east (MASSOB and IPOB) would cease if reversal is made to the contents of the 1963 Republican constitution. To this proposal Gana (2016), added his voice by stating the fact that the current posture of the Nigerian federation does not address the fears of the Niger Deltans, MASSOB and IPOB, and does not guarantee peace, equity and justice, hence the urgent need for citizens of the country to agree to sit at a round table and discuss.

Soyinka (2016) joined the fray of patriots calling for the restructuring of the Nigerian federation when he observed that the nation's sovereignty is negotiable. He argues for the decentralization of the country which would ensure healthy rivalry among the component units. He took on Nigeria's past leaders for their non-negotiable stance which to him is diametrically opposed to development. To Soyinka (ThisDay, 2016:14) therefore "the structure of the country is heavily defective, as it does not provide the enabling environment for growth and progress among the 36 component states of the federation." Atiku Abubakar in the same vein opened up vistas of expansion into the almost forgotten issue of the need for the restructuring of the Nigerian federation when he launched a blistering salvo that provided the spark of rekindled interest on the subject matter. In that same edition of ThisDay, Abubakar expressed his views on how Nigeria experienced relative peace when it operated a federal system at independence which allowed the regions to retain their autonomy, raise and retain revenue, promote development, and conduct their affairs as they deemed fit, while engaging in healthy competition with others, hence, his insistence on the need to restructure Nigeria's federation over the years. Abubakar further argued that the present structure and practices it has encouraged have been major impediments to the economic and political development of the country. Surprisingly, he averred that the current structure has served his part of the country (north) well more than the other sections of Nigeria. His recipe? Address the flaws of Nigerian federalism and the rest (economic and security challenges) will be things of the past (ThisDay, 2016:14). It is however sad to observe that when this same Atiku Abubakar served as the Vice President of Nigeria; he never made such a bold call for the restructuring of the federation. Consequently, a number of critiques have argued that his current posture has some political underpinning as he was projecting himself for the presidency, come 2019. He intends through such posture to win the sympathy of sections of the country that are at the fore front of restructuring agitation.

Cognizance should be taken of the fact that the call for restructuring is a result of long years of feelings of injustices and marginalization of sections of Nigeria in a supposed union of federating units meant to be independent and coordinate. Nigeria's federalism in recent decades has run contrary to the postulations of most federalist theories, summarized by Ofoeze (1999), Dode (2015) and others who submit that federalism thrives in states (heterogeneous in composition) where governmental (legislative) powers (responsibilities) are shared through constitutional legal provisions among different levels of coordinate governments. It is not out of place to argue that authentic federal states allow representatives of the countries

national communities to engage in dialogue and bargaining about their interests, grievances and aspirations; these are necessary components of any successful federal practice, which to a large extent have been scarce commodities in Nigerian federal practice over the decades, hence a number of teething problems remain unresolved.

**Previous attempts at political restructuring in Nigeria**

Sequel to the return to civil rule in Nigeria in 1999, the first attempt at national dialogue was organized between April and July, 2005 by former President Olusegun Obasanjo. That dialogue tagged 'National Political Reform Conference' failed to achieve it's set goals as it was reduced to the covert interest of ensuring a third term for the then President. That conference thus ended in a fiasco without recording any tangible result that would have help to solve problems facing the country. President Goodluck Jonathan would later inaugurate the 2014 National Conference, headed by Chief Justice (CJ) Idris Kutigi, with 492 delegates drawn from across the country. That conference broke into 20 committees that included public finance, political restructuring and forms of government and revenue. After five months of national restructuring debate at the National Judicial Institute, (NJI) in Abuja, the conference produced its draft final report. The basic agreement was that the federal system of government should be retained, but there was the need to minimize the fears of marginalization among the minority ethnic groups and the promotion of a broad-based development of the country. The 2014 conference did not foreclose the issue of regional government, preferring rather to have states, creating a self-funding zonal (regions) commission to promote economic development, good governance, equity and security in accordance with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). It proposed a homemade model of government that will effectively combine some essential qualities of the presidential and parliamentary systems of government, code-named modified presidential system. That system would see to a new and inventive idea where the president would select not more than 18 ministers from the six geo-political zones and not more than 30 percent of these were to come from outside the legislature.

That conference equally recommended solutions to many nagging issues, including revenue sharing, two-tier police system, independent candidacy, making chapter II of the extant constitution justifiable, and a ban on state funding of pilgrimage and religious matters (*The Guardian*, 30 September, 2015). The members equally suggested the creation of the Nigeria Charter for National Reconciliation and Integration; aimed at encouraging inclusiveness and the need to build a fully integrated nation. The conference observed that since the post-independence political upheavals, which ended the terms of nationhood entered into by the nation's founding fathers, the diverse nationalities of Nigeria have never had opportunities to formally express their consent to co-exist as one nation. It accepted as worthy of inclusion in the amended constitution, the right to self-determination by the states as federating units and that such rights be extended to ethnic nationalities within the states. Like the first republic practice, the conference recommended that states shall have their respective constitutions and a revenue sharing formula established by law in every

state. Former President Jonathan received the report of the conference and forwarded same to the National Assembly for prompt action, which never saw the light of day till he exited the presidency.

Currently, rather than reassure, these recommendations seem to have further stoked politicians and academics. The situation is now getting precarious and has become a high stake gamble for many, going by the different opinions groups and individuals hold on the nation's sovereignty in recent times. While some analysts call for the implementation of the recommendation of the 2014 conference, the other side of the divide is averse to it, fearing that it may mean an approval for the balkanization of Nigeria. Under the Buhari Presidency, the issue of restructuring the nation seems to be overshadowing talks on the economic hardship Nigerians are going through, the anti-corruption fight and the plethora of problems confronting Nigeria. It is also causing distraught among citizens who participated in the conference and the expression of enthusiasm generated by President Buhari during the 2015 electioneering campaign is fading. He promised to look into the report and implement the good aspects of it that would help move the country forward. But shortly after assuming power, President Buhari sent words to the militants in the Niger Delta region and IPOB in the East that Nigeria's unity is not negotiable. As a follow up, IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu and a number of his followers were hauled into different prisons in the country on trumped up charge of treasonable felony.

**Restructuring, a prognosis for peaceful co-existence in Nigeria**

The peace, unity and harmony that have long eluded the Nigerian state may possibly be achieved if the call for restructuring the polity that will be beneficial, all-inclusive and all-encompassing is carried out. Such a restructuring must take into account the prevailing conditions and give relevant segments of the country the opportunity to dialogue, negotiate and ventilate views, aspirations, fears and challenges. Nigeria is not the first to travel this tortuous road it currently finds itself; India, Brazil, Ethiopia and Eritrea practice federalism and are passing through or passed through such rough roads. Hence, in restructuring its federal practice, Nigeria can learn some lessons from these and other advanced democracies.

In his comparative studies of federalism, Dode (2015) believes that there are great lessons Nigeria can learn on how these countries surmounted their challenges to become reference points of federal formations that are advancing. He observes among others that a country like India had its federation established by the 1935 Act (colonial imposition), just like Nigeria was to experience in 1954. These federal structures did not emerge out of federal sentiments or as a result of compact or agreement between existing states. Studies however show to a large extent that India has developed a robust federalism that accommodates all shades of opinion because of the sincere and selfless posture of its leaders and the fact that no federating unit imposes itself on the other. This, among other measures has helped diverse groups in India to express their aspirations and resolve conflicts and tensions within a diverse society. Nigeria seems to have missed out of this federal recipe; issues pertaining to the national question are treated with kid gloves and in some cases politicized or

trivialized. The Ethiopian federal constitution assigns extensive powers to regional states to establish their style of government and democracy. The rights to secede, which the leaders of Nigeria will never give ears to, talk more of permit as an agenda in a national discourse, is enshrined in Article 39 of the Indian constitution. This provision was inserted to allay the fears of groups, especially the minority over marginalization. Such clause gives the states the feeling of being recognized as tangible stakeholders in the affairs of their collective common wealth. On the contrary, in Nigeria, the most important items (over 66) bearing enormous powers on the legislative list (as enshrined in the constitution) are bestowed on the federal government, thus making it too powerful. The implication has always been that whenever the federal government sneezes, the counter reaction will be that the states catch cold. This has made Nigeria's federal government appear like a leviathan, behemoth or an octopus.

Political restructuring would go a long way to correct this imbalance of power equation in a supposed federalist structure. Federations are expected to be created in a way that none of the federating units is larger or has advantage over the others in any form. The case of Nigeria is however a different kettle of fish. The observable trend is that Nigeria is defectively structured in a manner that the North is bigger than the West, East and South put together both in landmass and population. The implication is that the North has dominated and continue to further dominate national affairs, have more elective and appointive positions and receive the greatest share of national resources, among others. It is therefore noteworthy that until this anomaly is addressed through genuine, *quid pro quo* like dialogue, the fear of marginalization and other teething issues threatening the corporate existence of the country will remain unresolved.

It can be recalled that the creation of the 12 states structure by the Yakubu Gowon led military junta in 1967 and subsequent increases that brought the number to the current 36 states in the 1990s replaced the federal concept of coordinate and independent relationship between the centre and federating units to that of superior-inferior or master-servant. This has remained unchanged as the power equation (configuration) highly favours the federal government thus leading to incidents of tension, rivalry, acrimony and unhealthy relationship in the body polity. This unitary-like formation negates the basic principles and pillars of federalism; excludes some federating units from mainstream politics and development. Such practice, in the words of Anam-Ndu (1998) results in an impoverish leadership and governance type. Concentrating enormous legislative, executive and judicial authorities in the government at the centre has affected political integration. There is therefore need for discussions to re-align power distribution to reflect 'true' federalism. After all, democracy is largely about the people being in charge of their lives, being able to take charge of their resources, making power flow from them and not the other way round.

Nigeria's constitution is deeply in need of a holistic review to reflect the peoples' wishes and aspirations. It is unequivocally a military imposition with its unitary-like structure. The present constitution contains provisions that make it

stumbling block for democracy to be consolidated. It must be reviewed to among others, reflect the nature of change of relationship between the states and their citizens, where issues of political autonomy and control over local resources by the federating units are explicitly entrenched. The making of such ground norms must not be left in the hands of the National Assembly alone. The process must include all relevant stakeholders at a suitable forum and such constitution must be seen to address issues that threaten the peace and togetherness of Nigeria. Let it be known that mere constitutional amendment of some sections of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria will not usher in the desirable restructuring that would move the country forward. The present crop of political leaders lack the political will to do the needful with regard to radical steps aimed at amending the past anomalies.

A refashioned federal practice in Nigeria may bring back healthy competition and development. The current practice breeds hatred, distrust and competition of struggle for power and control of resources at the centre. There are indeed great lessons for Nigeria to learn from the federal structure of United States of America. The political structure of that country was settled early in the intense debates before its constitution (federalist papers) was ratified to reflect their collective will. The debates over the merits of federalism and confederalism engaged the convention delegates for long before they finally settled for federalism which took effect from 1789, with the Bill of Rights enacted as compromise to protect the liberty of citizens. States' rights were recognized.

The founding fathers of American federalism placed limits on the powers of the federal government, and state and federal governments were given dual spheres of authority. Each state in the USA has its own constitution, state anthem, symbols and other paraphernalia of governance. States are largely in control of natural resources (minerals) located and taped within their boundaries and on the basis of the revenue that accrue therefrom, (extraction tax on minerals mined by private companies), some states like Texas, choose not to subject their citizens to residents' state tax. The aforementioned describes how heterogeneity works and diversity benefits the entire American federation (hence from 13 initial colonies, it now boasts of 52 states – centripetal forces at play). This is in contrast to Nigeria's centrifugal forces which have been dominant in its political structure since 1966 when the military chose to fix the challenges of leadership with a change of the existing structure. Nigeria's federalism must be restructured like that of the USA to prioritize the autonomy of states on many governance issues; such step is likely to fuel socio-political and economic progress in the country. Among others, it is noteworthy that in the USA, the governor is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of his/her state, hence in charge of the state security, among other weighty responsibilities. Unlike in Nigeria, the governor in America appoints the Police Chief who hires his/her team (NYPD as an example). The governor determines the size of civil service the state needs, and based on the size of its economy, the state determines the minimum wage for its workers.

It will amount to an unempirical fact to state that the American system is 100% conflict proof. Surely, there are incidental tensions in the federal and state relationship and times there are when the United States federal government attempts

to overreach and the states resist with law suits. There are also incidents when states try to play fast with regulations that affect their minority populations especially in matters of voting rights. In such cases, the federal government, especially one that was headed by a progressive president, may seek to intervene to make things right, usually by approaching the courts. The basic reality about the states that make up the USA is that they are all viable entities on their own, and their residents, especially the voting population challenge their government on the need to be effective.

Finally, there is need to entrench a political culture that is dependent on the realities of modern states that can protect the rights of their citizens and extract duties from them (*quid pro quo*). Such a culture must reflect norms and values that place premium on the individual-freedom from state abuse and infringement of the rights of others. There must be guaranty of equality before the law as well as provision of opportunities for all citizens to have equal access to the material resources that guarantee their basic livelihood. The true essence of any democratic state is that citizens must be allowed to ventilate their views through unrestrained debates at all levels (federal, state and local) and that there should be active citizens' participation in governance as well as unrestricted communication between government and the governed. Fact remains that viability of states makes the difference in federal practices. In Nigeria, over 80% of the states are no more than glorified municipal counties that cannot survive three months without the monthly subvention from the Federation Account. Political restructuring could correct this imbalance. There may be need for geopolitical restructuring to allow for more viable constituent entities in the federation.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper demonstrated in unequivocal terms that although democracy has come to stay in Nigeria, much still needs to be desired; while the nation may have left 'Egypt', it has not reached the much anticipated 'promised land'. The structures that run the federal state are not only faulty but are not firm and deep rooted. Nigerian leaders (past and present) seem not to understand the dialectics of leadership and they tend to behave as if all is well with Nigeria's ship of state which though has remained in a permanent state of flux (wobble). Hence, citizens and groups that clamour for (sovereign) national conference or political restructuring of Nigeria are not far from realities on ground, while the political leaders are playing the ostrich. It is now more expedient than ever that Nigeria's federating units need to freely discuss the basis of the country's continuous existence.

- The forced marriage put in place by Lord Frederick Lugard in 1914 needs to be revisited and other critical issues of national import straightened up.
- There is need to develop and introduce a new practice of dialogue and negotiation, inclusiveness and tolerance so that no group is left behind to feel cheated or marginalized.
- The mutual suspicion and fears of domination by ethnic minorities should be addressed while the age long issue of resource control will be rested.

- The envisaged political restructuring must lead to decentralization of power at the centre and empowerment of the federating units to reflect 'true' federalism.
- The aspects of exclusivity in the country's federal structure clamoured against by groups like the IPOB and Niger Delta militants must be sincerely attended to.
- There is the need to fashion out a more acceptable and homegrown form of government in Nigeria as has been the case in countries like India, Ethiopia and Brazil.

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# Herdsmen-Farmers Contention and Sustainable National Security in Nigeria

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## Abstract

*Security of lives and property is the primary responsibility of every government. The Governments in Nigeria have demonstrated concern in guaranteeing security, but the nation is still confronted with new myriads of security challenges ranging from political violence, kidnapping, cybercrime, bunkering and herdsmen-contention. The herdsmen-farmers' contention has become deadliest and dispersed in Nigeria, thereby posing provocative challenges due to its guerilla phenomenon. Contending security challenge of this kind is hectic, but the security of a nation is predicated on two central pillars, namely: the maintenance and protection of the socio-economic order in the face of internal and external threat; and the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimizes the threat to core values and interests, as well as domestic order. This paper leans on this to argue that, 57 per cent of the 3,641 recorded deaths that occurred in 2018 is linked to the trend and dimensions of farmers-herdsmen conflicts. The study explored the effects of herdsmen /farmers clashes on National security. The research relied on existing information on violence, herders/farmers clashes among others and used the State failure theory to attribute herders-farmers' contention to the poor, inadequate and political response to the security of lives and property by Nigerian State. The study recommends the development of a balanced security strategy driven from national trust rather than political correctness in responding to the criminality of the conflict. It further indorses combination of methods that would ensure communication and interactive networks among stakeholders to arrest, disarm and prosecute suspects of violent crimes, as well as track their information and resource mobility flow by using advance technology apparatuses that can help locate their sponsors, intelligent power houses and systems.*
**Keywords:** Herdsmen/Farmers clashes, Security, National Security, Government, Failure

## Introduction

In recent times, Nigeria has witnessed increased violent conflicts ranging from ethno-religious, to insurgency and herdsmen/farmers clashes which are posing serious challenges to the country's polity. These herdsmen/farmers clashes have led to the destruction of lives and properties perpetuated an unbearable level of internally displaced persons with severe humanitarian crisis. According to Gambari *et al* (2018), "the pastoralists/farmers' conflicts in Nigeria have grown, spread and intensified over

the past decade and today pose a threat to national survival. Thousands of people have been killed, communities have been destroyed and so many farmers and pastoralists have lost their lives and properties in an extended orgy of killings and destruction that are not only destroying livelihoods but also affecting national cohesion…" It is contended that increasing clashes have become worrisome, especially in the Middle Belt and North Central Nigeria, not leaving out Delta, Kogi, Ekiti, Cross River, Akwa Ibom among others. While some Nigerians have blamed the continuation of these clashes which took a very disturbing turn since early 1990s on the poor and inadequate response to the security of lives and property by the government, others blame it on politicians whom they say have cashed in on land use conflicts to feather their nests. For example, in Mambilla Plateau of Taraba state, herdsmen and farmers have lived peacefully together for centuries. There was never a history of any clash between the neighbors until around the years 2001 and 2002, and both crises are believed to have been politically motivated (Abdulrahman, 2018).

It is worthy of note that, the increase in Nigeria's population has led to a need for much greater use of lands, especially for food production and this has ensured a considerable increase in natural resource conflicts since the early 1990s. Abdulrahman (2018) contended that the need to handle the scarcity of such facilities necessitated the introduction of the Fadama projects in the early 90s to support traditional small-scale farmers. The idea was to promote low cost technology for irrigation under the World Bank financing. The Fadama cultivation was promoted throughout the northern region. The expansion of the project coincided with large-scale urbanization and a growing demand for horticultural products in all regions. This ensured various types of dry season cultivation in many states and ultimately set the stage for the recurring farmers and herders clashes. The farmers usually desperate to meet the growing demand for food items in growing urban centers and to feed their families took up more of the riverbanks to farm. Doing this meant they encountered struggles with the other users, especially the herdsmen and even the marginal fishermen. The herdsmen frustration and hostility came mostly from finding the grazing routes and access to watering points covered by tomatoes, cucumbers, vegetables and other crops planted by the farmers. This led to misunderstanding and clashes leading to loss of lives and property.

It is the argument of this paper, that the resources available to cater for the rising need of the Nigerian people have been grossly misappropriated by government officials and those directly involved in development projects with regards to management and implementation, leaving a large group of people with little or no resources to cater for their livelihood. The need to source for facilities like pastures for their cattle has informed the desperate search across the country, and this has been met by desperate measures to protect individual properties especially in times when the country is in recession and majority of the people live below 1 dollar a day. No doubt, the aggressive search of greener pastures for their cattle by the Fulani herdsmen has provoked frustration from the crop farmers whose livelihood also depends on their farm produce. This has produced severe aggressive situations leaving hundreds of people dead across the country. The incessant killings and

wanton destruction of property across the country as a result of these informed this research work. This situation has ensured the use of weapons by supposed herdsmen against farmers. It has been exacerbated by political actors who have consistently ensured massive smuggling and use of arms and ammunition and has turn the low-keyed herdsmen/farmers clashes in the early days to deadly clashes since 1999. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of these clashes on national security.

## Methodology

The study adopted basically qualitative research design and adopts descriptive analysis to provide inside into the effects of herdsmen/farmers clashes on National security. It drew its information from secondary sources mainly newspapers, academic journals, internet sources, official government publications, meanwhile several articles where consulted on the subject matter in order to minimize error.

## Conceptualization and Theoretical Underpinning

In order to avoid ambiguity in interpretations of concepts, major concepts used in the study are specified with the intent to facilitate their context. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, pp.10-11) "we specify why we use particular terms for the purpose of facilitating their contextual definition and comprehension".

## Security

Security is one of the core values of every nation and it is given utmost attention. However, this concept has attracted divergent views from scholars in the field. The neo-liberalists maintain that security is a primary responsibility of the state as against the postmodernists who see security as the responsibility of the non-state actors and displaces the state as a major provider of security. Arguing that security embraces all measures of design to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the resources of individuals, groups, businesses and the nation against sabotage, or violent occurrences, they maintain that the government should be more concerned with the economic security of individuals than the security of the state because the root causes of insecurity is economic in nature (Ogunleye, *et al*, 2011).

According to the United Nations Development Program (1994) human security refers to the protection from hidden and hurtful disruptions in the daily activities, at home, offices or communities. That is, it is the state of being safe and secured from danger. According to Igbuzor (2011); Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013); Olabanji and Ese (2014,), security is the absence of threat to peace, stability, national cohesion, political and economic objectives of a country.

However, in the Nigeria context, Omoyibo and Akpomera (2012, pp. 132-142) argue that security is synonymous to an individual who put iron bars across his or her windows which eventually prevents the individual from escaping a fire outbreak. For them the only condition for the maintenance of peace and the guarantee of security is by upholding law and order. By this, the state could be secured against

threats which may include crime, organized violence, or armed insurgency (El-Rufai, 2012).

**National Security**

In every democratic society, the need to ensure law and order as well as guarantee the general safety of the citizenry is imperative. Therefore, Nwolise (2007) opines that security is "relative freedom from war coupled with relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur. On the same note, Nwolise (2007) states that security refers to safety, freedom from danger or risk, protection from espionage, infiltration, sabotage, theft etc. On this note, national security can therefore be defined as the measures, methods, facilities and mechanisms put in place by a state or nation to secure its citizens and resources from attacks, dangers, and infiltrations. Corroborating these positions, Paleri, (2008) argues that National Security is the measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multidimensional threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, that can be indexed by computation, empirically or otherwise and is extendable to global security by external variables.

**Theoretical perspective**

In Political Science, where perspectives differ, a plethora of theories could be used to explain the unabated crisis of herders-farmers' contention across the country. Some theoretical explanations to this crisis include the relational vengeance theory, the frustration aggression theory, and conflict theory. However, this study has a different view, it situates it arguments within the theory of Government Failure. The theory builds on the work of the public choice school concerning the behaviour of governments under the assumption that all relevant agents pursue their self-interest. It examines the theoretical consequences for efficiency and equity of three kinds of government activity: provision, subsidy and regulation (Le-Grand, 1991). Wolf (1988) identifies four reasons why government institutions with self-interested agents may fail in a fashion that parallels market failure. The first three of these are concerned with efficiency: 'disjunction between costs and revenues', 'internalities and organizational goals', 'derived externalities'. The fourth is 'distributional inequity'.

From the postulations, the unending herders-farmers' contention revolves on the failure of government interventions to the needs of provision, subsidization and regulation of the parties in the conflict. The inefficiency and inadequacy of Governments in Nigeria in responding to the challenges including protection of both parties as well as prosecuting the erring groups or individuals responsible for the criminalities and violence associated with the conflicts account for the '57 per cent of the 3,641 recorded deaths that occurred in 2018 which is linked to the trend and dimensions of farmers-herdsmen conflicts (Amnesty International Nigeria Report, 2018. The records of death and escalations of the conflict as the theory expounds is linked to the disjunction in cost and results of government strategies and tactics. In this regard, the government investment in security operatives and other agencies is

obviously ineffective to the extent that the conflict is fast becoming intractable because of derived externalities. Derived externalities refer to sponsors of the parties in conflict, especially outside government circles and by extension outside of Nigeria. The choice of this theory is further informed by 'internal contradictions of Nigerian state that undermine the organizational goals and capacities of Nigerian security apparatus in controlling violent crimes. Such contradictions include regulation and provision technological infrastructure for combatting internal insecurity. Also the prevalence of distributional inequalities in budget and release of fund add to government's failure in resolving herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria ensuring that the government's investment in security operatives and other agencies is obviously ineffective.

**Overview of the Herdsmen/Farmers Conflicts in Nigeria**
Historically Fulani pastoralists have grazed in lands around the arid and Sahel regions of West Africa partly because of the environmental conditions that limit the amount of land for agricultural purposes leading to less intense competition for land between farmers and herders. However, after recurrent droughts in the arid and Sahel regions, Fulani pastoralists have gradually moved southwards to the Guinea Savana and the tropical forest areas resulting in competition for grazing routes with farmers and they started migrating into Northern Nigeria from the Senegambia, 13th-14th centuries. After the Uthman Dan Fodio jihad, the Fulani became integrated into the Hausa culture of Northern Nigeria (Tonah, 2002, pp.43-59). During this time, many of the low-lying areas next to rivers in Nigeria were hardly used by farmers because of diseases like river blindness and malaria. Another is the problem of erosion peculiar to these riverine areas. These areas instead were mainly used for grazing by nomadic herders and fishermen. Further, during the dry season when tsetse fly population is reduced, Fulani pastoralists began to drive their cattle into the middle belt zone dominated by Non-Hausa groups and they return to the north at the onset of the rainy season. But while managing the herd and driving cattle, cattle grazing on farmlands sometimes occur leading to destruction of crops and becoming a source of conflict.

However, there has been continues growth in Nigeria's population from 33 million in 1950 to about 192.3 million in 2017. This phenomenal increase of the population has put enormous pressure on land and water resources used by farmers and pastoralists especially as the need for food production increases with the ever-growing population. The implication of this has been the blockage of transhumance routes and loss of grazing land to agricultural expansion, while the increased southward movement of pastoralists has led to increased conflicts with local communities. The government in its efforts to curb these crisis implemented the land use act of 1978 which gave the state or federal government the right to assign and lease land and also gave indigenes the right to apply and be given a certificate of occupancy to claim ownership of their ancestral lands (Okello, & Mejekodunmi, 2014) This placed the pastoral Fulani in a difficult position because most did not apply for lands of occupancy of their grazing routes and recurring transhumance movement will lead to encroachment on the properties of others. The Nigeria

government designed some areas as grazing routes but this has not stopped the clashes.

According to Oladesu (2018) herdsmen usually conducted themselves in a peaceful manner, tried to fraternize with host communities when on their pastoralist business. They never carried AK47 Rifles and cases of cattle rustling were not rampant. He further stated that there were no strife, rancor and acrimony, and when quarrels ensued between herdsmen and farmers, following the occasional destruction of crops and farm lands by cattle, the misunderstanding was usually resolved amicably. But in recent times, herders/farmers' violence has killed thousands of people and displaced tens of thousands more. It followed a trend in the increase of farmer-herder conflicts throughout much of the western Sahel, due to an expansion of agriculturist population and cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands; deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification and soil degradation; breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small arms and crime in rural areas.

From 1996 to 2006 about 121 people lost their lives in Bauchi and Gombe States as a result of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers (Abbas, 2014) According to the Terrorism index (cited in Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), Fulani militants are the fourth deadliest terrorist group in 2014, using machine guns and attacks on villages to assault and intimidate farmers, after killing around 80 people in total from 2010 to 2013, they killed 1,229 in 2014. The states of Benue, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Plateau and Taraba, recorded 847 deaths. The state of Zamfara, recorded 229 deaths. In addition to terrorist attacks, Fulani militants were also involved in non-state armed conflicts with groups from Eggon, Jukun and Tiv farming communities and these conflicts resulted in 712 deaths. The year 2016 saw further incidents in Agatu, Benue and Nimbo, Enugu State (Morning Star News, 2016; Thandiubani, 2016). Most recently are the deadly attacks in Benue, Taraba and Ekitti States which left hundreds of deaths from both farmers and herders. According to Omawumi, (2016) in 2014 herdsmen opened fire on community leaders and residents that were meeting in Galadima village and killed 200 people and an unknown number were injured in the attack. Further, 5 persons were killed by Fulani herdsmen at Okokolo village in Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State. Same year, about 500 persons were killed by herdsmen following a siege on Agatu local government area of Benue state. These communities include; Aila, Akwu, Adagbo, Okokolo, Ugboju, Odugbeho, Ogbaulu, Egba and Obagaji. He also stated that herdsmen attacked two villages in Gashaka Local Government Area of Taraba state on and killed 15 people. He maintained further that, on 19th April, 2016, twenty-five local government areas in Delta State grounded activities on the Benin-Asaba Expressway. They reported that the herdsmen allegedly killed over 23 persons. Interestingly, the police recovered 20 AK-47 rifles, 70 dane guns, 30 double-barrel guns and over 1,000 live ammunition, mostly from Fulani herdsmen during this period. While attacks on seven villages in Enugu State left about 40 persons y killed. And in June 20th, 2016, at Least 59 Deaths in recent attacks on Benue communities such as Ugondo, Turan, Gabo Nenzev while attacks in June 2016 in Ossissa

community Delta state and three communities (Ugondo, Turan, Gabo Nenzev) Benue State,with total killings no fewer than 60 persons.

According to Abdulrahman (2018), as violence between herdsmen and farmers grows, it leads to the development of criminality and rural banditry; popular narratives in the form of hate speeches have exacerbated the crisis. An example is the Zaki Biam killing that took place on 20th March 2017 in Benue State. The initial report was that "herdsmen" perpetuated the mass killing of the people of the town. The police however later reported after investigation that armed gangs led by the wanted militia leader, Terwase Agwaza, carried out the act.

**Some Efforts at Handling Herdsmen/Farmers since 1990s**

The government has made several efforts at curbing the herdsmen/farmers clashes in Nigeria since the upward trend of such clashes in 1990s. Some of the efforts include; the creation of commissions by the Federal government to investigate and find comprehensive solutions for the herdsmen/farmers crisis in the country. There was the presidential peace initiative committee in 2002, the Federal Administrative Panel of Inquiry in 2008, the Federal Advisory Committee in 2010, post advisory committees on security challenges in 2012 and so many others. However, successive Governments failed to implement any of the recommendations by the panels of inquiry set up to investigate previous crises (Abdulrahman, 2018). Meanwhile following the recent killings of farmers by herdsmen the proposal of Federal Government in 2016 to establish ranches as a solution to the problem has been revisited. According to Falana (2018) the official negligence of the federal government cannot be justified because, as far back as May 2016, the authorities in Abuja had rightly decided to establish ranches in line with modern practice in civilized countries. The plan was announced by the Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Chief Audu Ogbeh at a public hearing organized by the Senate Committees on Agriculture, and National Security and Intelligence on May 3, 2016. On that occasion, the Minister of State, Agriculture, Honourable Heineken Lokpobiri, who represented Chief Audu Ogbe said that as a result of climate change resulting from global warming and desertification, herdsmen had no option than to migrate southwards to find pastures for their animals, which now faced starvation in the North. Mr. Lokpobiri pointed out that nomadic cattle rearing had become obsolete and this was why ranches were a necessity to provide adequate food to the cattle and forestall unnecessary clashes. He further said that with ranches, the livestock would be healthier, more productive, while the herdsmen would avoid unnecessary attacks and would also be able to give their children opportunity to be educated (Falana, 2018).

Further, Ogbe justified the decision to establish ranches across the country during the National Summit of Traditional Rulers in Nigeria. In his address at the summit, he stated that

> Either way, ranches will not be established on lands extracted from communities, people have to farm in the ranches. In some parts of the North, some governors have given as much as 5,000 hectares of land,

some even 10,000 hectares. Our job is to bring the right kind of crops, do the right kind of water source and provide veterinary services because some of these cows have some disease issues. We cannot afford to allow cows and human beings mix the way they are doing now. The essence is to stop the crisis. Too many people have died, there is too much violence in the land, and we cannot go on like that. We cannot boast to the rest of the world that we thrive in killing each other it is not right (Ogbeh, 2018).

However, though ranching is top in world best practices of cattle breeding, others have proposed the establishment of cattle colonies and grazing reserves. With each argument gaining grounds the underlying issue is the large quantity of land needed to carry out these methods of pastoral activities cannot be sourced without infringing on the rights of some Nigerians. In line with the government's non commitment to effectively handle the crisis, Falana quoted the Minister of Agriculture Chief Ogbe in an extensive interview published in the May 4, 2016 edition of the Vanguard newspaper as having said "The army, the police should find them wherever they are now and take the guns from them as the first step. They carry AK47s on their necks, they tie them around the bellies of the cows, and they must be disarmed immediately. But since the federal government has neither established the ranches nor disarmed the herdsmen the reign of terror has continued in Benue, Taraba and many other states in the country.

**Implications of Herdsmen/Farmers clashes on National Security**

According to Toyi (2018), as the war against Boko Haram makes appreciable progress, another menace of a different kind, but with an equally potent capability to cold-heartedly waste human lives sets in "the vicious herdsmen, they have unleashed mayhem on various communities ranging from Agatu in Benue State, Akure in Ondo State, Bukuru area in Plateau State, Oke Ogun area in Oyo State, Gassaka and Bali local government areas in Taraba State to Nimbo in Enugu State." He further stated that "everywhere they go, sorrow, tears and blood trail them, that, they operate in such audacious fashion that makes mockery of national security arrangement (Toyi, 2018). The inability of the government to disarm the herdsmen has left majority of Nigerians wondering about the Government's level of commitment to peace. The evidence to show that the security measures put in place by government has not shown reasonable commitment to disarm the herdsmen as well as secure lives and property in affected communities, is demonstrated in the inability to adopt a policy that would address the present situation. Debates are ongoing as to which method of cattle breeding would be adopted ranging from grazing reserves, cattle colonies or ranching all of which seem to be rejected by some stakeholders, while killings are ongoing in some parts of the country. The unity of the country is threatened by the continuous destruction of lives and properties by herdsmen across the country. This has created a situation where suspicion, fear and hatred strive for a particular ethnic group or groups. Inter-ethnic distrust especially against the nomadic Fulani herdsmen

has ensured ethnic determination, persistent religious crisis and a spade of violent and deadly activities by the herdsmen. These factors have greatly undermined national cohesion thereby enabling the persistent call for a review of the country's federal status. This position is however corroborated by (Asogwa and Okafor, 2016 pp.22-37) who maintained that presently the country's geo-political landscape has been overwhelmed by a new dimension of tension and conflict as evidenced by the escalating deadly and fatal conflicts between nomadic Fulani cattle herders and farmers. valuable resources meant to address other national issues are directed at handling herdsmen/farmers clashes. A situation which ensures a continues increase of security budget leaving other sectors with little resources that loss of lives and property. The implications of this crisis on national security cannot be overemphasized. The nature of herdsmen activities in Nigeria has given rise to a "dangerous group of actors", who have gained significant relevance. This no doubt has led to massive smuggling and use of arms and ammunition which they use for the purpose of achieving their goals and desires. What is worthy of note here is the fact that these herdsmen who are in possession of these arms and ammunitions are well trained on how to use them and the government has not committed itself to disarming them. The resultant effect of this is that a portion of men are being armed, while farmers, local community members are intimidated or killed out rightly at the slightest provocation by these armed men, thereby revealing that there is considerable portion of illegal arms into the hands of unauthorized persons, who use them to commit crimes against humanity within the country. This no doubt has left communities and individuals with no option than to organize their own security outlets and outfits and manage available options within their communities and this has led to the creation of community-based militia groups or vigilante groups. National security is undermined as individuals and groups take their chances in securing lives and properties. In the absence of state protection, offshoots of regional and ethnic based militia are on the increase and this leaves the government in a perpetual state of searching for strategies to manage its multi-dimensional security challenges. It is the submission of this paper that some of these crimes if not properly handled would manifest in the rise of another insurgent group in Nigeria, while the government struggles to expunge the already existing deadly group- Boko Haram. There is no doubt that the violent clashes between herdsmen/farmers have instituted fear, distrust and suspicion among Nigerians especially against a particular ethnic group - Fulani people. This does not only destroy development structures, it destroys the very foundation of unity which the country relies on for its existence, given its diverse nature. It is argued here in that this crisis is capable of plunging the country into more chaos or total anarchy or lawlessness as a result of wanton deaths and destruction of private and public properties especially as the situation has led to the perception of high level of insecurity in the country. The implication on national security is overwhelmingly despicable. This has displayed itself in the massive displacement of persons who most times are forced to migrate to other places as refugees. Others who have lost their means of livelihood become frustrated and are violent at the slightest provocation, or open to criminal activities leaving as a result, a

large number of citizens have lost faith in the government as the activities of the herdsmen across the country have undermined the government's capability to protect the lives and property of its citizen.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

In order to curb the incessant killings of innocent Nigerians, arising from herdsmen/farmers clashes, political actors, stake holders and other concerned must be prepared to close up and work together aside internal contradictions and differences to adopt sustainable and global best practice in handling the crisis of herders-farmers conflict which hinges on cattle ranches. Tracing the root causes of the crisis, the rampant open grazing farming by herdsmen is identified as a major cause with far reaching consequences, as well as the quest for territorial space. It is argued in the study that, this method of cattle breeding destroys farmers' crops and farmlands, and this leads to disagreement between farmers/herdsmen resulting in serious confrontations, leaving several people dead, destruction of food bands and homelessness of community members who flee their lands for safety, as well as killings of herdsmen and cows. The persistence of this crisis in recent times, have showcase the weakness of the government in handling such crisis given its monopoly of the forces of coercion and diplomatic apparatuses. However, it is revealed in the study that some of the herdsmen who accompany the cows are armed as seen in Falana's quotation from the Minister's interview. It is worthy of note that some states have taken pro-active measures to stem open grazing in their territories like instituting the Anti- Open Grazing Law. Benue, Taraba and Ekiti are Pivotal, due to the exposition of the government's inability to respond rapidly to the needs of people. However, the implication of these incessant killings on national security has been enormous. The inability of the Federal Government to establish ranches as it announced, and also stated that it was determined to disarm the herdsmen reveals its non-commitment to handle the crisis.

Drawing from the experiences of countries like Botswana which is the largest producer and exporter of meat in Africa, with 2.2 million people and a cattle population of over 3 million has successfully stopped violent clashes between farmers and cattle herdsmen by establishing ranches. It is therefore reaffirmed that there is need for the immediate establishment of ranches, and that the armed herdsmen be disarmed by the federal government. With ranches and abattoirs established in a few states, meat would be prepared in large scale and distributed throughout the country and possibly exported. This will go a long way to ensure peaceful coexistence among Nigerians and the Fulani people who are already stigmatized by ethnic profiling of the entire Fulani race, accusing them of undertaking an ethnic cleansing agenda against Nigerians as a result of the recent clashes between farmers and herdsmen.

Secondly, it is imperative that the Federal Government reviews the border patrol system of the country, by providing more security personnel, deployment of new technological facilities that will aid the immigration and other security agents to verify and admit any foreign herders entering the country. This comes with the President's statement that some of the herdsmen causing havoc are not Nigerians.

This position is supported by Achumba et all (2013 p) who opined that the porous frontiers of the country, where individual movements are largely unchecked have contributed to the level of insecurity in Nigeria. As a result of the porous border, there is an unchecked inflow of small Arms and Light Weapons into the country which has aided militancy and criminality in Nigeria. The ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol of 1998 and the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement of Goods and Persons in West Africa also need to be reviewed.  Both acts allow herders access to designated stock routes and grazing lands/reserves through the West African countries. The review should be put in place to include world best practices of cattle breeding like ranching, in addition to identify new routes and away from the routes that have already been turned farmlands.

Thirdly, the efforts of states in the North like Kano who have offered lands for grazing reserves, the opportunity should be exploited. The compensation of the victims of these clashes who have lost their lives and properties should be taken seriously because most times it aids in the healing process. It is therefore imperative to create special tribunals to investigate, prosecute offenders and compensate victims. The study further endorses combination of methods that would ensure communication and interactive networks among stakeholders to arrest, disarm and prosecute suspects of violent crimes, as well as track their information and resource mobility flow by using advance technology apparatuses that can help locate their sponsors, intelligent power houses and systems.

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